How can I know that the experience that I'm having (or remember having) is a near death experience? — jkop

If you had an NDE it wouldn't be something that easily forgotten. Moreover, you would know based on what others have reported and comparing your experience with theirs.

Just listen to this NDE, it may answer your questions.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZfaPCwjguk

Could millions be liars and or delusional and or themselves persuaded before its first conversion into data? Maybe, but assume not. Could you say (and I haven't looked into this) the same about those who claim to be born again, saved by the holy spirit (speaking in tongues, muscle spasms, new outlook etc) or those who claim Satori etc? Or visitations/alien viewings? — ENOAH

Of course it's not just the numbers, as I've said, it's all the criteria that make a strong inductive argument. So, the numbers are impressive, but numbers don't give us the truth or the facts. You have to look at the testimonial evidence as a whole which leads to a strong conclusion.

I don't put much stock in religious belief, there is some overlap, but overall, the evidence for an afterlife based on NDEs is overwhelming. The evidence for some religious belief is very subjective and flimsy. NDEs give a much better picture of the afterlife than any religious view and with stronger testimonial evidence.

What if there might be other explanations for the consistencies besides that the claims are factual? — ENOAH

I never said that NDEs are consistent because they are factual. I said that the fact that NDEs are generally consistent gives support to the truth of the testimonials.

I take the testimonials at face value unless there are good reasons not to. I would suggest re-reading that post so that you fully understand the logic.

Thanks for the compliment, and the reply.

This is an updated version of the argument with some editing and added statements for clarity. This was copied from my posts in Quora.

This is the argument I put forth in my thread Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body, in The Philosophy Forum under the name Sam26. I have also talked about this argument in other philosophy forums. I say this to allay questions of plagiarism. I have been posting on this subject for at least 12-15 years across many platforms.

My claim is that there is sufficient testimonial evidence to reasonably conclude that consciousness survives (that we survive, albeit in another form) the death of the body. So, I am making the claim that I know the conclusion of my argument is true. And, although I believe I could make other claims (and I will in later posts) based on the evidence, that is, claims of knowledge (by knowledge I mean justified true belief), I am limiting the scope of the conclusion in this initial post to keep confusion to a minimum. By limited, I mean I am not trying to give evidence of a God, heaven, that we are eternal beings, or any other spiritual or religious idea or doctrine; nor am I trying to give evidence of many of the other claims people are making while having such an experience. Although, as I have said, I do believe there is strong evidence to support other conclusions, and these conclusions have varying degrees of certainty, just as many of our everyday conclusions have varying degrees of certainty (subjective as well as objective certainty).

Preliminaries:

The first question is, what makes a strong inductive argument? The criteria for a good inductive argument are much different from the criteria for a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say something happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers because numbers in themselves are not always sufficient. It is important to the understanding of this argument that all of the criteria work together to strengthen the conclusion.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. When examining the conclusion of an inductive argument, the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity if it is sound (soundness means the deductive argument is both valid and the premises are true). The difference is what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), versus what necessarily follows (deductive arguments). A common misconception among some people is that if we do not know with absolute certainty then we do not know, but this is an error. Most of what we know is based on inductive reasoning, including many of the claims of science. Most of it is probability-based, so it is not known with absolute certainty, it is known with a high degree of certainty. So, when I use the phrase “I know..” in reference to the conclusion of this argument, I am referring to what is known based on what is probably the case; and since probability varies significantly I should say that I believe that the conclusion follows with a very high degree of probability based on the strength of the evidence.

Third, the scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph (I'm referring to an opening paragraph in my Quora space.), it means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are much harder to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend. The reason is that conclusions that are too broad require much more evidence than conclusions that are limited in their scope.

Fourth, truth of the premises. This means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that make a good deductive argument, that is, a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness has to do with whether the deductive argument is valid, plus the premises must be true).

