Where are the thoughts going on in your mind to me? — T Clark

I really like this question. One big advantage of a materialist reductive account, say some kind of functionalism, is that it can clearly answer this question. The thoughts going on in @Wayfarer's mind are literally within his physical skull, because they just are some subset of his brain function. The more dualistic one's view is, the more work one has to do to come up with a plausible answer.

Why not be honest about what you believe and what your actual agenda is? — Janus

Everyone on this forum has an agenda, one can feel it behind posts. One can also hallucinate motive, and I think that also happens frequently. Luckily, such agendas and motives are all philosophically irrelevant, so we don't have to talk about them. Likewise, everyone on this forum says what they do because they are mentally ill in some way or another, luckily, that is philosophically irrelevant, so we don't have to talk about that either. Everyone on this forum is weak and wants a safe comforting worldview to make them feel better. Luckily this is philosophically irrelevant so we don't have to talk about it.

My criticism was going to Wayfarer's assessment of phenomenology. Phenomenology is a philosophical approach, not a position on the nature of consciousness. But I did note your sneer. Merry Christmas. — frank

It wasn't my intention to sneer at all, and I may have misunderstood your point.

Okay, but if we know of no consciousness which is not accompanied by material conditions, it follows that we cannot really have a grasp of the possibility, even though we can of course say it is logically not impossible. So, the question becomes 'What significance could such a vague possibility have". — Janus

Your original claim was that the existence of consciousness (or absence of it) depends on material conditions. That makes material conditions ontologically prior. That's not the same claim as saying that wherever there is consciousness, there are also material conditions. In the latter case, neither consciousness nor material conditions is ontologically prior - they always occur together.

We know of no consciousness which is not accompanied by material conditions. — Janus

That's likely true, but that's different from the existential claim:

consciousness is determined by material conditions — Janus

It is arguable, in fact it seems unarguably true, that the type or content of consciousness is determined by the material conditions it is conscious of. — Janus

Yes, I think I agree with that.

Right, consciousness is determined by material conditions — Janus

Do you mean the presence and not-presence of consciousness is determined by material conditions (a very strong claim), or that the type or content of consciousness is determined by material conditions (a different weaker claim). I think you probably mean the former.

All our scientific evidence points to that conclusion. — Janus

What evidence are you thinking of?

Would a phenomenologist have to stand on her head to explain how that works? — frank

No more than anyone else. The correspondence observed between brain function in humans and what those humans experience is compatible with all positions on consciousness, even substance dualism.

Lacking what is my point? Its not ability-driven. — AmadeusD

Indeed, a purely medical model approach makes no reference to an environment, and therefore not to the ability to do anything. What is lacking is statistical normality on a wholly medical model.

The distinction between medical and social model is less about the definition of disability (which has to be a function of the relationship between P and his environment), and more about the how we focus our interventions/supports. Do we change P or P's environment? With invisible disabilities like autism, we often get this wrong, trying to either cure P's autism or change P's behaviour. Neither of these will work and can be abusive. Instead, change the environment.

(My previous answer to you was making a different irrelevant point I think, sorry. I think I'd forgotten what my original point was.)

It is a classic, straight-forward example of the Medical Model.

The Equality Act definition makes disability depend on "an impairment (physical or mental)", and
the "effects of that impairment on the person’s abilities". It sets up disability as something that is wrong with the person. And is "normal day-to-day activities" is explicitly normative, treating deviation from that baseline as a deficit in the individual. As so often, the law adopts a medical model for pragmatic reasons.

That's not just my view. A quick search will find Parliamentary enquiries and academic papers pointing to this issue.

