Think about Descartes famous Meditation II where he resolves to doubt the existence of the world, which could, for all he knows, be the projection of an 'evil daemon'. This was not an empty gesture. It is the kind of thoroughgoing scepticism which philosophy drives us to consider. But he found that, even though the external world might be an hallucination or a delusion, that he could not doubt that he was the subject of such delusions or hallucinations. Hence the famous 'cogito ergo sum'. — Wayfarer

Where does this "thoroughgoning skepticism" lead to? It seems to me that if skepticism (of even your innate beliefs) is your starting point you have no rational basis for any claims you might make. You think you know where your keys are, but this means trusting your memories and your senses - that these were not deceptions by an "evil daemon", or part of an imaginary world your mind conjured. And yet, you are indeed confident of the whereabouts of your keys. This is in conflict with extreme skepticism, and is suggestive of self-deception: you indeed know where your keys are, but fail to accept the broad implication that knowing this implies your "mind created world(model) is consistent with the actual world.

I begin with this "common sense" notion: we DO trust our memory and senses (despite no rationally derived basis), so let's accept that it's true. It's innate: no one has to teach us these things. I also question whether it's even possible to fully divest of this belief. If you only do it part-way, you're being inconsistent- which seems less virtuous ( in terms of deontology) than fully embracing the common view.

In contrast metaphysical naturalism starts at the opposite end. It starts with the assumption that the sensible world is real. Basically many of your questions amount to 'prove to me that it's not'. I don't regard that question as being philosophically informed.

I haven't asked you to prove to me it's not; I've asked you to identify a flaw in my reasoning - explain why I shouldn't maintain this belief that you once had. I took a guess at why you changed your mind: that it was because you could find no rational reason to believe it in the first place. But if we're the product of either nature, or design, in a world we must interact with to survive, then we would be likely to have a natural sense that the world we perceive is real, at least to the extent to allow successful interaction with it. The belief would not be rationally derived, but it also wasn't derived IRrationally. So I suggest that inertia wins, because the mere possibility we're wrong is not a defeater. There has to be a compelling reason to change a belief; mere possibility is not compelling.

Where I'm coming from draws on all of that, but it's informed by cognitive science (hence the references to Pinter's book.) Cognitive science understands that what we take as the real objective world is generated in the brain. — Wayfarer

Two issues:

1) cognitive science assumes the world exists and can be understood through empirical analysis. How can you justify believing it, given it's supposedly questionable basis?

2) It's not in dispute that the brain generates the world-model. The question is: is this world-model (essentially) accurate? There are good reasons to think it is: it's critical to survival. Why would a false image be generated?

Not that nothing is real, that nothing matters, or anything of the kind, but again, an awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments... — Wayfarer

Yes, but also the way we're wired. You have challenged, what I argue to be, an innate belief - not one developed by reasoning from prior assumptions.

So the reason I don't propose to answer what is fundamentally real, is because it is something each individual must discover for themselves in their own unique way. — Wayfarer

That pertains to question 2:

You're blending 2 questions:
1) does there exist a mind-independent objective reality?
2) what is the nature of this mind-independent objective reality? — Relativist

I had asked you to answer question 1. You identified my affirmative answer as a pre-commitment, from which I infer that your answer is either "no" or "I don't know". And yet, you make use of knowledge you obtained in the world- which seems contradictory. So...what is your answer?

If we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B Edition, B59

It depends on the premise that the "nature and relations of objects" lack objective existence- they depend on "the subject".

Similarly, it also depends on the assumption that space and time have some dependency on "the subject".

While our concepts of space, time, and objects reflect a human perspective, I believe they are metaphysically grounded and thus true statements can be made about all of them.

I’m not trying to be uncharitable but your responses while intelligent and well articulated show some pre-commitments that need to be made explicit. — Wayfarer

No world view can avoid an epistemological foundation, so of course I have pre-commitments: properly basic beliefs that include the innate trust that our senses deliver a functionally accurate reflection of the reality in which we live. I believe that earlier in life, you shared this innate trust, and wonder why you would abandon it. The mere possibility that we're wrong is not a rational reason to drop a belief. My suspicion is that you abandoned your innate belief because you could think of no rational basis to believe it in the first place. I'll come back to this, below.

I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true
— Relativist

OK I will enlarge a little. That is a pre-commitment. You begin with a pre-commitment to the indubitable reality of the sensible world. — Wayfarer

Yes- and as I said, it seems to be an innate belief- more specifically, a properly basic belief (PBB). A PBB innate is possibly false, but rational to maintain in the absence of a defeater. I'll elaborate.

My epistemological theory is a variation of Alvan Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology. He addresses a flaw in epistemological foundationalism (EF). EF necessarily entails basic beliefs that are not derived from prior beliefs- they are foundational. The problem is that this would imply the foundational (basic) beliefs are irrational. He addresses this by suggesting that a basic belief would be rational if it was caused by forces that would be expected to produce them. Such beliefs are "properly" basic. Plantinga suggests God would be expected to produce a sensus divinitatus - innate knowledge of God. He acknowledges this is not an argument for God's existence. Rather, it's a demonstration that belief in God is rational - if God exists.

I'm an atheist, but the concept of properly basic beliefs seems sound. If the world would produce living beings that were to survive in that world, those beings would need to be able to successfully interact with that world - so functionally accurate access to that world would be expected - and therefore consistent with the realty we experience. No, this doesn't prove anything about the world- but it demonstrates rationality - if it's true that there is such a world.

What if there's not such a world? Then I'm wrong. But on what basis could one decide such a world does not exist? Not a rational one, because the only basis for abandoning our PBBs is because they are possibly false. Possibility is not a defeater: it is irrational to abandon a belief solely on the basis that it is possibly false.

My suspicion is that you pondered your properly basic beliefs about the world, correctly noticed they were not based on other beliefs, and this led you to abandon them- because they seemed arbitrary and irrational. This left you with no epistemological ground - no precommitments, and this led you to idealism - a framework that focuses on the impossibility of a rational epistemological foundation. This strikes me as an epistemological dead-end; if it's true, then no beliefs are rational - because there is no rational foundation. Even your belief about where your keys are is unjustified, because there's ultimately a dependency on certain basic beliefs that you reject.

I see you've given a second reply, but I don't have time to read and reply (we're decorating our xmas tree, then I'm driving out of town). I'll try to get to it later.

