You're not doing that (I'll refrain from using a colorful adjective) thing where you're (hopefully pretending to) reading me as saying something literally about employing (unaided) vision, are you?

And please tell me that you are indeed pretending to be that %&#$ if that was the idea there.

So ontology as a philosophical exercise is pointless then? — Isaac

I'm talking about ontology. You don't do ontology by looking at how we conventionally use language, as I said two or three times above.

Yeah, "With respect to" -- in other words, "when it comes to," versus sentences that aren't themselves moral stances but are just about them in some way.

Examination is just a more rigorous approach to observation. The world is the arbiter.

You keep conflating these two things when you talk about ethics, I don't know if it's just shorthand, or if you actually mean it, but on the face of it, there clearly are ethical truths. It is "true" that most people abhor extreme violence toward innocent children. — Isaac

Hence why I specified ethical/moral stances. I also said "opinions in this sense.". Those words aren't just decorations. They're there for a reason.

"Most people abhor violence towards children" is not an ethical/moral stance.

"Violence towards children is wrong" is an ethical/moral stance.

Yeah, you observe/examine/etc. the world

Re the source, people have a tendency to reject or at least be skeptical of difference, while being okay with sameness. This is rooted (phylogenetically way before homo sapiens) in the necessities of formulating conceptual abstractions required for survival, when we're talking about more complex creatures, with minds, who must continually make quick decisions about what to stay away/run away from, what to eat, etc. It's also rooted (again, phylogenetically way before homo sapiens) in survival with respect to communal species/flocks-schools-herds-tribes-etc. against competing species/flocks etc.

That doesn't justify it, it simply explains the natural tendencies it emerges from.

1. Let me present you a more simple version of my argument "nothing can come from nothing" which renders a creatio ex nihilo impossible, an argument without sets:

Let's define nothingness as the conjunctions of negations of any possibly or actually existing things: ~p1 & ~p2 & ~p3 & .... From that definition is follows trivially that no object can exist out of nothingness.

2. I still think the set S (representing the Being) of all existing things is neither the set of everything nor does it lead to it. It's different, because it only assumes things that are already existing and therefore non-contradictory, while the set of everything doesn't. Because S exists, ~S exists (~S = empty set = nothingness) and from there it follows trivially as well that if we assume ~S we cannot assume anything out of this empty set.

Yes, this model cannot grasp total nothingness (the same with 1.), but that's how far we can imagine nothingness anyway, there's no consistent way to imagine some more total nothingness because we always need something to define nothingness. Total nothingness is actually meaningless like triangle with four angles, it just looks like it means something due to its letters, but contentwise it's the same as "%$%/&%$/$/$" - meaningless. — Pippen

Aside from the problem of reifying abstractions and positing some questionable definitions there, you don't actually present any sort of argument as to why something can't "come from nothing." You seem to just be assuming that part as obvious, but that's supposed to be what the thread is about. Definitions would only be preliminary work. Once you set out definitions, you need to get on with the argument.

In Terrapinese, which is the name that I've just coined for your language, that is true. — S

What I said there, except possibly for the bit about properties, is completely non-controversial in analytic philosophy.

I'm not talking about a system or a process, I'm talking about a fact. — S

How would we have a fact that's not a system or process?

Facts arent about anything. "Fact" isnt the same thing as "true proposition." Facts are what true propositions are about.

If this stuff isn't clear to you it would have to be very confusing to read analytic philosophy.

by showing how the reaction of other objects is essential to the definition of loads of properties which we routinely call properties of the object. — Isaac

I've not been talking about definitions or what we call things, but what things are, regardless of definitions/what we call them. In short, I'm not talking about language (usage) per se.

If you're approaching this from an angle of "This is how we conventionally use language," that's fine, and there's no dispute about that, but that's not what I'm talking about. The way we conventionally use language can not line up very well with what's really the case.

This fact, however, causes no problem whatsoever for us calling the cup 'blue' or talking as if blueness were a property of the cup. Therefore, it need cause us no problem whatsoever to refer to meaning being a property of a word, despite the fact that it too is only manifest when some properly calibrated device (a language use) hears the word. — Isaac

That's about conventional language usage per se, though. Where manners of speaking are ubiquitous, and so on. That's different than doing ontology.

And I agree with you. Terrapin Station doesn't though, I think. But I'll let him speak for himself. If I've understood him correctly, he thinks that everything has a location, including meaning, including Tuesday - you name it, he'll "locate" it. — S

Correct. I think it's incoherent to say that anything exists, that there is any phenomenon that obtains, that does not have a location. That doesn't imply that a location is "simple" or in just one place, but it's a location (or set of locations) nonetheless. Tuesday, for example, is an idea, and as such is located in the minds (minds being identical to subsets of brain structure/function) of the people who are presently thinking the idea. We could also identify it with the word, with words explaining it, etc. in which case it's also located where those words are written (the locations of all of the books mentioning Tuesday, for example), where the sound is recorded, etc.

