Your logic goes way too quickly for me to follow, abruptly jumping to assertions of habit, addiction, rationalisation, and irrational desires, but no examples or justifications are offered.

I could ask a dozen questions and ask for clarification on how you're using many words, I'm not sure of the context or your goals, you're going too fast for me. I had a go at responding but I wasn't getting anywhere, so I'll have to pass on responding to the comment, my apologies.

Reliability means more than simply believing it. It means you're willing to risk something. — Echarmion

Well, again, one's willingness to risk something doesn't seem to do anything to guarantee reliability.

I think the art example is problematic because not everyone would agree that "this picture is beautiful" has a truth value. — Echarmion

Conceptually, it makes sense that it wouldn't since that example betrays what truth should be. As a binary, something that warrants belief. Nonetheless, it's a legitimate use of the word, grammatically and logically. I'd argue that grammar is determinative of what's correct in language use, and not the philosophical views of what truth "should" be. Anyway, I agree that it's a controversial topic if that's your only point.

It seems to me what's different among the different contexts is the prerequisites of the argument. — Echarmion

I agree that's part of it, and I believe the same as what I referred to as the "truth conditions".

I'd like to instead use a moral argument. Say: "Murder is immoral". I think most people would agree that this statement has a truth value. — Echarmion

Is there a truth value to "This box is too heavy to carry"? If "this box" weighs 5kg or 50kg, or if one person is carrying it, or eight, would you agree that such factors are relevant? The box might be "too heavy" to carry without risk of injury, but not "too heavy" to carry if we disregard the risk of injury. My point is that the statement has multiple truth values. That's kind of awkward for the concept of "truth".

"Murder is immoral, unless...", and "Murder is immoral, if....", are such additions unreasonable? Must we answer if "Murder is immoral" and we're forbidden from wanting more information or context? It can't be true in some conditions, false in others. True by one person's logic, false by another's? I hope you can agree.

"The sum of the interior angle measures of a triangle always adds up to 180°." — Echarmion

In contrast, what contextual information, or perspectival information can we add, that changes the truth of this statement? Does it matter what type of triangle? Nope. Does it matter how big the triangle is? Nope. Does it matter who measures the triangle? Nope. There's nothing we can add to change it.

The qualities truth is supposed to have, this "reliability", it works sometimes, and not always. Part of ensuring that your statement is like the latter and not the former is part of science. It's not an inherent quality of truth, one must take steps to ensure reliability. Though, "reliability" implies some purpose, and not every truth even has that.

Yes, I intentionally used "unscientific" terms because they should apply to all kinds of contexts.

Is an element of truth that people agree on it? If not I don't see how it matters that people can argue about it. But if *you* believe something is true, then there cannot be a convincing argument to the contrary for you. — Echarmion

Your comment was about reliability, and that was my focus.

I would say it's reliability. You need to be able to rely on the prediction of what will happen, so you can base your decisions/ designs on this.

Is that a fundamental attribute of truth? I would say it is. For something to be true it must be a reliable — Echarmion

Surely, neither merely believing something is true nor believing that no arguments against one's position are convincing does anything to guarantee reliability. It's one's reasons for believing something is true that determine that truth's reliability. Reasons that are measurable, and have been repeatedly verified are reliable, aren't such factors like these determinative of reliability?

I might think that dreams are a very reliable source of information, "X is true because I dreamt it was", and I'm not convinced by any argument that suggests X is false.

Words and ideas must be redefined within the context of science, and adhere to scientific standards, that's a prerequisite for doing science.

Is that a fundamental attribute of truth? I would say it is. For something to be true it must be a reliable — Echarmion

I agree that we must be convinced that something is true to call it true. "For someone to call something true, they must believe it is", sure I agree with that. But how does that give us reliability?

I have no idea what this would mean. — Echarmion

It means that within the context of science, someone saying X is true means it has met the prerequisites set out by the modern approach to science, and within the context of something else, like art, X is beautiful because it met the prerequisites for one to find it beautiful. Those prerequisites were just that they found X beautiful, and their belief just reflects their personal interpretation and experience. It wouldn't even cross our minds to challenge the "reliability" of the truth about X's beauty as it would in the scientific context. I was just saying that we don't treat truths the same across all contexts. It's the scientific process that gives truth its reliability in the scientific context, rather than truth being necessarily reliable. Some questions have concrete answers, others don't. This is what my OP is about.

It can tell you how to do things that you want to do well enough to get them done, and it will also explain phenomena to you such that you are happy with the explanations. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I voted yes to wanting it, but no if everyone else did. As I understand it, the invention the book came up with would do what I wanted, but not necessarily for the reasons it gave. So, if I ask the book how to invest in crypto and make easy millions, I will succeed, but I won't really know why? If so, the book is completely overpowered, it would be equivalent to a superpower, easy yes.

I don't want anyone else to have one though, that would diminish the value of mine greatly.

It seems this is one of these questions that everyone chooses so that they can give a wonderfully poetic answer to reaffirm our real-world values. I wonder, would anyone really pass up such utility and power for virtue if the choice was real, and not just a question that "reveals" the type of person one is.

If truth is just equivalent to "a complete description of what there is" then it seems to me that science is a search for truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's definitely not what truth is. Science makes use of language where truths are inherently pragmatic and goal-orientated. We can test the "effectiveness of X" or "compare the effectiveness of X and Y". It might be true that method X is effective if it fulfils the objective, and true that another method is superior because it can be done faster and more cheaply. We want methods that better accomplish our many goals, such as being more environmentally friendly or safer for workers and so on.

I get the sense that you're splitting the impractical and the practical in a way that misrepresents truth, what do you say to that?

"Is it true that X election contained widespread voter fraud" is a question we can ask, but how we understand and measure "voter fraud" is tied to our goals and values, it's practical. We'd want to know if the election was compromised. We'd need to have an understanding of what it meant for it to be true that an "election has been compromised". This is not some kind of worldly truth to uncover.

Techne increases our ability to enhance all living things' well being, even if we don't use that information that way. Both make us more free. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Power makes one more free, isn't that all it is? And it doesn't necessarily make "us" more free, but just whoever has that power.

I don't think that for one to do science requires any particular reason or motive, and I have a hard time thinking you'd disagree with that, not sure what to make of your comments then.

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths. — Leontiskos

So, there are all of these different types of truths, dozens of them, potentially infinite, and science pursues only one of these. Why not just say that science is the pursuit of "scientific truth" and not truth? Seems quite inefficient to say science is the pursuit of truth, but not political, philosophical, religious, moral, cultural, artistic, personal, and whatever other type of truths there are. All that just to disagree with the title of the OP?

What is the relevant quality of a scientific result? I would say it's reliability. You need to be able to rely on the prediction of what will happen, so you can base your decisions/ designs on this.

Is that a fundamental attribute of truth? I would say it is. For something to be true it must be a reliable. If something is true, this excludes surprise. It excludes a convincing argument to the contrary. — Echarmion

Reliability isn't the only relevant quality but forgetting that, conceptually, truth should be reliable, but in practice, it depends on the truth conditions. Within your argument, you use words such as "surprise" and "convincing", which are inherently unscientific. You can't measure the "convincingness" of an argument, right? If I find your argument convincing, that's no guarantee that someone else will. You could make the same argument with "reliability" itself.

The quality of truth is dependent upon the truth conditions. Truths can have various truth conditions and have various qualities, right?

Not sure I agree with the premise of the OP to begin with, that "rational agreement is elusive", or what exactly that entails. I also don't see why this would be a problem for philosophy since it doesn't need to reach or even aim for a complete consensus. I consider rationality a deeply flawed concept, but in this context, it's the completely unrealistic conditions it sets up that lead to this predictable failure to produce a unanimous consensus across (humanity?) or (across a civilisation?).

The gap, then, lies between the possibility of reasonable assent provided by logical and dialectical standards, and actual rational motivation

This captures part of these unrealistic conditions. However, I'd point out that logic and rationality rely on language, which is part of why there's a lack of consistency that would lead to unanimous consensus. All could easily agree that "People should aim to be reasonable", and proceed from this point, using it as a foundation for further argumentation. A premise that will help lead all of us to the same conclusion. The issue is that the truth conditions for when one or something is "reasonable" are highly complicated and context-dependent.

The logic of when something is or isn't reasonable includes too much nuance and subjectivity for it to be reliable. The same applies to many words that are commonly used in philosophy. It's part of the nature of those words, and I don't see it as a problem to be resolved.

The other problem is that logical arguments aren't very powerful, and you can see this when doing anything competitive. A novice can make as logical an argument as can be about how to achieve good results in X, but with their limited experience, I'd still expect their results to be subpar. All logic must accomplish is to be convincing or compelling, and that's no guarantee of results. There's always going to be a process of trial and error, of endlessly seeking ways to improve. It's a neverending process. The lack of consensus is part of that process, and it exists even within a single person when pursuing improvement. Top athletes or professionals never stop searching for ways to improve or exploring and testing new ideas.

The final problem is that rationality is holistic, and logic can never be holistic. I can go into detail on that if you disagree, but that mightn't be necessary.

I generally find that the problem with rationality as a concept overall is that the term pretends to be non-evaluative, and is yet evaluative. The word is deceptive. The truth conditions of the term have very little to do with what the term is supposed to represent. I'm almost at a point where I refuse to debate the term anymore. Treating the word as synonymous with "logical" or "sensible" seems fairest to me, and that's how I interpret the term when it's used, usually regardless of whatever the person using it wanted to express.

If you meant the first, then my exact same objection applies, because not all philosophy-transparency is argument. — Leontiskos

My claim was that arguments are a pre-requisite for transparency in philosophy (discussion), not the only pre-requisite or only factor. How can one be transparent in a discussion while refusing to explain their reasons for thinking as they do? "I believe X is immoral!", "Why?", "Well, it just is", how can that ever be described as being transparent?

What you probably meant in the first place was that transparency is a prerequisite for argument — Leontiskos

I wouldn't know what that meant, but what I will say, is that arguments don't have to contain one's true feelings to be compelling. One can also hide key details and still make a compelling argument. For example, a doctor could try to convince you to use drug X, without telling you that they'd receive financial compensation for prescribing you drug X. The argument could be compelling, but the doctor isn't being transparent. If we're not talking about the one giving the argument being transparent, but the argument itself, that just seems like a misuse of the word to me.

The transition from the assertion to the argument makes the reasoning and rationale visible. — Leontiskos

The reasons why the doctor wants to prescribe you drug X seem to be the merits he's explicating, but they're concealing the financial motivation, which may be their real motivation. Or you're just happy with any reasoning/rationale?

Given that you haven't managed to give such an argument, you are failing to be transparent. — Leontiskos

I just didn't give an argument for a position that I don't have, not sure who gets to judge whether my critique of the OP fails or not. I don't imagine you'd be able to explain my critique in a way that satisfied me, and true, that might be more my fault than yours, hard to say. I certainly have given arguments, though we may just be too far apart on language and what the word "transparency" refers to.

Well I am talking about transparency in argument, but "transparency" means transparency. It is a concept that can be applied to all sorts of different contexts, and it retains a similar meaning in each context. — Leontiskos

What it entails is different according to context, as well as how it's interpreted and understood, as my examples illustrate.

Words are in of themselves assertions, to say someone is being transparent is to assert that they are being transparent. To call a cat black is to assert that that cat is black.

The truth conditions or prerequisites for words mightn't change based on context, such as the word "triangle" which never changes. To correctly assert that something is a triangle requires it to be a shape with three sides, end of story.

