I am grateful to you for using an AI to generate your answer, which I will take to represent your view. It is much easier to understand than your posts typically are. I heartily recommend you copy its style. I note with relief it does not begin any paragraphs with 'So'.

Biosemiotics argues that life is fundamentally a process of sign production, interpretation, and communication, which is the basis for meaning and cognition. — ApoAI

I don't see a significant difference between mind as a process and mind as a function in relation to the conceptual issues. Both are a system doing something. In either case, whether it be a system performing interpretation embedded in an environment, or a brain realising a function, there is still a conceptual disconnect with that and consciousness.

]Biosemiotics attempts to address the "hard problem" of subjective experience (qualia) by positing that proto-experience or a basic level of awareness is a fundamental aspect of all matter/biological processes, which then expands to higher degrees of consciousness through complex, hierarchical information processing in the brain. — ApoAI

This is panpsychism, which you have previously distanced yourself from. ApoAI's apparent separation of proto-experience from consciousness is conceptually mistaken; consciousness does not admit of degree.

First-Person Perspective: It incorporates a necessary first-person, internal perspective, recognizing the subjective, felt qualities of experience that are difficult to capture with a purely functional, third-person approach. — ApoAI

That's interesting. What is needed for an emergentist account such as this is sufficiency, not necessity. Necessity requires that consciousness is already there. What is needed is the conceptual link that moves from sign production, interpretation, and communication to consciousness, without presupposing consciousness, on pain of begging the question. Why must the processes of sign production, interpretation, and communication embody/enact/realise/constitute (pick your concept please) consciousness?

Thank you for getting help to write an intelligible post. If it wasn't a potential violation of the site rules, I would encourage you to do so again for the sake of clarity. However the hard problem remains untouched.

Thank you, that's interesting. I can see that on this metaphysic, ideas interact with matter. But this isn't necessarily substance dualism, on which view there is more than one substance, each of which have nothing in common with the others. The non-dualist will say that if ideas and matter interact, they must have something in common, and therefore are not wholly other, and therefore not two totally distinct substances. I have no idea if Plato, Aristotle or any other platonists were, in fact, full-on substance dualists. In my experience, people who say they are dualist generally turn out not to be this kind of full-on two-distinct-substances-with-nothing-in-common type of dualist. I remember Galen Strawson arguing at length that even Descartes was not actually a substance dualist, but a property dualist of some kind (iirc).

Then semiosis actually defines life and mind as a modelling relation within the entropic world — apokrisis

Indeed, functionalists do tend to end up defining 'consciousness' by fiat as a function, just as they have with 'life'. But in doing so making the concept irrelevant to the philosophy and what people actually mean by 'consciousness'.

How does the concept of 'the good' solve the interaction problem?

Descartes wasn't an idealist as far as I'm aware. Idealism is monistic so the interaction problem does not arise.

So there is a lot of backstory to my particular take on Peirce. — apokrisis

Please could you tell us about it

Definitely

It is, and the answer, I think, is 'yes' if we include the assumption of omnipotence in the concept of perfection. It still only follows that what is is what ought to be from God's point of view. It remains possible for God to be at odds with the values of Earthly (or Andromedan) communities, and from their point of view, for God to be an evil git, who ought not to will what he wills. But I'm a moral (inter-)subjectivist. And indeed this is off topic.

Oh, fair enough. In that case I agree with you.

at some point you have to change from what you see about you to how you want things to be — Banno

I agree with you, but haven't you previously resisted a reduction of what ought to be the case to what one wants to be the case?

The fact that you are asking this question means you'll be fine I would think. Totally perfect posts aren't possible or necessary. Only Donald Trump is capable of those.

I've been involved in the set up of a couple of democratically constituted organisations, and there is always an awkward bit at the start, as sort of pre-creational, pre-symmetry breaking standing around and talking bit, where someone says, "OK, let's say this is how it's going to work" and makes a suggestion, writes it down, and then if a few people assent to it, a constitution is born. Then everyone can relax, the constitution gains a legitimacy separate from its author (who is then bound by it) and the whole thing starts off. The longer it lasts without challenge, and the more people consent to it, the more legitimacy it has. The original author doesn't need to possess any intrinsic legitimacy that the constitution must inherit.