My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it. — Wayfarer

The epistemic foundation is subjective. But I believe that (mind-independent) objective reality exists - irrespective of whether or not any metaphysical theories are true. Like all beliefs, this belief of mine is subjective. But if the belief is true, then it is the case that objective reality exists; IOW, this would be objective fact.

The modern discipline of ontology is the study of being, where "being" encompasses what exists, and covers all of actual reality, so my stated belief about objective reality constitutes a first principle of my ontological (AKA metaphysical) theory - one that I am fully committed to (in contrast to my considering naturalism the best explanation for all facts).

This is not a denial of realism in the sense of stable, law-governed regularity, but a rejection of the stronger metaphysical thesis that the world, as described by physics, exists exactly as it is described, wholly independent of the conditions of its intelligibility (i.e. 'metaphysical realism').

I don't believe that objective reality is exactly as described by physics either. But I do believe that if one chooses to embrace a metaphysical theory (=ontological theory), that at minimum it must be able to account for all known facts. So in that sense, it must be consistent with physics. This consistency need not include the "ontological models" physicists discuss (including, for example, interpretations of QM).

modern physics—especially quantum theory—has undermined the idea of observer-free, self-standing physical reality. Hence Einstein's question!

It only does this if one commits to a particular sort of interpretation of quantum mechanics. I am generally agnostic to specific interpretations, because I see no means of justifying a belief in a specific one. AFAIK, the so-called "observer dependent" interpretations have been supplanted by generalizing "observer" to include anything classical (like a measurement device) that interacts with the quantum system.

So what's your justification for embracing an interpretation that treats observers in a special way? Is it because it dovetails a commitment to a denial that there exists an observer-free reality (if that's what you believe)? If you're choosing it because it's consistent with your predisposition, then it doesn't serve as support for that predisposition (that would be circular).

To say of yourself “I am objectively existent” is already to adopt a third-person stance toward your own being and then retroject it into the first-person. In other words, you are importing the conditions under which others know you into the conditions under which you exist for yourself—and that distinction is precisely what the claim glosses over. — Wayfarer

That's not entirely correct. You are imposing your perspective of what is entailed by my claim. My belief that I am an objective existent is actually a consequence of my reasoning about reality: people, society, and the world at large and considering my role in these contexts. Regarding my relation to people: I recognized that I am similar to other people. I engage in thoughts (and have sensory sensations), and I infer that they do, as well. I also infer that the qualities that comprise my first-person-ness to me, also applies to them: I conclude that everyone is egocentric, so that my own egocentricity is not unique or special.

Label this a "third-person stance" if you like, but the label does not entail an obvious reasoning error on my part, but feel free identify an error.

So when you say that ontology can be pursued “in spite of” the phenomenological and perspectival conditions my essay focuses on, what you are really doing is presupposing precisely what philosophical ontology is meant to examine: namely, the conditi

ons under which objectivity, mind-independence, and even “being a thing” are first made intelligible to us. — Wayfarer

More or less true. Why should I not? It doesn't entail denying the role of phenomenology and perspective that you discussed. As I said, having a perspective doesn't imply falsehood. Do you believe it is impossible to make true statements about objective reality, under the premise that there does exist a mind-independent objective reality?

My claim is different: that what we call the “objective world” has an ineliminably subjective foundation—that objectivity itself is constituted through perspectival, experiential, and cognitive conditions. In that sense, the world is not “self-existent” in the way naïve realism supposes; it lacks the kind of intrinsic, framework-independent reality we ordinarily project onto it. — Wayfarer

You're blending 2 questions:
1) does there exist a mind-independent objective reality?
2) what is the nature of this mind-independent objective reality?

What is your answer to question 1?

You keep pressing me to affirm some alternative “substance” to take the place of the physical—some immaterial stuff, or “mind as substance.”...My critique targets the shared presupposition of both physicalism and substance dualism: that ultimate reality must consist of self-subsisting things. — Wayfarer

I don't demand you describe alternative substance; rather, I've asked if you can propose an alternative metaphysical model of reality. It's fine if your answer is no, perhaps because you consider reality to be inscrutable. That seems justifiable. But just because (I assume) you can justify this doesn't imply there is no justifiable basis for another person to think that reality actually does consist of "self-subsisting things".

Incidentally, "justify" does not mean a sufficiently strong warrant, to qualify as knowledge. It can be weak- merely a reason to hold a provisional belief - generally treating it as true, but remaining open to being supplanted.

I have mentioned I published The Mind Created World on Medium three weeks before ChatGPT went live, in November 2022 (important, in hindsight). A couple of weeks back, I pasted the text into Google Gemini for comment, introducing it as a 'doctrinal statement for a scientifically-informed objective idealism' (hence Gemini's remarks about that point.) You can read the analysis here. I take Google Gemini as an unbiased adjuticator in such matters. — Wayfarer

I haven't objected at all to your version of idealism, which I believe I understood. My criticism is that the essay does not provide a justification for claims you made in our discussion in this thread. Here's what sent us off in this direction:

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held
— Relativist

I've laid it out in the OP, The MInd Created World. It makes a rational case for a scientifically-informed cognitive idealism. We had a long discussion in that thread. We'll always be at odds. Simple as that. — Wayfarer

What I was referring to was this prior exchange:

So when you say:

"I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia."

you are illicitly fusing:

The organism that can be studied objectively, and

The subjectivity in virtue of which anything is experienced at all.
— Wayfarer
I'm "Illicitly fusing?! You seem to implying my view is the idiosyncratic one. Hardly. Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly! You have devised a dichotomy that is counterintuitive - at odds with our innate view of ourselves and the world - you need to make the case for why the intuitive/innate view is wrong, and your claims are correct. It seems unnecessarily complex - you need a reason to embrace this complexity over a simpler, more intuitive view. — Relativist

To focus on one thing: I indeed believe that I am an objective existent- an element of mind-independent actual reality. Your essay does not undercut this belief, and it does not justify referring to this as an "illicit fusing" - because it's possibly true - even though it entails judging through the lens of beliefs within the context of a "mind created world(model).

