What is questionable about the PSR? — A Christian Philosophy

We have been through this already.

I did not use the word "super-natural". — A Christian Philosophy

When natural explanations cannot explain why there is anything at all you resort to a super-natural explanation even if you do not use that word.

We should simply try to follow the rules of the PSR to its logical conclusion. — A Christian Philosophy

This is circular reasoning.

And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other contingent things — A Christian Philosophy

All other contingent things? Something whose existence is necessary is not something that is contingent. If all natural things are contingent then what is necessary is not something natural but rather the cause of what is natural.

Why must there be a reason for what is? Positing a principle that there must be is circular and question begging.

We could continue to go round and round, but I won't.

There is no one definitive version of the PSR. — RussellA

That is not what I asked. I asked which version says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred.

I don't believe that the PSR can logically be formulated to apply to unknown events. — RussellA

Then you reject every version of the PSR that does not explicitly state that the principle only applies to events we know of.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a principle, and principles only exist in the mind. — RussellA

It makes an ontological claim.

When the original event happened, the event wasn't following the principle that it could only happen if there was a reason. — RussellA

How do you know that?

The original event wasn't determined by a Principle. — RussellA

The principle does not determine the event. The event occurs in accord with the principle. The principle is not the cause.

But then you say we can say something about an event we know nothing about, ie, that it must have a reason. — RussellA

That is not what I said. What I said was:

We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later. — Fooloso4

I gave the example of

the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0 — Fooloso4

. Until recently we did not know it existed. We now know it does. According to the PSR it must have a reason for existing. That reason was not created by our discovery of it.

There is no one version of the PSR. There are different formulations. The PSR is a family of principles (SEP - PSR). — RussellA

And which of those versions says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred? Or is that your own contribution?

I am making the case that in the absence of a God, it wouldn't be sensible to apply a PSR to unknown events. — RussellA

How does our knowing that an event has occurred affect the event such that prior to our knowledge of it it did not or might not have a reason for occurring? We can now see events that occurred millions of years ago, how does our seeing it now but not previously change what occurred or why it occurred?

Is there any argument that could explain how we can know something about an unknown event, such as the unknown event having a reason? — RussellA

We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later. In what way does our coming to know them change the reason for them occurring?

There are different formulations of the PSR. You cite one version of it. See SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason. — RussellA

I asked you:

Whose version of the PSR are you relying on? — Fooloso4

The closest you came to answering is:

For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans. — RussellA

You say:

A principle that cannot be justified shouldn't be used. — RussellA

but when I asked:

Are you arguing against the PSR? — Fooloso4

your response was:

No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown events — RussellA

Once again, whose version of the PRS are you relying on?

And again, the Webb telescope makes known to us events that were previously unknown. According to Leibniz version, the reason for the existence of these events is present in the events whether we are aware of the event or not. The reason is inherent to the event, not to our knowledge of it.

The existence of a being whose existence is an essential property is deduced directly from the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

What is deduced from a questionable principle is questionable.

This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.
— Fooloso4
What else could it possibly be? — A Christian Philosophy

Positing a super-natural being in order to explain what you cannot explain is question begging. It assumes what is in question, that there must be a comprehensive reason for what is.

To avoid the risk of infinite regress, the fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause. — A Christian Philosophy

What is this something? What is the explanation for this something?

You propose a formulation of the PSR — RussellA

I don't propose it. I cite it.

You must feel that there is a justification for this particular formulation. — RussellA

Prior to the question of whether one agrees or disagrees is the question of what the principle is. The principle is not based on our ability to know the reason, but rather states that there must be a reason.

I do not know that there is a reason or that there is not a reason for everything

For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans. — RussellA

Up until this point you have been treating unknown as unknown to us. If God knows then even if we do not there is still a reason for all events, reasons known to God. The reason for something is not contingent on our knowing the reason.

Is your argument based on the existence of a God? — RussellA

My argument is that if you accept the PRS then you must accept that there is a reason for everything whether that reason is known to us or not. One might, of course, object along the lines of our not knowing that there is a God who knows all things.

No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown events — RussellA

Whose version of the PSR are you relying on? Where does it say in that version that the PSR does not apply to unknown events?

I am arguing that it is not possible to know about something that we don't know about, including any reason for the something that we don't know anything about. — RussellA

There is a difference between knowing what the reason is and there being a reason. According to Leibniz version, as I understand it, everything must have a reason. That reason is intrinsic to it rather than something that only exists when we know of the thing or event. We cannot say what that reason is if the thing or event is unknown, but it must have a reason whether we know it or not. If you cannot accept that then you do not accept the PSR.

