Seems to me there are so many intense personal takes on phenomenology that no two devotees seem to agree as to what it is and how it works. — Tom Storm

This should not be a surprise. They ask us to retreat into our inner private sanctum with the hope of emerging with all sorts of revelations to be shared. But the language they use is borrowed from the public realm, so if you to try to clarify, your are left with a feeling of wonder, puzzlement or suspension depending on your natural inclinations.

Okay! I can't help but argue though. — Constance

Ok, why are you arguing when you should be bracketing. Why are you trying to convince someone, when you should be detecting the pure presence of phenomena.

Thanks for minimizing the philosophical jargon, this helps to improve the dialogue.

When you face the world with understanding, it is not that the world is sitting there telling you what it is. — Constance

Not exactly, another human being is part of this world and they can tell me who they think they are.

What makes the world the world is your history of experiences, and this is what separates your world from a "blooming and buzzing" infant's world. But if it is education that informs the understanding, then how is it that the this education can ever access the "out there" of the world as it really is, given that the understanding is all about this stream of recollection? Sure, there is something before me, a tree or a couch, but isn't this recognition of what these are just the occasion for memories to be brought to bear in the specific occasion, and the palpable things of the world in their "really what they are" ness just an impossible concept; impossible because to have it as an an object at all is to be beheld AS a kind of regionalized set of memories, you know, memories about couches kick the moment you see a couch and there is no "in between" time to catch the couch in all its "pure presence". — Constance

I do not share your causal commitment here. We don't have a world because I have memories of it, but I have memories of it because there is a world.

I don't find there is much sense or value talking about "out there" of the world as it really is. If Husserl came to this concern through thinking of the metaphysical implications of illusions or hallucinations, I am not sympathetic to this worry. Talk about "real" loses its meaning because those who theorize never put forward what we are suppose to confirm, verify, detect to determine what it real and what is not. As for its value, I think CS Peirce said it best when he ask readers what would be wrong with a metaphysical theory that claimed a diamond is actually soft, and only becomes hard when it is touched. "Peirce argued that there is "no falsity" in such thinking, for there is no way of proving it. However, he claimed that the meaning of a concept is derived from the object that the concept relates to and the effects it has on our senses. Whether we think of the diamond as "soft until touched" or "always hard" before our experience, therefore, is irrelevant. Under both theories the diamond feels the same, and can be used in exactly the same way. However, the first theory is far more difficult to work with, and so is of less value to us." (from The Philosophy Book, Big Ideas Simply Explained)

But it goes directly to the issue of ineffability, for what is really on the table here is whether it makes sense to talk like this at all. — Constance

And yes, it makes sense to talk about the table, its shape, size, color, etc and to doubt the sense and value of such talk is foolhardy.

memories about couches kick the moment you see a couch and there is no "in between" time to catch the couch in all its "pure presence". — Constance

Just because I name that object "couch" and a teach a child to call that object a "couch" it is quite a reach that we both don't detect the "pure presence" of the "couch". But how would you know anyway, it is not like you have any privilege access to my experiences to characterize the presence as "pure" vs "impure."

Please sing with me:

I have decided to follow Husserl;
I have decided to follow Husserl;
I have decided to follow Husserl;
No turning back, no turning back.

Maybe, one day, philosophy will weave in music into this form of life.

But the evolving he has in mind follows science's lead. — Constance

Not exactly, from “On What There Is” he says “Here we have two competing conceptual schemes, a phenomenalistic one and a physicalistic one. Which should prevail? Each has its advantages; each has its special simplicity in its own way. Each, I suggest, deserves to be developed. Each may be said, indeed, to be the more fundamental, though in different senses: the one is epistemologically, the other physically, fundamental.”

Though, you are right, I would say Quine favors the later.

he first—“so much appearance, so much being”—is borrowed from the Marburg School. Over against this ambiguous proposition, owing to the double signification of the term “appearance,” we prefer this strict wording: “so much appearing, so much being.”1 The second is the principle of principles. Formulated by Husserl himself in §24 of Ideen I, it sets forth intuition or, more precisely, “that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition”2 and thus for any particularly rational statement. In the third principle, the claim is so vehement that it clothes itself in the allure of an exhortation, even a cry: “zu den Sachen selbst!” The fourth principle was defined considerably later by Jean-Luc Marion in his work Reduction and Givenness, but its importance hits upon the entirety of phenomenological development as a hidden presupposition that is always already at work. It is formulated thus: “so much reduction, so much givenness.” — Constance

What can I say but that:

This passage has an ineffable quality of sophistry

Thank you for the list!

