Opinion can be false or wrong; — tim wood

How can opinions in the sense of "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," etc. be wrong?

Or are you only talking about opinions in the sense of "It's Dr. Tata's opinion that garlic can help fight LDL cholesterol"?

3 and 5 are not relevant though, as disapproval of things like racist or sexist speech is not based on the potential for hurt feelings and, until we see mobs out there actually harming people that speak racist or sexist things, claims of 'mob mentality' are baseless hyperbole. — andrewk

(3) is relevant because what I'm referring to with the phrase "social pressure" and the like is more often than not a factor of many people acting in conjunction with each other to a particular end, and that's what I'm referring to by "mob mentality."

Re (5) hurt feelings was a big theme in related threads this past week.

And yeah, I'm basically a (minarchist) libertarian on these sorts of issues.

They're more important than etiquette because they concern the "preferences" which we value and seek to protect above all others (eg: the desire to go on living). Etiquette is about avoiding annoyance and petty confrontation, morality is about avoiding suffering and other existential threats. — VagabondSpectre

Plenty of people--almost everyone to some extent, values etiquette, too. The distinction from etiquette is simply because there are two different classes of interpersonal behavior we make these sorts of judgments about--one falls under the rubric of etiquette, and many consider it extremely important, and the other falls under the rubric of morality.

Not “a” standard, a specific one, the standard of reason. For example, if a person is contradicting themselves then they have failed to properly apply the standard. Obviously, to apply a standard the basis of those standards must be accepted but in the case of reason this is the most basic way we make sense of things. Saying a circle is also a square makes no sense, is not valid reasoning — DingoJones

So the guy who is contradicting himself says that he is being reasonable. You and almost everyone else says he is not, and says that he's not following "the" standard.

So once again, the question is whether "the" standard is determined by consensus.

Child vaccination springs to mind: both parents prefer their kids to be healthy, but only one of them is actually achieving it. — VagabondSpectre

People can get wrong just will achieve some particular state, but that does no work to make the moral part more or less objective.

"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective.

"X does/does not cause autism," etc. is the stuff that one can get correct or incorrect. There is no moral aspect to that, though.

That doesnt mean there is not a fact of the matter about what is reasonable. — DingoJones

And usually the parties on each side are adamant that the fact of the matter about what is reasonable is on their side. ("But it really is on my side" is usually the response to that.)

Since I'm someone who I'm sure comes across that way at times, I can tell you that:

(1) Sometimes I don't read a whole post, especially:
(a) if it's long and rambling, and the person is broaching what I consider to be 5, 10, 20 . . . different issues--both are more typical on this board than not, because unfortunately there is a belief that the value of posts is proportional to their length (fostered by this being a problem in "philosophy culture" overall)
(b) if it's in the midst of someone going back and forth with me, where it's clear they just want to argue with me, and where no matter how brief and focused I make my posts to them, they type a lengthy, less focused response. My goal in that situation is to tackle one small thing at a time, bit by bit, in a focused way, with the aim of "settling" that bit so that we can move on from it,

(2) If I agree with most of a post but see an issue with part of it, even if it's just a tangent or aside, I'll just quote and comment on that part. I agree I should announce more often that I agree on the other stuff,

(3) Sometimes I won't be interested in the bulk of a post, even if it's not very long, so I'll just quote and comment on the part I'm interested in, even if it's just a tangent or aside,

(4) There are some posters where I feel it's more or less futile for me to read and interact with them, because they're either not capable of or they're not going to bother communicating with me in a manner that I can understand --this is primarily folks who are most enamored with continental authors such as Heidegger, Derrida, etc. It's great that some people enjoy that stuff, but I never could really make heads or tails out of most of it, and I was never amenable to pretending about it or just glossing over big chunks of it (which I'd have to do otherwise) . . . but occasionally those folks will say something I comment on, in an irrationally optimistic hope that now I'll start communicating with them; and sometimes they'll respond to me.

I never respond to "win" anything, and I don't think it's possible to "win" in any significant sense. I come from the tradition of responding to folks' arguments with objections and constructive criticism, where the aim is to help them find the potential problems with their arguments, so that they can meet the objections, shore up the problems, and have a better argument, even if I don't agree with it.

