He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use ... An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth. — Sam26
While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change. — Sam26
And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26
It's the role hinges play in our system of judgments that's important, and it's certainly not about whether they're true or false. — Sam26
Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims. — Fooloso4
I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. — Janus
6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.
12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".
8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.
7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.
651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.
6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.
urther, although rejects radical skepticism he does hold a more measured and moderate skepticism.
651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.
Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:
6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.
We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact. — Fooloso4
With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:
6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.
What is this mental state? — Fooloso4
125. If a blind man were to ask me "Have you got two hands?" I should not make sure by looking.
If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn't I
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what?
(Who decides what stands fast?)
The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. — Sam26
In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. — Sam26
8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.
Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two. — Sam26
We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed. — Sam26
To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4
To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4
Yes, we do disagree. I don't think we are likely to change our opinions now, but we have both over time changed our understanding to some degree. So, I do think there is value in discussing and defending our take on things. In defending our views we go back to the text and sometimes we find something new. — Fooloso4
Do you think he put as much effort in his words as you are in interpreting them? — schopenhauer1
Is it even in some way "right" to over-interpret any one human's words to this extent? — schopenhauer1
Do you think the onus of understanding is on the author or the reader? — schopenhauer1
If not the author, then can I write a post, and make you figure it out if you don't understand it? — schopenhauer1
To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4
On Certainty and for that matter PI is an un finished work. — Richard B
a continuation of what he had started. — Richard B
This is more exciting because it could take philosophy is new and interesting directions. — Richard B
(PI 90)… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.
What do you think that is? — Fooloso4
Do you have examples or do you have in mind what statements such as the following: — Fooloso4
I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. … Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV, 36)
This is not about pondering the use of the word "God", but pondering life itself. — Richard B
The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life.
To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.
To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.
However this may be, at any rate we are in a certain sense dependent,
and what we are dependent on we can call God.
In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world-which is independent of our will.
I can make myself independent of fate.
There are two godheads: the world and my independent I.
What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? — Sam26
And, if for example, belief in God is a hinge, then there is no need to justify the belief as true or false, since they're arational beliefs. — Sam26
239. I believe that every human being has two human parents; but Catholics believe that Jesus only had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence to all the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain
circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves
the contrary. And so if Moore said "I know that this is wine and not blood", Catholics would
contradict him.
243. One says "I know" when one is ready to give compelling grounds. "I know" relates to a
possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light,
assuming that he is convinced of it.
But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his
assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.
336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.
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