So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises. — Metaphysician Undercover
I will try again. You said; — Fooloso4
Simple objects do. — Fooloso4
An object is not a function. The possibility of and ways in which simple objects combine is determined by those objects themselves. — Fooloso4
An object is not a way of organizing data. Objects are self-organizing in that the possibilities of combining are build into the objects. — Fooloso4
Objects are not in memory. They subsist independently of what is the case. — Fooloso4
None of this is a matter of what I say being right or wrong. It can all be supported and has been supported in this thread by reference to the text. — Fooloso4
4] With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology, 'prehensions'
are a generalization from Descartes' mental 'cogitations,' and from
Locke's 'ideas,' to express the most concrete mode of analysis applicable
to every grade of individual actuality. Descartes and Locke maintained a
two-substance ontology-Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication. Descartes, the mathematical physicist, emphasized his account of corporeal
substance; and Locke, the physician and the sociologist, confined himself
to an account of mental substance. The philosophy of organism, in its
scheme for one type of actual entities, adopts the view that Locke's account of mental substance embodies, in a very special form, a more penetrating philosophic description than does Descartes' account of corporeal
substance. Nevertheless, Descartes' account must find its place in the
philosophic scheme. On the whole, this is the moral to be drawn from
the Monadologyt of Leibniz. His monads are best conceived as generalizations of contemporary notions of mentality. The contemporary notions
of physical bodies only enter into his philosophy subordinately and derivatively. The philosophy of organism endeavours to hold the balance more
evenly. But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mental
operations. — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead
Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space? Are they real existences? Or, are they merely relations or determinations of things, such, however, as would equally belong to these things in themselves, though they should never become objects of intuition; or, are they such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently to the subjective constitution of the mind, without which these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any object? In order to become informed on these points, we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception as given à priori.
1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation. — Kant- Critique of Pure Reason
The world is everything that is the case.*
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the
facts.
1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and
also all that is not the case.
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.
1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything
else remain the same.
2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an
atomic fact.
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic
fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged
in the thing.
2.0121 It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing
that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state
of aairs could be made to t.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them. — Tractatus
Of course he could! But you being wrong about him is still wrong. — Fooloso4
He is not explaining epistemology. He is saying that logic is a transcendental condition for epistemology. — Fooloso4
We do not simply see things as they are but according to the way we represent or picture them. — Fooloso4
Objects such as blue, unicorn and hat and concepts such as processes and evolution are not referred to in the Tractatus as they are concepts proper in ordinary language and the Tractatus is not dealing with ordinary language.
Another reason that concepts such as process and evolution are not referred to in the Tractatus is that they are abstract concepts, such as angst and beauty, which can neither be described nor shown. Only concrete concepts such as blue, unicorn and hat that can be either described or shown. — RussellA
I agree that explaining how the mind can learn the meaning of the world "ngoe" from just five pictures is beyond my pay grade. All I know is that it works, and is in principle very simple.
The Tractatus only begins after I have learnt the word "ngoe", and only then, does the word "ngoe" in language mirror the "ngoe" in the world. — RussellA
On the one hand the propositional variable "x is a number" signifies a formal concept and on the other hand the variable x signifies a pseudo-concept object. Therefore, a formal concept cannot be a pseudo-concept. — RussellA
What do you think "ngoe" means, now you have been "shown" the picture? — RussellA
IE, I agree that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason makes more sense than Wittgenstein's Tracatus, although the Tractarian idea of modal worlds is very important in philosophy. — RussellA
Both can be communicated using symbols. One tells us about the state of affairs of the world, whether the case is true or false (synthetic-contingent, and experiential-empirical), and the other is necessary for language itself to function. Certainly, this could lead to a regress (definitions of definitions of definitions), and surely, at some point, it is simply just a matter of "knowing" the object is the object without any further explanation, but then we are getting into psychology, and NOT the "limits" of language. Surely I can point to these processes that account for object formation in the mind, and how we attach meaning to objects. And then, I have a "state of affairs" about how the mind KNOWS objects, and is not an infinite regress of definitions of the concept, but a theory of meaning that accounts for the concept-formation, and thus where language ends definitionally, I can continue on explanatorily with the psychology of concept-formation. — schopenhauer1
