The will is shown in the doing. — Banno

Schopenhauer took the step of describing his ideas through metaphor and analogy, pushing language to approach what lies beyond direct understanding. Wittgenstein’s 'show, don’t say' principle feels more like a self-imposed limit than a necessity. Schopenhauer’s approach suggests that even if language is imperfect, it still allows one to explore abstract and elusive ideas. By drawing a strict line around what we can talk about, he is really just conveying his sense of what’s worth discussing, not an absolute law of how or when to use language.

Sure. Folk want to talk about stuff about which they can't say anything. Off-topic, but be my guest. — Banno

‘Can’t say anything’ is tricky here, as it’s taken to mean both a normative restriction and a factual one. Schopenhauer, for instance, did say something about it- he called it the Will. However, he emphasized that the Will can only be described negatively (in terms of what it is not) and that any description of it must be analogical or metaphorical. So, in this sense, he did say something about what we don’t really ‘know’ in a direct, observable way. What you’re really getting at is that we can’t prove it beyond speculation. It remains a theory and can never be confirmed empirically; we know it only analogically, not through observation or experimentation. So ‘can’t,’ to me, seems unnecessary here- it’s more a matter of someone’s opinion about what can or should be discussed than an actual barrier to speaking about it.

Kant probably would have agreed with Wittgenstein. — Banno

But you have already turned this on its head. Rather, I would have phrased it, "Wittgenstein should have (rightly) attributed the point to Kant himself" instead of going off on something Kant explained (unnecessarily as if sui generis from Kant).

It isn't, it's irrelevant, and takes up far too much time and effort. — Banno

As you probably know, Schopenhauer fills the X with "The Will" and Hegel "absolute unfolding in dialectic of history", etc. and others with various other things, but is that not more of a 19th century debate that has somewhat faded away unless discussing "history of philosophy" and/or people take up the debates anew (as I often do, but reoriented with newer information at hand and different arguments)?

There is, actually, curtesy of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument. We can say nothing about the supposed thing-in-itself, so it cannot have a use in the conversation. It's a useless notion that can be set aside.

Unfortunately folk continue to say quite a bit about it. — Banno

I'm not sure that's a response. Since Kant didn't have much to say about it either other than as a theory of something that is probably there, but can't say much (X); it's about a wash with the beetle argument. A lot of words spent saying what Kant already said, shame.

You can almost claim self-awareness and values are one and the same because selfhood means holding values. Because abundant energetic activity, thoroughly and precisely executed in persistence over significant time, marshals resources to achieve the far from equilibrium state of a living organism,
the biological process presents as a synonym for values. The process of creating life is exquisitely value-centered. Slight deviations from these precisely calibrated values precludes the appearance of living organisms. — ucarr

I thought this was an excellent insight here. Humans have to value something, hold it as a reason for pursuing before the pursuit. Before one ounce of ink is spilled over A -> B, or 1 + 1 = 2, one has to care. As one philosopher noted (and has become almost a mantra), there is an "aboutness" to consciousness, an "intentional stance". This takes the forms in different creatures, but in humans, the value seems primary. Yes there are reflexes and physical responses to stimuli or lack thereof, but most of everything takes on value-drives. But these values I would say have implications that are nearing "necessity" when one takes into account self-awareness OF EXISTENCE itself. So do the values lead to conclusions, or is it always open-ended?

Gonna conjure Apo? It’s his wheelhouse, though if I remember he wasn’t particularly impressed of this information theory- could be mistaken.

Oldie, but goodie.

I only "troll" dogmatic Dunning-Kruger sophists, so by all means practice what you preach: "withdraw", lil butthurt schop. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Again thanks for displaying an example of the topic. Chatgpt has a good take. Describes you to a T:

An internet troll works by provoking reactions. Trolls often post inflammatory, off-topic, or simply annoying comments in online spaces with the goal of upsetting or frustrating others, often to entertain themselves or disrupt the flow of conversation. They typically exploit emotional triggers, baiting people into arguments

But it also understands what you do right below the radar:

People who don’t engage constructively or respectfully in disagreements often fall into a less obvious but still disruptive category of online behavior. These individuals may not outright troll, but they use tactics that impede productive discussion and amplify tension. Here’s how they typically operate:

Dismissive Language: Instead of addressing points thoughtfully, they’ll dismiss opposing views with sarcasm, short rebuffs, or blanket statements. This subtly shows disdain without contributing meaningfully to the conversation.
Passive-Aggressive Remarks: They may use veiled insults or condescending tones rather than direct criticism, creating a toxic atmosphere that can make people feel unheard or disrespected without outright hostility.
Refusal to Acknowledge Valid Points: Rather than considering points that counter their views, they ignore or downplay them, refusing to engage with any part of an argument they can’t immediately dismiss.
Straw Man Arguments and Deflection: Instead of addressing the actual points raised, they distort them, making it easier to refute, or pivot to unrelated issues to avoid the real debate.
Subtle Hostility: They might avoid outright insults but still make others feel belittled or unwelcome with tones that imply the inferiority of other perspectives.
Unlike overt trolls, these people often remain within the boundaries of site rules, making their behavior more challenging to address directly. However, their approach can be equally damaging to discourse by discouraging open, respectful dialogue and fostering an environment where productive exchanges are stifled. Responding calmly, asking clarifying questions, or even disengaging can help minimize the impact of their behavior.

