Anyway, I think the Law of Identity has to do with symbols and semantics both:

1. Symbolic: ''Box'' here at one time = ''Box'' there at another time

2. Semantic: ''Box'' means a container and this ''box'' = that ''box'' at another place in the conversation


Without this basic agreement conversation would be impossible right? — TheMadFool

I don't think that this is correct, the law of identity is not concerned with the symbol, nor the semantics (meaning) of the symbol, it is concerned with the particular thing which is identified through the use of the symbol. So, if we are talking about "the chair", the law of identity is not concerned with that symbol, nor what it means to be a chair, it is concerned with that particular entity which we have identified as "the chair". The law of identity says that this particular thing has an identity, regardless of the symbol we use to refer to it ("the chair" in this case), and what is implied about that thing (what "chair" means to us), through the use of that particular symbol chosen to represent the thing.

Really? How would you describe my knowing that God exists physically? Note that if you remove what my knowledge is about, you fail to specify what knowledge you are discussing. If I say moving my leg is local motion of a lower extremity, I have lost no content. — Dfpolis

The physicalists produce this description on the this forum quite commonly. They refer to neurological processes. I disagree with such descriptions because I think that leaving out the intentional aspect is to produce an incomplete description. You would insist that a description of "knowing that God exists" requires the "aboutness", but the physicalist would say that this is accidental, and so not required.in the description, the activity of such and such neurons is a sufficient description, and what this is about is only relevant to you, who claims it is about God.

I would argue the same point against you, on your description of a leg spasm. It is incomplete, because you are missing content, you are missing the fact that the leg spasm it is a neurological process of a living human being. When you remove this content, you may as well be talking about the movement of an extremity of a piece of rock.

So I think that your description of a leg spasm is incomplete because it leaves out the intentional aspect, just like the physicalist's description of thought as a neurological activity is incomplete because it leaves out the intentional aspect. I believe that all the activities of living beings have an intentional aspect, because intention is inherent within the "soul", which all living things have in common, as the source of all their activities. So I believe that any description of the activity of a living being requires reference to intention in order to be a complete description of that activity. To leave intention out from a description of a living activity is to provide an incomplete description.

As I said, some acts are intentionally done, others not. Or are you thinking that all acts reflect Divine Intent? — Dfpolis

What I think, is that in general, all the activities of living things display this "aboutness" which you refer to. They are about some further end. Sure you can point to a particular living action, and say, I don't see the aboutness here, therefore there is none, but we do not see intention. Intention is only reveled when we put the action into its appropriate context, and that context is often unknown. To do this is like pointing to a person walking down the street, and saying, that's a random act, there is no aboutness to that act of "walking down the street". Only when we put the act into the appropriate context, is intention revealed.

The problem is, that there is an intentional aspect to the act, must be presumed in order to give the act an intentional context. if you do not presume the intentional context, you will place "walking down the street" in the context of other physical acts by that person, and other people, in an ever widening physical context, without ever coming across intentionality. Instead though, our habit is to place the act into an intentional context, and this is the result of a logical conclusion. if the act is such and such (the conscious act of a human being, for example), then it is intentional, therefore we presume intentionality, and we look to give that act an intentional context. Notice that intentionality cannot be directly inferred from a simple description of the act. We class the act as intentional, based on some logical principle that this type of act ought be classed as intentional, and only following this presumption of intentionality do we seek a context of intentionality for the act.

So to give the act an intentional context, to say that it is an intentional act, requires some principles by which this presumption is made, otherwise the act will be placed in the category of physical act, and the intentionality of the act will be overlooked in any description of it. The common principle employed is that a conscious human act is an intentional act, and therefore we seek an intentional context for conscious human acts. I argue that intention is evident within acts of all living things, therefore we ought to presume that if it is an act of a living thing, it is intentional, and seek to put all living acts into an intentional context. I would not call this "Divine Intent", because I apprehend a separation between the intent of God and the intent of living things.

There's an SEP entry on Active Intellect (or active mind, nous poiêtikos) here. It makes the point again that the very brief passage on the active intellect is a minefield for interpreters, saying 'So varied are their approaches, in fact, that it is tempting to regard De Anima iii 5 as a sort of Rorschach Test for Aristotelians: it is hard to avoid the conclusion that readers discover in this chapter the Aristotle they hope to admire.' — Wayfarer

I think the important point to note, rather than trying to apprehend what "active intellect" refers to, is the distinction between active intellect and passive intellect. This places "active intellect" into context, and the passive intellect, as the scholastics found out, is really the difficult part to understand. The nominalist/realist division is started right here, in the question of whether the passive intellect is proper to the individual, or to the collective of human beings. However, as described by Aquinas, the passive intellect is required to account for memory so it must be proper to the individual, but as "passive", the passive intellect gets into the same category of things which matter is placed in, it is similar to matter. But Aquinas seems to take pains to establish a separation between the passive intellect, and matter, because he wants to attribute the intellect to the soul, which is immaterial, so he doesn't seem to be ready to allow that any part of the intellect, not even the passive intellect, is material.

Moving my leg is a physical act. It may or may not serve a purpose It may doe example be the result of a spasm. Bit, even if it did serve a purpose, that would not make it an intentional act in the sense Im using the term. Why? Because there is no need to include the purpose served in defining the act. It is the local motion of a lower extremity -- perhaps specified by the time and place of occurrence. On the other hand, you cannot define a belief or a hope without saying what is believed or hoped for.. — Dfpolis

You already said, you are using the word "intention" to refer to an act which is "about" something else. even the spasm in your leg is about something else, and is therefore intentional. Just because you can describe the action as a "local motion of a lower extremity" without referring to what the motion was about, doesn't mean that it wasn't an intentional act.

This is why I think your distinction between intentional act and physical act is meaningless. We can describe any intentional act as a physical act, simply by excluding the aboutness from the description. This is what physicalists, materialist, and determinists do, they exclude intention from the description of the act, and from that description without intention, they claim intention is irrelevant to the act. Because they can describe the act without referring to the intention behind the act, they say intention is irrelevant to the act. So your position is a little more advanced than this, recognizing the importance of intention. But your division between intentional act and physical act is completely arbitrary, depending on how one chooses to describe any particular act. One might not recognize that there is intention behind an act and so leave it out of the description. One might not know the particular intention behind a specific act, and so leave it out of the description. Or, a person like a physicalist might simply choose to leave intention out of the description. In all these cases, intention is left out of the description, so it is called a "physical act", but that's a meaningless misnomer because each of these acts were intentional acts, described as physical acts. Without any hard principles whereby one could distinguish a physical act from an intentional act in the first place, and then describe the act accordingly, the distinction is meaningless.

No, in general act does not imply change. My thinking <pi is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to is diameter> involves no intrinsic change. Neither does my acting like a statute. Indeed, to the extent that I am moving, I'm not acting like a statue. — Dfpolis

I don't see how you can make this claim. To go from not thinking "pi" to thinking "pi", involves a change. You cannot say that thinking pi involves no change, unless you've been always thinking pi, forever, in eternity. The same thing for acting like a statue. To go from not acting like a statue to acting like a statue involves a change, so you cannot say that you acting like a statue involves no change, unless you've always, eternally been acting like a statue.

Note that you had to add something the was not only outside of the act of knowing, but its contrary to knowing in trying to make your point. Nothing intrinsically includes its contrary. So, your argument fails. Being aware is an act that involves no intrinsic change. — Dfpolis

Of course I had to add something contrary, because that's what change is, what was, now is not. You cannot have change without this contrariety. Nor can you describe an act by describing a state. "Night" doesn't imply any change, but it's not an act. If we add its contrary, "day", we can talk about an act which is the changing between night and day. So it's not my argument which fails, your argument is only successful if your so-called "act" involves a state remaining the same forever. Since remaining the same forever is clearly not a case of doing something, it cannot be an act.