(a) Since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, to know if the testimonial evidence is true, we first need corroboration, that is, we need an objective way to verify the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the claims or the truth of the premises. Moreover, it helps add an objective way of verifying subjective experiences. There is both a subjective and objective component to this argument. The objective component helps to determine the objective facts of the experiences.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or secondhand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal. This is an important component of all testimonial evidence and should be carefully considered when examining any kind of testimonial evidence.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number, that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So, although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture. We often find inconsistent testimonial reports but that does not mean that all of the reports should be dismissed, it just means that our testimonial evidence should be based on those reports that are consistent.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely hear this criterion, but it is very important in terms of the effectiveness of the argument. There is a sense where any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux (Dr. Byron I. Bitar, Classical Christian Wisdom, p. 70).

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true? You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. So, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an argument's effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

Now we have given some of the preliminaries, we will proceed to the argument itself.

The Inductive Argument:

The following argument is based on the testimonial evidence of those who have experienced an NDE, and the conclusion follows with a high degree of certainty. As such, one can claim to know the conclusion is true. This argument makes such a claim.

Each of the aforementioned criteria serves to strengthen the testimonial evidence. All of the criteria in the previous paragraphs work hand-in-hand to strengthen the conclusion, and the criteria serve to strengthen any claim to knowledge. If we have a large enough pool of evidence based on these five criteria, we can say with confidence that we know that consciousness survives the death of the body, namely, we can say what is probably the case, but not what is necessarily the case.

Again, if there is a high degree of probability that these testimonials reflect an objective reality, then we can also say with confidence, that we know consciousness survives the death of the body. Thus, our knowledge is based on objective criteria, not on purely subjective claims.

We will now look at the testimonial evidence in terms of the five stated criteria, and how these testimonials support the conclusion.

First, what is the number of people who claim to have had an NDE? According to a 1992 Gallop poll about 5% of the population has experienced an NDE; and even if this poll is off by a little, we are still talking about millions of people. So, the number of accounts of NDEs is very high, much higher than what we would normally need to add to the strength of the conclusion.

Also, as was mentioned in the previous post, numbers in themselves are not enough, which is why the other criteria must be coupled with numbers.

The second criterion of good testimonial evidence is variety, that is, do we have evidence from a variety of sources? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. NDEs have been reported in every culture from around the world, which by definition means that we are getting reports from different religious views, and different world views. NDEs also span every age group, from young children to the middle-aged and finally to the aged. The testimonial reports come from doctors, nurses, scientists, atheists, and agnostics, literally from every imaginable educational level and background. NDEs occur in a variety of settings, including drowning, electrocution, while awake, while on the operating table, after a heart attack, etc. People have also reported having shared an NDE with someone else, although rarely. They have happened when there is no heartbeat, with the blood drained from the brain, and with no measurable brain activity. They have been reported to happen with a minimal amount of stress, that is, without being near death.

The third criterion is the scope of the conclusion, and the scope of this conclusion is limited to consciousness surviving the body. The conclusion claims that we can know that consciousness survives bodily death.

The fourth criterion is the truth of the premises. To know if the premises are true, we need corroboration of the testimonial evidence, a high degree of consistency, and firsthand testimony. In all or most of these cases, it seems clear that we have all three. We have millions of accounts that can be corroborated by family members, friends, doctors, nurses, and hospice workers. Corroboration is important in establishing some objectivity to what is a very subjective experience. It gives credence and credibility to the accounts. One example of corroboration is given in Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on YouTube, although the video is old.

Consistency is also important to the establishment of the truth of the premises. We have a high degree of consistency across a wide variety of reports. What are these consistent reports?