A metaphysical theory (e.g. The Thomist metaphysics that Ed Feser defends, or essentialism or physicalism) is a theory about the actual, real world. Your idealist theory only adds a layer to the analysis - a layer that may add a level of doubt, but it does not falsify any theory. My criticisms concern what your essay does not do. You have wrongly inferred that I am misunderstanding it. My quibbling with some instances of ambiguity are intended solely to relate your idealistic theory to ontology (theories about the real world). IOW, my position is that ontology can be entertained (and beliefs can be justified) in spite of the phenomenology and logical necessity of a perspective that your essay focuses on.

You say I should distinguish between "judgements about the world" and "judgements about the mind-created world(model)." — Wayfarer

I said no such thing. I said you should avoid using words ambiguously. It's not hard to avoid the ambiguity: judgements about the real-world are made through analysis of the world(model). IOW, we can entertain ontology and can justify beliefs in statements about the real world.

The issue I've repeatedly brought up is that this mental world(model) is BELIEF: it constitutes beliefs about the real-world. Judgements are made by analyzing these beliefs ; the resulting judgement is also a belief, grounded in the prior beliefs. Your essay doesn't put it this way, but I'd like you to understand that it is valid to consider one's mentally constructed "world" as belief- belief that is possibly true.

that there is no meaningful way to refer to "the world" apart from how it shows up within some framework of intelligibility. Not because mind creates or invents the world, but because "world," "object," "tree," "exists"—all these terms only have content within a cognitive framework. — Wayfarer

Of course there is, as long as one acknowledges that there IS a real-world. And notice that the term "real-world" is not ambiguous. An extreme skeptic might claim that it's inaccessible and therefore a complete mystery, because of the phenomenology/perspective-ness,, but even so - it is something we can refer to.

I won't adopt your terminology, because it presupposes the very thing at issue: that we can meaningfully refer to a "real world" wholly independent of cognition, and then compare our "models" to it. We cannot. Every comparison is already within cognition. — Wayfarer

You literally just referred to the "real world". Further, you acknowledged there is a mind-independent reality in your essay when you said: "there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind."

The next sentence begins reasonably, but ends problematically:

But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective.

"It's" clearly refers to the real world mind-independent universe. I agree that what we "know" (an expression of belief) is bound to the mind, but then you shift from real world to mental model by saying "reality is not straightforwardly objective. Here's a re-wording that I suggest expresses your point unambiguously:

But what we know of the mind-independent universe's existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, our understanding of actual reality is not straightforwardly objective.

Even if actual reality is inscrutable, it is nevertheless present. And since I'm dealing with ontology, the distinction is critical.

This incidentally harks back to an earlier discussion about correspondence in respect of truth.

the adherents of correspondence sometimes insist that correspondence shall be its own test. But then the second difficulty arises. If truth does consist in correspondence, no test can be sufficient.... — Wayfarer

This does not imply that correspondence theory should be rejected. The meaning of the word "true" is what matters. The quote merely argues that we can never directly verify the correspondence, which is irrelevant to the concept. Your observations about phenomenology could be treated as an argument against the possibility of knowledge (strict sense) of the real world- which could possibly be rational. But we need a concept of "true". There are other truth theories; correspondence is just the most widely accepted among philosophers (and for good reason).

Again, you think that by saying that, I'm claiming that the world is all in the mind or the content of thought. — Wayfarer

No, I had understood that you do not believe that. My complaint is that the language you use is prima facie ambiguous in the context of discussing "the actual, real world" - which was what I was discussing.

It is logically possible that some elements of our mental image of the real world are true- that they correspond to the actual, real world. You don't confront this possibility, but this doesn't stop you from judging that physicalism (which is a world(model)) is false. I do regard this as a flaw in your essay, because you include no reasoning for the judgement.

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.
— Relativist

I didn't say that perspective entails falsehood. I said that perspective is necessary for any proposition about what exists, and that only the mind can provide that perspective. — Wayfarer

I hadn't accused you of saying that, and I agree that perspective is a logical necessity for even entertaining propositions about the real world. That also follows when we examine this on the basis of beliefs. Beliefs are mental constructs, so a mind is necessary.

My statement was just another way of saying that HAVING a perspective doesn't preclude having true beliefs about the real-world (irrespective of whether those beliefs are justified- that's another discussion).

The reason I'm not making an ontological statement, is because I've already stated 'Adopting a predominantly perspectival approach, I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise. ...You, however, will interpret that as an 'ontological statement' because of your prior acceptance of the reality of mind-independent objects — Wayfarer

No, it's not because of my acceptance of mind-independent objects. It was because of the words you used*. Can you understand why "mind is foundational to the nature of existence" sounds like an ontological claim? This is the root of what I referred to as equivocation. You don't fully cure this with the disclaimer (i.e. the text I underlined in the above quote) because you are discussing "judgements we make about the world" - and here, you appear to be referring to the real world. Then again, maybe you're referring to "judgements we make about the mind-created world(model)". I'm sure you aren't being intentionally equivocal, but your words ARE inherently ambiguous. Own this- they're your ambiguous words! Don't blame the reader for failing to disambiguate the words as you do. Rather, you should refrain from using terms like "world" and "nature of existence" to refer to the content of minds. It's easily fixed, just as I did when revising "mind-created world" to 'mind-created world(model)"

Also, I must point out that the "real world" (i.e. actual ontology) is lurking behind what you say, even though you "are concentrating less" on it. How else could you consider your essay to be critical of physicalism (your words: "physicalist naturalism that this essay has set out to criticize")? Physicalism is an ontology, and therefore a criticism of it is indirectly dealing with ontology. As I said, most of what you say in your essay is consistent with (i.e. does not directly contradict) physicalism. You may find it implausible that a mind grounded in material could account for a "mind-created world (model)", but the mere fact that we each have one of these in our minds does not falsify physicalism.

_________
* I actually did discern that you might not be making an ontological statement. Here's what I said:
____________________

Mind is foundational to the nature of existence
You could have justifiably said that mind provides the foundation for an understanding of existence, but as written, it was an unsupported ontological claim. — Relativist

I'm not saying that 'objects are an invention of the mind' but that any idea of the existence of the object is already mind-dependent. What they are, outside any cognitive activity or idea about them, is obviously unknown to us. — Wayfarer

But the concept of "object" is within minds, and therefore dependent on minds, just as each individual conceptual object (tree, dog, toilet...) is a mental construct.

