It's clearly the case that lots of people don't agree with the "books require/catalyze/etc. more imagination than films" bumper sticker.

We could rather easily do surveys about whether people agree with that or not.

It's just not something that anyone has done any sort of rigorous survey about.

I think maybe it's the passing of time that I sense. What do you think? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that we sense relations including extension. :wink:

Things are in a constant state of flux. The identity of a thing need not be. In fact, change could not even be taken account of if we demanded such. — creativesoul

As I was pointing out to Janus, what nominalists are denying is that two numerically distinct instances can be exactly the same, so that it's literally one thing and not numerically distinct in the relevant respect, with respect to some x. So either some A and some B that are numerically distinct via being spatially separated, or A at time T1 versus A at time T2, which is numerically distinct via temporal separation.

Which generally means they hold the view/s that some item is objectively existent . . . and/or is independent of human thought — I like sushi

Another word for that (objectively existent/independent of human thought) is "real."

If someone was to say to me they were a realist it wouldn’t give me anything near an understanding of there overall view. — I like sushi

It depends on the context. Often we'll say that we're realists or antirealists on x, or the conversation will be solely about the ontology of x. That simply means that one is respectively asserting or denying objective existence/independence of human thought with respect to x.

If the context isn't clear aside from it being a philosophical context, realism is usually being contrasted with idealism, in the broadest sense, where one is a realist just in case one believes that there is (a la ontological realism) and/or we can access (a la epistemological realism) some objective/human-independent things, without one specifying just what things.

how incredibly complex the design of some living things are and how unlikely life was to even begin. — jamesfive

The notion of assigning a likelihood to life beginning is absurd. We have no frequency data (except that it happened on one iteration) to base this on.

This is the sort of thing it's worth doing philosophy over--"Thinking hard" about what it is that you sense.

There are theories I thought I believed, ones that tell me there is a higher order of truth that I do not understand; — Nasir Shuja

When someone tells you something like this, don't just drink the Kool-Aid. Ask yourself, "Wait a minute. How does this person know there's a high order of truth that I don't understand? How did they discover it? How did they learn it? How do I know that they understand it? How do I know they're not just bullshitting me? How do I know that they're not just deluded or manipulating me?" Etc.

The thing to get rid of is a desire for certainty. It's important to learn to be comfortable with things not being certain.

real doesn’t mean realism. — I like sushi

What makes someone a realist? What is the view of someone who is a realist on x that makes them a realist on x? Realists think what?

(I'll get to the other stuff after we think about the above)

As for the use of “real” it is far from apparent exactly what you mean. Not to mention I asked about what kind of “nominalism” previously and you appeared not to understand the question. Maybe if you look here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/#VarNom — I like sushi

I mentioned conceptualism, trope nominalism, etc. in my answer. You never commented on my response to your query (not that I saw, at least).

there isn’t an instance where “real” is mentioned in that passage. — I like sushi

"Realist/realism" etc. occur on that page 26 times by my count, including in the subsection about the varieties of nominalism. The traditional debate with respect to nominalism, by the way, is known as the "nominalism vs realism" debate.

I just want to do one topic at a time for the moment:

If change were time, there would be no way for time to come about. The creation of time takes change. — Devans99

Is there any way for change to come about? Does change need to be created?

By that logic if I had two clocks, one digital (little motion), one mechanical (lots of motion), time would run quicker for the mechanical clock. — Devans99

It depends on what motion we're focusing on. In the scenario you're describing, we usually focus on the watch faces and what they read. We're talking about our measurement of time relative to our concerns there.

We have evidence that time slows as the speed of light approaches so I do not see a timeless photon as controversial. — Devans99

What I wrote was "This is false when we consider them relative to other things, so that we're considering the motion. "

OK what's wrong with this proof:

1. Can’t get something from nothing — Devans99

Just taking it one step at a time, it starts to go off track with that first premise, if it's saying that there can't be nothing and then suddenly something appears. If it's saying that, there's no good reason to believe that.

Are you saying you think time does not change for the empty space (where there is no motion) and only changes for the clock (where there is motion)? That does not make sense to me. — Devans99

With the "empty space" only as our frame of reference, correct, time does not pass. If we're broadening the frame of reference to include other things, like the clock, then time would pass.

