And here you are spinning the word "physical". — Banno

I have no idea what you have in mind there.

This puzzles me. IS Terra's claim that the number 2 is a brain state? — Banno

Yes.

But that's nonsense, since it would mean that my 2 and your 2, being different brain states, are different numbers. — Banno

And indeed that's the case, a la it being a nominalistic truism that two instantiations of "the same" anything are not actually identical.

You're misunderstanding. This isn't about proving anything. I'm stating an ontological account of how logical and semantic spaces can be physical. In contradistinction to that, your task is state an ontological account of how they can instead be nonphysical, where your account isn't simply a set of negations.

They can be physical a la an ontological analysis of what they actually are as existents, which is a set of brain states in persons.

So the difference between that and nonphysical claims about them ontologically, where we're not simply stating negations, is?

Logical or semantic space can be physical, though. So what would be the ontological difference between physical logical or semantic space and nonphysical logical or semantic space that's not simply a negation?

Can you explain it, ontologically, in a manner that's coherent to you and that doesn't simply consist of negations ("not physical" etc. )?

It's a fiction that the UN is located at 405 East 42nd Street? lol

"This exists someplace that isn't physical" is what's absurd. The idea of that is completely incoherent. There isn't anything that's nonphysical. It's a completely idiotic idea.

In one sense of the UN, it's at 405 East 42nd Street, New York, NY.

The notion of a locationless existent (or subsistent, or whatever one would like to propose) is incoherent.

As a nominalist how would you demonstrate that abstracts don't exist? — Janus

By pointing to locations and noting that there are no abstracts there.

As I've mentioned many times, I always type my points.

Can't say that I'm eligible to join your club for that, unfortunately.

Seriously, it's on my screen when I look at this thread.

Very funny.

Weird. On my screen, those words are there, under his name, in the first post, and the way I put "Evolution means . . . the absence of morality" in my own post was via copy-pasting the Matias post. Must be something weird with your computer.

All we need in order to negate the premise of the initial post of the thread.

Who would disagree with that? That a mother addicted to heroine is worse for a child than were she sober? — Frotunes

I don't at all categorically agree with it, for one.

Where do you think that fifty-digit integers that have not been written down or spoken are located?

Are you disagreeing with "Matias wrote that 'Evolution means . . . the absence of morality'"?

I'm sorry that it's indecipherable to you, too.

Matias wrote that "Evolution means . . . the absence of morality"

A heroine addict mother wouldn’t be good for her child — Frotunes

That depends on who you ask. (And for many who answer, they're going to want some details, they might be careful not to conflate various things, etc.)

All we need is a practical difference that a belief one way or the other makes, whatever all the details. ;-)

In other words, he's saying that morality and evolution have nothing to do with each other. I'm disagreeing.

The first problem with your opening post is that morality arose out of evolution.

A simple example where belief in free will makes a difference:

Both Betty and Bill are miserable in their current life. They don't like their jobs, they don't even like the idea of working 9 to 5, etc.

Betty believes she has free will, and because of this, she believes she has a choice to completely change her life. So she does. She pursues other types of work that she finds more satisfying, that don't require the old 9 to 5, etc.

Bill doesn't believe he has free will. He believes he was destined to his current life and he believes it's not possible for him to make a choice to change it. So he doesn't.

Be good enough to provide your definition of "fact." You can refer me back and I'll look for it. — tim wood

Facts are states of affairs. Ways that things are. Remember that the subjective/objective distinction refers to mental phenomena versus non-mental phenomena. So an objective fact is a state of affairs that is NOT mental phenomena. A subjective fact would be a state of affairs that is mental phenomena.

A subjective judgment can't "become objective."

You're asking when particular sort of mental phenomenon can become the same phenomenon, just without it being mental. That's not possible.

Names are possible results of an algorithm that creates all possible strings made from a given alphabet — Mephist

If they're just possible, that doesn't imply that they're actual. The claim that they exist whether we count them or not is a claim that they're all actual and not only possible.

If something can be defined in a precise way, it means that there exists some kind of "attribute" common to different physical objects that identifies the abstract object. — Mephist

And that doesn't follow. Our definition could be inaccurate for example.

(I'm also overlooking just how we're using "common" here. Remember that as a nominalist, I don't think that any numerically distinct things, including properties, are actually identical.)

These "attributes" are identifiable information that is contained in physical objects, and information "exists" in reality. — Mephist

In order for the attributes to be actual names, we need to show that they are.

I'm definitely not a platonist. In fact, I'm a nominalist. I don't buy that any (objective) abstracts exist.

As a platonist, how would you demonstrate that abstracts exist?

For variables of logical propositions, they are only arbitrary strings or arbitrary length — Mephist

That exist where/how prior to someone (or something, like a computer) creating/assigning them?

"Proper name" aka "proper noun": "A noun that is used to denote a particular person, place, or thing, as Lincoln, Sarah, Pittsburgh, and Carnegie Hall." (https://www.dictionary.com/browse/proper-name)

We could extend it to "names" (do you mean variables?) used in logical propositions if you like. How are there any of those if someone didn't think or say them?

I like coffee ice cream. That over there is coffee ice cream. So far, objective facts — tim wood

"I like x" isn't an objective fact. It's a subjective fact.

"It's good" is a subjective judgment that an individual has to make, for whatever reasons they make it. "It's good" can't be the same as any objective set of facts, because no objective judgments such as that obtain.

Reason is subjective. It's a mental activity.

Say what? You're defining "objective" as "whatever one is willing to accept"?

Doesn't "sempiternity" refer to persisting infinitely into the future? How would something be after that?

If you're writing run-on sentences that are strings of 14 or 15 prepositional phrases, you should probably revise.

What would be an "objective justification" in general?

That's simply another way of effectively saying, "We're going to consider argumentum ad populums 'objective.'"

Exactly.

Knowledge has to be objective otherwise it's mere belief. — luckswallowsall

And indeed, knowledge in the propositional sense, rather than the "how-to" or "knowledge-by-acquaintance" senses, is belief. It's a particular sort of belief--justified, true belief, but of course, that's a type of belief.

Knowlege is indeed necessarily mental ... but it's also necessarily objective. — luckswallowsall

"Mental" is the opposite of "objective." Hence why "objective knowledge" is an oxymoron.