Comments

  • Tao follows Nature
    ... contrary to the “ways of life” of other animals.schopenhauer1

    Yup. There is at the heart of it something comical, or as some might regard it, tragic.
  • Tao follows Nature
    I had a hard time understanding this the first time round.

    And if I ever had an inkling, it is no longer shining through the dust of memory.
    Amity

    We would not expect attaining and tenuous to be joined together. They seem to contradict each other, but throughout there is a play of opposites:

    Everyone in the world knows that when the beautiful strives to be
    beautiful, it is repulsive.
    Everyone knows that when the good strives to be good, it is no good.5
    And so,
    To have and to lack generate each other.6
    Difficult and easy give form to each other.
    Long and short off-set each other.
    High and low incline into each other.
    Note and rhythm harmonize with each other.
    Before and after follow each other.
    (Chapter 2)
  • Tao follows Nature
    I have always thought of naming as described in the Tao Te Ching as something humans do.T Clark

    I think there is an ambiguity regarding human action. Some of our ways are in accord with but others contrary to the Way. Naming is something humans do. To be human is to be part of rather than apart from the Way. The authors of the Tao Te Ching uses names. But

    Now that there are names, know enough to stop!

    I think the Tao Te Ching means what it says.T Clark

    Does it say that we bring the myriad creatures into existence? As I read it, when it says in the first chapter:

    Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures.

    'it' refers back to the Way.

    The Way is like an empty vessel ...
    It seems to be the ancestor of the myriad creatures.
    (Chapter 4)

    The myriad creatures rely upon it [the Way] for life, and it turns none of them
    away. ...
    It clothes and nourishes the myriad creatures, but does not lord it over them.
    (Chapter 34)

    The Way produces the One.
    The One produces two.
    Two produces three.
    Three produces the myriad creatures.
    (Chapter 42)
  • Tao follows Nature
    This doesn't seem to account for any exceptions.Amity

    Except:

    Attain extreme tenuousness

    If in mysterious mode, we let go of the desire to know facts? We simply let thoughts be.Amity

    I don't think it is a matter of letting go of the desire to know facts. It is the source of facts that is mysterious.

    Danger from what or who?Amity

    Doesn't avoiding danger require knowing the source?

    This is when it becomes clear that we are not meant to know...so why do we go on so?Amity

    We do act and can come to a better understanding of our actions and motivations.
  • Skepticism as the first principle of philosophy


    While the emphasis is often upon withholding judgment, the Greek term skepsis means to inquire. As a "first principle" of philosophy it might be thought of in terms of philo-sophos, the desire to be wise. It stems from a recognition that one is not wise.

    I have argued elsewhere that the term 'first principle' is problematic. The Greek term is arche. The arche or source is not a principle in the sense of a proposition or claim that stands first and on which others are built. When Aristotle begins the Metaphysics by saying that all men desire knowledge he does not mean all men desire to know what claim or opinion from which all others follow from. The arche the inquiry is in search of is ontological not epistemological.

    He says: .

    .. it is through experience that men acquire science and art ...
    (981a)

    but we have no experience of the arche or source. In other words, we are not wise. Or, in Socratic terms, our human wisdom is our knowledge of our ignorance. We are in want of and in search of the arche. We inquire but do not know.
  • Tao follows Nature
    How do you connect with the Way? What does it mean for you in everyday life?Amity

    ... sages abide in the business of nonaction, and practice the teaching that is without words.
    (Dao chapter 2)

    I am not a Daoist sage. For the most part all I have to offer are words, most of which are not even even my own.

    A great deal has been written about nonaction (wuwei). Cook Ting is an example of wuwei and a practice that is without words. Of course he acts but by carving between the joints his actions are rhythmical and effortless, they meet no resistance. To reach this point, however, requires a great deal of effort. Certainly it is not something that occurs on its own or happens to us while we sit idly by. It does however require a kind of passivity, a looking and observing instead of just doing. It is a doing guided by seeing how things are.

    Right action follows right desire:

    Always eliminate desires in order to observe its mysteries;
    Always have desires in order to observe its manifestations.
    (Dao Chapter 1)

    Is to be aware of how you are and what you do?Amity

    I think so. And also of how others are and what they do.