Only in your opinion? There's no accounting for opinions. The question was, did they or didn't they. What say you? — tim wood

There are only individual opinions in this realm. There are no moral/ethical truths with respect to particular stances. Various people can have the same opinion, of course, a la there being many people who feel one shouldn't put ketchup on hot dogs versus many people who feel it's okay to put ketchup on hot dogs. Opinions in this sense can't be correct or incorrect.

Performing = something an individual does. It's a process they have to engage in on a particular occasion.

rather your question to the other dude prompted me to inquire as to your basis in asking the question. — DingoJones

The basis is simply that person A says "I reasonably supported assertion P," because person A sincerely feels that to be the case, whereas person B says "No you didn't," because they sincerely feel that to be the case.

So now what do we do?

You responded to my question with a question.

There's no grammatical "error" there.

From that, then, did the Nazis do anything at all immoral? — tim wood

In my opinion, sure.

I think the characterization of "trying to control others thought/speech/expression" is a false one though. — MindForged

People aren't just letting others' expression be and not applying various social pressures, etc., are they?

Facts are consituted in meaning — TheWillowOfDarkness

No idea what that would be saying exactly.

Any given fact has a meaning, — TheWillowOfDarkness

Only insofar as someone thinks about it associatively.

some sort of relation to other facts. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If you use the word "meaning" for relations in general, what word are we going to use for associative thinking?

. . . I'd have to do something in the vein of the above for every phrase in your post, basically.

Do you think reason is completely relative? That valid reasoning can be different for different people? — DingoJones

So do you go by consensus or something?

Either try to reasonably support the controversial assertion or be explicit about what it is and what you're doing. — S

Who gets to decide what's a reasonable support, though?

so long as one goes about it in the right way. The problem has been an apparent obliviousness of what going about it in the right way would look like. — S

Sure. So what would be "the right way"?

Seems odd to say that evidence for such states existing unconsciously is problematic epistemically but you seem fine with the existence of them conciously. Can you easily define a thought, desire, idea, concept in a way that there is clear evidence for the existence of such things? — Isaac

And this seems like an odd comment when I had just said, and you just quoted "Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic."

The important difference for conscious mental states is that the bearer has clear epistemic evidence of them. But we don't have that for unconscious mental states.

I can understand something like 'desire", for example, as a disposition to act toward a certain goal, — Isaac

That suggests defining it behavioristically and ignoring the conscious aspect when it's conscious. (It also doesn't capture conscious desires very well, because lots of people have desires that they never or almost never act on.)

The bottom line, though, is that if you believe there's good evidence of unconscious mental states, present it and I'll look at it. Otherwise I'm not about to think that's there's good evidence of unconscious mental states.

Yeah, I'm not at all a fan of the way this board is moderated, but the vast majority of boards have moderation problems. Moderators tend to be control freaks/tend to wind up with Napoleon complexes simply due to the fact that they finally have some power in their limited world.

Moderation is best when it's pretty much a hands-off policy aside from spam or things that might reasonably get a site into legal trouble. I think it's better when moderators don't interact with a site's regulars very often, because that tends to lead to cliquey behavior, it often leads to grudges, etc.

If you're either unwilling or unable to engage in a more productive way with an idea, because it clashes with an idea of your own that you won't let go off, — S

The point here would be that one thinks that the idea in question has things factually wrong, so "engaging in a productive way" with it would involve trying to correct the error.

I think you and I must have different definitions of unconscious mental states. I mean by it a state in which the brain can be which affect behaviour/decisions but which the subject, by self-reporting or location, is unaware of. There is literally direct a pretty incontrovertible evidence for this. — Isaac

For it to be an unconscious mental state, it can't be just any brain state. It has to be a mental state, just one that the subject is unaware of. It has to be akin to a thought, desire, idea, concept, etc.--anything mental.

Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic.

In any event, by the way, let's say that some moral stance, m, is not foundational for S at time Tx, but some unconscious moral stance, n. is rather the foundational stance for S at time Tx. Well, what good does this do us, since S by definition isn't aware of n at Tx? If we ask him at Tx if there's another sentential stance that m is a consequence of for him, he can't very well tell us n--it's unconscious.

the point I was originally making was that it can be of value to a person to discus morality even though they are just likes/dislikes — Isaac

No disagreement with this.