The word "unknown" doesn't even apply. I suspect you're speaking in terms of a reality from which we subtract perspective - which we agree is impossible. You haven't analyzed WHY it's impossible, so I'll give you my take.

As you noted, "perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists". But perspective, in this sense, does not entail falsehood. It just means that understanding entails a perspective. Reality itself is perspective-less, because it just IS.

Understanding entails a mind grasping some aspect of reality - which means mentally relating sets of concepts. What else could it be? (This pertains directly to the quote of mine that 180 Proof just referenced).

What 'an object' is, outside any recognition of it by us, is obviously not anything. Neither existent, nor non-existent.

Aren't you refering to the impossibility of a perspective-less account of some named object? Refer to the bold part of my above comment.

"though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle." — Wayfarer

As noted, understanding necessarily entails perspective, and perspective does not entail falsehood.

When you say, "must have been..." you seem to be referring to something about the way the world actually was, at an earlier point of time. Right? That implies it is ontological. Yes, your description depends on a perspective, but this is because descriptions (and understandings) are necessarily based on a perspective.

So why say "supposedly unseen reality" when it is reference to a past, unseen state of actual reality?

I am not positing 'metaphysical beliefs'. I am pointing out the inherent contradiction in the concept of the mind-independent object. — Wayfarer

You made these assertions that apply to ontology:

1. Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

2. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."

Both of these pertain to ontology (metaphysics). By stating them, you are expressing something you believe. Hence, they reflect metaphysical beliefs.

There is no "inherent contradiction" in the concept of a "mind independent object", but I think I understand why you say this: "object" is a concept - an invention of the mind. But this overlooks the possibility that there is a real-world referrent for the "objects"; and that there are good reasons to believe this is the case (irrespective of whether you find these to be compelling)

"determinate object with specific properties" is already a description that presupposes a framework of conceptual articulation. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but that fact does not entail that there are not determinable objects with specific determinable properties in the actual world. By "determinable", I simply mean that the mental object (along with identified properties) corresponds to something in the real world. It seems as if you deny this.

It's as if you think the fact of the "mind created world (model)" makes it impossible to have true beliefs about the actual world. (where "true" = a correspondence between the mental concept and the actual world). Is this indeed your view? If not, then clarify.

This isn't a rival metaphysical thesis. It's pointing out that the foundational claim of metaphysical realism—that objects exist as determinate things-in-themselves wholly apart from cognition—cannot be coherently formulated. — Wayfarer

My objection: it's irrelevant that our descriptions of objects is mind-dependent- because it's logically necessary that they be so. What is relevant is whether or not the descriptions MAP to reality (i.e. it corresponds).

Consider a tree. Our descriptions of the tree do not constitute anything ontological, but these descriptions may very well correspond to something ontological.

I'll turn again to your assertion, Mind is foundational to the nature of existence

It's undeniable that mind is foundational to understanding anything - because "understanding" is entirely mental.

But does "nature of existence" refer to the mind-independent (billions of years old) real world that you acknowledge? Whether or not your inclined to talk about it, the real world is something we can talk about, and we can talk about its "nature". That's an integral part of ontology, as a discipline. So I feel justified in asserting "mind is not foundational to the nature of existence". This does not contradict the notion that the "mind-created world (model)" is the cognitive basis for all our claims about the world.

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue — Wayfarer

Your equivocate on this point.

when I say that an unperceived object neither exists nor does not exist, I am not saying that objects go in and out of reality. I am saying that outside all possible cognition, conception, designation, or disclosure, there is nothing of which existence or non-existence can be meaningfully asserted. You cannot truthfully say “it exists,” because existence is never encountered except in disclosure. But you also cannot say “it does not exist,” because there is no determinate object there to which the predicate “non-existent” could attach. — Wayfarer

When I perceive a brick in front of me, I have developed beliefs about an object: the brick. This includes the belief, "there is [=exists] a brick at some approximate distance from me". If I close my eyes, I no longer perceive the brick, but my beliefs persist: I continue to belief this brick is there [=exists] at that location. Continued perception is not necessary to maintain the belief. The belief is true because it corresponds to an aspect of reality. You omit belief formation and persistence from your account. This is called object permanence: "Knowing* that objects continue to exist when they cannot be directly observed or sensed." It's a capacity we develop as infants. (See: this) Undoubtedly, you went through this stage of development, and yet you're now expressing doubt about this.

*"Knowing" is true, justified belief. So I CAN truthfully say "the brick exists even though I do not currently see it". Do you deny the belief is justified?

Accordingly, existence and non-existence are not free-floating properties of a reality wholly outside cognition; they are predicates that arise only within the context of intelligibility. Outside that context, nothing positive or negative can be said at all. It's not a dramatic claim. — Wayfarer

Denying object permanence, which you learned in your first year of life, is a dramatic claim.

Existence isn't a property at all. To exist means to be part of the world. To say, "X exists" means that the word "X" has a real-world referrent. We apply the term, "non-existence" to concepts (mental objects) with no referrent in the world.

If you take any object — this rock, that tree — and ask, “Does it exist when unperceived?” you have already brought it into cognition. To refer to it, designate it, or even imagine its absence is already to posit it as an object for thought. The very act of asking the question places the object within the space of meaning and predication. — Wayfarer

You use "object" in 3 incompatible ways:
1) to refer to a tangible, real-world object
2) to refer to the direct sense impression you experience as you look at it (directly perceiving it as a gestalt).
3) to refer to the mental object in your memory that you use in your reasoning as a proxy (referrent) for the tangible real world object that you are not presently looking at (also a gestalt).

You then conflate 2 or more of these senses of the word and arrive at absurdities. I think if you treated these as distinctions, and acknowledged that we establish beliefs about real-world objects, many of your issues would disappear. Consider,"If you take any object — this rock, that tree — and ask, “Does it exist when unperceived?” The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it. The perception of the object exists only while perceiving it, and the mental concept/picture of the object exists as a memory of the perception along with beliefs about the object.

The gestalt of tree (directly perceived or the memory object) reflects the way we cognitively organize our perceptions/conceptions - but it nevertheless corresponds to a functional object in the real world, an object about which true statements can be made - including it's interactions with other functional (and real) elements of reality.

‘Does the moon continue to exist when nobody is looking at it?’ " — Wayfarer

I believe the real-world object that we refer to as "the moon" exists when no one is looking at it; this is entailed by my belief in object permanance and my beliefs about this particular object. I believe real world objects have no ontological dependency on being either perceived directly, or remembered.

