With the broken pup, how does the moral whatever obtain, exactly?

If one person looks at the broken pup and says "the property of moral permissibility is contained in that" and another person says "no, the property of moral prohibition is contained in that," what nonmental aspect of it do we look at, exactly, with what instruments or methods, to see who is right?

I explained this to you re blue. Can you follow suit?

You assume that it is either mental or not mental; — Banno

I think it's only mental. If you think it's both mental and non (which it would have to be if there's a nonmental component, because obviously it's still mental, too), that's fine. I'm asking for evidence of the nonmental part. Can you provide that now?

I don't think that you're contradicting yourself. I don't think you're being incoherent. I think that you're simply ignoring repeated requests for evidential support of something you're claiming. There are a number of reasons you might be doing that. The most charitable reason would be that you don't understand some aspect of this. Well, or it's just something you accept on faith (I don't mean religious faith, though of course that's a possibility) but you don't want to straightforwardly admit that for some reason.

Re the discussion about blue, I certainly wasn't denying that there's the mental experience of color. That's not at issue. What's at issue is whether there's a nonmental correlate. I explained with blue what the nonmental correlate is, how we objectively detect/test it, etc. So all I'm asking is that you do the same with moral whatever-we-want-to-call-'ems. Nonmentally, the moral whatever is what? How does the property obtain? How would we measure it? Etc.

Right. So I'm asking you to provide evidence of that, to explain/evidence the nonmental moral whatevers. Can we finally get to the post where you do that? Post hoc is fine. I just want you to explain and evidence the nonmental moral whatevers now.

Dude, I'm not claiming that it is an objective property. . — Banno

You're disagreeing that it's just preferences, feelings, mental activity of some sort, right?

It's perfectly kosher for you to explain and evidence the objective moral properties post hoc. I couldn't care less about that. I just want you to explain/evidence the objective moral properties. Can you do that now?

And that's the same as saying "you can't just say that the cup is blue" — Banno

And indeed I didn't. I explained what the objective property is, explained how we objectively measure/detect it, etc. You need to do the same to support that moral properties are objective, that they're not simply a way that people feel, preferences they have, etc.

I demonstrated the sort of thing I'm looking for. Are you able to follow suit? If you can, please do so. If you can't, can we at least be honest about admitting this, and then we can think about why we'd not be able to do the same sort of thing for moral whatevers?

Sure, and I see that you will not accept the properties I show you, saying that the wrong is not to be found in the broken pup. I point out that blue is not found in the cup, but you insist that it is. — Banno

Because you can't just say "the property is in the broken pup" you have to provide evidence of it being in the broken pup, you have to explain just what property it is, how we can objectively detect it, etc.--anything along those lines.

You talk of subjectivism, yet use "we" and "our".

We spoke before about how we all agree that a broken pup is not A Good Thing.

These things are shared. Yet you claim they are internal.

How do you get around that? — Banno

The subjective/objective distinction has nothing to do with agreement or disagreement.

You feel x way. Joe feels x way. Sue feels x way. Etc.

They agree that they feel x way. Feelings are mental.

I hadn't read every post. Why were we bringing up the biological correlation to gender concepts anyway?

And I can't make heads or tails out of the notion of a subjective truth so non-cognitivism is about where I land in making sense of your view. — Moliere

Probably shouldn't bring it up, because we'd probably have to get into a big tangent about it, but on my view, truth is subjective because it's a judgment that individuals make about the relation between a proposition and something else (the something else can be facts/states of affairs (correspondence), usefulness/utility (pragmatism), the other propositions the individual assigns "true" to (coherence), consensus, etc.)

In most of your posts in this thread, you seem to be asking whether matter and energy need to have transcendental characteristics (where we're assuming Kant's view of the same). But what does any of this have to do with the distinction as you're defining it re:

Transcendent means an entity which lacks the necessary and strictly universal (a priori) properties or characteristics (Euclidian space and time) which would make it an object of HUMAN perception. — charles ferraro

??

Not to mention it being mysterious that you asked as if any of this follows from something.

If something is TRANSCENDENTAL to human consciousness (e.g., Euclidian space, time, and the categories), then does this mean that what is EMPIRICAL to human consciousness (e.g., matter and energy) must be TRANSCENDENT to human consciousness? — charles ferraro

Seems like a complete non-sequitur to me.

Something about saying moral statements are meant to influence others doesn't quite sit right with me -- not that I'm unfamiliar with the phenomena. Of course people say these things to influence others. But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do. — Moliere

I should have quoted you above. I was basically agreeing with this comment.

Sexism is a set of beliefs that can be embraced by either sex. — frank

What set of beliefs?

There's no doubt that beliefs are passed down generationally. — frank

I don't think that's the case in any literal sense. There is cultural influence, though, of course.

