So I am a Christian. I believe I am the first Christian to post in this thread. There are a lot of folk around here who are not Christians, know very little about Christianity, and love to opine on Christianity. — Leontiskos

It is evident that your own knowledge of Christianity is far less extensive than you seem to give yourself credit for. From its beginnings Christianity has always been diverse and pluralistic. One does not need to be a Christian to read about the history of Christianity.

You rely on Paul, but Paul himself admits the fissure between his teachings and that of Jesus' direct disciples. Pauline Christianity does not represent the beliefs and practices of all Christians, then, now, or in the long period between.

You might reasonably say that your own beliefs are based on the resurrection, or even that the beliefs of many Christians is based on the resurrection, but in the face of the evidence to the contrary it is not reasonable to claim that this must hold true for all Christians.

You are denying that we should evaluate politics based off of ethics; so we have to start there first. — Bob Ross

I am not denying that ethics should play a role in our evaluation of politics, but without specifics the claim is vacuous. For example, you said you would vote for Trump even if he is a rapist. In this case it would seem that you put political considerations above ethical.

Let's be real though: he was found liable for forcible touching and sexual abuse not once, not twice, but three times.... — Bob Ross

Did you miss the link I provided?

https://www.axios.com/2024/10/28/trump-sexual-misconduct-allegations-women

It strains credibility to the breaking point to think that this many women just made things up. The fact that he has never been criminally charged does [correction: not mean] that there is not ample evidence that he is a sex offender.

I will put this in non-legal terms:

Would you leave him alone with your wife or mother or daughter?

I was just noting that what he said was not an admission that he rapes women. — Bob Ross

He might not see it that way. He may believe he is so privileged as to do whatever he wants or so delusional that he thinks all women will welcome him grabbing them by the pussy, but bragging about doing this is an admission that he rapes women.

You missed the point: if you are a moral anti-realist, then you can’t say there is such a thing as being actually better or worse at farming. — Bob Ross

I am not bound by adherence to some particular moral theory. That is your thing. What you said is:

The fact that a farmer is good at farming is not hypothetical: it is not relative to the beliefs or desires you have about it, nor that I have about it. This is a form of objective goodness — Bob Ross

but when I give examples of why the claim about being good at farming is problematic, you appeal to a hypothetical, moral anti-realism.

I am not denying that one can be a better or worse farmer, but rather that without saying what it means to be better or worse at farming the point is empty. If you are going to appeal to a fact then you can't ignore the facts that determine whether or not farmer is a good farmer.

Rather than looking to ethical theory we need to look at what is actually going on.

The circumstances can inform our ethical decisions, but there’s more to it than that: you can’t purely empirically determine what is right and wrong. — Bob Ross

The question was whether the issue of abortion can be resolved. An appeal to normative ethics has not resolved it. That can be empirically determined.

On the point I was making, there isn’t much dispute. It is uncontroversially true, for the vast majority of ethicists, that politics should be governed by ethics (ultimately). Ethics is about right and wrong behavior afterall. — Bob Ross

An appeal to ethics gets us nowhere on this issue. Of course it is an ethical issue, but ethicists continue to argue the issue without resolution. The issue of abortion is very much in dispute between ethicists.

The issue cannot be resolved by an appeal to ethics over politics. First, respecting rights is a matter of ethics. Second, whether or not politics should be governed by ethics, the fact is, it is not. That is the political reality. We must deal with things as the are, not in terms of abstract theoretical ideals.

The simple answer is yes.

From its beginning there have been Christians on both sides of this. A couple of things muddy the waters. Resurrection was a common Jewish belief before Jesus. Who would be resurrected and whether it was a physical or spiritual resurrection divided groups of believers.

Paul seems to state in strong words that if Jesus Christ did not actually rise from the dead after 3 days in the tomb, the foundation of Christianity is a farce — Brenner T

The question here is whether one can be a Christian if one is not a follower of Paul's teachings. Again the answer is yes.

One thing that should be evident is that philosophy is not a distinct set of well defined set of practices with an agreed upon starting point, foundation, or common language. When it is argued that philosophy is or is not this or that there might be that very different exemplars are being used to defend that position.