On the other hand, Putnam, one of Quine’s heirs, wrote:
“Thus we have a paradox: at the very moment when analytic philosophy is recognized as the "dominant movement" in world philosophy, it has come to the end of its own project-the dead end, not the completion.” — Joshs

Furthermore, in one of my references on philosophy, they indicated that Husserl, toward the end of his career, wrote that the dream of putting the sciences on firm foundations was over. Rather tragic end to one who began phenomenology to put all the sciences on secure footing. Talking about a dead end

Give folk enough rope. — Banno

Indeed. I am open to evolving language; however, pragmatism, parsimony, and a sprinkle of aesthetics will put pressure on what is accepted.

The idea is to consciously dismiss presuppositions that implicitly give us the familiarity of the familiar world in a perceptual event. — Constance

Please list the presuppositions that I have to consciously dismiss that give me the familiarity of the world in a perceptual event.

No wonder anglo American philosophy is such a dead end, so busy trying to squeeze meaning our of ordinary language. Well, the world is not ordinary at all. — Constance

This may be limited characterization of Anglo American philosophy. W. V. Quine, one who belongs is such a tradition, said the following in Word and Object, "There are, however, philosophers who overdo this line of thought, treating ordinary language as sacrosanct. They exalt ordinary language to the exclusion of one of its own traits: its disposition to keep on evolving."

et my concept of "mountain" cannot be the same as anyone else's. My concept has developed over a lifetime of particular personal experiences, as is true for everyone else. A Tanzanian's concept of "mountain" must be different to an Italian's concept of "mountain". My concept of "mountain" is private and subjective, inaccessible to anyone else in the same way that my experience of the colour red is private, subjective and inaccessible to anyone else. — RussellA

Are you making a claim here? Something that is either true or false. But it can't be either by the very way it is defined. If someone's experience is private and inaccessible, how could one determine whether it is the same or different? By definition, we could not make this determination; thus, making a claim that "my concept of 'mountain' cannot be the same as anyone else's." cannot be determined to be true or false because you do not have accessibility to my experiences to compare nor do I have accessibility to yours to compare.

However, if you start using "mountain" in new or unusual ways with your fellow human being, you might begin to think that you have a different concept of "mountain".

No wonder anglo American philosophy is such a dead end, so busy trying to squeeze meaning our of ordinary language. Well, the world is not ordinary at all.

If trying to get “straight” our concepts about our shared reality is a dead end, I will enjoy the fruits as I build roads to new frontiers. If the alternative is listening to some phenomenologists talk about a privilege and private realms of deep insight, I think I might get more by learning a Gregorian chant.

As Frank Ramsey so humorous said of early Wittgenstein, "What we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either."

I like to consider how later Wittgenstein might have consider "The Ineffable".

From The Blue Book(1933-34) he says, "But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it"

Lastly, from Philosophical Investigations, "'But you will you surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain behavior without pain?'- Admit it? What greater difference could be there be? - 'And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing." - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. "

So, I would say there is no discovery of what "Ineffable" really means, however, we certainly can give it meaning such as "She felt ineffable joy at the sight of her children". However, if we start philosophically analyzing "Ineffable", we start going down the path of a grammar trying to force itself upon, like in the "pain" example, in which nothing could be said.

Why metaphysics is not legitimate?

Spendings time dwelling on whether “unactualizable impossibles” exist or not.

There is a world not external to anything nor internal to anything.

As the above makes clear, I don't think so. I think Hume's idea is that it's irrelevant what the source of our impressions is; however they come to mind, they are now mental phenomena, and whatever principles govern the relations among mental phenomena must be mental principles, not such principles as we imagine govern the behavior of external objects. — Srap Tasmaner

The study of physics, energy, mass, space and time, is how we make prediction of the objects around us. Not the study of mental phenomena.

Ultimately, Hume is trying to convince his perceptions that they are perception. And this demonstrates the absurdity of his position. Our starting position to understand another human being is our shared reality….tables, apples, hands….not private notions of perceptions, impressions, etc

Therefore if an AI passes the Turing test (over a very large number of conversations), it is likely that the AI can be considered to be a "brain-like system", and therefore conscious. — tom111

The problem with this conclusion starts before we even need to analyzed these theorems. Specifically, how do we define the input to show a particular system in conscious? Will any series of questions be OK? If not, then how is this going to be defined? We don't go around asking folk, “by the way are you conscious?” What would one say? Wait let me ask myself a series of questions that so called experts put together to make this determination.