Either way, life on earth is rigged for insuperable misery until death. However, the theist, unlike the antinatalist, can triumph over death through belief grounded in a faith lying beyond knowledge. — ucarr

I think that post is a nice summary of pessimism, as it plays out for the atheistic antinatalist and the theist (some forms at least). Just keep in mind, for Schopenhauer's conception, there are very few "manifestations of will" (individual people to you and me), who are able to "triumph over death through belief grounded in a faith lying beyond knowledge". Far far more people would be mired in the tragedy of suffering (assertion of will) that plays out from birth.

Antinatalism imposes original sin whereas theism gives saints a choice between sin and sanctity. — ucarr

I am not sure what you mean that antinatalism "imposes" original sin. Rather, antinatalism tries to prevent original sin (if we mean by this "birth" / the beginning of assertion of will for yet another hapless individual/manifestation/soul/person/ego/etc.etc.).

As one such antinatalist, I would propose that there can be communal catharsis, things I've proposed many times before and people have in various ways disagreed with because various attachments to work and relationships and modern living have made it seem like I am just not giving a balanced report. Inherent and contingent forms of suffering aren't taken seriously. And then, when something tragic happens, only then, maybe existential issues are entertained.

I'm struggling to see how this isn't another way of saying that, for some individuals -- the elect -- salvation happens through divine grace unwilled.* — ucarr

I guess we do agree on that point, as long as we have the same understanding of "grace unwilled" which I think you do now.

Gnosis, being knowledge of spiritual mysteries, comes to the saint unbidden, doesn't it? — ucarr

Yes

The secular bent of my mind has me conjecturing the following: Schopenhauer has worked out a plan for abstracting oneself from causality and the willful manipulation thereof. This abstraction to pure isolation sets up a subsequent dissolution of the self into... what?

If dissolution of the self into non-existence is salvation, then the unborn are blessed, and the living are cursed. This doesn't sound right to my ear that's always heard life is holy, not that non-existence is
holy. When a transgressor receives the death penalty for commission of a heinous crime, dissolution into non-existence unbidden is salvation? The life of a saintly buddhist dovetails with the life of an unrepentant blackguard? — ucarr

Well, Schopenhauer did believe birth was not good, so yes. He was a proto-antinatalist. However, since he wasn't a materialist but believed that Will needed to be denied, and this is only done through person becoming will-less, then only the ascetic saint, and not just any old death would do.

I myself am more materialist- or at least less believing in this notion of a unified Will... So I am being charitable myself here to Schopenhauer. Rather, I advocate antinatalism (no one should have children), and then for those already born, I don't see much way forward. I only have "practical" recommendations like "do not engage with others as it leads to more suffering". It just made me think of the other stuff one can do to minimize attachments and ultimately, unnecessary entanglements that "seem" good but actually may lead to simply more headache. That is to say, ascetics without the metaphysics perhaps.

First, I'd like to thank you for being Exhibit A for answering the OP question:
Withdrawal is the answer to most axiological problems concerning humans

I like to see the point demonstrated in real time.

Second, I don't engage/indulge/feed belligerent/hostile posters/trolls. Go troll someone else.

It seems to me that, given the above, Christianity's Gospel cannot be served up to the masses (as we are taught); salvation cannot be be reeled in like a fish on a hook; there is no learning how to fish for salvation, as it comes unbidden to the elect, in accordance with a mysterious divinity. If this is true, then Jesus came to earth to greet those already divinely chosen for the afterlife in heaven. — ucarr

I have several things I have contention with in your interpretation
1) Schopenhauer was absolutely an atheist, even if his metaphysics was a speculative Will. So when he discusses Christianity, everything is metaphor. If you look at what he said about Jesus more closely, you'll see he did not believe nor care about the actual Christian belief of a dead/resurrecting god, but rather only the metaphor of a being who REPRESENTS a "denial of the Will" in opposition to METAPHORICAL ADAM, who is "assertion of will". See the quote here:

Yet the origin of this sin is to be referred to the will of the sinner. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in him; Adam became miserable, and in him we have all become miserable. Certainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what remains is only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories. Therefore Jesus Christ ought always to be conceived in the universal, as the symbol or personification of the denial of the will to live, but never as an individual, whether according to his mythical history given in the Gospels, or according to the probably true history which lies at the foundation of this. — WWR Book 4

2) The "already divinely chosen", "group of elect" is not what I think Schopenhauer is going for in his notion of "grace", rather he is referring to the Protestant Christian notion that there is no contingency related to salvation (complete denial of the will to non-being). That is to say, "If I do this, then I salvation will happen". If this was the case, then cause-and-effect would be in effect and that already presupposes the operations of the will. Therefore and salvation-proper would take place by some non-causal capacity of the individual. This has always been there perhaps for some characters, to be realized, but one cannot tie it to a specific causal reason.

I see here that faith is a type of knowing, perhaps divine knowing. In our language, "knowing" is a verb, an action. Is there a divine knowing possible in the form of an existential reality that can be practiced within the natural world? — ucarr

No, this is just more about the non-causal type of salvation that is not contingent. The "knowing" would be something akin to a gnosis that one "reaches" (but again it's all very hard to describe being that "reaches" would indicate causality and thus explicitly not what he characterizes salvation).

What comes to mind as a possible alternative to non-existence is something akin to the virtual body of Jesus on earth. — ucarr

Well, he did talk about Jesus being a "spirt" of sorts, but again even this would be a metaphor to Schopenhauer, as he didn't care about the Christian mythos related to Jesus. It's simply the idea of salvation through a higher knowledge.

I wonder if the passage described here might better be characterized by some label other than "suicide." What about the idea of replacing "suicide" with "ascension"? Might Jesus' total surrender of his will to God have been the form of his ascension from the cave?

I've thought of ascension as a type of explosion that creates instead of destroys. In this context it might be the creative explosion of the will. With its explosion, the will merges into the Divinity. — ucarr

Yes perhaps, but then this is purely metaphorical. It would have to simply be instructive in what is happening to one's will. Remember, Schopenhauer's whole thesis is about "denial of the Will". That is to say, it's a negation. Thus things like "merge" and "creative explosion" would have to be in the negative meaning, it would have to be about the negation of one's will. It is thus so thoroughly denies (by some higher gnosis, I guess, given by grace), that one is like nothing, non-being. Again, very hard to describe in words, but we can get a sense.

As with most of my threads that come to a few pages, I recommend reading from the beginning to see how the conversation has unfolded, which might inform more of the ideas and the dialectic already at play.

However, there doesnt seem to be any reason for why suicide isn't the conclusion here, since non-experience will always have less suffering compared to the little in withdrawl. If you factor in the value of others, then it implies efilism (action towards human extinction). The fact you dont come to these conclusions suggests to me that you either dont realise this is the logical conclusion, or that you do have some value for desire aswell, although I dont know how that factors into your belief that withdrawl is still positive (seeing as that seems to imply suffering is valued more than desire). — Ourora Aureis

I am an ardent antinatalist- not so sure about "efilist". As for suicide, indeed if you read how I'm interpreting Schopenhauer, the ascetic man's final demise is suicide-through-starvation, with a moment of "grace" beforehand. That's how I interpret how he foresees any redemption of Will. Being that Schopenhauer's conception of will-to-live is tied so thoroughly to the subject/object and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the physical manifestation would surely cease functioning (to us, the still living), it would seem. Thus, I don't think Schopenhauer's version of "grace" (redemption) would be fully realized by a Buddha that is "enlightened" yet is still living. I think it would fully be someone who died a sort of "ascetic's death". That's just my interpretation of his notion of ascetic saintliness though.

As far as the OP, well, it was a milder version of all this really, recommending that we are not all going to be ascetic saints. Schopenhauer thought only certain characters were up to this, most weren't. But, as practical advice, I thought it such that social entanglements are a good place to start to reduce drama and the convoluted disappointments and despair that comes from it. It also provided a launching point for explaining how social engagements- despite popular opinion/media are not as fully conducive to flourishing as we may think. The conventional wisdom is to find good friends and partners/lovers. But perhaps this is like a mirage, an illusion that in the end brings more baggage than good. Contra popular wisdom, social entanglements almost always lead to worse outcomes, despite the initial "highs" one gets from their initial engagement- in preventing the "lonely" feelings of the isolated individual.

The "middle way" is probably one of the most misunderstood terms when referring to Buddhism. For old-school Theravadans, the "middle way" actually means living a monk's life -- with eating only one meal a day, wearing only robes, not engaging in sex, and all the other rules of a monk's life.

