This should probably be in my thread on OC.

So for example, when Moore raises his hand and says ‘I know this is a hand, and therefore it is true that it is a hand’, he is confusing an epistemological with a grammatical use of the concepts of know and true, because he considers his demonstration as a form of proof. Would you agree? But then what would be an example of a grammatical use of the word true in Moore’s case? Something like: ‘it is true that Moore is invoking a particular language game by raising his hand and saying he knows it is a hand? — Joshs

The way I explain Moore's confusion, which is Witt's point, Moore's use of know is more akin to an expression of a conviction. In other words, a subjective feeling of truth expressed by emphasis or gesticulation. A feeling of certainty, not to be confused with objective certainty or knowledge.

Moore does consider "I know this is a hand," to be empirical proof, a self-evident truth. In the Wittgensteinian sense "This is a hand" would be a grammatical truth by virtue of the language game and context. However, Moore is saying something different, he thinks he has good reasons to suppose that he knows "This is a hand." Wittgenstein disagrees.

But 2+2=4 is not arbitrary in the way that "bishops move diagonally" is. — hypericin

Yes, you are correct; it's not the same. However, any system, whether epistemological (JTB) or formal mathematical systems, will have hinges (hereafter referred to as basic beliefs) that are true, but not in the JTB sense. All I'm saying is that both are basic statements of belief, and they function in similar ways. In both systems, these basic beliefs are bedrock to the system and function in a way that's not provable within the system. Some mathematical statements are accepted as true for the system to function.

Or rather, 2+2=4 follows the rules of adding in the same way that a diagonal bishop move follows the rules of chess. But the rules of adding are not mere convention, they capture some sort of truth that has not been stipulated into being, like the rules of chess were. — hypericin

Some basic beliefs are arbitrary and some are not, but both are basic and needed for the system to function. The difference in the use of truth is that one use is epistemological, and one is not. This is where part of the confusion lies, at least in OC. Another part of the confusion is the idea of hinge proposition, which is why I think they should be called basic beliefs.

I believe that mathematical systems are the product of minds and that anything created by that mind/s involving mathematics will have mathematical systems intrinsic to it. In other words, mathematics will be discoverable within that creation, by other minds, which is the case when we discover math as an intrinsic part of the universe. I'm an Idealist and believe that at the bottom of reality is consciousness (other minds). So, I believe, mathematical knowledge is intrinsic to this consciousness or mind. So, the answer to the age-old question, "Is mathematics discoverable or created by minds?" - it's ultimately a product of a mind/s, but it can be discovered as part of a creation too. So, again, if any mind uses mathematics to create something, then mathematics will be discoverable within that creation.

One can believe this as an idealist without believing in some religious doctrine.

Chess rules are not true or false in themselves, the moves in the game which these rules specify are true or false. — Joshs

Hinges aren't true in the epistemological sense, i.e., justified and true. However, one can use the concept of true in other ways, just as the concept know can be used in other ways. For example, someone might ask when learning the game of chess, "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" You reply "Yes." This isn't an epistemological use of the concept.

I wouldn't use the phrase "true or false in themselves." I think that just confuses things even more. However, if you mean that the rules of chess are not something we discovered as a fact of reality (JTB), then I agree. The point is that what we accept as true can be independent of provability. So, hinges can be accepted as true, i.e., apart from provability and epistemological uses. I believe this is also how we should see some mathematical truths, e.g. 2+2=4 is true.

Since the laws of chess are the ground in the basis of which moves in the game can be correct or incorrect, the laws of chess are ‘not true, not yet false’. Is this what you meant? — Joshs

This is slightly different but related. The rules of chess do not describe the truths of reality in the same way that "water freezes at 32 degrees F" does. Instead, they constitute the very framework within which true and false (correct and incorrect) can be assessed.

This is one of the main points of OC. We often refer to things as true without being justified, just as we can use the word know without it being JTB. They're just different language games. In other words, you can hold them as true in practice, e.g., chess rules.

You still don't seem to follow my points. Of course, they could be used in arguments. We can talk about their truth values just as we can talk about the truth values of the rules of chess, they just aren't epistemological truth values, i.e., they're not justified and true. There are different language games for these words outside their epistemological use, and Witt points this out. It's in this sense you can use know, true, and even justified outside epistemology.

