Does it help achieve autonomy? — Banno

Yes, it is essential - it's the concept of disability. If someone isn't disabled, they don't need help. We have to able to recognise disability for what it is in order to be able to help. Regarding autonomy specifically, a person cannot make decisions if they do not understand information relevant to that decision, or if they cannot weigh the pros and cons of an option, or if they can't remember relevant information, or if they can't communicate their decision. If they could do all of these things, they would have autonomy and not need support with these functions. By recognising that they can't do these things on their own, we are in a position to put support in place that enables them to do these things and to gain some control over their lives.

what is more important: what they can't do; or what they might do? — Banno

Again I reject this opposition. A disabled person who can't do x might be able to with help. Not being able to do it is important to recognise so help can be put in place.

EDIT: I should probably add there is of course a danger in focusing on what someone can't do - there is the risk of talking someone into being more disabled than they are. People sometimes talk themselves into being more disabled than they are, and you can get into a bit of a negative spiral. That can happen with any kind of negative self-concept I suppose. There is also the converse trap - denying real disability. This can lead to self-hatred, self-blame, 'if only I tired harder', isolation and frustration. I see more of this latter trap than the former.

...and why is it so important to do whatever "P" is? And for whom is it important? — Banno

'P' is the person, not the action. x is the action. It's important for P. Much of my work is helping autistic people do the things they want to do, but can't do without help. They make the decisions, but they depend on me to carry them out much of the time. It is well established in the autistic community I am a part of that autonomy is much more important than independence, indeed the two are often in tension.

Well, no. The list of things they can't do is not the same as the list of things they are capable of doing. — Banno

Okay, P wants to do x, but they can't without help. P can do x with help. x is the same in both instances. The difference is not in P. The difference is not in x. The difference is in the presence of help.

what they can't do; or what they might do? — Banno

They're both the same. An inert autistic person can't get off the sofa. That 'can't' is real, and reality is important. However they might get off the sofa with help. So they both can't do it (without help), and might do it (with help). Relevantly, they want to do it. But motivation isn't enough to overcome their inertia. So they use me to supply them with the initiative. How have I delimited them in this account? It seems to me that I have helped.

Please try. I really don't get it, and this is important to me. How am I delimiting someone? It's very distressing to think that I am. I work with autistic people all the time.

Can you spell out the problem with that? Does it capture people who are not disabled, and leave out people who are?

Let's consider an example: inertia. Many autistic people have extreme difficulty in getting started with something, or changing from one activity to another without external help. Most people don't have this problem most of the time and can get themselves to do stuff without external help. It seems to me that this person, without help, is disabled, and they are disabled because they can't do something that most other people can do most of the time.

So the next step is to see if you can find something that P cannot do, that would not seem to count as a disability in our offhand use of the term - flying, writing a great novel, putting their foot behind their head. — Banno

Sure, to capture typical usage, we need to add some standard of typicality or normality, so that the disability is noteworthy, or in need of some kind of adaptation or intervention or whatever. As you say, I wouldn't normally characterise my inability to fly as a 'disability', even though I am unable to do it. But while it would be eccentric to characterise my inability (as a human) to fly as a disability, it would not be incorrect. Especially if I were a bird, where most birds can fly most of the time. So, I'll modify the definition to:

P is disabled in relation to task x if and only if P cannot do x, and x is a task most people can do most of the time.

Is there a coherent way to define disability at all? — Banno

Yes. P is disabled in relation to task x if and only if P cannot do x.

Are we disagreeing about anything?

I do think there is a difference between a straightforward concept of disability (or definition of 'disability') which is model-neutral, and the various 'models' of disability. The concept of disability is simple - someone can't do something, usually in comparison to others who can. The elephant can't get up the tree in comparison to the monkey who can. This is true whether you place the cause of that inability within the individual or within the environment. The elephant can't get up the tree because it has the wrong kind of body (medical), vs the elephant can't get up the tree because there are no concrete steps next to it (social), vs we shouldn't be expecting the elephant to get up the tree in the first place (capabilities model? But what if it wants to, on an equal basis with the monkey?) The models are approaches/attitudes to disability, suggestive of where the problem exists, and the appropriate way to respond to disability.

The distinction between definition and model is important. It is really important for a disabled person to be able to say "I can't do that, that's what being disabled means, that is our starting point" without that prejudicing the response from others. Sometimes a disabled person will want a pill or a prosthetic limb to fix the disability (medical). Sometimes they will want reasonable adjustments to their environment (social). Sometimes they will want to do something else instead that they can do, and challenge any absences of such opportunities in society (capabilities).

Here's a social model definition from PWDA — Banno

This is not a definition of 'disability'. It's a description of the social model of disability. It's the difference between theory and definition. The sun is that yellow disc in the sky up there (definition). It goes round the Earth (theory). The Earth goes round it (theory).