Is Heracleitan flux or Parmenidean fixity assumed to be primary? Arguments on both sides continue to be made after all this time. If philosophy represents

an argumentative pinnacle — J

then it is a precarious one that requires holding fast to something that others are only too quick and willing to dislodge.

When argumentative skill is regarded as the arbiter of truth philosophy has lost its way. This has been something that philosophers have wrestled with at least since the time of Socrates. Plato framed it in terms of the sophists ability to make the weaker argument stronger, but what stands as the stronger argument is a matter of persuasion. Plato did not think of philosophy as so pure as to not make use of sophistical arguments. It is because of the importance of persuasion that Aristotle thought it of great importance to teach rhetoric.

The boundaries between disciplines is historically and culturally contingent and changeable. Was Aristotle doing philosophy when working on metaphysics and doing something that is not philosophy when he worked on biology or politics? Was Wittgenstein doing philosophy or something else when he said?

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value, 16)

That is not a sex crime to grab a woman “by the pussy” if she let’s you do it. — Bob Ross

Come on Bob. I think you know better! Not all women let "a star" do it. And to assume ahead of time that they will is a rapist mentality. But I see that you do go on to admit he is a rapist.

Traditionally, yes, it comes from Christianity. I am not sure how deep we want to get into this — Bob Ross

We need not go so deep to see that an evaluation of religious versus secular values should not ignore beliefs, opinions, and values, that religious and secular values are not wholly separate and distinct, and that without specific examples to evaluate it is a fruitless argument'.

The fact that a farmer is good at farming is not hypothetical: it is not relative to the beliefs or desires you have about it, nor that I have about it. This is a form of objective goodness — Bob Ross

If good at farming means producing an abundance of crops then we have one measure by which we might say that someone is a good farmer. But what if he uses an excessive amount to fertilizers and pesticides produce his crop? Is he a good farmer if he disregards the environmental impact? Mono-culture farming may be successful in the short term but disastrous long term. Corporate industrial "factory farms" are very productive but they are not good stewards of the land or good neighbors. Independent farmers cannot compete. Consumers have less choice.

No. the fact is that the dilemma of abortion does not resolve. It is a stand off of conflicting rights.

I can tell you that is certainly not the case; although, like I said, people think that because they don’t understand how normative ethics works. — Bob Ross

Rather than looking to ethical theory we need to look at what is actually going on. And it is not as if there is no dispute on this between those who do understand normative ethics, unless you mean that to understand it is to agree with you.

No, but my point is that we don’t have to have an exact formula of what to tolerate to agree that a nation should step in to stop the Nazis. — Bob Ross

We might agree that there are cases where we should step in, but this ignores the larger question of when we should step in. Should we step in to stop the Russians or the Israelis or Hamas?

.Wittgenstein asks:

Now does this mean that it is nonsensical to talk of a locality where thought takes place? Certainly not. This phrase has sense' if we give it sense.

(7)

The idea of giving a phrase sense marks another departure from the Tractatus. It is a rejection of the idea that:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

(6.53)

There are two different senses of the expression “locality of thinking” (7) We give a phrase sense when we use it in the right way, otherwise it is nonsense. Wittgenstein distinguished between two phenomena. The first involves might contain such things as:

... a train of images, organic sensations, or on the other hand of a train of the various visual, tactual and muscular experiences which he has in writing or speaking a sentence. (8)

The second:

The other experience is one of seeing his brain work. Both these phenomena could correctly be called "expressions of thought"; and the question "where is the thought itself?" had better, in order to prevent confusion, be rejected as nonsensical.

(8)

The confusion arises when the distinction between them is not maintained. The distinction is between what is experienced and an explanation of what happens.

If however we do use the expression "the thought takes place in the head", we have given this expression its meaning by describing the experience which would justify the hypothesis that the thought takes places in our heads, by describing the experience which we wish to call "observing thought in our brain".

(8)

One might almost say that over-generalization is the occupational hazard of philosophy, if it were not the occupation. — Austin

I like that one too. Wittgenstein says pretty much the same.

Arthur Koestler's definition of philosophy: "the systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose."