For those Buddhists, death alone doesn't solve anything (regardless whether it's by starvation or gunshot wound). It's rebirth that needs to be ended, in order to end suffering. — baker

You misinterpret me. First off, I am proposing an even more extreme version in the Schopenhauer brand of asceticism. I am claiming that in his version, even the Middle Way of the Buddhist (Theravadans or otherwise), is not enough. Rather, that in his conception, whereby Will is extricabley tied up on physical existence, I see no way that the ascetic is physiologically still alive after their "grace" of salvation (spiritual redemption into non-being). It seems in his way, even the monk is not going to get there. And it is doubtful a Buddha who stays around to teach his enlightenment has actually become non-being.. Perhaps on their way.. I get the impression that the ascetic death is basically one of the only occasions.. perhaps a sort of grace before death and then (to us, the people left), a dead person.

In modern politcally correct culture, it's not acceptable to be ruthlessly selective in whom one associates with and for what purpose. — baker

This would be completely anathema advice to the what the ascetic viewpoint. It precisely leans into the attachments and that which causes more pain. The goal-seeking here, and the many sources for entanglements in drama/disappointment will be part of any human interaction. Even the calculative aspect of selection you speak of already sets the stage prior to the engagement.

And yet it appears to be possible to come up with such a set of values and goals, and thus priorities, accompanied by sufficient pride, that the vicissitudes of life are a minimal problem or source of suffering. This way, one is still engaged with the world (and not minimally), and yet doesn't suffer. Pride and priorities. — baker

I am not quiet sure what you are saying. If the ascetic follows it all the way through, they kill themselves through starvation. If not, I guess minimizing the addiction (the delusion of what's good that is really not.. like social interactions), is a good start. And thus my post here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/945569

It's telling that people generally prefer to think in black and white, all or nothing terms, rather than reconceptualizing the situation entirely. — baker

To be fair, the most common view for almost anything is "balance". I'm actually bucking that advise with what you may call "black-and-white" thinking. It's extreme and unsettling (when we usually think in terms of common advise terms like Golden Mean-type / Taoist koan "balance" or modern self-help stock strategies) for sure, not necessarily wrong.

Sure, withdrawing is fine and "leads to greater happiness" as long as someone else is paying your bills (such as in the case of Buddhist monks), or at least as long as your job is comfortable enough and you can earn money with relative ease.

But if such is not the case, one has to stay in the rat race, and be a rat, or be defeated. — baker

Absolutely. But I did say this:

However, being that food limitation and bodily starvation are near impossible for most, withdrawal is the next best thing. It is not going to solve the ultimate problem of disturbance laid upon us by existence itself, but it limits overall drama and harm caused to others. Withdrawal is preventative, but also a statement about not allowing oneself to inflict harms upon others. The key is to ensure that any contact is purely transactional- just enough to meet the basic requirements of existence, without letting it spiral into further emotional entanglements. — schopenhauer1

That is to say, the best some might be able to do is limit engagements, not completely eliminate them.

So, at the moment, I'm thinking self transcendence is an ego-stroking mind game. Why else would the saints, if they had really merged into non-existence, leave behind their writings? — ucarr

Two things to note about Schopenhauer's approach, or as I tentatively see it (it is complicated):

1) I think there is an idea of "grace" in Schopenhauer's approach to non-being. That is to say, it is not striven for, but received, but only as a final salvo of one's original isolation and denial of the senses:

Having regard, not to the individuals according to the principle of sufficient reason, but to the Idea of man in its unity, Christian theology symbolises nature, the assertion of the will to live in Adam, whose sin, inherited by us, i.e., our unity with him in the Idea, which is represented in time by the bond of procreation, makes us all partakers of suffering and eternal death. On the other hand, it symbolises grace, the denial of the will, salvation, in the incarnate God, who, as free from all sin, that is, from all willing of life, cannot, like us, have proceeded from the most pronounced assertion of the will, nor can he, like us, have a body which is through and through simply concrete will, manifestation of the will; but born of a pure virgin, he has only a phantom body. This last is the doctrine of the Docetæ, i.e., certain Church Fathers, who in this respect are very consistent. It is especially taught by Apelles, against whom and his followers Tertullian wrote. But even Augustine comments thus on the passage, Rom. viii. 3, "God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh:" "Non enim caro peccati erat, quæ non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat" (Liber 83, quæst. qu. 66). He also teaches in his work entitled "Opus Imperfectum," i. 47, that inherited sin is both sin and punishment at once. It is already present in new-born children, but only shows itself if they grow up. Yet the origin of this sin is to be referred to the will of the sinner. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in him; Adam became miserable, and in him we have all become miserable. Certainly the doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great truth which constitutes the essence of Christianity, while most of what remains is only the clothing of it, the husk or accessories. Therefore Jesus Christ ought always to be conceived in the universal, as the symbol or personification of the denial of the will to live, but never as an individual, whether according to his mythical history given in the Gospels, or according to the probably true history which lies at the foundation of this. For neither the one nor the other will easily satisfy us entirely. It is merely the vehicle of that conception for the people, who always demand something actual. That in recent times Christianity has forgotten its true significance, and degenerated into dull optimism, does not concern us here.

