What? You have faith but you lack that faith?

What I'd count as an answer is something that begins like this, "I believe that I'm perceiving something that has been transmitted from a tree because _______"

So, I simply deny both horns of your supposed disjunction. God is unqualified being. The beings of experience depend on God. Humans develop logic to think about being in a rational way. So, the order of precedence here is God -> created being (including humans) -> logic (created by humans). — Dfpolis

So if logic is simply something created by humans to think about reality, then God would not in any way be constrained by logical possibility, right?

Again, this is why I don't like to do more than one thing at a time. What happened to the question I asked prior to what you're quoting?

Is consciousness divided into a perceiver and an object of perception, ie the Cartesian theatre, or is consciousness and perception one and the same? Isn't "awareness" a synonym for "consciousness"?

Where is the "you" that perceives? — Harry Hindu

Consciousness is a general term for mentality, including awareness. Perception is one set of mental "modes." So is the notion of a self or "you." The location of all of this is your brain.

My view is that I'm perceiving whatever has been transmitted from the tree to the eye to the brain to my consciousness. The light as it travels is not a perception the instant it hits my lens, and the tree itself never moves from the woods. — Hanover

If you think that the tree itself is unknowable, then why would you believe that you're perceiving something that has been transmitted from a tree? What would be the basis of that?

What I think is going on is that you perceive the tree. Obviously that doesn't mean that the tree is in your brain, which is an inane misunderstanding/straw man that some people think is worth arguing against, as if anyone is claiming that. Perceiving the tree is seeing the tree as it is, from a particular point of reference, via the mechanisms of perception--receiving sensory data via light or sound or touch, etc. where nerve signals are sent to your brain, etc.

Assuming you're a realist, there is a tree "out there" that somehow is perceived by you. That leaves two things (1) the tree and (2) the perception of the tree. The tree is located in the woods and the perception is located in your head. Your knowledge of the tree is due to the light reflecting off the tree, the lens in your eye bending that light, that light affecting your neurons, and thorough some magic of consciousness, you perceive it. What else could you be perceiving other than some processed physical event in the world? — Hanover

Without addressing potential problems in this depiction, let's say those things wind up being the case under an assumption of realism.

That, however, is not your view. Your view is that you're "perceiving" mental content qua mental content. I'm asking you how you're arriving at that option. And the answer as to how you're arriving at it, why you're picking that option is?

Two worlds A,B and people a,x,b. a lives n A, b lives in B, x lives in both.
In A and B different languages are spoken, also A and B do not share anything but x.
The meta view is exactly this formalization of the two worlds. In this meta view we understand that from the point of view of a, x does speak weird gibberish, but we also know that this gibberish is indeed an actual language. One could say the language spoken in B is a private language in A used only by x.
However as we can choose only the viewpoint of a,b or x in real life, there are only these possibilities:
If we choose a: x is talking gibberish, it's not a language.
If we choose x: I know all languages, they all are public, as I talk to a and b.
If we choose b: same as a.
So there is no private language here, even with the more permissive use of the term above. — SomeName

This sounds like my comment above: "usually this just devolves into a rather facile disagreement about how folks are pledging to use the term 'language.'"

So in other words, the person is making a pledge to not use the term "language" when they think the language is gibberish.

I think your notion of consent issues is arbitrary . . . — Andrew4Handel

I asked the question I asked you because I was curious about your answer.

Re the more strict Wittgensteinian idea of whether there could be a private language that turns out to be indecipherable to others in perpetuity (I wouldn't say "in principle indecipherable" because I don't think it really makes sense to talk about principles in this context), I think that's possible, but usually this just devolves into a rather facile disagreement about how folks are pledging to use the term "language."

Now this person can talk to people in both worlds in different languages and I believe it makes sense to say that from their perspective all of these languages are public. — SomeName

That part doesn't follow from anything prior to it, and if you're trying to argue that language isn't private, you can't just jump to the conclusion you're shooting for in the middle of the argument.