His bivalent extremism puts me in the position of appearing to defend religious values over secular values. He has much more in common with religious extremists than he is aware of.

Send me a link to the sex offense that he was charged with, or the reasonable evidence that he should have been convicted (of some sex crime). — Bob Ross

We have Trump's admission that he grabs women by the pussy.

27th woman accuses Trump of sexual misconduct

On Tuesday, May 12, 2023, the Manhattan jury of nine men and three women found the former president liable for sexually abusing and defaming Carroll and awarded Carroll $5 million in damages.

And they, my friend, would be objectively wrong. I don’t care about people’s opinions—this theory is governed by facts. — Bob Ross

Please cite those facts. You like to throw around terms such as 'objectively'. I know you will not agree but values are not facts. The fact is, however, that the belief in equality comes from Christianity not secular sources.

Do you mean something like life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?

:smile: — Bob Ross

What does this mean? Do you think this stands as a reasoned argument?

In his recent book constitutional scholar Jeffery Rosen argues that the term 'the pursuit of happiness' as used by the Founders traces back before the philosophers of Liberalism to the classical philosophers such as Aristotle and Cicero. The pursuit of happiness is deliberative and public minded. It is not self interested but a matter of the 'common good' and 'general welfare'.

You have got it backwards. The right to the pursuit of happiness is not the right to do whatever you think will make you happy or even the right to do whatever you want as long as it does not impinge on the rights of other. It is not good because it is an individual's right. It is good because it is in pursuit of the good.

Most of the dilemma revolve, like abortion, around people not understanding how rights actually work. — Bob Ross

No. the fact is that the dilemma of abortion does not resolve. It is a stand off of conflicting rights.

You do not know that we could take over North Korea without grave consequences. This points to a problem with ideological wish fulfillment.

I never claimed to the contrary—you sidestepped my hypothetical — Bob Ross

Your hypothetical? Do you mean "without grave consequences"? The actions taken by one nation against another should not be based on improbable hypotheticals.

I agree that toleration should have its limits, but the problem remains as to what ought to be tolerated?

Fallacy of the heap. — Bob Ross

Once again you make my point. When dealing with the question of what should and should not be tolerated the problem lies with what is between the extremes. Do you think that real world problems are like the difference between stopping the Nazis and stopping people from eating vanilla ice cream?

It seems to me more credible that Trump won more on policy and not personality — bert1

Trump won on promises. More people are for various reasons dissatisfied with the way things are and where they think they are going and believe Trump will change things for the better. Policy specifics are in short supply. People will find that tariffs are not the magic bullet. When prices increase as a result Trump will place the blame elsewhere.

My point is that there's a limit as to how much a government can wield its power against the people, at some point, the people fights back. — Christoffer

Based on the results of the election, the people support the incoming MAGA government. If and when they become dissatisfied and want a change things will be very different. One key to understanding Trump is that he projects his intentions on the opposition. Next time around free and fare elections will be something he will attempt to prevent from happening if the people turn against him. He will have moved to do what other autocrats have done and silence information and political opinion sources that do not support him. His control of the courts will be stronger. Congress will not act as a counterweight. Government agencies will have been purged of civil servants who do not show sufficient loyalty to him. Corporations and the mega-wealthy will do his bidding as long as it increases their wealth.

In short, autocrats do whatever they can to assure that the people remain powerless. No situation is permanent, but by the time the Trump regime is overthrown things may have become very dire.

Very good article with a range of views on where we are and where we might be going.

Trump is not a supporter of sex offenses — Bob Ross

He is a sex offender, and not because he engages is consensual acts that some might find offensive.

Cultural relativism is a form of moral realism such that moral judgments are evaluated relative to the objective legal or moral law of the society-at-hand; whereas being vested in the national-interests is just the idea that you should be interested in your nation prospering so that you can too. — Bob Ross

You seem to have missed the point. If your nation is one of those:

obviously degenerate, inferior societies ... like Talibanian Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, China, India ...[,/quote]

then being interested in in its prospering it to be interested in degenerate laws and governance. If it is morally defensible because it is your nation of society is cultural relativism.
— Bob Ross

A meritocracy guided by secular values (e.g., of rights, liberties, etc.). — Bob Ross

Again, you seem to have missed the point. A meritocracy guided by secular values may be your preference but others may hold to religious values as superior, that it is religious values that have elevated us above the savagery, cruelty, and viciousness of secularism.