We may just have different concepts, I'm sure we agree on the ethics. Are any of the animals disabled in this scenario?

EDIT: I think the definition of disability is the same under the medical and social model, but maybe I'm just wrong. For me, P is disabled in relation to x if P can't do x. If that's not the definition, what is? The difference for me comes where we place the problem. Mr Medical must actually have a concept of the social model in order to even assent to the proposition that any of the animals are disabled, because only in the context of the task is a disability even possible. The difference comes in the solution/blame. Mr Medical says the animals are the wrong shape to climb the tree, and he tries to alter them, or to write them off as hopeless. Mr Social puts some concrete blocks for the elephant to climb, and a long sloping water run for the fish to swim up.

Ah, I disagree. On strictly the medical model, none of them are disabled. They are all perfect specimens.

Only on the social model are they disabled. They are disabled because of the social environment - the requirement to perform a task without any alterations to the environment.

Instead of asking all to climb the tree, we might ask what each would require in order to be able to pick the fruit. — Banno

OK, so to spell it out, in that cartoon, only two of the animals will be able to get up the tree. Five of them are disabled, no?

Any other theory is just a matter of wishful thinking. — Questioner

Another expert psychologist on the forum! What causes materialism? Too much breast milk?

Where else is consciousness found? — Questioner

Rubber bands and rocks

Is this about presuppositions of science, or of scientists? I'm not sure the former makes any sense. The latter is an empirical question only answerable by a survey, no?

“incontrovertible premise that consciousness comes about from the action of the brain.” — Questioner

It's not though. Correlation is, famously, not causation. It might be evidence of causation, but you need an argument.

I don’t think so. The primacy of consciousness claims that consciousness has metaphysical primacy over existence. I take the opposite point-of-view, that existence comes first. A brain must structurally develop before any consciousness can arise from it. — Questioner

That's indeed arguable, but that does not address @Wayfarer's point. The point is that there is nothing pre-existing the first experience according to his view - time does not exist yet, there can be no prior (temporal) conditions. Once the first experience happens, that creates time and all the temporal preconditions (development of a brain etc) for that experience. It's all done in a one-er, if you see what I mean. The experience depends on the brain, but the brain depends on the experience, but temporal order isn't an issue because time doesn't exist before the experience. So the appallingly offensive bootstrapping is perhaps permissible. I don't buy it, but you need to grasp the argument before dismissing it.

If the issue is ontological dependence rather than temporal, that's not as problematic. That can be circular, as one does not need to precede the other, they can be mutually helpful. I'll give you a foot up at the same (non-)time that you give me a foot up, and then we both find we have climbed the wall.

And does not that consciousness emerge as the function of neurological processes? — Questioner

I don't think so, although interestingly your view is compatible with the kind of mind-primacy that @Wayfarer has been talking about in this thread.

"And yet", he goes on, "the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence." Of course that goes against the grain of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect'. I've had many long (and mainly fruitless) arguments about this point on the forum, contested by those who are adamant that the world is there, external, outside of us, and ideas internal, in the mind, subjective. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared,—this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all."

At this point, 99% of people will object: “But we know that the world existed before there were any sentient beings.” My reply is that “before” is a mental construct. Fossils are not mental constructs, nor is the geological record. But pastness is not something contained in those rocks. It is a form under which they are understood. Outside that form—outside a temporal framework supplied by consciousness—the fossils do not say “earlier,” “later,” or “before” at all. They simply are. — Wayfarer

This is interesting, and perhaps coherent. But my mind recoils at the offensive apparent bootstrappyness of it. Some idealists avoid this bootstrapping - Berkeley by invoking God as the prior cause, Sprigge with panpsychism providing consciousness at the start.

From the bit you quoted, the ontological foundation for everything is the first experience, which then creates the temporal causal order that is the precondition of its own ability to experience. Don't you find that offensive? If someone said that in a pub, they'd get a slap. Adding God or panpsychism makes it much easier to swallow, no?

EDIT: I'm grateful for you bringing it up though, I hadn't thought about idealism quite in these terms before.

No doubt everyone has a purpose here, even if it is only entertainment, or an interest in exploring ideas in order to decide which ones seem the more plausible or a desire to find out what is true or whatever. — Janus

It's a pet niggle of mine - accusing people of purposes, biases etc derails discussions. But complaining about it doesn't help, so I should probably shut up.

