And by the way........ — tim wood

A tip of the pointy hat from the back of the room.

Supposed the nebula theory for galaxy creation, actually. Along with tidal forces making the moon’s orbit decrease, the prediction that stars were uncountable, the abolishment of Newtonian absolute time, the requirement for a constant velocity related to the motion of matter. Course, it was all metaphysical theory with no math or experiment, and Newton ruled the scientific roost, so.......

Then along comes GR, and the synthetic a priori judgement of all geometric properties goes right square.....well, you know the rest of the story.

The cultural invariant is the concept <five>, not what is counted — Dfpolis

Agreed. Which merely begs the question......from where did sure cultural invariant arise? It must be a condition of all similarly constituted rationalities, n’est pas? All that is counted, and the labels assigned to each unit of substance in the series of counting are immediately dismissed. What is left, both necessarily and sufficiently enabling a thoroughly mental exercise? It is nothing but the pure, a priori concepts, thought by the understanding alone, rising from the constitution of the mind**, the categories of quantity (plurality), quality (reality), relation (causality) and modality (existence). Without these, in conjunction with phenomena in general, no understanding is possible at all, which means.......no counting.
** Hey....this is a philosophy forum. Cognitive neuroscience is down the hall on the right, just past the fake rubber tree.

f we had no experience of cars, it would be difficult to understand the concept of a car crash. — Dfpolis

While such is agreeable superficially, it is also irrelevant, within the context of the topic. Because not all cars are involved in crashes, the concept of car alone is insufficient to justify the truth of the consequent (a guy will die). The synthetic requirement for an outstanding force is also necessary.

once we have such transcendental principles we know they apply to all reality, they may be thought of as a priori — Dfpolis

That’s what I’m talking about!!!!!! Odd though, you acknowledge that which we know applies to all reality, yet balk at the realization they are the ground of all empirical exercise. Like counting.

Nonetheless, I would say, they (transcendental principles) are thought a priori, rather than “they may be thought of as a priori”.

A belief that can be bought is a persuasion, and does not stand as determining a conviction. Receiving a thousand dollars to say something, is insufficient ground to stipulate the conviction being influenced has altered accordingly. One can easily say whatever contributes to his wants, regardless of what he actually believes.

Belief is, after all, nothing but a single person’s judgement made on a given set of conditions objectively sufficient for him. Therefore, the only way to change his belief is with a set of conditions with objectively certain for him, which is called knowledge, or, suspension of one subjectively valid conviction for another.

have to be more than a little careful in matching Kant against certain modern discoveries. — tim wood

Wouldn’t Herr Kant freak if he was around about the time they broke water down into its constituent parts? (Vion, 1869) Actually, no, probably not. Being an astrophysicist and a professor of math and physical science, he’d hardy be amazed. Hell, he probably could have done it himself.

Kripke or no, modern science or no, because water is a real object “All water is H2O” is an empirical judgement, hence synthetic, and from the proposition, the predicates of hydrogen and of oxygen absolutely cannot be derived from merely the subject “water”, hence, still synthetic.

“....But now I extend my knowledge, and looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body (water), I find weight (H2O) at all times connected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate, and say, "All bodies (water) are (is) heavy (H20)”. Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight (H20) with the conception of body (water), because both conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still belong to one another, only contingently**, however, as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions....”
**contingently, re: heavy water. The concept of water in and of itself is not altered by the additional mass of a neutron in the nucleus of one atom.

Parentheses are mine, obviously, because I didn’t want to delete or subvert what ws actually said in the quote, but to show the particulars are pretty much identical.

How should I consider Berkeley with respect to the Kantian noumena of the OP?

I don’t know what that means.

With respect to knowledge and experience I prefer what Kant has to say, I guess I am driving towards it. Or him, as you say. Subjectivity reigns supreme is my mantra, which makes explicit all knowledge, (“....whereby a conception conforms to its object...”) and experience (“....convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience...”) is given by reason, which obviously belongs to individual subjects.

I may well declare that subjectivity reigns supreme, but that doesn’t mean there is no objective world. Simply put, if there was no objective world, it would be impossible to explain myself as a body in space and time. It is abundantly clear I can explain how it is I occupy a particular space and time, therefore an objective world is necessary.