Hinge propositions are said, but never quite rightly. "Here is a hand" isn't justified, at least not by other propositions. It's shown. "If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest".

So I keep coming back to PI §201. What's not expressible may nevertheless be enacted. Not just in following a rule, but in using language, deciding what to do, and generally in what he called a "form of life". You don't say it, you do it.

Any comments, Sam26? I suspect this is an older reading of Wittgenstein than is popular now. — Banno

I'll comment on this: I'm not sure why you would say this, viz., "Hinge propositions are said, but never quite rightly." They are often mischaracterized and taken as normal propositions, so in this sense they are often "never said quite rightly." However, they can be talked about if one understands what they are and how they function. Indeed, they aren't justified but neither are they true, i.e., they are outside of epistemological talk. This means that not only are they outside talk of justification, but they are outside talk of truth, at least in the epistemological sense. They are true in the sense that the rules of chess are true. This use of true is not epistemological.

The point of OC 1 is not about showing. It's about saying to Moore that if he does know as he claims, then Wittgenstein will grant the rest of his argument. But of course, Wittgenstein demonstrates that Moore doesn't know in the JTB sense. He's using the concept know, not epistemologically, but as an expression of a conviction. It's purely subjective. This is where people seem to get confused, i.e., they don't understand this point.

Where we do see the idea of showing in OC is that many hinges are shown in our actions even prior to the expression of the belief. Showing is prior to the expression in many ways, but not always. In the most basic of hinges, showing is bedrock.

I given a more detailed explanation in my most recent posts in my analysis of OC.

The Practicality of Understanding Hinges

Wittgenstein's hinge propositions (hereafter known as basic beliefs) from On Certainty offer profound insights into how everyday life connects with intellectual pursuits. The ideas contained in OC extend far beyond philosophical theory, reaching into reality on a practical level, namely, how we learn, know, and act in the world. One example of this is how we teach a child. We don't start by proving fundamental facts about reality - we show them how to interact with the world, which is closely connected with our forms of life. A child learns this is a hand not by proof, but by interacting with the world, non-linguistically or linguistically. This practical subjective certainty provides the foundation for later learning, especially the more advanced concepts of knowledge and doubt. We teach a child how to follow the rules of mathematics, we don't prove that 2+2=4. We show them how to count, and we show them how to interact in the world by using mathematics. They learn the basic beliefs of mathematics first. The certainty they acquire is through practice and participation in our forms of life. A child doesn't start by questioning these basic beliefs. For example, they don't question if a word refers to some thing, they start by learning the language games of the concepts. Questioning and doubting come later in the more advanced language games after the foundation has been put down.

Basic beliefs are why scientists don't question everything. There's a certain set of basic beliefs that stand fast in order for scientific investigation to proceed. A biologist doesn't question the existence of the microscope, they simply use the microscope. Basic beliefs make scientific investigations possible.

Wittgenstein's basic beliefs explain why there are cultural differences, viz., some cultures have different sets of basic beliefs. This is true even if some core basic beliefs are shared between cultures. This is also true of religious beliefs; each religion has its own basic beliefs within its religious system. This doesn't mean that all basic beliefs are equal, some are absolute (like there are other minds), and some change because they're challenged.

There are obvious implications for how we understand knowledge. Instead of seeing basic beliefs as requiring justification, we recognize that some certainties (basic beliefs) must stand fast in order for epistemological justification and truth claims to be possible in the first place.

These insights demonstrate that our relationship with reality isn't primarily theoretical but practical. This doesn't diminish philosophical inquiry; it just puts it in the proper light.

Let me explain this idea more simply:

Again, thinking about the rules of chess. When we assert that "bishops move diagonally," this isn't something we prove or justify, it's just a rule we accept to play the game. It's like saying "This is how we move the piece," how we act when we play the game. We can say that it's true that bishops move diagonally, but this is different from saying that it rained yesterday, which we can defend by looking at the weather records and other evidence.

Imagine trying to prove that you have hands in a context similar to Moore's example. It would seem ridiculous because it's not something we normally need to prove. The subjective certainty we have about our hands is very basic, it's like the chess rule - we start with it, we act with our hands and we play chess using the rules of chess. We don't prove these things.