It is further an original and evangelical doctrine of Christianity — which Augustine, with the consent of the leaders of the Church, defended against the platitudes of the Pelagians, and which it was the principal aim of Luther's endeavour to purify from error and re-establish, as he expressly declares in his book, "De Servo Arbitrio," — the doctrine that the will is not free, but originally subject to the inclination to evil. Therefore according to this doctrine the deeds of the will are always sinful and imperfect, and can never fully satisfy justice; and, finally, these works can never save us, but faith alone, a faith which itself does not spring from resolution and free will, but from the work of grace, without our co-operation, comes to us as from without.

Not only the dogmas referred to before, but also this last genuine evangelical dogma belongs to those which at the present day an ignorant and dull opinion rejects as absurd or hides. For, in spite of Augustine and Luther, it adheres to the vulgar Pelagianism, which the rationalism of the day really is, and treats as antiquated those deeply significant dogmas which are peculiar and essential to Christianity in the strictest sense; while, on the other hand, it holds fast and regards as the principal matter only the dogma that originates in Judaism, and has been retained from it, and is merely historically connected with Christianity.[28] We, however, recognise in the doctrine referred to above the truth completely agreeing with the result of our own investigations. We see that true virtue and holiness of disposition have their origin not in deliberate choice (works), but in knowledge (faith); just as we have in like manner developed it from our leading thought. If it were works, which spring from motives and deliberate intention, that led to salvation, then, however one may turn it, virtue would always be a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism. But the faith to which the Christian Church promises salvation is this: that as through the fall of the first man we are all partakers of sin and subject to death and perdition, through the divine substitute, through grace and the taking upon himself of our fearful guilt, we are all saved, without any merit of our own (of the person); since that which can proceed from the intentional (determined by motives) action of the person, works, can never justify us, from its very nature, just because it is intentional, action induced by motives, opus operatum. Thus in this faith there is implied, first of all, that our condition is originally and essentially an incurable one, from which we need salvation; then, that we ourselves essentially belong to evil, and are so firmly bound to it that our works according to law and precept, i.e., according to motives, can never satisfy justice nor save us; but salvation is only obtained through faith, i.e., through a changed mode of knowing, and this faith can only come through grace, thus as from without. This means that the salvation is one which is quite foreign to our person, and points to a denial and surrender of this person necessary to salvation. Works, the result of the law as such, can never justify, because they are always action following upon motives. Luther demands (in his book "De Libertate Christiana") that after the entrance of faith the good works shall proceed from it entirely of themselves, as symptoms, as fruits of it; yet by no means as constituting in themselves a claim to merit, justification, or reward, but taking place quite voluntarily and gratuitously. So we also hold that from the ever-clearer penetration of the principium individuationis proceeds, first, merely free justice, then love, extending to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally resignation or denial of the will. — WWR Book 4

2) I think Schopenhauer's version of non-being is almost necessarily accompanied by a physical death because at that point of salvation, how does one go back to "willing" again? Willing is so intertwined with physiological living for Schopenhauer, I cannot see how the final "salvation" can be anything different (like a Buddhist might believe with the Middle Path):

There is a species of suicide which seems to be quite distinct from the common kind, though its occurrence has perhaps not yet been fully established. It is starvation, voluntarily chosen on the ground of extreme asceticism. All instances of it, however, have been accompanied and obscured by much religious fanaticism, and even superstition. Yet it seems that the absolute denial of will may reach the point at which the will shall be wanting to take the necessary nourishment for the support of the natural life. This kind of suicide is so far from being the result of the will to live, that such a completely resigned ascetic only ceases to live because he has already altogether ceased to will. No other death than that by starvation is in this case conceivable (unless it were the result of some special superstition); for the intention to cut short the torment would itself be a stage in the assertion of will. The dogmas which satisfy the reason of such a penitent delude him with the idea that a being of a higher nature has inculcated the fasting to which his own inner tendency drives him.

...