For a person from one of these worlds, that can only experience one of them and not travel between them, the languages from the other world are completely unintelligible and they would simply not call it a language. — SomeName

I don't think this part works, either. For one, we don't say that someone is speaking a language or not based on whether we understand what they're saying. We say that someone is speaking (or writing) a language if it seems to function as a language to them--it's used to communicate, to record information, etc. As it is, there are a handful of ancient languages that we haven't been able to crack yet, and maybe we'll never crack them. We don't say that they're not languages because of this.

Secondly, folks who posit that language is private, or at least has some private aspects--I'm one of them--obviously don't say that this makes language unintelligible.

But as we can at any point be only one person and have only one point of view we are unable to transcend into some meta view where we could call a language private relative to somebody else. — SomeName

That part I'm not sure I understand. Could you explain it in other words?

There's no demand for moonshine because alcohol is legal.

The same would be the case for weed.

A unconscious person can not express their consent on whether they would like their hand stuck in a fire. Unconscious people can never express an opinion so this period of inability to voice consent does not entail any rights or justifications for someone else to do something to them

Your positions entails that as soon as someone is unconscious or asleep then their inability to consent justifies whatever you do to them. — Andrew4Handel

So, if your house catches on fire and you can't escape being burned, is that a consent issue?

How many people buy moonshine now? That's about the same percentage that would buy illegal weed if it were legalized.

I don't to need to stick my hand in a fire to know i would not consent to having my hand stuck in a fire. — Andrew4Handel

If you have a fire in your house and get trapped so that you're burned, it's not a consent issue.

The circumstance where you're consenting or not to sticking your hand in a fire is where you have an option to stick your hand in a fire and choose to, or where someone is offering a fire to you to stick your hand in. When it's not something being performed as an action on you by another moral agent and you have no choice in the matter, it's not a consent issue.

Well, not only that; but, also the issue of characterizing the life of an unborn fetus, which one never knows really how would unfold, as unworthy of experience. By what standards, or to what purpose? — Wallows

Right, I agree with that. It's up to each person whether they think something is worthwhile or not. We can't decide that for other people (pro or con).

My position is that none consented to being born — Andrew4Handel

But that's nonsensical, because consent can't be an issue in that regard.

after coming to exist they did not consent to anything unless they explicitly consent to it. — Andrew4Handel

I don't really buy that consent has to be explicit for everything, although I think that's important for some things . . . to the point of requiring contracts for some things.

My older brother has had MS in its severe form for 20 years that has left him helpless and paralyzed. I can't imagine anyone consenting to that. — Andrew4Handel

I don't see that as something that requires consent, because it's not an action directly performed on someone by some other agent. Consent is only an issue for that in my opinion. Talking about consenting to physical "laws," mosquito bites, and so on seems kind of ridiculous.

"Gross-overgeneralization," would be the first thing that comes to my mind... — Wallows

You mean to frame anything in terms of "suffering"?

The idea of any ethical stance hinging on "suffering" isn't at all appealing to me, because I think that "suffering" is both (a) way too vague, and (b) not something that's inherently proscribable ethically.

These are not the consent issues that concern me — Andrew4Handel

Okay, but you can't really be selective about it. If you're going to argue that kids need to consent to their situation, you're opening up the door to consent about everything.

At some stage a person will be able to exhibit rational consent.

A very young child already withdraws its consent for a lot of things.

They often say no and can experience harm and desire boundaries. Also there is no reason to believes that the parents are capable of being a reasonable parent and the grounds to judge this problematic. It isn't children that voted for the Nazi's etc.

I think peoples analysis of childhood here is very unrealistic. — Andrew4Handel

Sure. My opinions on this are fairly controversial, but as I said, the vast majority of people aren't ready to let kids decide whether they want to drink and get tattoos and have sex (with whoever they might choose to have sex with), etc.

If you're not ready for those things, then you think that kids aren't capable of consenting to some things, either.