Structuralism says that transcultural symbols reveal the structure of the human mind. — frank

What empirical evidence is that based on, exactly?

Beliefs are usually related in some way to body of symbolism embraced by a society. — frank

It's clear enough that they'd be correlated so that symbols are produced that reflect something about beliefs.

Yes, I'm also saying that the (implicit) values of life and well-being are part of the natural function of being human. — Andrew M

Okay, so what is evidence of any implicit values of life and well-being, or where does that obtain/what is it a property of, etc.?

Are you talking about this? "So, for someone to say that they feel like a woman when they were born a man, what are they actually saying?"

I responded to that. I wrote: "They're saying that relative to social norms with respect to gender, as correlated to biological sex, they feel the social norm doesn't match their psychological reality."

Are you not reading my posts?

What was the first sentence, or part of a unique phrase, in the post in question?

I asked you what it feels like to be a woman or man first. Stop evading. — Harry Hindu

No, you didn't. "Then wouldn't you say that is what it feels like to be a man or a woman?" was in response to the question you're not answering.

Make it valuable for a human being, if that helps. I'm talking about what is valuable for human beings independently of personal opinions or preferences. — Andrew M

Right. So let's get back to that.

When you say that we need food and water to survive, are you saying something different than there are conditions that must be met for remaining alive?

You also never answered the "what is P in the contradiction" question above.

So we're back to one thing at a time, because you're ignoring stuff.

Is there wiring in the brain for menstrual cycles? — Harry Hindu

What happened to the fact that I just asked you a question (that you haven't bothered to answer)?

And what is valuable to a human being — Andrew M

Valuable to a human being--aren't you arguing that what is valuable is not dependent on to a human being? That's the whole gist of your disagreement with me, isn't it?

Then wouldn't you say that is what it feels like to be a man or a woman? — Harry Hindu

I'm asking you a question. Why would what I say it feels like to be a man or woman be a question?

Minds have a particular sexual characteristic--you mean that in terms of mental content, there are characterstics associated with biological sex F, and other particular characteristics associated with biological sex M?

Right, and in order for us to survive, certain conditions must be met, just like in order for us to not survive, certain conditions must be met.

Do you not agree with that?

Didn't I write, and didn't you respond to this?

Gender is male/female/etc. conceptually. Concepts are mind-dependent.

Biological sex is male/female mind-independently--per genetics, (nonmental) physical structure, etc.

It's a fact that we can survive or not survive, no?

Not sure of your point — Andrew M

My point at the moment is just that I want you to answer that question. I knew I shouldn't have typed more, because this is the most important part of the post.

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus)?

Ah, so you finally read the whole post and created a whole new post to respond to the same post. All this does is make it more difficult for readers to follow. — Harry Hindu

The rest of the post had nothing to do with the bit that you claimed needed the rest of the post.

I don't need to respond to everything someone writes, and I'm not going to do that if they're ignoring stuff.

So now the distinction is between psychological and biological factors? — Harry Hindu

So now? So now?? I explained this to you in the second post in this thread. The very first response you received.

This leads us to a metaphysical discussion about the difference between mind and matter where I say that there is no distinction — Harry Hindu

I agree that there's no distinction between mind and matter. What's there's a distinction between is properties of matter. Not all of it "behaves" just the same way. Hence why you don't smear jelly into battery compartments to make a battery-powered device operate.

but if you are saying that one's psychological reality is a social construct, — Harry Hindu

If only I'd said anything even remotely resembling that.

That the definition they are using is inconsistent. — Harry Hindu

What's P in the contradiction?

If someone is able to make a personal decision about what gender is AND that decision can run counter to the expectations of the culture they live in, then how is it a social construction? — Harry Hindu

Re this, for like the third or fourth time now, what I said was: "Psychological and social, yes. Different from biological sex. There's nothing to debate, really. People can feel they are different than their biological sex says they are, especially in relation to the social norms that become associated with biological sex. It's handy to have a term for that. The term we use for it is "gender."

Again, your post doesn't take into account the rest of my post — Harry Hindu

Tell me what in the rest of your post is relevant to what I said, and if I agree, I'll paypal you $1000

So, for someone to say that they feel like a woman when they were born a man, what are they actually saying - that they feel like a social construction, or a biological sex, or something else entirely (and if so, what)? — Harry Hindu

They're saying that relative to social norms with respect to gender, as correlated to biological sex, they feel the social norm doesn't match their psychological reality.

Sure. Why wouldn't it be useful to be familiar with any factual info? Among the factual info that it's useful to be familiar with is the fact that there's a popular convention of using "gender" to refer to a concept that's different from, though correlated with, biological sex, the fact that there are social norms with respect to gender, and the fact that individuals can feel at odds with gender a la the social norms.