The word "transparency" doesn't have such straightforward truth conditions or prerequisites as "triangle".
The rules and meaning change based on the context, because interpretation of the concept and the prerequisites change based on the context. I don't see how you can look at my list of examples and dispute that. A business, a government, a doctor, and an interlocutor on a philosophy forum are not held to the same standards, and the things they must do are completely different.

Where the word is used, who uses it, the context of the usage, and what the speaker was trying to express or accomplish, all of these things influence word meaning.

The word "black" was a poor example. I can think of hundreds of ways to use this word in a way that means something beyond mere colour. While playing chess, is the sentence, "You don't move first since you're black", illogical? It's not, right? Because the context is chess, and you understand the rules of chess, and so you understand the meaning of what's being said. It's the same for the word transparency, depending on what one wants to convey, the meaning of the word and its prerequisites change.

Language is very flexible and adaptable, it allows people to express their own opinions and ideas, and adjust to context. It's easy to miss if you use examples like "triangle", so I'd prefer it if you avoided it.

But I don't think that's right, because transparency very often occurs without argument. For example, if a wife tells a husband that his father's words have made her sad, she is being transparent and yet there is no argument in sight. — Leontiskos

I was imagining philosophy as the context for my statement, and these things are context-dependent. Transparency in your example isn't the same as the transparency of a government, or the transparency of a business, or the transparency of an interlocutor in philosophy.

What a business is expected to disclose to be transparent is completely different from what a doctor must disclose to be transparent, and so on.

Though the transparency you refer to was never explicitly outlined, as I understood it, the context is of debates and arguments. In a discussion, refusing to give an argument for your beliefs is antithetical to being transparent. Though, now that you've brought up a completely different context as your example, I suspect even you don't have a clear picture of the transparency you're referring to.

'Clarity' and 'transparency' are synonyms. — Leontiskos

I disagree. Transparency involves being open and honest, disclosing information, and allowing others to access, particularly because you believe they have a right to it. It's useful to hear you think they're synonyms though, since your usage generally felt inappropriate but I couldn't tell exactly why.

Clarity just involves being clear and easy to understand. The goal of clarification is to make the information more accessible and comprehensible. Clarifying involves explaining or simplifying complex or unclear concepts, ideas, or statements to enhance understanding. You're asking CS to clarify their position, to disambiguate it so that others can understand better what they're saying.

Unlike transparency, clarity isn't about disclosing information, it's about the way in which information is conveyed. CS doesn't appear to be failing to disclose anything, they're being open and honest, and so they're being completely transparent. They're just failing to be clear, concise and easy to understand.

Can some arguments be more transparent than others? — Leontiskos

They can be clearer and easier to understand if that's what you mean. In this context, the term transparency to me, involves disclosing relevant information, like some bias or conflict of interest. For instance, we might be talking about the morality of arranged marriages, and for transparency, I might admit that I'm quite unfamiliar with the subject.

Admitting that weakens my argument, but I felt like it was important to be upfront about it. That's an example of transparency. Outside of disclosing information that would weaken one's position, I don't think arguments themselves can be transparent.

Yes, and clarity of terms, definitions, intention, conclusions, etc. — Leontiskos

Unless a lack of clarity is motivated by some ulterior motive, the term transparency seems irrelevant.

But "transparent" does not mean "giving your reasons for belief." A dictionary will attest to this. — Leontiskos

What do you mean, a dictionary will attest to it? Word meaning is context-dependent, I'm referring to "transparent" in the context of your OP. What transparency involves depends on a wide variety of factors. Such as what information should be disclosed, which depends on the context and how "what should be disclosed" is interpreted. It could be broadened further though. I wasn't even referring to my own opinions on the subject, I was referring to how I interpreted the way the OP was using the term.

Right, and in this I think you are only agreeing with the OP. It is basically a paraphrase of the OP. So I'm not sure which part of the OP you believe yourself to be disagreeing with. — Leontiskos

Well, I interpreted your OP very differently, but if you understand and agree with all of my "criticism", then great. Not sure if there's any point in debating whether the confusion is my fault or yours.

Then why not do the same thing I asked in that other thread? Say, "Leontiskos believes X. Judaka believes Y. X contradicts Y." Be transparent. — Leontiskos

That's pretty much what all discussions involve, I'm not clear on what you're asking change. Are you arguing for that exact format? For example, you said clarity and transparency are synonyms, I replied and said you're wrong, and gave my reasonings for why I think that. What should I have done differently?

That thread is about belief, not truth...? — Leontiskos

It's about both. I'm confident the thread contains multiple explanations of how Banno understands the truth. Nonetheless, if you're unaware of his views then don't worry about it. In summary, that which is grammatically and linguistically correct to say is also true. If It's correct to refer to a shape as a triangle, then it's true that shape is a triangle. The rules for the word "triangle" determine when it's correct to refer to a shape as a triangle.

If I believe a shape is a triangle, then I believe it's true that shape is a triangle. "Truth" affirms the conditions for the applicability of the word were met. I may believe the conditions for truth were met, "The clock is working", but upon closer inspection, I realise I was mistaken, and that the clock is broken. The conditions for the clock to be "broken" were met, therefore it was broken.

Say it's because the time isn't moving that I believe the clock is broken, that seems justified, a working clock wouldn't be stuck like that. However, what if the clock only stopped moving because the batteries died? It's probably not correct to say something is broken when it's only not working because it was unpowered, but maybe it's also incorrect to say that an unpowered clock is working. The semantics determine what is and isn't true.

You said earlier:

You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done. — Leontiskos

In this view, truth is just correct language use, if it's correct to refer to a method as "the best", then it's true that method is the best. The rules for what's best aren't written in a dictionary, they're context-dependent, and they're rules we must establish. It's a complicated topic and my comment's already too long, so I'll wrap up, hopefully you get the gist.

Feel free to select what to respond to or to answer my comments indirectly, in order to move things forward. And respond at your leisure, no rush.

That claim was that to move from asserting to arguing involves an increase in transparency. — Leontiskos

There's certainly a relationship between being transparent and giving arguments, but surely it's just that an argument is a prerequisite to transparency. Refusing to give one's reasonings is antithetical to being transparent.

It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't. — Judaka

I don't think you will find anything in the OP to support these ideas of yours. — Leontiskos

Which part?

Firstly, defending my assertion of transparency as giving one's argument.

The transition from the assertion to the argument makes the reasoning and rationale visible. — Leontiskos

Yet in order for this to work the argument must be seen to be right or wrong — Leontiskos

Disguising or veiling arguments is a bit like going to the doctor and lying about one’s health in order to avoid an unpleasant diagnosis. It defeats the whole point. Arguments don’t exist to make us feel good about ourselves; they exist to help us pursue truth, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. — Leontiskos

In each case the crucial factor is that it be seen, that it be transparent. — Leontiskos

Secondly, you claim that transparency is an essential part of a good argument.

n this thread I am concerned with a key component of this shared pursuit: transparency, and in particular transparency as an essential part of good argument — Leontiskos

I can't remember why I said "By your logic, it isn't", but surely if being transparent means giving your reasons for belief, then that implies you had such reasons to give in the first place. If I give my argument, my real feelings for why I assert X, then I am being completely transparent, right? To be transparent I mustn't conceal my reasons or give false reasons.

Yes, and that requires transparency. — Leontiskos

As in it requires one to provide arguments and reasonings?

You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done. — Leontiskos

Very little to go on here.

Then name the third way instead of being opaque and contentious. — Leontiskos

I disputed the first "two ways" by going into detail about the simplicity of thinking that one is right or wrong. That which determines what is right or wrong is part of the argument/discussion. One must strive to be compelling or convincing, rather than right or wrong, even when dealing with truth. A claim found right by means we deem flawed has no value to us.

What does it have to do with the OP? — Leontiskos

The OP depicts an argument as a tool used in the "pursuit of truth", and good arguments as being necessary for success in that pursuit.

I hope the answer would have something to do with truth, knowledge, understanding, or wisdom. We knead dough to bake cookies and we argue to get at these sorts of things. — Leontiskos

I am claiming that truths are dependent upon claims and arguments, a good argument creates truth. For instance, if you provide a compelling argument for why "X is immoral", and I'm convinced by it, then it becomes true for me that X is immoral. What is determinative of whether X is immoral or not is still subjective, it still depends on how we interpret it, and perhaps your hypothetical argument addressed that.

Your claim that <only argument is able to arrive at truth> is not at odds with my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth. You're engaging in eristic, and you're not even addressing the OP — Leontiskos

I am understanding truth and the relationships between truths and arguments differently than you, and that's part of my criticism of the OP.

If you read those two pages and agree that my suggestion would aid the dialogue by introducing more transparency, then you should have a key to the meaning of the OP, which you seem to have misunderstood. — Leontiskos

I did as you requested. I'd rather describe your post as a request for clarity, not transparency. What you're asking for is for CreativeSoul to clarify their position because you feel their arguments and reasonings aren't clear. CS seems to be attempting to be as transparent as possible, it could be viewed as unfair and offensive to request they be more transparent.

By the way, though I aspire to disagree with Banno whenever I can, I share his view that truth is a product of language and grammar, the one he is arguing for in this thread. His stance could be a good template for understanding mine.

Bad day? — Leontiskos

I was in the mood for antagonising, apologies.

I think you've largely just used the word "transparency" to refer to having an argument. Having reasons for one's assertions. Which is itself an argument.

One very basic and concrete way towards transparency is replacing assertions with argument — Leontiskos

An assertion with no argument = there was no argument, surely.

Otherwise, transparency isn't a prerequisite to a good argument, completely irrelevant really. I could say "I think X" and have a brilliant argument for justifying that even if I refuse to share it.

It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't.

There are two basic ways that an argument can get at truth✝: by being right and by being wrong. — Leontiskos

This is such a drastic oversimplification that it's misrepresentative and incorrect.

The entire OP treats truth like it's a thing divorced from an argument/conclusion, like we "seek" truth, rather than create it, and this is a mistake. Truth conditions relate to one's objectives, one's interpretations, and one's claims, which are influenced by their arguments and the context.

If I argue that "This is the best way of doing X", then what determines the truth of that claim are things like: What are we trying to accomplish? How do we measure which way is best? Which factors, such as outcomes, consequences or resources are important? If you measure which way is best different from I, then you may end up with a different conclusion than I. One route, the one I argue is best, might be best when using my priorities and methods, but not when using yours. The "truth" relies on such things, and such things are established in one's argument.

The truth of what's moral, what's true, and what's right and most areas of philosophy are dependant on one's values, priorities, interpretations, methods and so on.

This means that in order to change someone else's mind, or to have an interesting discussion, talking about what's "true" is pointless. To change what someone else thinks is true requires one to be compelling, intellectually and emotionally, to help someone see the merits of a different approach or flaws in theirs.

One could argue that David Hume is a nut in reference to a flaw in his thinking, but the criteria to be met for someone being "a nut" are vague. Perhaps the flaw of his thinking could be true, whether that makes David Hume a nut or not, surely that's not a "truth" worth worrying about. I could go on, truth is context-dependent, even to the very argument being made. David Hume could be a nut in reference to his positions on X, but a genius in reference to his positions on Y. An argument is part of the assertion, instead of merely justifying it.

To sum up, truth without an argument is useless and irrelevant. If one doesn't know why something is true, and they don't feel those reasons are compelling, then they won't care. A truth's value is dependent upon the quality of the argument, and what the argument succeeds in doing.

The impact of the first judgement/guess a person makes when they encounter a new word is quite small compared to the intuition that will later come as the person hears that word in conversations. — Skalidris

The argument that I've made throughout the OP is that INTs aren't and can't be just meaningless names. I went through INTs such as self-driving cars or pay-to-win as examples where the words of the INT are crucially important to the term. The words are important in establishing an INT's truth conditions and in what it means for an INT to be applicable. That a self-driving car should be self-driving.

