"Science" is an abstraction. Right?

It's people who pursue truths. Scientific or otherwise. Right? — wonderer1

I keep floating that one, with little success. People insist on anthropomorphizing abstract ideas; insisting that religion "says" or science "does" something, as if these concepts had volition and agency. It can become very confusing when coupled with with other big abstract ideas like Truth and Knowledge. You can almost see them pricked out in stars in the night sky: Science in Pursuit of Truth, an eternally incomplete pass.

Science in Pursuit of Truth, an eternally incomplete pass. — Vera Mont

:rofl:

Reliability isn't the only relevant quality but forgetting that, conceptually, truth should be reliable, but in practice, it depends on the truth conditions. — Judaka

What do you mean by "in practice"? Truth is a concept we apply to statements.

Within your argument, you use words such as "surprise" and "convincing", which are inherently unscientific. You can't measure the "convincingness" of an argument, right? If I find your argument convincing, that's no guarantee that someone else will. You could make the same argument with "reliability" itself. — Judaka

Yes, I intentionally used "unscientific" terms because they should apply to all kinds of contexts.

Is an element of truth that people agree on it? If not I don't see how it matters that people can argue about it. But if *you* believe something is true, then there cannot be a convincing argument to the contrary for you.

The quality of truth is dependent upon the truth conditions. Truths can have various truth conditions and have various qualities, right? — Judaka

I have no idea what this would mean.

Yes, I intentionally used "unscientific" terms because they should apply to all kinds of contexts.

Is an element of truth that people agree on it? If not I don't see how it matters that people can argue about it. But if *you* believe something is true, then there cannot be a convincing argument to the contrary for you. — Echarmion

Your comment was about reliability, and that was my focus.

I would say it's reliability. You need to be able to rely on the prediction of what will happen, so you can base your decisions/ designs on this.

Is that a fundamental attribute of truth? I would say it is. For something to be true it must be a reliable — Echarmion

Surely, neither merely believing something is true nor believing that no arguments against one's position are convincing does anything to guarantee reliability. It's one's reasons for believing something is true that determine that truth's reliability. Reasons that are measurable, and have been repeatedly verified are reliable, aren't such factors like these determinative of reliability?

I might think that dreams are a very reliable source of information, "X is true because I dreamt it was", and I'm not convinced by any argument that suggests X is false.

Words and ideas must be redefined within the context of science, and adhere to scientific standards, that's a prerequisite for doing science.

Is that a fundamental attribute of truth? I would say it is. For something to be true it must be a reliable — Echarmion

I agree that we must be convinced that something is true to call it true. "For someone to call something true, they must believe it is", sure I agree with that. But how does that give us reliability?

I have no idea what this would mean. — Echarmion

It means that within the context of science, someone saying X is true means it has met the prerequisites set out by the modern approach to science, and within the context of something else, like art, X is beautiful because it met the prerequisites for one to find it beautiful. Those prerequisites were just that they found X beautiful, and their belief just reflects their personal interpretation and experience. It wouldn't even cross our minds to challenge the "reliability" of the truth about X's beauty as it would in the scientific context. I was just saying that we don't treat truths the same across all contexts. It's the scientific process that gives truth its reliability in the scientific context, rather than truth being necessarily reliable. Some questions have concrete answers, others don't. This is what my OP is about.

Surely, neither merely believing something is true nor believing that no arguments against one's position are convincing does anything to guarantee reliability. It's one's reasons for believing something is true that determine that truth's reliability. Reasons that are measurable, and have been repeatedly verified are reliable, aren't such factors like these determinative of reliability? — Judaka

Right, I see what you mean, but I wasn't intending to go that far yet. I was merely looking at what we wish to express when we say "X is true".

If X is true, we can use it as a premise for further argument. We can assume it for the purpose of building some machine.

We would also expect it not to change arbitrarily. That is, we expect that we can give reasons for why something is true. Hence why many people don't think tastes or preferences have a truth value.

The next question is then why we believe something is true.

Words and ideas must be redefined within the context of science, and adhere to scientific standards, that's a prerequisite for doing science. — Judaka

But I'm not doing science here.

I agree that we must be convinced that something is true to call it true. "For someone to call something true, they must believe it is", sure I agree with that. But how does that give us reliability? — Judaka

Reliability means more than simply believing it. It means you're willing to risk something. It means that if everyone in the room believes that X is true, you can safely base your argument on it.