Thanks, that's interesting and food for thought. Bit short on time at the moment so may leave it there.

The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy is an amazing resource. It goes in depth.

I'm not sure that is enough to understand what I mean. — Red Sky

An example might help.

Surely “consciousness” is synonymous with “living”? — Punshhh

Maybe ages ago before 'life' got redefined in functional terms.

Or maybe predictive model-formation does not really admit of rational analysis. If it has evolved it has done so without philosophy and intellectual reflection (perhaps), but that doesn't mean we can't apply reason to it anyway after the fact. Especially if there is a claim to truth.

Abduction includes elements of induction and deduction, no? The issue still remains.

Also consider Goodman's new riddle because it's fun. Lets say we have a model arrived at by abduction that predicts that water boils at 100C at earth surface pressure. Now let 'roil' mean 'boils at 100C before 2030 and boils at 150C after". Now do we have two model-predictions that are equally supported by evidence:

Model 1: Water will boil at 100C at Earth surface pressure next week
Model 2: Water will roil at 100C at Earth surface pressure next week

We all presumably think Model 1 is likely to survive the year 2030 and we will abandon model 2, but why? Is there a reason to prefer model 1 over model 2?

Science doesn't need to worry about this, it gets on fine. But this is philosophy, so we do this kind of shit.

This is traditionally framed as a problem for induction. But does abduction help particularly?

(hopefully I've got Goodman roughly right, correct me if not)

"All powerful"? Whatever gives you that idea? — Relativist

Just that on that view matter always obeys laws.

According to the theory, laws are relations between types of objects. — Relativist

Oh, OK. That weakens their claim to be real, perhaps, perhaps not. Maybe they are real, but not in the sense of having an independent existence from the systems they govern. I'm not familiar with the view. Interesting though. I can think of further problems - is the generation of objects governed by laws, or do the laws only exist once the object exist? Why does the same type of law always occur with the same type of objects? Why is there consistency across space and time?

To see if their "artificial" body can generate sapience or consciousness. — Copernicus

Can you think of a test that would detect sapience or consciousness?

i don't follow. Test them for what? What would that show?

This self-referential loop—where the cell both contains and enacts its own design—may be the root of sentience.
It embodies three critical principles:

1. Self-containment (it maintains boundaries separating self from environment)
2. Information feedback (it stores and interprets data through DNA and biochemical processes)
3. Adaptation and evolution (it changes in response to experience)

These mechanisms mirror the functional properties of consciousness itself: awareness, memory, and adaptation.
Thus, the cell might not only be the first living structure but also the proto-conscious one—a physical architecture enabling the emergence of the mind. — Copernicus

I applaud the OP for its clarity.

In this section there is the usual definitional conflation that functionalism seems to rely on (in my view). There are the functional aspects of mind, what mind can do (Block's 'access consciousness') and then there is the phenomenal aspect (Block's 'p-conciousness') whereby a system has experiences. Philosophers seem to be divided on whether this distinction is sustainable or not. Functionalists say it isn't - as functions are realised bit by bit, eventually they constitute the phenomenal. Pattee, and some other functionalists, do this by definition, saying that all we mean by 'consciousness' is this collection of functions (Cell phenomenology: The first phenomenon, H Pattee). Property dualists (for example) constantly point out the conceptual disconnect between the phenomenal and the functional, and insist that they certainly do not mean a collection of functions when they speak of consciousness. That's why we keep saying, ad nauseum, 'Yeah but why can't a Zombie do all that?'

There is conceptual work to be done before we can assess the value of any related science.

Cheers. If there is something in particular that I ought follow up on, let me know. — Banno

I feel a bit bad now. I was remembering conversations on the philosophy of mind. Your awareness of academic philosophy is valuable and noticed.

That is not the view of law realists. They suggests there to be an ontological basis for the observed regularities.