Through inductive reasoning, we can find the human purpose based on what we observe to be a good human being: — Samuel Lacrampe

This is just a vicious circle, using goodness in human beings to determine the human purpose, in order to use the human purpose to identify goodness. To say that so and so is a good person would require already that one has an idea of the human purpose, if goodness is determined relative to the human purpose. So we can't look for good human beings to determine what the human purpose is because we wouldn't know how to identify a good human being without already knowing what the human purpose is.

I suspect a misunderstanding either from me or from you; because as I understand your comments, I have already addressed these objections in my previous post. I'll try again, and maybe you can clarify. A maximum cannot imply an absolute quantity because absolute quantities are theoretically infinite, and so no maximum is theoretically possible. It can only imply a relative quantity, a percentage, where the maximum is 100%. I suppose you could also call it a quality insofar that relative quantities don't have any units. But as a relative quantity, I see not contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't understand what you're trying to argue. I agree that something with a maximum cannot be infinite. But no quantity can be infinite because "quantity" implies measured or measurable, which nothing infinite is. So "absolute quantity" as "infinite" doesn't make sense, "quantity" is always relative to measurement and never infinite. However, my point is that qualities such as goodness, cannot be measured as a definite quantity. And, it is the attempt to measure that which cannot be measured, that which is indefinite, which gives rise to the notion of infinite.

Now, when we say that a quality such as goodness has a maximum, it is implied that this quality is measurable through the use of that term, "maximum". So to measure the quality, we set up a scale, based in an ideal, and determine the degrees of that quality relative to the ideal. The ideal is something completely distinct from the quality, which the quality is related to for the purpose of measurement, it is not the "maximum" of the quality. For example, to measure heat, we set up a scale of temperature, and this scale is the ideal. We measure degrees of temperature relative to this ideal. The ideal is not the maximum, it is the scale. It is only when we try to limit the scale, to put a cap of maximum or minimum on it, that we attempt to turn the measurements into absolutes, as "absolute zero" does. If this limiting of the scale is accomplished, then the quality being measured, "heat", becomes a true measurable "quantity", in an absolute sense. But if the limiting is not accomplished, the measurements of degree are relative to the scale and so are not true quantities, nor are the measurements absolute.

I see. Real quantities imply real units. Although real, some can be man-made or arbitrary, such as 1 m in length, 1 kg in weight, etc. Anyways, I suggest dropping this side topic to focus on the main one. — Samuel Lacrampe

We can't drop this, because this is the very point I am arguing. If the units are arbitrary, then there is no real quantity. The quantity is relative to the arbitrary scale, there is a possible infinity, and no maximum. If the units are real, then there are real limits, no infinity, and a maximum, there is a quantity in an absolute sense. These two are incompatible. If we mix them together the result is confusion. So if we talk of goodness, we must determine whether we are talking about something which comes in real units, with limits, and therefore a maximum, or are we talking about something without limits, infinite, and without units.

we each have the correct interpretation of the words — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning" — Metaphysician Undercover
This appears to me to be a pretty direct contradiction. I'm lost. — Banno

The former, "we each have the correct interpretation of the words", is a statement of what is required for the existence of a proposition under your definition of "proposition". The latter, "I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning", is a statement of what I believe. The two are directly contradictory. Therefore I do not believe that there is any such thing as a proposition under your definition of "proposition". In other words, I think your definition of "proposition" is wrong, it doesn't describe the thing which is referred to with that word.

The motivation for a physical act is not the act. Some physical acts are intentionally motivated, others are not. The difference is that intentional acts is characterized by "aboutness." They are about something beyond themselves -- a goal to be attained or hoped for, something we know or believe and so on. Physical acts are characterized by motion and change: parts moving and transforming into other parts. — Dfpolis

Could you give me an example of a human physical act which is not about something else? I don't think there is such a thing, because it seems like this would be a completely random act with no reason for it.

By not involving change in any essential way. — Dfpolis

If there is an "act" which does not involve change in any essential way, how can this be said to be an "act" without contradiction? To act is to do something, and this implies change. "Act" requires change, and therefore "change" is essential to the definition of "act".

Take your example, "I know pi is an irrational number". Unless there is a change between the state of not knowing that pi is an irrational number, and knowing that pi is an irrational number, which is essential to the difference between these two, we cannot say that knowing pi as an irrational number, is an act. If there is no change which is essential to this so-called "act", then it is not an act at all, but something passive.

As always, the devil is in the details. As a moderate realist, I agree that there is a foundation in reality for the concepts of <human intentional acts> and <human physical acts>. So, they indicate really different aspects of the person. Still, these are aspects of a single person, of a single substance. — Dfpolis

I don't understand this division between intentional acts and physical acts. Isn't it the case that many physical acts are intentional? And, aren't all intentional acts physical because we cannot conceive of non-physical activity? How could an act be non-physical? Don't you find this distinction to be very impractical?

Why suppose there is such a process?

Is that a teleological assumption - there must be one true shared meaning, so there must be a process for verifying that we share the one true shared meaning - although apparently without making use of the word "true"... — Banno

No, I don't think there is anything teleological here. Interpretation is a process. Do you not agree? An interpretation is the result of an act of interpretation. So whatever it is that produces the one "correct" or "true" interpretation, which is necessary for the existence of a proposition, this must be a process as well.

I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning", we all interpret things in our own unique and idiosyncratic ways. The "correct" or "true" interpretation, therefore cannot be a one shared interpretation, because there is no such thing as a shared interpretation. interpretation is something one does on one's own. This is why I question your assumption that there is one "true" or "correct" interpretation. That would require one "true" or "correct" act of interpretation. Is this supposed to be an act of God?

I guess if there is no clear and evidently correct interpretation, there is no proposition there. That's why I asked, if there really is such a thing as a proposition under this definition. Try The Second Amendment, I guess there's no proposition there either.

Interesting. I am not familiar with this notion of "fundamental unit". Can you give examples to illustrate that the unit must be real in order to have a quantity? — Samuel Lacrampe

I suppose it's a matter of definition here. A "quantity" is always a number of units. If the units are not real, then neither is the quantity. If you have a quantity which consists of unreal, or false units, then this is not a real quantity.

But we know it is the case for goodness, straight from the definition of goodness: the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or ideal. Under such a definition, an ideal must exist for the judgement of goodness to apply. This definition is backed up by the examples given in the OP. Do you disagree with it? — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, this is a matter of definition. You are defining "goodness" in a way so as to support your position. But if you define it in a utilitarian way, you judge goodness by a quantity not by comparison to an ideal of a perfect nature, because quantity is infinite, allowing for no perfect or ideal 'good".

So if we follow your definition, we would have to assume that there is a purpose for human beings, in order that a human being could be judged as good. How would we define this purpose, the reason why human beings exist? In order to judge the goodness of any human being, or any human act, we'd need to know this purpose of human existence, and position the person, or act, relative to it. But clearly we do not know this purpose, and we do not judge goodness in this way. So I think that your definition does not reflect "goodness" as we commonly use the word.

What he means about maximum is not a maximum absolute quantity but a maximum in actuality from potentiality; or to say the same thing in a different way, a grade of 100%, which can be seen as a relative quantity, relative to the perfect nature or ideal. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that you, as well as Aquinas, are headed toward contradiction here. "Maximum" is a term which applies to things which are measurable, as is "quantity". To say that there is a "maximum" is to say that there is a "quantity", and this is to say that the thing is measurable. But you define "goodness" as a quality. So by talking about a maximum goodness you talk about goodness as a quantity, when you have defined it as a quality. If it's not leading toward contradiction, it's clearly a category mistake.