"Free Will" is an intelligible, meaningful set of words, which you interestingly aren't even capitalising, but simply referring to as "free will". An INT that's grammatically indistinguishable from ordinary speech, that uses normal English words in a standard way but has its own distinct set of rules.

The reason why I oppose this is because I think inevitably, we will use the words normally while talking about an INT. I'm justified in saying that a "flying unicorn" can fly, or that a self-driving car can drive itself.

If someone calls their hotel the "flying unicorn", that's fine, whatever, no one will mistakenly think that should be taken literally. But "Free Will" is so closely related to "free will", that I'd go as far as to say they're linked. That "Partial Free Will" would be a highly meaningful change to the name, it would change the claim. Just like "Partially self-driving car" is different from "Self-driving car".

It seems like you'd be okay if I just create a term called "Purple" and have it refer to the colour blue? Words can mean anything so long as they're part of a term?

Truth is a quality given to "correct reference", it's "the right answer", and what's "right" is determined by the logic of the sentence and the words being used. If the "right answer" is specific and measurable, and based on stable concepts, for example, "How many planets are there in our solar system?" Then "truth" can appear transcendent, and there it embodies the qualities that we think the word should have, of being objective and authoritative.

"Meaning" is neither specific nor measurable, it's context-dependent, and there are many valid arguments that can be made for what something "means". There is no authoritative "truth" to something's meaning because the logic of "What something means" precludes any definitive answer. Perhaps it's that which you've identified, and it's thus the self-assuredness with which others claim life has meaning that you find foolish.

To say definitively that there's no meaning to life is just as lacking in authority as definitively saying that there is a meaning to life. As it stands, you've just repeated the error. The only thing we can say definitively is that there's no definitive answer to the question of life's meaning.

The people are distracted, disillusioned, and misled in a system that presents false dilemmas and destroys any attempts the common people make to better their lives. We live under the yoke of the corporation and the billionaire, both of which have disproportionate impacts on policy such that getting anything off the ground is a tremendous effort - and just when we think we might win our prospects get shot in the back of the head by corporatist, career politicians. So, I say that duty has been here all along, it has mostly just lain dormant - but it flares up sporadically, giving us insight into what could be if the right man or woman came along. — ToothyMaw

I don't know how aware of it you are, but you're rattling off many alarmingly convenient oversimplifications. Philosophers often seem to overly rely on interpreting problems through a moral lens. "The immoral billionaires and their evil corporations are manipulating and abusing the innocent, who need a bold, righteous leader to rise. A hero who can lead us, the many, to a new, great future". Yeah, that's not what you said, it's my interpretation as a cynic, but how off is it really?

The devil is in the details, and the issues I imagine you're referring to are far more complicated than you're making them out to be. The public is quite complicit in supporting the system that creates the conditions you're (probably) referring to. I'd emphasise that more specificity is needed. I've no interest in discussions so vague that neither of us has any real idea what the other is saying, so I'll leave it there.

Duty is just as loyal a servant to evil as it is to good, that's something you'd do well to remember.

Duty is the strongest motivator, you claim? It seems you're defining duty as something that one has, even if they themselves don't think so.

But you have a moral obligation by virtue of all the good you could do - and no one gives a damn if playing the game makes you uncomfortable. — ToothyMaw

By your own account, there is a need for action:

Some say that the people might need to rise up in the United States because we are increasingly having to choose between fascism and neoliberalism - all the while the oligarchs line their pockets. — ToothyMaw

If duty is such a strong motivator, and one such duty is to do good, why are the current circumstances so in dire need of "rising up"? Has that duty of good-doing been inactive until now? Was it impotent?

I think you only wish that duty was the strongest motivator. "If it was, and this OP was unnecessary, how nice that would be".

Besides your criteria of validity, you just agreed with the sentence you quoted of me while attempting to disagree with it: — Bob Ross

You said rationality stipulates only that one must be consistent with one's ethics, and I took that to imply that one's ethical positions can be anything, rationality just requires one to act in accordance with them. I disagreed by saying that ethical positions are held to standards within rationality, but if you agree with that, then great.

It isn’t. — Bob Ross

I will make this my last response, as you're right this is getting nowhere. Mainly, from my perspective, because you are adamant about not interpreting my meaning as I intended. What I said was that your hypothetical example was different from reality, which is just true, for the reasons I said it was. Instead of saying something like, "Yes, I agree, but there are plenty of examples where serial killers are rational in real life", you instead tell me that I'm wrong because there are examples of serial killers who are rational in real life. Which makes no sense.

All of your responses are like this. You so rarely deal with what's actually being said, you either don't understand it or you assert its invalidity, but for the latter, unfortunately, with no argument for why.

That’s why it is called a “hypothetical”: you evaluate it based off of the stipulations. This is not a problem whatsoever. — Bob Ross

I explained the problem, and emphatically telling me I'm wrong isn't an argument.

Firstly, you admitting in the hypothetical that the serial killer is rational refutes your position that ethics is a criteria for rationality—that’s why I used that example. — Bob Ross

I've stated probably at least four separate times that ethics isn't a mandatory criterion for rationality, I argued only that it's an important aspect that in practice is almost always considered.

I didn't amend anything, I merely said it was unlikely (for the serial killer to be considered rational) and then gave some if statements. — Judaka

I said it was possible for a serial killer's actions to be considered rational, but it was unlikely, and then I defended that assertion of unlikelihood. I did not give points to assert that it was inherently irrational. — Judaka

Technically, yes, any ethical theory could suffice, but it's more complicated than that as I explained earlier. — Judaka

My claim isn't that by definition it entails moral goodness, but I think one could reasonably interpret moral goodness to be a condition for rationality — Judaka

I'm sure there are more than that, but all of those quotes acknowledge the possibility of a serial killer being rational, a sentiment I've repeated from the very first response to you bringing up this example.

Your thinking is unbelievably binary, and most of your arguments are related to a binary, and you strongly reject any challenge to your binary thinking as irrelevant or illegitimate. I don't see the value in that, and I don't subscribe to such absolutism. Rationality is heavily entangled with ethics, and I don't feel even remotely threatened in this claim by your serial killer example, I never have, and I have no idea why I would be. I see you are unwilling to budge, if I have no absolute binary to present, then you're uninterested, so be it, suit yourself.

You have not given a counter-example nor an example of how my definition leads to nonsensical and true propositions — Bob Ross

I've explained that it's impossible and that I wouldn't give one, which I believe I've said twice, but you're still asking for one. Rather than addressing my explanation, you ask again and again as though I just ignored you, unbelievable.

But the concept is in agreement with reality iff that concept corresponds to something in reality. — Bob Ross

Your overall explanation is unintelligible to me, I ask to have it disambiguated if I intended to continue this discussion, but I don't. This sentence stands out at least, as an egregious misunderstanding which helps me to understand the issue here. I appreciate that you see yourself as reasonable and willing to be proven wrong, but that's not my view, so I don't see the point in putting effort into explaining your error. You should more strongly emphasise the role of language, don't take it for granted, that's all I'll say.

On second thought, I actually don’t think intentions matter for rationality, because one could be intending to be rational while actually being incredibly irrational; so I think the definition stands as “to act in a manner that agrees with reality”. — Bob Ross

Rationality is a manmade concept, it can refer to whatever we want it to, intentions or acts. Obviously, an understanding of rationality as acts where intention is irrelevant, finds intentions to be irrelevant, but you actually seem to think you're saying something deeper than that. Rationality isn't some natural phenomenon that one studies like a scientist, the word just refers to what it refers to, but I agree, it disregards intention. Hence why I went through a list of problems that creates, which you avoided dealing with quite masterfully.

I honestly am starting to believe you don’t any examples of what you are claiming, as you never provide them and constantly beat around the bush about them. — Bob Ross

Your lack of ability to provide your own examples only demonstrates that you don't understand what I'm talking about, which, well, makes sense considering you rarely do. Examples are in areas of psychological factors, mental health problems, working memory/memory, executive function, thinking patterns, environmental factors, socioeconomic factors, physical factors and many other considerations. To begin with, one's prioritisation of long-term goals represents itself a goal, and is not purely reflective of someone's feelings and thinking. Many want to become fit, for example, is their inability to succeed in that a mere knowledge problem? Surely, you can understand it's deeper than that.

You're clearly willing to deviate from your definition as it suits you to make things work, and you might be okay with that, but I'm not. The truth conditions of your rationality are exclusively about acts, and yet all of the implications have to do with knowledge, and that's a problem. You know that if mental health issues or executive function problems are at fault, then one is not just being irrational, because the term clearly implies problems with thinking. What you've done in agreeing isn't defend the legitimacy of your definition, you've torn it apart, you've demonstrated how absurd it is to understand rationality as an epistemic term. It's disappointing that you can't see that, but I'm not surprised.

Our discussion was regrettable, despite everything I've said, I know your intentions were genuine, and I wish you the best.

But, as I said before, rationality does not consider anything ethical except for being consistent in one’s ethics; and I thought you agreed with me on that? — Bob Ross

Nope, goals must be rational as well, if your ethical position is invalid, inconsistent or illogical, then you aren't being rational by merely being consistent.

Sort of. If I can provide an example of a person that you would consider rational, under the definition thereof, which does not exhibit a property of which you are claiming is essential to rationality, then I thereby have demonstrated a contradiction in your view. — Bob Ross

I described it as an aspect, we've already covered this, and yet you're bringing it up like I haven't clarified this multiple times.

In the case of the psychopath, you can’t claim that (1) there is such a thing as a rational and egregiously immoral psychopath and (2) that rationality, by definition, entails moral goodness. — Bob Ross

My claim isn't that by definition it entails moral goodness, but I think one could reasonably interpret moral goodness to be a condition for rationality. In practice, us consistently finding immoral actions to be irrational would allow one to interpret that moral goodness was a condition. Remember that when you give me an example like "the serial killer has this goal and this opinion and these values", that's remarkably distinct from reality. I have no basis by which I can question the traits or opinions of a hypothetical serial killer, and so your word is law here. You can give your serial killer all the traits, values and beliefs (and you have done that) to make him rational, and thus, I can't reasonably call him irrational. That's true for the hypothetical serial killer, but not in any real-life case.

In real life, I'll be using my interpretations, my beliefs, my characterisations, my knowledge and my understanding of the serial killer, not yours. It's there that my biases and my opinions will be allowed to operate as usual, and there that the serial killer is unlikely to be considered rational - though it depends on the judge.

We won't see eye to eye on this though, it's clear enough that we have a different understanding of logic, language and truth.

Perhaps, if you would like, then you could offer a counter-example, similar to mine, that demonstrates the need of moral consideration to determine a person as being rational? — Bob Ross

I already tried to, but you just found ways of dismissing everything I said, as though that meant something. Whatever traits or beliefs your serial killer needed to be rational, you gave him, however, it was required to interpret his actions to be rational, you argued for. As someone who considers rationality highly subjective, none of this is compelling. Mostly you're just proving that he who acts the judge can conclude how they deem fit.

What relationship?!? — Bob Ross

Just rationality's importance in ethics.

I don’t disagree that what is rational will impact ethics, but you are saying that ethics impacts rationality. — Bob Ross

I'm saying that rationality is merely a tool for ethics, everything else is largely misdirection.

Thinking is an action, and actions which are in agreement with reality are rational. — Bob Ross

So you keep insisting. I was generous with your definition, I thought you were relying on a common understanding of what it might mean for something to "agree with reality", but it seems not, do you mean it literally? Can you explain how two unthinking concepts can be "in agreement"? Explain how that works.