The key point is that some things in life aren't things we know in the JTB sense. They are the foundation that lets us know in the epistemological (JTB) sense. In other words, you have to accept the rules of chess before you can play the game, and there are certain things you have to accept about the world before you can start making knowledge claims.

We often use words like true and know in different ways. When we say, "I know my name," we're not really offering a proof, we're just expressing a basic certainty. It's different from saying the Earth is the third planet from our Sun, which we can prove by observation. Much of the confusion stems from the different uses of these words (true and know), some are foundational (hinges), and others are not.

So, hinge propositions (bedrock beliefs) are outside our epistemological framework (JTB), which means that hinges aren't known in the epistemological sense, i.e., they are not justified and true. I say, "epistemological sense" because there are language games where using true about hinges can make sense. However, it's not an epistemological use. One can see this if, for example, we look at the rules of chess, which are hinges. There is no objective justification for saying that bishops move diagonally, i.e., there is no objective justification that leads me to the truth of the statement that bishops move diagonally. The rule is just an arbitrary backdrop or a matter of convention that we accept. Does this mean we can't use the word true about these rules, of course not. We accept them as true, but not epistemologically. For example, it's similar to the use of know that's not epistemological. Moore's use of "I know this is a hand," is the classic example, it's not an epistemological use in the context Moore is using it. His use of know is akin to a conviction, it's not epistemological. The word true can be used in the same way, as an expression of an inner certainty. Is it true that bishops move diagonally? In other words, is the statement "Bishops move diagonally" justified and true? No. It's a rule we accept that is foundational to the game. Are there instances where the "Bishops move diagonally" is justified and true? Yes. It depends on the context of the language game. People tend to conflate this distinction.

My take on some of this differs from what's been discussed here, especially since I'm an Idealist.

In Wittgenstein’s final work, OC, he grappled with the fundamental ideas of knowledge (JTB), certainty, doubt, truth, and others. This was in response to G.E. Moore’s claims about what we can know with certainty. This led to what many philosophers refer to as hinge propositions. Hinge propositions can be referred to in several ways including bedrock, foundational, or basic beliefs; however, no matter how you refer to them they raise important questions about the foundations of knowledge, i.e., our epistemological practices.

One issue (among others) that emerges with hinge propositions within epistemology is understanding their relationship to truth. Propositions traditionally are thought of as either true or false. It seems clear that Wittgenstein is separating the traditional view of what we mean by proposition, with a more nuanced view given Moore’s propositions. For example, “If true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true nor yet false (OC 205).” This suggests that what separates hinges from other propositions is their role, viz., that they are foundational or bedrock. This bedrock status is what separates them from traditional propositions. “I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry (OC 151).” The implication is that it is not justified or true because of evidence or reasons, but it is part of our method of inquiry that certain hinges (beliefs) stand fast. This is borne out in our forms of life. Our world picture comes before our talk of true and false. We inherit our background, it’s not a matter of it being true or false. The ground is what enables epistemological claims, which by definition include truth claims.
We can think of this as a kind of logic of precedence, i.e., before we can say anything we need a framework, shared practices, basic (subjective) certainties, and ways of judging. The ground is not yet true or false. In other words, hinges, which are the ground, are not true or false in this setting. This is simply the way I act, whether linguistically or otherwise.

We can think of the use of true in the same way we think of the use of know. For example, just as “know” can be used as an expression of JTB and as a conviction of what one believes, so the use of “true” can be used apart from its epistemological uses. This insight helps to explain Wittgenstein’s reference to the truth of 2+2=4. These basic mathematical statements, especially when functioning as hinges operate more like rules of practice, something akin to a rule of chess. They demonstrate how we operate with numbers rather than making truth claims. However, it depends on the language game or the context. Certainly, there are proper uses of “true” outside the context of epistemology, just as there are proper uses of “know” outside epistemology. The use of “know” has this dual nature, so too does the concept of “true.” The context of the language game is what drives the correct use.

Given that Wittgenstein never completed OC the term hinge proposition itself might be problematic. Alternative terms like bedrock beliefs, foundation beliefs, or basic beliefs might be better suited to capture their pre-propositional nature.

I’ve been thinking about expressing Wittgenstein’s hinges in terms of types.