If some statement is true under one interpretation and false under another, then these two interpretations express distinct propositions.

That's pretty much what a proposition is. — Banno

Right, so if you and I are talking about the proposition "it is raining", what is the process which ensures that we each have the correct interpretation of the words "it is raining", such that we are both talking about the same proposition?

Is this not a process of verification? Or, is it the case that when we discuss specific propositions, the different people in the discussion, having slightly different interpretations of the same words, are never really discussing the same proposition? if there really is such a thing as "a proposition" under this definition, where would the interpretation which constitutes "the proposition" exist? Isn't this what Plato questioned, inquiring into independent ideas?

Yeah, I agree with that, so far as navigating everyday life goes; but zooming out a bit more, I see identification as secondary (or subsequent to) to discovery, or the knowledge-gathering process. One identifies what is already known, but to bring things into knowledge is a different process, a process of generate-and-test. That's a process of punting, guessing at, possible identities the thing could have (possible coherent bundles of features that are logically interlinked, etc.), and then testing the implications of that possible identity as the object bumps into the rest of the world (including one's experiments and interventions with it). If it doesn't behave as expected, then either we try on another possible identity, or adjust the one we had. — gurugeorge

I think you are using "identity" here in a way other than that prescribed by Aristotle's law of identity. When you say "guessing at, possible identities the things could have", you imply that identity is what we give to the object. But this is exactly what the law of identity seeks to avoid. Identity is not what we give to the object, it is not the description we make of it, it is what the object has inherent within itself, its own identity, as the thing which it is. That's why the law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself, it's identity is inherent within it, not what we assign to it. The descriptive terms which we assign to the thing are something completely different from the identity which the thing has within itself.

Here's a question for you Banno. Since it is required that a proposition be already verified, in the sense that I described, such that it consists of the correct interpretation of the words, wouldn't this verification process also verify whether it is true or not?

For example, take your proposition, "it is raining". Inherent within that proposition is the correct interpretation of those words. Wouldn't the same process which determines the correct interpretation of those words also determine whether those words speak a truth or a falsity?

That's an interesting way of looking at it, and it would explain why Aristotle actually didn't formulate the Law of Identity as such, didn't seem to think it that important, and didn't connect it through to the Law of Non-Contradiction (which really was Aristotle's thing). All that - the way we think of the Law of Identity today - seems to be a later development with some of the Schoolmen, Leibniz and Locke. — gurugeorge

There is a natural progression from the law of identity to the law of non-contradiction. The goal is to know, or understand the object. First we identify the object, you might say we point to it, or assign a name to it. If we can do this, then we can say that it has an identify according to the law of identity. Having an identity validates the claim that it exists, as an object. Next, we describe the identified object, and we must do this according to the law of non-contradiction. We cannot assign contradictory properties to the identified object because this is repugnant to the intellect, making the object unintelligible. These principles are designed so as to make the object intelligible, they are what appeals to the intellect in its goal of knowing, or understanding the object.

Sure. That's not what meta said, but we can proceed; all propositions are always, already, interpretations.

So is Meta's point that a given proposition can be true under one interpretation, and false under another?

Because I can't see how that could work. — Banno

The group of words can be interpreted in different ways, and can be true or false depending on the interpretation. The proposition is, as you say, always already an interpretation. So this interpretation, which comprises the proposition, must be always already verified as the correct interpretation. Therefore there cannot be an unverified true proposition. The proposition is by its very nature already verified, and it is only by means of this "verified correct interpretation" that it may be true or false.

I can interpret the meaning of the statement "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe" without being able to verify (or falsify) it. — Michael

Right, you can interpret without verification, but the point is that there is no truth or falsity without verification of the interpretation. Perhaps Banno confused me into saying something not quite what I meant to say.

I think Metaphysician Undercover is saying that propositions don't exist sans interpretation. The ink on the paper exists independently, the rain exists independently, but the proposition expressed by the two sentences "it is raining" and "il pleut" does not exist independently. That they share the same proposition just is that we interpret them the same way. — Michael

I think that's a good way of putting it. A "proposition", as Banno defines it, is dependent on an interpretation. The interpretation is inherent within the proposition. This would be the "correct interpretation". And "correct" requires verification. So "proposition" implies "correct interpretation" and "correct interpretation" implies verified.

Without the "correct interpretation", any interpretation would be acceptable and this allows that the proposition could be both true and false. So "truth" requires "correct interpretation", and "correct interpretation" requires "verification".

That's not the law of identity, that's equivocation. The law of identity is used to identify specific things, it is distinct from a definition. Logic can proceed from definitions, without any specific object being identified as fulfilling the criteria of the definition. The law of identity dictates how we apply logic, to specific things in the world. Each object must be recognized as distinct from every other object, by the law of identity.

So the law of identity is really used independently of the logic, enforcing the idea that if this is the identified thing, which the logic is being applied to, then it and only it, is the thing which the logic is being applied to. A definition is a generalization, which allows exclusion to the law of identity. If object A has the same defining properties as object B, then the same logic, with regard to those properties, may be applied equally to the two objects. In this way we disregard the law of identity which states that the two objects are not the same, and we treat them as the same, by applying the same logic to them.

Hence, "It is raining" and "Il pleut" are the same proposition and yet the words used are distinct. — Banno

This is irrelevant to the fact that the words "it is raining", or "il pleut", if used as a proposition, require an interpretation in order that there can be a truth or falsity to that proposition. There can be no truth without an interpretation because the words have no meaning without an interpretation. And interpretation is a form of verification. Therefore there can be no unverified true propositions.

However, it is not necessary to prove that qualities cannot be reduced to quantities. What is necessary is to prove the existence of the ideal for goodness. Your way is indeed a means to that end, but not the only one. I use a different approach in the OP by showing that the judgement of goodness is possible only if an ideal exists. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes, to prove that the ideal for goodness exists is to prove that God exists. Your approach is the same as Aquinas', it is based in the assumption that to judge for goodness requires the existence of the ideal (maximum) for goodness.

I don't think that this assumption is sound because we can judge for quantity without the ideal (maximum) for quantity. Judgement for quantity requires the assumption of a fundamental unit, or unity, as a particular, an individual. So the soundness of this judgement, the judgement of quantity, is based in the reality of the assumed unit. The assumed unit allows for a first, the one, then the other numbers of the quantity may follow.

I believe that this is why the cosmological argument, which is based in the necessity of a first unit, the One, is a stronger argument than the ontological argument, which is based in the claim that the ideal must be real. That the ideal must be real can only be known intuitively and cannot be proven with logic, but that the unit, the individual or particular must be real, in order that there is a quantity, can be proven with logic.

So with respect to the argument from gradation, there is a real need to distinguish quality from quantity. If what is counted as a degree of goodness, is a real individual unit, a particular or individual unit of goodness, then there is no need for the ideal (maximum) goodness in order to count the degrees of goodness. But if goodness is a quality which cannot be reduced to a quantity (i.e. there are no real discernible units of goodness), then the units of measurement, the degrees, are arbitrary, and as such, to have any real value they must be based in an ideal which has real grounding. So with heat, we can have degrees of temperature which are completely arbitrary, either F or C for example, but the whole system of measurement is grounded in real principles such as the boiling and freezing point of water.

But notice that the reality of the ideal is not necessarily based in a maximum, as Aquinas describes. The reality of the ideal is the grounding principles for the system of gradation. When Aquinas talks about a "maximum" for goodness, this implies the character of a quantity, and this gives the argument an unsound premise to begin with.

Now you are confusing statements and propositions. — Banno

Lame.

