Kripke’s Theory of Naming thereby avoids any philosophical problems with the ontological nature of essence or identity. — RussellA

That was one of my points. Particularly in the context of this thread, which (per the 2nd article in the Op) IS about the ontological nature of possibility. Transworld identity is pertinent to that.

That sounds reasonable. I stand corrected.

If information can exist in the presence or absence of consciousness... — Patterner

That was part of my point: information does not exist in the absence of (an aspect of) consciousness. Characters on a printed page are not intrinsically information; it's only information to a a conscious mind that interprets it- so it's a relational property.

If a walking robot with a mechanical eye is approaching a cliff, and turns to avoid it, was it because there was information? — Patterner

Of course, and I agree information is relevant to ongoing mental activity. What I was referring to was understanding the fundamental nature of consciousness - the hardware that produces it. I should have been more clear. Sorry.

consciousness is best understood in terms of information — hypericin

What is information, in the absence of consciousness? Words on a page have to be interpreted by a conscious mind.

I'm fine with examining aspects of mental activity in terms of information, but information needs to be grounded in something else, to avoid circularity.

Kripke's defining of "rigid designators" is useful for identifying posteriori necessity (It is a necessary fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus), but it falls short when applying it to possible worlds.

You refer to Kripke's "necessity of origin". Kripke writes:

"How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally different sperm and egg, be this very woman? One can imagine, given the woman, that various things in her life could have changed...One is given, let's say, a previous history of the world up to a certain time, and from that time it diverges considerable from the actual course...And so it's possible that even though she were born of these parents she never became queen...But what's harder to imagine is her being born of different parents. It seems to me that anything coming from a different origin would not be this object" - Naming and Necessity, p 113

So he's saying an individual is essentially tied to particular features of its origin in a way that it is not essentially tied to particular features of its subsequent history. Further, he's saying that origin is a necessary condition, not a necessary and sufficient condition. Here's what he has to say about identity over time:

"adequate necessary and sufficient conditions for identity which do not beg the question are very rare...Mathematics is the only case I really know of where they are given within a possible world. I don't know of such conditions for identity of material objects over time, or for people. Everyone knows what a problem this is. But let's forget about that." -Naming and Necessity p43

If he can't account for identity over time, then he can't account for true trans-world identity either. Both would require sharp criteria that are both necessary and sufficient. Kripke is just suggesting some rules for the game of entertaining counterfactual worlds. They're OK rules, although different views of what is essential to an identity could lead to different rules.The issue is that the rules do not entail that these counterfactual worlds are actually POSSIBLE.

So some of us object to labeling them "possible worlds" because they are fictions with some things in common with the actual world without regard to whether these fictions could have occurred. This is purely a semantics issue. But the more serious issue is that Kripke gives very little insight to (The Possibilism-Actualism debate).

As the Wikipedia article says, the possibilist believes "There are possibilia, that is, things that are not actual but could have been." It's an ontological debate, that Kripke doesn't participate in.

Sure, all physical things and actions can be understood as "contingent". That means their existence is dependent on causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's not what contingent means. Suppose necessitarianism is true. Necessitarianism is the theory that every that event that occurs (past and future) occurred necessarily. IOW there are contingent events and no objects that exists contingently.

Under this theory, laws of nature necessitate their result. Where A and B are states of affairs, if A causes B, through a law of nature, then A necessarily causes B. If you have a ball in your hand, and you release the ball, it will necessarily fall to the ground (assuming there is nothing in the environment to impede the fall). Classical laws of nature work like this.

Contrast this with a quantum event, whose outcome is a consequence of quantum uncertainty. The specific result was not necessary (under most interpretations of QM). It was contingent. And yet, it was caused. So causation can either produce its effect necessarily or contingently. It becomes a historical fact that the effect was contingent vs necessary.

Unfortunately your definition of contingency mixes causality and and modality. If it were a definition of determinacy, it would work. — Banno

I wasn't "defining" possibility, I was discussing the ontology of possibilty - pertinent to the discussion of
"The Possibilism-Actualism Debate", referenced in the Op.

There are no metaphysically possible worlds unless there is contingency in the world, and this implies an ontological basis. You aren't obligated to participate in discussing that, but it is erroneous to suggest it's not a legitimate issue that directly relates to the topic.

For those reading along, the standard definition of contingency is roughly just that an event is contingent if it is true in some but not all possible worlds.

