So then, your morals, and praxis' morals are internal to me. — Merkwurdichliebe

Could you explain how that makes sense to you (as something you're figuring is implied by my comments)?

Your first passage above seems to be speaking not about nominalism but about those who disagree with it; — Janus

And yet you say you don't need 101 material. You're not understanding simple things I'm writing.

In sociology and other social sciences, internalization (or internalisation) means an individual's acceptance of a set of norms and values (established by others) through socialisation. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right, so that it was something external prior to the internalization.

The problem is that you can't literally have morals/morality, values, etc. that are external.

So the theory is flawed, because it has an errant ontology. That's just the point. We're talking about the source of something. We can't do that very well with misconceived ontology.

If we formulate existence as a property of objects, then we must either admit that all objects exist, including fairies and square triangles, or we must allow non-existent objects into our ontology. — Dusty of Sky

Would you say that goes for other properties, too? Either we have to admit that all objects are spherical, or we have to say that objects can have a property of "non-sphericalness"?

There is nothing upon which anyone can do other than to blindly guess if there are any gods or not. — Frank Apisa

That's not correct though. We can base our assertions on evidence, rationality, etc.

Why don't you simply use "habitualize"?

If, however, you are asking if I am of the opinion that there are NO facts which substantively and unambiguously point to "there is at least one god" or "there are no gods".... — Frank Apisa

That's not what I'm asking. You don't need "substantively and umabiguously" for something not to be just a blind guess. For it to not just be a blind guess it simply has to be based on some support--some evidence, some logical argument, etc.

Yes. Obviously I disagree with you on that.

You do not believe that there would be any evidence or logical argumentation or rational facts, etc. that would suggest one answer versus another?

"Numerically identical": if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life, and that is pretty much trivially obvious. — Janus

Again, there actually are people who assert that two different instances of something can be a numerically identical instantiation of some single thing. So in their view, this isn't "defining away" the possibility of indenticality in two instances.

Nominalists disagree with the view that two different instances of something can be a numerically identical instantiation of some single thing. Realists (on universals, genidentity, etc.(the latter you'd probably prefer to call "genidenticality," given what's being claimed)) are who we're disagreeing with.

So...if I know them to be blind guesses...you think it to be idiosyncratic for me to call them blind guesses rather than to use "believe????????????????????????????" — Frank Apisa

If you're really making blind guesses about something, how about spending some time rationally analyzing the issue at hand, and then examining empirical evidence, logical argumentation, etc. as appropriate?

Start with something like the Blackwell Companion if you're really interested in pursuing philosophical reading in the field:

Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Biology

Again, the definition is usually given as a cluster-property definition, where it includes things like environmental responsiveness and mobility, growth/cell division, homeostasis, metabolism, organization, reproduction and evolution.

You’re too unwilling to state the obvious. — I like sushi

Do you mean explain things like I'm teaching a 101 level course? I avoid doing that here because everyone wants to act like they're the expert, like they're the teacher. So I acquiesce to the positioning that they're familiar with all of this stuff already.

I'm just trying to figure out why you're having trouble with the meaning of 'internalize'. — praxis

I'm not. You're having trouble with the conventional sense of the term is you are if you are thinking that there's not a connotation of something being external initially.

You can have the idea and desire to develop a particular habit but until it is actually a habit it is not internalized. Make sense? — praxis

It doesn't make sense with respect to the conventional connotation of the term "internalized." It's not a word to use for that context if that's what you want to say and you want anyone to understand it.

TS is stuck in infinite reflection - a perpetual loop of direct relation. He is unable to make the dialectical transition out of immediacy, where a new relation can be synthesized. — Merkwurdichliebe

Well that was a bunch of gobbledygook. I appreciate that it was only two lines of it though. (Seriously.)

You're a Solipsist? — praxis

No. How would you arrive at that conclusion based on what you're quoting?

Internalize has a connotation that something was external.

Aren't you a native English language speaker?

Right. Anyway, I'm sure you have some sense of what internalize means, right? — praxis

Hence the question.

It doesn't make sense to talk about internalizing something that's never external in the first place.

You asked, "How would you possibly prove that another has morality . . . "

So now, not only do we not know that empirical claims are provable, not only do we not know what an empirical claim is, but we can't even recall what we just wrote 5 minutes ago, or we don't really understand what we wrote, or . . .

"X has/doesn't have morality" is an empirical claim.

Maybe we should start with a lot more basic/simple material first.

So then only you have morality, I suppose. — Merkwurdichliebe

Do only I have daydreams?

How would you possibly prove that another has morality by referring to "utterances a la sounds/marks etc." — Merkwurdichliebe

How are we attempting to have discussions of the caliber that we're attempting to have in threads like this when we haven't even learned that empirical claims aren't provable, period? Shouldn't we take 101-level courses and master that material before we try attending graduate seminars?

So my morality is internal to you? — praxis

I can't literally observe your morality. I can only observe utterances a la sounds/marks etc. that you make, correlated to your morality.

It's like asking if your daydreams are internal to me, as if I could literally observe your daydreams.

We've already established that evaluations of prelinguistic assessments are primarily acquired from an external source. — Merkwurdichliebe

That makes no sense to me. How would you acquire an evaluation from an external source?

This does not mean thought/belief cannot be affected by something external. — Merkwurdichliebe

Of course. But the wording you used was "internalize morality," as if morality could be something external that we'd then need to internalize.

At this stage we pressuppose everything involved in prelinguistic thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thought/belief are already internal.