In this particular case, that the something we don't know about has a reason. — RussellA

Are you arguing against the PSR?

The expression "all events whether known or unknown" is a contradiction in terms. It is not possible to know that there are unknown events as they are unknown. — RussellA

It is not a contradiction. An event is something that happens. According to the PSR there is a reason for it happening. Our knowledge of something happening is not a requirement for it to happen. The Webb telescope has detected the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0, which formed about 290 million years after the Big Bang. There is a reason for it happening, whether we know it happened or not.

The question is: how far will they bend toward Trump's will — Relativist

Up until the point where it becomes a liability:

When prices continue because of tariffs.
When the US can't sell goods overseas because other nations will impose tariffs in response.
When there is a shortage of workers because of deportations.
When the effects of climate change can no longer be ignored
.

Therefore the PSR cannot be applied to the unknown. — RussellA

If the PSR is valid it should hold for all events whether known or unknown. If it happened then there must be, according to the principle, a reason for it happening. If PSR is restricted to what we know or observe then the reason for the star exploding is contingent upon our knowledge of it happening.

In conclusion, the PSR is valid, but only applies to observable facts, events and truths. — RussellA

Suppose a star explodes 10 light years from us. It will not be observable to us for 10 years. If the PSR only applies to observable,facts does that mean that with regard to that event the PSR is not valid and will not be valid for 10 years?

The traditional answer is: we can posit the existence of a First Cause which has existence necessarily or as an essential property. The existence of this First Cause is grounded by logical necessity ... — A Christian Philosophy

This is an a priori abuse of logic. Positing something that has existence necessarily as an essential property is essentially a conjuring trick. Something does not exist because you posit its existence as necessary.

Either there is an illogical jump from natural causes to a supernatural cause or this supposed first cause is itself in need of a cause.

Rejecting the idea that there is a reason would go against our reasoning process ... — A Christian Philosophy

It doesn't. It is unreasonable to assume that because we can find reasons for some things that we can find reasons for everything. It leads to the unreasonable assumption of a first cause.

(3) By elimination, they are designed. — A Christian Philosophy

More conjuring. This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.

... there still must be a prescriptive explanation for why matter and energy behave as described by those laws. — A Christian Philosophy

'God did it' is not an explanation.

Then, if we observe a rock falling there would be no reason why we hadn't observed the rock not falling. — RussellA

The reason we observed the rock falling is that it fell and we were there to see if fall. There may be various reasons why it fell and various reasons why we were there to see it fall. It does not follow from the fact that we can posit reasons for why we observed the rock fall, that there is a reason for everything.

You did not address the problem. Observing that a rock falls is not a reason for why the rock falls.

Sooner or later explanations reach a dead end — RussellA

What does this mean in terms of PSR? The observation that a rock falls is not a reason for or explanation for it falling. If explanation reaches a dead end then either we have failed to find the reason or there is no reason.

when "gravity" means no more than a rock falls to the ground when released. — RussellA

But gravity means more than that.

According to the original poster by reason he/she means explanation.

Are you claiming that there are reasons that do not involve explanations?

The OP describes the PSR ... — RussellA

From the OP:

In this way, the PSR is also called “Principle of Parsimony” or “Occam’s Razor”: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. — A Christian Philosophy

We posit three explanations — A Christian Philosophy

It depends on the meaning of "reason" — RussellA

In accord with the OP it means that there is an explanation.

Did you mean 'petitio principii', begging the question?

Thus, if all objects in existence are explained, by 1 of the 3 types of reasons as per the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", then existence is also explained. — A Christian Philosophy

This is question begging.It assumes what is in question, namely whether everything in existence can be explained. These three types of reason are based on the existence of things. They do not explain why there is anything at all.

On the epistemology side, yes, that is, our knowledge of the PSR is defended by that premise. — A Christian Philosophy

Well, if we rejected the idea that there is a reason then we would not look for for one, but it does not follow that there must be one.

This occurs when we lack data. — A Christian Philosophy

That is the point. Where is the data that is sufficient to conclude that everything must have a reason?

Since there are only 3 types of reasons in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", the laws of nature would be explained by 1 of the 3 types. — A Christian Philosophy

Again, this is question begging. It assumes what is in question. It does not explain why there are laws of nature and does not demonstrate that those laws are prescriptive rather than descriptive.

C1 - The fact that my cat cannot understand The Old Man and the Sea does not mean that the book isn't understandable — RussellA

Maybe a superior intelligence might understand it, maybe not. In either case we do not, and based on our ignorance we cannot conclude that the universe is what we might regard as reasonable.

