I'm not necessarily disagreeing, but why are you saying that?

No, I wouldn't characterize it like that.

In this case immoral.

I agree that moral sensibility comes first, that's the point of it being foundational. And the commands do have use, but it's not the most meaningful thing. The command comes from the conviction or belief that kicking puppies is wrong.

My view is that the belief that kicking puppies is wrong isn't based on any justification, it's foundational like the rules of chess. It's a hinge.

One use is in teaching someone about right and wrong and how to treat other animals. I don't have to use the command when teaching. I can simply say it's wrong and I might even give reasons why. "Don't kick puppies" has other uses stemming from the belief that kicking puppies is wrong. It grows out of the basic belief that something is immoral or wrong.

It doesn't have to be formulated as a command. One of the bedrock statements of your moral theory could be something like, "It's generally morally wrong to kick puppies." There could be many foundational moral statements of this sort. That's a conviction you hold to that's bedrock, you accept it as true, a given. Like a rule of chess.

Ya, I think some moral statements can be counted as hinges. I was recently thinking about hinges and moral theories, but nothing definite. I think any system of belief relies on hinges otherwise you end up with an infinite regress. On the other hand, some beliefs that are counted as hinges aren't hinges in the Wittgensteinian sense. One of the important tests is that they can't be reasonably doubted. Some Christians are using the idea of hinges to support belief in God, but the concept of God can be reasonably doubted. It's not like "This is my hand."

I view faith in two ways: First, it can be simply a conviction (belief) that a statement is true, or it can be, as some claim, a belief that something is true based on evidence or good reasons. Some religious people view belief in God as a kind of Wittgensteinain hinge that's foundational to their belief system. To some, it's an arrational bedrock belief.

Wittgenstein's hinges tend to be more primal or universal (thinking of prelinguistic convictions). E.g., I have hands or I'm an object separate from other objects. Although there is a close connection related to action. That said, I haven't studied any of these writings, so I don't want to be dogmatic about any of this.

I've been tweaking my idea of bedrock beliefs as a replacement for Wittgenstein's notion of hinge proposition. Instead of bedrock beliefs which sound too personal and don't convey the shared nature of these beliefs, I've changed the wording to capture both the personal and their shared nature. A name that seems to fit this idea more appropriately is bedrock convictions, which capture their personal and shared nature. Personal in that all of us have these convictions and shared because all of us share these convictions as a necessary part of life and language. For example, as individuals and as part of a community we act with our hands is a conviction that stands as a necessary part of our background. I don't say "I have hands" before acting, I just act. So, our acting is at the bottom of the language game (OC 204).

Bedrock convictions (hinges) are also split into prelinguistic convictions and linguistic convictions. Prelinguistic convictions are shown in simple actions like picking up an object which reflects the conviction that I have hands. Our actions show these convictions apart from language, but they can also be expressed as part of language, however, language comes later. As language forms it will convey another layer to these convictions, viz., linguistic convictions, such as the rules of chess. Prelinguistic convictions are not subject to doubt because the use of the concept of doubt is a linguistic function (it's not necessarily a linguistic function, although the concept is) especially as part of Moore's argument and as part of the skeptic's argument. The prelinguistic props up the linguistic. It would be logically impossible for the latter (linguistic convictions) to exist without the former. This is why the skeptics' doubting is nonsense. We don't start with doubts, we start with subjective and collective certainty that enables the language games of JTB and the language games of doubting.