Arguably, it is already a plutocracy and an oligarchy. — Bob Ross

It has been at times but there have been correctives such as ant-trust laws and regulations. With Musk in Trump's pocket we are headed in a direction much more severe then what we have now.

upon deeper reflection, this is utterly self-undermining. — Bob Ross

Exactly my point!

In order to argue for this, we would have to claim that it is actually good to let people pursue — Bob Ross

Do you mean something like life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?

The human good is what grounds, in my theory, why it is actually good to let people pursue their own good. It is just. — Bob Ross

In your theory. You should not let your theory blind you to the very real tensions between the individual and the society. One troubling example: the rights of the woman versus the rights of the fetus versus the interest of the state and the country.

... if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross

For one, because of the consequences

:lol: — Bob Ross

You do not know that we could take over North Korea without grave consequences. This points to a problem with ideological wish fulfillment.

Two, because supremacy, whether it is some version of Western supremacy or some other, has more to do with power and domination than with ideology

Yes, and you need that. This is exactly the absurdity with hyper-liberalism: it is hyper-tolerant. — Bob Ross

There is a difference between liberalism and "hyper-liberalism". The right to national self-determinism is not hyper-liberalism. The use of power and domination to get a sovereign nation to conform to your ideology is hyper-imperialism.

Are you really going to say that Hitler didn’t have inferior values to Ghandi? — Bob Ross

Interesting example since Gandhi was opposed to the very thing you say is needed - power and domination. I agree that toleration should have its limits, but the problem remains as to what ought to be tolerated? And here we encounter the kinds of differences of opinion and values that is not covered by Hitler vs Gandhi. Should gay marriage. be tolerated? Hitler would say no. I don't know what Gandhi would have said.In any case, there is no clear line between tolerance and intolerance, and that is obscured when you posit extremes.

Three, because ideology itself poses a grave threat when it is imposed through action. The lines between persuasion and coercion, no matter now noble one's intentions, blur whenever there is an attempt to move from an ideal to an actuality via political action.

All I got out of this is that it would be difficult to implement; which I do not deny. — Bob Ross

Do you not get that the lines between persuasion and coercion can blur when it comes to implementing an ideology? Consider communist ideologies and what has been regarded as needed to achieve them. An ideology and what has been done to achieve it must be considered together.

By "post-truth" I mean to refer to liars and parasites who neither value nor care bout truth and honesty. — tim wood

I think the problem is more pernicious and extends beyond liars and parasites. Post-truth is cynical nihilism. On the one hand, the doubt or denial that the truth exists, and on the other, the rejection of the value of truth. Instead of truth there are versions of things to be accepted or rejected. Instead of just facts, there are "alternative facts", which in truth are alternatives to facts.

There is also the assumption that what believes is the truth. Evidence is rejected because it must be false because it contradicts the beliefs held as truth. This might be called patriotic nihilism.

Following the election Robert Reich remarked that we should stop pretending Trump is not who we are. Is Trump who we are? Has Trump always been who we are?

and there is such a thing as having a view which should not be tolerated (e.g., a supporter of sex offenses). — Bob Ross

One will become president of the US in a few months!

The first, in the sense that whatever nation you belong to you must have a vested interest in its flourishing and protection against other nations — Bob Ross

What is you are a citizen of one of those inferior nations? Why must we have a vested interest in its flourishing. How does this differ from cultural relativism?

, if your country has substantially better politics than other ones, you should have a pride in it and want to expand its values to the more inferior ones (which leads to imperialism). — Bob Ross

What is the measure of "substantially better"? Which is substantially better, a theocracy or a emocratic republic? If your values are based on some version of the will of God, then theocracy Trumps democracy. Unless, of course, the administration is playing both sides. What we end up with is where the US is clearly headed plutocracy.

Some societies are so obviously structured in a way antithetical to the human good ... — Bob Ross

While I share your concern with the human good, there has always been a tension in Liberalism between the human good and what individuals may regard as their own good. Some regard the notion of a 'human good' as antithetical to the rights of the individual.