1) Seeing one's body from a third person perspective, that is, from outside one's body, and hearing and seeing what is happening around their bodies.
2) Having intense feelings of being loved, intense feelings of peace, and the absence of pain.
3) Seeing a light or tunnel in the distance and feeling that one is being drawn to the light, or moving towards the light.
4) Seeing deceased loved ones.
5) Seeing beings of light that one may interpret as Jesus, Mary, Muhammad, an angel, or just a loving being that one may feel connected with.
6) Heightened sensory experiences, namely, feeling that one is having an ultra-real experience, as opposed to a dream or a hallucination. This happens even when there is no measurable brain activity.
7) Communication that happens mind-to-mind, not verbally.
8) Seeing beautiful landscapes.
9) Seeing people who are getting ready or waiting to be born.
10) Having a life review by a loving being who is not judgmental, but simply showing you how important it is to love, and the importance of your actions on those you come in contact with.
11) Feeling as though one has returned home. This is also confirmed by people who were told they chose to come to Earth.
12) A feeling of oneness with everything, as though we are part of one consciousness.
13) Memories of who they are return, as though they temporarily forgot who they were, and where they came from.
14) There are also reports of knowledge returning, and many questions being answered as quickly as they think of the question.
15) Understanding that ultimately we cannot be harmed and that everything is perfect as it is.
16) That we are eternal beings simply entering into one of many realities. We are simply higher beings that choose to have a human experience. Ultimately, we are not human, being human is just a temporary experience. Our humanity ends when we die, then we assume our original form.

Another aid in establishing the truth of the testimonial evidence is firsthand accounts, as opposed to hearsay. There are thousands of firsthand accounts being reported by the International Association of Near-Death Studies, and according to polling, there are many millions of firsthand accounts.

The fifth criterion is the cogency of the premises. Whether the argument is cogent for you depends on many factors, but many people have heard of near-death experiences, so the concept is not an unfamiliar one. It is not going to be cogent for everyone, but with a little study and reading it can be cogent. It is not difficult to understand the concept. Although it is probably going to be difficult to understand how it is metaphysically possible. This argument claims that it is highly probable that consciousness survives the death of the body, and that the conclusion is very strong based on what makes for a strong inductive argument.

The further claim of this argument is that I know that I know the conclusion is true. Is it possible the conclusion is wrong? Of course it is possible, but we do not want to base a belief on what is possible, but on what is likely the case. All kinds of things are possible, but that does not mean we should believe them.

Even if someone had the perfect proof it wouldn't change a thing. Why? Because many of the reasons or causes for believing or not believing in God have nothing to do with logic. Most of our beliefs are the result of culture, peer pressure, psychological predispositions, and a host of other reasons or causes. So, again, no proof, even if perfect would change a thing. Most people would still reject it. It's not a given that people would recognize good logic even if they saw it, and this is true even for people who have studied logic. Remember that most of the premises in an argument can be twisted this or that way. The arguments over the concepts alone can go on for years, and they have.

That said, I do think there are answers to some of these questions, but they raise other questions more difficult to answer.

I'm not a fan of spending too much time on secondary sources. I think that for the most part, they lead us astray, not always of course. Most of my time is spent reading primary source material even though Witt's OC is incomplete. He's written enough prior material to give us a good idea of his thinking. And even the ideas I've tried to expand have some connection to passages in OC. I think OC is the most lucid of all Witt's writings, so I try to take the passages in OC at face value without trying to overanalyze them. Whether I succeed at this is another story. I think when we were explaining objects in the thread on TLP there was a tendency to go beyond Witt's ideas, i.e., to overanalyze the concept. I don't want to be too dogmatic about what I'm saying here, but I think generally this is the case.

What I like reading secondary sources for is to compare my interpretation with that of others. I'm not saying there aren't good reasons to read secondary sources, only that when it comes to interpreting this or that passage in Witt's writings it's easy to go down the wrong path. Of course, it's easy to go down the wrong path no matter what you do, which is why it's a fool's errand to think this or that interpretation is correct. No matter what you say there's going to be a few people who will disagree.

I like reading Witt to see where it leads me.

I think they are exactly that: normal propositions. They do not differ in their structure from any other proposition. Where they differ is in the place they take in the things we do with words. — Banno

Ya, that's one of the disagreements we have, among others, but that's philosophy.

The salient point I would make for you is that a game can only be played if some propositions are, not exempt from truth or falsity, but treated as being true. — Banno

I would say that what we are dealing with aren't propositions in the normal sense or Wittgenstein wouldn't have singled them out as hinge, bedrock, foundational, etc. I never thought they were exempt from truth or falsity. I said that generally hinges are not thought of as true or false. there are exceptions, and Wittgenstein gave examples of those exceptions.