That is all the definition should ever portray: what is rational, and, in light of that, what is not. There is absolutely nothing else the any definition should do other than define the word. — Bob Ross

The definition of rationality defines what is rational, the word portray sends shivers down my spine... Do you think rationality is a natural phenomenon or what?

I don’t think this is irrational because you were still being consistent, to your best ability, with your goals: you just forgot. I don’t see how the act of genuinely forgetting is irrational. — Bob Ross

Your definition makes no mention of "to the best of one's ability".

Perhaps a better definition is “an act that attempts to agree with reality” — Bob Ross

That would be a significant improvement for sure.

I don’t see how this is a flaw: if one has a goal and has prioritized it above all the others, then it makes no sense do something prioritized lower—either de-prioritize the goal or do it. — Bob Ross

How silly. I'm going to just ignore this comment.

How is it absurd and antiscientific? — Bob Ross

A failure to act logically isn't necessarily an inability to comprehend what's logical, in fact, it's usually not. We struggle to do what we know we should do for a variety of reasons, surely, you can think of examples without my help.

I am starting to suspect you don’t have any examples of my definition implying something nonsensical — Bob Ross

Yep, you're right. I won't repeat myself a third time.

You can see my thread on truth here . — Bob Ross

Your understanding is a mess as expected. Truth is merely a correct reference or the correct answer, it's a function of logic and it's tied to language. I wrote something somewhat relevant recently.

I imagine you are using the word "truth" to roughly reference "being in accordance with reality". The other common use is through logic. The two combine to create a significant grey area for me. Let me ask a simple question, is a dog a dog? I think most people would agree, that it's objectively true, that a dog is a dog. But why? I think it's fair to say that language isn't part of reality, and the categorisation of a dog as a dog isn't either. So, it must be logic that makes it true.

Long story short, I think it's clear that truth is working in reverse here, it's not that "a dog is a dog in reality". It's "When a thing, in reality, meets all the prerequisites to be a dog, then it is a dog". So, if an animal meets all the prerequisites to be a dog, then it's objectively true that it's a dog.

Equally, the "truth" of my argument, involves interpreting reality as meeting the prerequisites of something like "useful". It's true that my argument seems correct, or it's true that my argument seems accurate, or something like that. — Judaka

To reference the "truth" of whether an act is rational or irrational is the same as referencing "the correct reference" or "the correct answer". Scientific claims are measurable and specific, and there, if the truth conditions and claims adhere to standards, then there should be a "correct answer". Rationality, neither measurable nor specific, is an unscientific claim, its truth betrays the characteristics you imagine truth should have. Anyone can create a category, give it a logic, and then claim truth when those conditions are met, isn't that so?

My answer to all: There's a way of understanding each, that is not given by setting out their definitions in words but seen in the way they are used.

But further, any such string of words will be inadequate, failing to account for all uses. — Banno

:up:

I agree and don’t see how this contends with my definition. — Bob Ross

Me neither, which makes sense, given it doesn't have anything to do with your definition.

Right now, we are just discussing what rationality is, not why one would be motivated to tell someone to act in accordance with their values. — Bob Ross

I'm talking about the motivations for creating the word rationality and the motivation for seeing actions or choices as rational or irrational.

I agree that ethics heavily relies on rationality (which is epistemic); but not vice-versa. — Bob Ross

I don't think rationality "relies" on ethics, but ethics play an important role in rationality, in so far as one's goals, values and beliefs naturally take ethical considerations into account. If one admits that's not true for them, fine, as their reward, they can expect their contributions in group discussions to be largely ignored going forward.

Your thinking is binary. As far as you're concerned, seemingly, if you can prove a single exception, then you've proven rationality is disentangled from ethics. I'm focusing on the 99.99% of cases where ethics matter, you're focusing on the 0.01% of cases where it mightn't.

Why are you so concerned with this technical, trivial truth that rationality doesn't necessarily include ethics? If rationality doesn't technically mandate including ethics, should we ignore the relationship between the two? Welcome to the real world, where people don't always speak honestly. Where we advocate for rationality, full well knowing and intending the implications the concept would have on morality and ethics.

I don’t see any moral considerations in what you have been saying about rationality. Saying that one should be consistent in their moral considerations is more like a prerequisite to ethics, not ethics itself. — Bob Ross

The importance of rationality in morality and ethics is the moral consideration, that's why the idea is attractive. Take that away, and we won't ignore that rationality is complete nonsense. It's merely a convenient/useful fiction.

Rationality lists a plethora of different standards for thinking, and it contains within it, nothing that mentions anything that falls outside the area of thought. Despite that, its definition, as well as yours, primarily focuses on acts as being rational or irrational. If I skip going to the gym because I feel tired, since going to the gym is aligned with my long-term goals, we could call that irrational. If I was studying but got distracted by a conversation with a friend, since what I'm studying for is action to accomplish my higher priority goal, then by definition, that's irrational. If I know it would be beneficial to put my keys in the same spot each time, but I forget to do it, by definition, that's irrational.

The implication of rationality as a word is clear, my action is irrational, and here are all of these various thinking techniques that are aligned with rationality, in other words, the term inherently asserts the problem is in my thinking. Yet, by definition, actions are rational or irrational even in cases where there's nothing wrong with the quality of my thinking. Why inherently? Because as you yourself said, it's merely true that one's actions were irrational, well, that holds even if common sense would tell us that this is not a knowledge problem.

Describing actions that don't align with long-term goals or higher-priority beliefs as a flaw of one's thinking is a riot, but that's exactly what the term does. The implication that such actions are necessarily thinking or knowledge problems is absurd and antiscientific, but that's really the only unique thing about rationality. To be able to argue that a failure to act morally is in fact, a knowledge/thinking problem, is greatly useful, but in reality? It's rarely that simple.

Rationality as a word, fails because it doesn't know when not to apply itself, and your definition is just as poor. One's actions may not be of "a manner that agrees with reality" for many reasons outside of knowledge. You can insist that the term is purely epistemic, but you're wrong. Your definition, and normative rationality, merely imply that irrationality is an epistemic problem, and do so incorrectly and misleadingly.

There are many other problems with rationality, mostly in the implications it has about the nature of human beings and thought. That there's a need a kind of logical consistency mindmap, ensuring none of one's beliefs contradict and that everything aligns perfectly, is just another nonsense. It's perfectly healthy to have contradictory beliefs and logic doesn't have to be able to work perfectly when being taken out of context. Again, where it does seem particularly important that we don't allow contradictory beliefs and for logic to be inconsistent is in morality and ethics, which I don't think is a coincidence.

What action that is a manner of acting in agreement with reality is nonsensical to you? Give me one example. — Bob Ross

You're asking me to give an example of sensible behaviour being nonsensical, why don't you see that as a problem? The definition is vague, that's the issue, and what I consider sensible may seem nonsensical to you and vice versa.

Firstly, I don’t think truth is objective nor subjective, but that’s for a separate discussion.

Secondly, I do think there is a truth to the matter of whether the psychopath or serial killer is being internally coherent and logically consistent: that absolutely not a matter of mere semantics. — Bob Ross

Explain how "There is a truth to the matter" is not the same as saying there's an objective truth. Aren't you saying, "There is a truth that is true regardless of whether someone disagrees", or in other words, that it's not subjective?

Then you agree with me that ethics is not a part of the discussion about if a person is being rational; for that serial killer could be violating every common moral law and still be considered rational. — Bob Ross

It's part of the discussion in 99.99% of cases, and arguably in 100% of cases, but there's some subjectivity there. As I said, if I want to interpret the serial killer's actions as irrational, and his thinking and goals as foolish, nothing stops me. You're intent on understanding rationality as an actual, objective truth, but I won't join you there. It requires interpretation, and the claim here is vague and unmeasurable, I think treating its truth as scientific-like truth is silly.

I am confused here: aren’t you saying that it is a part of rationality to be consistent with their own values? — Bob Ross

Yes, I am. In other words, I am saying an aspect of rationality is for one to act in accordance with one's values regardless of whether I think one should act in accordance with their values. I personally don't think one should strive to act in accordance with their values, as I think this leads to rationalisations. My decision-making process inherently involves using my values, if I decide to do something that apparently contradicts my values, I don't see a problem with that. By the way, I'm not aiming to contrast "acting in accordance with" and "acting consistently with", as I think they express the same idea.

I'd argue the entire idea of acting in a way that is consistent with one's values is a moral one. It's about holding people accountable. If you can get me to agree that "People should treat each other with respect", then you can hold me to that in the name of rationality whenever I fail to do that. I might then say "Well, in this case, they deserve it, so it's fine", and then you might dispute that, and that's an important role rationality plays in morality and ethics.

If I agree "People should treat each other with respect" but then later say "Oh, but by the way, I don't really care and I'll just do whatever I want, whenever I want", then what was the point of agreeing in the first place?

You can interpret the relevance of this idea as you like, but that's how I perceive it. The idea of rationality starts to fall apart if we don't include any moral considerations, particularly in the holistic element, noteworthy as instrumental rationality lacks that holistic element. We can talk about what one should do to accomplish goal X as is done in instrumental rationality, provided the goal is measurable and specific. (i.e. not "agree with reality" or any other non-specific, unmeasurable term).

So I can understand your counter here better, please provide me with one example of something which you can derive from my definition which is “utter nonsense” (or even just nonsensical). — Bob Ross

It's not possible from your understanding, because you've defined rationality as the opposite of nonsense. Linguistically, it'd be a contradiction to say something that can be correctly referenced as rational was nonsense, because by referencing something as rational ("...agrees with reality"), one is literally saying it's sensible. I can't call something sensible and nonsensical at the same time, can I?

You just don't appear to view this as a linguistic problem, your term more-or-less references sensible behaviour, that's its definition. In language, we would then reference something as "rational" to convey our opinion that "this is a manner of acting that agrees with reality". It can never be true that "a manner of acting that agrees with reality" was nonsensical, as anything nonsensical cannot be correctly referenced as being "a manner of acting that agrees with reality".

It's when you allow me to interpret and use the word you've created, without you interfering with my usage, that I can show the problem. But if I say "X action agrees with reality", to show how I've interpreted something nonsensical to be "agreeing with reality", I presume you will just tell me "Nope, wrong, X doesn't agree with reality, therefore your example is invalid". Arguably, the very fact that I intentionally selected a nonsensical example is contradictory, because I'd know my example was wrong.

The difference between the word "sensible" and rationality, is that sensible has no baggage, it's a purely evaluative term. Thus, I consider it an honest word. Rationality is inherently "That which is sensible" and also includes a bunch of subjective ideas, which implies that those subjective ideas define what's sensible.

Why? If that psychopath is being consistent, coherent, etc. then I don’t see why anyone would be justified in saying they are irrational on the grounds of them performing an act which violates that person’s ethical theory (of what is the right thing to do). — Bob Ross

Right, but I didn't say that. I'm saying they'd find the serial killer to be inconsistent and incoherent because the serial killer's ethical stance was nonsensical or unjustifiable. Most serial killers believe that what they're doing is immoral, they just either don't care or can't help themselves. You consistently misunderstand language, as though there's an objective truth to whether the serial killer is consistent and coherent, rather than thinking of these as words people use to convey opinion.

Obviously, nobody who thought the serial killer was coherent and consistent would simultaneously say he was irrational because he was incoherent and inconsistent, as that would be contradictory.

I think I may have identified our confusion with each other: are you trying to convey that "rationality" includes the consideration of one's morals and values, as opposed to 'rationality' entailing any sort of particular ethical theory? — Bob Ross

Yep.

If you are just trying to convey that one needs to be consistent with their own values, whatever they may be, then I agree and do not see how my definition precludes that. — Bob Ross

I am not saying one needs to be consistent with their own values, I'm saying that's part of rationality.