For example…

1. Types of Hinges

• Pre-linguistic beliefs (shown in our actions)
1. Spatial awareness
2. Continuity of objects
3. Causal relationships

• Rule-based hinges
1. Rules of chess
2. Mathematical rules/axioms
3. Any defined practice

• Varied hinges
1. Physical facts (“This is my hand”)
2. Social conventions
3. Rules of language

• Chess example
1. The rules can be learned as statements
2. However, their role as hinges is learned from:
a) Accepting their use in practice
b) Their role as enablers of the game
c) Their status as foundational

• Wittgensteinian Insight
1. Hinges have a particular function
a) Foundational framework
b) Beyond doubt in practice
c) Necessary for activity (science, linguistics, games, epistemology, etc)
d) Must be accepted to participate in the activity

Some insights into Wittgensteinian hinges and Godel’s incompleteness theorems.

Extended Theory: Foundations of Knowledge and Formal Systems

1. Parallel Foundations

A. In Epistemological Systems:
• Hinge beliefs serve as unquestioned beliefs
• Pre-linguistic beliefs ground our knowledge
• Pre-linguistic beliefs enable the practice of justification

B. In Formal Mathematical Systems:
• Godel’s unprovable propositions function like hinges
• Some mathematical truths must be taken as bedrock
• Some mathematical statements are necessary for system operation but unprovable within the system

2. The Foundation Principle
• All systems whether epistemic or formal require unprovable foundations (hinges)
• Unprovable statements are not weaknesses but necessary features
• Hinges do not limit systematic knowledge but are a requirement for all systems of knowledge
• The attempt to prove every statement within a system leads to the following:
o Infinite regress
o Circular reasoning
o Foundational assumptions (hinges/axioms)

3. Unified Understanding of the Limitations of Systems
• Epistemological systems are built on hinges
• Formal systems have unprovable but necessary truths
• Both systems require the following:
o Statements that cannot be justified within the system
o Statements that are necessary for the system to function
o Statements that must be accepted rather than proved

4. Knowledge Implications

A. Mathematical Knowledge:
• Some mathematical propositions must function as hinges
• These are not problems for the system but features of formal systems
• The unprovability of certain mathematical propositions in a formal system mirrors the role of hinges in epistemic systems

B. Scientific Knowledge:
• Foundational assumptions are necessary for a scientific system
• These function like mathematical axioms and epistemological hinges
• They are necessary to scientific progress

5. Practical Applications:

A. In Mathematics:
• Recognizing certain mathematical propositions as hinge like
• There are limits to formal proofs
• Recognizing the role of bedrock statements

6. Philosophical Implications

A. For Knowledge
• Knowledge doesn’t need complete proof
• Systems are reliable despite having unprovable elements
• Foundational elements and proofs have different functions

B. For Truth:
• What we accept as true can exist independent of provability
• Some truths must be simply believed without proof
• What we accept as true is not always provable

7. Integrating Epistemological and Formal Systems

A. Common Features:
• Unprovable foundations are necessary
• Accept starting points
• Seeing limitations as enabling features

B. Differences:
• Understanding the properties of foundational elements
• Different methods of verification
• Different types of knowledge acquired

Understanding this integration suggests the following:

1. The limits Godel discovered in formal systems coincide with the role of hinges in epistemology
2. Mathematical and JTB necessitate unprovable foundations
3. These are features of these systems, not problems to be solved
4. Having a clear understanding of these systems helps to better understand both domains

As far as I know, no one has made this connection, viz., between hinges and Godel's incompleteness theorem.

:up:

:up:

What might an outline of a theory of knowledge look like in my interpretation of OC?

A Layered Theory of Epistemic Foundations

1. Foundation Layer: Pre-linguistic beliefs or certainties
• Consists of pre-linguistic or animal beliefs or certainties
• Pre-linguistic beliefs are manifested through action
• E.g’s include special awareness, object permanence, and bodily awareness
• These form the foundations of what makes the language games of knowledge possible
• Not subject to claims of truth or falsity because they precede such concepts
2. Framework Layer: Hinge Beliefs
• Built on top of pre-linguistic beliefs
• This is the riverbed of our system of JTB
• Differing levels of stability
o Bedrock hinges (nearly immutable, e.g., physical objects exist
o Cultural hinges (can change over time)
o Local hinges (depend on contexts or practices)
• Not justified by evidence or reasons but shown through our practices
• Makes the language games of justification and doubt possible

