Science may have held this absolute presupposition, but modern physics forced scientists to reevaluate it, at least for the very small. Not sure whether that supports what you're saying about presuppositions equating to an uncertainty, but developments have lead people to question their presuppositions. — Marchesk

Yeah, that's relevant. My point was that science really is not based on "absolute presuppositions", it's based on descriptions and definitions, and these provide self-evident truths. However, as time passes and knowledge evolves, the descriptions and definitions change as well, such that what was once a self-evident truth may no longer be a self-evident truth. The fact that what was once a self-evident truth, is no longer a self-evident truth, so that its truth or falsity can no longer be ascertained, doesn't qualify it for the what is called an "absolute presupposition". The absolute presupposition is supposed to be neither true nor false at the time it is supposed, yet the self-evident truth is supposed to be true.

In sum, to date, every thing you have written about absolute presuppositions has been plain wrong. — tim wood

I'm just going by what has been posted in this thread. The following:

As I understand it. according to Collingwood absolute presuppositions are the fundamental principles upon which the fields of human inquiry depend. They are understood to be different than propositions in that it is inappropriate to speak about them in terms of truth and falsity. — Janus

In sum, to date, every thing you have written about absolute presuppositions has been plain wrong. — tim wood

So it seems quite clear that an "absolute presupposition" is something which was supposed when there was a lack of evidence as to its truth or falsity, and is therefore nothing more than an uncertain thought.

If you'd like to explain to me what an absolute presupposition "really is", in a way which leaves it not reducible to an uncertain thought, then be my guess.

But as I've explained, I think this proposition of Collingwood's is off base, wrong. I think that science is based on descriptions, definitions, and self-evident truths, not absolute presuppositions. If I misunderstand what an "absolute presupposition" is then pleas explain exactly what it is.

No, the point is that we assume there is an ascertainable truth; we don't take an attitude of uncertainty, because that would be crippling to our investigations. — Janus

That's ridiculous. If we assume that there is ascertainable truth, yet this truth is not already ascertained, then there is uncertainty by the fact that it has not been ascertained. We investigate to find answers because we are uncertain. So it is absolutely necessary that we proceed with an attitude of uncertainty. If we proceeded with an attitude of certainty this would be a bias which would be utterly crippling to the scientific method which is designed with a procedure of objectivity, to avoid such bias.

So, for example, in the case of assuming that every event has a cause, which enables scientific investigation, we can fully acknowledge that the truth of this assumption could never be ascertained, and yet proceed on the assumption that every event has a cause merely for the sake of seeing what our investigations then lead us to discover. — Janus

Either way, if we assume that the truth could never be ascertained, or that the truth is ascertainable, each implies a lack of ascertainment, and that is an attitude of uncertainty. The fact that the truth or falsity of the assumption has not been ascertained indicates that there is uncertainty.

You're misunderstanding what is written there. "We hope that there is some ascertainable truth about it" means that we proceed as if there were, otherwise we would not enquire; it does not mean that we are in a state of uncertainty about whether there is "some ascertainable truth". I'ts a subtle, but salient, difference you are missing. — Janus

Notice I quoted twice where the word "hope" was used. That we "hope" there is such an ascertainable truth indicates that we are uncertain as to whether there is.

So we can say that whether or not every event has a cause is undecidable, but that does not mean that we are undecided about the truth or falsity of "every event must have a cause — Janus

If you claim, "Whether or not every event has a cause is undecidable", then clearly you are undecided as to the truth or falsity of "every event must have a cause". What you are insisting is nothing but nonsense.

If, science proceeds on the assumption that "every event has a cause", and it is an "absolute presupposition", as described, such that it makes no sense to discuss whether this is true or not, then science proceeds as if "every event has a cause" represents an uncertainty.

You might say that we "hope" that "every event has a cause" is true, but since the procedures of science in general are an attempt to prove whether or not it is true, these procedures demonstrate the uncertainty of that thought.