Well we would apply reason to determine which was correct. It doesnt matter what each of them feel about the reason, there is a fact of the matter about if the standard is being properly applied. It depends in how exactly you define reason, but that is one way that is useful and meaningful. — DingoJones

They are both applying reason, though. Re a standard--so some consensus? (Hence my initial question.)

As soon as you introduce bad/good, better/worse, etc. you've left the objective realm, though.

So you can focus on something objective like "Doing x serves S's preference," bit then we're not actually talking about the stuff that we conventionally talk about with morality --good/bad, better/worse, should/should not, etc.

No one says it's personal preferences unqualified, as if whether someone prefers Cap'n Crunch to Count Chocula might be a moral issue.

They're preferences about interpersonal behavior that one considers more significant than etiquette.

We could say that "not molesting Billy serves Billy's (and whoever else's when it comes to Billy) preference to not molest Billy," but then if we're calling that morality, does morality no longer have to do with good/bad conduct, ways that we should versus shouldn't behave, etc.?

Belief = simply some degree of acceptance (there's a continuum) that such and such is the case.

So, there is no English language. Languages are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occur in individuals? — T Clark

First, how in the world would you be going: X is only a mental phenomenon, therefore there is no x?

Really, you don't believe that social or cultural systems have any existence outside of a particular humans thought, feeling, or behaviour? — T Clark

I don't know, because I don't know the scope of the term "systems" in your usage. You'd have to detail that better.

But I do know that societies/cultures don't literally have values. That's a category error. Values are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occur in individuals.

I am curious to hear about how you come to that view. Is it derived from some set of moral principles, or is it more just a feeling? If principles, I'd like to hear about what they are and how the derivation proceeds. — andrewk

I'm not a fan of a "principles" approach--I think it inevitably leads to absurdities to make principles a trump card.

But in general, it's related to me being a free speech absolutist, being against controlling others as much as possible, being against mob mentalities, being pro laissez-fairism, and not being in favor of sanctions in response to "hurt feelings."

Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures. — T Clark

Societies/cultures having values is really just a loose manner of speaking. It's individuals who have values. Individuals interact and can influence each other, which leads to social/cultural statistical tendencies, but the society or culture itself can't literally have values.

But ultimately, for ethical judgements to be grounded in something more than opinion or individual prerogative, I think there has to be some judgement about what constitutes a higher good or true good. But the dynamics of modern culture are such that any of those kinds of judgements are instinctively reviled - because they sound religious. — Wayfarer

I don't revile them, and certainly not because they sound religious.

The problem I have with them is the same problem I have with the notion of objective meaning (in the semantics sense, which has been the topic of a handful of recent threads): there is no evidence of extramental meaning/moral judgments/judgments about ("higher") good, etc., and a fortiori that's the case on my view as I don't buy realism for any abstracts whatsoever--I'm a nominalist.

I'm also a physicalist in general, and I have sort of a logical positivist disposition on metaphysical/ontological claims (although I'm not at all an orthodox logical positivist, I disagree with their "schematic," etc.--It's more just that my approach is that stingy/parsimonious/skeptical, and I tend to want to interpret everything in terms of observables/what actually is going on in reference to something in "practical," everyday terms of just what we're doing, just what we're observing, etc.)

Unsurprisingly if one knows much about my views, I see "conceivability" as primarily telling us about an individual's psychology, knowledge, biases, etc. People often say that "x is conceivable" where I find the idea of it being conceivable very dubious, at least without basically fantasizing in a manner that leaves out all sorts of details.

So I don't at all think that conceivability entails possibility.

Re Chalmers paper, where he describes a typical sort of argument, a la:

"Many arguments in these domains first seek to establish an epistemic gap between two phenomena (e.g. that we can know or conceive of one without the other), argue from there to a modal gap (e.g. that it is possible that one could exist without the other), and step from there to a metaphysical gap (e.g. that one is not reducible to the other),"

I actually see the biggest gaffe there as the third step. The fact that it's possible that A could exist without B does not at all imply that A is not reducible to B in the actual world.