It means that within the context of science, someone saying X is true means it has met the prerequisites of science, and within the context of something else, like art, X is beautiful because it met the prerequisites for one to find it beautiful. Those prerequisites were just that they found X beautiful, and their belief just reflects their personal interpretation and experience. It wouldn't even cross our minds to challenge the "reliability" of the truth about X's beauty as it would in the scientific context. I was just saying that we don't treat truths the same across all contexts. It's the scientific process that gives the truth its reliability in the scientific context, rather than the truth being necessarily reliable. This is what my OP is about. — Judaka

I think the art example is problematic because not everyone would agree that "this picture is beautiful" has a truth value.

I'd like to instead use a moral argument. Say: "Murder is immoral". I think most people would agree that this statement has a truth value. It's not scientific though. Or take: "The sum of the interior angle measures of a triangle always adds up to 180°."

If we take these statements and compare this to something empirical, say "the gravity on earth has an acceleration of 9,81 m/s²", what do these statements have in common?

That's how I arrived at my conclusion that there are commonalities among things we deem true.

And I would further add that another common element is that the truth can be argued for in a specific way. The argument has to take a specific form, fulfill specific criteria to result is a true statement.

It seems to me what's different among the different contexts is the prerequisites of the argument.

That's definitely not what truth is. Science makes use of language where truths are inherently pragmatic and goal-orientated. We can test the "effectiveness of X" or "compare the effectiveness of X and Y". It might be true that method X is effective if it fulfils the objective, and true that another method is superior because it can be done faster and more cheaply. We want methods that better accomplish our many goals, such as being more environmentally friendly or safer for workers and so on. — Judaka

The cause/effect relationship between means and ends deserves analysis. The basic representation is as you outline here, methods are employed as the means for achieving the goals, ends. So there is a cause/effect relation whereby the means are the efficient cause of the ends. However, there is obviously an inverse relation whereby the goals are the cause of the coming into being of the means, as the means are judged as what is needed to achieve the desired end. This is known as the causal affect of intention, final cause. So for example, if "truth" is the goal or end of the scientific method, then "truth" as an ideal (the desire for truth), as such, is the cause (final cause) of the coming into being of the scientific method. The scientific method is then represented as the potential cause (efficient cause) of truth, and may be judged as to whether it actually causes truth, based on the successfulness of its outcomes, results, in relation to the guiding end, which was the ideal, "truth".

Now, when we understand this inversible relationship between the means as efficient cause, and the end as final cause, we can move toward understanding a deeper, more significant and impactful inversion of the relationship between means and ends. When the means (methods) are judged as successful for bringing about the desired end, they are put into practise, production, and the methods are employed on a regular basis, toward bringing about the desired end. The successfulness and effectiveness of the method for bringing about the desired end, has been judged, and this judgement is now taken for granted.

So we have a practise of repeated employing the same means, and its successfulness is taken for granted. We can understand this practise of repeatedly employing the same means for the sake of producing an end which is taken for granted, as a sort of "habit", and we can understand this type of activity through that concept "habit". The inversion I am speaking of here, occurs when the method which is the habit, becomes the end itself, as a habit may get to the point of being. The addictive habit is chosen for the sake of itself only, because its effectiveness for achieving the end is taken for granted therefore it is actually desired for the sake of itself only.

If, on reflection, the ends which are taken for granted are revisited, and the habit is very addictive, such that the desire for it is strong, then the ends get shaped to fit the needs of the means, as the means are the addictive habit and have become desired for the sake of themselves. This is commonly known as "rationalizing". At this point, the method is actually the end, as that which is desired, and the stated goals are pseudo-ends. They are created, shaped, and stated, in a way which is subservient to the desire for the means as the addictive habit, which being desired for the sake of itself is the true goal here.

For example. We start with the goal of "truth", as the ideal which is desired, and we create the scientific method as the means to that end. The means are judged as effective and successful, and therefore become habitual. Then, as an addiction, the habit itself has become the desired end. Now the original goal, which was the ideal "truth", is replaced with the new goal, the scientific method as the addiction, and any reference back to the original goal must ensure that the status of "taken for granted" is well maintained. Now the original goal, the ideal "truth", must become subservient to the means, which is the scientific method, such that the means will always be judged as successful and effective at bringing about the end, so that the method will be continued to be employed. That results in a manipulation of the definition of "truth", because of the irrational desire due to addiction. At this point, it is required to adjust the definition of "truth" according to circumstances, to ensure that the scientific method is always successful and effective at bringing about the desired end, "truth". In reality though, the rationalized "ends" have become subservient to the means, the addictive habit, which has actually become the end itself.