Example: two objects with opposite electric charge (e.g. electron & proton) have a force of attraction between them. This force is a necessary consequence of their properties. The properties and force are ontological. — Relativist

Sure, that is a possibility. But it raises a lot of questions about the details of this objective, but invisible and all-powerful, existence that laws partake of. Are the laws all omnipresent? If so, how does that fit with them being numerically distinct? Or is there really one big law that explains everything? Do laws change? Eternal god(s) without the personality?

Why think that, other than that it's possible? — Relativist

Sorry, missed this. Because laws are descriptive and don't really explain anything. Intention is explanatory. Although this might still be vulnerable to @unenlightened's defence of Hume, I'm not sure.

By “we”, you mean you. — apokrisis

While @Banno can be as annoying as you to try to have a conversation with, in this he speaks for me as well. You are obscure Apo. It took me ages to decode from your posts your view of consciousness, which turns out to be a fairly straightforward reductive functionalism. Presumably obscurity is your intent, or you wouldn't speak the way you do. You decline interrogation (unless sympathetic), which is your prerogative of course. You say interesting stuff sometimes, but it's hard going to ask questions to get it clarified. Which is what philosophers like to do. @Banno is hard going as well, and slides away. @180 Proof, like you, relatively quickly moves to insult and condescension, although perhaps less so now. Everyone else submits pretty much, except for some of the crazy ones who get banned.

Anything born out of (may or may not be within) the universe. — Copernicus

That sounds like general monism to me, rather than physicalism in particular.

When I said physical, I meant a product of physical events — Copernicus

Sorry I missed that. But what have you said about an event when you say it is physical? What is it about an event that makes it physical?

OK, so why does experience accompany it sometimes, and not others?

The universe is physical. — Copernicus

Are you able to flesh out your concept of 'physical'?

Sometimes people seem to mean 'not mental' or even 'not supernatural'

Sometimes people seem to mean 'possessing structure and function only'

I think that the latter view perhaps captures 'physicalism' best, because that's what physicalists tend to assert: structure and function is enough to account for or explain everything else, including consciousness. Is that your view?

Neural activity, hormonal feedback, and sensory processing together constitute what we experience as emotion, thought, and will. — Copernicus

They may well do, but why? What role does experience play in that? Why can't neural activity, hormonal feedback and sensory processing happen without experience?

I thought I was arguing against using a reifying term such as consciousness. — apokrisis

But you think consciousness is real.

And you seem to understand consciousness as a substance to be accounted for rather than as a process to be deflated. — apokrisis

The classic functionalist straw man trotted out yet again.

You're a functionalist, and therefore wrong. Your own view seems to be a case of what @Wolfgang calls metaphysical positing: when a system does such-and-such, you declare it to be conscious. Your 'answer' to the question "Why can't it do all that in the dark?" is another question, the explanation-free "Why wouldn't it?"

Ok, who did they borrow it off? — Punshhh

Dunno. Banks?

I suspect that more often than not, the conclusion of a separate thing is begged at the start and rationalized from there. — noAxioms

It's really only substance dualists who think consciousness is a 'separate thing' and even then it's a conclusion not an assumption, at least ostensibly. Most non-physicalists (that I'm aware of) do not think consciousness is a separate thing anyway (unless you count a non-physical property as a 'thing' which I wouldn't).

There seems to be a necessity of memory and predicting going on. It’s almost impossible to be a predictor without memory, and I cannot think of anything that ‘experiences’ that does not do both things, but I can think of things that monitor internal processes that do so without either. — noAxioms

A zombie or android could do all that. Nothing in there entails consciousness. You may be right (or not) that consciousness requires memory and predicting, but memory and predicting are not sufficient for consciousness.

Consciousness is just what it is like to be in this kind of mechanised modelling relation with a world — apokrisis

Ooooooh no it isn't

So what's the alternative? — Relativist

Attribute regularities to will rather than law, maybe.

Here's how I approach it: some explanation is needed for the constant conjunction of past regularities. I judge that the "inference to best explanation" for this is that there exist laws of nature that necessitate this behavior. Inferring a best explanation is rational - it's a form of abductive reasoning. — Relativist

Check out Goodman's new riddle of induction if you haven't already. It's fun.