    Readers often form a picture of a peaceful, idyllic way of life, but:

    To embody the Way is to be long lived,
    And one will avoid danger to the end of one’s days.
    (Dao Chapter 16)
  • Tao follows Nature
    I wonder if I understand you correctly. Are you saying that process of carving the ox is analogous to the process of the Tao bringing the 10,000 things into existence.T Clark

    One who has "learned how to nourish life" does not bring things into existence but rather sees and acts in accordance with how things are.

    A name that can be named is not a constant name.
    Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth;
    Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures.
    (Dao Chapter 1)

    We name things. We carve them up. By dividing we multiply. We take what is one and regard it as many. This is the way of man. This does not mean we bring the myriad creatures into existence any more than we bring the part of the ox into existence. We can either act in accord with the Way or try to hack our way through life.
  • Tao follows Nature


    To name is to divide or distinguish one thing from an other. Zhuangzi's Cook Ting (Ding) divides the ox along its natural joints. To divide things in a way that is contrary to their natural divisions is to force things. The proper division of things requires knowing the natural patterns and organization of things. Knowing what belongs together, what is a part of some larger thing as well as what is separable toward some end or purpose.

    He says:

    At the beginning, when I first began carving up oxen, all I could see was the whole carcass.
    After three years I could no longer see the carcass whole ...

    It is because he had been dividing oxen for three years that he no longer see the carcass as an undifferentiated whole. He saw that it is made up of parts. He say now:

    I follow the natural form slicing the major joints I guide the knife through the big hollows ...

    The ability to guide his knife takes skill developed through practice. But this is not the difference between him and a good cook:

    What your servant loves, my lord, is the Dao, and that is a step beyond skill.

    Going beyond skill does not mean to bypass skill. The cultivation of skill is an essential step in the effort to develop effortless action or wu -wei

    We should not overlook the fact that this and other examples are about ordinary people doing ordinary practical things. As King Hue says in response:

    Excellent.“I have heard the words of Cook Ding and learned how to nourish life!”
  • Tao follows Nature
    A few words that caution us about the use of words.

    Chapter Sixteen:

    Attain extreme tenuousness

    Chapter 32:

    When unhewn wood is carved up, then there are names.
    Now that there are names, know enough to stop!
    Ivanhoe translation

    Zhuangzi poses the problem this way:

    If we’re already one, can I say it? But since I’ve just said we’re one, can I not say it? The unity and my saying it make two. The two and their unity make three.
  • How could Jesus be abandoned?
    He said on the Cross: "My God, My God, Why Have You Forsaken Me?". How could He be abandoned if He and God are one?MoK

    There are different interpretations of what it means to be one. In the development of Christian theology it has been understood to mean one and the same. The same ousia. The same being. The same essence. Homoousion.

    This is not the only sense of what it means to be one. To be one is to be united. To stand together rather than opposed. One who knows the Law, one, who recites the Shema and understands it, would not hear the oneness of God and man with pagan ears. Nowhere in the Gospel of Matthew do we find anything other than the distinction between God the Father and Jesus, a "son of God".

    It is only by a confluence of later influences that results in an abuse of logic that a son is his own father.

    Without the assumption that the two, God and Jesus, are one and the same, the story can be read in a way that is perhaps closer to the original. It appears as if Jesus knew nothing of the apologetics of sin and sacrifice that were to emerge. Like with Job and Ecclesiastes God's will is inscrutable. Why a man who was believed by his followers to be the Messiah was put to death was for them unfathomable. But in the ways of man myths emerged to try and make sense of it.
  • A Thomistic Argument For God's Existence From Composition
    1. Composed beings are made up of parts.Bob Ross

    It is not as if living beings are an assemblage of parts that exist prior to or independently of the organism. We might say that the parts of living beings are made by or caused by that being though a process of autopoiesis.

    2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.Bob Ross

    No, the parts are contingent upon the being of which they are parts.

    Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause.Bob Ross

    What is an uncomposed part? Where do we find them?

    An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.Bob Ross

    A simple being without parts is an imaginative fiction masquerading as an a priori ontological necessity. The existence of the fiction, a simple being, is made up of and contingent upon a poorly composed chain of arguments that begins with something known but misunderstood, a living being that has distinguishable but not independent parts, and then posits something unknown and inexplicable as if it is a causal explanation.