"Treated as true" is an interesting phrase. How does this differ from normal propositions that we treat as true? Do we treat hinges as true, but they're not really true? Or, maybe we act as though they're true, like the rules of chess. "It's true that I have a hand" seems as odd as saying "I know I have a hand," again generally speaking because of the exceptions.

I've brought up the idea that there are pre-linguistic hinges (e.g. animal beliefs) that seem clearly to have no association with truth or falsity unless you bring in the linguistic concepts of true and false. This is also why I think there are different categories of hinges. It seems that this is implied in OC. It's "the deed" that comes first, i.e., how we act that shows the hinge.

I suspect saying that this or that belief is a hinge might mislead one into forgetting that the it is a hinge only within the games we play, the things we are doing - perhaps into thinking that it is a hinge always and in all circumstances. — Banno

I agree.

Much of what I've been doing is thinking out loud. So, my analysis is partly an exegesis, which is difficult because we don't know which parts of OC Witt would have left in or out of a final draft, and partly where I think his thoughts lead.

I think OC has something important to contribute to epistemology.

I don't have much more to say, so I'll end this here.

Happy Hunting.

:grin:

Of all the people I've engaged with over the years in this forum you're one of the few that remind me of a troll. I've been debating people in this forum long before you arrived. Whether you're right or wrong it's just the way you engage, it's so predictable.

I also think it worthy of note that "hinge belief" does not occur in OC. — Banno

All knowledge is about beliefs (unless we're talking about knowledge as a skill), and from the start of OC Witt talks about what Moore considers knowledge. Witt then goes on to explain that Moore's propositions, which are about what he believes to be the case (what he knows), have a special role. All the propositions, even those referred to as hinges, bedrock, foundational, etc., are about beliefs, which is why I refer to them as hinge beliefs. Indeed, Witt doesn't use that wording, but I think it's clear, at least in my mind, that hinge propositions (Moore's propositions) are about beliefs of a certain kind.

The difference between what some of you are doing in this thread and what I'm doing is that I'm trying to go beyond OC to where it might lead. For me, it's not always about getting the correct interpretation, because as you and I have mentioned many times these notes were never finished. We can argue endlessly over interpretations, which I find pointless (at least to some degree). What I think is important is getting a handle on Moore's propositions as endpoints (where justification ends) for epistemology.

Also, although Witt never talked about classifying hinges, I do think there are different kinds of hinges given a particular context or language game.

It seems that language games are only possible if we don’t question certain facts, and whether these facts are true or false. Here I’m referring to hinge propositions (or hinge beliefs). Moreover, I don’t believe that our grammar is conditioned by certain empirical facts. This is not to say that facts don’t play a role in our grammar, it just means that whatever the relationship is, it plays a lesser role. I say lesser role given the autonomous nature of language. There seems to be no doubt that there is some relationship between empirical facts and our grammar (Wittgensteinian grammar). Saying that facts condition our grammar, as per Moyal-Sharrock, seems to diminish the autonomous nature of grammar, especially since it’s grammar that determines what we mean by fact, object, and reality. So, our grammar presupposes these concepts, but it’s not independent of reality.

It seems clear that certain facts of reality, those that we don’t normally doubt, create the surface that allows language games to be played. Similar to a chess board providing the surface area for a chess game. So, the language game of asserting and denying, viz., being true or false rests on Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions (or hinge beliefs), and thus, any talk of epistemology (justification and truth) rests on hinges. Another way to say it is that our methodology of evaluating propositions rests on hinges.

Part of the problem concerns the conflation of hinge beliefs with our normal beliefs (or you could say hinge propositions with normal propositions), they are quite different and have different functions. So, the language game of epistemology is only possible if we never question certain facts. Just as playing a game of chess involves never questioning the rules of chess. The logical role of hinges is that of being beyond doubt and therefore beyond truth and falsity. To bring in the idea that hinge beliefs are true and false is to miss one of the core points of On Certainty. It’s like trying to shove a square peg into a round hole.

That's different.