C2 - The fact that a question is the wrong question doesn't mean that there isn't a right question — RussellA

Sure, but the right question might lead to a rejection of the PSR.

C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. — RussellA

C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer. — RussellA

I was referring to what you originally had as Parmenides conclusion, that the world has always existed. But your corrected conclusion is no better. Both are based on the wrong question (C2) - when did it come into existence? And (C1) - our inability to conceive how something can come from nothing marks a limit of our thinking, but should we assume that our limits are the measure of reality or possibility?

Parmenides pointed out that if the world had come into existence from nothing, there is no answer to the question as to why the world didn't come into existence earlier or later than it did. From this he concluded that the world has always existed (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason) — RussellA

The problem, as I see it, is the assumption that if one asks a question there must be an answer to that question. There are several conclusions that might follow from not being able to answer a question. They include the possibility that:

C1 - Reason and our capacity to understand is limited.
C2 - The question itself is the problem.
C3 - Any conclusion that follows is questionable.

Or if you mean "existence" as the general concept, then that's just a concept. Concepts are not concrete existing things that need reasons. — A Christian Philosophy

I mean the reason why there is anything at all.

The reason is given in the OP under the section "Argument in defence of the PSR". In short, it follows from the premise that "Reason finds truth". — A Christian Philosophy

A premise is the reason why there must be a reason for what is?

Although we do employ reason in our search for truth, it may lead us astray. Your example of swans is a good case in point. We might conclude that all swans are white based on the fact that all the swans we have ever seen are white, but there are black swans. Reason does not simply explain what is observed, observation finds truth.

You posit "laws of nature" as an explanation, but this is problematic for two reasons. First, we might ask what the reason is for the laws of nature. Second, what is the explanation for the causal power of these laws?

I don't think it dawned on any philosopher, before the advent of modernity, that the Cosmos - a word meaning 'an ordered whole' - could be anything other than rational. — Wayfarer

For Heraclitus the tension of opposites is essential. We may think of it is the function of reason to disambiguate, but logos holds opposites together in their tension. Logos does not resolve all things to 'is' or 'is not'.

Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tension, like that of the bow and the lyre.

(fragment 51)

We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away through strife.

(fragment 80)

In the Phaedo Socrates says:

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best.

(97b-d)

Socrates accepted Mind as the cause, but instead of inquiring about what Mind is, or how it arranged things, he sought an explanation for why it is best that things be the way they are. He did not find such an explanation in Anaxagoras or anywhere else. He thus launched his “second sailing” to find the cause. (99d). With his “second sailing” Socrates looks to what seems best in a double sense. First, he wants to understand how it is best that things are arranged by Mind as they are, and second, having failed to understand things as they are, that is, to attain truth and knowledge, he seeks what seems to be the best argument.

Mind or nous as the governing principle, arranging things according to what is best, is not the same as a world governed by reason.

For Aristotle, the question of the intelligibility of the natural world faces two problems, the arche or source of the whole and tyche or chance. We have no knowledge of the source and what happens by chance or accident does not happen according to reason.

“For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist.” — A Christian Philosophy

What is the reason for existence?

What is the reason for thinking that there must be a reason for what is?

The ENEMY is the United States government. — ssu

Trumpian "conservatives" sound like the sixties counterculture. Perhaps the most significant difference is that the sixties movement was progressive, but Trumpism is regressive.

Do I understand you? — Moliere

For the most part, yes. He wanted to avoid accusations of heresy and atheism. He was, however, placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, the Index of Forbidden Books.

In the first meditation he says:

So all I need, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, is to find in each of them at least some reason for doubt.

His reason for doubting is methological. That is to say, in the normal course of his life he does not doubt all that he now finds some reason for doubting.

So today I have set all my worries aside and arranged for myself a clear stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself, sincerely and without holding back, to demolishing my opinions.

It is only now that he is alone and removed from the demands of life that he can call into doubt things that ordinarily he would be mad to doubt.

Would that happen today, no? — ssu

If Trump was asked : "Have you no sense of decency?" he would just smirk and say: "I have the most decency, the best decency. They say no one has more decency than me." It is, of course his complete lack of decency and his shamelessness that shields him from even being bothered by the accusation.

Do you think his conclusion—a kind of ontological argument for the existence of God—is also feigned? — Janus

Yes.