The sum of subjective experiences can paint a general picture of empirical reality, but if all but one rational agents vanish, the world remains as far as the lone survivor is concerned. And if he should follow his kind into oblivion, there would be no subject left to experience the world, no subject left to know anything.

Hunter orange relates to perception, and the determinations that follow necesarily from the differences in them. In this case, the world is the same even if seen two ways, but Kant claims the world may be very different for different kinds of rational agents. The point being, just because a thing is seen one way doesn’t mean it cannot be seen some other way. Hence, the thing in itself on the one hand, and the implications for the meaning of phenomena on the other.

Yeah, I used first person architecture for that very reason: any knowledge and experience belongs to subjects individually. Because it was stated as my claim, perhaps I should have said *my* knowledge along with my possible experience. Is that what you mean?

And yeah, it would take time and trouble to define terms, but it would be both worthwhile and necessary should some question about them arise. I’d do my best if anyone has some issue.

We learn by abstraction from experience. — Dfpolis

Hmmmm, yes. I see. I see you’re talking about learning, I’m talking about understanding.

I understand the abstraction of numbers. Like a concrete number without its denominant. Such being so, how do you suppose culturally differentiated systems find a commonality in their respective analysis? What is the same for a child here and now arriving at “5”, and a medieval Roman child arriving at “V”?

My question would be, if we had a priori "knowledge," what reason would we have to believe that it applied to the world of experience? — Dfpolis

One reason to believe would be, the world of experience satisfies some prerogatives that belong to a priori truths, re: one doesn’t need the experience of a severe car crash to know a severe car crash can kill him. But general a priori truths have nothing whatsoever to do with experience (hence the standing definition), but are sustained by the principles of universality and necessity, for which experience can never suffice, re: two parallel lines can never enclose a space. I think it’s more significant, not that we do know some truths a priori, but that we can.

So what exactly do you mean? — tim wood

I meant that the entire “This presupposition appears to me to be unjustified” from the OP, is indeed unjustified, because 1.) Kant never presupposed any such thing, as far as I know, and 2.) such presupposition, as stated, is certainly self-contradictory, which would toss all 600 pages right square in the crapper, and anything so susceptible for crapperization is hardly likely to be talked about scholastically 250-odd years later.

I take the blame if I wrote something that made it appear I thought there could be no world independent of my knowledge. Even so, I wouldn’t hesitate at all to claim there is no knowledge whatsoever of a world independent of my possible experience.

Do you have a favorite go-to translator for CPR?

Subject as “office”......I like it!!! Quite apropos, actually.

When you say Kant was anti-philosopher in the first critique and philosopher in the second, I take you to mean by the second, practical reason. As opposed to two versions of the first, that is. Yes? No?

how would you phrase it otherwise into more ordinary language — Wallows

The philosophical self deals with itself only as subject in itself, the empirical world merely incidental; the psychological self deals with itself as object in the world, the transcendental self merely incidental.

Philosophy the doctrine belongs to metaphysics the science, psychology the doctrine belongs to anthropology the science.

It seems to me that Kant presupposes that there exists a world which, by virtue of its being independent of our experience, is unknowable, yet nevertheless is the cause of our experience. This presupposition seems to me unjustified. How does Kant know that such a world exists? — philosophy

This presupposition is indeed unjustified, insofar as a world independent of our knowledge cannot be the cause of our experience. It follows necessarily that Kant generated a complete paradigm-shifting epistemological theory on a self-contradiction, or, he never presupposed the existence of an unknowable world independent of our experience in the first place. That a thing is proven to be necessary under one set of conditions does not thereby presuppose an existence under some other possible conditions.

Do you happen to know why deer hunters wear orange clothing of some kind? If so, do you see how that relates to what Kant has shown?

You must have spent a lot of time re-evaluating yesterday’s OP, to dump it and start over. Freaked me out when I came back to find everything missing.

CPR is a theory of knowledge, and as such, positing the existence of noumena is of course justified, because it conforms to the tenets of the theory. Positing the existence of the noumenal world is not justified because there is no such thing, Kant never suggested a “noumenal world” as such, and while there is some conflict in his use of thing-in-itself, one must remain very aware of the two distinct contexts within which he uses the term interchangeably.