This reality is very evident in the following exchange:

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths. — Leontiskos

So, there are all of these different types of truths, dozens of them, potentially infinite, and science pursues only one of these. — Judaka

simple example. Ethics is not provable nor testable by scientific method and yet dictates what science is permitted to study and how

Science is a tool to discover "some" of the truth. But not all of it. Art, music, dance, spirituality, personal perspective, individuality/personhood and self expression, morality, none of these things are both testable, quantifiable, repeatable nor provable by any scientific means of investigation. And yet they exist nonetheless and are true nonetheless.

Science is an investigation, but it is not an answer. It can never confirm with 100% certainty the truth of anything as its very progress involves recapitulation, paradigm shift and discrediting previously accepted scientific "truths" in favour of more plausible, accurate or explanatory ones.

- Yes. :up:

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Why not just say that science is the pursuit of "scientific truth" and not truth? — Judaka

Science pursues truth. It does not pursue expediency, or the promotion of special interests, or the winning of the arms race, etc. (and yet many are deeply confused on this point today).

Scientific truth is one kind of truth, and therefore scientists pursue truth. Apparently you ran into someone who thinks that only scientists pursue truth, and you reacted by claiming that, "It's incorrect [...] to understand science as a 'pursuit of truth'." The person you ran into is wrong. So are you. You overcorrected. Science is not the only pursuit of truth, but it is a pursuit of truth.

Agreed. The purpose of science is to tell us what it can about nature, not to define it.

"the pursuit of truth" — Judaka

and

"a pursuit of truth" — Judaka

are not the same. I would agree that science is not "the" pursuit of truth.

That's a good pickup. There is also the distinction between saying science pursues truth and saying that science yields truth. It also occurs to me that if knowledge is justified true belief and science pursues knowledge then it must also be pursuing beliefs which are justified and true, which would seem to entail that it is pursuing truth.

If knowledge is taken as "know-how" then it pursues knowledge in that sense too, since it seems obvious that science also pursues know-how.

Your logic goes way too quickly for me to follow, abruptly jumping to assertions of habit, addiction, rationalisation, and irrational desires, but no examples or justifications are offered.

I could ask a dozen questions and ask for clarification on how you're using many words, I'm not sure of the context or your goals, you're going too fast for me. I had a go at responding but I wasn't getting anywhere, so I'll have to pass on responding to the comment, my apologies.

Reliability means more than simply believing it. It means you're willing to risk something. — Echarmion

Well, again, one's willingness to risk something doesn't seem to do anything to guarantee reliability.

I think the art example is problematic because not everyone would agree that "this picture is beautiful" has a truth value. — Echarmion

Conceptually, it makes sense that it wouldn't since that example betrays what truth should be. As a binary, something that warrants belief. Nonetheless, it's a legitimate use of the word, grammatically and logically. I'd argue that grammar is determinative of what's correct in language use, and not the philosophical views of what truth "should" be. Anyway, I agree that it's a controversial topic if that's your only point.

It seems to me what's different among the different contexts is the prerequisites of the argument. — Echarmion

I agree that's part of it, and I believe the same as what I referred to as the "truth conditions".

I'd like to instead use a moral argument. Say: "Murder is immoral". I think most people would agree that this statement has a truth value. — Echarmion

Is there a truth value to "This box is too heavy to carry"? If "this box" weighs 5kg or 50kg, or if one person is carrying it, or eight, would you agree that such factors are relevant? The box might be "too heavy" to carry without risk of injury, but not "too heavy" to carry if we disregard the risk of injury. My point is that the statement has multiple truth values. That's kind of awkward for the concept of "truth".

"Murder is immoral, unless...", and "Murder is immoral, if....", are such additions unreasonable? Must we answer if "Murder is immoral" and we're forbidden from wanting more information or context? It can't be true in some conditions, false in others. True by one person's logic, false by another's? I hope you can agree.

