1. (AvB) ["is" statement]
2. ¬A ["is" statement]
3. ∴ B (1,2, disjunctive syllogism) ["ought" statement] — Nicholas Ferreira

Doesn't work for a couple different reasons.

First, ought statements are not true or false. They're not actually statements (in the sense usually used in philosophical logic, since statements are sentences that are true or false).

"AvB" is only an "is" statement if we parse it as "It is the case that either A is true or B is true."

Next you posit that A is false. Well, then AvB is false, because B has no truth value. (AvB is only true if either A or B are true.)

If you try to parse AvB as an "ought" expression (which makes little sense, really, but we could pretend that it does), then it has no truth value.

I'd be against because fallacies are a terrible way of relating to philosophy. At best the only describe some kind of logical error in abstract. It's not helpful to engaging with philosophical claims because doesn't really address them. In the face of a claim regarding what is true or not, fallacies only pick out some element of logical structure of an argument.

Pointing out a fallacy doesn't actually tell us about whether a philosophical claims is worthwhile. People argue poorly (or not at all sometimes), for true claims. If we are thinking about pointing out fallacies, we've lost sight of what we are interested in. We cease to be investigating what is true or which claims are worth accepting, and have insert became obsessed whether someone has said a word we think to be wrong.

The VR of fallacies holds no truths. All we see there are some rules we've grown to like playing in, a game of handing out jellybeans or not, depending on whether someone has said all the right words. Fallacies are for debaters, who are not interested in learning anything. — TheWillowOfDarkness

We could pin this as an example of what not to do.

My dreams are nothing at all like my waking life phenomenally. The phenomenal quality of the two is completely different.

The assumption that most people wouldn't want this is merely a convenient fiction perpetuated by main beneficiaries of representative democracies; namely politician and the business communities. — Txastopher

It's difficult to get people to vote every four years even. They're going to want to vote on stuff weekly (or even more often)?

I can't speak for your taste in laws, but even so, I suspect that democracies are far more likely to have the laws you agree with. — Txastopher

What are you basing that belief on?

The evidence of those implicit values is that a model assuming them makes successful predictions (and, in addition, is explanatory). Suppose that Bob has a bottle of water and a bottle of poison on the bench and that he is thirsty. The bottles are clearly identified. I predict that Bob will drink from the bottle of water, not the bottle of poison. I would predict this, even without knowing Bob or asking him what his preferences are. — Andrew M

Why couldn't it be that you're predicting what his preferences will probably be, based on knowledge of most persons' preferences?

You are hopelessly befuddled*. Morality is not reducible to biology any more than concepts like 'marriage', 'money' etc, or more to the point, "beauty", "virtue", "the good" and so on. (Speaking of the trivially obvious... ) — Baden

"x is not reducible to biology" . . . that's a claim. What's the support of it?

Concepts are reducible to biology. They're mental phenomena.

The complement nonmental phenomena to subjective experiences are brain states, which are physical configurations of a biological brain. i.e. We can observe/measure brain states with instruments. They are in that sense part of the 'objective' realm. — Baden

I'm a physicalist, an identity theorist. Some brain states are mental states. Some brain states are not mental states. "Subjective" refers to mental states. So it refers to those brain states that are mental states. "Objective" is the complement--everything that exists that's not a mental state--so nonmental brain states, ocean states, office desk states, etc.

I wouldn't say that subjective things are necessarily brain states, by the way, just because mental phenomena might be able to obtain in other substances/structures. We don't know if that's going to turn out to be possible or not, but it very well could be.

Re the series of quotes you reposted, you didn't say anything about them. Maybe be a little more verbose why you're reposting that stuff?

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? — Baden


Yes, it's a brain state. — Terrapin Station


would you say brain states can be moral / immoral? — Baden


I'd not call them moral/immoral. — Terrapin Station


So, the brain state is morality but there is no moral / immoral to brain states? Where can you find the moral / immoral then?

Just trying to clarify here. — Baden

In other words, "It is morally wrong to murder," ontologically, is a brain state.

"It is morally wrong to have the brain state that it's wrong to murder" is not what I'd call a moral stance, since morality is about interpersonal behavior and having a brain state isn't interpersonal behavior. While someone could feel some way about brain states qua brain states re whether they're moral or not, I wouldn't call that morality, and it would be very unusual. We don't usually make moral judgments about brain states. We usually make moral judgments about interpersonal behavior.

And in your conception, is a brain state a subject or an object? — Baden

I use subjective to refer to mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are a subset of brain states. There are brain states that don't amount to mental phenomena. An obvious example is the brain of a dead person. But there are states of living persons that don't amount to mental phenomena, too.

Nahhh... the easy stuff is done; morality is subjective, mentally located, if that is how one thinks of it. Philosophy, never one to leave well enough alone, still wants to ask, how is it that it is (However it is thought) and why should it be that way.

Otherwise, we talk about what we accept without sufficient explanation as to why we accept it the way we do. — Mww

Ah--yeah, that makes sense, but I'd say it's another topic from what I've been focusing on.