Are you mocking me, sir? — Questioner

Only a little, your position is that of the majority I suspect. Emergentists, it seems to me, often use many more obscure words to say exactly what you refreshingly did in two: 'consciousness happens'. How does it happen exactly? is the question, and Why there? Not that the OP is offering a theory of the generation of consciousness, nor does it seem to be asserting a temporal priority to consciousness, nor is there a position on where consciousness is in the world. Not sure if an ontological priority is asserted, or if it is just epistemelogical or methodological priority. Perhaps it's bollockological priority. I'm not a scholar of historical phenomenology I'm afraid.

consciousness happens — Questioner

If only I'd thought of that!

Is there a particular question you'd like to focus on from the OP?

Where are the thoughts going on in your mind to me? — T Clark

I really like this question. One big advantage of a materialist reductive account, say some kind of functionalism, is that it can clearly answer this question. The thoughts going on in @Wayfarer's mind are literally within his physical skull, because they just are some subset of his brain function. The more dualistic one's view is, the more work one has to do to come up with a plausible answer.

Why not be honest about what you believe and what your actual agenda is? — Janus

Everyone on this forum has an agenda, one can feel it behind posts. One can also hallucinate motive, and I think that also happens frequently. Luckily, such agendas and motives are all philosophically irrelevant, so we don't have to talk about them. Likewise, everyone on this forum says what they do because they are mentally ill in some way or another, luckily, that is philosophically irrelevant, so we don't have to talk about that either. Everyone on this forum is weak and wants a safe comforting worldview to make them feel better. Luckily this is philosophically irrelevant so we don't have to talk about it.

My criticism was going to Wayfarer's assessment of phenomenology. Phenomenology is a philosophical approach, not a position on the nature of consciousness. But I did note your sneer. Merry Christmas. — frank

It wasn't my intention to sneer at all, and I may have misunderstood your point.

Okay, but if we know of no consciousness which is not accompanied by material conditions, it follows that we cannot really have a grasp of the possibility, even though we can of course say it is logically not impossible. So, the question becomes 'What significance could such a vague possibility have". — Janus

Your original claim was that the existence of consciousness (or absence of it) depends on material conditions. That makes material conditions ontologically prior. That's not the same claim as saying that wherever there is consciousness, there are also material conditions. In the latter case, neither consciousness nor material conditions is ontologically prior - they always occur together.

We know of no consciousness which is not accompanied by material conditions. — Janus

That's likely true, but that's different from the existential claim:

consciousness is determined by material conditions — Janus

It is arguable, in fact it seems unarguably true, that the type or content of consciousness is determined by the material conditions it is conscious of. — Janus

Yes, I think I agree with that.

Right, consciousness is determined by material conditions — Janus

Do you mean the presence and not-presence of consciousness is determined by material conditions (a very strong claim), or that the type or content of consciousness is determined by material conditions (a different weaker claim). I think you probably mean the former.

All our scientific evidence points to that conclusion. — Janus

What evidence are you thinking of?

Would a phenomenologist have to stand on her head to explain how that works? — frank

No more than anyone else. The correspondence observed between brain function in humans and what those humans experience is compatible with all positions on consciousness, even substance dualism.

Lacking what is my point? Its not ability-driven. — AmadeusD

Indeed, a purely medical model approach makes no reference to an environment, and therefore not to the ability to do anything. What is lacking is statistical normality on a wholly medical model.

The distinction between medical and social model is less about the definition of disability (which has to be a function of the relationship between P and his environment), and more about the how we focus our interventions/supports. Do we change P or P's environment? With invisible disabilities like autism, we often get this wrong, trying to either cure P's autism or change P's behaviour. Neither of these will work and can be abusive. Instead, change the environment.

(My previous answer to you was making a different irrelevant point I think, sorry. I think I'd forgotten what my original point was.)

It is a classic, straight-forward example of the Medical Model.

The Equality Act definition makes disability depend on "an impairment (physical or mental)", and
the "effects of that impairment on the person’s abilities". It sets up disability as something that is wrong with the person. And is "normal day-to-day activities" is explicitly normative, treating deviation from that baseline as a deficit in the individual. As so often, the law adopts a medical model for pragmatic reasons.

That's not just my view. A quick search will find Parliamentary enquiries and academic papers pointing to this issue.

The social model sees disability as when society’s structures, attitudes, and practices create barriers that prevent folk from fully participating in social, economic, and cultural life, regardless of their physical or mental differences. Disability is not caused by the person’s impairment, but by the mismatch between the person and the environment. — Banno

I half agree. The wording of it is indeed very suggestive of the medical model - it does appear to locate the issue within the person rather than the environment by the unfortunate and useless use of 'impairment'. But people who are disabled by being in an adverse environment are still protected under the Act - the Act isn't really endorsing a particular model. The duty to make reasonable adjustments (in the same Act) shows it accepts social model analyses. The test is functional - can P do X, where X is something most people can do most of the time? Yes there is a norm, but that makes sense under the social model. Environments are typically adapted to the majority, so social-model disability will only arise in relation to that norm. The norm refers to typical, common activities within a fairly standard enabling environment, not to a 'standard human'. Indeed, even under a medical model, disability doesn't really make sense without a functional test. A functional test will always be context-specific, and take into account an environment. If you simply say "P is disabled if they deviate from the standard human", which is pure medical-model, then people with ginger hair will then be disabled, even if they are functionally able to do all the 'normal day to day activities'.