    27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is.Bob Ross

    Our use of the term 'good' does not entail that what is called good is without privation. "what the thing is" is an ambiguous claim. We might say that a dog or a meal a song is good but in none of these cases do we mean that to be a dog or a meal or a song is to be good or without privation. There are bad dogs and meals and songs. The claim that to be God is to be good because what God is is good is circular and question begging.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    the bedrock, the groundless groundJoshs

    I think the following metaphor is apt:

    152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
    subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
    anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    From On Certainty:

    177. What I know, I believe.

    179. It would be correct to say: "I believe..." has subjective truth; but "I know..." not.

    180. Or again "I believe..." is an 'expression', but not "I know...".

    424. ...One says too, "I don't believe it, I know it".

    478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

    483. The correct use of the expression "I know". Someone with bad sight asks me: "do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?" I reply "I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it." - A: "Isn't N.N. at home?" - I: "I believe he is." - A: "Was he at home yesterday?" - I; "Yesterday he was - I know he was; I spoke to him." - A: "Do you know or only believe that this part of the house is built on later than the rest?" - I: "I know it is; I got it from so and so."
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    The idea that it's absurd to say one "knows" that one has a toothache suggests that "knowing" is about justification.Count Timothy von Icarus

    His remark is about the grammar of the word 'know'. It makes no sense to say that I have a toothache but do not know it. If it is not the kind of thing that I do or might not know then it makes no sense to say that I do know it.

    The idea that one can doubt anything one "knows" also makes it pretty clear that "knowledge" here is something like belief.Count Timothy von Icarus

    What would it mean to know something but doubt it? I know by experience not to grab a hot pan from the stove. If I ever doubted it I no longer do. My knowing it has nothing to do with believing it or not believing it. I will get burned whether I believe it or not.
  • An Analysis of "On Certainty"
    Two questions:

    1. Where in the grammar of ordinary language do we find the idea that knowledge is justified true belief?

    2. Where do we find Wittgenstein claiming that knowledge is justified true belief?
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason


    We are talking about very different things.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    While I can see your point, natural theology will suggest that the regularities and rationally-intelligible principles that constitute what we describe as natural laws suggest a prior cause.Wayfarer

    Perhaps the pursuit of natural theology is to forsake wisdom as it is understood in the wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible. Perhaps the attempt to understand God in terms of rational principles is a misguided attempt to understand a God who is understood, to the extent he is understood, as willful.

    One could argue among the aims of philosophy is to discern the boundary of what can be explained in terms of natural laws, and to intuit what may lie beyond it, even if it can't be stated in scientific terms.Wayfarer

    One could also argue that an appeal to intuition is in this case to mistake the imagination for intellection in the sense it is used in Plato's divided line.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason


    You are circling the drain. Repeating the same claims as if they are truths.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    We got now the first event of how the Trump administration will work as Musk showed his power in the incoming Trumpster-fire administration.ssu

    Short-term they will attempt to work as if the US is a joint business venture. People who do not understand how running a nation works might think this is a good thing, but the US cannot take advantage of the protections it offers to corporations that both Trump's and Musk's businesses depend on. Citizens are not workers who can be laid off and disregarded. The country is not for the benefit of the owners and shareholders.

    Long-term it seems likely that the relationship between Trump and Musk will fracture. For both of them shared power means shared recognition and neither wants to play second fiddle. Then there is the question of who the "shareholders" aka Congress will back. Trump's power lies with his popularity, but Musk's with his technological prowess. And while the social media platform X dwarfs Trump's Truth Social, the more decisive power lies with Musk's SpaceX, for which Trump has nothing even remotely comparable.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    .
    It matters because it's relevant to what Stephanopolous said. ABC would probably have won the case, although it would have raised Trump's ire and led to his retaliation.Relativist

    I think the decision was made by or with ABC's parent company, Disney. They are concerned with Trump's escalating weaponization of the legal system while pretending that he is the victim. His strategy is always two-fold - legal determination backed by appeal after appeal and public opinion. The merits of the case was not Disney's main concern. They were more concerned with the process of discovery and what dirt could be found or manufactured against Disney's wide ranging assets and how this might affect their public image. As Trump knows well, whatever the truth may be, the harm comes from the accusations.