Capital T truth is pronounced synoptically. Anything else that might be said will, inevitably, fall within the ambit of the truth pronounced - and so can be given its proper place. — csalisbury

Really, it need not be like this. One might say "this is the way I see things, do you see them in the same way?", instead of pronouncing the truth This is quite different from what apokrisis expresses:

Be that as it may, my response was simply that the right way to go about things is to "pronounce truth" - as that is then inviting falsification head on. It is saying, come have a go. — apokrisis

What apokrisis expresses is an aggressive form of self-assertion, the other an expression of insecure, uncertainty. Psychologically they represent two completely distinct, and somewhat opposed attitudes.

Thomas Aquinas’ argument from degree for the existence of God can be summarized as follows:



P1: If there exist beings with varying degrees of a property, then there must exist a being with that property to the maximum degree.
P2: There exist beings with varying degrees of moral goodness.
C: The moral good to the maximum degree exists (which is what we call God). — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think the argument from gradation is properly represented here, P1 seems a little simplistic. The argument is that in order for things to be graded, by degree, there must be an "ideal". The "ideal' defines the maximum. So for example if "heat" is graded by degree, then there must be an ideal which defines the maximum possible heat. Likewise with "good", if good is graded by degree, then there must be a maximum good, provided by the ideal.

The argument may not be sound though because in the case of quantities, the ideal is "infinite". So with quantities the ideal escapes the maximum. What is required to make the argument sound, is to establish an acceptable distinction, a categorical division, between quality and quantity, such that a quality cannot be reduced to a quantity. If qualities are really quantities, then the ideal is infinite, there is no maximum, and the argument is unsound.

You appear to be confusing truth with belief. — Banno

No, absolutely not. A proposition consists of two aspects, the words or symbols, and the meaning. The truth or falsity of a proposition is relative to its meaning. The meaning is dependent on interpretation. Therefore the truth or falsity of the proposition is relative to the interpretation of the proposition.

This has nothing to do with "belief", it's just a demonstration that a proposition being true or false is relative to an interpretation of that proposition. One interpretation may render the proposition as true while another may render it as false, so there is a need to validate the "correct interpretation". Therefore, there can be no such thing as an unverified true proposition, because verification of the meaning of the proposition is required in order that it may be true.

You seem to be taking for granted that any given proposition has a "correct interpretation" already inherent within it, so that verification of the meaning is not required. But that is a mistaken assumption.

But there is clearly a distinction to be made between a proposition being true, and its being verified as true. There are, after all, unverified true propositions. — Banno

That depends on how you look at things. Some might say that truth requires judgement, that to be true requires a judgement of truth. Ever heard the saying "beauty is in the eye of the beholder"? We can say the same with "truth", it is a property of the judgement.

The reason why it makes sense to argue this position, against what you say, is that the words or symbols of the proposition must be interpreted for meaning. And, it is the meaning which is judged for truth or falsity. So without the interpretation of what the proposition means, the proposition cannot have any status of being true or false. Let's say "the sky is blue". Without definitions for "sky" and "blue", it makes no sense to talk about this proposition being true or false. A judgement as to the meaning of "the sky is blue" is required in order that the proposition may be either true or false, and there can be no such thing as an "unverified true proposition".

Two pennies are alike, When one contrasts and compares two pennies, they might say that they are the same, opposed to being different.

But they are not the same penny. — 3rdClassCitizen

That's right, two pennies are "the same" in the sense of the same type of thing. But they are not the same in the sense of the law of identity which would mean that they would have to be one and the same penny.

The best way to think of it is as a definition of "=". — Banno

I think that this is incorrect. Equality (=) implies two distinct things with equal value. The law of identity identifies one thing as itself. "Equals" and "the same" do not have the same meaning.in the sense that the law of identity implies for "the same".

Regarding the Law of identity "a is a" is it wrong to argue that a is not a because one a is on the left side of the copula and the other a is on the right side, and having different properties they are clearly not identical. — jlrinc

The Arostotelian formulation of the law of identity is that a thing is the same as itself. It may be that "a is a" is a representation of this. The thing to remember then is that "a" is a symbol which represents the thing which is the same as itself. So if we take the symbol "a" and ask if one "a" is the same thing as another "a", clearly they are not the same, by the law of identity, as they are distinct things. And when we say that one symbol, one instance of "a" is the same as another instance of "a", we are using "the same" in a way which does not correspond to the law of identity. Beware of equivocation.

TBH, I don't think you want to understand it or, it seems, anything else that doesn't tally with your pedantic sophistry. — Janus

I understand it, it's not very complicated at all. I just don't agree with it, and that's why I point out the inherent contradictions. The only true absolute presupposition is to presuppose nothing, because to presuppose is to presuppose something and this makes the presupposition relative. To go beyond relative presuppositions, is to leave the category of presuppositions, and then we're not talking about presuppositions. anymore. So what Collingwood calls an "absolute presupposition" is not a "presupposition" at all, and he's completely off track with that term. He's trying to leap from presuppositions to something which is not a presupposition at all, giving it the misleading name of "absolute presupposition".

Sophistry is only possible when the fundamental laws of logic are not strictly adhered to. So pedantry is not sophistry, it's the way we defeat it.

No, as i understand it, for Collingwood absolute presuppositions are always such in relation to a context. — Janus

Sounds just like a relative presupposition then.

Have you actually read Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics? It doesn't sound like it! — Janus

No I haven't it doesn't sound very interesting, and full of contradiction according to how you and tim wood explain it.

You're responding to the wrong sense of 'absolute'. All it means is that the absolute presupposition in a context is the one that underpins all the others and is not itself underpinned by another. — Janus

I think we're talking about "absolute" as opposed to relative. That is to say "absolute", as distinguishable from "relative". This would mean "absolute" in the sense of that which can exist without being related to anything else..

If you think you can show how one "absolute presupposition" could underpin every single presupposition that someone has, then be my guest. This would disallow the possibility of conflicting or contradicting presuppositions, which many people appear to have.

Until then we should consider "absolute" in the sense that Collingwood uses it, as distinguishable from relative. This would mean that the absolute presupposition is not underpinned by another presupposition, because this would make it "true" in relation to that other presupposition, and the absolute presupposition must be free from that relation. But the absolute presupposition doesn't necessarily underpin all others, that one may have, and this is why multiple absolute presuppositions are possible.

The reason why I said that there could only be one absolute presupposition, so that all absolute presuppositions would be one and the same presupposition, is that there could only be one end to that seemingly infinite regress of presuppositions, and that would be the complete lack of presupposition. So an absolute presupposition could be nothing other than a presupposition of nothing. Nothing presupposed. This could be the only "first" presupposition, the one which supports others, but is not itself supported, the presupposition of nothing. If it presupposed something, this would be a prior presupposition which supports it.

Yes, but as has been pointed out absolute presuppositions are historical. Something can be an absolute presupposition for us at our present stage of knowledge, and not be such for future inquirers. — Janus

If it's absolute, it cannot be relative to temporal existence in this way. Being relative to temporal existence is what makes it about something particular and therefore relative, like your example.

Of course all hypotheses necessarily involve absolute presuppositions; — Janus

Unless you can show the logic behind this conclusion there is no sense to the assertion. As far as I can see, hypotheses involve relative presuppositions, but I don't see how an absolute presupposition is even possible.

So, I think the idea that all events are caused, and related principles, are far more certain candidates for being considered to be absolute presuppositions or regulative assumptions — Janus

Even this is quite clearly a relative presupposition. It is a proposition which relates to physical existence in general.

On a theological note, the related ideas of God — Janus

God may be an absolute presupposition, but this assumption would need to be defended, justified.