... if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross

For one, because of the consequences. Two, because supremacy, whether it is some version of Western supremacy or some other, has more to do with power and domination than with ideology. Three, because ideology itself poses a grave threat when it is imposed through action. The lines between persuasion and coercion, no matter now noble one's intentions, blur whenever there is an attempt to move from an ideal to an actuality via political action.

... science cannot absorb philosophy into its inquiry, whereas philosophy can set the terms for discussing how science is done. — J

Philosophy is for Hegel science. It differs from the natural sciences in that its subject matter is not an object that is other than the subject. It is the science of the whole, which included the thinking subject.

From the thread on the preface to the Phenomenology:

3. … the subject matter is not exhausted in its aims; rather, it is exhaustively treated when it is worked out. Nor is the result which is reached the actual whole itself; rather, the whole is the result together with the way the result comes to be.

The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.

… differentiatedness is instead the limit of the thing at stake. It is where the thing which is at stake ceases, or it is what that thing is not.

The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.

Instead of dwelling on the thing at issue and forgetting itself in it, that sort of knowing is always grasping at something else.

That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive.

5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of that truth.
The truth exists only in the system of knowledge of the truth.

To participate in the collaborative effort at bringing philosophy nearer to the form of science – to bring it nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing – is the task I have set for myself.

Hegel sees himself as a participant in a collaborative effort with those who are lovers of knowledge, that is, the philosophers who preceded him, of whom it can be said that they are not actual knowers. To the extent he succeeds he will be the first to actually know.

The inner necessity that knowing should be science lies in the nature of knowing, and the satisfactory explanation for this inner necessity is solely the exposition of philosophy itself.

Hegel’s task is the exposition of the inner necessity of knowing, that knowing is the system of science.

However, external necessity, insofar as this is grasped in a universal manner and insofar as personal contingencies and individual motivations are set aside, is the same as the internal necessity which takes on the shape in which time presents the existence of its moments. To demonstrate that it is now time for philosophy to be elevated into science would therefore be the only true justification of any attempt that has this as its aim, because it would demonstrate the necessity of that aim, and, at the same time, it would be the realization of the aim itself.

The exposition of the inner necessity is externally realized in time, and Hegel will demonstrate that now is with his philosophy the time for philosophy to become actual knowing.

Except, as above, that all philosophical discourse resists being absorbed/reduced into a different discourse. Or at least that's the possibility we're looking at here. — J

To the contrary, much of philosophy is modeled on the success of science.

Consider also the proliferation of the philosophy of science and its disciplines, such as biology, medicine, political and cognitive science. Then there is philosophy of religion, of literature, law, environment.

The division between philosophy and literature is not so clear.

More an attempt to tease out some possibilities as we consider what, if anything, is special about philosophical discourse. — J

The only thing special about philosophical discourse is that we cannot identify anything that is special about it, that is, there is nothing unique that all philosophical discourse has in common that distinguishes it from other modes of discourse. But that might be something that is special about it.

I'm not sure what it even means to be without limits? Is this a capacity we have ... — Tom Storm

I think all of our capacities have limits, except perhaps for our capacity to deceive ourselves. I can't say what those limits are, but they fall short of omniscience and omnipotence.

Philosophy could be called highest because it is without presuppositions. — Leontiskos

Such presuppositions are the death knell of philosophy.

Inquiry stops with philosophy because being -- what there is -- does not extend beyond what can be reflected upon. — J

Why would you assume that the limits of human thought are the limits of being? Perhaps what is is without limits.

So I'm interpreting W as saying that when I imagine calculating there appear to be nothing that fills the blank in "I calculated by..." (except possibly imagining that I was calculating) — Ludwig V

I take him to be saying that the question: "What I am calculating by?" is misleading. There is not this something that is analogous to the hand or mouth. I imagine. I calculate. In some cases this involves the hand or mouth, but in others there is not some other agent or thing to be identified. And, of course, as you point out, it is not the hand that does the calculating.

The temptation is not to treat words as objects, but to assume that there must be some object that corresponds to the word:

But it is the use of the substantive "time" which mystifies us.