The social model sees disability as when society’s structures, attitudes, and practices create barriers that prevent folk from fully participating in social, economic, and cultural life, regardless of their physical or mental differences. Disability is not caused by the person’s impairment, but by the mismatch between the person and the environment. — Banno

I half agree. The wording of it is indeed very suggestive of the medical model - it does appear to locate the issue within the person rather than the environment by the unfortunate and useless use of 'impairment'. But people who are disabled by being in an adverse environment are still protected under the Act - the Act isn't really endorsing a particular model. The duty to make reasonable adjustments (in the same Act) shows it accepts social model analyses. The test is functional - can P do X, where X is something most people can do most of the time? Yes there is a norm, but that makes sense under the social model. Environments are typically adapted to the majority, so social-model disability will only arise in relation to that norm. The norm refers to typical, common activities within a fairly standard enabling environment, not to a 'standard human'. Indeed, even under a medical model, disability doesn't really make sense without a functional test. A functional test will always be context-specific, and take into account an environment. If you simply say "P is disabled if they deviate from the standard human", which is pure medical-model, then people with ginger hair will then be disabled, even if they are functionally able to do all the 'normal day to day activities'.

Any coherent definition of disability must involve a functional test, no? At it's base, P is disabled if and only if P can't do something.

definition means defining something. everything can be defined. — Copernicus

Definition in this context is limiting the application of a word. You can define a block of wood, not with observation, thought and speech, but with saws and chisels.

small and nasty — Banno

Like my dick!

Is disability a social construction? Is there a coherent way to define disability at all? — Banno

In the UK there is this definition which seems relevant:

6 Disability
(1) A person (P) has a disability if—

(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and

(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. — Equality Act 2010

Although this looks like it has a formal diagnostic element ('impairment') and a functional element, apparently it doesn't in law. A diagnosis isn't necessary although some diagnoses are automatically sufficient. All you really need to show is that there is something about you can name or describe (an 'impairment') that means you are not able to carry out day-to-day activities that most people can manage without much difficulty.

This definition is neutral in terms of the social and medical model. It does require us to come up with a standard of 'normal', but that normality could be in medical terms (P is disabled because of atypical brain function which prevents him doing day-to-day activities) or social (P is disabled because he is in a minority whose day-to-day needs are different and not adapted for by the majority). Where a minority congregate and become the majority, who is disabled and who is not may switch, according to a social conception. At Autscape, neurotypicals can feel very uncomfortable and struggle to integrate in the group.

Regarding the tension between medical and social models, it seems to me the main relevance of the distinction is in deciding what to do about a disability. Sometimes it's better to locate the problem within the disabled individual (medical model) where a relatively simple 'fix' is the best support, e.g. prosthetic limbs, which enables the person to carry out their day-to-day activities. Even then there may be elements of social disability remaining, perhaps the patronising attitudes of others result in the disabled person not developing the skills needed for the day-to-day activities as quickly as they might. The social model is especially necessary for those with invisible disabilities that do not have medical diagnoses, such as autism, where the diagnosis is based on a set of behaviours. On a medical conception, one could suggest that autism is a made-up thing, and as it doesn't really exist, autistic people are delusional and should just snap out of it. Autistic people typically are disabled - there are things they want to do, that most others can do easily, but can't, for example, go to a noisy pub or bar; or wash up before cooking dinner; or change classrooms unexpectedly, etc. The medical model (locating the problem within the autistic person) is useless - there is no pill that autistic people can take, trying harder only works for a limited time before burnout, cognitive behavioural therapy is worse than useless because it teaches them that they can change their abilities by changing their beliefs, and self-hatred results when this fails. The cure for autistic disability is environmental modification - quiet social spaces, avoiding sudden unexpected changes, setting up systems and routines for every task, answering questions with the detail required, and so on.

If a fish jumps out of the water and land on the path and starts exhibiting challenging behaviour, the medical model would have us fit it with artificial lungs and a trolley at great taxpayer expense. Proponents of the social model will pop it back in the water where it is not disabled.

Yeah, I think this is reasonable (discussion of discredited/toxic beliefs to confirm their falsity or salvage defensible bits), but so is the stance TPF has taken. There may be other forums that welcome it, but that would presumably come with a quality penalty I would imagine. As you say, all would be well if we tried harder. That goes for global warming, understanding people different from ourselves, reading actual articles rather than AI sound bites, being fit and healthy, not indulging in drive-by posts (which I never ever do), noticing sentences that end in questions marks and answering them, and life in general. Or maybe not. Maybe life would be worse if we all tried harder, instead of just doing, as Nike and Yoda might argue.