Photons can move the whole length of the universe in no time. — Devans99

This is false when we consider them relative to other things, so that we're considering the motion. It's false that they cover no length as well. I'm not saying that no one says these things. I'm telling you that they're wrong in saying them. They're misled by the mathematical conventions they're using, where they're basically "worshipping" the mathematics per se, and they see the mathematics as ontologically primary.

Presentism is impossible; — Devans99

Nope. B time is incoherent.

I think time enables motion. Change maybe possible without time. — Devans99

This is wrong. Time is identical to change/motion.

If photons change, they're not timeless.

It's not possible to move timelesslessly, because motion is identical to time.

Re at any rate, so why would we need to posit something that can't move or change in order to say that then something moves/changes?

Maybe God's first motion creates some form of time/causality? — Devans99

Any motion, any change would BE (identical to) time. You can't have motion/change without time, because motion/change is what time is.

There isn't any time without matter, by the way, so time can run differently "in the present of matter."

At any rate, any motion, any change would be time, so you couldn't "start time" from outside of time.

I'll leave that alone for a moment (we're not going to get anywhere with me pointing out that the stuff in the first paragraph is all incoherent in my view, etc.), and ask this:

How is something permanent in your sense of that term supposed to start time? Isn't that something it would have to do?

The opposite of 4d spacetime, presentism, is incompatible with a start of time: — Devans99

This, and the rest of the comment, seems to have nothing to do with my comment that you quoted just prior to it.

Neither 4D spacetime nor presentism have anything to do with positing a fourth spatial dimension, by the way.

Re my comment about permanence and how you're defining it, you didn't seem to understand that, either. Quoting someone else isn't going do us any good, unless they directly addressed the question just as I asked it.

The answers to questions 1 and 2 are PORTMANTEU and PHOTOGRAPHY. — ACRatone

I don't get that either without further explanation. How do we get, as an acrostic, "portmanteau" from

Come, pack my things, and let the clothes
Be neatly brushed and folded well:
The friends I visit all suppose
That I'm a perfect London swell.

(Come)
P (ack my things, and let the cl)
o (thes be neatly b)
r (ushed and folded well:)
T (he friends I visit all suppose, That I')
m
a (perfect Lo)
n (don swell)

. . . but that's obviously not right, not to mention that we ran out of letters before we could finish the word. So I'd need even that one explained.

There's something missing in the explanation in the book (at least in that section--maybe it's explained elsewhere in the book)

I don't think that the idea of a fourth spatial dimension is coherent aside from it being a sort of "game" we can play with the way we've constructed mathematics.

But okay. So "permanence" isn't referring to a state in your usage. It's a name for a type of object?

I just did give it a definition as a 4D object in space rather spacetime. — Devans99

What is the fourth dimension supposed to be?

Our task at the moment is to define "permanent" so that it's somehow not relative to time (in the sense of whether something persists relative to time).

Be more careful in defining your use of terms and it would cause much less confusion. The term “real” is used in a variety of ways in philosophy. — I like sushi

The way I've used "real," and especially in its connection to any discussion of nominalism, should be pretty clear from context to anyone who has studied or who reads a lot of philosophy. What I described is a very common way to use the term, especially historically, and especially in the context of the issue of nominalism. But I don't mind clarifying it when folks ask, as you did.

Not quite sure what you mean. — Devans99

I asked you how you'd define the term "permanent" if you're not using it to refer to a concept of something existing for all time (or at least for some particular extended length of time).

Your response to that request was "I'm not sure."

Wait, if we're basing an argument on the notion of permanence, we'd better know what we're referring to with that term.

So the requirement that something exist permanently has to be satisfied by something outside of time. — Devans99

So what would you say that "permanent" refers to in general?

There is a start of time, there must be something permanent causally before that to create time. — Devans99

Doesn't "permanent" only make sense in relation to time? Permanent refers to something lasting for all time (at least of a particular range), no? What would it refer to outside of that?

There is a timeless first cause that has existed permanently that starts everything else. — Devans99

Why can anything exist permanently?

Is change real or not? — Janus

Of course it's real. It's just not a "thing itself" that can then change or not.