Is there someting wrong with this answer? Is my stated belief (in bold) unjustified?

Why did Einstein ask this? My understanding is that he was challenging the notion that observation plays a role in determining physical realty, an idea suggested by the Copenhagan interpretation of QM. His implied answer was, "of course not!".

It’s not a claim about existence, it’s a claim about our world, the world we find ourselves in. The point being that our mind as an intrinsic aspect of our being interacts with the natural external realm (neumenon), such that what we experience is commensurate with the character of our being. Or in other words, the world meets us in a form appropriate to our nature of being. In the case of a plant, or tree, the neumenon will be meet it with an entirely different experience appropriate to its being. Something which it would be impossible for us to understand without being a tree ourselves. — Punshhh

Nothing you've described is inconsistent with physicalism. Human mental experiences are unique, among those of other living things, because we're physically different- differences shaped through our unique evolutionary history. Individual human beings have similar experiences to each other, because of our physical similarities - yet we aren't physically identical, so each individual's experiences are somewhat unique.

As for the unperceived object refer to Kant, or quantum physics. It’s just a soup of interacting infinitesimally small particles passing energies around. It is only experienced as an object when experienced by a being on our scale (approx’ 6 feet tall as opposed to infinitesimally small), with our inherent sensory apparatus (I include the body as a whole in these apparatus)* — Punshhh

This is a mereological issue. Just because objects are reducible to particles doesn't imply they are not actual, functional entities in the world. By "functional", I mean that they can be analyzed in terms of their interactions with other functional entities.

Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. — Wayfarer

This is an unjustified statement: you have provided no basis to claim reality has a mental aspect. I infer from other statements that you really mean "our mental image of reality has an inextricably mental aspect" - but this makes it trivial: a mental image is inextricably mental.

This part is fine:

Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.' — Wayfarer

But it doesn't imply that we don't have true beliefs about the world. (Where true=corresponds to objective reality). Nor does it imply that the gestalts we identify as objects aren't a valid paradigm for developing truths about the world.

These are unsupported assertions about the nature of existence.
— Relativist

It is supported by the above. The argument is that 'existence' is a compound or complex idea, not a binary 'yes/no': it's not always the case that things either exist or don't exist, there are kinds and degrees of existence. — Wayfarer

No! It isn't support at all, because your observations only apply to our mental image of reality.

The key point is that our grasp of the existence of objects, even supposedly those that are real independently of the mind, is contingent upon our cognitive abilities. — Wayfarer

Which is reasonable, but it doesn't imply our undetstandings are false.

Physicalism declares that some ostensibly 'mind-independent' object or state-of-affairs is real irrespective of the presence of absence of any mind - that is what is being disputed (on generally Kantian grounds).

That's not physicalism! It's the common view of reality (shared by physicalists) - likely grounded in our innate view of the world. I expect you believed it too, before you entertained idealism.

It's not even clear that you deny it now- you equivocate by writing AS IF the actual world is dependent on mind - speaking about reality, then saying you don't really mean it.

On the other hand, your only justification seems to be that physicalism is false, therefore your view must be true.
— Relativist

Physicalism is highly influential in modern culture. Much of modern English-speaking philosophy is based on a presumptive physicalism, and it's important to understand how this came about. — Wayfarer

Irrelevant. Not(physicalism) does not justify your ontological claims.

I don't say that having a perspective entails falsehood. Nor do I dispute scientific facts.'I am not disputing the scientific account, but attempting to reveal an underlying assumption that gives rise to a distorted view of what this means. — Wayfarer

Distorted? That's an unjustified leap from simply noting the basis for our perspective. Distortion does imply falsehood- something non-veridical about our understanding. Either a scientific fact is true, or it not. It is a fact that the universe is billions of years old. This is not a distortion, even though this fact is phrased and understood in human terms.

This oversight imbues the phenomenal world — the world as it appears to us — with a kind of inherent reality that it doesn’t possess. — Wayfarer

Strictly speaking, the "phenomenal world" is what we directly perceive. Both scientists and metaphysicians make efforts to understand aspects of reality at a deeper level. Scientists clearly have had a lot of success- they've provided a set of objective facts about the world. Of course it's in human terms, but still true. To be clear, I'm not defending scientific realism. Even an instrumentalist acknowledges that the equations reflect something about reality.

Only that the subjective pole or aspect of reality is negated or denied by physicalism, which accords primacy to the objective domain, neglecting the foundational role of the mind in its disclosure. — Wayfarer

I can't imagine why you would think physicalists necessarily have to deny the subjectivity associated with being human. But it's irrelevant, because you still have provided no justification for the ontological claims I highlighted:
-that mind is foundational to existence;
- that the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.

The core problem is this: physicalism treats “the physical” as the fundamental ontological primitive, yet physics itself does not—and cannot—define what 'the physical' ultimately is. — Wayfarer

The core problem in our discussion, in this thread, is your false dichotomy: physicalism or your view. In case you haven't noticed, I have not been discussing or defending physicalism here. I've been pointing to general problems that I see with your claims. My criticisms are not contingent upon physicalism being true. On the other hand, your only justification seems to be that physicalism is false, therefore your view must be true.

I had read that Op, and the longer article you linked to. I had it in mind thoughout my comments in this thread.

You article simply laid out a point of view. However, there was no argument showing why you would believe this, vs a more standard ontology.

Examples:

- Mind foundational to the nature of existence
You could have justifiably said that mind provides the foundation for an understanding of existence, but as written, it was an unsupported ontological claim.

To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it."
These are unsupported assertions about the nature of existence. You accept that the universe existed billions of years ago, despite it not having actually been perceived (so...does inferred count?). Is it false to assert that unicorns do not exist?

You discuss the role of our human perspective in developing our understanding of reality, but you fail to consider the fact that we nevertheless make some true statements about reality from this perspective. As you note (and I agree) perspective is essential to understanding. But having a perspective doesn't entail falsehood. If you accept science, then you have to accept that our human perspectives managed to discern some truths about reality - truths expressed in our terms- but nonetheless true. (I discussed the role of perspective in the post that led to your dropping out. Considering the importance you place on perspective, it's something you need to be able to address).

