Why do you want to lock down the use of “convinced” in this way? What purpose does that serve? — DingoJones

Because that's the way the word is generally used. So if you used it in another way the interpreter might misunderstand you. And if that "other" way of using it is intentional, it could qualify as deception. Would you tell me that you were convinced of X even though you knew of reasons to doubt X? If so, I would say that you used "convinced" deceptively. If Terrapin Station said "I am convinced that all of reality is physical", and I found out that Terrapin was actually considering possible reasons why this is not true, I would conclude that Terrapin used "convinced" in deception. Instead, Terrapin said "everything seems to be physical empirically". The use of "seems" instead of "convinced" tells me that Terrapin is in some way open to other possibilities. Therefore the possibility of that form of deception is excluded by a careful use of words. That's the purpose.

Would you tell me that you were convinced of X even though you knew of reasons to doubt X? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you still convinced of your definition of "convinced," even though you know of reasons to doubt your definition of "convinced"--such as @DingoJones using that word differently, with no intention to deceive?

I suggest that our strongest convictions are precisely the ones we know of reasons to doubt, but we find those reasons unconvincing.

I didnt intend to connect my question to anything Terrapin was saying.
It seems a very strict use of the word, that if you experience any doubt or know of any substantive/rational reason why your position MIGHT be in error then you cannot be convinced of the position. It seemed like you had a specific utility for that use and indeed you do, trying to lock down what you consider Terrapins slippery usuage of language.
As I just noticed aletheist has pointed out, there is another state of being “unconvinced” that softens the strictness of the usage of that word, which I think is correct in general.

All this hemming and hawing over the word "seems." Sometimes it seems like some of the regulars here must be social misfits who have zero to no interaction with typical, everyday Joe (at least American) English speakers, because these issues are sometimes tackled as if we're extraterrestrials trying to figure out "English--how does it work?"

https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/it-seems
http://www.idioms4you.com/complete-idioms/seems-to-me.html
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/seems

Okay, the string, "unicorn" represents, or symbolizes (both are synonyms of "express") the idea <unicorn>. You seemed to contradict yourself by saying that universals refer to potential instances. — Harry Hindu

To express an idea is to instantiate a sign capable of evoking it. So, "unicorn" is an expression because can evoke <unicorn>. Still, it is not a symbol for the idea, because it is not the idea <unicorn>, but imagined/potential unicorns (animals) that both the word and the idea refer to.

Instead of "potential instances" - which seems like a loaded term, I'd use the term "category". Unicorns, cats, dogs and planets are categories. We put things (Uni) in mental boxes, or categories (unicorns) - Uni the unicorn. — Harry Hindu

While there are categories, <category> is not a fundamental concept. An instance is in a category because its objective nature, its intelligibility, is able to evoke the concept defining the category. If beagles were not able to evoke the concept <dog> they would not be categorized as dogs. So concepts are logically prior to categories -- and concepts refer to all of their potential instances, not just those that we have experienced or those that actually exist at any given time.

You said they have different essences because they can do different things. Every thing does something different, which means that each idea is a different essence, and each material thing is a different essence. — Harry Hindu

No, as I explained in my last response to this same issue, things are not essences. Essences are specifications of possible acts, but specifications do not entail that what is specified actually exists -- that it is operational.

Ideas are not things, but subjects thinking of things. Further, ideas are abstractions. The do not exhaust what we are thinking of. Since ideas are abstractions, they can leave individuating characteristics behind, and so the same idea can be evoked by many individuals. That is why many concepts are universal.

There is no distinction between what is ideas and what is matter if everything is different from each other. — Harry Hindu

This is a complete non sequitur, and I can't think of how you came to this conclusion. The fact that we have 100 different plastic toy cars does not mean that there is no difference between the idea of plastic and the idea of a toy car.

Goats eat grass, but grass doesn't eat grass, so they would be different essences. — Harry Hindu

Yes, goats and grass have (not are) different essences. Goats can eat grass , but not photosynthesize sugar. Grass can photosynthesize, but not eat grass.

But wait a second, can you imagine grass eating grass (the idea of grass eating grass)? Would that then make it the same essence as the idea of the goat eating grass? — Harry Hindu

We can imagine many things, but that does not make them exist. Grass that ate grass would have a different essence than actual grass.

Every thing has a different essence and existence. — Harry Hindu

Yes.

ach idea would have a different existence and essence. So what? What does that have to do with the difference between what an idea is and what matter is? You've simply explained the difference between things, not the difference between the category "idea" and "matter" — Harry Hindu

That is because the distinction of essence and existence is metaphysical (an observation about being as being) and applies to all finite beings. I explained it to deal with your misunderstanding my use of "essence," not to explain the difference between the concepts of materiality and intentionality, which I already explained in the OP.

To distinguish materiality and intentionality, we need to reflect on more than the fact that they both exist and have an essential character. We need to reflect on our contingent experience to see their essential differences -- what things in each category can do that things in the other category cannot.

It seems to me that one's essence defines one's existence. It seems to me that they are inseparable, as one's essence/existence is a relationship with everything else, so in a sense you did redefine "thing" as "essence/existence". In a deterministic world, that relationship would be deterministic, with no potentialities. — Harry Hindu

Yes, the relation of essence and existence is transcendental -- all beings have both and they are ontologically inseparable. Still, we can distinguish them mentally -- think of them separately.

Determinism alone does not eliminate the distinction between actual and potential. Even if the time-development of the universe were fully determined by its initial state at one time the present state was not the universe's actual state, but only a fully determined potential state.

"Potentialities" are the result of our perception of time, as if the future is yet to happen and still isn't determined. — Harry Hindu

I think you have this backward. Time is a measure of change, and change occurs because what was merely potential becomes actual. Determinism is irrelevant to the reality of change.

You still haven't addressed the differences between "idea" and "matter". — Harry Hindu

Reread the OP.

So, I consider the related general definitions of information, message, communication, code, and data to constitute a foundational concept which applies to both material (physical) and intentional (mental) domains. — Galuchat

If that were so, we could not define them in terms of more fundamental concepts, but I think we agree that we can.

Data being asymmetries, are you referring to anything other than symmetry?

Data being asymmetries, are you referring to anything other than symmetry? — Galuchat

I am sorry, I do not understand this, as it seems to me that symmetry is as much a datum as asymmetry. A priori, we could have either.

Dfpolis, thank you for the excellent post!

I am not a dualist. I hold that human beings are fully natural unities, but that we can, via abstraction, separate various notes of intelligibility found in unified substances. Such separation is mental, not based on ontological separation. As a result, we can maintain a two-subsystem theory of mind without resort to ontological dualism.

You explicitly state in the previous sentence the separation is [by substance?] mental. How would you categorize 'mental separation' if not as an ontological separation?

1. Neurophysiological data processing cannot be the explanatory invariant of our awareness of contents. If A => B, then every case of A entails a case of B. So, if there is any case of neurophysiological data processing which does not result in awareness of the processed data (consciousness) then neurophysiological data processing alone cannot explain awareness. Clearly, we are not aware of all the data we process.

Well I think this is a bit 'low resolution'/unspecific. It's definitively clear neurophysiological data alone isn't sufficient for awareness but that doesn't mean that a certain kind of neurophysiological processing is not sufficient - this is the bigger argument here.

2. All knowledge is a subject-object relation. There is always a knowing subject and a known object. At the beginning of natural science, we abstract the object from the subject -- we choose to attend to physical objects to the exclusion of the mental acts by which the subject knows those objects. In natural science care what Ptolemy, Brahe, Galileo, and Hubble saw, not the act by which the intelligibility of what they saw became actually known. Thus, natural science is, by design, bereft of data and concepts relating to the knowing subject and her acts of awareness. Lacking these data and concepts, it has no way of connecting what it does know of the physical world, including neurophysiology, to the act of awareness. Thus it is logically impossible for natural science, as limited by its Fundamental Abstraction, to explain the act of awareness. Forgetting this is a prime example of Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness (thinking what exists only in abstraction is the concrete reality in its fullness).

I don't think the first sentence [of the two in bold] leads to the conclusion in the second sentence.