I bet we can construct of series of “inputs” where we would exclude not only AI as conscious but also a good portion of humanity as well. Alternately, we could construct a series of “inputs” to encompass all of humanity and most systems, like calculators, as conscious. This does not demonstrate the need of further refinement, but to just give up this sorry attempt at defining conscious as a series of “inputs” and “outputs”.

Besides, if Jesus/Bible/St. Paul didn't do any better than scientists then why should anyone believe they are teaching divine truth? — Art48

Alternately, a believer might just say that it not “divine truth” that get us in trouble but the fallible human that gets confused.

And the main point is just because disagreement exist does not necessarily mean “divine truth” is futile.

Scientists may disagree on the meaning of experimental results, but we would not go as far to say it is futile to think that there may be a better theory or a better experiment to perform.

Anyone who has frequented religious forums has probably seen a similar discussion. Such discussions show the fatal flaw in the teaching of Jesus: sincere Christians can’t agree on what he taught and what is true doctrine. — Art48

Yeah, and you can see the same kind of discussions about quantum mechanics and what is the “true” interpretation, or is “realism”or “idealism” and which is the right metaphysical view, etc…..

And so, do we want to say this demonstrates the fatal flaw of anyone’s views and philosophies around these topics?

I think not.

Here is another thought:

There is no end at all for the self since there is no self that ends. That at each moment the individual dies because they change to a different individual.

Birth and death merge into one and thus disappear into eternity.

To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin

To say “This rock exists in location X” is saying something about the rock and its location. Can this same something be said of the rock if it is move to location Y and back to location X, does it exist in location Y still?

The present is 2022 AD. I exist.

We're in the future relative to 1997. I exist.

We're in the past relative to 2060. I exist. — Agent Smith

I think all that was said was that you exist in 2022.

I make no claim to philosophical depth, but you are the one confused — hypericin

It is true, that I am confused - like if someone ask me how many touchdowns were scored in a baseball game.

This rock" merely points attention to the rock. — hypericin

And “This rock exist” does not do the same?

To say "This rock exists" is saying something about the rock. Can this same something be said of the rock of yesterday or tomorrow? — hypericin

To say “This rock exists” is saying something about the rock. But have I said anything less if I just pointed to the rock and said “This rock”. And would I say anything more if I said “This is the rock I stubbed my toe on yesterday and by the way it still exists. You mean now? No, I mean still exists in yesterday.”

This is good example of confusion disguised as deep metaphysical musings.

I find a watch upon the ground, and it so finely tuned of an object to make such precise movements, there must be a maker of such exquisite craftsmanship. And yet such a device cannot fit in my coat pocket.

Worthless!

Thus, God almost existed.

So, it seems material objects are actually theoretical constructs, i.e., ideas we experience based on our sensory input. (Some philosophers go further and claim this disproves materialism. I don’t agree. But it does reveal the epistemological basis of materialism, i.e., materialism is an ontological construct not an evident, directly experienced reality.) — Art48

Maybe we can start by agreeing that the ideas of “material object” and “sense data” are theoretical constructs. But how did we come about to learn such ideas? Let us start with “material object”. We learn to point to objects like trees and apples and teach others that we call such objects “tree” and “apple”. If we see others react to such objects and use the words “tree” and “apple”, well we have the building blocks of language. Later we can generalize a bit and call these trees and apples under the concept of “material object”.

Next, let us look at “sense data”. I think we can agree we don’t learn such a concept by pointing externally to sense data to teach others what we mean. Additionally, we don’t internally point to sense data to teach what we mean because other are not privy to this internal private act. We come up with this theoretical construct of “sense data” when we want to explain odd reporting of objects that are called hallucinations and illusions.

So looking at it this way, I would say the idea of “sense data” is more theory laden than I would say the idea of “material object”.