Another absolute presupposition is that humans can acquire certain knowledge of a 'higher" kind. — Janus

Again, this is relative. It is relative to human knowledge, and answers a question concerning human knowledge.

No, that's not what I (at least) am trying to avoid at all. And I don't think Collingwood would argue that we could establish what must be absolute presuppositions for all time, but merely what are or have been the absolute presuppositions in various contexts at various historical moments. We can establish what are absolute presuppositions for us, what cannot presently "take the form of a proposition", as I have already argued. — Janus

This is clear evidence of the failure of Collingwood's theory. If the presuppositions change at various moments in history, then they are relative and not absolute. They are relative to the concerns of the people at that time. It is contradictory to say that the absolute presuppositions are different at different times, for different peoples, because this describes them as relative.

I think the mistake you're making is in not treating the classification as a theory. Like any other theory, it's a best guess until something better comes along or some evidence disproves it. — Pseudonym

This is not quite correct. Many insist that the skeptic cannot criticize a theory without offering a better one. But that's not true because we will not seek a better one until the problems of the existing one are exposed. So exposing the problems is first, and does not require offering a better theory. Further, it does not really require "evidence" to prove that a theory is faulty. If a theory can be proven to be illogical, by way of contradiction or that it breaks some fundamental laws of logic, this suffices to demonstrate its faults, though one might call this evidence it is not physical evidence.

In my interpretation, one asks of a belief "why would they believe that?". Sometimes one will find a set of empirical evidence and a rational argument but these will always be accompanied by another belief (the belief that this evidence coupled with this argument leads to this conclusion). So we ask the same question of that belief. At some point in time we do not find empirical evidence and rational argument forming part of the justification. At that point we propose the theory that this is an absolute proposition, and move on with investigating other things until such time as new evidence arises, or a better theory comes along. It's pragmatism as much as metaphysics really. — Pseudonym

This is just an assumption. To break the infinite regress of justification you say there must be an absolute presupposition. But perhaps you are going in the wrong direction. You are looking backward in time, asking which belief is prior to this belief, in order to justify it. But if you consider the nature of intentionality, you'll see that beliefs are justified by what is wanted, or desired, "the end", and this relates to what will come to be in the future, not what has been believed in the past. The infinite regress is ended by "the end", not by the beginning. So to justify "why would they believe that?" you must look at what they wanted, and there is no empirical evidence at that time, for what they wanted, because it comes into existence at a later time. Empirical evidence at one time always points to what was wanted at an earlier time.

Why do you say that an absolute presupposition "never answers a question" then give examples, each of which is an answer to a question. You make such a fuss about how little I know about absolute presuppositions, and how I misunderstand the whole concept, yet you give examples which clearly contradict the description you give. I really think that you know less about this then I do, and I quite obviously know very little. But I think that it's worse when you know little, to think that you know a lot.

The alchemist, trying to turn tin into gold, or whatever, makes any number of relative presuppositions. But what does he absolutely presuppose? That there exists a method, which he intends to find, of accomplishing his goal of turning tin into gold. — tim wood

This cannot be an absolute presupposition because it answers the question of is there a method to turn tine to gold, with Yes, there is such a method.

The cannibal eats the enemy he just killed because he absolutely presupposes he's better off for doing it, and worse off for not. — tim wood

This cannot be an absolute presupposition because they do not answer questions, and this answers the question of am I better off eating the enemy.

The witch doctor sacrifices virgins to the volcano god because he absolutely supposes that his efforts will mean fewer volcanic eruptions. — tim wood

Once again, an answer to a question. Why do you think that these examples are of absolute presuppositions rather than relative presuppositions? They all appear as relative presuppositions to me.

The significance of the relative presupposition, then, has nothing to do with its being true (the car is in the lot where I think it is) or false (the car is not in fact there); rather it has to do with its efficacy in facilitating my thinking. — tim wood

It's very clearly not true that the significance of the relative presupposition has nothing to do with its truth or falsity. It may be true that it facilitates thinking, but the truth or falsity of the presupposition leads one toward either appropriate, or mistaken thinking respectively. Thinking itself is insignificant, it may be completely random, but whether the thinking is correct thinking, or incorrect thinking is what is significant, and this is determined by the truth or falsity of the relative presupposition.

Are you ever going to get to the question of the nature of the absolute presupposition? That's what you're talking about isn't it?

Any natural scientist absolutely presupposes one god - monotheism. That is, the world is absolutely presupposed to operate under one set of rules and not many sets of irreconcilable rules, and that the one set is valid both here and there. (And because the presupposed god is perfect, the nature of his creation is absolutely presupposed to be comprehensible within the bounds of scientific thinking). That is, "[N]atural scientists standing in the Greek tradition absolutely presuppose in all their inquiries
1. That there is a world of nature....
2. That this world of nature is a world of events....
3. That throughout this world there is one set of laws according to which all movements or events, in spite of all differences, agree in happening; and that consequently there is one science of this world.
4....." (222-223). — tim wood

All these are answers to questions, and absolute presuppositions are never answers to questions. Furthermore, the truth or falsity of these presuppositions would guide the scientist either correctly or incorrectly. So let's get beyond these relative presuppositions, and find the true nature of an absolute presupposition, one whose truth or falsity is irrelevant to the thinking of the person presupposing.

Didn't Socrates or Plato say that philosophy is derived from wonder? Would you agree that "wonder' is completely general, and never the answer to any specific question, but related to many questions? And would you also agree that wonder presupposes no specific truths or falsities? The point I think you are missing is that the absolute presupposition cannot presuppose any truth or falsity, or else it is not absolute, as described. Truth or falsity must be irrelevant. The truth or falsity of the presupposition cannot lead the person's thinking correctly or incorrectly, so the thinking must be free from any presupposition of truth or falsity. The thinking may go any which way, because there is no presupposed truth or falsity.

So you cannot give examples of "absolute presuppositions" as this or that person believes that such and such is true, because this makes truth or falsity relevant in directing the thinking correctly or incorrectly. You need examples where nothing is presupposed as true or false, where there is a complete lack of bias or prejudice, and this is why "wonder" is a better example. The problem though, is that as we approach the true "absolute presupposition", it ought to become increasingly clear to you, that this requires that nothing is presupposed. The real "absolute presupposition" is the presupposition of nothing. Any inquiry, to be objective, true, unbiased, and honest, must approach the matter without presupposition. The "absolute presupposition" is the complete lack of presupposition.

Surely one of the things it is reasonable to take away from Collingwood is that some presumptions which seem to be absolute presuppositions turn out, on analysis, to be either relative presuppositions, or not to be presuppositions at all, but propositions. That is, surely the point of analysing them? — Pseudonym

Yes, this is where I'm trying to get. How are we going to distinguish an absolute presupposition from a relative presupposition? According to tim woods' description, there is a substantial difference between these two, so there must be some defining principles which we could identify within presuppositions to distinguish them, if the various presuppositions are described properly.

There is no contradiction involved in saying that what seems impossible in principle now my not seem so in the future; in other words there may appear a foreseeable way to answer questions about which there is presently no foreseeable way to answer. — Janus

I know, but you said "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false", to me that implies in the future. So if you remove that implication, then there is no contradiction. However, then the absolute presupposition may take the form of a proposition which may or may not be proven to be true or false, in the future. And that's what we're trying to avoid.

i

I think Peirce, as a good scientist, allows for the possibility, and even hope, that what is understood to be possible in principle in the future may not be the same as it is understood now. So I see no contradiction there. — Janus

What do you mean no contradiction? You said "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false". Clearly that contradicts "we hope that there is some ascertainable truth", "possible in principle in the future". One expresses hope, the other no hope.