In short, a proper understanding of phenomena is absolutely required before an understanding of noumena is possible, and both from a strictly transcendental philosophy point of view, as it was intended, and this juxtaposition of relation is the crux of matter between Hume and Kant.

Hey kids, god here. I don’t do this very often, but I’m reminded of one of my more astute creations.....well, according to some of you anyway, to others he was just some old dude with funny hair......which pretty much illustrates just what’s going on right now. Now I know y’all are really challenging yourselves and not me exactly with this stone thing, but really....c’mon man. Far be it from me to get in the way, you’re free.....get it? Free?.....to talk about this however you like as long as you like, but just be aware of what you’re actually doing.

“....To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger—not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it—of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) "milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve”.....

......Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of illusion—a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, (...), for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions (...) any attempt to employ it as an instrument in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever. Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy....”

Peace.

Everything I know starts with "I" and then "I AM" — BrianW

If I had said something like that, which I have before because I think it’s true, I would have used a few dozen more words, which wouldn’t have made it any better.

I have much in there I wish I could excise. — Not

Fear not!!!! Some neurobiologists insist unused or seldom used neural pathways degenerate to an un-actuated condition eventually. Bad news is, other neurobiologists insist every one of our experiences we’ve ever had maintain their respective pathways forever. On the other hand, philosophical moralists and fundamental religionists both tell us we should pay more heed to which experiences we should have in order to not be in conflict with consciousness.

Funny, isn’t it? Woulda, coulda shoulda on this side, The Serenity Prayer on the other. Find your Happy Place somewhere in the middle and keep on chooglin’’!!!

Logical operations (...) don't stand independently (.....) outside of a logical system. — MindForged

Understood. An epistemological theory grounded in rules should adhere to that system of rules sufficient to regulate it.

Because intuitionistic logic alone has existed for nearly a century now — MindForged

First I heard about it. Call me old-fashion that way, I guess. Can you tell me why a plain ol’ guy on the street like me would need anything but plain ol’ propositional logic?

The three laws of thought, as put forth by Aristotle, are analytic propositions, not because of their content, but because they are true necessarily, which just means their negation is impossible. From a Kantian point of view, the laws of thought are analytical propositions because the predicate contains no conceptions that are not explicit in the subject. He would call the use of these pure transcendental logic because they serve as the form of a proposition and will therefore be true no matter what particulars are used as subject.

All that being said, why do we need synthetic a priori propositions anyway?

Since we have to teach children to count by counting specific kinds of things, I see no reason to think that there is any a priori component to counting. — Dfpolis

What mechanism is the child using to relate a word he hears to an object he sees, in a system of quantitative analysis, that doesn’t have an a priori component? How does he understand exactly what he’s doing, as opposed to simple learning by rote? What do I say to my child, if after saying, “count this as one, these as two.....”, he asks, “what’s a two?”

It appears you’re not much of a fan of a priori stuff, I must say. Maybe we just call It by different names, dunno.

I am starting to believe that consciousness is not Mind. — Not

That’s good, because consciousness is not mind.

If redness is the condition of being red, thickness the condition of being thick, why can’t consciousness be the condition of being conscious? Just as some object must be represented as possessing redness so must some object be represented as possessing consciousness, and, just as the being of red is one of the properties of some thing so the being of conscious one of the properties of some thing. The thinking subject, known as the “I”, is the thing and the total of all objects of experience is the condition of the “I”’s being conscious. All the objects of consciousness is the condition of being conscious and is that which permits “I am” to have it’s objects necessary to define it, re: I am tall (short); black (white); European (Australian); Protestant (Shia); Hegelian (Cartesian)....and so on.

Mind, on the other hand, is what makes all the above possible, being nothing more than the name given to the capacity for rational thought. Consciousness doesn’t think: mind doesn’t define.

My philosophical Jello of the Day......whether it sticks or not, we’ll see.

A few quotes — aletheist

Yes, interesting. Thanks.