But I'm not talking about what practically matters. I'm talking about what matters to the philosophical questions on epistemology and ontology. We want to know if the things we see exist independently of us, and if they are (independently) as they appear to be. We want to know if a thing's appearance justifies any claims we make about what that thing is (independently) like. If you're not interested in these questions then by all means ignore them, but if you are then you can't address them simply by arguing that "I see a tree" is the conventional way to speak in English, and this seems to be where so many in this discussion get lost. — Michael

I think we both would agree that Pragmatism is consider a philosophical approach that was expressed in the 19th and 20th century by philosophers such as C. Peirce, W. James, and J. Dewey. These philosophers dealt with these very issues that are being discussed in this post. For example, Peirce asked his readers to consider the following: what is wrong with the following theory, a diamond is actually soft, and only becomes hard when it is touched. Peirce thought there is no way of disproving it; however, he claimed that the meaning of a concept (such as "Diamond" or "Hard") is derived from the object or quality that the concept relates to and the effects it has on our senses. Whether we think of the diamond as "soft until touched" or "always hard" before our experience, therefore, is irrelevant. Under both theories the diamond feels the same, and can be used in the same way. However, the first theory is far more difficult to work with, so of less value.

Pragmatism. Ordinary Language philosophers, and Logical Positivist are philosophical traditions that have attempted to delineate what is meaningful vs what is non-sense. So, what is discussed in epistemology and ontology is fair game. We all learn words like "independent", "appears", "exist" in the ordinary course of life. However, if one takes the ordinary concepts and starts putting a metaphysical spin to them; followers of aforementioned traditions start to smell something fishy. Now I am sympathetic to the idea that one can treat ordinary language a bit sacrosanct and not appreciate its disposition to keep evolving (as Quine so nicely put). But like evolution, ideas will survive or perish, and one of driving forces that picks a winner would be the practical value it has upon the human beings that use them.

What matters is whether or not things independently have the shapes, colours, sounds, tastes, and smells that they are perceived to have and as they are perceived to be. — Michael

This is strange statement that what matters is whether or not things independently have shapes….that they are perceived to have. Why should one worry about such a thing. If I look at what appears to be an apple and grab it, smell it, cut it, and taste it, and by all indication it is an apple. What error am I concerned about making in this scenario. My biological apparatus did a good job of picking out an object to nourish myself. What matters is if another human being has difficulties picking out such an object and what scientific/medical discoveries have be made to help that human being correct their biological apparatus to make better judgements about the external world around them. Additionally, if my apparatus is functioning as expected but I am fooled somehow that what appears to be an apple turns out not to be, and it becomes a consistent problem, well it may be time to do some creative thinking and come up with new detection method to help screen out the false positives.

But “when” is space, so to speak? Position A and position B can be determined be measuring the distance between the two points based on some established convention. But these concepts are unsustainable on analysis; show me the duration at positions A and B. If positions A and B have no duration, all that can be confirmed is an altogether indeterminate position, for a lack of a better word.

No, I think something like the Sense-Datum Theory of perception is correct. — Michael

"Common Kind Claim: veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences (as) of an F are fundamentally the same; they form a common kind.
Thus, a veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experience, all alike in being experiences (as) of a churchyard covered in white snow, are not merely superficially similar, they are fundamentally the same: these experiences have the same nature, fundamentally the same kind of experiential event is occurring in each case. Any differences between them are external to their nature as experiences (e.g., to do with how they are caused)."

There are significantly problems with what is stated concerning the Common Kind Claim.

(1) The Common Kind Claim is un-verifiable in principle. The non-veridical experiences are private to the subject having them. Thus, there is nothing to verify whether the claim is true or not. Also, that is how we learn that certain experiences are non-veridical because we come to understand that there is nothing to verify when one makes reports on a non-veridical experience.
(2) What is in common to both experiences, veridical and non-veridical. They have the same kind of churchyard and the same kind of white snow. But this is the subject of the experience, not what makes these experiences fundamentally the same. For example, let’s say we take a picture of this churchyard with a camera, a mobile phone, and have an artist create a super realistic painting. Would we say the churchyard makes them fundamentally the same. True, the subject, the churchyard, could be said to be what is common in each picture. But fundamentally? If there was a different subject in each picture, what would be in common fundamentally? The subject should not matter, but what is fundamental between the pictures or the experiences excluding the subject?
(3) Lastly,Is it true that any differences between veridical and non-veridical are external to their nature (e.g. to do with how they are caused)? I do not think so. I could report that I had a hallucinatory experience, and we determine this because it made no sense. The report was of flying rocks and people with four heads. You may have no idea what the external causes might be but the report of the experience is so absurd you can likely draw the conclusion it was a hallucination.

We have different sense-data, and this sense-data is the immediate object of perception. — Michael

As I mentioned before, the duck/rabbit image is the same sense data, yet we can report out there is an image of a duck or there is an image of a rabbit.