If the material may be "misread", there is a problem with it. I happen to believe that tim wood's interpretation is completely wrong, requiring tim wood to make up a completely fictional, and nonsense distinction between "suppose" and "presuppose" to support this misinterpretation. To "presuppose" means to suppose before hand. So at that time, before hand, when the presupposition is created, it is nothing other than a supposition. Later, when it is being used, we call it a presupposition in relation to its use.

An "absolute" is an ideal, like God, and this is where "hope" and uncertainty enters the representation. We "hope" that the "absolute presupposition" is correct, but nevertheless we are uncertain. If we proceed to represent this uncertainty concerning the absolute presupposition as certainty, e.g. "I am certain that God exists", instead of "I hope that God exists", we are mistaken. And this is misleading.

No, it's not an uncertain thought under that definition, because its truth or falsity is not in question; we are not undecided about its truth or falsity; it is simply irrelevant. — Janus

Yes the truth or falsity clearly is in question, according to that quoted passage. Did you read it? We hope to someday resolve it as to truth or falsity, though it is not resolvable at the time of making the presupposition.. From that quoted passage:

“the only assumption upon which [we] can act rationally is the hope of success” (W 2: 272; 1869). — Janus

when we discuss a vexed question, we hope that there is some ascertainable truth about it, and that the discussion is not to go on forever and to no purpose. — Janus

The fact that we hope it will some day be resolved as true or false indicates that it is something which we are undecided about. It is an uncertain thought.

It is not an uncertain thought in any other sense, either, because it may be as clearly conceived as you like. — Janus

That a thought is clearly conceived doesn't make it a certainty.

OK, but it's still nothing more than an uncertain thought under your definition

An "uncertain thought" is a thought about which we are undecided as to whether it is true or not. — Janus

In any area of endeavor where thinking is involved, you get to ask if your process - whatever it is - is valid (true, provable, whatever qualifying word you want). Pretty quickly you get to, in some areas, axioms. Within the process or activity, the axioms are - well, we all know what axioms are, yes? Outside the process, a person may question axioms, but while the answers may be interesting, they are not relevant to the process itself - unless they destroy the process. — tim wood

What do you mean, "we all know what axioms are"? An axiom in mathematics exists by a completely different standard from an axiom in philosophy. And I am sure there are many in between.

It's reasonable to question axioms, because how the results of the questioning break influences, rebounds back to, the endeavor. — tim wood

In philosophy an axiom is a self-evident truth. It is based in experience, description, and definition. It's really not reasonable to question an axiom unless you have reason to believe that the description or definition is inaccurate. In this case one might question it, because the so-called "truth" is not self-evident to that person who sees a fault in the description or definition.

I know, all sorts of people get immediately exercised at the notion that something can be efficacious independent of its truth, but the idea is that it is an absolute presupposition, and the idea of an absolute presupposition is that you have to start somewhere. This isn't to say that the starting point is weighed and tested and argued on; usually it isn't. Absolute presuppositions evolve. And they change, usually as the result of a significant rupture in understanding and culture, whether large or small. — tim wood

Why not start with description rather than "absolute presupposition"?

Here's a not very good example of an absolute presupposition. Suppose you need a sterile bandage. You find some at home, and you (relatively) presuppose that they're sterile. But they've been in your cabinet for five years, so it's reasonable to ask if these supposedly sterile bandages are really sterile. You decide you need to be sure, so you go to the pharmacy to buy some new sterile bandages. The presupposition that the pharmacy bandages are sterile is an absolute presupposition in the sense that they're what you're going to use, and the question as to their sterility does not arise (it is absolutely presupposed). — tim wood

What does this have to do with metaphysics?

An "uncertain thought" is a thought about which we are undecided as to whether it is true or not. Absolute presuppositions are understood to be things we necessarily suppose in order to investigate anything at all, and about which it is inappropriate to think in terms of their being propositions which could be demonstrated to be true or false; so...no. — Janus

If we suppose them, we believe them to be true. I wouldn't suppose something I didn't believe to be true, except for the purpose of a counterfactual. So it's not true to say that we cannot speak of them in terms of truth or falsity, we are supposing them not for the purpose of counterfactual, we are supposing them as truth, therefore we speak of them as true.