"The sum of the interior angle measures of a triangle always adds up to 180°." — Echarmion

In contrast, what contextual information, or perspectival information can we add, that changes the truth of this statement? Does it matter what type of triangle? Nope. Does it matter how big the triangle is? Nope. Does it matter who measures the triangle? Nope. There's nothing we can add to change it.

The qualities truth is supposed to have, this "reliability", it works sometimes, and not always. Part of ensuring that your statement is like the latter and not the former is part of science. It's not an inherent quality of truth, one must take steps to ensure reliability. Though, "reliability" implies some purpose, and not every truth even has that.

are not the same. I would agree that science is not "the" pursuit of truth. — Arne

That's a good pickup. — Janus

I believe my intention was to say it wasn't "a pursuit of truth" as in, it wasn't merely a pursuit of truth. But, I take your point and can agree.

Agreed. The purpose of science is to tell us what it can about nature, not to define it. — Arne

Who/what is this in response to?

Science pursues truth. It does not pursue expediency, or the promotion of special interests, or the winning of the arms race, etc. (and yet many are deeply confused on this point today). — Leontiskos

I agree with others that it's wrong to say "Science pursues truth", since science has no will of its own.

Scientific truth is one kind of truth, and therefore scientists pursue truth. Apparently you ran into someone who thinks that only scientists pursue truth, and you reacted by claiming that, "It's incorrect [...] to understand science as a 'pursuit of truth'." The person you ran into is wrong. So are you. You overcorrected. Science is not the only pursuit of truth, but it is a pursuit of truth. — Leontiskos

What makes you insist that there are multiple "kinds" of truth? To be clear, I was just humouring you earlier.

I can agree that it's reasonable to say "science is a pursuit of truth". I concluded that:

science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science. — Judaka

Isn't your argument with me just semantics? By claiming that there's this "scientific truth", you're pretty much saying the same thing as me. My OP is a response to a concern that "truth" is being overly understood as the domain of science. If you want to say "Science pursues scientific truth", at least, that leaves me with nothing to be concerned about in that regard.

I'm not sure where this conversation is going. It seems to me this is turning more towards a general conversation about language and meaning rather than about truth specifically.

It seems to me that, taken to the extreme, your argument would be that "truth" really does not refer to anything specific, and is rather just a way to emphasize a statement. So it's just a language tool.

The contrary argument would be that "truth" is a fundamental category in the human mind. That would mean that regardless of the precision or imprecision of language, saying "X is true" would be an attempt to address this category.

My position is indeed that "truth" is just a language tool. To discuss truth is to discuss language. It's not "a way to emphasise a statement", it refers to "correct reference", or "the correct answer" or it affirms a statement.

We can change a word in a sentence from "Murder is immoral" to "Murder is cruel" and "the truth" is entirely responsive. It's also responsive to how you interpret what it means for something to be "immoral" or just merely how you interpret the word. Precision in language is always relevant, how could it not be?

I don't see what I wrote in my last response that wasn't directly relevant to "truth" though, I thought I was staying on the topic that you started, but perhaps I misunderstood something. Even if you feel truth isn't just a function of language and logic, the issues I brought up should still be relevant to truth's reliability.

Well, to discuss anything is to discuss language. But the buck must stop somewhere. Language must at some point reference back to a mental concept. Otherwise I don't see how communication would be possible. At some point thoughts must turn to language, and language back to thoughts.

So the question is is there some mental concept we (usually) address with the term "truth"? I'd say there is. It seems to be pretty obvious that we must have a mental concept for "things we actually expect to be real".

I find it funny some people are obsessed with some standard upon which people *should* agree on things (i.e. truth, realism). Yet, in practise, they know this is never the case or else they would never be having these debates about truth or realism. The motivation for realism is almost more like an insecurity or nagging anxiety. Perhaps stranger realists (including, perhaps most notable, karl popper) are those that accept many of the arguments for anti-realist views yet seem to find themselves unable to get over their intuition for realism and enforce it no matter the cost, essentially question begging. Given that anti-realism or realism doesn't really matter, I guess the whole debate about whether science yields truth is essentially a personality contest between different people who's different personality traits and intuitions draw them to different dpgmatic assumptions and question begging foundations.



If truth is a language tool then I think mental concept is equally a language tool. Science is just a biological activity, a special case of the same biological activity that allows the use of words like "truth" and "mental concept".

