Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4
I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211. — Banno
Does Anscombe mention a single simple object? The claim that language demands it is not the same as actually identifying either a simple object or a simple name. — Fooloso4
What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno
What an atomic object is, as Anscombe argues, is unimportant to the argument in the Tractatus as presented. — Banno
The objects form the substance of the world.
But the vital thing here, which permeates all of Wittgenstein's work, is that the world is not made of objects but of facts. — Banno
↪Fooloso4 In the post above, (↪Fooloso4 )where you quote my comment about simple objects and then go on to reply to it as if it were about elementary propositions. — Banno
He is responding to Russell's question about the constituents and components of a thought. — Fooloso4
If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.
And that there should be simple names and simple objects is equally presented as a demand at 3.23
Because you seemed to me not to be differentiating between atomic objects and elementary propositions. — Banno
↪Fooloso4 Ok, but elementary propositions are not atomic objects. — Banno
See also the last whole paragraph on p.27. "The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Banno
(28)But it is fair to say that at the time when he wrote the Tractatus, Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned.
That there are such things is implied by the structure of language Wittgenstein develops. What they are is irrelevant. See p. 28 op.cit - I can't easily quote from it here. What they are is an issue for psychology. — Banno
...whatever elementary propositions may be, they are not simple observation statements
If the elementary propositions of the Tractatus are not simple observation statements, it seems necessary to find some other account of them before we can grasp the doctrines of the book even in vague outline.
Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them.
— Fooloso4
I don't quite agree with this. As Anscombe says, simple objects are demanded by the nature of Language (see her text, p.29), referencing 2.021 and 2.0211.
The rejection of this view strikes me as one of the main departures from the Tractatus found in the PI. — Banno
Now we can be lost together!
— Fooloso4
This is why we do philosophy, after all. — 013zen
(CV 65)When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.
So, there we see clearly what Wittgenstein has in mind here. — 013zen
"The young man is starting college tomorrow." — 013zen
Any young man, any college, any date, etc. — 013zen
(3.1431)The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.
(2.021)Objects make up the substance of the world
What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. — Sam26
(2.06)The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)
“Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real. — Sam26
(2.024)Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
(2.0231)The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties.
The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. — Sam26
I don't believe that this is how analysis works for Wittgenstein. Analysis yields atomic propositions, which are objects. "Man is a man" is just another proposition, not an atomic proposition. — 013zen
The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.
(18.6.15) — Fooloso4
Thanks for the direction! — 013zen
Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem. — Sam26
Besides I'm not sure I see your point. — Sam26
Rather, it is the precise material properties that a particular has that are determined by the arrangement of objects. — 013zen
Those are objects "in the original sense" — 013zen
Plato is a complex entity which we can define by appealing to many different aspects of his existence. — 013zen
"I asked Wittgenstein whether when he wrote the Tractatus, he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 'simple object'. His reply was that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try and decide whether this thing or that thing was a simple matter or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter" (A Memoir, p. 70). — 013zen
Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality. — Sam26
I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26
When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.
Now, however, it seems to be a legitimate question: Are-e.g.- spatial objects composed of simple parts; in analysing them, does one arrive at parts that cannot be further analysed, or is this not the case?
It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the WORLD must consist of elements. And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be definite. Or in other words, what vacillates is our determinations, not the world. It looks as if to deny things were as much as to say that the world can, as it were, be indefinite in some such sense as that in which our knowledge is uncertain and indefinite.
All I want is only for my meaning to be completely analysed!
I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." — Sam26
First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language. — Sam26
(Notebooks 17.6.15)When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.
The Socrates of The Clouds has the advantage of being quite funny though. — Count Timothy von Icarus
he knew nothing except just the fact of his ignorance.
(177d)I know nothing other than matters of eros ...
I have not fully studied the historiography of Socrates (anyone here?) — Lionino
Socrates famously proclaimed that he knew that he knew nothing. — Echogem222
I don't see the issue that you're referring to. — 013zen
(NB 17.6.15)And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.
In a sense, an object is both logical and physical. — 013zen
(2.0231)... only by the configuration of objects that they [physical objects] are produced.
(2.027)Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.
An expression characterizes a form and a content" (3.31). — 013zen
(3.13)A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.
(6.111)All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content are false.
(3.221)Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.
(21.6.15)Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one.
To my understanding, the Tractatus essentially sets up an isomorphism between thought, language, and possible/actual reality. — 013zen
"Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (Tract, 4.2211) — 013zen
(1.13)The facts in logical space are the world.
(2.0121)If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.
(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.)
"The ball" is an arrangement of objects both logically and spatiotemporally. — 013zen
Let us assume that every spatial object consists of infinitely many points, then it is clear that I cannot mention all these by name when I speak of that object. Here then would be a case in which I cannot arrive at the complete analysis in the old sense at all; and perhaps just this is the usual case.