I like to do one small step at a time . . . especially because, as we've seen, it can be like pulling teeth even to get that done. :razz:

Still, as written, it is all hypothetical. What needs to be done now is turn that into a theory. Nobody’s gonna give a crap about a theory without sustainable grounds for it. In science, sustainable grounds are the natural laws; it follows that a possible moral science should have laws. — Mww

I'm not sure I understand what you're getting at there. A theory or a law that morality only occurs in a particular location?

In other words, if an alien came to earth and asked me what morality is, I would point to instances of moral behaviours / interactions rather than brain states to explain it. — Baden

Okay, but how would that work. We can point to someone helping a little old lady across the street. We can point to someone giving food to someone who is hungry. We can point to someone groping someone else in the subway. We can point to someone shooting someone else, etc. It's a fact that all of those behaviors occur as we point to them. Where is "murder is bad" etc. in those actions?

would you say brain states can be moral / immoral? — Baden

I'd not call them moral/immoral. Morality is judgments we make about (usually) interpersonal behavior that we consider to be more significant than etiquette.

I acknowledge the objectivity there, but I don't think that it's necessarily right to call that "immoral". — S

I don't, because it actually requires a bunch of additional "shoulds." "One should act in accord with one's moral views." "One should act in the most direct, efficient manner." Etc. There's nothing objective about any of that.

The binary approach in question here, is the subjective/objective dichotomy, which is not required for *obtaining* individual morality. It is required to *demonstrate* the morality already obtained.

I understand subjective to mean in me, objective to be outside me. If that’s a misunderstanding, or inappropriate, somebody outta tell me. — Mww

First, I use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena, and "objective" to refer to the complement--"nonmental phenomena" so to speak. My mental phenomena are mental phenomena, and your mental phenomena are mental phenomena, and Ned Block's mental phenomena are mental phenomena, and so on. So that's subjective stuff. Ned Block's television, and the Hudson River, and a dead body (just to bring this back to something we make moral judgments about) and so on are not mental phenomena.

So if morality is necessarily a type of mental judgment that we make, then it would seem that the subjective realm is necessary for obtaining morality. Morality doesn't occur elsewhere, in the objective realm.

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? Can you be very specific in pointing to the 'that' you think is morality and then maybe we can get to the bottom of our difference. — Baden

Yes, it's a brain state. That's the only place where moral whatevers occur (I don't want to call them judgments because I don't want to be seen as stacking the deck--we can use whatever term someone thinks makes their case best.)

Is democracy an illusion? No.

Is there any "direct/'pure' democracy" where people simply vote on everything and that's that? No.

Could there be a "direct/'pure' democracy"? Yes, but it's unlikely we'd ever have that, and most people probably wouldn't want it.

Are representative democracies complex and kind of messy? Yes. That doesn't imply they're not democracies, though.

Do I think that there's something inherently preferable to democracies? No. What I care about is what laws a country does and doesn't have. I couldn't care less if those laws were put in place by a democracy, an oligarchy, a king--whatever. Democracies aren't any more likely to have laws that I agree with.

Wait, so then why would there be no need of the binary approach?

That's fine. We just need the evidence then of moral whatevers obtaining in a nonmental location.

Note though that others, while they might not agree, are actually engaging — Baden

Although how much good is it doing? You're not continuing to follow through. :wink:

where and how morality obtains has no need of the binary approach, o — Mww

Well, unless it's located in one place and not another.

So in your view nonmental things can treat something with attention and kindness?

How would you say that nonmental things consider something? How does that work physically?

Of course not, because they would have already been constituted socially before you removed the others. Isn't that obvious? — Baden

I've been around philosophy long enough to never assume that anyone might not be claiming something that seems insane to me.

"Constituted" is often used in the sense of "comprised of." If x is constituted of y and z, then x is identical to y and z.

You're not using "constituted" in that manner then?

Let me put it this way, I'm claiming there is only social relations, which when packaged in individual bodies, we call 'persons' or 'subjects'. — Baden

Wait, so you're saying that if we took one person and every other person but that one were to die or disappear, that one person would no longer exist? I'd be very curious about your ontology if that's what you're saying. (Presumably you'd think that the Twilight Zone episode "Last Man on Earth" is simply incoherent?). And would two people be enough for someone to exist? Three?

Personal moral values exist as brute facts, and they're inexorably relative; "moral truth" is something more than mere personal preference. — VagabondSpectre

So where would you say moral truth occurs aside from personal preference?

If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, — Baden

So for example, if you were saying that moral judgments (or whatever you'd call things like "murder is bad") are somehow embedded in social relations, I'd want you to explain just how the moral whatevers physically obtain in social relations--just what "murder is bad" and the like are properties of, where in social relations they're located, etc.

For the subject/object distinction to fail, one has to be claiming that there are not (a) brains functioning in a mental way, as well as (b) things that aren't brains functioning in a mental way.

If someone wants to claim there is no (a) or (b) or both, that's fine, but then we should first figure out what the person believes there is ontologically instead, including what their ontology of mind is (assuming they believe there are minds or at least mental phenomena).