Empiricism starts with defining a phenomenon -any phenomenon. Phemonema can be mental or physical or can even be some interaction between mental and physical [e.g. the reduction of awareness that results from taking a mind altering physical substance; the alteration of one's awareness of self and one's relation with objects of consciousness [e.g. feelings or things in consciousness] that can occurs with mind altering physical substance or anything else that leads to the latter type of experience - brain lesion, trauma to head, neurodegenerative disease, infection of head.] Certainly when a science deals with those sorts of phenomena they have a language to at least begin an inquiry into it and know how to collect data in order to test their hypotheses else they wouldn't begin.

And, secondly, concepts can be taken from different levels of analysis - the psychological, the neurophysiological, the cellular. At present there is research that attempts to map language from one level to the other - e.g. the concept of 'memory' can now be explained partly through biophysical mechanisms - long term potentiation and depression of neurons in a certain kind of circuit; 'mental concepts or 'ideas' ' through the activation of a certain set of neurons in a hierarchically organized sensory circuit. So connections are in fact being attempted between what's traditionally been considered a 'mental field' e.g. psychology and 'physical' fields e.g. biophysics.

3. The material and intentional aspects of reality are logically orthogonal. That is to say, that, though they co-occur and interact, they do not share essential, defining notes. Matter is essentially extended and changeable. It is what it is because of intrinsic characteristics. As extended, matter has parts outside of parts, and so is measurable. As changeable, the same matter can take on different forms. As defined by intrinsic characteristics, we need not look beyond a sample to understand its nature.

To be orthogonal is to be completely independent of the other [for one to not be able to directly influence the other]. I gave examples of instances where physical objects result in changes in objects of experience and awareness itself. The fact that they can influence each other so plainly, I think, gives good credence to the fact that these two things are not orthogonal. And, more importantly, the fact that this is a unidirectional interaction [i.e. that only physical objects can result in changes to mental states and not the other way around without some sort of physical mediator] gives serious reason to doubt an fundamentality to the mental field - at least to me it's clear its an emergent phenomenon out of fundamental material interactions.

Intentions do not have these characteristics. They are unextended, having no parts outside of parts. Instead they are indivisible unities. Further, there is no objective means of measuring them. They are not changeable. If you change your intent, you no longer have the same intention, but a different intention. As Franz Brentano noted, an essential characteristic of intentionality is its aboutness, which is to to say that they involve some target that they are about. We do not just know, will or hope, we know, will and hope something. Thus, to fully understand/specify an intention we have to go beyond its intrinsic nature, and say what it is about. (To specify a desire, we have to say what is desired.) This is clearly different from what is needed to specify a sample of matter.

I'm unsure why intentions [my understanding of what you mean by intention is: the object of a mental act - judgement, perception, etc] are always considered without parts. I think, for example, a 'hope' is deconstruct-able, and [at least partly] composed of a valence component, an cognitive attitude of anticipation, a 'desire' or 'wanting' for a certain end to come about, the 'state of affairs' that defines the 'end'. and sometimes a feeling of 'confidence'. I can also imagine how this is biophysically instantiated [i.e. this intentional state is defined by a circuit interaction between certain parts of the reward system, cognitive system, and memory system]. So what you have is some emergent state [the mental state] composed of interacting elements.

4. Intentional realities are information based. What we know, will, desire, etc. is specified by actual, not potential, information. By definition, information is the reduction of (logical) possibility. If a message is transmitted, but not yet fully received, then it is not physical possibility that is reduced in the course of its reception, but logical possibility. As each bit is received, the logical possibility that it could be other than it is, is reduced.

The explanatory invariant of information is not physical. The same information can be encoded in a panoply of physical forms that have only increased in number with the advance of technology. Thus, information is not physically invariant. So, we have to look beyond physicality to understand information, and so the intentional realities that are essentially dependent on information.

I think things are a bit more complicated and don't necessarily result in this conclusion. Implicit assumptions about the underlying theory of meaning [eg. logical atomism vs language-game] can influence how we make sense of this problem. I'm still forming my thoughts on this and this part of your post but I'll give you a response when I think of one.

To express an idea is to instantiate a sign capable of evoking it. So, "unicorn" is an expression because can evoke <unicorn>. Still, it is not a symbol for the idea, because it is not the idea <unicorn>, but imagined/potential unicorns (animals) that both the word and the idea refer to. — Dfpolis

This is very confusing.
First, the word, "unicorn" does not just evoke <unicorn>, the word itself is evoked by <unicorn>. As I have been saying, words and ideas are both causes and effects of each other, and each carries information about each other.
Second, I have no idea what you mean by "imagined/potential unicorns". There is the word, "unicorn", pictures of unicorns, and the idea <unicorn> (a mental image of a unicorn), and the causal relationship between them. That's it. An imagined unicorn is just another name for the mental image of a unicorn.

While there are categories, <category> is not a fundamental concept. An instance is in a category because its objective nature, its intelligibility, is able to evoke the concept defining the category. If beagles were not able to evoke the concept <dog> they would not be categorized as dogs. So concepts are logically prior to categories -- and concepts refer to all of their potential instances, not just those that we have experienced or those that actually exist at any given time. — Dfpolis

This is just more confusing. This is just a bunch of unnecessary use of terms in a long-winded explanation.

There is just the causal relationship between some visual or auditory experience of the written or spoken word "unicorn", and a mental image of a unicorn. That relationship is your evocation - causal. And it happens in the opposite direction where mental images (ideas of unicorns) of unicorns cause/evoke the written word, or spoken sound, "unicorn. Concepts are mental categories, so it doesn't make sense to say that concepts are prior to categories.

Ideas are not things, but subjects thinking of things. Further, ideas are abstractions. The do not exhaust what we are thinking of. Since ideas are abstractions, they can leave individuating characteristics behind, and so the same idea can be evoked by many individuals. That is why many concepts are universal. — Dfpolis

All I am saying is that ideas have causal power. Does an idea of a unicorn exhaust a unicorn like the idea of a horse exhausts a horse? An idea of an imaginary thing does exhaust what that thing is because an imaginary thing only exists as imaginary, not also as real. There is nothing more to an imaginary object than what is imagined. But the idea of a unicorn (an imagined unicorn) has just as much causal power as an idea of a horse (an imagined horse). The difference is that there are no real unicorns to evoke the idea of unicorns. There are only pictures and words.

There is no distinction between what is ideas and what is matter if everything is different from each other. — Harry Hindu

This is a complete non sequitur, and I can't think of how you came to this conclusion. The fact that we have 100 different plastic toy cars does not mean that there is no difference between the idea of plastic and the idea of a toy car. — Dfpolis

No, that isn't an example of my restatement of your claim.
It would be more like we have 100 different things with no relationship at all. Everything would be made of a completely different element and with a different function. Using your explanation of "essences" and "existence" there is no possibility for the existence of categories.

Again, you said that animals and ideas have different essences because they can do different things. A goat can eat grass, but the idea of a goat can't. You also said that an essence is a specification of possible acts. This would mean that the idea of a horse and the idea of a unicorn have different essences because they both do different things. If they did the same thing, how would you know which one you were thinking of? So, not only do animals and ideas have different essences, different ideas have different essences too. So why place them in the category, "ideas"? Everything can't do everything different or else there could be no categories. There must be actions that things do that are similar for us to form categories.

We can imagine many things, but that does not make them exist. Grass that ate grass would have a different essence than actual grass. — Dfpolis

Can you please try to stay focused. That isn't what I asked. I don't think you're actually taking the time to read what I'm writing. You seem to only want to push your view.

Go back and read what I wrote. I was comparing two imaginary things, not imaginary grass and real grass. Go back to your definition of "essence". If two things do the same thing then they would have the same essence. Does the idea of grass eating grass have the same essence as the idea of a goat eating grass?

I explained it to deal with your misunderstanding my use of "essence," not to explain the difference between the concepts of materiality and intentionality, which I already explained in the OP. — Dfpolis

And I already went over this with you where you talked about how you change your intent and I pointed out how this is no different than how an apple changes color, but you didn't respond to it. Your intent, along with the apple's color changes as a result of prior causes. I am showing that their isn't a difference that you can explain coherently because there is no actual difference between what we call ideas and matter. It's all information.