Or that his skepticism regarding the authority of the church extended to the 'holy book' itself? — Janus

He makes good use of the good book for his own ends. In Genesis 2 after man gains knowledge God says that man has become like one of us. God blocks them from eating of the tree of life and becoming one of them, that is, immortal. But Descartes, in agreement with the NT, says that the soul/mind is immortal.. The theme of being god-like is continued in the story of the Tower of Babel:

The Lord said, “If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them.

(11:6)

In the fourth meditation Descartes says:

I know by experience that will is entirely without limits.

and:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ... — Fooloso4

Once again we see what Trump means by MAGA, a return to the time of his mentor Roy Cohn and McCarthyism, a campaign of fear and repression, with the "deep state" now taking the place of communism as the enemy within.

You can infer ... — Corvus

You ignore what Descartes says and impose your own inference based on your own opinion rather than on anything said in the text.

How could he exist without his body and senses? — Corvus

A good question, but your rejecting the possibility does not mean that Descartes thought, even briefly, that is it impossible. Imposing your own opinions onto your reading of Descartes is bad practice.

He briefly doubts his own existence — Corvus

Where does he say this? He doubts his body and his senses, but not that he exists. He posits a malicious demon that will do everything he can to deceive him, but concludes it cannot deceive him about his existing.

He doubted everything even his own existence. — Corvus

He does not doubt that he exists. From the second meditation:

I will set aside anything that admits of the slightest doubt, treating it as though I had found it to be outright false; and I will carry on like that until I find something certain, or – at worst – until I become certain that there is no certainty. Archimedes said that if he had one firm and immovable point he could lift the world ·with a long enough lever·; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one little thing that is solid and certain ...

Now that I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world – no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies – does it follow that I don’t exist either? No it does not follow; for if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.

My point was existence precedes doubting and thinking — Corvus

So you have said, again and again and again. I agree, but it is not as simple as you assume. It is not a matter of taking his side but of trying to understanding him. When you say:

Doubting one's own existence negates one's own sanity. — Corvus

you show that you do not understand him. He does not doubt his existence. That is the one thing he cannot doubt. That is his starting point.

One way to approach him is by attempting to read him as someone at that time might have. Belief in an immortal, immaterial soul was widespread and fundamental to the teachings of the Church. By substituting mind for soul reasoned thought rather than Church dogma and doctrine becomes fundamental. In addition, the unquestioned authority of Aristotle in matters of science is also called into question and replaced by certainty.

The question of whether consciousness is fundamental is an open question. We should not be too quick to dismiss Descartes because he held a similar view.

Right I agree but surely to be consistent Descartes must have imagined that he had grounds for skepticism regarding the existence of those other thinkers. — Janus

I don't think so. I think his doubt is rhetorical. A way to doubt the teachings and authority of the Church by feigning to doubt everything.

Added: Doubt is methodical, the purpose of which is to gain certain knowledge based on what is indubitable.

Is it not the case, that he must have existed in order to think? — Corvus

You are mixing tenses.

Existence is a precondition for thinking. — Corvus

It is a condition for thinking. Whether it is a precondition is not as obvious as you think. From Anaxagoras to the present there have been educated people who belief in the existence of a non-physical nous/mind/intellect/consciousness. In addition there have been and still are those who believe in the existence of a soul separate from the body.

All thoughts must have its contents or objects. — Corvus

Right.

When you say, a thinking being, it doesn't mean much without the knowledge of what the thinking is about. — Corvus

What is the point?

Without the content or object of the thought, Cogito is not saying much more than I dance, or I sing. — Corvus

Descartes concludes that he cannot doubt that he exists and cannot be deceived about his existing. He might be dreaming that he dances or sings but even if he is dreaming he is certain that he exists.

A person called "whoever" sounds still ambiguous. — Corvus

Whoever mistakes "whoever" for what a person is called is confused. This reminds me of how the Cyclopes is fooled by Odysseus.

These are the operations of mind which are only possible under the precondition of the living bodily existence. — Corvus

Right, sensing and willing are operations of the mind or of a thinking thing. You have made it clear that you think this requires a body, but this is not a good reason to misunderstand or misrepresent him, especially in cases where you are in agreement with him regarding the confirmation of your existence.

If the content of thought is empty or unknown, what meaning or relevance does the thought have with one's own existence on claiming cogito? — Corvus

That one is thinking and what is thought are not the same. He must exist in order to think.

Whoever is a name for nonexistence and unknown, hence meaningless. — Corvus

?

Isn't it a meaningless utterance? — Corvus

No.

I do exist. But my existence is confirmed by my own sense perception of the world of my own body and the actions I take according to my will. Not by cogito. — Corvus

In the second meditation Descartes says:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.