What is a "mental concept"? Aren't all concepts linguistic?

We use language to express our thoughts and feelings, a view I'm not convinced you oppose. Language is public, words are used by all, and so even when you say "things we actually expect to be real", you have to be more specific, what makes something real? Is beauty not real? What about kindness, or wisdom or whatever else? Is it not true that some movies are better than others? Or that someone can sing better than someone else? Is it true that I'm as good as Messi at soccer?

Truth is a word changed by its context. If I claimed that "X shop is selling doughnuts at Y price" and you asked, "Is that true?" I would fully appreciate that you wanted to verify the information was reliable. Conversely, if I said "The doughnuts from X shop are delicious", and you asked, "Is that true?", I would appreciate that you knew this is not a matter where my opinion was definitive. If you ate some and said they weren't that good, you wouldn't call me a liar, you'd just know it was a difference in taste/opinion.

I think the word works fine with context. I've only tried to point out that context is determinative of truth's qualities. One puts it together for themselves. Whether a truth claim is about "something real" or not.

If truth is a language tool then I think mental concept is equally a language tool. Science is just a biological activity, a special case of the same biological activity that allows the use of words like "truth" and "mental concept". — Apustimelogist

Ok. And how is this relevant?

What is a "mental concept"? — Judaka

One of the categories your mind uses to work.

Aren't all concepts linguistic? — Judaka

I don't see how that could be the case.

We use language to express our thoughts and feelings, a view I'm not convinced you oppose. Language is public, words are used by all, and so even when you say "things we actually expect to be real", you have to be more specific, what makes something real? Is beauty not real? What about kindness, or wisdom or whatever else? Is it not true that some movies are better than others? Or that someone can sing better than someone else? Is it true that I'm as good as Messi at soccer? — Judaka

I don't think it's useful to start fragmenting this into a million little questions if we can't even agree on the basics.

If I say "X is true" is that different from saying "I like X"? That is, is "truth" just an expression of my preferences or is there more to it?

Truth is a word changed by its context. — Judaka

Yes, that is the claim you're making, I know.

If I claimed that "X shop is selling doughnuts at Y price" and you asked, "Is that true?" I would fully appreciate that you wanted to verify the information was reliable. Equally, if I said "The doughnuts from X shop are delicious", and you asked, "Is that true?", I would appreciate that you knew this is not a matter where my opinion was definitive. If you ate some and said they weren't that good, you wouldn't call me a liar, you'd just know it was a difference in taste/opinion. — Judaka

But taste and price are already different. There's no need for truth to be different as well. This example works just as well if we assume the term "truth" does exactly the same in both sentences and the difference lies entirely in the claim itself.

One of the categories your mind uses to work. — Echarmion

What sort of categories are you referring to?

This example works just as well if we assume the term "truth" does exactly the same in both sentences and the difference lies entirely in the claim itself. — Echarmion

My position is indeed that "truth" is just a language tool. It's not "a way to emphasise a statement", it refers to "correct reference", or "the correct answer" or it affirms a statement. — Judaka

Truth is a word changed by its context. — Judaka

Yes, that is the claim you're making, I know. — Echarmion

You don't seem to understand my claim though. You seem to think I'm arguing that the "change" is a literal rewrite of the word's meaning and that's not the case at all. The "change" is:

That context is determinative of truth's qualities. One puts it together for themselves. Whether a truth claim is about "something real" or not. — Judaka

How truth functions isn't changed by context, the concept remains the same. If it's true that a doughnut is delicious or that a doughnut costs Y, in either case, it just means that indeed the doughnut is delicious or indeed the doughnut does cost Y. The statements were correct.

Science doesn't purse anything. Science is a tool or a method that we use to acquire facts about the world, or perhaps more accurately, is the attempt to falsify hypotheses we make about the world. Science is the tool of methodological naturalism, and can be used equally by theists and atheists alike, as long as while doing it they agree they are hypothesizing and searching for natural causes. The strength of science is that it is always open to falsification, refinement and improvement -- and thus is not appropriate for making absolute declarations of truth. Still, I would argue, it is the best method we have to acquiring facts -- and theories supported by facts -- about the natural world.