I think that it is rational to consider one's values stems from the fact (i.e., that it agrees with reality for me to say that) that one must use their values inevitably to perform any actions; and so it would be irrational to contradict or put no effort into deciphering one's values. However, there is no consideration of any ethical theory in what it means to 'be rational', as it would be very odd indeed to say that someone is irrational for merely disagreeing with one's normative ethical theory (or what not) even in the case that they are being logically consistent, coherent, etc. — Bob Ross

No, rationality by definition references the importance of acting in accordance with one's values, that's what rationality is. You keep referencing your definition to prove we can justify the tenants of rationality with it. Yet, your definition is so vague, that I have no doubt your definition can be used to justify anything bar utter nonsense, so I'm not convinced by what you're doing whatsoever.

Technically, yes, any ethical theory could suffice, but it's more complicated than that as I explained earlier. Your ethical theory must be rationally justifiable and must be in harmony with what's realistic, your expectations, your values and your goals. Consider also, who it is that finds an ethical theory rational or irrational.

If I'm judging the rationality of your choice of ethical theory, I may arrive at a different conclusion than you, and the serial killer is a good example of that. Most wouldn't find the serial killer's goals and values to be rationally justifiable, and so even though his actions align with their own goals, it mightn't matter, but it depends. Rationality is a bloated concept, so full of aspects that I think one can arrive at whatever conclusion one likes.

You took issue with me explaining rationality references ethical considerations, but I just explained my view of what rationality is, it wasn't an endorsement. I don't like or see the value in the concept of rationality, your attempt to just redefine the term as evaluative, as utterly good while retaining the nuances of it, I find a dishonest practice. I'm not interested in fixing the term, it refers to what it refers to.

I don’t think you have demonstrated why “rationality” would include ethical considerations, and I think I have demonstrated that excluding ethics actually fits experience better (such as in the case of a rational psychopath). — Bob Ross

Clarify something for me, are you trying to use the word "rationality" as though you invented it? To give it your own definition and understand it in your own way. Or are you treating it as a public term where I need to justify my understanding of rationality?

On one hand, you're telling me that your OP defines rationality, and I should deal with what you're saying, on the other, you want to have a discussion about "What rationality is" and what comprises it.

I think so. I don’t think you have demonstrated why “rationality” would include ethical considerations, and I think I have demonstrated that excluding ethics actually fits experience better (such as in the case of a rational psychopath). — Bob Ross

Instrumental rationality excludes ethical considerations, if I wanted to convey that I wasn't using them, I'd use that term. As for why rationality would include ethical considerations, it's largely because most people care about them. I listed ethical considerations as an aspect of rationality, not a prerequisite to being rational, and I explained that a serial killer could be considered rational, and gave some if statements to demonstrate part of what was necessary for that to happen.

Rationality is holistic, unlike instrumental rationality, and so it includes the wider ramifications of one's actions. You've given me a hypothetical of a serial killer with no conscience, and a very particular and unusual set of priorities and beliefs, and I've agreed that they could be rational, but your example isn't representative of even the average serial killer, let alone the average person.

For the majority, who do have moral beliefs and value ethics, one will naturally need to take these factors into consideration. One aims to act in a way that makes sense considering one's goals, beliefs and values, that's rationality.

You're depicting rationality as ultra-pragmatic and goal-driven by denying the ethical element, which would be fine if you specified you were talking about instrumental rationality... or if you're pretending you made up the term rationality and you're defining it in your OP.

It can never be an epistemic problem, but it can surely be a pragmatic or moral problem! You keep conflating the different types of “goodness” I have outlined with some sort of generic one, which doesn’t work. — Bob Ross

The problem you outlined with a "generic one" and the way in which it doesn't work was intended. I've only ever brought up the term "good" to demonstrate the problems with your definition. You've overcomplicated things by insisting on interpreting "good" as moral. I'm tired of making the same point though, so I won't.

First, I want to know what benefit there is to including moral considerations in the term “rationality”, and then we can dive into ethical theories if we want to. — Bob Ross

Benefit?

Why do you think it needs moral considerations? — Bob Ross

I don't think it needs to, it just does. I understand rationality as something far more specific than you seem to. In terms of "agreeing with reality", that is so goddamn vague, I could add anything I wanted, and I would, as would everyone. I would understand the term however I wanted. You can't both define rationality as "acting in a manner that agrees with reality" and then also outline the ways in which we must understand when actions "agree with reality". A definition is just a small, short few words, and then people fill in what that means for themselves.

Not at all. I said nothing that denies the law of noncontradiction. — Bob Ross

Well, if you say so.

I would also like to mention that the primary focus of the OP is not the definition rationality: you have just hyper-focused on it: the argument is that there are objective epistemic norms. — Bob Ross

There are objective standards for good singing or dancing as well, and everything else, sure, why not epistemic norms as well?

Based off of your response, I do not think this discussion is going to be productive. I think I put in the effort to address all of your points and, instead of reciprocating that effort, you resorted to primarily re-voicing your distaste for my definition (with no real substantive response). — Bob Ross

What do you think makes something part of rationality? Is something only part of rationality when we agree with it? What makes an understanding of the concept "correct" or "incorrect"?

You say you disagree with the ethical dimension of rationality, but is it even valid for you to disagree? Who gets to decide what is or isn't part of rationality, and on what basis?

Rationality just is what it is, I explained my understanding of what it is, and if you provide a very good problem with it, then I won't just say "Ah, that's not part of rationality then", I'll instead say, "You've pointed out a good problem with the concept".

You've set up rationality as "good", you've literally defined it as "good practice", and thus, rationality can never be a problem, and I think that's asinine. There are many flaws with it, but look at your OP, you're making the case for rationality, while also defining rationality as "best practice". Can't you see how stupid that is? If rationality is best practice, then it's self-evident that it's the best, so why would we need a thread validating it? There's nothing to discuss, besides rejecting your definition.

Your justification for it not counting as rational, which is imperative for your position to work, is the hypothetical that they understood their actions were wrong; — Bob Ross

I said it was possible for a serial killer's actions to be considered rational, but it was unlikely, and then I defended that assertion of unlikelihood. I did not give points to assert that it was inherently irrational.

The reason rationality is biased against the serial killer is that it emphasises moral views as being of the highest priority. Morality excludes personal factors and motivations, it's about what's best for the group. The serial killer's joy of killing isn't a valid moral argument, and without that, intellectually speaking, the serial killer would probably conclude that their actions weren't best for the group - obviously. Yes, they press ahead anyway, but rationally, their actions do not correlate with their moral beliefs, so we could say they're being irrational.

You may understand rationality as unbiased and fair, as you seem to think it's literally perfection, but all that means is you're unable to critically analyse the concept. It's not unbiased, it's not fair, and the concept is rigged against the serial killer - though mind you, most people are fine with that.

If you wanted to know what instrumental rationality is, how about, GOOGLING it? What the heck... I'm not the first person to bring it up to you.

All definitions are ‘made up’, but that doesn’t mean they are whimsical or arbitrary. — Bob Ross

Everyone has an opinion. Reasons and justifications come as easily as ideas, nothing special. That's no cause for dishonest language. Rationality can be best practice - and let anyone define what that is, or it can be a specific idea, as outlined previously, choose one.

I am not sure what you are implying here: either something is p or it is not p; so either something is rational or it is not rational. — Bob Ross

Ah, is that so? You said yourself that nobody can be 100% perfectly rational, which should invalidate it as a binary, does it not? Rationality is just an idea, it can have flaws, well, at least if you define it reasonably, which you haven't.

The tenants of rationality are not the same as its definition: they are examples of it. I gave the definition. — Bob Ross

Yes, I'm unwilling to work with you while you use that definition, it's dishonest to an extreme, but like I said, keep it as is your right. I recommend that if you intend to keep it no matter what, you shouldn't respond to this comment, it will be a waste of your time.

No (: This is a hard no for me. Again, a psychopath can kill people in a highly rational (as in carefully planned, logically consistent, goal-oriented, coherent, effective, etc.). — Bob Ross

Yes, well, as I said, you're describing instrumental rationality.

You have amended the originally example I gave in a manner that fundamentally changes it: you are positing that the psychopath themselves believe that they are doing something wrong. — Bob Ross

I didn't amend anything, I merely said it was unlikely and then gave some if statements.

In summary, I think that your tenants are derived from my over-arching definition of rationality. — Bob Ross

They're definitely not derived from your over-arching definition of rationality...

Your definition is so vague, that I'd be surprised if you couldn't fit whatever you wanted into it. Hence why I called it a form of "good".

Thusly, to be rational is purely an epistemic consideration; but it may be that certain rational behaviors are banned for moral reasons. — Bob Ross

You're entitled to your opinion, but you'll get pushback from others.

Rationality is conditioned to be epistemically good by what epistemology is set out to accomplish, which is to know. It is not logically, actually, nor metaphysically necessary that it is good. — Bob Ross

This is just linguistics. You're behaving as though your definition was earned, given to the term rationality because it really deserves it. Have you forgotten that you just made it up...?

but that doesn’t lend any weight to your argument that rationality as I defined it is inherently good. — Bob Ross

I'm shocked it's something that required an argument. Genuinely, how is this even a discussion for you? There's zero ambiguity here, it's never good to fail to act in a manner that 'agrees with reality", there's no merit to it. Not epistemologically, morally, logically or in any other way.

Irrationality is nonsense. — Bob Ross

And you've decided these are the two options? Rationality or irrationality? Get a bit more creative.

Ahh... by the way, you won't be able to succeed in this if you keep your current definition of rationality. Perhaps just try to think about rationality through its tenants instead.

Because in order to know the world one has to deploy principles which agree with it. — Bob Ross

Principles that agree with the world? Good gracious... Well, that's checkmate I guess, nobody would dare argue with principles that agree with the world.

Although I am going to address your points as adequately as possible, I would like to ask you to define and elaborate on, likewise, what you think “rationality” is; that way, I can assess and compare our views more sufficiently. — Bob Ross

Rationality has a few aspects to it:
1) Logical thinking - One should think logically, and avoid unhelpful emotional and psychological influences.
2) Goal-driven thinking - One acts in accordance with their goals
3) Logical Consistency - One acts in accordance with their values and beliefs
4) Hierarchical Thinking - One follows 2) but prioritises goals and values in order of importance
5) Reflection and Openmindedness - One aims to improve their thinking and decision-making
6) Ethical Considerations - Rational decision-making should take into account ethical principles and moral values.
7) Acknowledging Biases - One should aim to think objectively, be mindful of the potential for biased thinking and aim to focus on the facts
8) Evidence-based Thinking - One should ensure their thinking has sufficient evidence to be justifiable

In comparison to alternatives, I'll highlight a few things that are accurate in my estimation:

1) Goals must be rational

This is a critically important point to understanding rationality, one's goals must qualify as rational, or else goal-driven behaviour is irrational. It's unlikely that a psychopath's desire to kill would qualify as rational, though it's possible. If they understood their actions were wrong, considering that morality is of the highest importance, we couldn't say their actions aligned with their beliefs and values, which is a prerequisite to rationality. Their actions have risks such as imprisonment or death, if one understands the risks of an action outweigh the potential rewards, then by definition, pressing ahead anyway would be irrational.

Rationality has an important role in morality, because within philosophy, morality is overriding, it's of the highest priority. To argue logically that morality isn't overriding is unlikely to succeed within the context of philosophy. Essentially, one doesn't get to ascribe rationality to their own actions, and there are quite a few hoops to jump through.