I added this to the previous post, by the way. I should have just posted it at the same time:

" Because "gender" hasn't been defined consistently as something other than sex, I consider sex the same as gender. — Harry Hindu"


Re that, you can do that, of course, but you're just not going to understand a lot of what people are talking about in that case. It would be as if you're intentionally courting confusion on your part re what a lot of people are talking about.

Isn't it useful to recognize and be knowledgeable of the statistics, especially when it's as high as 99.9% for the topic we are discussing - the real differences between sex/gender? If not, then why have statistics? — Harry Hindu

Wait, are you saying that something statistically unusual isn't real?

Because "gender" hasn't been defined consistently as something other than sex, I consider sex the same as gender. — Harry Hindu

Re that, you can do that, of course, but you're just not going to understand a lot of what people are talking about in that case. It would be as if you're intentionally courting confusion on your part re what a lot of people are talking about.

Here if I select Sledge, there are automatic thoughts — kill jepetto

Are you saying "automatic thoughts" as part of some game? Or you're claiming that in reality, people have automatic thoughts in relation to anything?

If gender is socially constructed (i.e. not determined by the individual) then it's subjective and CAN be determined by the individual. — Judaka

How is this not a contradiction? — Harry Hindu

Yeah, I don't get what he's saying there, either.

"If life has value then ..." in an ordinary sense. — Andrew M

We just need to say how it would be that life (or anything) has value outside of what anyone thinks about it.

Everyone having their own arbitrary preferred standard is no standard at all. — Andrew M

I don't know of anyone who thinks that moral stances are arbitrary, by the way.

From an evolutionary perspective, we want food and water because we need them to survive. — Andrew M

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus, that is)?

(By the way, if you believe that everyone prefers to live, then your antinatalism makes little sense.)

If biological differences are real then how does that not lead to real differences in behaviors and expectations of others. Females seem to have this need to keep the male around to help rear the children rather than her doing it all by herself while the male wants to be promiscuous. Is this a social construction, or natural behaviors stemming from natural (biological) causes? It seems to me that marriage is a social construction that limits a males natural inclination to be promiscuous. — Harry Hindu

Definitely there are some physical or behavioral differences statistically, most not universally, correlated with biological sex, and that definitely influences gender concepts, but that doesn't amount to gender not being conceptual/mental. What we're referring to by "gender" conventionally is something conceptual.

(Just noticed another typo in my post above, by the way--"enforced" should have been "reinforced.")

On one hand we have people referring to a feeling as gender, while on the other we have people referring to a social construct as gender. — Harry Hindu

This is very confused per what I'm saying and per the conventional views of this.

Gender is male/female/etc. conceptually. Concepts are mind-dependent.

Biological sex is male/female mind-independently--per genetics, (nonmental) physical structure, etc.

There are social norms with respect to gender conceptually. Basically, this is ways that individuals think about gender, where that gains some social traction via others agreeing on the conceptual divisions, and then that's reinforced via social behavior, social expectations, etc.

An individual can become aware that those social norms with respect to gender don't capture how they feel--they don't match their psychological reality, in other words.

So we're not referring to two different things by "gender" re social interaction and individual feeling. It's just that two different conclusions are being reached about gender. The social norm and the way and individual feels. An individual feels they don't fit the social norm. Thus they consider themselves a different gender, relative to the social norms.

Biological sex is irrelevant in all of this, aside from the fact that the social norms are at least to some extent correlated with biological sex a la the gender concept of "female" being attached to female per biological sex, for example. And then some individuals who feel they don't fit the gender social norm decide to change their biological sex to the extent that they can--which involves changing some aspects of physical structure. They want their biological sex to match their gender as much as possible.

The direction of fit stuff is from Searle, and Anscombe; so it stretches across both Oxford and Cambridge. I think it very useful. — Banno

I've actually read some of that before re Searle etc. but I sure didn't remember it. I don't agree with some of aspects of it re what I'm reading now to review it (like the assumptions that are made about the criteria for a desire to be satisfied), but the distinction at least makes some sense. At that, a moral whatever-we-want-to-call-it per se can't be made to obtain "in the world." Only what we'd prefer could be made to obtain. In other words, the moral part of it can't be made external.

Turns out Terrapin Station doesn't think mathematical statements have a truth value. I can't see how that could be made to work. — Banno

I have a subjectivist theory of truth, anyway, so it's not going to amount to what you want it to amount to if I think a sentence has a truth value.

I actually would say that mathematical and other claims that are subjective do have a truth value if we're talking about someone who uses a relation other than correspondence for the truthmaker relation, and my theory allows for various relations, but I use correspondence and I didn't want to get into a big tangent on truth theory, so I simplified this.

And actually even the above is a simplification. Truth value could also work for these claims under a correspondence relation depending on how an individual interprets/assigns meaning to the proposition in question.

The problem for what you want, however, is that on my view, all of this stuff is subjective.