I'm further arguing that Wittgenstein's hinge propositions are probably a necessary function of Moore's reference to his statements as propositions and not so much that Wittgenstein thinks of them as traditional propositions. This seems obvious given Wittgenstein's reference to Moore's statements as hinges. But there is an important point that Wittgenstein's writing alludes to, viz., that hinges are not true in the traditional epistemological or propositional sense. In other words, they don't carry truth values in the same sense that traditional propositions do where they're open to verification or falsification. Bedrock convictions aren't subject to the justificatory machinery of JTB. They are the frame that stands fast for the machinery of JTB (JTB for me consists of different language games in the Wittgensteinian spirit). So, the truth of bedrock convictions is tied to the language game of conviction rather than justification. Normal propositions (true and false propositions) are subject to justification and doubt, but bedrock convictions are not. I have the conviction that I have hands (shown in my actions), and this conviction expresses another use (another language game) of the concept true that is foundational to our systems of epistemology and doubt. The truth of bedrock convictions is a pragmatic and necessary one. They are structural.

Can you read the title of the thread? Evidence of consciousness surviving death - that's what the thread has been about. It sure isn't about any religion if that's what you're inferring. The other sense of proselytize is to convert from one belief to another. I guess that's what any argument tries to accomplish, so I'm not sure what your point is.

Actually, you could ask the same question about my Wittgenstein threads.

I'm thinking about participating in this but haven't made up my mind. I would encourage people to participate, especially if they enjoy philosophy.

The following videos are among the best NDEs I've recently listened to. They are category 3 NDEs, meaning they are much more detailed and informative than category 1 or 2 NDEs. So, for those of you who have the time, these are worth listening to.

1)

2)

I thought I was burned out on Witt but even though I'm not writing in this forum, I'm still writing in other spaces. I get in these moods that tend to change like the wind. I can't stop doing philosophy, my mind naturally goes in that direction. :gasp:

I don't mind any talk of the AI agents in this thread.

You can't escape philosophy. Most people's view of philosophy is much too narrow. Philosophy permeates all of life. It doesn't matter the subject, the arts, science, ethics, consciousness, religion, and even games, all of these subjects have a philosophical side. Philosophy necessarily emerges from the questions we ask across a wide swathe of domains: What is beauty? What is mathematical truth? How do we determine the best chess move? What is best for my family? How do we align a particular architectural design with our goals? All of us who think, and ask questions, are doing philosophy.

I wonder opinions and thought people on this forum have in regards whether or not China is willing to invade Taiwan or not in order to make it part of China. — dclements

They certainly want Taiwan, but they might end up destroying all they've accomplished in the last 50 years. Trying to predict what China will do is difficult. I think the chances of a war in the next five years are about "50 50," but that's just a guess. I'm sure China would like to have TSMC, but that factory will probably be blown up if they invade. That said it's probably a matter of pride for them to get Taiwan. China could do a blockade because Taiwan imports just about everything. However, if they blockade Taiwan, the U.S. and its allies would have time to bring more force to bear.

If I was China, I would attack before the U.S. had time to build up long-range missile inventories. The U.S. is trying to build inventories as we speak. The carriers are going to have to stay about 1000 miles away or risk getting sunk. China could be stopped but the price would be high in lives and ships. Is it worth it? If the U.S. does nothing, then Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, etc., are going to start wondering if the U.S. will protect them if China wants to expand its influence. I hope it doesn't happen, but who knows?

Here are a couple of videos for those who like to keep up with the latest AI news.

I'll continue to work on the book and maybe get back to post some of it sometime.

There's always more...

Good one Josh, I stand corrected.

I was equating “system of convictions” with the expression you did use: “truths that are part of our background certainty.”
Do you distinguish between what you call the “framework of reality” and what Wittgenstein calls a system of convictions, which I see as equivalent to language games, hinge propositions and forms of life? — Joshs

While it's true that many of our convictions are hinges (basic beliefs), I wouldn't use "system of convictions," and Witt never used this wording. He did equate Moore's use of "I know..." to that of an expression of a conviction, which closely resembles a strong opinion, although not always. Sometimes one's conviction is the result of JTB, it's just that the conviction is justified as opposed to Moore's conviction which isn't justified, nor can it be.

I've explained in other posts the answers to your last two paragraphs. Please, I don't want to re-write it, or even search for where I talked about these issues.

