To suggest, as Dennett seems to, that the apparently sensory
aspects of phenomenology (say) are in some sense illusory because they aren’t the product
of sensory mechanisms in the way we suppose, — luckswallowsall

This isn't contra you or what Strawson are saying, but it's difficult to believe that Dennett might actually be saying that people are effectively claiming that there are no such things as optical illusions.

When he says illusion in recent years, he literally user illusion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_illusion — Forgottenticket

"According to this picture, our experience of the world is not immediate, as all sensation requires processing time. It follows that our conscious experience is less a perfect reflection of what is occurring, and more a simulation produced unconsciously by the brain. "

Actually, that doesn't follow at all. The only thing that follows from "our experience of the world is not immediate" is itself: our experience of the world is not immediate.

The closest to definition he comes is here which he describes as fourfold.

"Qualia are: "(1) ineffable (2) intrinsic (3) private (4) directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness"

The experiments are less about illusion and more supposed to show the defenders of qualia are failing to meet that definition. — Forgottenticket

But he's doing nothing to show that qualia aren't ineffable, intrinsic, private or directly or immediately apprehensible to consciousness. Rambling through a bunch of optical illusions certainly doesn't accomplish that.

But he was promoted as such because meaninglessness is promoted, not because he created great art. — Henri

He created great art because I love his work.

I don't think it's a monopoly, but I do think it's a mess, and a big problem is that there are only two viable parties for major offices, with candidates having to kowtow to the norms of those parties.

I'd actually rather a system with no parties.

We never see things as they are. Free will is very limited or inexistent. — leo

We already went over the free will issue. Re "never seeing things as they are" why would we believe that? Especially when we don't have evidence of how things really are, where that's different than the way we are seeing things, BUT, if we have evidence of that, then we're saying that we can see things as they really are, so there's no way to support the claim that we can not.

Thanks. I'm not very familiar with blindsight studies, unfortunately (to be able to comment on them).

This is so because there are numerous people who are consciously blind yet they are able to cross a room and avoid all the furniture without any problem. — I like sushi

"Consciously blind" . . . are you referring to people who are blackout drunk or something here? I don't know what "consciously blind" would refer to.

that there can be epistemically objective facts about ontological subjectivity. — luckswallowsall

"Epistemically objective" is an oxymoron. Knowledge can't be objective. Knowledge is necessarily mental.

There are integers that have never been thought or said. — Banno

There are? Where? And how do their names exist prior to being named?

And how is it a proper name prior to being used as such?

Please indicate where this subject arose. I do not believe it's a part of this thread. — tim wood

It's what's at dispute if we're disputing whether value judgments can be objective.

The problem is that your sentences do not say anything that could in any sense be considered valid in the contect of my OP. — Matias

I don't see it as a requirement that you have a particular opinion about how my comments relate to your initial post.

You say that there is no objectivity, — Matias

I didn't say that. I said that we can't be objective.

Does that in any way invalidate my arguments in the OP? No. You are just deliberately misinterpreting them. — Matias

As I've explained a couple times now, we can't actually "stand back" from our perceptions, beliefs, etc. You can't do that any more than you can escape your own shadow.

If it's all beliefs from top to bottom: what is the difference between these two beliefs?
(a) Grinded rhino horn is a remedy for erectile dysfunction
(b) AIDS is caused by the HI virus — Matias

There are a lot of differences. But one of them isn't that one is "objective" while the other isn't.

Re this:

They believe that the Neural Activity is sufficient for us to move around in the world without bumping into things. — SteveKlinko

The thing is that it seems to be sufficient, at least for some organisms--for example, I think it's doubtful that a lot of insects have something like consciousness, but they have neural activity that allows them to respond to dynamic environments.

We don't know just how similar to our own brains something has to be before consciousness arises. Consciousness is definitely helpful for survival purposes, though, especially when you get to organisms like us, who are relatively complex and who aren't adapted to easily survive to reproduction age without a lot of assistance and without the benefits of being able to learn things (such as things in our environment that are dangerous).

but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness — Forgottenticket

That was one of my suggestions earlier in the thread: "another possible charitable interpretation is that he's simply denying a view of what consciousness is, while saying that consciousness is really something else instead, but it's not clear just what the view is that he's denying, or just who would hold the view in question/just how universal that view would be."