2) Rationality is holistic

Rationality perceives a person as a machinery comprised of beliefs, values and goals, all tied together, what one produces should correlate with those parts. One's beliefs need to be non-contradictory, there needs to be cohesion, and everything should make sense together. One must review their beliefs, values and goals to ensure their quality and cohesion.

There's more I could say, but that's the gist of it.

What you're describing is seemingly best described as "instrumental rationality", a strict means-end approach.

I don’t see how it, by definition, divides between moral goodness vs. badness, and it being epistemically good is not the definition of it but, rather, a biproduct “rationality” being an essential element of epistemology.

How is the division between some good vs. bad “the only thing it does”? — Bob Ross

Are you honestly saying that it's not epistemologically good to "act in a manner that agrees with reality"? I interpret your definition to be directly referencing my accurate understanding of the world, and my ability to understand my acts in relationship to how things really are (reality). It suggests that when one makes decisions or holds beliefs, they're basing them on accurate information and evidence about the way things actually are.

You've set up rationality as inherently good with your definition, have you not? Rationality by your definition is "good epistemological practices". It's not that complicated, there's no circumstance where you'd consider being called irrational praise. It's not conditionally good, it's necessarily good. No soul under any circumstances would consider being called irrational praise, especially not with your definition.

1. Whether I think being rational is good (in any sense of the term) is irrelevant to its definition in the OP. — Bob Ross

I agree, but only because being rational is inherently good by your definition, and I believe it's unreasonable to think otherwise.

There are objectively better norms for “knowing the world”; that is, there are better ways, independent of minds (i.e., of “opinions”, of “subjects”, etc.), to come to know reality. — Bob Ross

How unfortunate, you're contrasting rationality against nonsense. I find your understanding incorrect on so many levels. To begin with. where in your definition of rationality does it reference anything related to "knowing the world"? Or in other words, why do I need to act in a manner that agrees with reality to know the world? It's pretty much the other way around, I need to know the world to act in a manner that agrees with it.

I could fail to follow most of what you call rationality and be no worse off in "knowing the world", perhaps if you want to talk only about epistemology, that's what you should do. Make no mention of acts, logic or goals, limit your definition to knowledge if that's all you want to talk about.

For me, the only kind of rationality is normative, so when you say “normative rationality” it makes me anticipate that you may believe that there is a non-normative mode of being rational: is that true? — Bob Ross

By normative, what I mean is, rationality can be interpreted in a number of ways, "normative" is "the normal way". As in, there are other ways of interpreting rationality besides the normal way. My only meaning is that l I'm saying your understanding isn't normal.

I am not entirely sure what you mean here: yes, acting in a manner that agrees with reality is the general definition I use. — Bob Ross

Okay. Your definition can't be taken literally, as it wouldn't make sense, and so I need to interpret what kind of manners of acting would "agree with reality". You've said this isn't just "good", great, prove me wrong. I struggle to imagine you can come up with one because I can't understand why it would ever be good to not "act in a manner that agrees with reality". Could you give me an example of where it would be?

I've called your definition another way of saying "good" because I'm confident you think it's always "good" to act in a manner that agrees with reality. Meaning, you will not be willing to refer to anything that you thought wasn't good as "acting in a manner that agrees with reality". Do you see my logic? Your definition almost certainly divides between good and bad, and that's seemingly the only thing it does.

Objective epistemic norms provide an epistemic “goodness” but not a moral goodness. — Bob Ross

I hadn't intended "good" to refer to "moral goodness". Your "good" is unknown to me, it's just clear that your definition is a version of "good".

The act of agreeing with reality (i.e., being “rational”) is epistemically “good” because it is an objectively better means of “knowing the world”, which is a hypothetical imperative that one has committed themselves to the very moment they engage in epistemology. — Bob Ross

Objectively better? Could you elaborate? Do you have any evidence to back up your claim?

1. I am not saying that one should be things that agree with reality: I am saying that one should act in a manner that agrees with reality. — Bob Ross

Yes, I believe I said as much, the "it's" here is referring to what I had guessed "acting in a manner that agreed with reality" entailed.

What do you mean? A reasonable alternative definition? — Bob Ross

Well, that would work too.

I read your response to 180 and hmm, you are definitely understanding rationality in your own way. I had been assuming much based on my understanding of normative rationality, but it's clear that doesn't apply to you.

Aren't (3) and (4) key components of rationality? As in, a rejection of rationality could target either of these points. Your thinking seems to have been heavily influenced by the ideas of rationality as shown by (3) and (4), as well as your use of "objective".

Your definition of rationality is terrible, "acting in a manner that agrees with reality". You're really going to refer to "agrees with reality" as being "objectively grounded"?

The manner of acting that can be referred to as "agrees with reality" is just "good". That which is sensible, efficient, or appropriate, is what can be referred to as "agreeing with reality", more or less, right? So, it's objectively good to be things that by definition can only refer to things that are good? Yeah... no kidding.

Contrast rationality with a reasonable alternative. Setting up rationality as "good" and then talking about how it's good to be good, that's pointless.

I think (?) your are implicitly picturing some naked reality (from no perspective, but really still yours) that MAKES a statement true or untrue. — plaque flag

Why?

In that sense, all beliefs are true, as an expression of how the world is seen by the mind by a person at that time --- but only about their view on the world. — plaque flag

When you have the concept of a plum, and the concept of a box, and the conceptual understanding of what it would mean for a box to contain a plum. And you then believe that a box has a plum in it, and you open it up, and it doesn't, then your belief is wrong, right?

As a function of logic, truth relies on concepts, it's an expression only possible in language (inclusive of mathematics/symbols). Logic works the same regardless of where the data comes from, and yes, our perspective is given to us, and the only data which gets inputted into my logic comes from my brain. Nonetheless, a specific claim can still be invalidated by new information, I can believe something that is false.

That new information can come from "naked reality", in so far as the plum does actually refer to something real, as does the box, and if the plum isn't there, maybe we could call that "naked reality', idk. As a word, reality has its uses, but it's vague, I'm not too interested in discussing what is or isn't in it.

I wonder, has your position changed since we first began speaking? How firm is your commitment to your current understanding? Do I need to reconcile what you say now with what you've said in the past?

Discussing is people working together toward better beliefs. [People might say 'truer,' but this leads to confusion, because 'true' is simply [mostly] used to agree with 'mere' belief.] — plaque flag

"True" validates correct reference, as for what makes a reference correct, that depends on the logic. This means that what's "true" could be unknown, such as if I ask which poster on this forum has the highest number of posts. I don't know the answer to that, but I believe there is an answer. I don't want a "better belief", I want to know the truth, and the true answer isn't just whatever I believe.

I figure I must be misrepresenting you somewhere, but at the same time, here you are telling me that "better beliefs" are equivalent to "truer beliefs". I'm a bit lost, and perhaps that's my fault, I have difficulty tracking long discussions. I do aspire for better beliefs, but what's better is guided by what's pragmatic, my objectives, what's the logic you're using to define "better'?

Boring answer but I think the possibility you alluded to is correct, the word has separate definitions and the meaning depends on the context.

A consistent definition that works within all the different contexts will poorly represent what the word means in each of those different contexts.

I have agreed that all we have is belief, and I agree that our concepts are part of our understanding of the world. I can talk about dogs, but that's it, I can only refer to a concept, and think in terms of concepts.

I think your explanation of "true", as endorsing or disputing beliefs, risks misrepresenting the concept. I could dispute a belief for any number of reasons, but to call something untrue is a particular type of dispute. Truth has a particular quality given to it because it's a function of truth, it should be clearly distinguished from belief. I won't say more than that, I doubt I can tell you anything that you don't already know.

I thought you meant a word referring to nonword stuff. — plaque flag

The opposite. A dog is a dog, an animal, a mammal, a loyal companion, a pet, but not a building. It's not true that a dog is a building, it's an incorrect reference. Even if dogs went extinct, it changes nothing, the rules are all made up, and they only change if we change them.

Our understanding of the word would, I claim, be an understanding of part of the world. — plaque flag

I agree, the concept of fairness certainly is part of anyone's understanding of the world.

To me it seems like you are wavering between trying to explain what makes a true statement true and how 'true' is used. But I don't think the first mission is possible.

It does not work to talk about prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true. It gets paradoxical, because 'prelinguistic stuff' is linguistic stuff. — plaque flag

I don't understand the criticism of "prelinguistic stuff making linguistic stuff true". What is prelinguistic stuff?

To clarify, rain is a created category, as we agreed, it doesn't exist in reality, and there is no "actual raining". I understand truth as a correct reference, in other words, it can't be disentangled from language. Truth is a function of logic, but that isn't the "logic of reality", it's the logic of our language and concepts.

All we ever have is belief. But we use 'true' and 'false' to endorse or dispute beliefs. Establishing which beliefs are warranted/ justified is where the real work happens, except that our discussion is valuable for making all of this clear to ourselves, getting the power cord untangled.

How does that sound ? — plaque flag

I agree that all we ever have is belief, but truth is technically a function of logic, the term does not endorse or dispute but affirms or denies the conditions as being met. This allows us to talk about truth conceptually, as that which would meet the conditions, regardless of whether we know of it. Context helps us to guess what conditions are being employed, should be employed or are being referred to. "True" might not be an endorsement of a belief, but an assertion that the conditions were indeed met, and that one is sure of this.

To say that something can be correctly referenced as something is to say something about it, and the logic of what one should do if something is something is also part of the idea of truth.

A central idea in philosophy is fairness, but arguably, this term tells us absolutely nothing about the world. Also arguably, what matters more about the word fairness, isn't what it describes, but what it means must be done. If something is unfair, it's wrong, so it shouldn't be done. To me, this part of unfairness is entangled with the concept, as if I can provide a compelling justification for why something is beneficial or practical, we mightn't want to call it unfair, as it would mean we'd have to stop.

We could point out how unfair the capitalist business structure is, practically a dictatorship, characterised by an immense imbalance of power. Yet, the merits of the system would get brought up against this argument, the productivity, the efficiency and so on. This doesn't seem to make sense, until noting that pointing out how unfair and immoral it is would demand condemnation and cessation of the practice. If you can point out a good alternative, suddenly, people are happy to condemn it as unfair. I'd argue the same thing happened with the ramping up of industrialisation and the end of slavery.

The philosopher has their tools, for example, "rationality, "responsibility", "free will", "morality", and so on. How is a critique of these tools handled? What is the usual response? Your experience might be different, but for me, they start talking about consequence and utility. These ideas, and their truth, are as contingent upon their usefulness as anything else. A compelling argument against the utility of their understanding would suffice to convince them to change, and it's this I meant, though truth is not usefulness, usefulness is truth or a prerequisite to truth.

Essentially, it's important to note that the conditions for establishing truth are often selected for pragmatic reasons, the reference is made for pragmatic reasons and the term is defined pragmatically. On top of that, we may assert a reference as true or false for its implications, as a reason for doing something. Even in our summary of truth, you may resist mine and I may resist yours, not because of a flaw in the other's understanding but because we're paying attention to what serves our own ends best.

If we have a community that cares about God and believe in God, then someone saying 'God is love' is sharing their own conceptual view of this entity. — plaque flag

I think "God is love" is a good example of how truth is pragmatic, and I don't for a second believe such a vague claim inspires belief for any non-practical reason. The subtext of the claim is more important, what are they trying to get you to do because God is love? What are they trying to get you to think? Why is it important to them that God is love? Probably, the argument can be whatever suffices to convince belief, and if their objective was better served by some other argument then they'd use that instead. Well, I'm undoubtedly a cynic, but what's useful too often coincides with what's true, the two go hand-in-hand.