    .
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    Does "natural" only mean things in the world that we already know of, and "super-natural" means things that we don't know of yet?A Christian Philosophy

    No. When you say:

    We could entertain that the laws of nature are caused by prior laws, but this only pushes the problem one step back. To avoid the risk of infinite regress, a fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause.A Christian Philosophy

    that is an indication that you know the difference. What is natural means what can be explained, to the extent it can be explained, by the laws of nature. It is because you accept the idea that everything must have a cause and reject the idea that the laws of nature are self-caused that you "deduce" that there must be something that causes the laws of nature. Rather than questioning the principle that there must be a cause you simply posit the existence of one because you believe that there must be one.

    Rather than the problem of an infinite regress, the problem is one of the limits of human reason.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    I am unclear on what you mean by "natural" vs "super-natural". How do you define those two terms?A Christian Philosophy

    Roughly, natural explanations do not introduce anything outside the natural world. It rejects the idea that the world is contingent and requires a necessary cause, that is, a super or supra-natural cause that is above or beyond the limits of the natural world and on which the world is dependent.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    What is questionable about the PSR?A Christian Philosophy

    We have been through this already.

    I did not use the word "super-natural".A Christian Philosophy

    When natural explanations cannot explain why there is anything at all you resort to a super-natural explanation even if you do not use that word.

    We should simply try to follow the rules of the PSR to its logical conclusion.A Christian Philosophy

    This is circular reasoning.

    And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other contingent thingsA Christian Philosophy

    All other contingent things? Something whose existence is necessary is not something that is contingent. If all natural things are contingent then what is necessary is not something natural but rather the cause of what is natural.

    Why must there be a reason for what is? Positing a principle that there must be is circular and question begging.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason


    We could continue to go round and round, but I won't.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    There is no one definitive version of the PSR.RussellA

    That is not what I asked. I asked which version says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred.

    I don't believe that the PSR can logically be formulated to apply to unknown events.RussellA

    Then you reject every version of the PSR that does not explicitly state that the principle only applies to events we know of.

    The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a principle, and principles only exist in the mind.RussellA

    It makes an ontological claim.

    When the original event happened, the event wasn't following the principle that it could only happen if there was a reason.RussellA

    How do you know that?

    The original event wasn't determined by a Principle.RussellA

    The principle does not determine the event. The event occurs in accord with the principle. The principle is not the cause.

    But then you say we can say something about an event we know nothing about, ie, that it must have a reason.RussellA

    That is not what I said. What I said was:

    We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later.Fooloso4

    I gave the example of
    the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0Fooloso4
    . Until recently we did not know it existed. We now know it does. According to the PSR it must have a reason for existing. That reason was not created by our discovery of it.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    There is no one version of the PSR. There are different formulations. The PSR is a family of principles (SEP - PSR).RussellA

    And which of those versions says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred? Or is that your own contribution?

    I am making the case that in the absence of a God, it wouldn't be sensible to apply a PSR to unknown events.RussellA

    How does our knowing that an event has occurred affect the event such that prior to our knowledge of it it did not or might not have a reason for occurring? We can now see events that occurred millions of years ago, how does our seeing it now but not previously change what occurred or why it occurred?

    Is there any argument that could explain how we can know something about an unknown event, such as the unknown event having a reason?RussellA

    We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later. In what way does our coming to know them change the reason for them occurring?
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    There are different formulations of the PSR. You cite one version of it. See SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason.RussellA

    I asked you:

    Whose version of the PSR are you relying on?Fooloso4

    The closest you came to answering is:

    For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans.RussellA

    You say:

    A principle that cannot be justified shouldn't be used.RussellA

    but when I asked:

    Are you arguing against the PSR?Fooloso4

    your response was:

    No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown eventsRussellA

    Once again, whose version of the PRS are you relying on?

    And again, the Webb telescope makes known to us events that were previously unknown. According to Leibniz version, the reason for the existence of these events is present in the events whether we are aware of the event or not. The reason is inherent to the event, not to our knowledge of it.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    The existence of a being whose existence is an essential property is deduced directly from the PSR.A Christian Philosophy

    What is deduced from a questionable principle is questionable.

    This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.
    — Fooloso4
    What else could it possibly be?
    A Christian Philosophy

    Positing a super-natural being in order to explain what you cannot explain is question begging. It assumes what is in question, that there must be a comprehensive reason for what is.