As I said earlier in that same post: "No one is claiming anything even remotely similar to 'there are no optical (or other similar sensory) illusions.'"

Lets just think about the Redness of the color Red. If you are Experiencing Redness or if you are having an Illusion of Redness, it is still Redness that you are Experiencing. The Illusion still gives you an Experience of Redness. — SteveKlinko

Exactly.

The question is: What is that Redness in the first place regardless of if you want to call it an Illusion or not. — SteveKlinko

I have views about that, but I think it's going off topic for this thread (although maybe we'd rather change the topic, since it doesn't seem like anyone is of the opinion that at least the language that Dennett, Frankish, etc. use in the claims they make has merit).

What is your point? — Matias

I type my points. The point of every sentence I type is just what that sentence says. I don't see the utility of typing something that's not my point--why beat around the bush?

At any rate, "I'm not sure if Accra is the capital of Ghana," "I don't think that Accra is the capital of Ghana," etc. are beliefs.

Again, yes, we're able to reflect on beliefs. That's not something objective that we're doing, and it's not something non-biased, non-belief-based, etc. that we're doing.

The moment you decide to try to find out about X, you are trying to be objective, because your intention is directed towards an object. — Matias

No I'm not, because I realize that people can't be objective. That doesn't amount to not wanting to reflect on, not wanting to test, etc. beliefs. I just realize that there's nothing objective about it.

Proper names only occur when someone thinks or says one.

Isn't the probability of you, as the particular individual you are, living now, actually 1?

The notion that there's anything random about you, as the particular individual you are, living at any random time seems flawed, no? Graphs like that would only make sense if you "already existed" somehow, without living, and then the exact year that you wind up living is chosen in a manner akin to selecting lottery numbers. But that's not how it works. So we can't pretend that it's how it works if we want to say anything not purely fantastical about it.

The idea isn't at all that people do not judge things to be good or bad, preferable or not, recommendable or not, etc. Obviously we do.

Rather, the world outside of people does not judge things to be good or bad, preferable or not, recommendable or not. Those judgments are something that brains do. They're not something that rocks, the atmosphere, a music CD, a vitamin A pill, etc. do.

I think you're just going to have to man up and admit that in your thinking there is no such thing as a fact. — tim wood

I said, "Vitamin A, and other vitamins have an effect on your body." That's a(n objective) fact. What's not a(n objective) fact is whether the effect is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, something we ought to pursue or not, etc.

I looked at a couple, but they didn't seem to be making claims about "negative stereotypes and harmful 'Indian' sports mascots playing a role in exacerbating racial inequity." Could you point me to one of the studies that claims this?

Vitamin A, and other vitamins have an effect on your body. It's up to each individual whether they value that effect or not. There's no objective fact that the effect it has is more valuable than the effects of not having vitamins, or that you should value the effects or anything like that.

See this recent thread for a discussion about this:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6039/illusionism-undermines-epistemology

With studies showing that negative stereotypes and harmful “Indian” sports mascots are known to play a role in exacerbating racial inequity — Baden

What's an example of some of those studies? Let's look at their methodology.

No? I've had grape juice. I like grape juice. I want grape juice. (Fermented, these many years.) This, per you, is foundational. This is the is-ness. Are you arguing I cannot get to an ought? If I want wine I should - ought to - go to the store and buy some. — tim wood

From a fact to a value statement. "Ought" is a type of value statement. As is "I like grape juice" and "I want grape juice."

Saying that something is the "is/ought problem" is a way of mentioning that you can't derive any value statement from an objective fact.

If comparing the similarities between animal brains and human brains and their structures is an indication that these brains share the qualities of subjectivity then why would we not also assume that these same brains experience subjectivity the same way with the same qualia? Why would similar brain structuring mean it provides a first-person experience but with different qualia? — Harry Hindu

We know, first off, that brain structure isn't identical from individual to individual, so that could easily lead to different subjective experiences. But it also seems to be the case from third-person reports that we don't all experience the same things the same ways, via different aesthetic and gustatory tastes, for example, different impressions of the same sensory phenomena, etc.