I think they get carried away, following a path of philosophical analysis based on a hypothetical possibility, without ever considering whether or not it leads to a justifiable belief. Metaphysics is not exempt from epistemology. If justifiable belief is not their objective, they should say so.

I surmise that you have no rational justification for your claims, and you have rationalized your position by blaming me for failing to grasp what you're saying. This is because even if there's something I'm not understanding, you could respond to this:

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held. Somehow, your old beliefs were supplanted. You make much of the phenomenology; if that were the sole basis, it would be irrational - it would be dropping a belief because it's possibly false. So there must be more than that. This is what I'm asking you to explain. — Relativist

But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.
But there’s no reason to assume that it isn’t the case either. It’s a possibility, so having an understanding of what we don’t know helps us to not make assumptions, or broad brush conclusions about the world and existence. — Punshhh

You're right. My issue is how one uses possibilities in further reasoning. Conpiracy theories begin with a possibility. It's possible some vaccine increases the liklihood of autism. It would be irrational to reject vaccines solely on the basis of this possibility. It would be rational to examine data to look for correlations.

The ‘subject’ at issue is not you viewed objectively; it is the subject or observer for whom anything can appear as ‘a world’ at all. — Wayfarer

Of course the subject is me! It's a different perspective - but a different perspective of the same me. It's like working in building: you know the building from the perspective of an occupant - where the toilets are, the carpet colors, knowledge of other occupants, etc. Someone who never worked in this building will not have this insider perspective, but you would be able to understand his perspective - one based on external appearances. These 2 perspectives have no ontological significance - what's different is the background knowledge and context.

By re-describing the ‘I’ entirely from the third-person standpoint, you’ve already shifted back into the objective stance and thereby bracketed out the very role of subjectivity that is in question.

Acknowledging my subjectivity does not undercut my beliefs about things that exist. If one believes X exists, then one believes this to be objective fact. Pointing to the phenomenology doesn't undercut anyone's beliefs about what exists. It only raises the possibility of having false beliefs about reality, and possibility alone is of no epistemic value - beyond the modal truth.

I have the capacity to consider myself from a 3rd person perspective, but that's all it is: a perspective. It's an exercise in considering the world at large, and my place in it. It has no ontological significance - except to the degree that having this cognitive capacity needs to be accounted for ontologically.

In terms of my building analogy, I'm the sole occupant of me. I have internal knowledge of me that is unavailable to anyone else. But I can still consider myself from an outsider's perspective. It doesn't imply an ontological distinction, just a difference of background knowledge and context.

Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly!
— Relativist

Right! Which is why it's so hard to argue against. — Wayfarer

What I'm looking for is your own epistemic justification to believe what you do. You previously shared the common view - it was a belief you held. Somehow, your old beliefs were supplanted. You make much of the phenomenology; if that were the sole basis, it would be irrational - it would be dropping a belief because it's possibly false. So there must be more than that. This is what I'm asking you to explain.

it's not a 'problem to be solved'. It's not that 'nobody can describe pain satisfactorily'. It's being pointed to as an 'explanatory gap' - 'look, no matter how sophisticated your scientific model, it doesn't capture or convey the felt experience of pain, or anything other felt experience.' So there's a fundamental dimension of existence that is left out of objective accounts. — Wayfarer

I think you mean that third-person descriptions cannot convey knowledge of pain. This is Mary's room. Knowledge of pain and other qualia is a knowledge of experience. Nevertheless, it IS an explanatory gap that a complete ontology should account for. You talk around the issue in vague terms, by (I think) implying there's something primary about first-person-ness. Does that really tell us anything about ontology? It's not an explanation, it's a vague claim that you purport to be central. Obviously, 1st person experience is central to a first-person perspective. It's also the epistemic foundation for understanding the world. But it seems an unjustified leap to suggest it is an ontological foundation - as you seem to be doing.

the “I” that is the subject of experience — the subject to whom qualia appear, the one that is doing the thinking right now — is not itself an object within the field of objects. It is the condition for there being a field of objects at all. You never encounter this “I” as a thing in the world in the way you encounter tables, neurons, or even brain scans. It is always on the experiencing side of the relation. — Wayfarer

"I" refers to a single, specific identity - I am an individual with this unique identity, distinct from all other identities. I have perceptions and experiences; I interact with the world beyond me - the world I am a part of. My experiences are distinct from yours; your experiences take place when and where your body is are, mine take place when and where my body is. What part of this do you disagree with?

So when you say:

"I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia."

you are illicitly fusing:

The organism that can be studied objectively, and

The subjectivity in virtue of which anything is experienced at all. — Wayfarer

I'm "Illicitly fusing?! You seem to implying my view is the idiosyncratic one. Hardly. Nearly everyone on earth does this implicitly! You have devised a dichotomy that is counterintuitive - at odds with our innate view of ourselves and the world - you need to make the case for why the intuitive/innate view is wrong, and your claims are correct. It seems unnecessarily complex - you need a reason to embrace this complexity over a simpler, more intuitive view.

Those are not the same ontological role. The first is an object in experience; the second is what makes experience possible in the first place.

I think we agree that "what makes experience possible" is "the mind" (irrespective of what this refers to). And yet, you propose some vague dichotomy - seemingly contradicting the law of identity.

You mentioned a "field of objects" , seemingly refering specifically to my mental image/understanding of the objects around me. That much would be fine, but nevertheless - I believe this mental "field of objects" corresponds to actual objects around me. Do you consider this wrong? If so, then explain why you would deny this intuitive (and innate) belief.

You refer to an "ontological role". Generally speaking, a role is contextual: it relates an object to some aspects(s) of the rest of the world. "Parent" is a role that a person plays with respect to his children. "Food" is a role a bull might play, to people who eventually consume him. If you don't mean it this way, then you need to define what you mean by, "role".

It goes like this, there are minds with technology on earth which emerged naturally. Presumably there are other planets with minds with technology. Due to temporal variation in the development of planets and minds, there are likely to be minds far more advanced, in terms of technology (not to mention what’s going on in those other possible universes) than us. If minds are where artificial things come from (as in the example of humans), there could be highly advanced artificial things around. How do we know there aren’t artificial worlds, spacetime bubbles, universes out there? How do we know our world (known universe) isn’t artificial?
2h — Punshhh

One can justifiably believe there are non-earthly minds elsewhere in the universe, based on naturalism being true - which implies abiogenesis occurred: this implies the probability of minds coming into existence has a probability> 0. The universe is vast, and old, so it is reasonable to believe it's occurred multiple times. One or more may have created artificial worlds. Of course, it's possible, and it's a viable science fiction theme. But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.