Sorry. I hit post before I was done. S“....There is no Cartesian subjectivism in St. Thomas which groups the whole of Being around the thinking self, no principium reddendae rationis which refuses to grant permission to be unless the being can present its credentials before the jurisdiction of reason (Leibniz), no Hegelian absolutizing of rational categories. In St. Thomas, reason is subordinate to faith, to mysticism, and, in the end, to the eschatological consummation of intelligence in the beatific vision....” (Caputo, 1982, p. 250)

First, because counting is an intellectual operation, while seeing is a physical operation, — Dfpolis

I suppose counting could be construed as an intellectual operation, in as much as I am connecting an a priori representation of quantity to spatially distinguishable objects. On the other hand, I don’t agree that seeing is a physical operation, in as much as an object impressed on a bunch of optic nerves can be called seeing. Is it merely convention that the intellect is required to call up an internal object to correspond to the impression, in order to say I am in fact seeing?

For Aristotle, the categories are different ways in which something can be said to "be." — Dfpolis

Yeah, I know. Less Kant dammit!!!! I post this only to justify my claim.

“.....and consequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (....) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of experience be thought....”

i think all thought has an inherently binary and 'subject-object' nature. — Janus

I can dig it!! Although, if one holds with the representational system of human cognition, he is met with a logical dilemma, insofar as the subject that thinks (half your binary nature) is at the same time the object to which the thoughts belong (the other half).

Agreed, reality isn’t dualistic, in and of itself. It just appears that way from the perfectly obvious reason that there are no basketballs in my head but I’d know a basketball if I saw one.

that takes the form of a conversation between different voices. — Janus

OK, if that’s how it seems to you.

I know it seems like quibbling, but you started by saying “internal dialogue” which to me means at least two conversants, otherwise it would be an internal monologue. I don’t have an issue with a thinking subject pitting itself against a variety of ideas, but it really doesn’t suit me to permit ideas to take the form of cultural voices. There are ideas which are bereft of any cultural bias, after all.

I think experience falsifies this claim. We all make errors in reasoning. Logic enables us to discover those errors. — Dfpolis

Experience falsifies the claim if I’d said “reason’s sole domain is to *force* thinking correctly”. A set of logical rules doesn’t come with the promise of their use, only that we’re better off if we do.

counting does not depend on what is counted — Dfpolis

Why isn’t this just like “seeing does not depend on what is seen”? Seeing or counting is an actual physical act, and mandates that the objects consistent with the act be present. Now, “the ability to see or to count does not depend on what is seen or counted” seems to be true, for I do not lose my visual receptivity simply because my eyes are closed. Otherwise, I would be forced into the absurdity of having to learn each and every object presented to sensibility after each and every interruption of it.
Are you saying counting and the ability to count are the same thing?

The categories are the same for Kant as they were for Aristotle. My mistake if I got the impression you were a fan of Aristotle, hence I didn’t feel the need to define them.

What is Cosmogenesis and who is the authority for it? What is ideogenesis and who is te authority for that? Thanks.

it would hopefully be the most rational one. — Janus

Which begs a MAJOR question......how is most rational decided?

Really, when the lights go out, when the outside noise has gone away.....are there really two (more than one) of you up there, between your ears?

You know, I can easily bring up a representation of any person I choose, have a discussion with him, even picture him is the attire and accoutrements of his day. But I have never ever had the occassion of us communicating simultaneously.

Why not a conversation with oneself; an "internal dialogue"? — Janus

In the event of a conflict, which member of the dialogue would be the decision maker?

I suppose, though, an internal dialogue is no worse for intelligibility that the classic dichotomy of “I” the thinking subject vs the “I” that is the object to which thoughts belong.

Humans. The only known animals that intentionally confuse themselves.

Kant's assumption that we have a priori knowledge is inadequate grounds for calling Hume's position an error — Dfpolis

Yes, it is, because a priori knowledge derives from universality and necessity, which Hume’s empirical grounds, with respect to cause and effect, do not and can not possibly afford.

But, Kant wants more than the principle of causality to be known a priori......
(Correct, he would wish all principles whatsoever be known a priori)
.......... He wants it to be imposed by the mind so that its contrary is literally unthinkable. — Dfpolis

(No, not literally unthinkable, for reason has no power to not think. Reason’s sole domain is to enable thinking correctly, which means understanding does not confuse itself with contradictions.)

Pure reason is reason without data........
(The data of pure reason are categories, without which reason and indeed all thought, is impossible)
.........Lacking grist, it can conclude nothing, not even transcendental principles. — Dfpolis

(Reason does not conclude, that being the sole domain of judgement. While judgement is a part of the total faculty of reason, it is improper to attribute to the whole that which properly belongs to the particular function of one of its parts. In this much I grant: without categories reason has no means to, and therefore cannot, derive transcendental principles.)