This has the great advantage of not involving any notion of causality or temporality. — Banno

IOW, it ignores the controversies. I have inferred that the controversies are the topic of this theead.

when we look to the past and say that Y could have occurred instead of X, this is to project the present into the past, and say that at that time, when that was present, Y could have occurred. But this is a fictitious projection of the present back into the past, which is really not possible to do, go back in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're conflating possibility with potential. There is no potential for a different past, but we can consider whether a past event was necessary or contingent.
The past event E was contingent if the causal factors (C) that produced E had the potential (at the time) to produce E or ~E. IOW, both E and ~E were possible.

After the event, it will remain a historical fact that E was contingent (E and ~E were possible).

Of course fuzzy logic is algorithmic to some degree or it wouldn't be programmable for digital computers. But it's much more flexible & adaptable to the non-algorithmic real world than sharp line-item programming — Gnomon

You're presuming that "real world" human reasoning is somehow beyond duplicating. I don't see any problems at all, because any specific issue you might bring up could be dealt in the design- either in software or hardware. If digital computing seems too "sharp"- analogue computing could be used. However, there really isn't anything an analogue computer can do that couldn't be implemented in software. For example, Artificial Neural Networks engage in the analog process of pattern recognition - and yet, the underlying technology is digital processing.

self-awareness seems to require something a bit beyond just fuzzing the focus : a generalized contextual worldview and an embodied subject. :smile: — Gnomon

Three issues:
1) The thought processes involved with much human reasoning do not seem to require self-awareness.
2) For a thought process in which self-awareness was a factor, the role that it plays could be simulated.
3) If the feelings issue could be solved - it might actually be possible to induce true self-awareness (this is my theory).

Yes. Non-algorithmic Fuzzy Logic*1 is an attempt to make digital computers think more like humans. And it may be necessary for Chat Bots to deal with imprecise human dialog. Yet it reduces the primary advantage of computers : precision & predictability. — Gnomon

Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic ARE algorithmic- it's feasible to program these. The programmming could keep it predictable (a given input will necessarily produce the same output), or randomness could be introduced.

Neither of these processes is inconsistent with standard 1st order logic. Standard logic is a special case of fuzzy logic with each premise assigned a 100% certainty.

Microprocessor inventor, Federico Faggin says : "There is an unbridgeable gap between artificial and human intelligence, which is characterized by comprehension : a non-algorithmic property of consciousness that is often underestimated and inaccessible to computers" — Gnomon

He is expressing an opinion, one that I regard as rooted in a lack of imagination.

To be clear (and to repeat what I've said elsewhere in this thread), feelings are not algorithmic. They are the one serious challenge for physicalism. They do not, however, falsify it.

Set that challenge aside for the moment, and assume as a premise that feelings could be added to the hardware. I suggest that this would make it feasible to duplicate human reasoning: not a mere simulation, but duplicating the algorthmic processing that it involves.

At the present, looking forward in time, we have real ontological possibilities in relation to what may occur, and this affects our decisions on actions. In this case, "possible worlds" might be acceptable. If we believe in free will, rather than determinism, the possible worlds of the future can have real ontological status, as real possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

We seem to be on similar tracks, so far. But I'll expand on this.

If determinism is true, then there is actually only one future possibility: the actual world that will unfold to us. Of course, we're ignorant of the future (except to the degree that we can apply the laws of physics). On the basis of this ignorance, we can discuss epistemic possibilities- as far as I know X (a future event) is possible.

As you said, if (libertarian) free will exists, then there are multiple (metaphysically) possibly futures. Further, quantum indeterminacy establishes multiple (physically) possible futures.

At the present, looking backward in time, there is no ontological possibility in relation to what has happened. The past is fixed, and presents us with what actually is, as we understand the empirical observations which have occurred. — Metaphysician Undercover

However, if determinism is not true then there were past contingencies: events in which X occurred, but Y could have occurred instead. This could make it reasonable to consider possible worlds in which those past contingencies were realized. But this only opens up only limited possibilities.

And at the present there is ontological possibility toward the future, so we can talk about what could have happened if things had played out differently, when 1972 was the active present. This is fictional, because we cannot actually put the present back in time, to play things out differently. So this ought not be represented as "possible worlds", to distinguish it from real possible worlds looking forward in time. And we have a goof name for that "counterfactual" so we might call it counterfactual worlds. — Metaphysician Undercover

If voters exercised LFW, then perhaps a different outcome could have occurred- but even LFW choices are made for reasons that would still be present- so it's too far-fetched to take seriously.