Did anyone get a sense that Bob was ashamed of his views? I didn't, but I didn't read a great many of his posts. He was defending claims rather than confessing to feelings, wasn't he?

Was there any time in your entire life that you read something and it incited you to violence or hatred or anything that can be construed as a crime? When you read the above tweet, did you feel yourself reaching for the pitchfork? — NOS4A2

Not in that particular case, but at other times, yes. Words are not movement, but they can unlock the door to it, or influence its direction.

Ahh, that's an awkward one though because it has to assume the social model. In that society, we wouldn't put an amputee in the same category as a ginge, still. — AmadeusD

Maybe, but not if we're gingerphobic. We know, because everyone knows, that gingers are a bit lacking, bless them. Unfortunate genetics. Medical model.

I can't quite understand the question - having red hair is not an ability-related trait. — AmadeusD

Might they be in a society of gingerphobes? The ginger people wouldn't be able to speak perhaps, because everyone knows gingers are incapable of learning, so it would be a waste to try to teach them.

I don't want to go overboard defending the social model - I do think the medical model has its place. For example, a deficit model is appropriate when developing aids for an amputee, perhaps. A peg leg makes a lot more sense than installing foot-high platforms alongside all pavements for amputees to rest their stumps on.

But all of those conditions refer to conditions that are generally thought of disadvantageous — Hanover

I don't think that's true among, for example, the autistic community (insofar as there is such a homogenous thing). Autistic people often consider neurotypicals to have communication disabilities, not saying what they mean, not meaning what they say, being obsessed with the weather and what they had for breakfast and talking about it with no awareness of how boring it is. And not taking an interest in fascinating topics like steam engines. Neurodivergence was embraced as a concept as a means of unifying people with different diagnoses who nevertheless shared similar experience. It was (and still is) broadly seen as a positive.

I guess the issue is that the word "normal" is not normatively neutral, but it designates someone who is appropriate in some respect. — Hanover

Indeed. 'Typical' is normatively neutral, and is only statistical.

This just points out the difficulty in creating language truly intended to be neutral. — Hanover

But it's hard to think of medical concept of disability that is normatively neutral. If you just define 'disability' as statistical outliers without making a judgement, then gingers are disabled.

The term "neuro-divergent" is a word that has become euphamistic for autistic, and so despite it being a euphamism, it has picked up a connotation of someone who thinks differently in a way that challenges them socially. — Hanover

I don't think it's a euphemism exactly, although maybe some use it that way. It's supposed to be a broader category than autism, to include ADHD, dyslexia, hyperlexia, savantism etc. It may eventually become a replacement for autism and ADHD, as there is some talk of there being a continuum between ADHD and autism, but it's all a bit muddy.

Wouldn't that make people with ginger hair disabled, if it's only about statistics?

No where can i recall did he request a "permanent" ban. — Outlander

That would be a bit weird wouldn't it? "Can I be banned for 45 days after which I will have calmed down and want to come back please?"

I'd like to see the return of Streetlight to be honest. — Jamal

Ditto. I'd like to see TGW back as well.

The "natural" is anything that exists that is causally connected to the actual physical world through laws of nature. — Relativist

Is the 'laws of nature' bit essential to naturalism? Is naturalism committed to the idea that laws of nature are what causes the world to be as it is, and behave in the way it does?

through analysis of the universe. — Relativist

Yes I think that methodological criterion is important. That stops ghosts and angels falling under the definition, as although these are claimed to have causal connections with us, they are not usually claimed to exist by virtue of an analysis of the universe, although I suppose that's arguable. By analysis of the universe I presume you mean by means of the scientific method predominantly.

'Naturalism' isn't a clear doctrine, so I'm not sure if I'm a naturalist or not. I'm inclined to agree with @Relativist in that I don't think anything 'unnatural' exists, but I think that just means I'm a monist.

EDIT: If you say something is 'natural', what have you said about it?

Yes, it's a good challenge, and an insurmountable one to substance dualists. Fortunately there aren't any.

EDIT: I've been gestating a thread about causality and panpsychism, but am not ready to plop it out just yet. I hope you can bear the suspense.