It might be supposed that the entire exposition (now terminated) of that which I call the denial of the will is irreconcilable with the earlier explanation of necessity, which belongs just as much to motivation as to every other form of the principle of sufficient reason, and according to which, motives, like all causes, are only occasional causes, upon which the character unfolds its nature and reveals it with the necessity of a natural law, on account of which we absolutely denied freedom as liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ. But far from suppressing this here, I would call it to mind. In truth, real freedom, i.e., independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs to the will only as a thing-in-itself, not to its manifestation, whose essential form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element or sphere of necessity. But the one case in which that freedom can become directly visible in the manifestation is that in which it makes an end of what manifests itself, and because the mere manifestation, as a link in the chain of causes, the living body in time, which contains only phenomena, still continues to exist, the will which manifests itself through this phenomenon then stands in contradiction to it, for it denies what the phenomenon expresses. In such a case the organs of generation, for example, as the visible form of the sexual impulse, are there and in health; but yet, in the inmost consciousness, no sensual gratification is desired; and although the whole body is only the visible expression of the will to live, yet the motives which correspond to this will no longer act ; indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual, and in this way the greatest check to the natural will, is welcome and desired. Now, the contradiction between our assertions of the necessity of the determination of the will by motives, in accordance with the character, on the one hand, and of the possibility of the entire suppression of the will whereby the motives become powerless, on the other hand, is only the repetition in the reflection of philosophy of this real contradiction which arises from the direct encroachment of the freedom of the will-in-itself, which knows no necessity, into the sphere of the necessity of its manifestation. But the key to the solution of these contradictions lies in the fact that the state in which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not proceed directly from the will, but from a changed form of knowledge. So long as the knowledge is merely that which is involved in the principium individuationis and exclusively follows the principle of sufficient reason, the strength of the motives is irresistible. But when the principium individuationis is seen through, when the Ideas, and indeed the inner nature of the thing-in-itself, as the same will in all, are directly recognised, and from this knowledge an universal quieter of volition arises, then the particular motives become ineffective, because the kind of knowledge which corresponds to them is obscured and thrown into the background by quite another kind. Therefore the character can never partially change, but must, with the consistency of a law of Nature, carry out in the particular the will which it manifests as a whole. But this whole, the character itself, may be completely suppressed or abolished through the change of knowledge referred to above. It is this suppression or abolition which Asmus, as quoted above, marvels at and denotes the "catholic, transcendental change;" and in the Christian Church it has very aptly been called the new birth, and the knowledge from which it springs, the work of grace. Therefore it is not a question of a change, but of an entire suppression of the character; and hence it arises that, however different the characters which experience the suppression may have been before it, after it they show a great similarity in their conduct, though every one still speaks very differently according to his conceptions and dogmas.

You might be interested in my last post as this kind of addresses some paradoxes/questions you raise.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/945569

@I like sushi

Imagine an analogy relating to social relationships and the concept of withdrawal. Picture existence as having a kind of "trickster" element.

The common idea is that we must find balance in our engagement with life- too much indulgence leads to an unhealthy lifestyle, and excess brings pain. This aligns with the "Golden Mean" approach, where moderation is the ideal.

However, the ascetic perspective is more radical, challenging the common viewpoint. The ascetic views the world as a kind of addictive drug: the more you engage with it, the more entangled you become. The attachment grows, and it grips you more tightly. True liberation, from this perspective, comes from withdrawing and reducing engagement with what ensnares us. Thus, the usual wisdom that advocates social engagement becomes, paradoxically, like a drug- poisonous over time.

In this light, the progression of loneliness to non-being becomes a journey away from attachment: Loneliness > Aloneness > Solitude > Stillness > Non-being



Just like an addictive pleasure, social attachment may initially seem beneficial, but it brings unintended consequences. Though you may not feel it right away, the effects will eventually surface. Learning to live alone and detach from the need for constant interaction brings a different kind of freedom.

I understand the counterargument: “But there's freedom and fulfillment in good friendships, challenging relationships, and the dramas of life.” Yet, this perspective, while valid, is also a justification for engagement that often leads to suffering. It's a departure from a “eusocial” outlook, and I realize this can be unsettling.

In a Buddhist sense, this process involves releasing attachment. Schopenhauer goes further, suggesting that at the point of complete detachment, an unmotivated “grace” arises, leading to a state beyond will- even to the point of embracing starvation. Though this concept is difficult to fully comprehend, it reflects Schopenhauer’s extreme view. Here’s a quote from the final pages of Book 4 in The World as Will and Representation:

Before us there is certainly only nothingness. But that which resists this passing into nothing, our nature, is indeed just the will to live, which we ourselves are as it is our world. That we abhor annihilation so greatly, is simply another expression of the fact that we so strenuously will life, and are nothing but this will, and know nothing besides it. But if we turn our glance from our own needy and embarrassed condition to those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having attained to perfect self-knowledge, found itself again in all, and then freely denied itself, and who then merely wait to see the last trace of it vanish with the body which it animates; then, instead of the restless striving and effort, instead of the constant transition from wish to fruition, and from joy to sorrow, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope which constitutes the life of the man who wills, we shall see that peace which is above all reason, that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest, that inviolable confidence and serenity, the mere reflection of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio have represented it, is an entire and certain gospel; only knowledge remains, the will has vanished. We look with deep and painful longing upon this state, beside which the misery and wretchedness of our own is brought out clearly by the contrast. Yet this is the only consideration which can afford us lasting consolation, when, on the one hand, we have recognised incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the manifestation of will, the world; and, on the other hand, see the world pass away with the abolition of will, and retain before us only empty nothingness. Thus, in this way, by contemplation of the life and conduct of saints, whom it is certainly rarely granted us to meet with in our own experience, but who are brought before our eyes by their written history, and, with the stamp of inner truth, by art, we must banish the dark impression of that nothingness which we discern behind all virtue and holiness as their final goal, and which we fear as children fear the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways—is nothing. — Schopenhauer -WWR Book 4

I’m on a philosophy forum. Debating ideas.

There are moral facts. — Bob Ross

You would have to prove that there is an underlying principle that is necessary for government to even justly operate.

The American Revolution used a lot of "self-evident" truths for this. The problem is that contrary to your view, it was not brought from without, but came from within. Even then, only 1/3 of Americans were "pro" revolution. 1/3 were "Torries" (wanted to remain British), and 1/3 were agnostic (and this is not including slaves or Native Americans of course).

Importing a revolution only works if people want it internally. The American Revolution was fueled by mainly large landholders, lawyers, and merchants that were well-read in Enlightenment ideals (Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Diderot, Voltaire, etc.). The culture comes before the action, generally. China, Iran, North Korea, et al. are highly restrictive precisely to reduce exposure to this. So, perhaps the validity of your argument comes from somehow opening doors of cultural exchange, not outright war.

When you are suggesting even fasting and starvation for the bare minimum bodily existence, you are escaping from yourself too. Schopenhauer was into Buddhism. That is what the Buddhists practice, and their aim is escaping the world, and even from their own existence too. — Corvus

So, are you critiquing Schopenhauer, Buddhism, or asceticism in general? If you have a specific issue with these philosophies, lay it out- I'm genuinely curious. Too often, people throw around vague criticisms to be contrarian or they have a bone to pick, without really engaging with the core ideas, or any number of unknown reasons why people like to argue. If you think there’s a flaw in Schopenhauer’s or Buddhism’s approach to transcending the self, make the case. Give me more than an overused cliché about escape—show me there’s substance behind your argument. Present to me that you know what Schopenhauer (or Buddhism if you want) says about asceticism and then debate the point.

Well, it entails a life. Any living organism is aware of its environment, which includes the organism. It is causally self-reflexive in the sense that it responds to its environment, and the fact that there is an environment causes its response. — jkop

That is what most animals do. But I am talking about self-awareness of existence (pretty just us).

edited for more explanation

I did read it. The title "withdrawal", and your comments in the OP like above give strong impression that you were suggesting the best way to live your life is escaping from the social activities, the world, and even your own existence. — Corvus

Ok, what about it? You can't escape from yourself is not a response to the idea I am proposing. Are you familiar with ascetic practice? Schopenhauer et al? There are more complex ideas at play here. By just saying it like that, you present a cliche as philosophical critique. Which is why I "withdraw" much critical response to it.

There is 'being alive' and there is 'living'. It is unfortunate you have not seen the difference yet. If you keep digging down you may, perhaps, come to understand things differently. — I like sushi

So is this like Corvus in the other thread? Am I supposed to refer to the Hollywood movie where the curmudgeon main character learns that human connection is the most important thing?

The point is that, your seeking to withdraw from the world, society and yourself will be futile and unrealistic. — Corvus

Queue Hollywood movie.

So you didn't really read my post. You don't get what I am conveying about Schopenhauer. Do you know what a charitable reading is? Before you critique, breakdown something in what you think the intended idea is.