    To avoid the risk of infinite regress, the fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause.A Christian Philosophy

    What is this something? What is the explanation for this something?
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    You propose a formulation of the PSRRussellA

    I don't propose it. I cite it.

    You must feel that there is a justification for this particular formulation.RussellA

    Prior to the question of whether one agrees or disagrees is the question of what the principle is. The principle is not based on our ability to know the reason, but rather states that there must be a reason.

    I do not know that there is a reason or that there is not a reason for everything
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans.RussellA

    Up until this point you have been treating unknown as unknown to us. If God knows then even if we do not there is still a reason for all events, reasons known to God. The reason for something is not contingent on our knowing the reason.

    Is your argument based on the existence of a God?RussellA

    My argument is that if you accept the PRS then you must accept that there is a reason for everything whether that reason is known to us or not. One might, of course, object along the lines of our not knowing that there is a God who knows all things.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown eventsRussellA

    Whose version of the PSR are you relying on? Where does it say in that version that the PSR does not apply to unknown events?

    I am arguing that it is not possible to know about something that we don't know about, including any reason for the something that we don't know anything about.RussellA

    There is a difference between knowing what the reason is and there being a reason. According to Leibniz version, as I understand it, everything must have a reason. That reason is intrinsic to it rather than something that only exists when we know of the thing or event. We cannot say what that reason is if the thing or event is unknown, but it must have a reason whether we know it or not. If you cannot accept that then you do not accept the PSR.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    In this particular case, that the something we don't know about has a reason.RussellA

    Are you arguing against the PSR?
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    The expression "all events whether known or unknown" is a contradiction in terms. It is not possible to know that there are unknown events as they are unknown.RussellA

    It is not a contradiction. An event is something that happens. According to the PSR there is a reason for it happening. Our knowledge of something happening is not a requirement for it to happen. The Webb telescope has detected the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0, which formed about 290 million years after the Big Bang. There is a reason for it happening, whether we know it happened or not.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    The question is: how far will they bend toward Trump's willRelativist

    Up until the point where it becomes a liability:

    When prices continue because of tariffs.
    When the US can't sell goods overseas because other nations will impose tariffs in response.
    When there is a shortage of workers because of deportations.
    When the effects of climate change can no longer be ignored
    .
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    Therefore the PSR cannot be applied to the unknown.RussellA

    If the PSR is valid it should hold for all events whether known or unknown. If it happened then there must be, according to the principle, a reason for it happening. If PSR is restricted to what we know or observe then the reason for the star exploding is contingent upon our knowledge of it happening.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    In conclusion, the PSR is valid, but only applies to observable facts, events and truths.RussellA

    Suppose a star explodes 10 light years from us. It will not be observable to us for 10 years. If the PSR only applies to observable,facts does that mean that with regard to that event the PSR is not valid and will not be valid for 10 years?
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    The traditional answer is: we can posit the existence of a First Cause which has existence necessarily or as an essential property. The existence of this First Cause is grounded by logical necessity ...A Christian Philosophy

    This is an a priori abuse of logic. Positing something that has existence necessarily as an essential property is essentially a conjuring trick. Something does not exist because you posit its existence as necessary.

    Either there is an illogical jump from natural causes to a supernatural cause or this supposed first cause is itself in need of a cause.

    Rejecting the idea that there is a reason would go against our reasoning process ...A Christian Philosophy

    It doesn't. It is unreasonable to assume that because we can find reasons for some things that we can find reasons for everything. It leads to the unreasonable assumption of a first cause.

    (3) By elimination, they are designed.A Christian Philosophy

    More conjuring. This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.

    ... there still must be a prescriptive explanation for why matter and energy behave as described by those laws.A Christian Philosophy

    'God did it' is not an explanation.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    Then, if we observe a rock falling there would be no reason why we hadn't observed the rock not falling.RussellA

    The reason we observed the rock falling is that it fell and we were there to see if fall. There may be various reasons why it fell and various reasons why we were there to see it fall. It does not follow from the fact that we can posit reasons for why we observed the rock fall, that there is a reason for everything.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason


    You did not address the problem. Observing that a rock falls is not a reason for why the rock falls.
  • In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    Sooner or later explanations reach a dead endRussellA

    What does this mean in terms of PSR? The observation that a rock falls is not a reason for or explanation for it falling. If explanation reaches a dead end then either we have failed to find the reason or there is no reason.
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