(6)

This is worth repeating:

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

When we look for the meaning of the word 'cow', for example, there is no inexplicable temptation to treat the word as an object. But there is an object, an animal that we can point to that explains the meaning of the word 'cow'. We cannot, however, explain the meaning of 'time' by pointing to something. There is no thing that corresponds to it.

Both 'cow' and 'time' are substantives, but grammatically they do not function in the same way. When the grammar is understood we are no longer misled by the language of substantives.

Is doing a calculation with pencil and paper a mental or a physical activity? — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein takes up this question in the PI:

236. Calculating prodigies who arrive at the correct result but can’t say how. Are we to say that they do not calculate? (A family of cases.)

(364) Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than calculating on paper? It is real calculating-in-the-head. Is it similar to calculating on paper? I don’t know whether to call it similar. Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it similar to a human body?

His use of "agent" here is unusual.When I think by writing, the agent is my hands. When I think by imagining, there is not agent - for some reason the obvious agent - me - doesn't count. — Ludwig V

It does count. As he says, "we think by writing", "we think by speaking" (6). But then:

... and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6)

There is no agent here that is analogous to the hand that writes or mouth that speaks. We might say that in this case it is the mind that imagines, but we do not think with the mind in a way that is analogous to thinking with the hand or mouth.

We are misled by language, or, more precisely, the grammar of our language, when we regard 'mind' as we do 'hand' or 'mouth'. Grammatically all are substantives. They are nouns. As such we may be led to assume that they all name particular things.

What we must do is: understand its working, its grammar, e.g. see what relation this grammar has to that of the expression "we think with our mouth", or "we think with a pencil on a piece of paper".

Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our thoughts is this: the existence of the words "thinking" and "thought" alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes us look for an activity, different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word "thinking". When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the analogy hold throughout.

(7)

What does Wittgenstein mean when he says?

I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6)

He is not denying that we think, but rather that the mind is the agent that thinks:

It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a "mental activity". … This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks.

(6) [emphasis added]

He continues:

If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be the agent in writing.

(6-7)

Elsewhere he says:

I really do think with my pen, because my head often knows nothing about what my hand is writing.

(CV 17)

This is, of course, metaphorical. Contrary to the Tractatus, however, metaphors although not propositions of natural science, are no longer regarded as nonsense. The logical structure of language and thought that was fundamental to the Tractatus has been rejected.

We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.

(1)

A substantive is some thing named:

We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.

(1)

What is at issue is a critique of the Tractarian metaphysics of mind. The logical necessity of the connection between names and the existence of corresponding objects, and, by extension, propositions and facts.

One difficulty which strikes us is that for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions; e.g. for such words as "one", "number", "not", etc.

(1)

This is followed immediately by the question:

Need the ostensive definition itself be understood?--Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood?

That “tove” can ostensibly mean pencil or round or wood might seem to be veering off on a tangent, but it raises a related question about the logical connection between language and the world. Language lacks the precision assumed in the Tractatus. That 'tove' means ‘this’ (pencil)and not ‘that’ (wood) is something that is clarified in practice by the activity of using language.

This activity may involve mental processes but is not reducible to them.

We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium, the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we don't quite understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could.

(3)

Why does the mind seem to be a queer kind of medium? This happens when the mind is taken to be a substantive, a thing with its own mechanism, but a mechanism that can bring about effects that no material mechanism could.

But here we are making two mistakes. For what struck us as being queer about thought
and thinking was not at all that it had curious effects which we were not yet able to explain (causally). Our problem, in other words, was not a scientific one; but a muddle felt
as a problem.

(5-6)

Consistent with the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains the distinction between philosophy and natural science.

Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us.

(6)

Is it Plato or the translator? — Amity

It is Plato.He uses these two different words. As Paine pointed out, the fault of the translator lies with those translators who fail to distinguish between these terms. I think Plato intends for us to try and work though the connection.

Where is the overlap in meaning? — Amity

Doing certain things will cause me trouble and pain. If I do them anyway I am being heedless or careless or unmindful. We often fail to learn from our mistakes. Have we forgotten what happened in the past?