Contrasting capitalism to socialism is folly, instead, we should assume private ownership, and ask what level of government interventionism there is. Neoliberal capitalism is largely responsible for most of the issues people associate with capitalism, but really, we've been told a bunch of lies about what's needed for capitalism. Let's not underestimate human greed, even under very unfavourable and unfair conditions with high levels of government oversight, companies would retain their drive for profit and innovation.

The second question is the structure of the private ownership, contrasting what we have to co-ops etc.

If you clarify this I might agree.

But let me offer this:

Does
The assertion that it is raining is warranted.
mean
It is raining. — plaque flag

This question really shows a significant problem with truth in my opinion. The answer is, of course, yes. A correct reference is correct because it's correct or in other words because the conditions were met for the reference to be correct. If it's correct to say it's raining, then it's correct to say it's raining, which is what your question is asking.

This might also explain some of your usage of the words truth and the truth that I can't make any sense of. You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining". Let's explore some of the nuances here.

To borrow ChatGPT, I asked it : What must be true in order for us to say it's raining? It's reply:

For us to confidently say that "it's raining," certain conditions must be met:

Precipitation: Rain is a type of precipitation where water droplets fall from the atmosphere. So, for it to be raining, there must be a significant presence of falling water droplets.

Observation: Someone (or something) must have observed or detected the falling water droplets. This could be a person visually seeing and feeling the raindrops or a rain gauge measuring the amount of precipitation.

Consistency: The presence of falling water droplets must be consistent over a certain period of time. A brief drizzle or a few isolated drops might not qualify as "it's raining."

Not Other Forms of Precipitation: To distinguish rain from other forms of precipitation like snow, sleet, or hail, it's important to confirm that the falling precipitation is indeed liquid water droplets.

Corroborating Evidence: It's helpful to have corroborating evidence such as wet surfaces, the sound of rain hitting roofs or windows, or changes in visibility due to the falling precipitation.

Meteorological Criteria: In meteorology, there are specific criteria and instruments used to officially measure and record rainfall. These criteria might include a certain amount of water collected over a specific time period, which is often measured in millimeters or inches.

In essence, for us to confidently declare that "it's raining," we need to observe a consistent, significant presence of falling liquid water droplets that align with meteorological and observational standards. — ChatGPT

Without bothering to ask whether I agree with this or not, it's illustrative of a set of conditions that must be met for it to be correct to reference the weather as raining. We can assume these were met if it's correct to say it's raining.

We can also contrast, where although the conditions for saying it's "raining" were met, it could still be incorrect because "drizzling" better captures the kind of rainfall we're referring to. "it's incorrect to say it's raining because it's drizzling" and I'm sure the distinction between raining and drizzling has been made. What's reasonable to do or not do because it's raining isn't the same as what's reasonable to do or not because it's drizzling, and it's different again for "pouring" which implies heavy rain.

Thus, there are many arguments I can make for why "raining" is an incorrect reference, even if it's technically true. "Rain" is a straightforward concept, it obscures most of the subjectivity at play in language and truth, which is why it's wrong to extrapolate from them.

The effect isn't just produced because "rain" is closer to sense data, it's that examples using sense data are typically very straightforward. Is it correct to reference "rain" as a word that starts with the letter R? Is it correct to reference "rain" as a noun? They're just as obvious - because they're straightforward, simple and use stable concepts. The truth of the correct reference is so compelling, it's so inconceivable that anyone could disagree, but that's not what truth is. It's just an extreme on a spectrum, nothing more, unfortunately, I think it's a nameless spectrum, but maybe "objectiveness" is close.

So prejudice is simultaneously enabling and limiting. — plaque flag

I prefer the word bias to prejudice, though for some shitty reason, both words have negative connotations but nonetheless, I agree. Selecting good biases is essential, one of the most important aspects of thinking. Philosophy is its own pair of glasses, each pair has its own pros and cons.

'Oppression' has a role as a token in a 'game.' It's like a virtual object in conceptual space. People see this object differently. The word has different meanings for people. The argument is about how the token/word ought to be understood and used. It's my private perspective on this 'object' that I want foisted on everyone else. I want 'them' to see oppression as I do ('correctly.') — plaque flag

I see. I mostly agree with your characterisation, but for the sake of clarity, I'll explain that the word "oppression' is still true when it's correct as a reference. The difference between it and a word like "rain" is in the conditions. For it to be correct to reference something as oppression, it must be unfair, and that's why the word is so contentious. That the conditions for something to be "fair" are so vague and open to interpretation is part of why the word oppression is so contentious.

The conditions for a reference to be correct exist for all words, and truth is created when they're met. That tells us all we need to know about truth, it has only a single quality, that of correct reference. Which is my point, why should anyone care about a disorganised list of correct references?

It's trivially true that truth matters, it's so abundant, and self-asserting, just like logic. That's what makes truth & logic so fickle and worthless. The questions to which we want truth are value-laden, it's all about the conditions. I ask a question I want an answer to, "How can I get the best results in X" or "How can I most efficiently accomplish Y". My question and the conditions for knowing truth are what matters, the value of truth is entirely dependent upon their good qualities. To talk of my search for answers as a search for truth is asinine, it's misleading, my questions are pragmatic, they're about doing, about use. My conditions for truth aim to ensure its usefulness.

Truth and logic have as their primary qualities abundance and mixed and unreliable relevance and quality. I assume any thinker, and especially one as advanced as yourself understands this problem, the need for good questions, good truth conditions, good biases and objectives. Yet, I think it's wrong to only talk about truth & logic, assuming these things were done well, we're attributing our successes to the wrong things.

Your response covers a lot of ground, and I am starting to lose track of what we're arguing for/against. I'll focus on debating what truth is for now, but I'm a bit unsure as to what your motivations are. To clarify, I am unhappy with philosophy being understood as an impractical interest in truth, or thinking of logic in philosophy as exemplary of what's "truly logical". I see it as having its particular biases and objectives, and I believe that's how it should be understood. There are advantages and disadvantages to its approach, and a philosopher can be understood as someone who believes in the project and its merits.

I think what I can offer in discussions can be rapidly diminished as I'm overwhelmed by different topics, contexts and objectives, and maybe I'm already overcapacity, so apologies in advance.

How does one hold up a meaning (the meaning of an assertion) against the world to compare that meaning with a state of affairs right ? — plaque flag

I'll just stick with what I've been saying, that truth is a correct reference. What that actually means is ambiguous, it depends on the word or claim. All of the rules for language use are invented, including for words such as "rain". The reference is correct when the conditions for it to be correct are met, and that's what truth is.

Words reference and nothing more, and what they're referencing is tied to the conditions of the reference being correct.

When I call an assertion true, I am basically endorsing or repeating that assertion. — plaque flag

You're agreeing the reference is correct in a linguistic sense.

It's only correct to reference the weather as raining under such strict conditions, the claim is very testable, and the meaning is quite specific. So, there are very few cases where one person would think it's correct to say it's raining, and another would disagree. Such simple examples can obscure the subjective nature of truth.

Just as with "systems should never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", you can agree it's correct to say this, but the assertion probably isn't the same. It's just too vague, who qualifies as powerful? What does it mean for a system to rely on the goodwill of the powerful? We can say the same words, but what we mean isn't the same, and I think the assertion is in what we mean, but let me stress, my reasons for saying this are definitely pragmatic.

To give an example close to the heart of philosophy, I criticise the way we agree to condemn moral terms such as oppression, racism, theft and so on. Since, generally the thing we're referring to needs to be immoral for it to be correct to reference that thing using one of these moral terms, the consensus is hollow. We can both agree that oppression is immoral, but it's a rather superficial agreement, especially if we refuse to reference the same conditions as "oppression".

I agree we don't "intend" to find things to be something like oppression, but I worry that you're trying to extrapolate from simple examples such as rain. I'm sure you're not extrapolating as though there's zero difference, but I'm unsure about the differences you do perceive.

The next issue is whether it is raining. — plaque flag

Just to clarify specifically, I disagree with this, it's just a matter of whether it's correct to reference the weather as raining. The nuances of this are far more apparent when dealing with a word such as oppression.

It has to be an explication of a logic we mostly use transparently. — plaque flag

Can you clarify what you mean? What & why?

I think that phrase of mine was awkward. I meant describing the world [accurately.] I 'intend a state of affairs' as 'actual.' — plaque flag

I don't think truth is a word about describing the world accurately. When you attempt to describe the world, it's only correct to reference that description as true when it's accurate, which is what creates this meaning of the word. So, it depends on the context. "God is love" is almost certainly not trying to accurately describe the world, if that's what you had meant, I thoroughly disagree. This claim is about interpretation and understanding, it's sophisticated thought.

For Gadamer, following Heidegger, our interpretative prejudices are otherwise invisible to us. We think they are the world, but they are glasses we can take off. — plaque flag

I'd be interested to hear more about this, as I'm not quite sure what you're referring to here, but perhaps this represents our disagreement. What do you mean by "glasses we can take off"? How would "glasses we can take off and exchange for other pairs" work as an alternative?

A big part of philosophy is converting false necessity into optional contingency ---a journey toward greater freedom and a wider view. — plaque flag

Could you clarify what you mean?

You might like this essay on the topic. I do think Brandom is great in general. — plaque flag

I am ADHD and thus struggle to follow even small essays, but I am going through it. How much of this paper coincides with your understanding? Anywhere you notably disagree with it?

For what it's worth, I think your views are quite reasonable on an existential level. So I'm just being a stickler on a few technical issues that interest me. — plaque flag

Glad to hear it. It's clear that some miscommunication occurred, I delayed my response so we'd have a chance to collect ourselves. Unlike in most conversations, our need for a precise understanding in discussing philosophy makes miscommunication easier, but also more problematic. On top of that, we lack the precise language other disciplines may have, so, I take it as part of the game, we try to avoid it, but alas, it's unavoidable. I'd like to not worry about who is responsible for the miscommunication, though if you want to address that, I'm okay with it, but I'll just cover some areas where I think it happened and hopefully, we can resolve it.

Habermas now proposes instead a “pragmatic epistemological realism” (2003a, 7; 1998b, chap. 8). His theory of truth is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that depend on our linguistic resources. — plaque flag

This is at minimum, very close to my view, and has the possibility of being the exact same. I'll address some possible differences, but first, I'll address this:

It's not a fiction. A fiction is a claim, a story. It's just a created category or status. It exists in the world like being-married and being-baptized. — plaque flag

Marriage is a good example of something I was referring to as a "useful fiction", but from now on, I'll call it a "created category", as I like that. Although I thought calling marriage a useful fiction was normal use, I can see how it could include more than just "created categories", so this term is much better for me. You could re-read whenever I said "useful fiction" as "created category" instead, as that's what I was talking about.

Hopefully, that alone clears most things up.

I'd like to hear what you consider "useful fiction". Would "useful falsehood" work as an alternative? Perhaps give me some alternative names, that might help.

Returning to Habermas. If we're including any created category or concept, such as marriage or justice, then, while he's maybe not saying the exact same thing as me, I do 100% agree with him. This quote says "proposition/statement for which we claim truth", which could imply that we have to be intending to make a statement about what is true, and if that were the case, then I wouldn't go that far.

For me, a single word works just as well as a proposition/statement. I've made the example of "dog" which I consider a created category, if it's correct to refer to an animal as a dog, then it's true that it's a dog. This is what I meant by "useful fictions create truth", now replacing that to be "created categories create truth".

I include typically subjective categories such as "beautiful" or "just". If it's correct to refer to a thing as beautiful, then it's true that thing is beautiful. To clarify, by "correct" I mean, one agrees it's beautiful, not just agrees it's a correct use of the word grammatically.