Truth, I would say, is a philosophical concept. As philosophers we pursue the truth, and science along with logic and reasoning is how we attempt to acquire it. The assumption is that if we can get our beliefs to correspond exactly with how reality is, then we have the truth. At least that is the correspondence theory of truth, which is probably the most prevalent and commonsense definition of what truth is. It doesn't take too much reflection to realize we can seldom if ever get our beliefs to correspond to exactly how reality actually is, or at least we have no way of verifying that. So, we have to be content striving for it, and always admitting the possibility of error.

I agree with others that it's wrong to say "Science pursues truth", since science has no will of its own. — Judaka

This is just another quibble. When someone says, "Science pursues X," they are not claiming that science exists apart from scientists.

Isn't your argument with me just semantics? — Judaka

The problem is that you are using false statements to support your claim that not all truth is scientific truth. You already admitted that the first sentence of the OP is false. Here is another:

science isn't "the pursuit of truth" but "the pursuit of truth under a particular set of circumstances", and these circumstances are what we call science. — Judaka

That's like saying, "Science isn't Y, but Y under Z, and Z is what we call 'science'." The sentence isn't even coherent. Science cannot simultaneously be "Y under Z" and "Z". I think your faulty theory of language is leading you to try to separate science from truth. Science really is "Y under Z" and not just "Z", so to speak. Y cannot be separated from science.

.

What makes you insist that there are multiple "kinds" of truth? To be clear, I was just humouring you earlier. — Judaka

Oh, is that right? So you don't think that some truths are scientific truths and some truths are not? You're all tied up in knots. :wink:

What sort of categories are you referring to? — Judaka

The basic building blocks for thinking and experiencing. Like causality, basic logic operations, basic concepts that allow you to sort and make sense of sensory input.

You don't seem to understand my claim though. You seem to think I'm arguing that the "change" is a literal rewrite of the word's meaning and that's not the case at all. The "change" is:

That context is determinative of truth's qualities. One puts it together for themselves. Whether a truth claim is about "something real" or not. — Judaka

It seems like we're talking past each other and not getting our points across.

If you write that "context determines truth's qualities, then to me that sounds like "a literal rewrite of the word's meaning".

I understand "qualities" to mean the specific attributes that define something and make it distinct from other things.

Ok. And how is this relevant? — Echarmion

I think you are looking for something that doesn't really exist. I don't think the mind consists of like substantive thoughts as objects which can be converted into words and back again.

If you write that "context determines truth's qualities, then to me that sounds like "a literal rewrite of the word's meaning". — Echarmion

It could have meant that, but it's part of a paragraph that goes on to explain those changes in qualities, which did not include any major changes to how truth functions. Using that context and my the context of my previous statements, I had hoped my meaning was made clear. Nonetheless, I clarified the misunderstanding, isn't this what I should've done?

It seems like we're talking past each other and not getting our points across. — Echarmion

You misunderstood my point, and I've been open about not yet understanding yours.

The basic building blocks for thinking and experiencing. Like causality, basic logic operations, basic concepts that allow you to sort and make sense of sensory input. — Echarmion

I agree that there is such thinking that doesn't rely on language.

So, what is the relationship you're proposing between these categories and the words used to refer to them?

The problem is that you are using false statements to support your claim that not all truth is scientific truth. — Leontiskos

Isn't this your position? That not all truth is scientific truth? Otherwise, why bother using the term?

That's like saying, "Science isn't Y, but Y under Z, and Z is what we call 'science'." The sentence isn't even coherent. — Leontiskos

Sure, if you want to be anal about it, others understood my meaning perfectly fine, and I suspect you do as well.

Oh, is that right? So you don't think that some truths are scientific truths and some truths are not? You're all tied up in knots. — Leontiskos

This is why I think your view of language is counterproductive. While humouring you, I made it clear that I agreed with your meaning/point when you separated scientific truth from other types. You should've cared more about that. But instead, you take this very anal view of language, and interpret my words without caring about what you know about me, what I've said or the context. To suggest what? That I completely dispute your point, which I've twice agreed to?

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths. — Leontiskos

This is the exact same shit the OP says. If I wrote "Science is not a pursuit of truth, but scientific truth", it'd have the exact same meaning. That should mean you agree with me, and yet, you're taking a combative stance and tearing my view apart. It makes no sense to me. Even I won't agree with my own statements if they're taken completely out of context.

I agree that there is such thinking that doesn't rely on language.