"Counterfactual fictions" would be a more precise label for discussing the past.

I agree with pretty much everything else you said.

Again, that is the cart before the horse. For Kripke Essence is a consequence, not a beginning. — Banno

The reasoning is inescapably circular!

It starts with the assumption an object is the same object in a (non-actual) possible world (it has a trans-world identity) and then conclude that the object must have an essence that accounts for it being the same object.

What you fail to grasp is that trans-world identity is controversial. Kripke does not solve the contoversy- he just alligns to one side of it.

I read Naming and Necessity some years ago. Later, I read Mackie's How Things Might Have Been*. The latter was written after Kripke's work; she references Kripke, Lewis, Plantinga, and others - and demonstrates the problems I have been relating to you. Responding, "but Kripke said...." is not a refutation.

*Mackie also wrote the SEP article on Transworld identity. The article summarizes the arguments in her book. I recommend you read it.

the claim that “Kripke’s theory of possible worlds is contingent on essentialism being true” gets the explanatory order wrong. Essence is explained in terms of necessity, not necessity in terms of essence. — Banno

The "explanatory order" doesn't falsify the logic: there's s logical dependency on essentialism. But go ahead and explain essence.

The opposite extreme: 100% of an objects properties (all of which are qualitative) at time t1 are necessary and sufficient for being that object at t1. This is my view.
— Relativist

That is my view too — Metaphysician Undercover

The implication is that there is only one possible world: the actual one. Do you agree?

When we conceive of (allegedly) possible worlds, we are constucting a fiction. IMO, the semantic framework can be useful for analyzing possibilities, but the exercise should not be taken too seriously.

Kripke was an essentialist: he believed individual identity was associated with its essence - a subset of an individual's properties.

So his theory of possible worlds is contingent upon essentialism being true. It falls apart if essentialism is false. My position has been that it is false. Can you defend essentialism?

You have not addressed what it means to be the "same" individual. You simply assume it's the same. That creates a logical contradiction under my definition of individual identity.

You can disagree with my definition, but then you need to provide your own.

Relativist: A rigid designator refers to a specific individual in this world. '

A rigid designator refers to the very same individual in every world in which it exists. — Banno

Under my view of individual identity, that is logically impossible.

My view is that 100% of an individual's properties (including intrinsic properties and relations to other objects) at each point in time, are necessary to being that individual.

This is what you aren't addressing.

In Kripke's system, and in the example we just gave, Prince Charles is imposed, fixed by the act of rigidly designation, and it's this very supposition that sets out that the Prince Charles in the alternative possible world is exactly the same Prince Charles as is in the actual world. — Banno

A rigid designator refers to a specific individual in this world: he has a specific physical composition at each temporal point of his existence, a specific history, and a set of relations to every other object in the universe. If we mentally place the individual in another environment, some of those relations are dropped. Since the world is different, he may have a different history - this may result in differences in his physical structure, and his memories. The more different the world, the more differences from the real world.

So it is never the case that it is "exactly the same individual" because there are necessarily differences. You have to designate what properties and relations make it "the same".

In Lewis' system, there is an algorithm to decide which person in some other possible world is the counterpart of Prince Charles. — Banno

Counterparts do not have the same identity as the person being discussed. It's perfectly fine to reference counterparts- individuals with similarities to the one referenced.

Transworld identity or counterpart theory is not discovered by the model, it is presupposed — Banno

Which makes it fine for an intellectual exercise, but it does not establish possibilia: that the "possible world" being analyzed is possible.

What I mean by "possible" is that it is metaphysically possible: the "possible" world would have been the actual world, had certain continencies occurred. Just because we can conceptualize a world does not imply it was metaphysically possible.

can True/False computers replace Maybe/Maybe-Not human philosophers?* — Gnomon

Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic address this, at least to a degree.

We ask "What if Prince Philip had passed before his mother?" and understand that this is about sentences about Prince Philip and Queen Elisabeth, and we do that without the need for the philosophical baggage of haecceity. — Banno

Of course, we can entertain any conceivable "what-if?", but entertaining it does not entail that it was truly possible.