My interpretation of OC comes closest to Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (University of Hertfordshire). I arrived at my interpretation quite independent of her or any other philosopher. My idea of pre-linguistic beliefs, which I've often compared with animal beliefs is similar to comments she made about the animal in OC (OC 359). I believe, as does she that Wittgenstein solves the infinite regress problem in epistemology, which is one of his contributions to the subject of epistemology. As she says, "it puts a logical stop to infinite regress."

"Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers have
traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must ultimately be based
on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be propositional beliefs. They are really
animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by philosophers), look like
propositional beliefs. It is this misleading appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at
the foundation of thought is yet more thought. For, though they often resemble empirical
conclusions, basic certainties (or 'hinge certainties' or 'hinges' – as I shall also call them
following Wittgenstein's hinge metaphor [OC 341]) constitute the ungrounded,
nonpropositional underpinning of knowledge, not its object. In thus situating the foundation
of knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest themselves as ways of acting,
Wittgenstein has found the place where justification comes to an end, and solved the regress
problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, shown the logical impossibility of radical or global
scepticism. I believe that this is a groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of
calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece' (The Animal in Epistemology:
Wittgenstein's Enactivist Solution to the Problem of Regress, by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock)."

What may count as good reasons for you may not be what others regard as good reasons. Once again: — Fooloso4

Well, I don't view good reasons as something subjective, as if it's just some decision I make arbitrarily.

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

Unpacking this can be tedious, but I don't think there is any problem here. I'm not talking in absolute terms but in general terms. You seem to be pushing Witt into a more relativistic position, but I don't. There is a relativistic point to all this of course, but there is also an objective component, which is more important.

If I had to characterize “hinge proposition” I would say it is one where a human accepts it and its logical consequences as a whole. This acceptance would not be because it strikes us as true but that it has some pragmatic effect on us that when we put them into practice it brings value and meaning to our lives. — Richard B

I'm not sure that we have the same view on hinge beliefs. It depends on what you mean by "logical consequences" of a hinge belief. There is no doubt that hinge beliefs have consequences in our acts (linguistic and non-linguistic), and that there is a logical scaffolding to our belief systems. However, we have different views of hinges if you use "logical consequences" as a synonym for correct reasoning (inductive and deductive). Also, hinge beliefs don't depend on some practical effect. A practical effect would give some justification for the belief, which goes counter what a hinge belief is.

Some may have as part of their hinge beliefs that sacrificing a child will yield more crops. So, are hinge beliefs relative to some system of beliefs? Yes. But this doesn't mean we aren't capable of sorting out what I call "proper" hinge beliefs from "improper" ones. The question becomes, are there good reasons to reject or doubt what they consider a hinge belief? If there are good reasons to doubt, then it's not a hinge. The fact that we're constantly arguing over, belief in God, shows that at least some doubting is warranted, if not most or even all doubts are warranted. It's certainly not like doubting that there are objects that exist in space. I can't understand what a doubt about the existence of objects would even entail. However, I can and do understand doubting the existence of God; and even though my e.g. at the beginning of this paragraph is more extreme, the same point holds.

Not to those who are convinced otherwise. To doubt it would put everything, their whole system of beliefs, into doubt.

Is there any support in Wittgenstein for the notion of a "proper hinge"? — Fooloso4

Of course they're convinced, which is why they consider it a hinge.

One could argue based on some of Witt's remarks that there are hinges of different kinds and that what's considered a hinge at T1, might not be at T2. We acknowledge that hinges change and that some of these changes are more pronounced than others. Wittgenstein doesn't use some of my terminology, but that's because I'm trying to expand on Witt's ideas. I'm not saying that all of my remarks can be supported by passages in OC or anywhere else. My remarks are a combination of my conclusions based on passages in OC, and my expansion of his ideas whether they agree or not.

My view is that belief in God is not a hinge belief.
— Sam26

In an earlier post you said: — Fooloso4

For many religions, belief in God is a hinge.
— Sam26

I'm not saying that people don't use it as a hinge. I'm saying it's not a proper hinge. There could be some beliefs within any system, even ones that contain myths, that are viewed as hinges. What makes a belief a proper hinge is that it doesn't make sense to doubt it (what does making sense here mean?). Doubting that there is a God makes perfect sense. It's nothing like doubting there are objects, or hands, or minds, etc. People may act as though it's a hinge (belief in God), which shows they believe it's a hinge, that's all.