However here I am discussing the lack of consent that arises once someone is born until they explicitly give consent at some stage. — Andrew4Handel

Well, typically we don't consider kids to be capable of consent until they're older--until they've gone through puberty, or until they've reached adulthood, etc. Hence why we don't allow kids to choose whether they want to bother with school, with doctors, why we don't allow them to choose to drink and smoke and drive and have jobs and get tattoos and have sex etc.

We could argue that consent should be an issue earlier than it is, but then we need to be prepared for allowing kids to make their own decisions about all of that sort of stuff and then some. A lot of people aren't prepared to allow that.

Re political situations and so on. some people (like me) only consider consent an issue for things that are actions you're directly involved with--actions that are done to you, where you're "physically" involved in direct forces applied to you, but sure, to some extent political situations factor into that. But (a) that's the whole theory of allowing people to vote, to have a say in what laws we have, etc., once we consider them old enough to consent, and (b) it's difficult to figure how we could have societies that only consist of things that you opt into, although that's part of the gist of minarchist libertarianism, for example.

I'm not sure I follow. The illusion is what is perceived - so it must be identical to what is perceived? — Devans99

Phenomenally--in other words, re what's present to mind/experience, there is movement. For example, when we have a fly in the house and we watch it flying around (again, at least in terms of what we experience). We see it zip across our field of vision. Whether we want to say that that's an illusion or not, whether it's what's really going on outside of our phenomenal experience, it's our phenomenal experience nonetheless. It's what appears to be the case, regardless of whether it's really the case.

So if someone is trying to argue that we don't actually have that phenomenal experience, that there's not that appearance, I'm not sure how they'd do that.

Ah, okay. It would be interesting if someone is claiming that there can't be phenomenal movement (as part of an illusion if they want to say that), to see just how they'd try to argue that how things seem to one, phenomenaly, is not in fact how they seem. (Note that it would not be saying that how they seem is not how they are--but how they seem is not how they seem.)

I think that the claim is that the illusion of movement exists in our minds. When the image changes, the afterimage of the previous moments remains as an impression in our minds to which the current moment is contrasted, giving an illusion of movement. — Devans99

I want you to be clear on whether you're claiming that there is phenomenal movement or not.

- At time t0, I see a completely still image
- At time t1, I see a different completely still image
- It is a different version of the brain at t1 to t0, but it remembers the image at t0, processes the image at t1 and incorrectly (according to eternalism) interprets the difference as movement. — Devans99

So it's claiming that there's no literal phenomenal illusion of movement? "Interpreting the difference as movement" is not supposed to be phenomenal but conceptual or something? I'm not sure how to make sense out of saying that phenomenal movement isn't actually phenomenal movement. That seems like we just don't understand what "phenomenal" even refers to. And it seems to make the term "illusion" nonsensical.

We could also ask how we phenomenally get from t0 to t1 (as well as how we go from t0 to t1 in terms of memory, so that memory can function from one to the other).

Give this a little thought. As I said, logic, as correct thought about existents, is based on the nature of existence. You are suggesting that existence is limiting, but it can't be. Existence is not a predicate like other predicates. If something is red, for example, it is limited, because the opposite of red is not-red and not-red things can exist. But, if, as you think, something were limited by being, what is excluded is not other kinds of things, but non-being. So, "everythng that is logically or ontologically possible" only excludes non-being, which is nothing. Clearly excluding nothing is not a limitation. — Dfpolis

The idea is much simpler in a way:

If God exists (something like the typical ideas of God re the Judeo-Christian God), then either:

(a) God created logic, or it's at least part of His nature, and God could make logic however He'd want to make it--He has control over His own nature,

or

(b) Logic is more fundamental than God, and God can't buck it any more than we can. God must conform to it. It supersedes Him in its regard.

Good(ness): things, including behavior, that you like or prefer, or at least where you like or prefer what you take to be the ultimate consequence or upshot of the thing in question.

Perfection: when you have an ideal for something and that ideal is met, or when you feel that something couldn't possibly be better than it is.

The relation is that perfection is the pinnacle of good(ness).