Trans-world identity is closely related to identity over time: what is it that makes any object the SAME object from one day to the next? Is there a subset of the object's properties that are necessary and sufficient? Imagine a big rock that is eroding over time: is it the same rock when it's 5 kg? 2 kg? 1 gram?

Similarly, with people: are you the same person as the infant that grew and developed into you? We naturally assume so, but analyze it: what makes both of them the same person? DNA mutates over time; your dimensions change; you gain memories, physical scars, etc. There's no set of necessary and sufficient properties that comprise the essence* of you. Rather: you have a causal relation with each prior version of you: Thursday-you is a material cause of Friday-you. There's also a continual piling on of new memories.

This is how I suggest we have an identity over time- but it means these hypothetical thought experiments are not really referring to the same identity. Actual Queen Elisabeth had a very specific history, and it is that history that strictly defines her identity.

There's also a matter of how the counterfactual situation would have come about: Elisabeth and Philip died when they did for some very specific reasons. So for the counterfactual to be truly possible, one or more of those reasons would have to have differed. For it to be truly possible, there needs to have been some contingent factors. If determinism is true, then there is no contingency.

_________
*haeccity, if it exists, would be the essence of a identity.

n the zombie case the sights, sounds, feelings, emotions and so on were detected but never consciously — Janus

This depends on how one defines "conscious". If it's defined as a state that necessarily includes qualia, then it's true. But a qualia-absent being could have something very similar.

Representationalists say that qualia are "representational states": pain represents body damage, with an acuteness proportional to the damage; a physical texture represents some physical property of the object; a visual image represents the surroundings we are within...

If those representations could be made in computable ways, without qualia, this arguably results in a form of consciousness. They could even have unconscious experiences: capturing representations of aspects of the world, but only storing them in memory- not in active use by the executive function.

This is a good example of the problem I mentioned above. It's basically the problem of infinite possibility. You say "the object could be qualitatively entirely different between the worlds". Well, so could every object. So there is nothing then to distinguish one object from another, between worlds. We claim there is something, "haecceity", but we can't know it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The people engaging in the possible world analysis know which object they are referring to: it's a footballer in one world, a cockroach in the other. So "infinite possibility" is the point: possible world analysis of an object has no bounds. Of course, this means there are no ontological cross-world identities. (This doesn't prevent us from entertaining fictional possible worlds).

Consideration of haeccitism establishes an extreme: no qualitative properties are necessary for holding a particular identity (albeit it requires the questionable assumption that identity is associated with a non-qualitative property).

The opposite extreme: 100% of an objects properties (all of which are qualitative) at time t1 are necessary and sufficient for being that object at t1. This is my view.

Is there a viable alternative between the extremes? I don't think so.

But haecceity then cannot account for transworld identity. Transworld identity must allow that the same thing has different properties at the same time, is different in different worlds — Metaphysician Undercover

Read literally, what you've written makes no sense. I think what you trying to say that IF there is transworld identity, then an object can have the same identity in 2 different worlds, despite having a different set of properties in each world. I agree that is what transworld identity means.

Haeccety (if it exists) is a non-qualitative, non-analyzable property. It is the one and only necessary and sufficient property that an identity has. So if haeccetism is true, then all the qualitative properties are superfluous to the identity. In comparing two possible worlds, the object could be qualitatively entirely different between the worlds - but it would be the same object (same identity) as long as the particular haeccety is present.

I am correcting what I said before: I had conflated haeccity with bare identity. They are very similar, but subtly different.

As an ontological theory, I think it's ridiculous. It seems to be arrived at by process of elimination: take away each of your non-essential parts and properties, and what's left? I say, nothing. But someone committed to transworld identity say that haecceity is what's left.
— Relativist

The concept of haecceity is the opposite of this though — Metaphysician Undercover

I refer you to the article's definition of haeccitty:

The view that an individual’s transworld identity is ‘bare’ is sometimes described as the view that its identity consists in its possession of a ‘haecceity’ or ‘thisness’: an unanalysable non-qualitative property that is necessary and sufficient for its being the individual that it is.

The P-zombie case, as specified would seem to be the very opposite to that, in that the zombie would say that they had seen, heard, felt, tasted, etc., while not having actually had any experience of anything at all. — Janus

But the sights, tastes, sounds, etc had to be detected in some way. That set of of detected things will be remembered, and that's what the experience is to them.