There seem to be certain core beliefs that most systems of belief recognize as hinge. In other words, there are overlapping systems of belief that contain the same core beliefs (hinges), but they also contain other beliefs, considered hinges, but not recognized as such within those other systems. So, you end up with systems with competing hinge beliefs. Sorting this out happens over time.

I would just repeat that a claim to know is not knowledge in the sense of definitely knowing the truth of some proposition but is rather merely belief. — Janus

I believe this is incorrect, and it's a misunderstanding of what it means to know. I assume your use of the phrase "definitely know the truth" means to know with 100% certainty. Most of what we claim to know is not known with absolute certainty. Most of what we claim to know is what's probably true or likely the case, and this follows from logic (inductive reasoning). I think your idea of knowledge is too restrictive.

Also, a strong inductive argument wouldn't be considered "mere belief," since it would have strong evidence to support it. A mere belief to me is a belief that's based on no evidence or very little evidence, like an opinion.

He does not agree with your claim that hinges are not epistemological because: — Fooloso4

I know that he doesn't agree, I've talked with him and listened to his lectures on Youtube. My point in bringing him up was that he talks about how a religious epistemology might try to use belief in God as a hinge, i.e., as an arational belief. My view is that belief in God is not a hinge belief.

I have followed his disagreements with other philosophers who hold a similar position to mine. So, I'm familiar with his interpretation of Wittgenstein and his view on hinges.

I read Pritchard's paper on Hinge Epistemology. The first thing to be noted, as can be seen in the title, is that he regards hinges as epistemological. — Fooloso4

I know that, what's your point?

I'm not sure what you mean.

What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? Or, what if another world picture excludes belief in God as part of their hinge beliefs? Can we just decide whether this or that belief is a hinge? And, if for example, belief in God is a hinge, then there is no need to justify the belief as true or false, since they're arational beliefs. Does Wittgenstein address this problem, or do we end up with conflicting hinge beliefs? Dr. Duncan Pritchard often mentions this in his papers and his lectures. I believe Wittgenstein does address this issue.

"I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry (OC 151)."

It seems clear that Wittgenstein is not only saying Moore's use of know is a misuse, but also that it's not knowledge. The beliefs (arational and hinge beliefs) Moore claims to know are the bedrock, foundation, and solid "...part of our method of doubt and enquiry." It forms a whole system of beliefs that "...characterize the way [we] judge, characterize the nature of judgment (OC 149)." The "nature of judgment" includes our epistemological language games and our language games of doubting. This means that justification and truth are an outgrowth of what stands fast, which is why, generally speaking, hinge beliefs are not justified and not true or false. How can this be? There is no how or why it's simply how we act. "Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from my chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act (OC 148)."

Does this mean that the system of our judgments doesn't change, of course not, it just means that at any given point in time, there is a system of judgment that we don't question. Some of the beliefs in the system will remain unchanged and some will be removed, and others added, but the system will always be there as part of our bedrock beliefs. That there is a system of judgment is unchanging, it can't be otherwise. There is a limit to reason, to justification and truth, and it's an arational system of beliefs.

Do I think Wittgenstein is correct? Absolutely, and it changes the nature of epistemology, and moreover, it shows the limits of epistemology. I believe many philosophers and thinkers have overlooked Wittgenstein's final remarks.

The most difficult part of Wittgenstein's epistemology is to understand the groundlessness of our epistemology. The whole system is predicated on arational beliefs, and this is what is so different about Wittgenstein's approach to knowing and doubting. I believe that if you don't see this, you're missing the core of what Wittgenstein is saying.

"Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasting but excusable: it is part of judging (OC 150)."

"When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions (OC 136)."