Glad I could provide some humor. :grin:

By the way, the whole Gettier problem is misguided, but I agree with you and am not interested in re-hashing that mess.

Wittgenstein pointed out in several instances that Moore's use of "I know..." is more like an expression of a conviction, it's not that JTB is incomplete. You seem to not acknowledge that there are uses of "I know..." outside JTB, i.e., they have nothing to do with JTB. For example, "My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. Here the expression 'I know' stands for the conviction [my emphasis] that this is so (OC 86)." These are two completely different language games. Not every language game involving the use of "I know..." is about an epistemological language game (JTB).

No, it's not incomplete, there are just other uses (language games) where the use of "I know.." isn't JTB.

Yes.

But did Wittgenstein continue to believe it was a good definition? — Banno

I'm sure he didn't align himself with the traditional accounts of JTB. So, no, I don't think he would agree with traditional JTB. This was acknowledged above in my account, although not explicitly.

"Don't think, look!"

"I know I have a toothache - how silly of you to suppose otherwise!". "I know where my hand is".

These look to be reasonable, straight forward uses of "I know..." and yet they are problematic for the JTB account. The use of "I know..." is broader than the JTB account sanctions. The game is played, in such a way that the JTB account is inadequate to explain it. — Banno

They do look reasonable, after all, Moore thought so. I wouldn't say they're problematic (although they're problematic for Moore's account) for JTB. I would say they aren't JTB at all, and that's Witt's point.

I don't think it contrary to the OC to say Wittgenstein was arguing for the inadequacy of Justified True Belief. And he would be in good company. — Banno

I don't see any indication that Witt was specifically arguing against JTB. He was arguing against the misuse of language, specifically Moore's misuse of know. Moreover, Moore's use of know, strictly speaking isn't a case of JTB. I think that's more to the point.

You say that the system of convictions that form the background certainty of a language game can be used as propositions in an argument — Joshs

Sorry Josh, but I never said anything about a "system of convictions." You're confusing what I said about Moore's use of "I know..." (which is more like an expression of conviction as opposed to knowledge) with the framework of reality, made up of basic beliefs or certainties.

The statement, "I believe this is a hand," can be said (I don't like the term 'truth value') to be true in some language games. It's comparable to saying "It's true that bishops move diagonally." These are just certainties that grow out of very basic beliefs about our foundational background. For example, part of the background reality of chess is that there are rules, pieces, and a board, and it's this background that allows for the game of chess. In the same way, basic beliefs (hinges) are basic beliefs about our background (beliefs like "we have hands" "there are other minds" etc) - this background is necessary for the language games of knowledge and doubt to take place. This doesn't mean that basic beliefs can't be referred to as true, just not in combination with being justified, i.e., justified and true. So, you can't on the one hand believe that the foundation is not justified (i.e., hinges) and on the other say they are justified. It's necessarily the case that hinges aren't justified - that's the whole point of Witt's argument.

If read closely, much of what I've written implies that Wittgenstein's OC enhances the traditional view of knowledge as JTB. I believe that JTB is still a good definition, but given OC, it needs a bit more nuance. Let me be a bit more precise about my view of JTB given the backdrop of OC.

So, integrating JTB into OC involves rethinking how we use justification and truth, and how we think of beliefs. For example, justification often focuses on logic or rational argument, but Wittgenstein's approach is more practical focusing on the various language games within our forms of life. Also to acknowledge the limitations of justification as foundational or bedrock to our whole system of knowledge. Thus, what constitutes justification is based on the context of the language game being played. To understand this requires a good understanding of Witt's views in the PI.

My approach to truth is that it's more about their role in different language games. So, one role is that statements can be true as part of a framework, like the role of hinges or the role that rules play in a game. These are not truths that are justified, but truths that are part of our background certainty (and they can be used as propositions in an argument).