Determinism alone does not eliminate the distinction between actual and potential. Even if the time-development of the universe were fully determined by its initial state at one time the present state was not the universe's actual state, but only a fully determined potential state. — Dfpolis

No, the present state is one of the universe's actual predetermined states.

I think you have this backward. Time is a measure of change, and change occurs because what was merely potential becomes actual. Determinism is irrelevant to the reality of change. — Dfpolis

Time is the stretching out of the causal relationships that make up the universe. A causal relationship is a change (cause and effect).

Dfpolis, thank you for the excellent post! — aporiap

You are welcome. I thank you for your thoughtful consideration and wish you and yours a joyful Christmas.

You explicitly state in the previous sentence the separation is [by substance?] mental. How would you categorize 'mental separation' if not as an ontological separation? — aporiap

The basis for logically distinct concepts need not be separate, or ontologically independent, objects. In looking at a ball, I might abstract <sphere> and <rubber> concepts without spheres existing separately from matter, or matter existing formlessly. Thus, by ontological separation, I mean existing independently or apart. By logical distinction, I mean having different notes of comprehension.

Further, while concepts may have, as their foundation in reality, the instances that can properly evoke them, they are not those instances. The concept <rubber> is not made of the sap of Hevea brasiliensis. Natural rubber typically its. So, generally, in contrasting logical and ontological I am contrasting concepts with their foundation in reality.

Finally, concepts are not things, but reified activities. <Rubber> is just a subject thinking of rubber.

1. Neurophysiological data processing cannot be the explanatory invariant of our awareness of contents. ....

Well I think this is a bit 'low resolution'/unspecific. It's definitively clear neurophysiological data alone isn't sufficient for awareness but that doesn't mean that a certain kind of neurophysiological processing is not sufficient - this is the bigger argument here. — aporiap

It is low resolution. My purpose was to convince the reader that we need more than mere "data processing" to explain awareness -- to open minds to the search for further factors.

In my book, I offer the following:

The missing-instruction argument shows that software cannot make a Turing machine conscious. If software-based con­­­scious is possible, there exists one or more programs complex enough to generate consciousness. Let’s take one with the fewest possible instructions, and remove an instruction that will not be used for, say, ten steps. Then the Turing machine will run the same as if the removed instruction were there for the first nine steps.

Start the machine and let it run five steps. Since the program is below minimum complexity, it is not conscious. Then stop the machine, put back the missing instruction, and let it continue. Even though it has not executed the instruction we replaced, the Turing machine is conscious for steps 6-9, because now it is complex enough. So, even though nothing the Turing machine actually does is any different with or without the instruction we removed and replaced, its mere presence makes the machine conscious.

This violates all ideas of causality. How can something that does nothing create consciousness by its mere presence? Not by any natural means – especially since its presence has no defined physical incarnation. The instruction could be on a disk, a punch card, or in semiconductor memory. So, the instruction can’t cause consciousness by a specific physical mech­anism. Its presence has to have an immaterial efficacy independent of its physical encoding.

One counterargument might be that the whole program needs to run before there is consciousness. That idea fails. Con­sciousness is continuous. What kind of consciousness is unaware the entire time contents are being proces­sed, but becomes aware when processing has terminated? None.

Perhaps the program has a loop that has to be run though a certain number of times for consciousness to occur. If that is the case, take the same program and load it with one change – set the machine to the state it will have after the requisite number of iterations. Now we need not run through the loop to get to the con­scious state. We then remove an instruction further into the loop just as we did in the original example. Once again, the presence of an inoperative instruction creates consciousness. — Dennis F. Polis -- God, Sceince and Mind, p. 196

Thus, we can eliminate data processing, no matter how complex, as a cause of consciousness.

John Searle points us in a different direction, suggesting that it may not be abstract, but embodied, data processing that gives rise to consciousness. In other words, that some cryptic property of the physical brain, and not its mere data processing, causes consciousness. I am happy to agree that consciousness is unexpectedly (from the perspective of physics) found in humans. Still, the claim of emergence from cryptic (aka "occult") properties of matter is not an explanation, but a belief.

In natural science care what Ptolemy, Brahe, Galileo, and Hubble saw, not the act by which the intelligibility of what they saw became actually known. Thus, natural science is, by design, bereft of data and concepts relating to the knowing subject and her acts of awareness....

I don't think the first sentence ... leads to the conclusion in the second sentence.

Empiricism starts with defining a phenomenon -any phenomenon. Phemonema can be mental or physical or can even be some interaction between mental and physical ... — aporiap

I have no problem with empiricism. I see the role of philosophy as providing a consistent framework for understanding of all human experience. My observation is directed specifically at natural science, which I think is rightly described as focused on physical objects, or if you prefer, physical phenomena.

Aristotle, who I think has made as much progress as anyone on understanding the nature of consciousness, based his work on experience, but treated our experience as subjects on an equally footing with our experience of physical objects.

So connections are in fact being attempted between what's traditionally been considered a 'mental field' e.g. psychology and 'physical' fields e.g. biophysics. — aporiap

Yes, they have. I am not disputing this, nor do I have a problem with holistic explanation. I am merely pointing out that physicalist approaches, and those naturalistic approaches founded on physicalism or materialism, are logically incapable of explaining consciousness, and that, as a consequence, the "Hard Problem" is a chimera.

To be orthogonal is to be completely independent of the other [for one to not be able to directly influence the other]. — aporiap

That is not what I explained that I mean by concepts being orthogonal. I explicitly said, "... logically orthogonal. That is to say, that,though they co-occur and interact, they do not share essential, defining notes." Having non-overlapping sets of defining notes makes concepts orthogonal -- not the consideration of interactions in their instances, which is a contingent matter to be resolved by reflecting on experience.

Concepts are abstractions and do not "interact." All that concepts do (their whole being) is refer to their actual and potential instances. Still, it is clear to all but the most obdurate ideologues, that intentionality can inform material states. Whenever we voice a concept, when we speak of our intentions, our speech acts are informed by intentional states. Conversely, in our awareness of sensory contents, material states inform the resulting intentional states. So, the fact that intentional and material abstractions are orthogonal does not prevnt material and intentional states from interacting.

What reflecting on the orthogonality of materiality and intentionality does, is force us to look for bridging dynamics. Whatever dynamics allows intentions to inform material states, in describing it, we must employ both material and intentional concepts. Whatever dynamics allows material states to inform our consciousness, in describing it, we also must employ both material and intentional concepts. If we did not, then there would be no "middle terms," no connections, leading us from one kind of state to another.

... the fact that this is a unidirectional interaction [i.e. that only physical objects can result in changes to mental states and not the other way around without some sort of physical mediator] gives serious reason to doubt an fundamentality to the mental field - at least to me it's clear its an emergent phenomenon out of fundamental material interactions. — aporiap

This misses the fact that intentional states do inform material states. That we are writing about and discussing intentionality shows that intentional states can modify physical objects (texts, pressure waves, etc.)

Think of the intention to go to the store. The resulting process is unlike a ballistic trajectory, which is fully determined by the initial physical state and the laws of nature. I go to the garage, and find my car will not start. This was unknown at decision time, and so can't be part of my initial state, but, if I am commited, I will find other means. I planned on a certain route, encoded in my initial state, but as I turn the corner, I find my way blocked by construction. I find an alternate route to effect my intended end. In all of this, the explanatory invariant (which can revealed by controlled experiments) is not my initial physical state, but my intended final state. Clearly, intentional states can produce physical events.

I'm unsure why intentions [my understanding of what you mean by intention is: the object of a mental act - judgement, perception, etc] are always considered without parts. I think, for example, a 'hope' is deconstruct-able, and [at least partly] composed of a valence component, an cognitive attitude of anticipation, a 'desire' or 'wanting' for a certain end to come about, the 'state of affairs' that defines the 'end'. and sometimes a feeling of 'confidence'. I can also imagine how this is biophysically instantiated [i.e. this intentional state is defined by a circuit interaction between certain parts of the reward system, cognitive system, and memory system]. So what you have is some emergent state [the mental state] composed of interacting elements. — aporiap

To say that intentions have "no parts outside of parts" does not mean that they are simple (unanalyzable). It means that they do not have one part here and another part there (outside of "here"). My intention to to go to the store is analyzable, say, into a commitment and a target of commitment (what if is about, viz. arriving at the store.) But, my commitment and the specification of my commitment are not in different places and so are not parts outside of other parts.