One difference between Kant and Wittgenstein is that Wittgenstein's Picture Theory in the Tractatus does not engage with the possibility of knowing that 1 + 1 = 2 prior to observing the world (as I understand it). — RussellA
It has been said that Wittgenstein never studied philosophy as such, although he may have learnt from certain other philosophers he was in direct contact with, such as Bertrand Russell. So he did ignore epistemological history as he was not interested in the history of philosophy as a field of knowledge. — RussellA
There may be a difference between Kant's analytic a priori and Wittgenstein's formal concept, in that Kant's analytic a priori is knowledge prior to any knowledge about the world, whereas Wittgenstein's formal concept straddles on one side language and thought and on the other side the world. — RussellA
In the Tractatus, the formal concepts existing in language, which cannot be described but only shown, are mirrored by formal concepts that also exist in the world
4.21 - "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs. — RussellA
IE, within the Tractatus, the number 3 cannot be a pseudo-object as it doesn't make up the substance of the world, but because it is part of the logical structure of both elementary propositions and state of affairs, it must be, as with all particular numbers, and as with all logical constants, a formal concept. — RussellA
@RussellAMathematical equations are pseudo-proposiitons , but this does not mean the equation is a concept, either proper or formal. 1+1=2 is not concept, it is a calculation. — Fooloso4
'Number' is the constant form. 1, 100, and 1,000 are variables that have as a formal property this formal concept. — Fooloso4
Yes, but Kant would simply classify it as analytic a priori. It is a truth that can be grasped through purely reasoning and not experience (equivalent to Wittgenstein's "state of affairs in the world"). But I am perplexed why with all this epistemological history he could have drawn from, he ignores it. — schopenhauer1
As numbers are formal concepts, I think I am right in saying that Wittgenstein would call this proposition meaningless. — RussellA
It seems that an object like the number1 is a formal concept, and being a formal concept, can never be the sense of a proposition and can never be described by a proposition, but only shown. — RussellA
So on the one hand I think there is a bit of begging the question with respect to the "plain meaning of the text." — Leontiskos
On the other hand, I think you are correct that obedience is central to the text, as I've noted above. I'm not quite sure what you and Hanover are disagreeing on. — Leontiskos
Yes, that is the understanding of logos that seems to be universal. The problem is knowing right from wrong. From one point of view cutting down the forest is a wonderful idea and from another point of view, it is a terrible idea. Then the ones who want to cut down the forest may come to an agreement with those who want to protect the forest and both sides get part of what they want. This thinking does not require religion, and denying non-religious people also weigh the good and the bad, is just wrong. I say so because I have dealt with Christians who think they have morals and people without God, do not have morals. While coming from a science point of view, science deniers lack morality and are the problem.
How do we know truth? — Athena
I take the rabbinic period to have begun after the fall of the second temple, which I also take to be the beginning of the Talmudic period, which is what I also take to be the beginning of Judasim as we currently know it. Prior to that, I would consider it a religion centered around the Temple and sacrifice, and, if we go back far enough, we have questions about origins generally in terms of when monotheism emerged. — Hanover
My point being that we're now to decipher what the beliefs of a people were dating back from the Bronze Age and then we get into questions of when the various parts of the Torah were written, compiled, and edited into a single version as we know it today. Laying claims to how these stories were interpreted and what significance they had is entirely speculative. For example, we have today a creation story that could just be a fable to try to explain our origins that the ancients might have taken literally, but very well might not have. In fact, Genesis has two entirely different origin stories. That story has morphed into an account of original sin and the need for God to give his only child to save us from that sin. It is also argued that Jesus is the slaughtered lamb in the Isaac story. — Hanover
The Talmud was written in the late 1st century AD, which is the best we can say regarding how the Torah has been interpreted since then. Per Jewish tradition, however, it is believed that the Talmud encompasses the oral tradition passed down by the Pharisees, and it is this oral tradition that holds as much weight as the written tradition of the Torah. That is, it is tenant of Orthodox Judaism that the oral tradition was received alongside the written word at Mt. Sinai. The point being that tradition argues that the written law was never interpreted without the oral tradition alongside it. — Hanover
So where this leaves us is in a highly contextualized spot, where we can't just say the Binding means we should blindly follow God's will without question. It certainly does present an argument that we should listen to and trust God, but it would also suggest that God wouldn't steer us wrong, and it is presented as a story that attempts to end the idea of human sacrifice, which I suspect was an issue among other religions at the time. — Hanover
But you can't make an argument that the Torah stands for the proposition generally you shouldn't argue with God and question him. There are plenty of examples of that from Moses, Abraham, and Job (and more) directly questioning God.