The other predominant role of truth is those that are justified, these are epistemological, i.e., they are used in our language games of epistemology. So, I don't think the use of truth is restricted to the language games of epistemology. I guess this is a dualistic approach to truth.

You can think of traditional JTB as being enhanced by OC. First, with the base layer of hinge propositions (or as I like to say basic beliefs or basic subjective certainties). In this layer justification and truth are about their role in our system of epistemology, viz., they're bedrock to our system of epistemology. In other words, they allow the language games of epistemology to take root.

The upper layers above the base layer (bedrock) are more akin to the traditional language games of JTB. This is where the typical role of inference takes place.

Then there is the role of skepticism in all of this or the role of doubting. Some claims don't need to be justified in response to skeptical doubt because they are part of what makes doubting possible.

This view of knowledge (JTB) is more holistic and is connected to a web of beliefs, practices (forms of life), and language games. So, JTB is enhanced by Wittgenstein and how it correlates with our practical life, viz., how we act (linguistically and as we move in the world).

By integrating these ideas the traditional model of JTB can be enhanced.

So, whenever I use JTB this is what I think about.

No problem Banno, and thanks for the kind words. I tried to capture what I thought was Witt's thinking. I'm sure I did in many ways but failed in others. What I tried to do is go beyond his thinking, i.e., to see where it might lead.

My account of JTB is a bit more nuanced than what you might normally hear from those who hold to JTB. For e.g., there are different language games that account for the different uses of justification (logic, testimony, sensory experience, and linguistic training for e.g.). And my account of truth is a bit more nuanced. We all think the other guy we disagree with is doing poor philosophy.

C1 is an intermediate conclusion and C4 in the final conclusion. Of course, there are different theories of knowledge, but since Witt is generally dealing with JTB that's how I formulated the argument. Any argument that's formed like this is based on a particular interpretation, so it can always be challenged.

So, what would a logical argument look like in favor of my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions?

P1: All knowledge in the traditional epistemological sense requires justification, truth, and belief.
P2: Hinge propositions, do not require (or cannot undergo) justification since they are bedrock.
C1: Therefore, hinge propositions do not fit into the traditional knowledge model (from P1 and P2).
P3: If something does not fit into the model of knowledge where it must be justified to be known, then based on JTB, it is not "known."
C2: Hence, hinge propositions are not known in the epistemological sense (from C1 and P3).
P4: If something is not known epistemologically, it does not meet the criteria of being justified or true in the traditional sense.

Who knows? We have to disagree about something. :grin:

If it appears that I lump all language games about truth into a single mix, that is becasue the games around knowledge and the games around truth are not unrelated. One can only have justified true beliefs if there are truths. — Banno

Where we seem to disagree is on the idea that "One can only have justified true beliefs if there are truths." Obviously this is true, but this doesn't address my issue.

Sorry, I edited this.

You didn't direct this at me, but I wanted to respond.

Yes, they're examples of hinges. However, certain hinges (basic beliefs) provide the framework for the language games of epistemology to work. There is no mistake here about truth, it just depends on the language game being used. It appears that you're lumping all language games about truth into a single mix. Moreover, hinge propositions are not normal propositions, if they were he wouldn't have singled them out. So, in what sense are they true? You seem to ignore the examples I gave that point out how they can be said to be true, and the ways they cannot be said to be true. Maybe you can clarify.

Well that's my interpretation of OC.

OC 291 is just Witt reiterating that some truths about the world are just part of the framework or foundation of understanding. They're not questioned or doubted. I just believe it, i.e., I believe it's true without justification.

OC 292 - Our knowledge is part of an enormous system and the value of our beliefs or knowledge takes place in the broader system of beliefs and practices.

OC 293 - Again, some basic beliefs must remain fixed for practicality and if they didn't, we wouldn't be able to act effectively in the world.

One can look at these basic beliefs as foundations for action, both in linguistics and epistemology. This is why I think Witt is just giving us a foundation for our beliefs to stand on, but it's not a traditional foundational view.