As it stands now, though, we can only see two ways in which propositions can be confirmed, the one certain and the other forever uncertain, in the final analysis. — Janus

Propositions are confirmed as either true or false. They cannot be confirmed as "forever uncertain". That's nonsense which you are making up.

So deductively logical confirmation is certain, because it is dealing with tautologies, with the fact that true premises must, deductively speaking, yield true conclusions. Inductively logical confirmation is uncertain, or only relatively certain, insofar as it is a matter of empirical observation and is always contingent upon empirically observable events and matters of fact. — Janus

Deductive logic alone cannot produce certainty because it cannot confirm the truth or falsity of its premises, and it requires premises. Truth or falsity of the premise is most often confirmed with inductive reasoning. If you deny that inductive reasoning can produce certainty, you deny the possibility of certainty altogether. That is what you have done here, denied the possibility of certainty.

So, the idea that every event has a cause is neither logically nor empirically confirmable, and hence is undecidable in principle. — Janus

You've just denied the possibility that we could be certain about anything. Everything, even the idea that every event has a cause, is undecidable in principle, when your principles are such as you have described, because you deny the possibility of certainty.

So, we can say that the idea is epistemologically necessary... — Janus

You haven't shown that it is epistemologically necessary though. You have just asserted that it is indispensable to all our investigations. That particular "absolute presupposition", if it is true that such are required for investigation, is responsible for some particular investigations, but from another "absolute presupposition", other investigations follow. So that particular "absolute presupposition" is not necessary.

But if you want to say that absolute presuppositions are uncertain in the sense that they might turn out to be true or false, then I would disagree, because 'undecidable' means that they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false — Janus

We need to ask then, in what sense are they "undecidable". If it's as per the quote you gave me from Peirce, "we hope that there is some ascertainable truth", then the belief that "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false", would constitute contradictory beliefs. In the one case we would recognize that they could never turn out to be true or false, and in the other case we would hold out hope that there was ascertainable truth. These two are inconsistent, incompatible.

We are certain of their undecidablility, because they are things which cannot be either empirically or logically confirmed. — Janus

I really don't think that this is the case with absolute presuppositions. I think the hope is there, that they will be decisively proven at some future time. That's my opinion. However, having the nature of uncertainty, one person's attitude toward an absolute presupposition might be different from another's. So some people who hold a particular absolute presupposition, might have hope that it could be decided in the future, while others might believe it is impossible for it to be decided ever. That's the nature of subjectivity.

This is why it is important to determine the precise characteristics of what it means to be an absolute presupposition. We need to find the precise thing which is referred to and analyze it. Only then can we make an informed judgement as to whether or not there is hope of ever proving one true or false. I believe that we ought not do as tim woods does, and continually make blind assertions concerning the nature of absolute presuppositions, denying the descriptions provided by others, we need to really look at what they are and agree on descriptive terms.

As I explained already, if the idea that all things have a cause, is an absolute presupposition, the nature of this particular presupposition has already been explained by Aristotle in his Physics. And it now exists in a propositional form, as the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore it would be incorrect to say that an absolute presupposition could never be rendered in a propositional form. Perhaps it loses it's status as an absolute presupposition if rendered in propositional form, but that would be a different matter.

We could look at some other absolute presuppositions as examples. There must be some such presuppositions in relation to space and time, what Kant calls pure intuitions.

Of the ones I enumerated, I would only call Platonic Ideas "independent forms," and, as you know, I have no reason to think Platonic Ideas exist. — Dfpolis

OK, so you do not believe that immaterial things exist. I assume also that you do not believe that they are real. So I have assigned the name "materialist" to you. But then you claimed that immaterial things do exist, in an inseparable union with material things. I've explained why this is illogical, and you have yet to reply to this problem. So I'm back to the designation of materialist. You really do not believe in immaterial things.

So, again, while related, the form embodied in the blueprint is different from the form of any actual vase.

So, there is no single entity, no reified form, that passes from plan to physical vase to concept. — Dfpolis

Right, now consider what you've said here. Is the form of the vase, in the sense of the blueprint for it, or conception of it, not independent of the material vase? If you agree that it is independent, then you ought to allow that the form of the vase is separable from the material vase. And, as is evident in the case of blue prints, the form precedes the existence of the material vase, so the form is independent from the material vase, in an absolute sense. In no way is it dependent on the material vase. But, as a "cause" of existence of the material vase, we must assign to this independent form some sort of actuality, real existence.

In the same way, the "form" in a plan is not the same as the form of a real vase, but, as food contributes to health, the plan contributes to the making of a vase. In the same way, the "form" in the concept is not the same as the form in the vase, but it is a sign of the form of the vase. Thus, we are not dealing with one form moving from plan to implementation to cognition, but with three, dynamically related, analogically predicated, kinds of form — Dfpolis

I agree that the form which is the plan for the vase is not the same as the form which is in the material vase, because it does not contain the accidents which are proper to the material existence of a vase. Clearly we cannot say that the two distinct "forms" of the vase, the independent immaterial form, and the one which is united to the matter are "the same" in a strict sense as required by the law of identity, unless we can demonstrate continuity of the form, and show that being united to matter is just a change.. But this is not what is at issue here. The question is whether the form can exist independently of the material thing, Clearly it does, in the case of the plan for the thing. And, since the existence of this plan or form is supported by the human mind and soul (as attributes), which are elements of spirituality (and you assume these to be true independent, immaterial existents), then why is not the independent form an immaterial existent?

All I can do is ask you to put aside your commitment to Platonism and consider the facts of the matter without preconception. If you cannot do that, we had best agree to disagree. — Dfpolis

I've put that commitment to Platonism aside, and I've told you the logical problem with your description, irrelevant of any Platonism. It is because of this logical problem, which you still have not addressed, that I cannot accept your position.. If two things (such as matter and form) are united in such a way that it is impossible to separate them, then your claim that they are distinct things is invalid. There is only one unit here, a material entity, and your claim that there is matter and form is unjustified because one cannot be separated from the other.

They need to be logically distinct. They need not be separable in reality. — Dfpolis

As I said, if your logical principle is not supported by reality, then all you have is fiction. Why would I adopt, as an ontological principle, a designated fiction, something which is not only unsupported by observable reality, but stated to be impossible in reality? That would be ridiculous.

I said a determinate end at any point in time. — Dfpolis

There is no such thing as a point in time. That would make time discontinuous, but time is continuous. By the time you say "now", it is already a later time. If your "determinate end", or "well-defined" process, requires a point in time, then you need to reconsider.

No, fictions are statements that do not reflect reality. — Dfpolis

Correct, and that was my point. You claim that matter and form are logically separable, but not separable in reality. Therefore your separation of a material object into matter and form is pure fiction. This is why, even when I put aside any form of Platonism, I cannot accept your principles You insist that your separation of matter and form is fictional. So we're left with one thing, the material object. If you fess up to your materialism, and argue materialism, without the claim that there is something immaterial united to the material object, then you'd have a more consistent argument and a better chance at convincing me.

gave it in my second post on this thread (the third post on page 1). "Logical Propagators" is printed in bold at the beginning of the section. — Dfpolis

I don't see how your logical propagator argument can be used to conclude that if there is order then there is intentionality. You need to demonstrate that there cannot be order without an end. Your propagator argument seems to assume that if there is an end there is intentionality, but it doesn't account for the problem which I brought to your intention, that order doesn't necessitate the conclusion of an end.

Similarly, you can if you want "transliterate" absolute presupposition into proposition. Then you can say whatever you want about the proposition. — tim wood

Clearly I recognize the difference between an absolute presupposition and a proposition. We describe propositions in terms of certainty, truth and falsity. We do not describe absolute presuppositions in these terms, so I conclude we describe them in terms of uncertainty. So I have not been trying to translate one to the other, I've been trying to relate one to the other.