Is it, A PRIORI, clear that in analyzing we must arrive at simple components - is this, e.g., involved in the concept of analysis-, or is analysis ad infinitum possible?-Or is there in the end even a third possibility?
And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.
(NB 17.6.15)And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing.
(11.5.15)The simple thing for us is: the simplest thing that we are acquainted with.--The simplest thing which our analysis can attain-it need appear only as a protopicture, as a variable in our propositions-that is the simple thing that we mean and look for.
(17.6.15)When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense.
(18.6.15)The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.
... the worthlessness of the world (6. 41)
and the ethical will, which rewards or punishes itself in its very action (6. 422)
the power of the will to change the world as a whole without changing any facts (6. 43).
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.
[Wittgenstein] could make nothing of the "objectification of the Will"
Is this noumena? — Manuel
Or ethics? — Manuel
Or sensations? — Manuel
For instance, the metaphor of reading his book is like climbing a ladder and then kicking it down was taken directly from Schopenhauer who says the same thing. — Manuel
Not how the world is, but that it is, is what's mystical, reminds me of Schopenhauer's claim about the riddle of the world. — Manuel
His last part of the Tractatus, the mystical side, certainly echoes Schopenhauer's views about art, wherein we catch glimpses of a pure idea, but such experiences are very poorly explained in propositional form. — Manuel
As for representation, I don't know exactly how it fits in, nevertheless, Schopenhauer begins his book by saying "The world is my representation.", Wittgenstein says "The world is everything that is the case." There may be something to that. — Manuel
The early Wittgenstein was a Schopenhauerian. — Manuel
Putting the government in charge of reporting the news is a nod toward allowing propoganda. — Hanover
That was a pro-Biden, anti-Israel, anti-Trump conversation. — Hanover
I think the matter is put more forcefully than that:
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
— ibid. 5.64
That may have a shared purpose with other expressions of doubt. But it is also cojoining what many have struggled to keep apart. — Paine
Implicit in this argument is the additonal argument that if a news outlet doesn't adequately promote the correct ethical side, financial pressure should be placed upon that outlet to get it to change its course.
I'd argue that it is this type of reasoning that has led to the politicalization and delegitimization of much of media where you go only to your own personal trusted news source for any information. — Hanover
The article makes clear that NYT readers believe the NYT has an ethical duty to promote Biden and never to provide fodder to the right. — Hanover
My question is whether anyone disagrees with what I've said and believes that the press has a duty to stake out a preferred social objective and then to use its power to promote that objective? — Hanover
Do you see the press as a legitimate political force ... — Hanover
... leaving to the reader the conclusions he wishes to draw? — Hanover
Thankfully the justices can all read the plain language of the Constitution. — NOS4A2
You're quoting the concurring opinion. — NOS4A2
The majority mentioned the laws already in place to jail and disqualify insurrectionists from office. — NOS4A2
Congress must “prescribe” specific procedures to “ascertain” when an individual is disqualified under the 14th Amendment.
They probably should have mentioned that Trump was already acquitted of insurrection, as well. — NOS4A2
... on the basis of some hare-brained theory, — NOS4A2
There is one issue brought before the court and decided by the court. Per Curium. 9-0. And that was whether those who tried to remove Trump from the ballot were wrong in doing so. They were. You ignore it. — NOS4A2
(https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2024/03/supreme-court-trump-colorado-ballot-disaster.html)The majority says that Congress must “prescribe” specific procedures to “ascertain” when an individual is disqualified under the 14th Amendment. Such procedures, of course, do not exist today. And without them, the majority insists—in just a few paragraphs of sparse reasoning—the insurrection clause cannot be enforced against office seekers.
... reaches out to decide Section 3 questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to disqualify a Presidential candidate under that provision. In a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons that course.
(1)The world is all that is the case.
(5.634)Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Whatever we can describe at all could be
other than it is.
There is no a priori order of things.
(5.632)The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
(5.62)The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
(6.51)Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where
no questions can be asked.
For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.
(6.53)The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.
(bold added)“Although federal enforcement of Section 3 is in no way at issue, the majority announced novel rules for how that enforcement must operate,” Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote in their joint concurrence, referring to the section of the 14th Amendment that contains the insurrection clause. The court’s main opinion, those three justices wrote, “reaches out to decide Section 3 questions not before us, and to foreclose future efforts to disqualify a Presidential candidate under that provision. In a sensitive case crying out for judicial restraint, it abandons that course.”
Liberalism as we now understand it is the idea that no conception of the good life is to be imposed, and everyone is to be allowed to pursue their own notion of the good life. — Leontiskos