The propositions Moore claims to know, viz., those listed in his paper A Defense of Common Sense are the propositions Wittgenstein is referring to. Besides the most commonly used of Moore's statements "I know this is a hand," others include, "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body," and (paraphrasing) "There are other human bodies of the same class that have lived on Earth and have had many different experiences." These are the propositions Wittgenstein is referring to as empirical propositions that we affirm without special testing. In other words, we don't normally need a justification (epistemologically) for these beliefs. These are hinge propositions (I prefer to call them hinge beliefs), and they fulfill the logical role of being bedrock, foundational, or basic to our whole system of epistemological language games. It's where justification ends (no special testing required). Why? Because special testing or justification gets its life from these hinge beliefs. Not only do these beliefs give life to our epistemological language games, but they also give life to the language games of doubting. Such beliefs also reflect an ungrounded way of acting, which is at the core of our world picture or inherited background.

And where it's proper to give a justification for Moore's propositions, i.e., the exceptions, then these propositions are not hinges. So, they can function as proper propositions in certain contexts, but not generally. As I've mentioned elsewhere, and where I've expanded on what I think follows from OC, is that these beliefs at their core are pre-linguistic beliefs, shown in our actions.

It's not only Moore's use of know that is problematic, but saying these hinge beliefs are generally true is also problematic in similar ways.

Yes, we do disagree. I don't think we are likely to change our opinions now, but we have both over time changed our understanding to some degree. So, I do think there is value in discussing and defending our take on things. In defending our views we go back to the text and sometimes we find something new. — Fooloso4

I'm not saying there's no value in discussing and defending these ideas because there is, and I know that others are reading as we write. The frustration is that people are constantly misinterpreting things, so I have to keep repeating myself. I think I'm being clear, but not so much apparently. I find it an agonizing process, but I can't stop. I stop for a bit, and then in a few months, I'm right back at it. It's a love-hate relationship.

We disagree, I'm moving on.

"Can one say: "Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either (OC 121)." The doubt, in the sense of challenging one's knowledge claim, is essential to what it means to have objective knowledge. Otherwise, we end up with pronouncements like Moore's, as if the pronouncement itself is enough. It also seems to be why Wittgenstein says in OC 4 to consider the negation of these kinds of propositions. If the negation doesn't make sense, then it's not epistemological it's a hinge. The epistemological use of "I know..." has to make sense when considering its negation. If it doesn't then it's just an expression of a hinge belief. It's the doubt that separates the epistemological from the hinges. In the former the doubt makes sense, in the latter it doesn't.

We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed.

With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.

What is this mental state? — Fooloso4

The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. Moore's use of "I know..." is just that, a conviction of certainty. In OC 42 Witt refers to what is expressed by tone of voice and gestures (expressing a conviction), which fits Moore's use of "I know..." as he pronounces "I know this is a hand," by raising his hand before an audience. It's not an epistemological use of the words "I know..." where one is expressing a justified true belief.

In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. These are the subjective certainties of our world picture, which is how we act in the world. It's a misuse of know in the epistemological sense, we don't justify these kinds of beliefs, which is what Moore is trying to do and why Witt is criticizing his use of know. If OC 7 isn't about one's inner certainty, then it would be making the same mistake Moore makes.

Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two.

Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims. — Fooloso4

Again, what I'm saying is that there are uses of the word know, as Witt points out, that are not epistemological. For example, "I know...," as an expression of a conviction, which is what Moore's use of know amounts to. This is a non-epistemological use; it refers to how I feel about a belief.

Science is a form of knowing in a participatory and a practical sense. We know the world, in the sense of participating in it, via science. It is practical too in the that it is a practice, a know-how. Propositional knowledge though, it seems to me, requires observation. I know I have hands because I can see them, observe myself using them and so on. I know it is raining when I am out and I feel the rain on my body and see the drops falling. In those kinds of cases, of which there are countlessly many in our lives, we cannot be mistaken, barring faux-doubt and bizarre thought-experiment scenarios, which I don't believe deserve our concern. — Janus

Science uses the same justification methods we all do, logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), sensory experience (observation), and testimony (peer reviewed papers, lectures, etc). It's just that science is generally more precise with these methods than the general public. Most knowledge in general is practical, not just science. Moreover, science draws conclusions based on whatever method of justification it's using, and these conclusions are in the form of propositions. If science presents a theory based on experiments or mathematical models, then someone probably believes the conclusions are either true or false. If they believe they're true or false, they're using propositions. Most all of what we know is in the form of propositions.