Why not just try to understand them for what they are? If you want to call them "uncertain," I suppose ultimately you can. But since that designation is irrelevant, then why not call them also bing cherries or horse chestnuts? — tim wood

You have claimed that absolute presuppositions are fundamental to science. Therefore whether they are certain or uncertain is extremely relevant. It's .nonsense to point out the foundational elements of epistemology and then claim that it's irrelevant whether they are certainties or uncertainties.

As fundamental to epistemology, clearly it is relevant whether we are certain about them or not. Furthermore, propositions form the body of epistemology, so we need to find a relationship between propositions and absolute presuppositions if they truly are fundamental to epistemology. Therefore my act of establishing a relationship between propositions and absolute presuppositions, by means of the terms stated above, certainty and uncertainty, is warranted, and relevant.

Why not just try to understand them for what they are? — tim wood

That's exactly what I am trying to do, understand them for what they are. They are said to be fundamental to science, yet truth and falsehood is irrelevant to them. From the former I conclude that they play a key role in epistemology, and from the latter I conclude that we have no certainty concerning them.

But I wouldn't ask if the explosion had a cause - that I would take for granted; that would be for me an absolute presupposition; that would be my ground, my logical starting point. — tim wood

I would call this an intuition. That's the word Aristotle, as well as others used to describe this type f knowledge, "intuition". Are you comfortable categorizing an absolute presupposition as an intuition? I would say that "intuition" has a broader meaning such that an absolute presupposition is a type of intuition, where there would be other types of intuitions as well. An absolute presupposition would be a pure intuition, while a relative presupposition would be less pure.

Is it "uncertain" that everything that happens has a cause? You answer. And whatever you answer, it is irrelevant to the fact that for me it is an absolute presupposition of my beliefs about the explosion. — tim wood

Whether or not the absolute presupposition is uncertain may be irrelevant to you, the one presupposing it, but to the metaphysician who is analyzing it in relation to epistemology, the degree of certainty of the absolute presupposition is extremely relevant.

Here's another thing to consider. To you, being the one presupposing, and acting on this intuition, the presupposition has the effect of having a high degree of certainty. You act on it without doubting it, therefore it appears like you hold this belief with a high degree of certitude. That is your personal attitude, which is a subjective certainty. To the metaphysician, who seeks to observe these intuitive activities, that activity is activity which is unjustifiable and is therefore based in uncertainty. Until the intuitions, absolute presuppositions, can be brought out, stated in the form of propositions, and justified, these intuitions are uncertainties to the metaphysician.

In the same way all endeavor rests on absolute presuppositions. To be sure, ancient ones might sound ridiculous to you and me. But it would be a mistake to dismiss them, because they were the foundation for the machinery that got that work done. And we all everyone at every level have them now. But they're hard to ferret out. Some are obvious (hidden in plain sight, as it were): God, for Christians; Allah, for Muslims; none of the above, for atheists. Unlike most APs, these are often made explicit and questioned. But most APs lurk in the background. — tim wood

So once the absolute presuppositions are "ferreted out", they may be stated, and are put in the form of propositions. At this time they can be judged for truth or falsity. Prior to this, they are intuitions, tendencies in one's actions, a hunch that worked so you follow it. They really cannot be judged for truth or falsity, nor stated as propositions, because they are not understood, nor are the words available. When the action is repeated time and again, the reasons for the action start to come to light, the words to describe these reasons are produced, and the intuition is ferreted out, stated as a proposition so that it may be judged.

Perhaps you don't think the notion that everything that happens has a cause is a supposition. — tim wood

The notion that everything which happens has a cause is a very ancient intuition. It has already been ferreted out by Aristotle, and forms the basis of the cosmological argument. In its propositional forms, the most common being the principle of sufficient reason, it is judged by some as true and by others as false. This reflects its uncertainty.

I thought this thread was in general philosophy; how did it get into the lounge - or is that where it always was? — tim wood

Being in the lounge we're allowed to use bad language, insult each other, maybe even throw things at each other. It's all in good fun until someone gets hurt.

OK, an absolute presupposition is different from a proposition in the sense that the distinction of truth or falsehood does not apply to them. Why would you not accept that what you have described is what I call an "uncertain thought"? Propositions which we are certain of, we describe in terms of truth and falsehood, this is a representation of our certainty. To say that something is true or false indicates one's certainty. If an absolute presupposition falls outside of these descriptive terms, then why is the absolute presupposition not an uncertainty? If we do not say that absolute presuppositions are true or false, this indicates that they are uncertainties.

Make clear that you have researched absolute presuppositions to the point where you can exhibit that understanding and make clear that you understand what they are. Then argue them, up or down, either way. Until you do, what you write is error and misleading: you dis-serve everyone who reads your posts. That is, put up or shut — tim wood

I've seen enough information about absolute presuppositions to know that the description of them places them into the category of uncertainties. if you truly believe that I am wrong about this, then please, by all means demonstrate that you have a better understanding of "absolute presuppositions" than I, and show how I am wrong. If not, then accept my description and we can proceed to discuss what, if any role, uncertain thoughts play in science and metaphysics. And quit the fuss, you're like a child wrongfully accusing me of bullying.

Dfpolis, I'm finding it very hard to understand the logic behind the assertions you make. You make assertions which appear to be illogical, and when I ask you to explain how you understand these principles which you are asserting, in a logical way, you tend to just reassert the same thing without explaining it. Here's some examples.

So, realities independent of matter are realities that can act without depending on any material object. — Dfpolis

You are claiming that there are realities which are independent of matter here. Classically these realities would be understood as independent Forms. However, you also argue that forms cannot exist independently of matter. So what type of existence are you giving to these "realities which can act without depending on any material object? If there are actual realities which are independent of all material objects, and they are not "Forms", how else would you classify these immaterial things?

If it ever ceased to be in the vase, it would cease to be the form of the vase. — Dfpolis

This is not true though. It is how we have conceptions, blue prints, plans, these are forms of things which are not in the material thing which they are the form of. The form of the vase, can exist in places other than the vase itself. The difference between the essence of the vase as a form, and the form of the vase which includes all of its accidents, indicates that "the form of the vase" need not include all of the vase's accidents. So the "form of the vase", without the accidents of the material vase, exists independently of the material vase. It is only if you insist that "the form of the vase" must include all the accidents, that it becomes impossible for the form of the vase to exist independently from the material vase. But you have not justified this insistence.

Something immaterial can be completely inseparable from matter... — Dfpolis

You keep insisting on this, and I've asked you to justify this assertion, which you have not. I've also explained why I think that this is logically impossible, and you haven't addressed my argument either. Let me explain again.

If something is completely inseparable from something else, then it cannot be identified as a distinct thing. That very description, "A is inseparable from B" dictates that A and B are not distinct things. They are inseparable and are therefore one and the same thing. If B is material, then by the law of non-contradiction, it is impossible that A is immaterial because this would indicate that the same thing is both material and immaterial.

In order to provide that the immaterial is united with the material, you must allow that they are separable, and identifiable as distinct and separable parts, to avoid violation of the law of non-contradiction.

If it can exist apart from matter, it is called "spiritual." — Dfpolis

Should I assume that for you, immaterial realities which are independent of matter, are "spirits" then? How is a spirit not a form? Why do you assume that a spirit, which is immaterial, can exist independently of matter, but a form, which is immaterial cannot exist independently of matter Do you think that a form is a type of spirit, or that a spirit is a type of form, since you class them both as immaterial?