— Hanover
But, what does the story mean to those who read it? https://www.sefaria.org/topics/binding-of-isaac?sort=Relevance&tab=sources All sorts of things. — Hanover
Another matter, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: When Abraham sought to bind Isaac his son, he said to him: ‘Father, I am a young man, and I am concerned that my body will tremble due to fear of the knife, and I will [thereby] upset you, or perhaps the slaughter will [thereby] be rendered unfit and it will not be counted for you as a valid offering. Therefore, bind me very well.’ Thereupon, “he bound Isaac his son.” Is a person capable of binding a thirty-seven- year-old [variant reading: a twenty-six-year-old] without his consent?
Immediately, “Abraham extended his hand.” As he extended his hand to take the knife, his eyes were emitting tears and the tears were falling into Isaac’s eyes, because of the father’s mercy [for his son]. Nevertheless, his heart was joyful in fulfilling the will of his Creator. The angels gathered themselves into groups up above. What did they cry out? “The highways are desolate, those passing on the way have ceased, he breached the covenant, he has spurned the cities” (Isaiah 33:8) – does He not in fact desire Jerusalem, and the Temple that He had planned to bequeath to Isaac’s descendants? “He had no regard for man” (Isaiah 33:8) – if the merit of Abraham is not sufficient, there is no significance for any person before Him… — https://www.sefaria.org/topics/binding-of-isaac?sort=Relevance&tab=sources
But you can't make an argument that the Torah stands for the proposition generally you shouldn't argue with God and question him. There are plenty of examples of that from Moses, Abraham, and Job (and more) directly questioning God. https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/5298/Arguing-with-God.pdf — Hanover
It's a hard argument to make that the Torah stands for the notion one should not wrestle with God, considering the strange story of Jacob wrestling with God and having his name changed to "Israel." (“Your name will no longer be Jacob, but Israel, because you have struggled with God and with humans and have overcome.” Genesis 32:28) — Hanover
Faith didn't mean then what it means now. If we're accepting the Bible literally, when Abraham was told by God to sacrifice Abraham, he literally said it to him (although, again, not all traditions accept that God literally talked ever). That is, if there is some guy walking around being all powerful and I hear it and see it daily, it's hardly an act of faith to agree to do what he tells me. It's a fair stretch to then say the Bible must be followed blindly because it's God "telling" me what to do in the same sense Abraham was "told" what to do. Reading a several thousand year document contextualized with all other documents is a very different sort of "telling" than what Abraham meant by "telling." Abraham meant he was told it, not that he read a old document about it.
Anyway, I've gone on long enough, but interested in your thoughts on all this. — Hanover
There are poems and fragments of older texts dating back centuries earlier perhaps as early as the 11th century BC for some of the poems which conceptualize God in highly anthropomorphic, warrior-like ways like song of the sea. Perhaps the texts were completed around the 7th century BC? — BitconnectCarlos
According to Shaye Cohen scribes appear in the second temple period. By scribes he means laymen knowledgeable of the Tanakh. — BitconnectCarlos
Yes the general theme of the Tanakh is obey God, follow his directive, and good will come. And of course the inverse is true too. But this isn't universal as seen in Job and Ecclesiastes.
an hour ago — BitconnectCarlos
And again, this works generally how the God of the Israelites in the Tanakh operates- good is rewarded, evil is punished, and sometimes good people are punished for unclear, but heavenly reasons (Job). — schopenhauer1
You put so much work into your post and I want to honor that. My questions are sincere wonderment, trying to figure out a puzzle about how we judge truth. — Athena
Those men could not have experienced a god in an empirical way because that god is not made manifest on earth. So in want did they have faith? It seems to me they had a very high opinion of themselves, to think they could know god. What evidence of god were they using? — Athena
:chin: Just about everyone had a patron god or goddess and around the world people have done all in their power to please the gods and goddesses. There is nothing unigue about believing the Nile or an irrigation ditch will flood or there will be a good harvest if a god/goddess is pleased and bad things happen when they are displeased. People turned on their leaders when it seemed obvious the gods no longer favored them. I don't understand what you said if you said others didn't have a god's protection. — Athena
@BannoThat is, let us assume the Abrahamic religionists have foolishly accepted a literally evil text to support their morality but they themselves are folks like all others in search for the truth and the good. And so they did as you say and have turned the text upside down to have it mean something you don't see anywhere in the text, that etymology impacts the meaning in no way.
This history lesson of how their world was formed even if true doesn't matter to what the binding of Isaac means. That you can read "break a leg" to mean break a leg doesn't mean you want an actor to fracture a leg. — Hanover
Some time afterward, God put Abraham to the test, saying to him, “Abraham.” He answered, “Here I am.”