Such speculations can sometimes lead to important investigations that uncover new facts. I'm not at all suggesting that we should treat speculations as necessarily false. They are, and should remain, possibilities.

And the thing is, you acknowledge this. You've said in many places, yes, physicalism can't account for the nature of mind. — Wayfarer

You can't justify your view on the sole basis that physicalism is false*.

The mind - neither mine, nor yours, nor anyone else's should they be in this room - is not an objective existent. — Wayfarer

However I am an objective existent. I engage in mental activities; I experience qualia. As I suggested, and you did not dispute: "the mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. You have not reconciled the fact that I am an objective existent with your claim that "the mind" is not.

it is categorically, or ontologically, of a different order to existent things. — Wayfarer

This is vague. Describe these various ontological categories.
_____________
*I have never claimed everything will one day be solved.

What I've acknowledged is that physicalism, narrowly defined, does not account for qualia very well. But the most modest leap from this is an extended physicalism that adds some aspect of reality not otherwise detectable that accounts for the explanatory gap.

what we don’t know looms large to me. And yet you are sort of restricting what is natural to what has been deemed to be so by human thought. While we have no metric by which to measure how much of our world we know about and therefore, the extent of our ignorance. — Punshhh

It seems reasonable to believe there's a great deal we don't know. But what use can be made of this fact? Does it lead anywhere?

Well we have one example of a mind existing. Something which is naturally emergent in biological life. So it seems reasonable to allow the possibility of other minds, creating other artificial things. Including highly advanced technologies. Which might for example have technology to control physical material, energy etc.
I say this because it seems reasonable to consider that human technology will be able to do such things in the future — Punshhh

Regarding other "minds", IMO we can justifiably believe they exist in other humans, and in a diminished sense- in other animals.

But sure, it's fine to speculate about what we might create. Speculation can lead to discovery and invention. I also do not insist that empirical evidence is necessary to believe that something exists. Example: we can justifiably infer that there is life elsewhere in the universe.

Universes not causally connected, could include infinite universes entirely different to ours. But which is somehow constrained by human thought. If not a gap, a leaky sieve. — Punshhh

I covered that by referencing "anything inferred to exist by analysis of the universe", which means via accepted theory.

I intentionally leave out mere possibilities. My definition is intended to identify what we can justifiably believe. This also applies to:

Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind? — Punshhh

'. I'm not really seeing how this runs against anything else said though - anything discovered would ne 'natural'. If there is some 'non-physical' reality of some kind, or some sort of film between us and reality that necessarily negates the objectivity of what we see, that is also natural. — AmadeusD

The notion of something "between us and reality" is self-contradictory. Perhaps you mean "between us and the rest of reality". My problem here is that you seem to be posing a mere possibility. I grant naturalism (as I've defined it) is possibly false, but mere possibility doesn't undercut believing naturalism to be true, in the provisional sense I have in mind.

The very best scientific theories are possibly false, but that mere possibility is not a good reason to believe it false.

This might need tidying up a bit. You might have left a big hole there for other things to sneak in. — Punshhh

What hole do you have in mind?

I would define natural as everything except what is made up in peoples heads. Putting the emphasis on the human mind, the only place where artificial things are created.

That's tricky. Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality.

By analysis of the universe I presume you mean by means of the scientific method predominantly. — bert1

Most of our knowledge of the universe comes from science, but there are potential additional sources of knowledge- such as knowledge derived from conceptual analysis. So it's best to leave this open.

Is the 'laws of nature' bit essential to naturalism? — bert1

It's essential to the naturalistic metaphysics I know and defend, but one could instead depend on Humean regularities (each causal action is unique). IMO, (non-Platonic) laws make the most sense.

Say what you will about Mamdani. but he must a world class ass kisser. — Wayfarer

Trump got nothing out of it, that I can see. GOP had been trying to paint Mandami as a "Communist" and claim this is the direction Democrats are taking. Trump gave the dems soundbights in which Trump praises Mandami's intelligence and that he agees with him on many things. Meanwhile, Mandami did not back off from calling Trump a fascist.

If you say something is 'natural', what have you said about it? — bert1

I'll give you my definition:

The natural= That which exists (has existed, or will exist) starting with oneself, everything that is causally connected to ourselves, and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.


Naturalism is a metaphysical system that assumes the totality of reality is natural. The "natural" is anything that exists that is causally connected to the actual physical world through laws of nature.

I feel exactly the same level of passion as Wayf does about avoiding people who claim its either sorted, or all-but-sorted — AmadeusD

Withholding judgement is perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, it is not UNreasonable to make a judgement. My judgement is that naturalism is the inference to best explanation, as an overall metaphysical theory. So, I "believe" naturalism is true - basically I see no good reason to think anything unnatural exists. This is not an expression of certainty - I'm open to having this theory challenged and defeated. But the mere possibility it is false is not a defeater.

Unclear what you might hope to accomplish by taking this stance. — noAxioms

. My initial statement on the issue said it all:

In terms of ontology, things have properties, processes do not have properties. You may have meant it in a de dicto sense. Regardless, we agree consciousness is a process. — Relativist

Beyond that, I was just explaining what I meant.

Vapor pressure is not a property of boiling? — noAxioms

No. It's a property of the material. I'm referring to the intrinsic properties of existents. Everything that exists has intrinsic properties.

Unclear what you might hope to accomplish by taking this stance. — noAxioms

Clarity on ontology.

One could say that "red has the property of being in a wavelength range of X-Y" but it's just way of talking. Red isn't a thing. Rather, the word "red" corresponds to wavelength range of X-Y.

One could refer to speed as a property of running. But speed is actually a property of the runner (or more precisely: a relation between the runner and the earth).

If consciousness is a physical process, what are the answers to these kinds of questions? — Patterner

Neuron firings, changes to action potentials, release of chemicals, other bodily activities. Of course, none of these measures apply to what we consider thought processes. But that would require knowing exactly how thoughts are produced in a brain.