Not trying to speak for Banno, but absolutely agree with him it fails. If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, and the term 'objective' in terms of morality is that which applies equally to all moral subjects i.e. the complete world, or set of worlds, of social relations then the dichotomy fails. The 'objective' is in the 'subjective' as much as the 'subjective' is in the 'objective'. i.e. For the subject to function as moral agent, it is necessarily a socially constituted entity, in some sense both 'objective' and 'subjective'. — Baden

None of that has anything to do with what I'm actually talking about though. You're talking about how we interact with others, preconditions for certain things, etc. I'm talking about where moral judgments (or whatever moral xs, whatever you want to claim has moral properties or however you'd want to characterize it) occur, in terms of physical location(s). I'm talking about just what physical stuff moral whatevers are a property of. I'm focusing on the judgment (or whatever) itself, as a physical phenomenon, just like we could talk about a painting itself, as a physical phenomenon a la pigments suspended in some medium and applied to canvas. With paintings, you could also talk about the necessity of social relations, etc., but that's a different topic than what the painting is, where it is or isn't located, as a physical object.

I think it boils down more to finding a better way to talk about morality than fundamental disagreements about what it is. — Baden

This is where the upshots become important. There are implications to moral whatevers being located in one place versus another. And those implications often factor into normative talk about morality. So we can't just ignore what morality is.

My view is about the physical location(s) where moral whatever-one-wants-to-call-thems occur.

I'm in no way saying that moral views aren't influenced by social interactions, that we can't agree with each other and cooperate, or that we can't think about any moral utterances as inviolable commands.

There are upshots to where, in terms of physical location, moral whatevers occur, but I just want us to first get straight where the phenomena occur.

I explained this earlier, by the way. When i talk about moral judgments, I'm talking about making an evaluation a la good/bad, permissible/impermissible, etc. It's like voting for or against something, approving or disapproving, yaying or booing.

Using "judgment" for saying "that's blue," as if it's the same sense of the term, is a conflation. Re "that's blue," we're not approving or disapproving, we're just identifying.

There would be no dispute re identifying "that's a broken pup." Just a difference re approving or disapproving of it.

You could claim that we're just identifying the moral approval or disapproval if you like, but hence me asking for evidence of what the moral approval or disapproval is nonmentally.

But would you be wiling to say that our moral judgements involve the world? — Banno

Of course. In many different ways. They're about things we experience in the world, they have an impact on our interactions, etc. It's just that the moral judgments, qua moral judgments, do not obtain in the nonmental world.

And how is this different from how we judge the cup to be blue? — Banno

I'm not asking you about judgments per se. There's no dispute that we make judgments, is there?

There's a dispute about what sort of stuff obtains nonmentally. I say that blue obtains nonmentally. I explained what blue is nonmentally, what it's a property of, how it obtains, how we can nonmentallly detect it with instruments, etc. Supposedly you're claiming the same thing about moral whatevers. But no explanation of what property they are, how they nonmentally obtain, how we nonmentally measure them with instruments etc. is forthcoming.

I never said anything like "Our moral judgments do not involve the world."

I said that moral judgments (again, or whatever someone would want to call the moral things/properties/whatever) do not occur in nonmental things. They're a mental phenomenon. It's like saying (simplifying the possibilities drastically) that paintings do not occur on non-canvas things. That doesn't mean that the paintings are not of non-canvas things, but the painting itself doesn't occur on a non-canvas thing. (And we'd certainly not be saying that paintings aren't embedded in the world.)

Maybe someone would try to claim that a painting of a cow occurs not only on the canvas, but somehow in the cow itself. And then I'd ask them to explain how the painting could occur in the cow itself.

Obviously we make moral judgments about things like broken pups, but we make those judgments. The broken pup doesn't make the judgment. Rocks don't. It's not some physical field, etc.

Is it dishonesty that's leading you to evade like that or what? I really am curious what's going on in your head.

I think we're embedded in the world. I think that "what we ought to do" is only a mental phenomenon. We certainly look around the world we're embedded in to make such judgments, but it's not a judgment--or whatever you want to call it--that occurs nonmentally.

Weren't you disagreeing with me that "what we ought to do" occurs only as a mental phenomenon, and claiming that somehow it also occurs in the world we're embedded in?

The broken dog is nonmental.

Nonmentally, it's not a moral problem.

See how easy it is to straightforwardly answer a question? Can you try that now?

You ask me to use an instrument to demonstrate how things should be. — Banno

Didn't you claim that how things should be is a nonmental phenomenon in the broken pup somehow?

Let's talk about the non-end part where we detect things with objective instruments. Are you able to do that?

What's that? — Banno

You're asking how we do this? For example, we can take an x-ray.

Now, describe at least one way we would use an instrument to detect anything about moral whatevers.

Well, go on, then — Banno

What?

I'm asking you to do something. Are you capable of doing it?

It's easy to explain, re nonmental propeties, how we check whether a dog's bones are broken, whether the dog is alive, etc. If there were a dispute about that, it's a relatively simple matter to describe how we (nonmentally) check who is right.

So let's describe this same sort of thing with respect to the moral properties (or however you want to characterize the moral whatevers--whatever you'd think would best make your case).