But it's simply the case that one can state a foundational ethical stance, where there's not some other sentential reason behind or beneath it. It's not always the case that there's some other sentential reason behind every stance we state. There can't be because that's obviously an infinite regress. And people can start at the bottom so to speak. There sometimes seems to be an assumption that one never would, but that makes no sense.

Basically, to re-iterate I think you can be wrong about whether a moral stance is foundational, — Isaac

Whereas I do not agree with this, because I don't believe that there is any good reason to buy the notion of unconscious mental content, and you've not presented any good reason to buy that idea yet.

A real example would be that an hour is a measurement, and a measurement is a human activity, or that meaning is a mental activity. That wasn't what I was saying at all, and bringing these interpretations into the discussion without proper justification caused big problems. — S

Those are ontological analyses of what the terms are conventionally referring to. People are naturally going to disagree on such things. There's no way to demand that others use the same ontological analysis that you believe is correct, or to demand that they just ignore ontological analyses altogether.

One can understand that touching fire causes pain even if the one in question is language less. Meaning is attributed within the experience. The creature draws a correlation between it's behaviour and what happened immediately afterwards, The creature learned something, and by doing so, attributed meaning to the act and the fire. The fire became meaningful and/or significant to the creature after the connection was made between touching it and the pain that ensued. The creature attributed/recognized causality.

So, not all meaning involves reference, and not all understanding is of something that is already meaningful. — creativesoul

I'd say that the meaning they're performing re fire and pain includes a reference to pain. But I don't think of reference as necessarily linguistic in the sense of having to utter a word.

So there's nothing wrong with my breaking you arm? Or you mine, for that matter? — tim wood

What's wrong with anything morally is that someone disapproves of it as interpersonal behavior.

Do you understand this?

So they were wrong about preferring the taste of Coke, — Isaac

I already discussed this part (hence why I dislike doing longer posts and like to focus on one thing at a time until it's settled):

You're reading this situation as "I prefer the taste of x" where packed into that is a claim about what x really is objectively, so that if one gets the objective identification wrong (per whatever metric), then one's statement re "I prefer the taste of x" can be wrong.

I'm saying that "I prefer the taste of x" is about the person's experience, qua their experience, qua their understanding, etc.--so that whatever is really the case objectively is irrelevant, their identification is irrelevant, etc., and where it's either a present or historical claim. (Because otherwise it's a prediction--"I will prefer the taste of x," and I'd agree that they can get the prediction wrong (even on x as their experience, understanding, identification, etc.)

We were supposed to be talking about the idea of unconscious mental content here, though--specifically anything that would count as evidence of the same, and this has nothing to do with that.

The thing about "wrong for the reasons" presumably assumes that people are explicitly making statements like "I prefer x for reason y alone," and for some reason we're assuming that the statements are 100% accurate (and we're ignoring all of that stuff we were discussing before about meaning, etc.) and there isn't anything else going on consciously in their minds that they're not expressing or that they can't articulate very well?

I want to break your arm. Probably you do not want me to break your arm. Of course your feelings are just your personal problem and you need to work on those. So I get to break your arm, and no third person gets to intervene for any reason - yes?

And how do you get from the fact that I want something to I ought to get it? — tim wood

It's just a matter of what we're able to enact or not. Factors include how much power each of us has, how common the views are, what our persuasive abilities are like, etc.

then if you want P, you ought to do Q. — tim wood

I just pointed out to you that for one, this has packed into it the claim that "You ought to achieve what you want."

The evidence seems overwhelmingly to show that there is sub- or un- conscious mental content. What do you think was going on in the damaged part of the brain such that those for whom it was removed no longer showed a brand bias they were consciously unaware of? — Isaac

Wait--how would they have a brand bias that they're not aware of? You mean that people aren't aware that they're preferring one brand to another (when they know what the brand is)?

Why wrong? You've amputated from your thinking the usual answers most folks would give. If you had not done that, then those answers would probably suffice and this discussion would be too trivial to pursue. But in as much as you've taken yourself off that ground, the question arises as to just what your ground is. — tim wood

It's annoying that people don't understand that everyone's ground is simply their feelings about interpersonal behavior.

Maybe X is something good. — tim wood

What? That's a value judgment. Not an "is."

You could fool yourself into think the reason you have an aversion to stealing is because you dislike the kind of world it might bring about, but actually it's just that you're scared of getting caught. — Isaac

How would that work where we avoid positing unconscious mental content?

I didn't say that I don't consider any hurting of other people wrong. In fact, I explicitly said otherwise.

Again, "hurt/harm" etc. are too broad/vague in my opinion.

And yeah, I'm sure I hurt some people's feelings. No one can avoid doing that, especially as there are some folks around with unusual quirks, whose feelings will be hurt by things that most other folks would never imagine would hurt someone's feelings.