I don't agree with Plato's views (and my comments above have nothing to do with Plato if you're asking for homework purposes), but you can find some info about Plato's idea of "the good" and perfection here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfect-goodness/
and more simply here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Form_of_the_Good

The movement is just an illusion if you treat time like a spacial dimension - with that way of thinking about it - there is no movement. — Devans99

The illusion exists, doesn't it?

Consent is an issue for things that are capable of granting or withholding consent.

It can't be an issue for things that are not capable of granting or withholding consent.

Honesty versus dishonesty (lying) depends on what the person in question believes.

You're honest if you report what you believe. You're dishonest if you report something that you take to contradict what you believe.

So if you believe you see a dog, but you say you see a cat, you're being dishonest/you're lying. The fact that it turns out to be a cat is irrelevant (for whether you're being honest).

I am sorry you lost me there. You are talking nonsense, do you realize that? If you make symbols, and want to communicate with those, you must denote their meaning, and the reltionship between them.

What you wrote is sheer gibberish to me. Sorry. — god must be atheist

The letters, including the Greek letter, are variables. The capital letters are variables for types of things, which I did explain in parentheses. The Greek letter, φ, was a variable for a property.

But let's use an analogy instead.

There are Asian and there are African elephants.

Does this imply that there are Asian and African Gila monsters?

And you seem to be quite happy and comfortable accepting that there are WRONG different views. I am not. — god must be atheist

You don't believe that there are other views, or wrong views?

If there were in reality weak determinism, then there would be weak Darwinism, weak Relativity Theories, weak Quantum Mechanics, weak arguments and weak minds. Oops, I got carried away. Going back to the stream of things; weak determinism would yield weak truths, weak logic, weak time measurements, weak classical physics, weak laws of thermodynamics, weak gravity. — god must be atheist

Your argument is that if there's some F (some type of thing) with property φ, then all G, H, I etc.(all types of things) must have property φ?

I don't use the qualifiers as an endorsement. The idea is simply that since there are different views, it's a courtesy to give some indication of which idea I'm referring to, when it wouldn't be clear from context, as an aid to anyone who might be reading a post.

Anyway, your view strikes me as having faith in (strong) determinism, but I'm not sure why you'd have such faith in it. If someone were to point out phenomena that are commonly believed to be ontologically (not epistemologically) probabilistic, you'd insist that it's only an epistemic issue, but I'm not sure why you'd insist that.

Since you're in that mode of wanting to argue about every little thing, I'm just going to address one thing at a time. I'm not going to perpetually argue five, then ten, then fifteen etc. different things per post.

Sure there is support of determinism (there is no divisions between determinism such as "strong" "weak" etc; — god must be atheist

"Strong determinism" is basically the Laplace's demon version. The notion that the precise location, momentum, etc. of every particle in the universe causally dictates the future location, momentum, etc. of every particle (and there are only particles).

"Weak determinism" is any of a variety of views that are less stringent--typically they allow for at least some (non-0 or 1) probabilistic phenomena.

There doesn't have to be a pattern, because there are so many factors behind a decision its different each time, meaning that the reason why I decide to walk (of the 50%) is different each time and the times I pick the bus are also from different conditions.

If you flick a coin 100 times, the reason why it landed heads so many times and tails so many, is because of the conditions: where it was held in the hand, the energy in the flick, the density of the air, the dirt that kept adding to the coin surface etc. And a lot of those conditions were created because of the conditions of the persons body, their mind, the changing environment, and on it goes. — AngryBear

Sure, so assuming something other than preferences or conscious states in general as the reason then?

You raised an objection which you can't defend. — god must be atheist

The defense of the objection is that there is no support of strong determinism as a logical principle. The relevance of talking about it as a logical principle is that that's what Devans99 is appealing to in his proof.

We choose to walk instead of taking the bus because a condition was created from previous events that made us prefer walking instead of the bus. — AngryBear

What if you choose daily and it works out to about 50-50 with no discernible pattern?

If we want to just discuss "the problem of many" that might be good to start a thread on . . . although like the sorites "paradox," I personally don't think there's much of a paradox or puzzle to it.