Haecceity in itself could not account for transworld identity, because haecceity describes an individual being what it is, in all its uniqueness. Haecceity is the identity of the individual in all of its uniqueness. Therefore each individual would have a unique haecceity, and unique identity in each possible world.

If we say that a thing's haecceity is its essential properties, and this provides for transworld identity, as your referred article seems to imply, then we don't have a thing anymore, no de re, just Platonism, ideas, things said. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. As described in the article I had linked to (here again), haecceity is just a bare identity, not decomposible into a set of one or more things or properties. It is essence, but not comparable to other theories of essence, except for contrasting it.

Under this theory, your haecceity could have been actualized in King Charles, a dog, an amoeba or a quark.

As an ontological theory, I think it's ridiculous. It seems to be arrived at by process of elimination: take away each of your non-essential parts and properties, and what's left? I say, nothing. But someone committed to transworld identity say that haecceity is what's left.

The SEP article was written by Penelope Mackie. I read her book "How Things Might Have Been". She does a good analysis of the problems with essences, and distills it down to this being the inly viable form- iff one is willing to accept it. I don't know if she really believes it, or if it's just a foil.

:rofl:

Accessibility gets murky when dealing with epistemic, conceptual and metaphysical modality at the same time, because there's overlap - not just subsets (like in the diagram in the article). Example: it is possible that there exists a necessarily existing God. Therefore God exists.

I'm not happy with it either- it seems an ad hoc assumption designed to rationalize trans-world identity in our counterfactual ("possible world") analysis.

We do, but this pertains to the 2nd article referenced in the op: The Possibilism-Actualism Debate.

We can entertain counterfactuals as "what-ifs", but they aren't truly possible - unless they pertain to future choices we may make (there's actually only one possible future, but we're ignorant of it, and our choice-making contributes to it). It is not truly possible for Germany to have won WWII, or for Nixon to have lost his 1968 or 1972 elections.

Determinism seems to suggest that everything that happens, happens necessarily - implying there is no actual contingency in the world. This would mean there are no true possibilia.

Do you agree?

It seems possible, although the technology isn't available today.

Pretty much, except that a Zombie would have more direct experiences with the real world. If their body is damaged, it wouldn't feel pain, but it would behave as if it had pain (eg wincing), and register some analogue, like a score, that they would remember.

I accept a version of physicalism created by by David Armstrong. It is a comprehensive, consistent metaphysical theory, As such, I embrace the theory as an inference to best explanation: it explains all facts, and does so parsimoniously and a minimum of ad hoc assumptions. So...I would change my mind if a better comprehensive theory was available.

One could easily identify alternatives to components of this theory, but it would raise other questions that aren't dealt with- there's not a lot of comprehensive theories.

Because physicalism (at least the specific form of it that I defend) entails determinism - either strict determinism, or probabilistic. By definition, LFW is not deterministic.

This thread is for a read through of two SEP articles on possibility and actuality. The articles are:

1. Possible Worlds

2. The Possibilism-Actualism Debate — frank

There is a related issue that cuts through this: contingentarianism vs necessatarianism. Contingency entails the assumption that some counterfactuals could have been actual. That may be an unwarranted assumption. Here's an excerpt from Amy Karofsky's "A Case for Necessitarianism":

"One of the most common ways to justify the belief that contingentarianism is true is by appeal to intuition …Granted, most philosophers do share the intuition that things could have been otherwise. However the mere fact that most philosophers think that things could have been different is not adequate proof that there really are ways things could have been. In fact, what may seem to be a belief about a (so-called) unactualized possibility, when carefully examined, could actually turn out to be a mere modal illusion in the sense that it is confused and incomplete thinking and more akin to a figment of the imagination than to a genuine belief.

"Michael Jubien wrote that it is intuitive and evident from ordinary thinking that there is genuine contingency in the world…'We ordinarily think of an object could have been elsewhere because we think that our physical forces acting upon it might have been different. We think a sudden gust of wind might have altered the path of a bird in flight.'

"According to Jubien, we ordinarily think that the direction of a bird’s flight is contingent because we think that the causal series that involves the physical forces could have been different; we think that a sudden gust of wind could have altered the causal series that resulted in the bird’s path. [But] the mere fact that some people think that physical forces can be different is not adequate justification for the claim that the physical forces [i.e. those in effect in a particular instance] can be different.