So, what is the relationship you're proposing between these categories and the words used to refer to them? — Judaka

Since humans are capable of entertaining counterfactuals and also of dealing with probabilities and necessary elements, I'd say that there needs to be some faculty for sorting things into possibility/necessity/actuality.

We'd then expect to have language that corresponds to these. So "truth" would correspond to actuality. If it's true that there's a tiger in the bush, I must act immediately. If it's merely a possibility, or a story, the proper reaction would be different.

It could have meant that, but it's part of a paragraph that goes on to explain those changes in qualities, which did not include any major changes to how truth functions. Using that context and my the context of my previous statements, I had hoped my meaning was made clear. Nonetheless, I clarified the misunderstanding, isn't this what I should've done? — Judaka

Well, my problem is that I can't really tell what your point is.

Based on your OP I got the impression that you were arguing for multiple truths. That is truth has multiple distinct meanings, or perhaps we could say functions. For example scientific truth, which is for empirical questions. And perhaps as a counterexample aesthetic truth, which applies for feelings of beauty or taste.

My response to this idea is that I do think truth has the same core meaning, or function, across different contexts. Specifically, truth does always seem concerned with establishing a reliable and reasoned basis for further decisions or debates.

This of course does not mean that any sentence that contains the term "truth" means the same thing. Context matters for language. And also it is obvious to me that a less precise claim, even if it's true, might not strictly imply any further conclusions, while a more precise claim, if true, might then imply very specific consequences.

But the above caveats, to me, are simply about all language in general and have as much to do with "truth" specifically as they have with any other term.

So maybe we actually agree and are just framing the issue differently.

Since humans are capable of entertaining counterfactuals and also of dealing with probabilities and necessary elements, I'd say that there needs to be some faculty for sorting things into possibility/necessity/actuality. — Echarmion

We'd then expect to have language that corresponds to these. — Echarmion

Are you saying possibility/necessity etc are concepts that exist without language, and language merely corresponds to these (mental) concepts?

If it's true that there's a tiger in the bush, I must act immediately. — Echarmion

Right, but it's only true that there's a tiger in the bush if it's "correct to say" that there's a tiger in the bush. It's only correct to say that there's a tiger in the bush if there really is a tiger in the bush. Even if "truth" is "correct reference" or "correct answer", it would have served the function you wanted in the example you gave.

I'll again reiterate that I am confident that you do not use the word truth to refer to actuality, you use it as "correct reference" or "correct answer". To answer if it's true that "There's a tiger in the bush", one must understand the concepts "is", "tiger", "in" and "bush". If the tiger is behind the bush or in front of it, or if it's a lion and not a tiger, or if it was in the bush, but already left, then "There is a tiger in the bush" is false. I could say "There is a predator in the bush" or "There is something in the bush" and these could be true as well as "There is a tiger in the bush". It's clear that "truth" corresponds to the "correctness" of the statement, which is based on the applicability of the language used.

So "truth" would correspond to actuality. — Echarmion

Why must it do that?

Well, my problem is that I can't really tell what your point is. — Echarmion

I thought we were close to agreeing earlier on, but then suddenly the discussion took an unexpected turn.

My response to this idea is that I do think truth has the same core meaning, or function, across different contexts — Echarmion

Your understanding of the OP wasn't my intention, and I agree with you that truth has the same core function across different contexts.

Where we seem to disagree is on the core function itself.

The point of the OP doesn't make any sense using your understanding of truth's core function as referring to "actuality", and that's maybe why you didn't get it. If you try thinking about it from how I explained "truth" then probably you will.

Your understanding of the OP wasn't my intention, and I agree with you that truth has the same core function across different contexts.

Where we seem to disagree is on the core function itself.

The point of the OP doesn't make any sense using your understanding of truth's core function as referring to "actuality", and that's maybe why you didn't get it. If you try thinking about it from how I explained "truth" then probably you will. — Judaka

Maybe I should not have used the word "actuality", as it seems to have caused more confusion than it solved. I just meant it as what is actually the case as opposed to what's possible.

But if we both agree that the core function of truth is the same across different contexts, we probably don't disagree all that much.

I tend to stay away from technical discussions about what truth is exactly, since they never seem terribly productive. I like the somewhat playful phrase that truth is that which asserts itself regardless of your wishes.