So you're just going to deliberately ignore what I said earlier on this very point? — S

I have no idea what you're referring to here, so I suppose I have no option at the moment aside from "ignoring" it.

Right. "It's possible that my car is parked on Main Street, given the city it's parked in, as the city is now, etc."

There's no way to know that without knowing something about the city it's parked in, as the city is now, and that can't be known a priori.

I'd have no idea what "it's the case" is supposed to refer to if it's not a synonym for facts a la either states of affairs or the colloquial "true proposition" sense.

But okay, I guess just assume that I must know.

How would I help you help me? I haven't the faintest idea how you're using the term "fact" based on what you've said you don't have in mind with it.

I've already shown you what I mean and explained my position. — S

Nevertheless, I have no idea what you'd be referring to by the term, exactly. Do you want me to just pretend that I do because you don't want to try to explain it some other way?

Are you still opposing? — frank

Yes. For it to be possible, we have to know that there even is a Main Street first off.

Without getting into a big discussion re if there's a different between "physical" and "metaphysical" possibility, we can just say, by the way, that "It's possible that my car is parked on Main Street" is a modal statement about where my car might be parked given the city it's parked in, as the city is now, etc.

Is there something wrong with applying social pressure against somebody's expression? — andrewk

In my view, yes. The fact that it's common doesn't excuse it.

The now establishment nature of International Women's Day suggests, at least to me, that it serves the ends of the powerful. — Txastopher

I have no idea what "the ends of the powerful" would refer to, even. Who are supposed to be "the powerful"?

When the state sanctions the feminist critique of men, — Txastopher

It's simply a "women's day." It's not a critique.

While the main enemy of women is men" — Txastopher

Oy vey.

Okay. So how would you argue that "It's possible for my car to be parked on Main Street" would be a priori?

Alas, you are terribly confused. I'll approach this way: Is 2+2=4 true? Or is it merely the report of some people who apparently feel that it is true? This rock over here: is it a rock, or simply a matter of some people feeling that it's a rock?

Is morality representative of anything beyond what some people opine of it? — tim wood

I don't want to get into mathematics because I don't see how that wouldn't turn into a big tangent about a different subject. (If you're really interested in my view on the mathematical question, I posted a couple times in this recent thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5244/is-2-2-4-universally-true)

Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette.

My point is that facts are not what they're about. — S

First, I don't even have any idea what you're referring to with "fact," because per your claims, you're neither using it in the state of affairs sense nor in the colloquial "true proposition" sense.

Facts aren't about anything except if one is sloppily using the term to be a synonym for "true proposition."

The fact is that I am alive. — S

The fact that you are alive is the fact that your body is undergoing metabolism, cell division, etc.

Depends on the claim in question.

"It's possible for my car to be parked on Main Street" is empirical.

"It's necessary that every existent has a location (or set of locations)" is a priori.

It appears you are unable to answer the question. Please give it another try. Lest we be persuaded that Terrapin has so cross-threaded his thinking that he is unable to identify any action of the Nazis as immoral, by implication saying that all Nazi actions were moral, or some or all neither moral nor immoral. But none immoral. — tim wood

In my view a lot of the actions were immoral. What that refers to is the fact that I disapprove of the actions, that I "Boo" them.

I'm not the only person to feel that way, of course. But all of us who feel that way are simply (in terms of what's really going on ontologically) reporting our disapproval.

How are you with the notion of quantum indeterminacy, out of interest? Do you find that coherent? I ask because the inability to completely conceive of something has never stopped me from using it. — Isaac

Some aspects I think are just an instrumental way to make predictions. I don't take them as making any sort of ontological commitment. Some interpretations of qm are just nonsensical in my view. But I have no problem accepting the general notion of indeterminacy.

Do you mean "that's what I would do"? — Isaac

Yeah, sorry--that's what I would do in response to what someone takes to be good evidence for it, where I don't agree that it works as evidence for it.

I'm saying that to say that it's a fact that I'm alive at the time of typing this is not to say anything about a system or process — S

How could you think that being alive is not a process, for example? Are you alive if you're not experiencing metabolism? Cell division?

How could you think that you're not a system and part of other systems? Are you alive sans a circulatory system?