We need to be clear on what is happening at the river Lethe. — Amity

I would like to, but I forgot.

What do you think is the purpose of its meaning 'forgetfulness' - in its place just before the re-birth. — Amity

It explains why we do not remember what happened. Er remembers because he did not drink from the river.

What do you think is the purpose - at this spot - if its meaning is 'heedless' or similar? — Amity

We can avoid being heedless by keeping to our proper measure in all things. Determining what that is has something to do with knowing who we are, which includes knowing who or what we are not.

We will have to agree to disagree that there can only be one meaning: per you saying: "I see only one river and one meaning or understanding, given the context."
— Paine

Perhaps we need a negotiator? — Amity

Plato uses two different words λήθη (621c) and ἀμέλητος (621a) when referring to the same thing, the river. Heraclitus might say it is not the same river but by this he means something different. Although we might ask him whether we should use the same name if the river is not the same.

λήθη, forgetfulness, and ἀμέλητος, heedlessness, carelessness, or unmindfulness, do not mean the same thing but there is an overlap in meaning, just as there is with the three terms used in translation.

Lethe and Aletheia have the same root. We might think of Lethe as having forgotten the truth, and Aletheia as remembering or recollecting the truth. There is, however, not a single truth but overlapping truths at issue. The truth of what has happened, the truth of the soul, the truth about yourself.

And the almost obsessive focus on the degree of 'justice' of the sou — Amity

Socrates' task as set out at the beginning of Book 2 is to persuade them, as Glaucon puts it:

that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust

(357a-b)

So, it is about 'forgetfulness' not 'carelessness'. — Amity

It is about the connection between them and with philosophy as phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence, thoughtfulness)

the role of Lethe set over against the role of Mnemosyne (or Memory). — Paine

We should not forget that in the Phaedrus there is the plain of Aletheia or truth. (248b)

That suggests to me that the role of recollection is principally the activity of the living soul. — Paine

I agree. In the Phaedo the distinction between recollection and being reminded are blurred:

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. (72e)

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded"

...

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?”

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'

Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'

(73b-d)

The question is why must they drink the water. — Amity

It is by necessity. Given the conditions the souls all get thirsty. There is not other source to drink from.

If you mean why does the story include this, I think it is a response to the anticipated question of why we don't know what happens in death.

No mention of a River of Heedlessness. — Amity

Heedlessness is Horan's translation. Bloom translates it as carelessness. The Greek is ἀμέλητος It means, according to Liddell and Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, not to be cared for.

See the note in the Perseus translation you linked to:
2. In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe.

The later literature calls the river of ἀμέλητος the river of Lethe (Λήθη)

I see that Paine has edited his post to include this.

Why does it matter if it is the same river? — Amity

I do not think Plato uses words heedlessly or carelessly. To say why it matters we must first make note of the difference terms. Someone who forgets might act heedlessly, but one might act heedlessly without forgetting.

Doesn't it depend on the definition? — Amity

If you mean the definition of philosophy, I am going off of what is said beginning at 618e through 619e.

Hmmm. The word 'actually' bothers me. It can mean 'according to one's beliefs, views or feelings'.

There is no certainty that we can be so thoroughly objective. — Amity

Actually is used to mean how things are as opposed to one's beliefs, views, or feelings. More to the point, as opposed to how things are represented in images.

What is the message from either Plato or Socrates?
To be good, to care, to think, to be wise, to be just, to study and practise philosophy? — Amity

Yes, all of the above.

Does knowing ourselves save us from ourselves? — Amity

If to know yourself is to know what is and is not good for you then you are saved unless you are heedless and do things that are contrary to what is good for you.

If no vessel can hold the river's water, then how can it be properly measured? — Amity

I took this to mean that the whole of heedlessness is greater than what any vessel can hold. The heedlessness of souls is without limit.

What is a 'certain measure'? — Amity

I am not sure. Perhaps enough so that we forget what has transpired but not so much that we forget yourself.

To be 'saved by wisdom' or 'good sense' - does it take philosophy? — Amity

I think that this is what he means by philosophy.

Or are some born with it? — Amity

Some will be born with it if they did not drink too much.