....
“Do not raise your hand against the boy, or do anything to him. For now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your favored one, from Me.”
When Abraham looked up, his eye fell upon a ram, caught in the thicket by its horns. So Abraham went and took the ram and offered it up as a burnt offering in place of his son.
...
I will bestow My blessing upon you and make your descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven and the sands on the seashore; and your descendants shall seize the gates of their foes.
All the nations of the earth shall bless themselves by your descendants, because you have obeyed My command.” — Genesis- Tanakh online
Now, in a study published today in the journal Tel Aviv, the pair reveals that ancient Judeans, in a period that spans throughout much of the first millennium B.C., enjoyed a diet that didn’t fully adhere to Jewish kosher laws. According to the study, archaeologists have found the remains of three non-kosher species in the two ancients Judean settlements—the Kingdom of Israel in the region’s north and the Kingdom of Judah in the south. Judah residents in particular ate a lot of catfish. These findings help scientists and historians build a more complete picture of how the ancient Judean cultures developed and adopted these rules.
According to rabbinic tradition, Moses, the most important prophet in Judaism, received the commandments that outlined how to live life as a Jew sometime around the 13th century B.C. Scholars don’t know exactly when these rules and practices were written down into the Torah, but in his upcoming book, Adler argues that evidence for its observance does not appear until the Hasmonean period that lasted from 140 B.C. to 37 B.C. And the point in history at which Judean citizens adopted the dietary rules prescribed in Torah into their lifestyles, essentially becoming kosher, is also not certain.
Adler has been working on the Origins of Judaism Archaeological Project, which aims to find out when ancient Judeans began to observe the laws of Torah, including dietary rules. He was hoping that the centuries-old fish scraps tossed away after dinner might help shed some light on that. “I can find out a lot about people by going through their garbage,” he says. “So we can learn a tremendous amount of what people were actually doing through the material remains they left behind—and this is particularly true for food.”
When both kingdoms rose to prominence, an average Judean denizen lived under the rule of a king, and was a farmer who plowed fields and harvested crops. With the exception of the societal elite, most individuals were illiterate. So while the educated intellectuals of the time had penned down laws, scribbling them on animal skins or papyrus, the vast majority of Judeans didn't necessarily know about them and couldn’t read them either. Even if the societal intellectuals may have started adopting kashrut, the masses likely hadn’t yet gotten the memo. — What Archaeology Tells Us About the Ancient History of Eating Kosher - Smithsonian Magazine
Now, I do think the text lauds Abraham's obedience. That is part of the meaning. I'm not convinced that Hanover was disagreeing with this. — Leontiskos
If God is interpreted as Good, then where is the secular/religious distinction you make here? — Hanover
This is just incorrect. Fundamental literalism is a reactionary response to perceived threats of the scientific revolution. It's a modern phenomenon. — Hanover
Peshat interpretations also note the importance of context, both historical and literary.[3] This is in contrast to Drash, which will often take the text of a verse out of its context, for uses beyond the context such as ritual or moral purposes.[3]
For God to be an ogre demanding obedience, you have to take a very literalist definition and you must assume he decrees without being subject to interpretation.
If, though, you apply a more open interpretation throughout all contexts, your demand for obedience isn't to some angry demanding man in the sky, but it's to a conceptual goodness.
God is fully incorporeal, so what exactly do you propose you're being obedience to? — Hanover
22:9. They arrived at the place of which God had told him. Abraham built an altar there; he laid out the wood; he bound his son Isaac; he laid him on the altar, on top of the wood.
22:10. And Abraham picked up the knife to slay his son.
22:11. Then an angel of the LORD called to him from heaven: “Abraham! Abraham!” And he answered, “Here I am.”
