That you feel that way is probably why you're arguing with me despite not really understanding or caring about what I'm saying. Good basis for a conversation.

Good that you're trying to argue with me when you're not even understanding and don't particularly care about what I'm saying, haha.

I supported the claim with links to philosophical sources, jot computer techs talking about philosophy. You can do a Google search yourself if you're not satisfied. — Marchesk

I asked you "So you're claiming that this, for example, reflects the misunderstanding of thinking that scientists are saying that chairs don't really exist because they're made up of molecules/atoms/etc. with "empty space" between them, with unclear surface boundaries if you look at them on a microscopic scale, etc.? "

Because if you're claiming that, you're wrong. That article isn't even about that.

You ignored clarifying if you're claiming that and tried to redirect.

Do you also not want to sidetrack to whether any beliefs can turn out to be wrong, now? (Re the Hebrew cosmology tangent)

So you just want to drop anything but what you initially wanted to talk about now. Forget trying to support the claim that philosophers are perpetuating a particular misunderstanding of science rather than computer techs etc. who like to talk about philosophy online.

Are we changing the subtopic from whether it's philosophers who are misunderstanding what science is doing?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/problem-of-many/ — Marchesk

So you're claiming that this, for example, reflects the misunderstanding of thinking that scientists are saying that chairs don't really exist because they're made up of molecules/atoms/etc. with "empty space" between them, with unclear surface boundaries if you look at them on a microscopic scale, etc.?

Ontology — Marchesk

lol - in other words, you stated it as if there's some implicational relationship, but there isn't.

I don't think it's mostly philosophers with this misunderstanding, by the way. I've mostly seen it from people online, usually people with kinda tech-oriented jobs who have some hobbyist interest in theoretical sciences, philosophy, etc., and it's usually from people who have an ulterior motive for this particular sort of misunderstanding.

So there are two important things here. The first is that our concept of ordinary objects may not reflect what makes an ordinary object, which leaves the door open to the possibility that there are no ordinary objects. — Marchesk

Huh? What do the two have to do with each other?

So you're saying professional philosophers agree it's not a problem and don't discuss it? Or that you have just solved it now? — Marchesk

What I said was that anyone who thinks this is a problem doesn't understand what science is doing.

Scientists aren't saying that there are no chairs, that chairs aren't solid, etc. They're saying that chairs, from one perspective, and solidity from one perspective, is such and such collection of molecules (or atoms, or whatever microscopic level we want to focus on), arranged in this and such manner, with those and such relations, including extensional relations, etc. That contradicts nothing about ordinary conceptions of chairs. It's just another perspective, another way of describing the same thing.

It's not a problem. As I said, "The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular 'ordinary object' might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway."

The problem arises because philosophers noticed conflicts between our notion of everyday objects and what science says they're made up of. — Marchesk

That would be a misunderstanding of what science is doing/saying. There's no conflict.

How do you decide exactly which collection of particles is the chair? — Marchesk

Ordinary object concepts aren't about molecules, are they?

Not if we take science seriously, in my opinion. — Marchesk

Science isn't saying anything at all like "chairs aren't real" lol

The problem is that this leads to paradoxes because the scientific version raises issues for our concept of ordinary objects. — Marchesk

You'd have to give an example. The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular "ordinary object" might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway.

The "scientific versions" aren't different than the "ordinary versions." They're other ways of looking at the ordinary versions, they're the ordinary versions from other reference points, at least different explanatory reference points.

Are philosophical problems language on holiday?

I don't think that all of them are, unless I really don't understand what many folks are saying (and vice versa). It seems to me like many of us really have different beliefs about what (sorts of things) exist(s), what's possible/impossible, what we can know, what the nature of things is, how things work, etc.

If everyone really agrees with me on all of that, and I really agree with everyone else, and we just don't realize it because of language issues, then we sure do not know how to sort out those language issues, do we?

If you're referring to Quantum Mechanics, it's still (at least) probabilistic determinism - when there is quantum uncertainty. — Relativist

The (ontological) probabilities of determinism are 0 and 1.

If we switch to one spacial dimension only then on a 2D graph, this could be represented by a point (the stationary observer) and a line (the fly moving across space).

But the 2D graph is completely static. — Devans99

And what would that have to do with the fact that there is something that is moving or changing?

So please show me this exception. I have nothing but asked of you for this, and now you lecture me on how one such instance invalidates determinism.

Be my guest. Invalidate determinism. I am all ears. Show me that example. — god must be atheist

You're not understanding me. What I was objecting to was something stated as a logical principle.

I'm avoiding a discussion of whether we experience causality and what does or doesn't count as an example because that's a different topic.

Terrapin Station, you can prove me wrong just naming one effect that has no cause, and just naming one cause that has no effect. — god must be atheist

As I said, as a logical principle, it can't be supported by empirical data.

In the proof, we're not saying, "We never observe phenomena with no cause," we're saying that there can be no phemomena without a cause.

"There can be phenomena without a cause" isn't at all inconsistent with "We never observe phenomena with no cause." If there can be one thing in some far-flung corner of the universe that occurs, just one time, with no cause, then "There can be phenomena without a cause" is true even though "We never observe phenomena with no cause" is also true.

But "There can be phenomena without a cause" can't be true if "There can be no phenomena without a cause" is true.

It's important to understand the distinction there, and to understand why empirical data can't support the logical principle.