We must pay the utmost attention to how each of us will be a seeker and student who learns and finds out, from anywhere he can, who it is who will make him capable and knowledgeable enough to choose the best possible life, always and everywhere, by distinguishing between a good life and a degenerate one.

(618 b-c)

How wise is it to keep reading Plato - as opposed to any other philosophical, religious, psychological texts or works of literature? Knowledge of the sciences? — Amity

Reading Plato need not preclude reading other things. In part it depends on what appeals and resonates with you.

The Plain and River of Forgetfulness or Lethe

Because of the heat and harsh conditions of the Plain of Forgetfulness it is necessary for the souls to drink from the River of Heedlessness. (621a) In his closing comments Socrates refers to the river as the river of Forgetfulness rather than the river of Heedlessness. What is the connection between heedlessness and forgetfulness?

Those who are prudent are not heedless. They are made prudent by the study and practice of philosophy.

… by looking to the nature of the soul, and calling the life that leads soul to become more unjust, the worse life, and the one that leads it to become more just, the better life. All other studies he will set aside, for we have seen that in life and after death this is the supreme choice.

(618e)

Philosophy is about self-knowledge. Forgetfulness is forgetting yourself. To act heedlessly is to forget yourself. Human wisdom, knowledge of ignorance, is not the divine knowledge of the gods. It is, more moderately, phronesis not sophia.

Socrates tells Glaucon:

“And that, dear Glaucon, is how the story was saved and not lost, and it may save us too if we heed its advice, and we shall safely cross over the River of Forgetfulness without defiling our soul.

(621b-c)

Socrates began the story by saying:

Once upon a time …

(614b)

Starting with this fairytale opening and by telling us that the body of Er, unlike the other bodies, had not begun to decompose, we have reason to doubt the truth of the story. But

… knowing things as they actually are. (595b) — Fooloso4

is limited by things as we can actually know them. We cannot know things as they are after we die but we can come to know ourselves as we actually are. The mythological truth lies in recollecting and heeding the message of the story. In this way we may be saved.

One aspect that is often ignored is that we are historied and encultured beings.

Looking back I see that I did not include quotation marks for the passage from the Laws. I have edited it.

I took Lachesis' role to be that once the choice of a daimon and of a life is made by the soul, that choice becomes part of the fate of that soul. There is a connection here with something Socrates tells his friends in the Phaedo:

... all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead.

(64a)

The best preparation for making that fateful choice is something you can do now.

With regard to virtue or excellence, it too is a choice:

... each will have more of her or less of her, as he honours her or dishonours her.

(617e)

This does not make sense to me. If people were in heaven, then they will already have been judged as good. Even if their virtue is through habit, it is part of their character, formed and informed by life experience and doesn't mean 'without philosophy'. — Amity

One can be brought up with good habits, but that does not mean that philosophy is part of their education. Good habits do not preclude philosophy, but may not be the result of philosophy.

'untrained in sufferings' — Amity

Perhaps given their wealth and good fortune Cephalus and Polemarchus are untrained in suffering. Socrates repeats a common assumption to Cephalus:

... for they say that wealthy people have consolation in abundance.

(329e)

Cephalus agrees and goes on to say:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally ...

(331b)

No academic philosophers required. — Amity

I agree. As I understand it, what is meant by philosophy here is something different. I will have more to say on this in connection to the River of Forgetfulness.

I don't see where Plato's concept differs from ours. — Amity

In the Timaeus necessity is called the wandering or errant cause. (48a) The necessary connection between necessity (ananke) and chance (tyke) is discussed in Plato’s Laws:

Fire, water, earth and air all exist by nature and chance, they say, and none of these exist by artifice. And the bodies that then come after these, those of the earth, sun, moon and stars, have come into being through these four, entirely soulless entities. They move by chance, each according to its particular power, in such a way that they come together, combining somehow with their own, hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard and so on for any mixture of opposites that is produced, of necessity, according to chance. In this way, based upon these processes the whole heaven has come into existence and everything under heaven, including animals and indeed all the plants too, and from these all the seasons have arisen, not through intelligence, they say, or through the agency of a god, or through artifice, but, according to them, through nature and chance.

(889b-c) Emphasis added.