All of this means that "truth" doesn't tell us how the world actually is, and one's interpretation, one's logic, and one's concepts, all matter in determining what's true and what isn't. In scientific disciplines, norms and rules attempt to limit the flexibility of interpretation, there's a specific and carefully selected logic that must be used, and concepts have a clear and specific meaning. In those contexts, "truth" has a specific meaning and weight to it, but in other contexts, the truth could just reflect a single person's whimsically formed opinion.

The point is your intention to articulate the truth. God is love is also vague, but people who say it are trying to tell me about the world — plaque flag

Where I've been struggling is in your usage of "truth" or "the truth". Truth is a correct reference, it requires two parts, the thing we're referring to, and the thing we're calling it - or the claim.

It doesn't make sense to me to talk about "articulating the truth", I don't know what that means, especially in the way you're using it. Here, if you think that God isn't love, then you assert it's untrue, if you agree that God is love, then you agree it's true. The reason you change your mind could be anything. A different perspective, a new argument, a revision in your understanding of God or love, or whatever else. Truth isn't just about the world, it's a function of logic, and without pointing out a single new thing about the world, one can change their logic, concepts or created categories and reach a different conclusion.

If I argue "systems should never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", for this to be true, only one thing needs to happen, you need to agree. You can pick any reason, any argument, it doesn't matter. Regardless of if you agree because of reason A or B or Z, all that matters is that your reason shows that systems shouldn't rely on the goodwill of the powerful, and then the statement is true.

But if the claim is specific and measurable such as "The population of Sweden is less than 5 million", then it's a completely different story.

Every example you've worked with while explaining truth has been extremely specific and measurable, such as whether plums are in a box or not. They're the most straightforward, clear-cut, specific and measurable claims we can talk about. They're not representative of the types of claims made in philosophy, which deal with complex concepts and objectives, and require sophisticated interpretation and thinking.

You might agree with a philosophical argument because "It's true that it represents the best option I've heard of". That would be perfectly reasonable. Philosophy is a set of biases, of things that must be true. There's a competition, where "It's true that this approach is likely to succeed at maximising the outcomes I care about" might decide which ideas are best. The "truth" part can be forcibly added, but it's trivial.

Let me know where you agree or disagree, or where more clarity is needed.

To me it's like you are saying the world makes statements true (true statements 'refer' correctly to states of the world? ) and then that truth is just useful fiction. — plaque flag

Yes, true statements refer correctly to states of the world, that's what truth is. If I make up some crap, for example, "If a human being has less than 10 fingers then they're a 0d0f0fj, and all 0d0f0fj should receive 1000 dollars from the government every week", then whether you're a 0d0f0fj or not is simple, we check how many fingers you've got. It wouldn't be true that I'm a 0d0f0fj, there's no arguing about it, I don't meet the prerequisites, since I've got 10 fingers. It's part of "truth" now, but it's also a useful (or not very useful) fiction.

I would love to hear an example that doesn't involve sense data, you keep giving me simple examples, which I don't want. How do we know when something is useful? Is it true that things can be useful? Give me an example like that, I'm uninterested in universally accepted statements like the sky is blue, such examples obscure the subjectivity of truth claims. It comes from the concepts and their application, so don't pick the most stable concepts with the most stable methods of verifying them.

I think this is fascinating path. In my view, it requires a weird ironism. You have to become a kind of metaphysical zen clown, with your speech acts never completely earnest, aiming more at a mood than a stable theory. — plaque flag

Truth is primarily a function of logic for me, it's not "that which is in accordance with reality", we're on the same page about that, right? I am feeling misunderstood.

It's one thing to point out the historical contingency of concepts, but I think you are assuming a radical split between human concepts and some 'pure' preconceptualized world. But that itself is 'just made up,' in my view, a mere philosophers fiction. Just look around the room your in. You see familiar objects, the tools of life. This is what's truly given, not sense-data, etc. The concept of the dog is just part of our recognition of a dog as such. — plaque flag

I'm not aiming to contrast human concepts and a pure pre-conceptualised world whatsoever.

That statement would be true if indeed systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful. — plaque flag

"Indeed"? As in, there's some objective truth on the matter? There are a hundred reasons why systems must not rely on them and hundred reasons why it might be fine for systems to rely on them. If I believe one of the hundred reasons that says we shouldn't or if I believe one of the hundred reasons that said it's fine, isn't that what matters? Also, you could just reject the claim as vague, since without guessing what I'm referring to, there's not enough information to go on. I don't know what "indeed" refers to here.

That's what Trump believes too. If you are so smart, why aren't you a billionaire ? But I think this is an insincere pose, at least for those who aren't sociopaths. — plaque flag

As I argued previously, philosophy is thought funnelled through biases of justice, morality, group benefit, logic, rationality and so on. To me, it's absurd to call it impractical interest in truth, our biases show what we're aiming to do, and I call that utility. I look at a concept such as rationality and don't for a second bother to ask if it's true - a senseless question, I ask what it does, whether is it useful, useful to whom and under what conditions. Utility is defined by our ambitions and values, it's present for the noblest goals and the most self-serving, not just the latter.

But it's not only an insincere pose in my opinion: it's also self-cancelling. If we are all just rationalizing monkeys, then the claim that we are such rationalizers is itself a rationalization --- flattering the 'sophistication' of its confused or (best case) ironic purveyors. — plaque flag

Rationalising? We're talking about literal truth here, that's all it is. A correct reference. I don't understand your argument.

I'm not a pragmatist. P is not true because it's useful to believe P. Though it is often useful to believe the truth. To say that P is true is primarily (ignoring the metacognitive extras) just asserting P. — plaque flag

I don't think P is true because it's useful to believe P either. I think whether P is true depends on whether it's correct to reference it as true, which depends on what it's being referenced as, and the rules of the reference. It's these two latter things which are useful to believe, not P itself. A dog is a dog, that's true, I don't believe it's true because it's useful, it's merely true. But what's a dog? That's just made up, a useful fiction.

You haven't addressed my Husserlian approach yet. — plaque flag

It's the same as mine, except, much less. It's not dealing with the concepts themselves, or where their correct use requires more than just sense data. Tell me when it's true that something is useful, or when it's true that something is funny, something like that, or alternatively, something more vague, a question which might have an answer but testing it would be difficult. For example, my claim about "systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful", what would make that true? Explain it.

Is this true or just a useful fiction ? See the issue ? Surely you intend it as a deep truth about our shared reality. This is the problem with earnest pragmatism. It can't remember that it doesn't believe in truth. — plaque flag

I told you useful fictions and truth are one and the same, you must be misunderstanding me, though, that might be my fault. Usefulness is truth because it's true that it's useful.

You are blunt, so I'm being blunt, but not out of a lack of respect. This is good conversation on a crucial topic. — plaque flag

I enjoy the discussions and I don't mind bluntness.

I wasn't speaking in my own voice, but from within the perspective that I am indeed criticizing. My use of 'I' was rhetorical, in other words. — plaque flag

:groan:

Yes, and that of course is part of the ideal of rationality --- autonomy of the individual and of the community at large. So we work together to decide what to believe and do as a whole ---without dissolving completely into the crowd. — plaque flag

I see this as largely tangential so I'll resist going into any more detail on it.

That is the question. But if you say that nothing makes them true, where does that leave your claims ? Are sentences 'really' as meaningless but somehow as useful as teeth ? — plaque flag

I'll tell you one thing for sure, whatever does make them true, it's certainly a relatively narrow perspective, and hardly stringent, well-thought-out rules. Just a sense of "Yeah, that makes sense" would suffice for most.

I think you are seeing the community from the outside in Darwinian terms and forgetting your own position as a speaker about the world interpreted through this vision. The issue is whether you believe what you say, whether you really think the world is one way or another way. — plaque flag

You've brought up the truth a lot, so I respond, as befits my understanding, I don't really care about it. Truth is abundant, overwhelmingly so, I don't seek it, I'm interested in power, useful knowledge, and useful understanding. I think "seeking truth" is asinine, and anyone who says they are, always remains guided by biases that end up resulting in the search for power and utility. Much of my interest falls outside the spectrum of philosophy, as I said, here, I play by those rules, but that doesn't mean my philosophical views represent me. But if that isn't a good answer, try explaining your point in greater detail and I'll try for a better response.

There's enough consensus for you to say so. 'Communication is impossible' is a performative contradiction. One can also not prove the untrustworthiness of logic. — plaque flag

Language is just a bunch of claims as words, there's sufficient freedom left for my claims. Of course, I can prove the untrustworthiness of logic, it is easy. If you hide behind "truly logical", I'm left stumped as to what you consider truly logical, and if you then say "Logic can be critiqued and improved upon as it's proven wrong", then I'm unable to critique any logic to prove my point, since even if I could find bad logic that was yet "truly logical", it'd just be part of the process of logic being improved. Give me something real, rather than a concept with "good" in it, and I'll show you how untrustworthy logic is, and how weak it is. If logic implies it is good logic, well, that's cheating.

The world is conceptually articulated. So I can talk about situations that aren't in front of me. I can claim there's money in the banana stand. We can check. We can see directly whether my intention is fulfilled. — plaque flag

What about a claim that can't be verified by perception alone?

I think pragmatic versions of truth are inspired by a questionable imaginary perspective on communities from above. We look down on them and see their beliefs as tools. But we gaze on this vision and describe it in a 'naive' way, forgetting to apply the insight to ourselves. — plaque flag

I'm struggling when you start talking about "pragmatic versions of truth" because I still have no idea where we disagree on the topic of it.

A consistent pragmatist is a potentially dangerous character. Judge Holden from Blood Meridian, who takes War for his deciding god, is happy to 'argue' the finer points with you. — plaque flag

I'm a nihilist and a pragmatist, I know very well. Had I sufficient power, so much of my philosophical ideals would lose their usefulness to me, and I would abandon them for that. I think it's a big part of why power corrupts, it invalidates the usefulness of the group logic of philosophy, to the powerful, they're a hindrance. I believe philosophers should take this to heart, systems must never rely on the goodwill of the powerful.

The ethnocentric point is that we can't see around our own culture. But Rorty can't present this as a truth about human beings. Instead (for him anyway) it's only a useful tool, a speech act better understood as scratching an itch or opening a can of beans. — plaque flag

Language meaning is changing all the time, culture is changing all the time, and it's possible to understand words and ideas differently despite the culture you're living in. We see this in different political affiliations within the same country, as they are sure to understand words and concepts differently, in ways that reflect their political views. Culture does have an impact though, sure.

If you mean it's not perfectly critical thought, then I agree — plaque flag

It is critical thought, with a particular set of biases and goals attached. It's just how it is, but I'm unsure on what "not perfectly' refers to.

As Habermas puts it, the ideal communication community is, well, ideal. It's the perfect circle we never achieve. — plaque flag

I think language needs to allow for expression of differences in perspective, I'll defend this against motivation. Philosophy as overriding must have its limits.

So I earnestly assert epistemological limits and violate those limits as I assert them. — plaque flag

Yeah, I agree, though I'm surprised to hear you say this. Isn't this the very performative contradiction you're so damning of? Why aren't you defending your infinite consensus argument? I always aim to strike where I think our disagreements lie, just to always find thin air.

To what does this truth relate ? — plaque flag

It relates to my argument, which I established earlier on.

To be sure, things get messier when concepts refer to concepts, but is our intention still transcendent ? Beyond utility ? — plaque flag

Motivations might involve values and ideas with intrinsic value - as opposed to utility, and we make a lot of compromises, there's also some implicit intention that could be argued against. An unthinking person might just accept the concepts they're given, and apply them without question. Not quite sure what you're asking though, usefulness can be more or less directly involved, and our motivation is almost certainly accompanied by other concepts, interpretation is subjective.