Of course my intention to go to the store has biophysical support. My claim is that its biophysical support alone is inadequate to fully explain it.

First, as explained in the scenario above, the invariance of the intended end in the face of physical obstacles shows that this is not a case covered by the usual paradigm of physical explanation -- one in which an initial state evolves deterministically under the laws of nature. Unlike a cannon ball, I do not stop when I encounter an obstacle. I find, or at least search for, other means. What remains constant is not the sum of my potential and kine

Second, you are assuming, without making a case, that many of the factors you mention are purely biophysical. How is the "valance component," as subjective value, grounded in biophysics? Especially when biophysics is solely concerned with objective phenomena? Again to have a "cognitive attitude" (as opposed to a neural data representation) requires that we actualize the intelligibility latent in the representation. What biophysical process is capable of making what was merely intelligible actually known -- especially given that knowledge is a subject-object relation and biophysics has no <subject> concept in its conceptual space?

Third, how is a circuit interaction, which is fully specified by the circuit's configuration and dynamics, "about" anything? Since it is not, it cannot be the explanation of an intentional state.

I'm still forming my thoughts on this and this part of your post but I'll give you a response when I think of one. — aporiap

I await your reflections.

First, the word, "unicorn" does not just evoke <unicorn>, the word itself is evoked by <unicorn>. As I have been saying, words and ideas are both causes and effects of each other, and each carries information about each other. — Harry Hindu

The word is indeed evoked by the idea in the author of a locution, but it must evoke the idea in the recipient if the locution is to communicate. If I look at the word "unicorn," and have no idea what a unicorn is, the string cannot signify unicorns to me. That is why unknown languages are meaningless to us -- because they are incapable of evoking the ideas their authors intended in us.

Second, I have no idea what you mean by "imagined/potential unicorns". There is the word, "unicorn", pictures of unicorns, and the idea <unicorn> (a mental image of a unicorn), and the causal relationship between them. That's it. An imagined unicorn is just another name for the mental image of a unicorn. — Harry Hindu

Universal ideas do not just apply to actual instances but to any potential instance we may encounter in the future. Even if you believe unicorns are impossible, you still want the idea <unicorn> to apply to imagined unicorns.

Ideas are not images. First, some ideas are too abstract to be imagined. What is the image of <indenumerable infinity> or of <existence>? How could we have an image of indenumerable infinity using a finite number of neurons? Second, ideas are indeterminate, while images are determinate. Is the idea <human> black, Caucasian or Asian; male or female; old or young; tall or short? None, of course, but any image will have definite characteristics.

An imagined unicorn is not the mental image of a unicorn, which is an image, not a unicorn, but a mental image thought of as existing.

While there are categories, <category> is not a fundamental concept. An instance is in a category because its objective nature, its intelligibility, is able to evoke the concept defining the category. If beagles were not able to evoke the concept <dog> they would not be categorized as dogs. So concepts are logically prior to categories -- and concepts refer to all of their potential instances, not just those that we have experienced or those that actually exist at any given time. — Dfpolis

This is just more confusing. This is just a bunch of unnecessary use of terms in a long-winded explanation. — Harry Hindu

The point is that categories are based on concepts and concepts are based on objective intelligibility being actualized by minds. So, appealing to categories does not avoid dependence on mental concepts.

All I am saying is that ideas have causal power. — Harry Hindu

I accept that.

Does an idea of a unicorn exhaust a unicorn like the idea of a horse exhausts a horse? — Harry Hindu

As unicorns don't exist, all that there is to a unicorn is what we imagine it to be. Horses, on the other hand are real, and can be studied. Over time we learn more, and it is always possible to to be surprised. So our idea <horse> does not exhaust the reality of horses.

No, that isn't an example of my restatement of your claim.
It would be more like we have 100 different things with no relationship at all. Everything would be made of a completely different element and with a different function. Using your explanation of "essences" and "existence" there is no possibility for the existence of categories. — Harry Hindu

I still don't understand your reasoning. Categories are based on common notes of intelligibility in their instances. All instances of materiality are extended and changeable. All instances of intentionality are about something.

This would mean that the idea of a horse and the idea of a unicorn have different essences because they both do different things. — Harry Hindu

Of course. The idea of a horse is not the idea of a unicorn. Still, both are ideas -- are about something -- and so are intentional realities.

So why place them in the category, "ideas"? — Harry Hindu

Because they have something (not everything) in common: their whole being, all they can do, is refer.

Can you please try to stay focused. That isn't what I asked. I don't think you're actually taking the time to read what I'm writing. You seem to only want to push your view. — Harry Hindu

I am doing my best to understand what you are saying. This should be clear from the time I spend responding to each point you make.

If two things do the same thing then they would have the same essence. Does the idea of grass eating grass have the same essence as the idea of a goat eating grass? — Harry Hindu

They would not have the same essence unless the full specification of their possible acts is the same. The fact that they share some powers is not enough. So, no, the idea grass eating grass would not have the same essence as the idea of a goat eating grass. While both are ideas because all they can do is refer, what they refer to is different. So they can't both perform the same act (refer to a goat eating grass).

And I already went over this with you where you talked about how you change your intent and I pointed out how this is no different than how an apple changes color, but you didn't respond to it. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I know. I did not respond, because I did not understand how it helped you. Say an apple changes color from green to red. The principle of continuity, what remains the same, is the apple, not the color. One color ceases to be, and the other comes to be. In the same way, if I change my intent, I, the intending subject remains, but my old intent ceases to be and my new intent comes to be. The principle of excluded middle allows no continuity between willing to go and not willing to go, or between no being red and being red.

On the other hand, matter is, itself, a principle of continuity. The mass before a physical transformation is the mass after the transformation. So, I don't see how this helps you.

No, the present state is one of the universe's actual predetermined states. — Harry Hindu

Being actually predetermined is not the same as actually existing.

I think you have this backward. Time is a measure of change, and change occurs because what was merely potential becomes actual. Determinism is irrelevant to the reality of change. — Dfpolis

Time is the stretching out of the causal relationships that make up the universe. A causal relationship is a change (cause and effect). — Harry Hindu

I have no idea what "Time is the stretching out of the causal relationships that make up the universe," means. I have a very good idea of what "Time is the measure of change according to before and after means." We have no power to stretch causal relations. We do have the power to measure change.

The word is indeed evoked by the idea in the author of a locution, but it must evoke the idea in the recipient if the locution is to communicate. If I look at the word "unicorn," and have no idea what a unicorn is, the string cannot signify unicorns to me. That is why unknown languages are meaningless to us -- because they are incapable of evoking the ideas their authors intended in us. — Dfpolis

Sure, but that isn't to say that the author never had any intent to write anything down. Those words still mean what the author intended even if no one ever reads what he wrote. The same goes with everything else ("material things" as you call them). Just because some effect isn't noticed, or part of some awareness, doesn't mean that the cause never happened. You are basically saying that meaning only arises in the relationship between matter and ideas. I'm saying there is no distinction that you have been able to coherently show between them and that they are both causal and can establish the same kind of relationships - meaningful/causal. Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect.

Ideas are not images. First, some ideas are to abstract to be imagined. What is the image of <indenumerable infinity> or of <existence>? How could we have an image of indenumerable infinity using a finite number of neurons? — Dfpolis

If they can't be imagined, then how do you know what they mean? How do you know that you're thinking of <indenumerable infinity> or of <existence> if they don't have any imagery that the words refer to? How do you distinguish between <indenumerable infinity> and <existence> in your mind (other than seeing the words on a screen)?