“And what does it mean to "see something differently"? It means that we experience different sense-data. I experience white and gold, you experience black and blue. The colours we experience are the medium by which we indirectly see the photo of a dress.”

Based on your logic because two people can report out two different sets of colors, we conclude that they must experience different sense data. But in this case the sense data is the same but they report out two different images. Do we give up the sense datum theory as immediate? Then what, we are immediately aware of the idea of a duck and the sense data is indirect? Are we back to idealism?

This is a very difficult debate when one does not understand what someone means by saying “direct”.

From what I can tell, if it has to do with the five senses, it is not direct. If link to scientific theory, not direct. If you ask, well then what will meet the definition of direct. The answer you get will be something that does not have an intermediary. And if you ask that, there is no answer other than I believe it when I see it. Wait that is already excluded.

It’s not about what people prefer but about what they find the evidence and reasoning shows. — Michael

Before evidence and reason, we need to understand what we are talking about. The private world of sense data has some problems getting us to this point.

Wittgenstein says the following "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing is the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

So why the indirect realist prefers the limited and impoverished view of his own biology is the real question. — NOS4A2

Because they prefer the certainty of appearances and/or immediate sense data of their private world.

Let's consider a robot that can pick out objects and report out the name of such objects similar to how humans would perform.

We place an orange and the robot reports out "orange". We place an apple and the robot reports out "apple". The scientist seems satisfied of the the performance. However, on occasion he places a particular apple and the robot reports "orange". On another occasion the is no object and just suddenly reports "apple". The scientist response is to examine the hardware or software and determine if there is a problem. And in these scenarios that's exactly what they find, a revision to the software and the robot no longer report "orange" when there is an apple; and a repair to the hardware and the robot no longer reports "apple" when there is no object. Should the scientist wonder if these scenarios indicate they don't have access to the "real" apple or orange? Seems absurd to say such a thing.

If a human does the same, why should our reaction be any different. What if we can re-wire human beings where they don't hallucinate, experience illusion, never dream, can we now say they directly perceive objects?

Thus, a veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experience, all alike in being experiences (as) of a churchyard covered in white snow, are not merely superficially similar, they are fundamentally the same: these experiences have the same nature, fundamentally the same kind of experiential event is occurring in each case. Any differences between them are external to their nature as experiences (e.g., to do with how they are caused).

I would not agree these ever could be the same kind of experiential event. An hallucinatory experience is private to the subject. There is no verification of a subject's hallucinatory reporting, while a veridical experience can in principle be verified since they can report on a public environment.

I do not know how in principle you can make a claim that they a fundamentally the same. How is this comparison to see if in fact they are exactly the same done? Ask the person to describe their hallucination? By seeing how detailed they speak of it? But what if they talk about a book they never read, and I ask him to open it to read page ##. Would they be able to do it? And how do I verify they get it right? If I ask them to examine their hallucinated Plato's Republic which they never read, could they get the passages right?

The brain-in-a-vat and other such hypotheses are just analogies. The underlying principle is best exemplified by Kant's transcendental idealism. There is indeed something that is the cause of experience, but given the logical possibility of such things as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, it is not a given that everyday experiences show us the cause of experience. The causal world might be very unlike what is seen. And that includes being very unlike the material world as is understood in modern physics. So it's not that we could just be some brain-in-a-vat, it's that we could just be some conscious thing in some otherwise ineffable noumena.

At the very least this might warrant skepticism (in the weaker sense of understanding that we might be wrong, not in the stronger sense of believing that we're likely wrong). — Michael

Just because we can imagine something does not mean it is possible.

Lets suppose one day a scientist demonstrates that the "brain-in-a-vat" is not possible due to the "Laws of Nature".

What would be the skeptic's reaction? Well, they could just say, "it could just be another scientist manipulating a "brain-in-a-vat" to think it is not physical possible to create a "brain-in-a-vat" due to the "Laws of Nature".

What are you going to believe? Someone's imagination(hypothesis), or someone's demonstration by theory and experiment that such an idea from someone's imagination(hypothesis) is not possible.

At times, the empirical needs to set the boundaries for the creative mind.

What is interesting is why does he think it follows from his analysis. It does not look like it logically follows, nor can it follow empirically.

Indeed, Russell, in The Problems of Philosophy, says the following after talking about difficulties that arises with his analysis of senses: “Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table , if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known.”

I believe the transition from his analysis of senses to his conclusion is not evident. But for the Indirect Realist, this may be the area to clarify to help their position.