3. Operational Layer
• Built on the foundation of hinge propositions
• Requires:
o Meaningful doubt
o Methods of justification
o Context within language games
• Subject to verification and falsification
• They can be taught and demonstrated

Key Principles:
1. The Doubt Principle
• The language game of doubt requires a stable framework
• Not everything can be doubted
• There must be practical consequences to doubt
• Doubt is necessary for knowledge claims

2. The Justification Principle
• Operates within language games
• Different language games require different forms of justification
• Justification ends with hinge propositions
• Justification cannot have an infinite regression

3. The Principle of Context
• Knowledge claims only make sense within the language games of epistemology
• Some propositions can be epistemological in one context and be a hinge in another

4. Principle of Practice
• Knowledge is demonstrated by practice and by our statements
• Actions are more fundamental than statements
• Learning involves the acquisition of explicit knowledge and implicit certainty
• Practice grounds theoretical knowledge

Methodological Implications:
1. Epistemology
• Understand how knowledge claims function in practice (language games)
• Examine the relationship between our actions and our certainties (beliefs)
• Study the many language games of justification across contexts
• Understand the importance of our background reality in knowledge

2. Scientific Knowledge
• Scientific methods rest on hinge certainties
• Paradigm shifts involve changes in hinges
• Understand the relationship between theory and observation

3. Everyday Knowledge
• Acknowledge the importance of practical knowledge
• Again, recognize the role of the inherited background
• Recognize the relationship between action and belief

This is a way of understanding knowledge within the context of some of Wittgenstein’s thinking in OC and the PI.

A lot more work needs to be done, but this is the beginning of how I think of epistemology using Wittgenstein as a catalyst for my thinking.

Key Themes of Thread:

1. Context and Purpose
• On Certainty is Wittgenstein’s response to G.E. Moore's papers Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense.
• Wittgenstein challenges Moorean propositions (e.g. “Here is one hand”)
• As part of Wittgenstein’s critique he addresses skepticism and the nature of doubt

2. Hinge Propositions:
• Hinges are foundational beliefs that form the bedrock of our language games and knowledge claims
• They aren’t subject to traditional epistemological categories of justification and truth
• Examples include basic beliefs about having hands, the existence of objects, and other minds
• They are part of our inherited background or world picture
• There are a variety of different hinges, with some being more immutable than others


3. Knowledge and Certainty
• OC distinguishes between knowledge and subjective certainty (conviction)
• Moore’s claims are more akin to expressions of his convictions rather than knowledge claims
• Knowledge (JTB) requires truth, justification and the possibility of doubt
• Knowledge claims must be demonstrated rather than stated


4. Doubts Role
• Doubting is not always meaningful; some are logically excluded
• Doubt requires a framework and a context to make sense
• Universal doubting would undermine meaningful doubting
• Meaningful doubting must occur within a system where things are not doubted

5. Language games and Framework
• Certain propositions must be held fast within a language game (not questioned)
• Bedrock beliefs allow for the possibility of language and meaning
• Like the rules of chess, the pieces, and the board they provide the background for the game to be played

6. The Nature of Hinges
• They can be pre-linguistic or animal beliefs
• Hinges can be pre-linguistic rather than propositional
• They can change over time, although some are more permanent than others
• They can vary due to different systems of belief, though some core hinges are universal

7. Implications for Epistemology
• Challenges traditional epistemology that all beliefs within an epistemological framework require justification
• Some beliefs make justification possible
• Helps to understand the limits of knowledge and doubt
• Demonstrates how certainty is grounded in action rather than a specific theory

Thanks, I listened to most of it and there's not anything new there. There are many more interesting videos on the topic. I've been listening to Dr. Bernardo Kastrup.

It doesn't make any sense to me, but I'll delete them anyway.

I don't use LLMs to write my posts. I quoted the LLM's answer to a question. Isn't this like quoting a paper or book? Do you want me to delete the posts?

I think Grok 2 mini beta did a great job of answering these questions

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Sorry, but I'm a bit burnt out when it comes to Wittgenstein. Good luck with your thread.

Ya, I'm familiar with him. I do believe we live other lives based just on what I've learned from NDEs.