Are you saying possibility/necessity etc are concepts that exist without language, and language merely corresponds to these (mental) concepts? — Judaka

Yes, though I would not claim it must be these specifically. Or that it's as simple as language using something that's there. It's probably a more messy kind of feedback loop.

But basically it seems to me there needs to be some common mental framework language can use, otherwise I don't see how we can, for example, decipher ancient languages noone speaks anymore.

Right, but it's only true that there's a tiger in the bush if it's "correct to say" that there's a tiger in the bush. It's only correct to say that there's a tiger in the bush if there really is a tiger in the bush. Even if "truth" is "correct reference" or "correct answer", it would have served the function you wanted in the example you gave.

I'll again reiterate that I am confident that you do not use the word truth to refer to actuality, you use it as "correct reference" or "correct answer". — Judaka

I don't understand this, specifically I don't understand why actuality and "correct reference" aren't one and the same here.

To answer if it's true that "There's a tiger in the bush", one must understand the concepts "is", "tiger", "in" and "bush". If the tiger is behind the bush or in front of it, or if it's a lion and not a tiger, or if it was in the bush, but already left, then "There is a tiger in the bush" is false. I could say "There is a predator in the bush" or "There is something in the bush" and these could be true as well as "There is a tiger in the bush". It's clear that "truth" corresponds to the "correctness" of the statement, which is based on the applicability of the language used. — Judaka

So truth always signals the applicability of the language used in the claim to the situation? I mean that sounds vaguely like what I believe, but I'm not sure I really understand.

Why must it do that? — Judaka

I don't know if it must, it just seems plausible to me.

I don't understand this, specifically I don't understand why actuality and "correct reference" aren't one and the same here. — Echarmion

"Correct reference" refers to the correct use of language, and "actuality" refers to "that which really is". What constitutes as "correct use" of language is a very complicated subject, as I'm sure you appreciate. It involves a wide variety of context-dependant linguistic and cultural factors that are entirely manmade. Social conventions and laws, political or artistic concepts and a litany of other concepts are all part of "correct reference".

A basic example is ownership/private property. "It's true that I own the computer I'm using" is true by "correct reference". It's true according to the social conventions of the society that I live in, since I bought this computer, and it resides in my dwelling and I use it. If you want to treat concepts as though they're above language and manmade rules, and "truth" as beyond such things, then there's zero basis for believing that the concept of "ownership" is real. Or look at a card game like Yu-gi-oh or Pokémon, "It's true that Pikachu is a Pokémon", you'd probably agree, even though it's complete fiction.

So truth always signals the applicability of the language used in the claim to the situation? — Echarmion

Yep, that's right.

Though "truth" can also be used to directly refer to a hypothetical "correct reference", using the logic contained within words. Such as "hypothetical" applicability, something that could be correctly said, even if it wasn't said. For instance, it's true that I wrote this comment, because it'd be correct to say that I wrote this comment, it's true regardless of whether anybody actually makes the claim that I did.

Another example is how people say things like "True courage is X", possibly to suggest that it's incorrect to reference Y as courage, because only X is correct to refer to as courage. I could say "I want to find out what true compassion is", "true compassion" is equal to "that which can be correctly referred to as compassion". In summary, your description is correct in this context, but we can manipulate that concept in these ways that you're undoubtedly familiar with.

But basically it seems to me there needs to be some common mental framework language can use — Echarmion

It's based on the "shared human experience", we could agree on that. It's also based on practicality, we want similar functions from our languages.

I just meant it as what is actually the case as opposed to what's possible. — Echarmion

As in, the word "truth" doesn't refer to actuality, but confirms a possibility as a certainty? I'd agree it can sometimes have that effect.

I like the somewhat playful phrase that truth is that which asserts itself regardless of your wishes. — Echarmion

Conceptually that's true, but not in practice, as I tried to demonstrate here.

Is there a truth value to "This box is too heavy to carry"? If "this box" weighs 5kg or 50kg, or if one person is carrying it, or eight, would you agree that such factors are relevant? The box might be "too heavy" to carry without risk of injury, but not "too heavy" to carry if we disregard the risk of injury. My point is that the statement has multiple truth values. — Judaka

Technically, truth does not respond to one's wishes, but it does respond to one's desires, values, logic and intended meaning.

I tend to stay away from technical discussions about what truth is exactly, since they never seem terribly productive — Echarmion

Hmm, well, feel free to wrap this discussion up when it no longer interests you.