"Moreover, it is not even evident that we do think the way Jubien thinks we do…We might and sometimes do think that because some actual birds paths are affected by gusts of wind, it is possible that a gust of wind could affect any bird’s path. But this type of reasoning commits the existential quantification, possible instantiation fallacy. The fact that some bird’s paths are affected by wind does not entail that the direction of any particular bird’s path is contingent; it merely indicates that the actual paths of some actual birds are affected by wind. We might and sometimes do think that this bird’s path can be affected by a gust of wind because being a bird’s path is compatible with being affected by a gust of wind. But…the compatibility of abstract properties does not prove that the instantiation of a particular property is contingent. Thus, even if we think that the abstract properties are compatible, that does not mean that we think that the particular property instances are contingently instantiated. And if we do think so, our belief remains unjustified because it presupposes contingentarianism."

She provides a number of examples from the literature wherein philosophers describe events that they claim describe "obvious" cases of contingency (such as a throw of the dice, and deliberative decisions based on future "contingencies"), but points out that these reflect merely epistemic, not metaphysical possibilities. She also reviews some claims about past contingencies, all of which entail circular reasoning: we assume things "could" have been different, and then creatively imagine differences - without actually analyzing the factors that would need to differ in order for the alleged non-actualized possibility to have obtained:

"in general, any contention that an imagined situation is a consideration of a possible, but unactual state of affairs presupposes that what does not happen can, and any suggestion that thinking about the past is an encounter with an unrealized possibility rests upon the assumption that actual past events could have failed to have occurred."

It is mentioned in the SEP article, "the truth conditions for sentences exhibiting modality de re involve in addition a commitment to the meaningfulness of transworld identity". This, as I explained above, is supported ontologically by Platonism, and requires a violation of the law of identity — Metaphysician Undercover

Transworld identity can be accounted for via haecceity: the notion that there is something unanalyzable and immaterial that makes you YOU. It's comparable to a soul. This doesn't depend on Platonism; but it does depend on immaterialism.

You’re treating “the experiment” or “the state of affairs” as the object that perdures, so objecthood on this context is not in question. — Wayfarer

(FWIW: A state of affairs does not perdure. Perdurance applies to individual identities).

Yes, of course "objecthood" (state-of-affairs-hood) is not in question - it's a first principle of the ontological theory. You had alleged that the theory is incompatible with QM. If this were true, it would falsify the theory. But I demonstrated that it IS consistent.

But, as you already acknowledged, the 'true ontology' is unknown. What this means is that there is not some 'actual state of affairs' or 'object with determinate properties' at the fundamental level. — Wayfarer

You're misinterpreting what I said. I was referring to the "true ontology" of QM. As you know, there are a number of interpretations - each of which is an ontological hypothesis. Our lack of knowledge which one is correct does not entail that it is NOT a state of affairs with determinate* properties! See this:

"according to textbook quantum mechanics, there are two different ways that wave functions can behave. When they are not being measured, they obey the Schrödinger equation. That behavior isn’t too much different from what we encountered in classical mechanics: wave functions evolve smoothly, reversibly (information about the state is conserved), and deterministically. But at the moment of measurement, we throw Schrödinger out the window. The wave function collapses suddenly, irreversibly, and indeterministically, in accordance with the Born rule.

The measurement problem is, essentially, “What’s really going on when we measure a quantum system?”
"Quanta and Fields: The Biggest Ideas in the Universe", Sean Carroll, P38

"Indeterminism" arises at the point of measurement. This doesn't entail indeterminate properties of any state of affairs (both the pre-measurement and post measurement states of affairs have deterministic properties); it's consistent with a law of nature with a probabilistic outcome.

_____________________________________
* The fact that the unmeasured wavefunction evolves deterministically implies the system's properties are determinate. "Fixed position" is not a property of the wavefunction. It's analogous property is of a non-localized position and momentum:

"the essence of the uncertainty principle isn’t about measurements at all. It has implications for measurements—if we measure either position or momentum precisely, the wave function will collapse and we will have no idea what the other one would be immediately thereafter—but it’s really a feature of quantum states even before we measure them. The point is not that you inevitably bump into a quantum system while measuring it and therefore change it. It’s that there do not exist any states in which both position and momentum are highly localized at the same time. This is hard to internalize if we remain stuck with classical intuition, thinking of position and momentum as things that really exist; it’s easier to swallow if we think of them as sets of possible observational outcomes that we derive from an underlying quantum state." - Carroll, p55

What are you alleging I stipulated?