At any rate, so the rest is like saying that "AC/DC is a source of the Cult"?

Practice. Or perhaps a whip? — praxis

The problem is that morality never occurs as anything other than something internal.

internalization of morality — Merkwurdichliebe

What would that one be? How could you internalize morality (where presumably it wasn't something internal prior)?

He could explain himself better. — Merkwurdichliebe

"Succinct" isn't in his tool kit for one.

Re "multifaceted" what would the facets succinctly be?

So you think it is idiosyncratic of me to call my blind guesses...blind guesses? — Frank Apisa

It's idiosyncratic to not call them beliefs when it's something you'd assert. Whether they're conventionally blind guesses hinges on whether you have any supporting empirical evidence, logical argumentation, etc. for them.

The philosophers try to define life in terms of purpose of life. — Vipin

Actually, the standard definition in philosophy--which you'll find primarily under the auspices of philosophy of biology, a subdiscipline of philosophy of science, is very similar to the standard scientific definition, which is based on phenomena such as cell division, metabolism, etc.

Fine.

YOU do "believing."

I do not.

As to the immediate question of whether any gods exist or not...

...do you blindly guess there are gods or blindly guess there are no gods?

Me...I do not blindly guess in either direction. — Frank Apisa

You do what-I-and-most-people-call-"believing" but what-you-idiosyncratically-call-something-else.

Re the question of gods, I know there are none, based on lots of different evidence.

I can't wait to compile the relevant posts of this discussion. We have made it to 30 pages in less than a month, and for the most, we've not been bogged down in rhetorical bullshit (thanks to the methodology of creative soul). — Merkwurdichliebe

I haven't read most of what creativesoul wrote. What would you succinctly say that he gives as the source of morals?

I DO NOT DO BELIEVING.

I do understanding; guessing; supposing; estimating...and all that kind of stuff that others call "believing."

But I call my guesses, suppositions, and estimations...guesses, suppositions and estimations.

I DO NOT EVER CALL THEM BELIEFS. — Frank Apisa

You might not call them beliefs--that's fine, but you're doing what I name "belief" when you assert things like "I do not do believing." You can call it something else. What we name it doesn't really matter. Many of us just happen to name "that thing" "belief."

they end up saying things like you cannot step into the same river once. — creativesoul

You've said that a couple times. Could you maybe explain it?

We all know that entities are constantly changing, — Janus

There are people, including philosophers, who posit that multiple instances of things, whether temporal or spatial or both, can somehow be (not just conceptually, not just in name, etc.) identical in some regard--that is "exactly the same," numerically identical in some regard. Nominalists are taking issue with that (at least as one prominent branch of nominalism). If you don't agree with the notion that multiple instances of things can be (not just conceptually etc.) identical in some regard, then you're actually on the nominalist side of the debate.

Hey Terrapin. Just making sure you don't feel ignored in this thread. I think we are in general agreement (perhaps not exact, but much closer than those I am responding to). I just don't have anything to say when people are in agreement with me, haha. Certainly let me know if you feel I have missed anything. — ZhouBoTong

Sure, no problem. It's a topic I'm very interested in, but so far in this thread I primarily keep hoping that people will relax from typing so much, haha. I like to interact with folks so that it reads like a transcript of a casual in-person conversation we might have . . . which makes me picture people obliviously going into interminable lecture mode with all of these long posts.

There are much better ways to deny that much. Some which do not lead to reductio. — creativesoul

If that's all that nominalists are doing, why isn't it as good as any other way, and how would it lead to a reductio?

That's the point. So much of what we 'know' is not consciously known. — pomophobe

Intentionality can't be unconscious.

I don't buy unconscious mental content in general, but even if someone did, it wouldn't make any sense to posit unconscious intentionality.

Good posts, fdrake. A lot of stuff to question in them insofar as Heidegger goes, though (unsurprisingly enough from me, haha). For example:

"should the essential nature of experience be highlighted through abstract mental operations, or by attempting to draw out the essential character of how people experience stuff on a day to day basis? "

People actually experience stuff in a wide variety of ways on a day to day basis. It would probably be just about impossible to give anything like a comprehensive list of that, and it wouldn't be surprising if anything we can imagine would be on the list.

"Say Eric Clapton is freestyling on his guitar, he's damn good at it, he's performing and composing at the same time, it's badass. This is formed from an interplay of attending to how the situation was (the previous bit of improv), how the situation is (the previous bit of improv being extended by playing appropriate notes) and how the situation could and should develop (expressing whatever theme Clapton is experimenting with). It's also an awareness that has a sense of normality to it - if one of his strings breaks the situation changes. This is a very open ended sense of intentionality; lots of things and relations of things are attended to when Clapton's playing the guitar."

I doubt that most people doing something like playing guitar typically have anywhere near all of that stuff in mind when they're playing. I certainly don't when I'm playing.

And in a metaphysical discussion “real” can also be taken to mean ‘universal’ and/or make a claim for an ‘essence’. — I like sushi

The problem with parsing it that way is that one can be an antirealist on universals and essences while not denying universals and essences. That's the conceptualist brand of nominalism in a nutshell.

Insofar as there are a lot of people who have difficulty regularly acquiring good food, who simply go without health care and education because they can't afford it, who have to worry about whether they're going to have a place to live, who have to worry about affording other necessities, who have difficulty with travel--either because of cost or availability, who don't have satisfying employment, who don't leisure time, and who don't have the freedom to do some consensual things they'd like to do, I think we need to change it.

Otherwise, no, not really.