Fair enough. As I've said many times in this thread, I think research into children with memories of previous lives is corroborative in some ways to NDE reports. Both indicate modes of being beyond physical birth and death. — Wayfarer

There is some evidence that supports previous lives, but I don't know how strong it is because I haven't studied it as closely as NDEs. In terms of numbers, it's not as common as NDEs.

It's a shame you can only see it through your pre-concieved notion of what a 'religious point of view' must be. — Wayfarer

It's not a preconceived notion, it's a conclusion arrived at through more than 45 years of study. I was very religious for years.

But they're not synonyms - one is a state of a thing and one is the thing itself. But anyway, I suppose that's just a terminological issue (actually, I think it reflects the 'mind is the brain' view currently dominant, where it is consciousness that is what is distinctive about the brain, as opposed to there being a soul that has the consciousness). — Clearbury

I'm afraid I have to disagree with the dominant view. The mind as I use it is, for all practical purposes, is synonymous with consciousness. Although there may be differences in some contexts, especially if you're a materialist or physicalist. Also, I generally don't use the term soul in reference to that which survives death. I believe consciousness is more accurate.

There are two types of NDEs that you seem to be conflating. There are those that involve floating about in the room. Those are the ones that, supposedly, others can corroborate - though I think there's no hard evidence of such corroboration. Plus, just as we incorporate alarm sounds into dreams, nothing stops the same happening in these scenarios. — Clearbury

Actually, I'm not conflating anything. I've described three kinds of NDEs (category 1, 2, and 3) pointing out the differences between each of these NDEs. I don't know why you would say supposedly corroborate, the data on this is overwhelming. As I've pointed out it's the same data that a detective uses when trying to confirm or disconfirm testimony, you interview the people involved. It's not very difficult and it's done all the time. I find it a bit strange that people just dismiss this information. Although you did acknowledge it with some hesitation. I don't know what you mean by "hard evidence?" Maybe you mean scientific evidence, but this is something I've also addressed, viz., by pointing out that epistemology is not limited scientific evidence. This seems to be a common misunderstanding of many that post in this thread, and even when they do acknowledge it, they seem to forget just how powerful good testimonial evidence is.

I'm not saying there aren't some similarities between dreams and veridical experiences. I'm saying that we don't corroborate hallucinations, delusions, or dreams in the same way that we do veridical experiences. The way these terms (hallucinations, delusions, and dreams) are used in our everyday language clearly separates them in a significant way from veridical experiences. On the other hand, NDEs are being corroborated all the time, and if they can't, then I'm skeptical of them, or at least I set it aside. I'm not saying that all NDEs can be corroborated, but a significant number can.

Then there are the NDEs where people seem to have the experience of travelling to a different realm. Those are not corroborated. There's a similarity among these experiences, but there's a lot of similarity between dreams too, and the similarity does not seem significantly greater. — Clearbury

When we look at the testimonial evidence of NDEs we have to examine it the same way we would examine any testimonial evidence. First, again, is corroboration, which gives us an objective way to verify the testimony. Even NDEs that incorporate traveling through a tunnel, seeing loved ones, having a life review, have been corroborated. What I mean is that if you can objectively corroborate at least part of their story, then you can make an inference based on how consistent it is with other stories that see and hear generally the same things. So, although you can't corroborate some of the story that doesn't mean we don't have other means of testing the story. For example, let's say someone tells you of their trip to Alaska and part of their story can be corroborated and other parts can't, we generally would accept the testimony as accurate, especially if there are other stories that match with theirs. So, although we can't corroborate all of it, there is enough consistency with other stories that allows us to accept their story as truthful or veridical. Do people sometimes lie, of course, but are all these people lying? Analyzing testimonial evidence takes time and patience. It must be compared with a lot of data. I've spent a lot of time analyzing the testimonial evidence and I generally find it to be accurate. There're two main reasons that people reject these stories: First, they're wedded to a particular worldview. Second, they don't have all the facts/information.