Personally I suspect consciousness is a physical process. If a process (like a movie) is a thing, then yes, else no. It isn't an object. Not sure how you're making this conclusion of 'thing' based on what I post. — noAxioms

In terms of ontology, things have properties, processes do not have properties. You may have meant it in a de dicto sense. Regardless, we agree consciousness is a process.

Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties...

Of course it has physical properties. It is the cause of physical effects. — noAxioms

You seem to be assuming consciousness is a thing. Physicalism does not require that; it may be that consciousness is produced by the physical in a manner analogous to a movie is produced by the rapid projection of a series of still images. We can refer to the movie as if it is an object, but it actually is not. My hypothesis is that consciousness entails the rapid change from one static brain state to the next. This would be no more detectable than a movie: brain states can be detected, but not the subjective experience they create.

The reason that the mind is not an object like those of physics or chemistry is because it is what we are. The mind (observer, subject, consciousness) is the one utterly indbuitable fact of existence because it is that to whom all experience occurs. — Wayfarer

You assert the mind is not an object, and therefore "not in the frame". And yet, it is a fact that I exist, I am an observer, a subject, and I engage in mental activities. "The mind" is conceptually that aspect of myself that engages in mental activities. Reconcile this.

Now the entire phenomenological, idealist, Indian, and most contiental philosophy understands this in a way that Anglo physicalism cannot.

And for you, that's just an inconvenient detail, — Wayfarer

To claim these philosophical perspectives "understand this" implies you have identified some objective fact. You have stated no facts that need to be accounted for. You've discussed an alternative, incompatible paradigm that depends on vague concepts.

You say you accept science, but science is reductive. You need to explain how your vague concept of "the mind" fits into a universe that is otherwise completely physical. You also need to reconcile how the functions of this non-object "mind" are influenced by the physical (drugs, brain disease, trauma...), and how the mind can have causal efficacy with the physical aspects of the body.

So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for?
Physics of course, which is how they're accounted for if physicalism is true. — noAxioms

Are you referring to physics, as a scientific discipline?

It's possible that feelings depend on some aspect of physical reality that only manifests in sentient beings. Physicists would never be able to detect its existence.

There's nothing in what I say that is 'anti-science' or 'opposed to science'. The only thing I'm opposing, is the application of scientific method to philosophical problems. — Wayfarer

Do you regard Inference to Best Explanation as "scientific method"? That's all I've done.

You see, I think your approach is undermined by this reductionism, the conviction that basic physical level is the only real one, to the extent that you can't even consider any alternative. You simply assume that philosophy must defer to physics, as if that can't even be in question. — Wayfarer

I do not "defer to physics". Physics provides a set of facts. A metaphysical theory needs to be able to account for all facts, including (but not limited to) the facts physics presents to us.

If explanation bottoms out in simples, yet consciousness and cognition are inherently gestalt-like, ... — Wayfarer

Whoa! Did you actually make a positive claim? Do you indeed believe the mind is irreducible? Or is this one of those noncommital possibilities (you did say, "if"). What about everything other than mind? You said you accept science.

If you think the mind is irreducible, how does it come into existence?

A Turing machine can't create the experience of "redness".
— Relativist
If physicalism is true, then the machine very much can. So your assertion amounts to a claim that physicalism is wrong, but apparently expressed as opinion, not as something falsified. — noAxioms

Good point, but it means your Turing machine question doesn't further the analysis.

A Turing machine could produce feelings if (and only if) the machine's initial state includes the capacity to exhibit feelings. Feelings can't be programmed into existence. So the issue remains: how can feelings be accounted for? I offered 2 possibilities: illusionism and some otherwise undetected aspect of reality.

You reference simulation in your op. This amounts to a zombie: one could simulate a human that appeared to behave like a human in all ways, but it would not experience feelings because the machine lacks the capacity for them. For example, the machine could detect the wavelengths of reflected light, and identify "red", and react just as we would. But that't not experiencing the quale as we do.

I hold that there is a mind independent of space and time, but that it is present in the world through being hosted by the brain (and the body). — Punshhh

Why do you believe that? What's your justification? What you describe sounds like dualism - is that indeed your position? Are you familiar with the interaction problem?

I embrace physicalism (generally, not just as a theory of mind) as an Inference to Best Explanation for all facts.
— Relativist

Except for the nature of mind and the felt nature of experience, right? You’ve acknowledged that in various places as I understand it. — Wayfarer

Then you misunderstood. I was open to an alternative that might be a better explanation for the "hard problem", but you didn't offer one. That's why I kept asking for more than the "negative fact" (not physicalism).

Try to understand this in terms of seeking an Inference to Best Explanation: that "negative fact" explained nothing. As I said then, it merely opened up infinitely many possibilities. But also, if anything is possible then it's also possible that there is an unknown natural solution - one that may even be inaccessible to scientific analysis. This is a dramatically smaller explanatory gap than leaving all possibilities open.

Some physicalists (including Armstrong) insist that all questions about the natural world will one day be discovered by science. I do not share that optimism. We may never determine the true ontology of the QM "measurement problem". String theory may be true, but it is empirically unverifiable. But there could easily be other aspects of reality that are beyond our capacity to explore. This rationalizes the assumption that the explanatory gap has a natural solution. I acknowledge this as a weakness, but it's minor compared to the alternatives.

You aren't even in position to justifiably disagree, because you don't embrace any particular theory of mind (much less, a metaphysical theory).
— Relativist

That is a virtue as far as I’m concerned. — Wayfarer

Withholding judgement is always a respectable position. But you should be consistent and also withhold judgement on physicalism: it's not provably false; it has a great deal of explanatory power, and it's consistent with what we do know about neurology and the natural world.

Although I make a judgement, I don't rule out the possibility I'm wrong. It's odd that you rule out the possibility I'm right.

Yes, I'm aware that you believe the mind is not physical, and therefore not on par with physics and chemistry. But the extent of what you told me you believe about mind is just this negative (supposed) fact: it's not physical. This means you answer no positive questions, account for no aspects of reality, so it's logically impossible for this singular negative fact to constitute a better explanation for reality (including, but not limited to, mind) than a comprehensive metaphysical theory.

I also do understand that you don't have much interest in a general metaphysical theory, and I'm fine with that. But you haven't grasped that this means you aren't positioned to judge my inferrence to best explanation. Instead, you seem to think that your objections to a physicalist account of mind are so objectively strong that no well-informed, rational person could fall for it.