Regarding Nominalism, are you happy to say that ‘abstract entities’ such as ‘numbers’ exist but that they are not objects? — I like sushi

On my view, all abstracts, all abstraction is only a (particular, physical) mental event. It's a way that we think about things, about relations, etc. So this includes numbers.

From my understanding of nominalism many would hold that a ‘chair,’ ‘banana’ or other such ‘concrete entity’ doesn’t exist, but that ‘numbers’ - as ‘abstract entities’ - do exist (just not as ‘objects’). — I like sushi

It's primarily a position on universals. The idea is that there's not a "chair" universal (or a "round" universal, or a "red" universal, or anything like that), which isn't identical to any particular chair (or roundness or redness), that's then somehow instantiated in various particular chairs (or round or red things). Most nominalists don't buy realism (extramentalism or objectivity) for abstracts in general--whatever you want to call them, abstract objects, abstract entities, etc.

The confusion and misapplication of terms seems to me to be the main purpose of the nominalistic approach to discussion. — I like sushi

The gist of it isn't that it's an "approach to discussion." It's ontology. It's a stance about what sorts of things there are in the world.

Re "object" and "entity" I'm not using them in some technical manner. I use them as synonyms for a <whatever you want to call it> that exists, or subsists, or occurs, or is instantiated, or whatever you want to call that, in any manner whatsoever.

Re "real," it's traditionally used in these discussions to refer to something existing (or subsisting, or again any word you want to use like that) "outside of" mentality. So if you think that x is real, or if you're a realist on x, that implies that you believe that x occurs apart from the mental.

"Concrete" is used for particulars--single things that are some specific way ("thing" is not being used technically there). "Concrete" usually has the additional connotations of being physical, in spacetime, etc.

"Abstract" is in contradistinction to "concrete." Abstracts are usually thought to have no physical referent, no referent in spacetime, and/or they are not particular things (again, "thing" there is just a nontechnical "<whatever it is>"); they rather arch over many particulars--for example, as universals. On my view, and on the view of "conceptualist" nominalists in general, abstracts, or the act (or event) of abstraction, is a mental phenomenon (and actually concrete, particular as such) whereby we formulate a concept that arches over many particulars by focusing on some more or less similar feature in a number of particulars (which can include particular relations) while ignoring other details and more fine-grained differences.

I haven't said that any aspect is "identical" — Janus

We need to go back a step then. I asked you this:

"If x at time T1 and x at time T2 have an absolutely unchanged identity in your view, isn't (aren't?) the identity of x at T1 and x at T2 identical?"

You responded with "That's right."

Again, "identical" refers to being exactly/literally the same, zero differences, or "absolutely unchanged" as you say, in two instances, including at two different times.

Time can't just start on its own — Devans99

Why can anything start on its own (as in whatever you figure started time)?

I'm confused. Where are the letters a-l-l-a-h in the poem at hand (whether directly or via word substitutions or whatever, akin to the infamous "Mabel"/"Emily" acrostic)?

So you can't do a definition, just ambiguous examples?

Empirical claims can not be proven period. Again, you'd learn this in Science Methodology 101 should you ever take it. So all empirical claims can not be proven by means of empirical evidence.

I didn't claim that change itself is doing anything. I said that change itself isn't a thing to do anything or not.

The difference in your view is?

don’t you mean non-empirical claims? — TheGreatArcanum

No.

Empirical claims are not provable. Science methodology 101.

the man who holds that all is changing all the time except change itself, — TheGreatArcanum

"Change itself" isn't a thing that's changing or not.

Then we're back to truth being limited to humanity (in concepts, ideas, etc) — BrianW

Right. At least on my view. On the alternate view, one would need (what I consider to be) a wonky ontology of propositions.

Because, again I ask, wasn't there truth before the rise of humans?

No, not on my view.

Whether it's an atom, a human, planet, solar system, etc, neither is the whole of reality. Each is just an expression of reality, albeit a limited one in one way or other. — BrianW

Well, I'd say each is a part, but not the whole. The whole is the atom + the human + the planet, etc., plus the dynamic relations those things are in. Re "absolute," are you using that simply to refer to the whole as such? I don't know. I don't understand how you're using "absolute."

What's more frustrating is how it seems to go more quickly the older you get.

Oh well, back to my Christmas shopping.