But movement just becomes an illusion — Devans99

The "illusion" of movement contains movement in the illusion, doesn't it?

In other words, phenomenally, something like a fly, say, moves across my field of vision. We can call that an "illusion." The illusion features movement, doesn't it?

The success of science. Empirical evidence shows the world to behave in regular, predictable ways, which supports the hypothesis that there are inviolable laws of nature. Scientific efforts to uncover those laws of nature (or at least approximations of those actual laws) have been extremely successful. — Relativist

But the standard view in the sciences hasn't been determinism for about 140 years or so.

See if Fooloso4's comment might make more sense or within the context he is offering? — Wallows

Not really. I think all of that is just as problematic.

If you plot a 2d graph of space and time, then from the perspective of a point moving through spacetime, its position is always changing - so the point would always think the world is dynamic. But viewed from the perspective of looking at the graph, all is static. — Devans99

If there's a point "moving through spacetime" (I'm putting that in quotation marks because the "time" part is identical to moving; spacetime isn't some sort of thing or container that other things are in) then there's something not static. Whether things could be static from some perspective is irrelevant. Something exists that isn't static.

So first, I have no idea what Wittgenstein would be thinking when he says, "Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism." To me, that seems like Wittgenstein wouldn't really understand what those terms refer to.

If the sentence after that is supposed to offer some insight, I don't know how. Wittgenstein says, "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension." That just seems like math-fetishist gobbledygook.

I'll just start with that.

But you always experience what you are experiencing. You always belief now is now. So each version of you in 4d spacetime thinks now is now. — Devans99

Yes, but what I experience, my nows, are dynamic, they're not static. Again, maybe this is just me, but it's me nevertheless.

That model might not be right - we always think it is 'now' so maybe a cursor of time is not required, then everything would be completely static. — Devans99

My phenomenal experience is not at all static. So that would be a problem with that theory. ;-)

Maybe your phenomenal experience is static. I don't know. That would be weird, though.

Anyway, re the philosophical point, sure, people expect different sorts of words to be used in different ways relative to how other people use those words . . . although that's not really uniform for different sorts of words, but there are expectations that are more or less common.

Re the supposed "puzzle," it doesn't strike me as anything puzzling.

Re this question: "when we encounter something new we've never seen before, what do we want to know?" That really depends on the person and the exact scenario. Not everyone is curious about the same thing there. And wanting to know what something is called is going to also only occur if the person has some reason that they believe that others would be familiar with the thing in question and they figure that they probably have a word for it, probably have some idea of how it relates to other things, some notion of its history, etc.

Beginning with 'delicious', Pitkin argues that calling something 'delicious' doesn't name a set of foods, so much as it is a way of saying something about that food. That an Inuit might find rotten whale blubber delicious, but you find it disgusting, does not tell us that the Inuit is using the word 'disguising' in the wrong way. It means the Inuit has a different idea of what is delicious. We both agree on the meaning of delicious, just not what is (called) delicious (we can call different things delicious). 'Green', however, is not like 'disguising'. For the meaning of green is tied directly to what is green. We cannot dispute what is green, without disputing what is "green". Were the Inuit to say, "that, to me, is blue", while pointing to a green thing, he either does not know how to use the word blue, or he is colour-blind in some way. An understanding of the meaning of 'green' requires taking something of the world into account in a way not necessary with the word 'disguising'. It has an added variable of meaning. — StreetlightX

Nothing to do with the philosophical point there, but "disguising" is bound to throw some folks off as they read the above.

I suggest that determinism should be the default assumption in the physical world. — Relativist

Any particular reason you suggest that?

What has changed is the cursor of time has moved onto a different version of the person with a different view of a different 'now'.

But the past person and past view are static and the current person and current view are static - when considered from a 4d spacetime perspective. — Devans99

Okay, but that doesn't get rid of a flow of time, because the "cursor of time has moved"

Then there is the next moment, the view is different but we and the view are still static.

So nothing is changing from the perspective of a static 4D universe. — Devans99

But something is changing from some perspective, otherwise there's not a next moment with a different view.

Imagine sitting still in front of window watching the world go by. The view changes but you do not. So we would be part of reality and unchanging - but we'd see the ever changing 'now' view of the world. — Devans99

Okay, but then the view is changing, and the view is part of reality, isn't it?

As something empirical, it's not provable either way. Empirical matters have to be decided on factors other than proof.

If we only perceive part of reality (now) but all of reality actually exists in some unchanging form (past, present, future) then change would seem to be an illusion - nothing changes in reality - it is just what we are looking at that changes. — Devans99

Are you positing us as something separate from reality?

Another possibility is future real eternalism - then change is just an illusion — Devans99

Change can't be an illusion, because the "illusion(s)" change.

In other words, say that someone wants to say that my typing this sentence, phenomenally, to me, is really just an illusion. But the supposed "illusion" is changing--I'm aware of typing "In" and then "other" and so on. If that's changing, then there is change--whether it's an "illusion" or not.

It could be the timeless environment is like growing block universe maybe. So part of it has permanent, unchanging existence, but it can 'grow' to allow change of some form. — Devans99

Again, change is time, so we'd have time in that scenario. It wouldn't be timeless.

The only way to get around that is to pretend that time isn't simply change/motion, but then we're "mystery-izing" time in an ad hoc way in order to reach a particular conclusion.