So why don't they kill themselves and encourage others to do likewise? That is what we would typically do if we find a beautiful place - we try and revisit it and encourage others to do likewise. These people claim to know, in a way that the rest of us do not, what lies in wait for us the other side of death. And they claim it is wonderful. Yet they seem reluctant - more reluctant, if anything, than the general population - to go back there. That's very peculiar to me. — Clearbury

I've read over 5000 accounts of NDEs, and what you'll find is that many people who have an NDE don't want to come back to this life, but they're told they must return because their objectives for coming here aren't complete. What I've found is that we enter into some agreement before choosing to have these human experiences, and it's important that we finish our task. Also, those who commit suicide often find that they've made a huge mistake, i.e., they're just going to have to come back again and do it all over again. So, it's not as simple as you might think and killing yourself is not an escape.

From a philosophical perspective, it might be instructive to consider the Buddhist view — Wayfarer

I have found that nothing gives us as clear a picture as NDEs. The evidence is much stronger than any religious point of view. I find that most religious have it generally incorrect. There are interesting ideas in the Buddhist tradition, but, again, if you want some answers about the afterlife, then NDEs give the most information.

Although I believe in life after death, I think NDEs are not good evidence for it. They seem better explained as dreams. — Clearbury

I'll answer this question first. I've written a lot about why I think NDEs give us good testimonial evidence, and why they're different from hallucinations, dreams, delusions, or any other purely subjective experience. The main difference is that they can be corroborated by others who were there. In other words, doctors, nurses, family, friends, and any other person at the scene can corroborate or invalidate what the NDEr is claiming to have experienced (seen, heard, etc). So, if others who were at the scene affirm one's claims, then that puts the experience into the realm of objective reality. This is what separates the NDE from hallucinations, delusions, or dreams. We can't corroborate what you see or hear in a dream. I can't go to your friend who was in your dream and ask if he said X, Y, or Z. The way we generally know that an experience is veridical is that others are having the same experience, or generally the same experience. Corroboration is one of the ways we use to examine whether or not testimony is reliable. This is seen in good detective work and even in good science.

'consciousness' survives death, rather than 'the person' or 'the mind' survives death? I am not a consciousness. i am a person. I am conscious a lot of the time (though unconscious some of it). When I am unconscious I am not non-existent. I exist, but I am just not conscious. So 'consciousness' and 'a person' are not equivalent. My quibble, then, is that it is persons or minds (I use the terms interchangeably) who survive death, not 'consciousness' (consiousness is something persons have, but it is not what a person 'is'). — Clearbury

Consciousness is much broader in scope than just being a person, although it's true that I'm referring mainly to persons. I believe that there is some element of consciousness in most if not all living things. I also believe that consciousness is at the heart of reality and that all of us ultimately come from this core consciousness. Death simply returns us to where we reside. What makes you who you are, are the memories and experiences that attach to your specific conscious awareness. For you to survive death I believe that your specific conscious awareness with all the memories and experiences that attach to you must survive, and I believe it does.

When you're unconscious you still exist, you're just not aware for a while, or you're vaguely aware as in a dream. Being unconscious seems to be something specific to this body, or more specifically, to the brain.

I also generally use the terms consciousness and mind as synonyms.

An interesting take on the argument of materialism vs idealism by Bernardo Kastrup.

Bernardo Kastrup | Refuting Materialism: full lecture

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPCvQQQrZwU&t=2164s

An interesting podcast on consciousness.

Two AI's Discuss: The Quantum Physics of Consciousness - Roger Penrose Deep Dive Podcast

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-isq40ARB9g

Clearly, you haven't understood a thing I've said. I question your ability to interpret not only what I've communicated over and over again, but your ability to interpret OC. I find it a waste of my time trying to explain myself to you. You either don't take the time to read or you have a bottle of vodka next to you, maybe it's the latter. I don't know which.

It's not at all a leap in the dark, no more than accepting the Earth is more than 100 years old is a leap in the dark, or that I have hands is a leap in the dark.

And maybe life itself leaps forward with unreasonable confidence. — frank

It's not reasonable or unreasonable it just is the framework we have to work with.

It is justified within the system. — Fooloso4

To say that hinges are justified in any epistemic sense is to miss the main thrust of OC. It would be to "...grant you [Moore] all the rest (OC 1)." Hinge propositions are not subject to verification or falsification (the doubt) within the system, they allow all our talk of epistemic justification and doubting to take root. In other words, they are the ungrounded linguistic framework that allows the door to swing (the door of epistemology). This is why justification ends with basic beliefs, and why it solves the infinite regress problem. They form the bedrock of how epistemic language gets off the ground in the first place.