22:12. And he said, “Do not raise your hand against the boy, or do anything to him. For now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your favored one, from Me.” — Genesis
Now Iapetus took to wife the neat-ankled maid Clymene, daughter of Ocean, and went up with her into one bed. And she bore him a stout-hearted son, Atlas: [510] also she bore very glorious Menoetius and clever Prometheus, full of various wiles, and scatter-brained Epimetheus who from the first was a mischief to men who eat bread; for it was he who first took of Zeus the woman, the maiden whom he had formed. But Menoetius was outrageous, and farseeing Zeus [515] struck him with a lurid thunderbolt and sent him down to Erebus because of his mad presumption and exceeding pride. And Atlas through hard constraint upholds the wide heaven with unwearying head and arms, standing at the borders of the earth before the clear-voiced Hesperides; [520] for this lot wise Zeus assigned to him. And ready-witted Prometheus he bound with inextricable bonds, cruel chains, and drove a shaft through his middle, and set on him a long-winged eagle, which used to eat his immortal liver; but by night the liver grew [525] as much again everyway as the long-winged bird devoured in the whole day. That bird Heracles, the valiant son of shapely-ankled Alcmene, slew; and delivered the son of Iapetus from the cruel plague, and released him from his affliction—not without the will of Olympian Zeus who reigns on high, [530] that the glory of Heracles the Theban-born might be yet greater than it was before over the plenteous earth. This, then, he regarded, and honored his famous son; though he was angry, he ceased from the wrath which he had before because Prometheus matched himself in wit with the almighty son of Cronos. [535] For when the gods and mortal men had a dispute at Mecone, even then Prometheus was forward to cut up a great ox and set portions before them, trying to deceive the mind of Zeus. Before the rest he set flesh and inner parts thick with fat upon the hide, covering them with an ox paunch; [540] but for Zeus he put the white bones dressed up with cunning art and covered with shining fat. Then the father of men and of gods said to him: “Son of Iapetus, most glorious of all lords, good sir, how unfairly you have divided the portions!” — Hesiod
If God is interpreted as Good, then where is the secular/religious distinction you make here? — Hanover
It's how you wish use such documents that comes into debate, and that informs how you'll interpret it, meaning how you use it determines its meaning. — Hanover
Others suggest it stands for the proposition that human sacrifice is prohibited. Others as a foretelling of the coming of Jesus. — Hanover
Yep. It sits in the foundational story of Abraham, who would sacrifice his son because god wills it, glorifying doing what one is told to do over taking personal responsibility. — Banno
Ok, well we might debate what counts as adequate explanation here. But what is not a good response is to say, "yes, it does seem inadequate, but that's only because human reason is ultimately deficient." This essentially amounts to saying "I do not need to offer a convincing explanation or demonstration, because such a thing is not possible, but you should still accept the truth of what I'm saying."
This is like Luther's response to Erasmus. Erasmus says "a God who predestines — forces — man to sin, and then punishes him for it seems evil."
To which Luther responds: "yes, but it only seems evil because our reason is deficient due to the fall." This is not an explanation though. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I hear you...What I am saying is that just as it isn't uncommon to flip through a Socratic dialogue, and see Socrates challenging what others say about certain things (such as the good), and through dialogue shows how the thought leads to problems, we see Witt doing the same. In the preface to the Tractatus, Witt says his concern is first and foremost thoughts, not language...he just happens to concede that it is through language that the analysis has to be conducted since that's how we communicate our ideas with one another. — 013zen
My point is, let's assume that you're right and Witt is Saying that metaphysics such as Plato's theory of forms, really doesn't belong in a modern day metaphysics. Wouldn't you agree? (I, personally, wouldn't necessarily take Witt to be committing to this view)Is it so strange that someone that:
1. Graduated from a mechanical engineering program
2. Enrolled in an aeronautics doctorate program with the intent to design his own plane
3. Designed and patented his own propeller (tbh it was kinda a stupid design though lol)
And only after 5-6 years of this, when trying to manufacture his propeller, did Witt become interested in extremely complicated mathematics and learned about Frege and Russell. — 013zen
I am not saying that his project was different, but rather his approach, and some of his conclusions. — 013zen
So, to the original point, I don't find it even remotely odd that someone that worked in mechanical engineering for 5-6 years and then worked on philosophy for another 6 years wrote something that was somewhat of an outlier when compared to a lot of the other analytics at the time. He explicitly references Heinrich Hertz in the Tractatus, and is quoted elsewhere saying that his line of thinking was influenced heavily by Ludwig Boltzmann alongside Frege and Russell. — 013zen
Perhaps the following is relevant.
It may not be the case that Wittgenstein was trying to break away from the tradition of epistemology and metaphysics, but rather that he didn't know much about the tradition in the first place. From IEP Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) — RussellA
You've just summarized, like, 75% of the philosophy papers that I have read. xD — 013zen
He was well aware that he wasn't the most articulate, but he thought there was something of value in his thoughts. I'd like to say that just as each of us is articulate to differing degrees, that being less articulate than another neither preclude one from engaging in philosophy, nor does it inherently suggest that the ideas are wrong, or not useful at their core.