Second, ideas are indeterminate, while images are determinate. Is the idea <human> black, Caucasian or Asian; male or female; old or young; tall or short? None, of course, but any image will have definite characteristics. — Dfpolis

Again, if words don't refer to some mental image, then what do they refer to? When the word "human" crops up in my mind, humans that look like me crop up in my mind (Caucasian, white middle-aged male, or maybe a fine-looking woman depending on my mood), and I'm sure it's similar for others. What a words evokes in some mind is what that mind has most of it's experiences with. Again, how could you know that you are thinking <human> instead of <unicorn> if there isn't some mental imagery happening that those scribbles refer to?

An imagined unicorn is not the mental image of a unicorn, which is an image, not a unicorn, but a mental image thought of as existing. — Dfpolis

This is so confusing. I think your problem is that you are over-complicating things. Yeah, a mental image of a unicorn is not a unicorn, but then what does the scribbles, "unicorn" refer to? You have used this string of scribbles, "unicorn" over and over while claiming that unicorns don't exist. Then what do you mean when you use those scribbles? You keep contradicting yourself saying that unicorns don't exist yet you keep using the word to refer to something. What is it? If "unicorn" refers to an image of a unicorn, then the image of a unicorn is a "unicorn".

As unicorns don't exist, all that there is to a unicorn is what we imagine it to be. — Dfpolis

Another contradiction! Unicorns don't exist, yet all there is to a unicorn is what we imagine! Then unicorns exist as what we imagine (mental imagery). What does your unicorn look like? How do you know you're thinking of a unicorn? Please answer that question and the previous one about how you distinguish between indenumerable infinity and existence in your mind. How do you know you're thinking of one as opposed to the other? How do you know what those strings of symbols mean?

The point is that categories are based on concepts and concepts are based on objective intelligibility being actualized by minds. So, appealing to categories does not avoid dependence on mental concepts. — Dfpolis

Actually, I'd go so far as to say that categories only exist in minds. Therefore the only kind of category is a mental category, (or a concept).

So why place them in the category, "ideas"? — Harry Hindu

Because they have something (not everything) in common: their whole being, all they can do, is refer. — Dfpolis

And so can matter. I already went over this. Effects refer to their causes and effects can be "material" or "intentional". The tree rings refer to the age of the tree because of how the tree grows, and the tree rings will mean the age of the tree even if no one comes along to see them. The tree stump and its rings still exists. It still reflects light, even if their are no eyes to capture that reflected light. That reflected light could make other things happen - material things - without ever encountering a mind to branch off the causal path into new directions.

So you have yet to explain the difference between "matter" and "ideas". Everything you say that an idea can do, I can say that matter does as well. They both establish causal relationships. They both refer to their causes. Is there anything else that you can think of that would distinguish between "matter" and "ideas"? I'm willing to be that you can't because it is a false dichotomy.

And I already went over this with you where you talked about how you change your intent and I pointed out how this is no different than how an apple changes color, but you didn't respond to it. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I know. I did not respond, because I did not understand how it helped you. Say an apple changes color from green to red. The principle of continuity, what remains the same, is the apple, not the color. One color ceases to be, and the other comes to be. In the same way, if I change my intent, I, the intending subject remains, but my old intent ceases to be and my new intent comes to be. The principle of excluded middle allows no continuity between willing to go and not willing to go, or between no being red and being red. — Dfpolis

You obviously didn't understand my point if you didn't understand how it helped me. You actually just proved my point here. Your intent is the same as the color. You are the same as the apple. In other words you are no different than an apple (you are both constants that change), and intent is no different than the color (what changes). So again, how are intents different than matter if in both cases there is a constant and something that changes?

You have failed in making any coherent distinction between what is "matter" and "ideas".

Being actually predetermined is not the same as actually existing. — Dfpolis

Sure it is. It is your perception of time that makes you see the future as something that doesn't exist yet.

I have no idea what "Time is the stretching out of the causal relationships that make up the universe," means. I have a very good idea of what "Time is the measure of change according to before and after means." We have no power to stretch causal relations. We do have the power to measure change. — Dfpolis

I explained this already when I spoke about how our minds operate at a certain frequency of change relative to the other processes of the universe. Your mind stretches those causal relationships. The speed at which you experience the world is dependent upon your conscious state. Lethargic lizards experience the world as a blur, where the causal relationships are blurred together. When they warm up, those causal relationships stretch into something more discernible (causes and their effects).

Hi DfPolis -- I'm going to break my response up into parts since it's grown quite long already

You are welcome. I thank you for your thoughtful consideration and wish you and yours a joyful Christmas.

Thanks! Can't believe it's already over.

The basis for logically distinct concepts need not be separate, or ontologically independent, objects. In looking at a ball, I might abstract <sphere> and <rubber> concepts without spheres existing separately from matter, or matter existing formlessly. Thus, by ontological separation, I mean existing independently or apart. By logical distinction, I mean having different notes of comprehension.

Further, while concepts may have, as their foundation in reality, the instances that can properly evoke them, they are not those instances. The concept <rubber> is not made of the sap of Hevea brasiliensis. Natural rubber typically its. So, generally, in contrasting logical and ontological I am contrasting concepts with their foundation in reality.

Finally, concepts are not things, but reified activities. <Rubber> is just a subject thinking of rubber.

Okay the last sentence is what really clears it up. This sounds like nominalism, is that correct?

It is low resolution. My purpose was to convince the reader that we need more than mere "data processing" to explain awareness -- to open minds to the search for further factors.


In my book, I offer the following:
The missing-instruction argument shows that software cannot make a Turing machine conscious. If software-based con­­­scious is possible, there exists one or more programs complex enough to generate consciousness. Let’s take one with the fewest possible instructions, and remove an instruction that will not be used for, say, ten steps. Then the Turing machine will run the same as if the removed instruction were there for the first nine steps.

Start the machine and let it run five steps. Since the program is below minimum complexity, it is not conscious. Then stop the machine, put back the missing instruction, and let it continue. Even though it has not executed the instruction we replaced, the Turing machine is conscious for steps 6-9, because now it is complex enough. So, even though nothing the Turing machine actually does is any different with or without the instruction we removed and replaced, its mere presence makes the machine conscious.

This violates all ideas of causality. How can something that does nothing create consciousness by its mere presence? Not by any natural means – especially since its presence has no defined physical incarnation. The instruction could be on a disk, a punch card, or in semiconductor memory. So, the instruction can’t cause consciousness by a specific physical mech­anism. Its presence has to have an immaterial efficacy independent of its physical encoding.

One counterargument might be that the whole program needs to run before there is consciousness. That idea fails. Con­sciousness is continuous. What kind of consciousness is unaware the entire time contents are being proces­sed, but becomes aware when processing has terminated? None.

Perhaps the program has a loop that has to be run though a certain number of times for consciousness to occur. If that is the case, take the same program and load it with one change – set the machine to the state it will have after the requisite number of iterations. Now we need not run through the loop to get to the con­scious state. We then remove an instruction further into the loop just as we did in the original example. Once again, the presence of an inoperative instruction creates consciousness.
— Dennis F. Polis -- God, Sceince and Mind, p. 196

Thus, we can eliminate data processing, no matter how complex, as a cause of consciousness.

There are a some things I have issue with the missing instruction argument:

1. Why would the program not be conscious when running the first 5 steps of the algorithm? Why not it simply loose consciousness when the program has reached the missing instruction in the same way a computer program freezes if there is an error in a line of the code and simply resume running once the code is fixed?

If you say it's because it's simply not complex enough to be conscious because it is missing that line of code or that rule then there are two issues here --

(i.) The way this scenario is construed makes an issue for any kind of binary descriptor of a continually running algorithm [e.g. any sort of game, any sort of artificial sensor, any sort of continually looping program] not just specifically for ascribing consciousness to an algorithm. Eg. Say you call this algorithm an 'atmospheric sampler'. Say you take one instruction out now it is no longer an atmospheric sampler algorithm because it cannot sample, let it run until after the instructional code, now repair the instruction and it has become an atmospheric sampler seemingly a-causally.