Any coherent definition of disability must involve a functional test, no? At it's base, P is disabled if and only if P can't do something.

definition means defining something. everything can be defined. — Copernicus

Definition in this context is limiting the application of a word. You can define a block of wood, not with observation, thought and speech, but with saws and chisels.

small and nasty — Banno

Like my dick!

Is disability a social construction? Is there a coherent way to define disability at all? — Banno

In the UK there is this definition which seems relevant:

6 Disability
(1) A person (P) has a disability if—

(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and

(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. — Equality Act 2010

Although this looks like it has a formal diagnostic element ('impairment') and a functional element, apparently it doesn't in law. A diagnosis isn't necessary although some diagnoses are automatically sufficient. All you really need to show is that there is something about you can name or describe (an 'impairment') that means you are not able to carry out day-to-day activities that most people can manage without much difficulty.

This definition is neutral in terms of the social and medical model. It does require us to come up with a standard of 'normal', but that normality could be in medical terms (P is disabled because of atypical brain function which prevents him doing day-to-day activities) or social (P is disabled because he is in a minority whose day-to-day needs are different and not adapted for by the majority). Where a minority congregate and become the majority, who is disabled and who is not may switch, according to a social conception. At Autscape, neurotypicals can feel very uncomfortable and struggle to integrate in the group.

Regarding the tension between medical and social models, it seems to me the main relevance of the distinction is in deciding what to do about a disability. Sometimes it's better to locate the problem within the disabled individual (medical model) where a relatively simple 'fix' is the best support, e.g. prosthetic limbs, which enables the person to carry out their day-to-day activities. Even then there may be elements of social disability remaining, perhaps the patronising attitudes of others result in the disabled person not developing the skills needed for the day-to-day activities as quickly as they might. The social model is especially necessary for those with invisible disabilities that do not have medical diagnoses, such as autism, where the diagnosis is based on a set of behaviours. On a medical conception, one could suggest that autism is a made-up thing, and as it doesn't really exist, autistic people are delusional and should just snap out of it. Autistic people typically are disabled - there are things they want to do, that most others can do easily, but can't, for example, go to a noisy pub or bar; or wash up before cooking dinner; or change classrooms unexpectedly, etc. The medical model (locating the problem within the autistic person) is useless - there is no pill that autistic people can take, trying harder only works for a limited time before burnout, cognitive behavioural therapy is worse than useless because it teaches them that they can change their abilities by changing their beliefs, and self-hatred results when this fails. The cure for autistic disability is environmental modification - quiet social spaces, avoiding sudden unexpected changes, setting up systems and routines for every task, answering questions with the detail required, and so on.

If a fish jumps out of the water and land on the path and starts exhibiting challenging behaviour, the medical model would have us fit it with artificial lungs and a trolley at great taxpayer expense. Proponents of the social model will pop it back in the water where it is not disabled.

Yeah, I think this is reasonable (discussion of discredited/toxic beliefs to confirm their falsity or salvage defensible bits), but so is the stance TPF has taken. There may be other forums that welcome it, but that would presumably come with a quality penalty I would imagine. As you say, all would be well if we tried harder. That goes for global warming, understanding people different from ourselves, reading actual articles rather than AI sound bites, being fit and healthy, not indulging in drive-by posts (which I never ever do), noticing sentences that end in questions marks and answering them, and life in general. Or maybe not. Maybe life would be worse if we all tried harder, instead of just doing, as Nike and Yoda might argue.

Did anyone get a sense that Bob was ashamed of his views? I didn't, but I didn't read a great many of his posts. He was defending claims rather than confessing to feelings, wasn't he?

Was there any time in your entire life that you read something and it incited you to violence or hatred or anything that can be construed as a crime? When you read the above tweet, did you feel yourself reaching for the pitchfork? — NOS4A2

Not in that particular case, but at other times, yes. Words are not movement, but they can unlock the door to it, or influence its direction.

Ahh, that's an awkward one though because it has to assume the social model. In that society, we wouldn't put an amputee in the same category as a ginge, still. — AmadeusD

Maybe, but not if we're gingerphobic. We know, because everyone knows, that gingers are a bit lacking, bless them. Unfortunate genetics. Medical model.