You can withdraw from the world, but you cannot withdraw from yourself and your own existence. — Corvus

Yeah sorta my OP. What’s your point other than cliches? Read my op as I don’t think you grasped what I was conveying,

But if everyone withdrew from the world, then would they not be harming each other even more? All the jobs to be done for others wouldn't be done, and the world will degenerate into chaos e.g. rubbish bins won't be collected, no running water and no electricity due to everyone withdrew from the world and their duties in the works, and the shops, schools, and hospitals shut. — Corvus

Best preventative option is not producing more workers. For us laborers already here, I did say this:

The key is to ensure that any contact is purely transactional- just enough to meet the basic requirements of existence, without letting it spiral into further emotional entanglements. — schopenhauer1

The ineffable. Does the ineffable have a place in philosophy? Does talk of The Middle Way or The Dao/Tao really constitute a philosophical position we can do much with? — I like sushi

I gave you language more adept at conveying non-willing, as you noted action words driven by goals. As far as the ineffable, it isn’t hard to articulate the problem- being born/existence itself. The solutions I’ve presented over and over. Tell someone on here who recently fell in love that existence is suffering. The hormones alone will lead them to (internally) violently resist. They just “won” and you are going to question that? Skip a few years and babies, and more pay from work, and a bit of status in society. You end up with grandkids and half the old timer posters on here giving you their quite middlebrow-everyday man’s workaday morals of something equivalent to Aristotle’s Golden Mean. At the most, they can give you “balance” in some Tao inspired koan. But it’s all to preserve that lifestyle. They cling to it, because if that was lost, a whole despair from a loss and attachment to a lifestyle and stability has gone away. Of course these posters oppose the kind of radical pessimism and antinatalism I speak of.

I guess it works more like in this post..note, language is tricky here:

But as for the starvation, I wonder how far Schopenhauer intended the ascetic. Sometimes I think he thought the ascetic man needed to go beyond Buddhist monks. Starvation without really starving, because one is no longer attached. This happens not through striving though, because that itself would be "motivated" and this "will-driven". It's sort of a paradox. — schopenhauer1

So Schopenhauer claims there is no diversity in the ways people respond to their conditions? In that case he would obviously be mistaken. — Janus

:roll:

Please lay out the point you want to make. I am not inclined to read that passage and have to try to figure out what the counterpoint to what I said is. — Janus

All of what you said is pretty much the opposite of Schopenhauer's claim. Figure it out.

In the case of life itself however it becomes a bit less clear what it is we're trying to avoid (or gain control over). Death perhaps? — Tzeentch

With other people, its more pain. With life, it's more pain. And thus, one gives up perhaps eros or philia for agape. Loneliness becomes aloneness becomes solitude becomes stillness becomes non-being. Or something like that.

Genuinely, I think much of the negative influence we experience from social interactions are a product of the aforementioned whims of passion and desire.

Asceticism and isolation can be a way to regain control over these influences. — Tzeentch

:up:

Fasting can be productive, but don't starve yourself. Even Buddha seemed to have felt this wasn't necessary. But what's stopping you? — Tzeentch

What's stopping me, is me.

But as for the starvation, I wonder how far Schopenhauer intended the ascetic. Sometimes I think he thought the ascetic man needed to go beyond Buddhist monks. Starvation without really starving, because one is no longer attached. This happens not through striving though, because that itself would be "motivated" and this "will-driven". It's sort of a paradox.

Fun quote.

In some ways I view the problems you describe similarly as for example addictive substances. One can avoid them like the plague, in fear of the damage they might do. Or one may, treading cautiously, confront the danger and rise above it. The latter approach bears a certain risk - this is true. — Tzeentch

:up:

Human social interaction, for all its surface appeal and fleeting “highs,” often pulls us into cycles of drama, pain, and struggle that leave lasting marks. Entangling ourselves in the lives and expectations of others can feel exhilarating initially, like a quick fix of validation or belonging, but it frequently devolves into complex webs of obligation, conflict, and disappointment. Much like a drug, social interaction can create a dependency- where we crave that next connection or approval, only to find it comes with an equal measure of stress, misunderstandings, and sometimes even betrayal. In the end, the temporary buzz fades, often leaving us more entangled and drained than before.

This isn’t about a rigid rule for how every single person should live; it’s about recognizing that most of our daily struggles come from entanglements with others- the stress, drama, and inevitable disappointments of dealing with people, along with all the attachment and validation-seeking that comes along with it.

I’m not saying everyone can just turn their backs on this and be perfectly content. But look at those who do- monks, ascetics, anyone who’s chosen to walk away from the usual cycle of social and material pursuits. They weren’t born immune to desire or perfectly serene; they actively choose to confront and deny those attachments, and in doing so, they find a quieter, more enduring form of satisfaction. Sure, it’s a path that involves struggle, but it’s a different kind of struggle- one that cuts through the noise instead of adding to it.

It’s understandable that, with longer lives, the idea of spending decades in isolated repose might seem daunting or even unbearable. But maybe that very dread hints at how conditioned we are to constant social stimulation, mistaking it for fulfillment. The silence and simplicity of withdrawal might seem intimidating in theory, but in practice, it could offer a kind of clarity and peace that our social habits continually obscure. This isn’t about forcing isolation on everyone; it’s about rethinking what kind of life actually brings us to a place of genuine peace.