(ii.) The implicit assumption is that the complexity of an algorithm is what generates consciousness and that complexity is reduced by reducing the number of instructions. But this is not necessarily true:
a. It could be that an algorithm with a particular set of instructions, by virtue of simply running, generates consciousness. In this scenario you could get consciousness even by removing one of the instructions. The algorithm would still be conscious and run until it reaches the missing instruction upon which it would stop running and consciousness would cease, upon replacing the missing instruction the algorithm could resume and consciousness would be restored because the program is now active again. b. Instead of complexity depending on the number of instructions, it could instead depend on the relationships between instructions. Say, for example, there is an algorithm in which a later instruction calls upon a previous instruction. There could be some web of feedback and feed forward connections which causally link instructions that are not immediately adjacent to each other. This scenario would provide the necessary causal power to missing instructions


2. This assumes data processing can only happen in a turing machine like manner -- singular program running through a series of sequential steps. The brain apparently does not have this organization and runs, to my understanding, via large numbers of coordinated parallel processing units in a hierarchical arrangement with feedback connections and other complicated circuit connections. This would make the analogy not necessarily work as you now have to take into account sets of parallel [not in series] processors or 'turing machines' which interact with each other in a way that may not be clearly characterized in a series of sequential deterministic steps.. Perhaps this is why say, a neuron, which is a single processing unit is not capable of consciousness whereas a conglomerate of neurons is.

I have no problem with empiricism. I see the role of philosophy as providing a consistent framework for understanding of all human experience. My observation is directed specifically at natural science, which I think is rightly described as focused on physical objects, or if you prefer, physical phenomena.

Aristotle, who I think has made as much progress as anyone on understanding the nature of consciousness, based his work on experience, but treated our experience as subjects on an equally footing with our experience of physical objects.

Why make the dichotomy between "natural" and "psychological" objects? I think psychological constructs that are well defined and have some clear physiological correlates [e.g. reward system and valence - limbic system; awareness - reticular activating system] are fair game for being considered 'natural phenomena'. I don't think there has to necessarily be a hard dichotomy. Besides, even in the physical sciences we don't have access to 'things in themselves' anyway, 'electron', 'proton' are known by virtue of the effect of their intrinsic properties on measurement devices and not by actually physically observing them. I feel this is analogous to the way in which we can't observe 'pleasure' or 'pain'. Of course those constructs are simply less well defined and less concrete, but -in the same way the atomic model was refined after more fine-grained experimentation- the psychological ones I feel can come somewhat closer to that in time. The point is that these fall within the range of natural objects albeit of a lesser degree as opposed to something wholly different so as to involve a completely different way of knowing or learning about them.

I am sorry, I do not understand this, as it seems to me that symmetry is as much a datum as asymmetry. A priori, we could have either. — Dfpolis

So a datum (asymmetry or symmetry) is epistemically and ontically foundational?

What is interesting is the ''hard'' in The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Why didn't Chamlers use ''impossible''?

It seems that Chamlers was aware and wanted to convey to his readers that an explanation of consciousness was/is nonexistent but couldn't rule out one in the future.

Are you taking this a step further and claiming this is the IMPOSSIBLE problem of consciousness?

If you are can you clarify further. Thanks.

Those words still mean what the author intended even if no one ever reads what he wrote — Harry Hindu

Yes, they do, but that only supports my point that intent is logically prior to expression. They have meaning only because they express their authors intent. Yet, when the author is gone and her language forgotten, the meaning of her words is only latent and will remain so unless and until someone is able to decode her language

Just because some effect isn't noticed, or part of some awareness, doesn't mean that the cause never happened. — Harry Hindu

I agree completely. I never claimed otherwise.

You are basically saying that meaning only arises in the relationship between matter and ideas. I'm saying there is no distinction that you have been able to coherently show between them and that they are both causal and can establish the same kind of relationships - meaningful/causal. Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. — Harry Hindu

You are confusing potential meaning, intelligibility, which is found in matter, with actual meaning, which is found only in minds.

I explained in the OP how matter and ideas differ. That both can cause effects only means that they both exists. To make your case, you must show that they cause the same kinds of effects. They do not. Ideas are formal signs and can do only one thing -- refer to their real, potential or imagined objects. Matter does many things, but intrinsically, it does not refer to anything. Of course, we can use it as evidence for its causes, but to be actual evidence minds have to understand its causal relations. So any actual meaning matter has depends on the extrinsic factor of a mind actualizing its intelligibility.

If they can't be imagined, then how do you know what they mean? How do you know that you're thinking of <indenumerable infinity> or of <existence> if they don't have any imagery that the words refer to? How do you distinguish between <indenumerable infinity> and <existence> in your mind (other than seeing the words on a screen)? — Harry Hindu

I know the meaning of abstract concepts because I grasp the notes of comprehension that define them. I may think of, or even imagine, examples, but the examples are not the meaning. I understand <indenumerable> as ruling out countability -- counting has no power to exhaust what is indenumerable. I understand <infinite> as denying limits. I understand <existence> as reflecting the power to act in some way -- but as <existence> places no limit on the kind of act, it cannot be imagined, even though I can imagine specific things doing specific acts.

Again, if words don't refer to some mental image, then what do they refer to? — Harry Hindu

Words refer to any object able to properly evoke the idea they express. "Human" refers to any being that, when encountered, can properly evoke the idea <human>. "Properly" carries a lot of weight here, but it is easy to define. An instance can properly evoke an idea if its notes of intelligibility (what can be known about it) correspond to the notes of comprehension defining the idea.

Again, yes, we typically think of an example when we think of concepts, but the example will always have specific characteristics ("accidents") not found in the concept. So, the example is not the concept.

I think your problem is that you are over-complicating things. — Harry Hindu

My problem is that I'm doing philosophy where small errors can quickly grow into ludicrous positions. So, I have to be very precise.

what does the scribbles, "unicorn" refer to? — Harry Hindu

As I said, the image thought of as existing. Harry Potter does not exist, but when we talk about him, we think of him as though he did exist. Aristotle called this "the willing suspension of disbelief."

Another contradiction! Unicorns don't exist, yet all there is to a unicorn is what we imagine! — Harry Hindu

This is not a contradiction if you accept what I said about the image thought of as existing.

What does your unicorn look like? How do you know you're thinking of a unicorn? — Harry Hindu

The minimalist idea of a unicorn is a horse with a horn between its eyes. In my imagination they are small, white, and have a spiral on the horn. Still, if an author wished to write of a variant on this, I would take no exception.

How do you know what those strings of symbols mean? — Harry Hindu

The meanings of word strings is defined by a shared social convention that we learn.

Actually, I'd go so far as to say that categories only exist in minds. Therefore the only kind of category is a mental category, (or a concept). — Harry Hindu

I would agree as long as you admit that universal ideas have a foundation in reality. E.g. each homo sapiens has the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>.

So why place them in the category, "ideas"? — Harry Hindu

Because they have something (not everything) in common: their whole being, all they can do, is refer. — Dfpolis

And so can matter. I already went over this. — Harry Hindu

And I already explained that potential reference is not actual reference.

So you have yet to explain the difference between "matter" and "ideas". — Harry Hindu

As we are making no progress, this should be our last exchange on this topic.

how are intents different than matter if in both cases there is a constant and something that changes? — Harry Hindu

Again, because when material objects change, what remains unchanged is their matter. When intentions change, they do not remain through the change. The old one ceases to be and the new one comes to be.

Being actually predetermined is not the same as actually existing. — Dfpolis

Sure it is. It is your perception of time that makes you see the future as something that doesn't exist yet. — Harry Hindu

Baloney! It may be predetermined that rain will fall in the desert. That will not prevent dying of thirst as actual rain can.

Your mind stretches those causal relationships — Harry Hindu

I understand that this is your belief. I also understand that sometimes "time flies" and other times it seems to crawl. I do not see that this tells us anything about the objective nature of time.

This sounds like nominalism, is that correct? — aporiap

It is Moderate Realism, which sees universal concepts grounded in the objective character of their actual and potential instances rather than in Platonic Ideas or Neoplatonic Exemplars. Nominalism and conceptualism see universals as categories arbitrarily imposed by individual fiat or social convention.

1.