So, causality, space and time are not forms imposed on reality by the mind, but empirically derived concepts. — Dfpolis

Correct. Causality, space and time are pure forms imposed on the mind by reality.

In other words, Hume did not agree with Kant's assumptions. — Dfpolis

Hume died 20 years before Kant put his assumptions to print. At least, the ones we’re talking about.

consistent because it is grounded in the experience of counting. — Dfpolis

Arithmetic is consistent by means of its use *because* the principles from which it arose have nothing whatsoever to do with counting. The numeral “5”, or any series of objects representing the numeral, denotes a quantity, but “quantity” cannot be derived from anything arithmetic alone.

If mathematics were known a priori, there would be no reason to question it. — Dfpolis

Mathematics the science is never questioned. Mathematics the discipline may be.

I did not say that the subject and predicate contained the same information, but that they had the identical object as their referent. — Dfpolis

And I say that if they have the same referent they have the same information. But I’m. Probably misunderstanding some word usage or something.

Something may be true transcendentally (true of all existents)........
(This is not what transcendentally means to me)
........, but it is not a priori unless we know it without the experience of an existent informing us. — Dfpolis

(True. I know the principle “all bodies are extended” is true without the experience of a body informing me, otherwise I would only be entitled to say “this body is extended”. I know all bodies are extended not because of *this* body I perceive, but rather because the concept of empirical bodies in general must have the pure concept of “extension” belonging to it, in order to be intuited as “body” at all. “Extension” is hardly empirical, so any knowledge of principles connected with it must be a priori.

Your turn.

Coming to think philosophically at all can be understood to be a dialectical process. — Janus

Agreed, this kind of dialectic would be an internal process of understanding. But still, not a conversation, more like a private theater.

Find a book that describes a lot of philosophical -ism’s; pick the one closest to your beliefs. From the choice of -ism’s, look for the -ist that either created the -ism or the one responsible for making that -ism last as long as it did. You’ll probably find there isn’t a single -ism that fully sustains your beliefs, or maybe if you find an -ism that fits you’ll find there are a dozen -ist’s that have something to say about it. And rest assured it is highly unlikely you have an -ism of your own that doesn’t already have its -ist.

Your personal philosophy is directly proportional to your age. You start out looking for other peoples’ truths you can use (how cool your drinking buddy is) then end up with your own somewhere down the line (how stupid your drinking buddy was).

Good luck.

It suffices to think that, having once grasped it a posteriori, in an experienced example, we can see, that it applies in all future cases "a priori." — Dfpolis

Which is PRECISELY the error Kant points out regarding Hume’s characterization of the principle cause and effect. Sure we can “think” it applies in all future cases, but that is merely given from the habit of never having seen its falsification in the past. Hume, being an rabid empiricist, had no call to suppose a principle being grounded in pure reason, as are all principles whatsoever, absolutely **must** have it’s proof also given from pure reason. Kant’s argument wasn’t that there IS a proof per se, but rather no empirical predicates at all can be attributed to a possible formulation of it. Which of course, makes Hume’s convention of repeatable occurrences fall by the epistemological wayside. From this, it is clear that while it is certainly true no thesis can be reject that has not first been considered, Kant’s argument was that the thesis of which Hume was aware (a priori judgements do exist), having been considered, was summarily rejected (slave of the passions and all that happy crappy) because it wasn’t considered **as it ought to have been**. In other words, he didn’t consider it the right way.

I shall not insult your intelligence by informing you the human cognitive system is already in possession of a myriad of pure a priori principles of the kind Hume failed to address, first and foremost of which is, quite inarguably, mathematics. And as a final contribution, I submit there is no logical reason to suppose cause and effect should lend itself to being differentiated between kinds, with all due respect to Aristotle.

A couple minor points, if I may:
Isn’t a proposition where the subject and predicate describe the same event and contain the same information a mere tautology?

It’s not that the relationships are contingent; it’s that instances that sustain a principle governing them are. If cause and effect is an intelligible relationship prior to our knowledge of it’s instances, doesn’t it’s very intelligibility mandate such relationship be necessarily a priori?