When a process is ordered, in the sense I an using the term, it acts in a determinate way. If it acts in a determinate way, it will have a determinate end at any point in time. To have a determinate end is to have a purpose. — Dfpolis

I don't see how a process could possibly have a determinate end. By the law of conservation of energy, energy continues, and therefore activity continues with time. It would be impossible to say that process ends, unless activity ends. Any designated "end" is a judgement. so this argument fails for that reason.

I disagree. We can determine their intentionality by applying Brentano's analysis or my logical propagator approach.

Also, the human failure to discern purposes is not an argument that there are no purposes — Dfpolis

OK, we clearly have completely different notions of intentionality. But I don't remember your logical propagator approach, could you describe it again for me please.

Not at all. Order is one sign of intentionality. Purpose is another. The ordering of means to ends is also a sign, Aboutness is a forth. Being a logical propagator is another. Being a product of intellect or will are still others. — Dfpolis

Yes, the ordering of means to an end is a sign of intentionality. But order without any indication of an end ought not be mistook for a sign of intentionality. I agree that a failure to determine the particular purpose of any particular action is not an argument that there is no purpose, but my argument is that unless you can determine a reason to believe that there is a purpose, it is unreasonable to assume that there is. The existence of order, in general, does not provide us with that reason. As I explained, intentional agents take already existing things and use them as means to ends. It is in relation to intention that the thing becomes a means, but they still exist as the things which they are, prior to becoming means. As you say, means require ends, but the things which become means exist prior to becoming means. And this includes order in general, it exists as order prior to becoming the means to an end. Unless you can demonstrate that order requires intention, i.e. that all order is purposeful order, your claim that whereever there is order there is intention, is unjustified.

Because neither the matter nor the form are the actual being we call a "vase." Each is an aspect of the vase that we can separate in our minds, but not in reality. — Dfpolis

Right, but the point is that to produce a separation in the mind, which is impossible to produce in reality, is to produce a piece of fiction. This is why your endeavour violates the fundamental laws of logic, you are describing an impossibility, like a square circle. you can say that there's such a thing as a square circle but we know it's fiction. You can say that matter and form are separate aspect of the vase, but if in reality they are inseparable, then this is just fiction. So either matter and form are separable in reality or else the separating of them in our minds is nothing more than fiction.

How low can you go?

Your techniques are those of a Trump. — tim wood

Coin that, you've just designed the worst possible insult.

Let me be succinct. To describe a proposition, assumption, or presupposition, as neither true nor false is to violate the law of excluded middle. Any description which violates the law of excluded middle is illogical. Therefore the description of "absolute presuppositions", which describes these as neither true nor false is illogical.

Your remarks on the topic in the face of repeated references and descriptions is not reasoned argument, rather it is a form of badger-like viciousness. — tim wood

If, to point out that one's position is illogical is to be vicious, then you are correct to accuse me of viciousness.

The third alternative that you are missing is that we think it is inappropriate to speak about it being true or not, because it is undecidable. — Janus

If the truth or falsity of a matter is undecidable then thoughts about that matter are uncertain thoughts. That's not a third option, it's the second option.

This seems to be nothing more than sophistry. — Janus

Your argument is deception, describing an uncertain thought and claiming that it's some form of certainty.

Can you offer up an example for analysis? — Janus

Human beings once described the sun and planets as orbiting the earth. That the sun took 24 hours to orbit the earth was a self-evident truth. It's no longer true.

I haven't said that we are certain of absolute presuppositions at all, or uncertain about them, but that we assume them for the sake of scientific investigation. — Janus

You clearly described absolute presuppositions as things which we are uncertain of. Then when I called them "uncertain thoughts", which is how you described them, you objected, as if they were somehow certainties. Now you seem to claim that scientific investigation is based in thoughts which are neither certain nor uncertain.

The issue is that there are two aspects to our approach to scientific investigation, things which we are certain about, and things which we are uncertain about. Proper scientific investigation proceeds by maintaining a clear distinction between these two, to confuse these two is disastrous to science. The conflation of the things which we are certain of, with those that we are uncertain of, and the claim that absolute presuppositions are neither, is a simple violation of the fundamental laws of logic. Any description which violates the fundamental laws of logic is wrong. Therefore this description of the foundations of science, as "absolute presuppositions", is wrong.

I'll try one last time to help you to understand the point. Returning to the example of causation; it seems to us that the events we observe have causes, but we also know we cannot prove that all (or even any) events actually do have causes; so, why would we need to claim that it is true that all events must have causes, rather than merely assuming that they do in order to enable our investigations? — Janus

You are just describing the problem of induction. We see through observation that all events have causes, but the proof is in inductive reasoning, and the problem of induction allows you to deny that this proof proves. Therefore any principle known by induction cannot be known with certainty, and cannot be called "a truth". Because of this, you would claim that any premise based in induction is neither true nor false. But this would render all deductive logic which follows from these inductive premises as unsound. Therefore your approach renders everything which follows from scientific investigation as unsound.

You need to show what practical advantage it would lend to our investigative abilities to claim that it is true that all events must have causes, rather than merely proceeding on the provisional assumption that they do, if you want to convince me that your harping on this point is not merely pedantic carping. — Janus

The practical advantage is that by distinguishing true from false in inductive reasoning, we have the means whereby we can judge inductive reasoning and the premises upon which scientific knowledge is based, so that not all scientific knowledge is classed together as unsound. We turn to the accuracy of descriptions and definitions to judge the validity, and determine the truthfulness of scientific premises based in induction, instead of just claiming that such principles are neither true nor false because inductive reasoning cannot give us truth.

Of course we must be uncertain about what we will find when we investigate, but we cannot investigate without assuming that nature is invariant, if not deterministically, than at least statistically, and that things have been caused to be the way they are observed to be. — Janus

OK, so let's suppose that we assume that nature is invariant, for the purpose of investigation. Either we assume that such is true, In which case it's not an absolute presupposition as described, or we assume that we do not know whether this is true or not, in which case it is an uncertain thought, but also qualifies as an absolute presupposition. What am I missing?

We are not uncertain about invariance and causality, even though we know they cannot be proven; they are not what is in question at all in any scientific investigation, instead they are indispensable assumptions. — Janus

If you claim that we are not uncertain about invariance, then why can't we call it truth. If I am certain of something, I believe it to be true, so why not say that? It's nonsense to say that it's acceptable to claim that you are certain that nature is invariant, yet it's unacceptable to claim that it's true that nature is invariant. If I am certain of X, on what basis do you insist that I ought not say it is true that X.

Why not face the reality, that you are not really certain that nature is invariant, and this is why it cannot be proven? If you are not really certain that nature is invariant, and therefore uncertain, this justifies your claim that you ought not speak about the invariance of nature in terms of truth or falsity.

If something were once really a "self-evident truth" then it could never fail to be true forever. — Janus

A self-evident truth is dependent on the meaning of the terms, definitions. These things change over time. Therefore what was once a self evident truth is not always a self-evident truth. There is no contradiction, because contradiction requires that the same thing is and is not at the same time. The proposition is a self-evident truth at one time, and not a self-evident truth at another time. Where's the contradiction?

The latter are not taken to be true and should not be thought about in terms of truth and falsity; the avoidance of thinking about them in terms of truth and falsity is the way to avoid the absurdity involved in the idea of self-evident truths that could later cease to be self-evident truths. — Janus

The fact that what was once a self-evident truth later ceased to be a self-evident truth is not at all absurd, it's just a reflection of the temporal nature of reality. Things come into being and cease to be, that's what happens in the temporal world. Human knowledge is a part of this temporal reality.

The absurdity is your description of absolute presuppositions, as something you are certain of, but you cannot claim to be true. That this is absurd is self-evident.