Why would the program not be conscious when running the first 5 steps of the algorithm? — aporiap

If we assume that consciousness is the result of the mere presence of all the steps, then it will not be conscious for 1-5 because the minimum complexity is absent. On the other hand, if we think consciousness is a consequence of running the instructions, it can't be either. Why? Because if running only a few steps elicited consciousness, then the program we started with would not be the shortest possible, since the few steps (1-5) we ran to elicit consciousness would be shorter.

Why not it simply loose consciousness when the program has reached the missing instruction in the same way a computer program freezes if there is an error in a line of the code and simply resume running once the code is fixed? — aporiap

The program does not run into the missing instruction. It is halted and the instruction removed, then later replaced before it is executed.

The way this scenario is construed makes an issue for any kind of binary descriptor of a continually running algorithm [e.g. any sort of game, any sort of artificial sensor, any sort of continually looping program] not just specifically for ascribing consciousness to an algorithm. Eg. Say you call this algorithm an 'atmospheric sampler'. Say you take one instruction out now it is no longer an atmospheric sampler algorithm because it cannot sample, let it run until after the instructional code, now repair the instruction and it has become an atmospheric sampler seemingly a-causally. — aporiap

No. Notice that we run all the original instructions. Any program that simply runs an algorithm runs it completely. So, your 'atmospheric sampler' program does everything needed to complete its computation.

The problem is, we have no reason to assume that the generation of consciousness is algorithmic. Algorithms solve mathematical problems -- ones that can be presented by measured values or numerically encoded relations. We have no such representation of consciousness. Also, data processing operates on representations of reality, it does not operate on the reality represented. So, even if we had a representation of consciousness, we would not have consciousness.

In the computational theory of mind, consciousness is supposed to be an emergent phenomenon resulting from sufficiently complex data processing of the right sort. This emergence could be a result of actually running the program, or it could be the result of the mere presence of the code. If it is a result of running the program, it can't be the result of running only a part of the program, for if the part we ran caused consciousness, then it would be a shorter program, contradicting our assumption. So, consciousness can only occur once the program has completed -- but then it is not running, which means that an inoperative program is causes consciousness.

We are left with the far less likely scenario in which the mere presence of the code, running or not, causes consciousness. First, the presence of inoperative code is not data processing, but the specification of data processing. Second, because the code can be embodied in any number of ways, the means by which it effects consciousness cannot be physical. But, if it can't be physical, and it's not data processing, what is is the supposed cause?

The implicit assumption is that the complexity of an algorithm is what generates consciousness and that complexity is reduced by reducing the number of instructions. — aporiap

The general assumption among supporters of the computational theory is that complexity is required. I never found that assumption cogent, and do not make it myself. The argument does not relate program length to complexity. It only notes that if there is a Turing programs able to generate consciousness, one or more of them must be of minimal length. Whether is tis complex or simple is irrelevant to the argument.

This assumes data processing can only happen in a turing machine like manner — aporiap

No, not at all. It only depends on the theorem that all finite state machines can be represented by Turing machines. If we are dealing with data processing per se, the Turing model is an adequate representation. If we need more than the Turing machine model, we are not dealing with data processing alone, but with some physical property of the machine.

I agree that the brain uses parallel processing, and might not be representable as a finite state machine. Since it is continually "rewiring" itself, its number of states may change over time, and since its processing is not digital, its states may be more continuous than discrete. So, I am not arguing that the brain is a finite state machine. I am arguing against those who so model it in the computational theory of mind.

Perhaps this is why say, a neuron, which is a single processing unit is not capable of consciousness whereas a conglomerate of neurons is. — aporiap

This assumes facts not in evidence. David Chalmers calls this the "Hard Problem" because not only do we have no model in which a conglomerate of neurons operate to produce consciousness, but we have no progress toward such a model. Daniel Dennett argues at length in Consciousness Explained that no naturalistic model of consciousness is possible.

It is also clear that a single physical state can be the basis for more than one intentional state at the same time. For example, the same neural representation encodes both my seeing the cat and the cat modifying my retinal state.

Why make the dichotomy between "natural" and "psychological" objects? — aporiap

"Dichotomy" implies a clean cut, an either-or. I am not doing that. I see the mind, and the psychology that describes it, as involving two interacting subsystems: a neurophysical data processing subsystem (the brain) and an intentional subsystem which is informed by, and exerts a degree of control over, it (intellect and will). Both subsystems are fully natural.

There is, however, a polarity between objects and the subjects that are aware of them.

even in the physical sciences we don't have access to 'things in themselves' anyway, — aporiap

Please rethink this. Kant was bullheaded in his opposition to Hume's thesis that there is no intrinsic necessity to time ordered causality. As a result he sent philosophy off on a tangent from which it is yet to fully recover.

The object being known by the subject is identically the subject knowing the object. As a result of this identity there is no room for any "epistic gap." Phenomena are not separate from noumena. They are the means by which noumena reveal themselves to us.

We have access to reality. If we did not, nothing could affect us. It is just that our access is limited. All human knowledge consists in projections (dimensionally diminished mappings) of reality. We know that the object can do what it is doing to us. We do not know all the other things it can do.

We observe everything by its effects. It is just that some observations are more mediated than others.

The point is that these fall within the range of natural objects albeit of a lesser degree as opposed to something wholly different so as to involve a completely different way of knowing or learning about them. — aporiap

This is very confused. People have learn about themselves by experiencing their own subjectivity from time immemorial. How doe we know we are conscious? Surely not by observations of our physical effects. Rather we know our subjective powers because we experience ourselves knowing, willing, hoping, believing and so on.

So a datum (asymmetry or symmetry) is epistemically and ontically foundational? — Galuchat

Data are the given that we seek to understand. As given they are irreducible and so fundamental. Since things a given when we interact with them they are ontologically prior to being given. Still as far as thought goes, things have to be given before we can reflect on them.

What is interesting is the ''hard'' in The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Why didn't Chamlers use ''impossible''? — TheMadFool

Because he do not understand the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science and its implications.

Are you taking this a step further and claiming this is the IMPOSSIBLE problem of consciousness? — TheMadFool

Yes. I am not saying that we cannot understand consciousness, only that to do so requires primitive concepts that were projected out of natural science when it left our experience as knowing subjects on the table to fix attention on known physical objects.

There is nothing "spooky" or unnatural about being a knowing subject. It is just logically distinct from being a known object and so beyond the scope of concepts that apply only to reality as objective.

Thank you for the clarification.

If I understand you correctly, you mean the observer by ''knowing subject'' and you consider it different from the observed - the ''known subject''.

Why?

What other concept makes you feel that way? If I understand you correctly you don't consider material (scientific) explanations adequate to explain the ''knowing subject''.

Why and how is the ''knowing subject'' different from the ''known subject''?

Sorry if I'm bothersome but I'd like to know why that's the case. Thanks.

Cheers!

Please rethink this. Kant was bullheaded in his opposition to Hume's thesis that there is no intrinsic necessity to time ordered causality. As a result he sent philosophy off on a tangent from which it is yet to fully recover. — Dfpolis

Been following your dialogue from the beginning, finding nothing worth bitchin’ about, instead finding your novel approach interesting. But I have to ask......what is your idea of Hume’s thesis that Kant was bullheaded about, with respect to “time-ordered causality”?

I’d guess A.) you’re talking about the effect on our knowledge of a thing being antecedent to the causality of the thing’s impression given to us by sense, or, B.) you’re talking about the simultaneity of the external impression on sense and the internal knowledge of the object so impressing.

I shall add myself to the “sorry if I’m bothersome” group and say thanks as well.

If I understand you correctly, you mean the observer by ''knowing subject'' and you consider it different from the observed - the ''known subject''.

Why? — TheMadFool

Because, as Aristotle points out in De Anima iii, in the act of coming to know sensible objects, the knower acts as an agent, while the known is a patient. Before we come to know the object. it is intelligible, but not actually understood. We are capable of being informed, but not actually informed (wrt the object). When we turn our attention to the sensory representation, both of these potencies are actualized by a single act.