I've read plenty of philosophers that I couldn't make heads nor tales of (I'm looking at you Hegel), but others are able to discover some merit within. There is a reason that Witt says:
"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts." — 013zen
Truthfully, I was being a bit tongue in cheek :P — 013zen
Positivists are. Not all analytic philosophers are positivists... it just so happens that historically, a lot of them have been. — 013zen
This is hardly the case. All philosophy, from Aristotle to Putnam has always started with some set of basic assumptions before moving forward. Its a perennial belief that can be endlessly quoted, and pointed out, whether it be a scientist assuming materialism or Aristotle assuming first principles. — 013zen
Now you're not even trying to be charitable to what I'm saying, if you take that bit to be me simply saying, "Witt and Socrates were doing exactly the same thing in every regard" :P — 013zen
Idk what that means. Providing historical context is this "hipster fandom talk"? — 013zen
I'm sure you wouldn't want to say the analytic tradition is nonsense, despite being the result of logicians and scientists "doing philosophy " like logicians and scientists. — 013zen
These folks were interested in what science could say about reality and how we can ensure that our theories map to reality. So, naturally they start from the assumption that our words should somehow tie back to reality in some guaranteed fashion. — 013zen
Thank goodness we had physicists like Helmholtz, Hertz, and Boltzmann engaging in philosophy otherwise the atomic theory would have continued to be ridiculed by positivists and younger thinkers like Einstein would have never engaged with the concept of atoms, particles, fields, etc. In the first place since they lacked empirical evidence. — 013zen
Perhaps the following is relevant.
It may not be the case that Wittgenstein was trying to break away from the tradition of epistemology and metaphysics, but rather that he didn't know much about the tradition in the first place. From IEP Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) — RussellA
He was influenced by Schopenhaur's division of reality into the phenomenal and the noumenal. From Schopenhauer's Influence on Wittgenstein by Bryan Magee. — RussellA
This is a recasting of my position :P I take him to be concerned with the logical clarification of thought, which might occasionally involve critiquing how one uses a term, and whether or not it makes sense. This isn't new to philosophy, in any sense, with Socrates objecting to how folks use the word "good", Aristotle to how others use the word "cause", etc. How else are we meant to clarify the thoughts in our heads, except, by occasionally engaging in correction of language. This is not to say that correcting grammar is the goal in and of itself. — 013zen
One might wonder why then, upon returning from the war, and having his work acclaimed by the positivists, that Wittgenstein so vehemently rejected them. Why, Witt considered Russell's atomist interpretation so foreign to his own in spirit that he spent three years of his life trying to get the work published, despite being poor from having given his fortune away - in the hopes that he'd find someone that understood the work. That's a pretty strong response to a bunch of people basically understanding what you were trying to do. — 013zen
these are not interchangeable. — 013zen
You know, historically, positivism was actually very pervasive in society. What I mean, is that it had real "pull" in the scientific community. Einstein's theory of special and general relativity was influenced by positivism, believe it or not. Einstein says that concepts like "space" and "time" were not clear at all, and he prepossess redefining them in a relativistic fashion ala Ernst Mach. — 013zen
Witt also says that he was influenced by Boltzmann and Hertz, and he studied to be a mechanic prior to studying philosophy, so he was no doubt familiar with the contemporary argument between positivism of Ernst Mach and the up and coming "picture theory" of Boltzman and Hertz that challenged it in an attempt to provide science with metaphysical speculation once again. — 013zen
Positivism developed slowly, but from some basic assumptions, one of which was that metaphysics needed to be put on proper footing. This is what Bacon, Hume, Kant, etc. were concerned with...they thought metaphysics lacked clarity and rigor.
Wittgenstein, is attempting to say with the final statement that any metaphysical statement will have to first and foremost be made logically clear. Until this is done, we should be cautious of wasting too much time talking about it, since language will lead us in circles. Clarity must be established first.
Throughout the work, he tries to offer suggestions on how to do this, and also gives examples of other thinkers formulations and how they are logically unclear, offering methods to reformulate the idea in a more clear manner. — 013zen
I see him to be trying to re-furnish the metaphysics that positivists had stripped to all but "positive facts" or experience. — 013zen
Therefore, a state of affairs being objects in possible combinations cannot be d/t but must be time divided by distance. If this state of affairs obtains, then the fact is distance divided by time, not d/t. — RussellA
An object is a unified whole. — Fooloso4
Where does he say that an atomic fact is about something? — Fooloso4
An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things) — 2.01