OK, so you are taking offense at the metaphor "to stand back from X"? — Matias

No. Merely explaining that it's not possible to "stand back" from your beliefs and perceptions.

How do you call it when you hold a belief and then it occurs to you "I could be biased or prejudiced or simply mistaken"? — Matias

I don't have a special term for it. The point is simply that "I could be biased or prejudiced or simply mistaken" is itself a belief, a type of bias, as is the notion that one should perform this sort of examination, etc.

Or do you never doubt or question any of your beliefs, judgements, perceptions? — Matias

Of course I do. I just don't pretend that I can be non-biased, objective, etc.

Most briefly, if you want X (if X is something to be that isn't), And Y is the way to get it, then you ought to do Y. — tim wood

Hence why I said foundational. "If you want x" would be the foundation. You can't get to that from an is.

So it's not even addressing the claim I made.

The "is-ought" problem was resolved long ago. For a current resolution, see Mortimer Adler. Language - broadly defined - through memory mediates experience, and reason underpins language. That is, reason is always there. Arguably there in the experience itself, but I am not prepared to argue that. But you might care to try a self-analysis of what you do when you accidentally touch something hot and burn yourself. — tim wood

Huh???

First, what was Adler's supposed resolution? If I read it in the past, I don't recall it.

Are you suggesting that categorically there are none? That's how I'm reading you - no duties at all. Question: assuming you drive, do you drive on the correct side of the road? Why, exactly (assuming you do)? — tim wood

It makes sense to say that there are duties a la things that are legally enforced, for example. But if that's what you're saying, then (a) obviously there are no duties to use particular grammar, which was his example, and (b) even if there were, obviously he was saying that he disagrees with the notion of that.

It's nonsense to say that a foundational preference could be based on reason, as it would be an attempt to overcome the is/ought problem.

How do you propose you'd have a foundational preference that has something to do with reason? What would be an example?

Today, however, it is nearly impossible to not be a member of a community - never mind whether or not you want to be. That imposes duties. — tim wood

How and in what sense would you say it imposes duties? Do you just mean things that you'll be possibly fined, arrested, etc. for?

If most of us disagree with you, I suppose you haven't stated a fact. — g0d

Exactly. The construction with a high degree of consensus is actually that "fact" refers to "state of affairs."

What I have argued is that there seems a natural evolution of tribe->community->law->morality that further evolves under reason, when communities have the luxury of being reasonable. — tim wood

Moral foundations have nothing to do with reason. They're purely individual preferences.

Means that according to you, everyone can do what they like. — tim wood

"If the law is immoral" --obviously I'm saying in my view.

You're doing that thing where you're figuring that people are going to defer to an "objective view." An "objective view" is a category error for this realm.

Sure, but that's not saying that it's immoral to do drugs or take risks oneself. The issue you're bringing up is an issue of putting other persons' lives at risk nonconsensually. That's a different idea. You can put other people's lives in danger nonconsensually with all sorts of things, including texting while you're driving, including other (legal) chemicals you have on your person that are dangerous in non-ventilated spaces--like turpentine, say. Those things aren't at all specifically issues about drugs/drug-taking.

It seems like there's maybe not a clear idea (in general, based on other posts from other people, too) of the difference between consensual and nonconsensual activities?

I never claimed that there "are no perceptions or beliefs", but you can question your beliefs (and if you are unable or unwilling to do it, other people can do it for you - that is the essence of science).
If you told me that you are never doing this, I would not believe this for a second. — Matias

You question your beliefs, from the framework of other beliefs, perceptions, etc. You're not "standing back" from perceptions and beliefs. And there's nothing objective about it.

"Right" morally refers to an preference of behavior that an individual has.

There is no objective "right" in the sense of "correct" when it comes to morality, because there are no objective moral judgments.

Each individual. Morality is a matter of individual judgment.