Since the object has only the potential to operated in the logical order, it is not yet operational, and so cannot operate to make itself known. Nor, for that matter, can our capacity to be informed (nous pathetikos = passive intellect). Still, there is an aspect of the subject, which Aristotle calls nous poiētikos (the agent intellect), which is operative and so capable of actualizing both potencies. If there were not, intelligibility could not become actually known, and we could not become actually informed.

If one reflects on the phenomenology, it is easy to identify the agent intellect with our awareness, for it is by turning our awareness to various objects that we come to know them.

Thus, subjects and their sensible objects are distinct and related as agent and patient.

What other concept makes you feel that way? If I understand you correctly you don't consider material (scientific) explanations adequate to explain the ''knowing subject''. — TheMadFool

You understand me correctly. Feelings are irrelevant to deciding such abstract questions. They are to be resolved by logical analysis -- which begins by noting that every instance of actual knowledge requires a knowing subject and a known object.

Why and how is the ''knowing subject'' different from the ''known subject''? — TheMadFool

I wrote "knowing subject" to make role of the subject in the subject-object relation of knowing clear. Of course, we also know the operation of the subject, or we could not discuss it.

Contrary to Gilbert Ryle's claim in the Concept of Mind, we know ourselves by introspection. How is this possible? Because every act of knowing is informative not only of its primary, typically sensible, object, but of ourselves as subjects. Let us call the known sensible thing the "objective object" and ourselves, as known concomitantly, the "subjective object." If I am aware of seeing a ball, the objective object is the ball, but the act of knowing the ball is replete with information about myself as subject. I am informed that I can see, that I can know sensible objects, etc. The powers so known are aspects of myself as subject and, jointly, these powers constitute the subjective object in seeing the ball.

No honest question needs an apology. Thank you for your interest.

what is your idea of Hume’s thesis that Kant was bullheaded about, with respect to “time-ordered causality”? — Mww

Hume showed that we could not know that there was any intrinsic necessity to time-ordered causal sequences. This was not a new discovery, as Ibn Sina used the observation as a basis for proving the existence of God. Still, it seems to have shocked Hume's contemporaries, many of whom were beginning to coalesce around the mechanistic determinism later articulated by Laplace.

Kant seems to have felt that, since time-ordered causality was known to be necessary, Hume's analysis must be flawed. The result was the separation of noumena and phenomena and the whole system of Transcendental Idealism with the supposed imposition of the forms of time, space and causality by the mind. Of course, there were many other factors motivating Kant, some of them from the mystical tradition, but I do think the causality issue was the crucial one.

I’d guess A.) you’re talking about the effect on our knowledge of a thing being antecedent to the causality of the thing’s impression given to us by sense, or, B.) you’re talking about the simultaneity of the external impression on sense and the internal knowledge of the object so impressing. — Mww

I have in mind the distinction of Accidental and Essential Causality, which goes back at least of Aristotle, and which was common in Scholastic analysis. What contemporary philosopher's mean by "causality" is time-ordered or accidental causality. E.g.. the cue striking a billiard ball in the appropriate way is the cause of it going in the corner pocket. Kant defined this notion of causality as "time sequence by rule," and it is what Hume showed to have no intrinsic necessity. Since it links two separate events, intervention is always possible in principle, and so such sequences cannot be absolutely necessary.

The other type of causality, (essential causality) might be called concurrent causality. It does not involve separate events but is the result of analyzing a single event into agent and patient. Aristotle's paradigm case is a builder building a house. In it the builder building is the cause and the house being build is the effect. The analysis of this event reveals an identity that serves as the basis of necessity. (The builder building the house is identically the house being build by the builder.) As there is only one event there is no possibility the separation of cause and effect or of intervention. So, essential causality has an intrinsic necessity.

Lest one think that essential causality plays no role in modern thought, the laws of nature operate by essential or concurrent causality. Mass-energy being conserved by the law of conservation of mass-energy is identically the law of conservation of mass-energy conserving mass-energy. So essential causality is alive and well today. It is just not discussed by most contemporary philosophers.

Further, the two types of causality are linked. The the general sequence of causal and caused events is explained by integrating the essential causality of the laws of nature over time.

Again, no honest question id bothersome. Thank you for your kind words and interest in my thoughts.

Lest one think that essential causality plays no role in modern thought, the laws of nature operate by essential or concurrent causality. Mass-energy being conserved by the law of conservation of mass-energy is identically the law of conservation of mass-energy conserving mass-energy. So essential causality is alive and well today. It is just not discussed by most contemporary philosophers. — Dfpolis

But energy is not conserved by the Principle of energy conservation. It is conserved due to the dynamics undergone by a system obeying the laws of physics.

But energy is not conserved by the Principle of energy conservation. It is conserved due to the dynamics undergone by a system obeying the laws of physics. — Inis

To avoid any confusion, let us distinguish the laws of nature, which are operative in nature, and the laws of physics, which are approximate human descriptions of the laws operative in nature.

When we speak in the plural of the laws of nature, it is not because there are many different laws in nature, but because the dynamics of nature, which is its law, is understood by us in many partial ways. What I mean is that the same unified dynamics conserves mass-energy, momentum, angular momentum, attracts masses, repels like charges, and so on. Nonetheless, when we think and write of it, we do so in terms of abstractions as though these various aspects were separate laws.

So, to say that mass-energy is conserved by the law of conservation of mass-energy is to speak of one aspect of the unified dynamics in abstraction -- and does not deny that in reality there is one, many faceted dynamics at work in nature.

I hope this addresses your point. If not, let me know.

Kant seems to have felt that (....) Hume's analysis must be flawed. — Dfpolis

Flawed, yes; bullheaded, no. Egotistical.....ehhhhhh, maybe. (Grin)
“....This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous generation of understanding and reason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in experience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else; and hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to extend our cognition a priori....”

How is the builder building identically being the building built any different than the ball hitting identically being the hit ball? The house built and the ball hit both have an intrinsic necessity for their respective causes, herein being no more than the predicates of natural law. Even so, all empirical relationships concerning cause and effect are contingent with respect to human knowledge, which implies if any absolute necessity, that is to say, the falsification of which is impossible, must arise from a priori conditions.

I’m still interested in your thoughts, but I don’t want to be the reason the thread goes too far off topic. Well.....any more than I am already.

To avoid any confusion, let us distinguish the laws of nature, which are operative in nature, and the laws of physics, which are approximate human descriptions of the laws operative in nature. — Dfpolis

Fair enough, but since, as you point out, we do not know the laws of nature, how do we know they obey the Principle of conservation of energy? And is the Principle of conservation of energy, a Principle of physics or of nature?

I suppose, that if you wish the Principle of CofE to be an essential cause, then it better be a Principle of nature.

Also, I'm not sure the Principle of conservation of energy even tells you how to measure whether energy is conserved or not.

I assume the quote is from Kant. Note that he contradicts himself saying "did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done." If this were the case, he could not have specifically addressed a priori arguments, by "regard[ing] this augmentation of conceptions, ... independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible." No one can reject a thesis that was never considered.

How is the builder building identically being the building built any different than the ball hitting identically being the hit ball? — Mww

"The builder building the house" describes the identical event, with the same information, as "The house being built by the builder." I am not sure what you mean by the "ball hitting," but certainly the bat hitting the ball is identically the ball being hit by the bat. Have I missed your point?

all empirical relationships concerning cause and effect are contingent with respect to human knowledge, which implies if any absolute necessity, that is to say, the falsification of which is impossible, must arise from a priori conditions. — Mww

It seems to me that relationships need to be intelligible in order to be the object of human knowledge. So the relations are logically prior to our knowledge of them -- and not contingent on our knowledge.

It is not that the events of house building or ball hitting are necessary. The necessity is in the linkd between an essential cause and its effect. While there may well be no builder building or house being built, given that there is a builder building, necessarily something is being built. Likewise, given that something is being built, necessarily something is building it. In other words, every happening is a doing, and every doing is a happening.

Relating this to your quotation, I see no reason to suppose that this principle is known a priori. It suffices to think that, having once grasped it a posteriori, in an experienced example, we can see, that it applies in all future cases "a priori."

Have I addressed your concern?