There are masses of evidence, but without actually checking you've just decided to believe there isn't. — Isaac

Oops. Patronization fallacy. It's not that I'm unfamiliar with everything considered to be evidence for this.

I think there's scarcely any different level of evidence of the meaning of a word being located in the brain — Isaac

There is a ton of good evidence that mentality is simply brain function. Maybe you don't agree with that. That's fine. If you didn't agree with it and I were trying to convince you of it, I'd present some of the evidence for it, and then you could present your argument for why you don't believe that it is good evidence of it. That's how this works.

That's what I do re the supposed evidence for unconscious mental phenomena.

I don't think that 'meaning' is a thing that can occur anywhere. — Isaac

On my view, the notion of an existent anything that doesn't have a location, a particular (set of) time(s) and place(s) of occurrence, etc. is incoherent.

it wouldn't mean that you're not wrong, or that you're not speaking a language which clashes with ordinary language use. — S

Sure, and definitely the latter is true. A lot of philosophy jargon departs from everyday speech. That's true in any field, really.

Easy. That's not how I use the word. Nor is it how it is ordinarily used. It doesn't even make sense to say that facts like that today is Saturday, or that I am in my room, or that I can't run faster than the speed of light, and so on, are systems or processes. They're just facts. — S

But I don't know how it makes sense to say of anything that it's not part of a system that it's not a process.

And this is where you're clashing with ordinary language usage big time. — S

Right. In colloquial speech, "fact" is often used as a synonym for "true proposition" (although "proposition" in colloquial speech isn't nearly as well-defined as it is in analytic philosophy, and almost no one would define in as analytic philosophers do). Analytic philosophers, and by extension the sciences, etc., do not use "fact" that way. And there are reasons for this, due to analysis, the utility of making certain distinctions, etc.

I agree. Facts and true propositions are distinct, and correspond. — S

If you're not using them the same, but facts are somehow about something in your view, however you're using the term would be a mystery to me, Maybe it's stemming from unfamiliarity with the analytic phil sense of proposition, though.

me and my room and my location. — S

Which is a fact on the analytic phil and standard scientific usage.

I'm referring to the fact that you dismissed masses of scientific evidence pointing to their existence. — Isaac

I don't believe that there are masses of evidence pointing to the existence of unconscious mental phenomena, though. And you simply went with the old chestnut that I should "look it up myself."

There may be plenty of evidence that's misinterpreted as being evidence of unconscious mental phenomena, but then that's the issue there. At any rate, that's getting off-topic per the thread.

That seemed incongruous to me with your attitude here that the mere suggestion of scientific investigation that mental states could hold meaning is now sufficient for us to presume it is so. — Isaac

Say what? I'm not saying anything about "scientific investigation" there. If someone thinks that meaning doesn't occur mentally, we can deal with that when we encounter that person. If you don't think this, then it's kind of pointless to spend time on it, because it's not at issue.

I said nothing whatsoever about my "theshold for evidence." If you think that meaning doesn't occur mentally, that's fine. Say so, and then we'll talk about that.

Achieving your goals with it. If we were of the opinion that gravity were not predictable, how far do you think we'd get with our objectives? So treating gravity as if it were predicable and consistent seems to be a good idea. Doesn't matter if it really is until the approach we have stops working (or looks like it might). — Isaac

Say what??? (with a couple more question marks this time). Are you claiming that we do not have empirical evidence of gravitational attraction?

I wanted you to give me an example of something that we'd posit, with there being zero empirical evidence of it, for good practical reasons.

Evidence for the existence of mentality is a far cry from having directly identified the meaning of a word located in someone's brain. Earlier (in another conversation) you were very dismissive of the whole of neuropsychology pointing to unconscious mental states, now you seem to be sure it's basically discovered the location of the meaning of words. — Isaac

I'm saying nothing at all about it being unconscious.

Are you now claiming that we don't actually think meanings, that meanings are in no sense a conscious phenomenon?

Convenience. Practicality — Isaac

What would an example of that be?

Okay, so #1, there isn't zero evidence of mentality.

#2, if we're going to posit existents for which there is zero empirical evidence of them, what would you take to be good grounds for that?