Every theory of mind has some problem, — Relativist

Absolutely. It's a matter of picking the least problematic. Or not picking at all. I think some kind of panpsychic property dualism is the most sustainable, but that has plenty of problems as well. I think for some of us (by 'us' I mean the hard-problem mongers on the forum), the conceptual issues around emergence seem so hard, clear and intractable that they can be provisionally discarded in favour of exploring other options.

That’s not a cognitive failing, it’s a conceptual one. — Wayfarer

Very good

"consciousness is [the] experience of". — Gnomon

Yes, that certainly seems blatantly question-begging. I don't know if the context helps at all.

EDIT: I haven't read the whole McFadden article, but the opener in the abstract isn't question-begging:

"Abstract: In the April 2002 edition of JCS I outlined the conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory, claiming that consciousness is that component of the brain’s electromagnetic field that is downloaded to motor neurons and is thereby capable of communicating its informational content to the outside world. In this paper I demonstrate that the theory is robust to criticisms" — McFadden

I also think consciousness is field-like, as he says in the opening sentence of the main article. That might be an interesting read.

I actually thikn what you're talking about is highly important, and you're dealing with it well. It just seems utterly wrong to think it answers something like the Hard Problem. — AmadeusD

It might be repurposed as a theory of identity (or what makes a system an agent in some sense) rather than a theory of consciousness, perhaps.

I had a similar thought with Tononi's IIT model of consciousness. It might work better as a theory of individuation: the more information a system integrates, the richer its experience, and the more it has a sense of identity, perhaps.

You are not exactly a guy for the details, even if you continually demand them. — apokrisis

Regarding my own views, I don't have a great many details. There are large areas of uncertainty and doubt for me.

If there were such a mechanism pinned down, I'm sure it would be quite easy to explain — AmadeusD

One would have thought so.

We don’t need to explain “consciousness” as if it is some magically emergent non-material stuff produced by nervous systems. — apokrisis

This sounds like a straw man. It is a view, but not one that anyone I can think of holds.

It we understand the semiotic modelling relation that gives us life and mind, we can then start to analyse “consciousness” as the stack of modelling relations that an embodied and socially cocooned organism can weave around its being. — apokrisis

We need a lot more detail of course, but at first glance it is not clear what prevents this being accomplished by a zombie.

I caught the tail end of the good ol' days in the UK. I got out of University only about £3000 in debt in 1996. My parents helped a bit too.

Free education should be easy to justify what with the massive productivity that is possible now with machines of various kinds. Just have to get the means of production under collective control so that it doesn't all get funnelled to private interests. Apparently I've just turned into a socialist. Maybe I always was.

It didn't change my mind much, mainly because of what seemed to be his definition of the phenomenal. Some of the questions I would ask i have already asked you in this thread. Questions about definitions, necessary and sufficient conditions, and the precise relationship between structural and functional concepts and phenomenal concepts. Also elaborations on concepts that are unfamiliar to me.

Please will you make a recommendation or two?

Do you know of any other papers on this topic I can read?

I am interested in this topic, including a biosemiotic approach to the emergence of consciousness. I can't elicit replies from you about it, which is very frustrating, but what you do and don't want to engage with is obviously up to you. I wonder if you would be willing to recommend a paper or two specifically on this topic, focusing as much as possible on the move from unconscious processes, to those involving meaning, the development of a self-other distinction, developing models, making predictions, or however the argument goes, until we get to the necessary and sufficient conditions for experience. You have given some idea of this, but by no means in enough detail for me to be able to get the argument clear in my head. I have read Pattee's "Cell Phenomenology: The first phenomenon" which was very interesting. Are you aware of any other papers on this? I could ask AI, and I may yet, but I'm hoping it will be easy for you to point me in the direction of a paper or two. If you don't want to that's OK. It's not my preferred method of learning - I prefer a live specimen to examine, but we can't always get what we want.

So we know how the brain generates consciousness by solving all these timing issues. — apokrisis

That's a somewhat different theory from all your previous ones. Are brains necessary for consciousness then? Is solving all these timing issues sufficient for consciousness?