Inquiring minds.......

One opposes a different opinion through dialogue. — Wallows

True. That is dialectic conversation. Reasoned argument between opposing positions, or as you say, philosophy progresses in a dialectical manner. Nonetheless, a guy can.....and I’m of the mind that everybody does......have his own personal philosophy he only discusses with himself, or from which he views the world in general, in which case it is not a dialectic conversation. You don’t have to do philosophy in public.

Do you think philosophy progresses in a dialectical manner? — Wallows

Dialectical, as in the Socratic dialogues, insofar as reasoned arguments tend towards a truth? Yes, as long as philosophy is discussed among rational folks. Philosophy isn’t dialectical at all, if a single rational folk is just trying to figure stuff out for himself.

Kant seems to have felt that (....) Hume's analysis must be flawed. — Dfpolis

Flawed, yes; bullheaded, no. Egotistical.....ehhhhhh, maybe. (Grin)
“....This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous generation of understanding and reason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in experience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else; and hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to extend our cognition a priori....”

How is the builder building identically being the building built any different than the ball hitting identically being the hit ball? The house built and the ball hit both have an intrinsic necessity for their respective causes, herein being no more than the predicates of natural law. Even so, all empirical relationships concerning cause and effect are contingent with respect to human knowledge, which implies if any absolute necessity, that is to say, the falsification of which is impossible, must arise from a priori conditions.

I’m still interested in your thoughts, but I don’t want to be the reason the thread goes too far off topic. Well.....any more than I am already.

When does one ever reach an understanding of any particular philosopher — Wallows

First.....thanks for the compliment; ‘preciate it. As for when, ehhhhh, damned if I know. Whenever it feels right, I guess. The further back in time one goes in his choice of philosophers to understand, the less information he has to work with and the more the language used in the writing differs from the language used in the understanding. But first and foremost, the major difficulty arises directly from the degree of paradigm shift incorporated in the writing, because even if one thinks he understands what is being said, he must then relinquish his own predispositions in order to agree to any truth that may be found in it. Otherwise......what’s the point, right??

Please rethink this. Kant was bullheaded in his opposition to Hume's thesis that there is no intrinsic necessity to time ordered causality. As a result he sent philosophy off on a tangent from which it is yet to fully recover. — Dfpolis

Been following your dialogue from the beginning, finding nothing worth bitchin’ about, instead finding your novel approach interesting. But I have to ask......what is your idea of Hume’s thesis that Kant was bullheaded about, with respect to “time-ordered causality”?

I’d guess A.) you’re talking about the effect on our knowledge of a thing being antecedent to the causality of the thing’s impression given to us by sense, or, B.) you’re talking about the simultaneity of the external impression on sense and the internal knowledge of the object so impressing.

I shall add myself to the “sorry if I’m bothersome” group and say thanks as well.

I think Wick's account is still valid — Wallows

I can live with that. I don’t know from which translation (if any) Wick is working, but I’m betting it’s much newer than my 1909 Haldane/Kemp literary antique. Still, both the Masters in question, re: K and S, insist on the ineffectiveness of second party interpretations of novel epistemological enterprise, carrying the implication that if one needs to refer to an interpretation, either he is too lazy or otherwise ill-equipped to comprehend the original. This rears its subliminal head when Wicks himself references Hofstadter for the Möbius strip thing. Which to me, is merely a basic philosophical infraction squared.

FYI, and as the Great And Wonderful Janis Joplin said......of no particular social import.....
Schopenhauer, Preface WWR, 1844: “...And, in general, how is it possible that philosophy, degraded to the position of a means of making one's bread, can fail to degenerate into sophistry? Just because this is infallibly the case, and the rule, “I sing the song of him whose bread I eat,” has always held good, the making of money by philosophy was regarded by the ancients as the characteristic of the sophists. But we have still to add this, that since throughout this world nothing is to be expected, can be demanded, or is to be had for gold but mediocrity, we must be contented with it here also....”

Kant, Preface CPR 1787: “.......it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind (....) than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel....”

Odd, though, that both of these guys acknowledged his respective philosophy was most likely beyond the general understanding of the crowd to which was explicitly directed, yet decried the method for teaching it to them.

Ever onward, eh?