Knowledge can come in the form of a skill (know how) or in the form of a belief. Mostly when we talk about knowledge we're talking about beliefs not knowledge as a skill (like riding a bike or conducting skillful experiments). Although skills overlap with knowledge as a belief.

When you say "So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken." I have no problem agreeing with you because it is not a claim that I know, but a claim to have good reason to believe that I know. And this highlights the strangeness of saying that I could know, without knowing that I know. For me, if I don't know that I know, as I say I do in cases like 'I am a human being' 'my body is bilaterally symmetrical (more or less)', I have hands and feet'. 'My head sits on my shoulders' and so on endlessly, then I would say instead that I don't know, but I believe or don't believe this or that, or I reserve judgement. — Janus

A claim to have good reason to believe X is partly what we mean by know. Good reasons are how we justify many of our beliefs and why we make claims that a proposition is true. It is a claim to know.

Part of Wittgenstein's argument against Moore is that we don't know we have hands. The hinge belief that we have hands is just part of the world picture we have along with a million other things, but it's not knowledge. I believe Witt is correct about this.

I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. The problem I have with the idea that knowing involves uncertainty or defeasibility, is that it seems weird, inconsistent or incoherent. to say that you know, but that you could be mistaken. — Janus

It could simply mean that your inductive reasoning, which is a legitimate form of knowing is only probable (most of science is inductive). So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken. This happens all the time. Evidence changes and so do our conclusions. I think the problem is when we conflate the meaning of knowledge as JTB for example, and one's claim to knowledge, they are two different things. The definition is one thing, that is what it means to know, but your inductive claim doesn't have the same force of necessity (if necessity is the correct word).

Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course. — Fooloso4

Witt seems to point to two senses of know and certainty throughout OC. He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use. He also talks about subjective certainty which is the same as know when used to express one's conviction. This is what I mean by non-epistemological uses of these words. An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth.

Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table — Fooloso4

While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change.

If you going to critique what I say at least read with more care. That said, I'm sure we have disagreements nothing new here.

I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. Knowing and doubting does not occur as an epistemological language game when speaking of hinge beliefs, generally. So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations.

OC 3 is just an example of where it might be proper to doubt and how we might satisfy that doubt. Moore's use is not such a case.

7 is referring to a subjective knowing and certainty. That's my interpretation.

None of the rest of your e.g.'s hurt my position. You don't seem to be following my position carefully. At least that's what it seems to me.

But recall that Wittgenstein regarded the ordinary meaning of "to know" to not imply infallibility, in the sense that even if a fact P necessarily implies another fact Q, "knowing that P" does not necessarily imply Q. — sime

Right, he never implies that "to know" means some infallibility on our part.

I don't think Wittgenstein would use phrasing like "P necessarily implies some fact," or what others use, viz., "P if and only if P," etc.

This stems from his epistemic consideration that in a literal sense nothing is knowable in the sense demanded by a philosopher. And yet he appreciated that everyone including himself ordinarily use the verb "to know" all the time. Therefore he concluded that the ordinary meaning of "to know" isn't an insinuation of ideal knowledge. — sime

Philosophers don't, as a general rule, hold to the notion that knowledge implies infallibility if that's what you're implying. Inductive reasoning is probabilistic, so any knowledge gained by inductive reasoning is not infallible by definition. I think Wittgenstein's point is that some uses of "I know.." are not epistemological as in Moore's case, at least that's part of Witts point.

What I am emphasizing here is what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in the following:

110 “….As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.” — Richard B

Yes, that's an important part of his thinking in OC.

"Giving grounds [justification], however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;--but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting [non-linguistic], which lies at the bottom of our language game (OC 204)."

Wittgenstein's ideas seem to build on each other. At the bottom, i.e. the grounding or the world picture, then we have our actions (non-linguistic actions) within that grounding. On top of this comes a primitive language, then more sophisticated language games like knowing and doubting. Knowing and doubting come much later, it's parasitic on the world picture.