Even if we suppose them as counterfactuals, they are uncertain thoughts. So either way, if we suppose them as true when we have no reason to believe them as true, or if we suppose them as counterfactual, they are uncertain thoughts.

Imagine if the world ran on subjective/experienced time. Symphonies would fall apart halfway through. — rachMiel

The symphony stops when I fall asleep.

If we accept that the bible can't prove the validity of itself, since that's a form of fallacy, — Christoffer

The problem with this argument is that the Bible is a collection of writings, not one single writing by one single person. When we collect together a number of different accounts of the same event, and they corroborate each other, it may be argued that they prove the validity of each other. Such proof can never be absolutely conclusive though, as is evident from conspiracy.

They are understood to be different than propositions in that it is inappropriate to speak about them in terms of truth and falsity. — Janus

OK, if we can't speak of them in terms of whether they are true or false, why not identify them for what they are then? They're uncertain thoughts.

As I understand it. according to Collingwood absolute presuppositions are the fundamental principles upon which the fields of human inquiry depend. — Janus

Collingwood seems to have a negative view of epistemology. He thinks that the fields of human inquiry are based on uncertain thoughts.

I think a casual N-word on tape just verifies what we already know, which is why I think it's ultimately going to be immaterial. — Benkei

Trump is racist? Shocking news!

You are confusing being material with the laws being dependent on matter for their expression. For example, the form of a vase is immaterial (not made of matter), but it is inseparable from the matter of the vase. I have made it quite clear that the laws are immaterial -- it is a category error to ask what they are made of. — Dfpolis

But the form is separable from the matter, that's how we know things through abstraction, the form of the vase is brought into the mind. If the form of a vase were inseparable from the matter of a vase, you could not say that the form is immaterial because it would be of necessity united with matter, impossible to be otherwise, and therefore material. To say that it is both immaterial, and inseparable from matter is contradiction. You are handing "form" the contradictory properties of "inseparable from matter" and "immaterial".

It is not that we have different notions, it is that I am showing the intentionality of the laws by looking at their intrinsic character rather than their Source. — Dfpolis

Actually, what you are doing, as I said, is jumping to a conclusion. The existence of order does not necessitate the conclusion of intentionality, the existence of purpose does. So when something is seen to have order we cannot conclude intentionality until it is demonstrated that the order is for a purpose. Then we can conclude intentionality.

Here are some examples. We see that birds build nests, the material is ordered in a specific way so as to make the nest. If we satisfactorily demonstrate that the order is put to that material for a purpose, for instance so that the bird can hatch eggs and raise young, then we can conclude intentionality. Likewise, we can look at the ordering of material in a beaver dam, and if we are satisfactorily convinced that the beaver builds the dam for a purpose, then we conclude intentionality. So we could look at the photosynthesis of plants, and ask if there is purpose to this activity, to see whether or not there is intentionality there as well. How about the activity of the earth orbiting the sun, or of things moving from gravity? These are orderly activities, described by laws, but unless we can determine a purpose for these activities we cannot conclude that there is intentionality.

Not so fast. If decide to walk to the store, each step is a physical process closely described by the laws of physics. It is also a product of my intention to arrive at the store by walking. So, there is no either-or here. It is a both-and situation. An adequate account has to incorporate both the physical and the intentional realities at work here. — Dfpolis

Yes, that's exactly what I said, it appears we agree on this point.

There is more than one way to skin a cat. I offered less contentious arguments, viz. my logical propagator argument and that based on Brentano's analysis of intentionality. — Dfpolis

As I said though, we have different notions of intentionality. The essential aspect of intention is purpose, that I believe is quite clear. But you want to change this definition such that order is the essence of intention. This is incorrect because intentionality is associated with the end, and order is the means to the end. The intentional being will use whatever appears to be efficient, as the means to the end, and this includes things which pre-existed the intentional being. This demonstrates that it is possible that the means may pre-exist the intentional being, and therefore pre-exist intentionality. Therefore the existence of the means, i.e. order, does not necessarily indicate intentionality.

In 3, I said we can study the physical structure of the mind (the brain), by applying the method of natural science. I did not say we were studying the mind's "matter." Let me say it yet again: "Physical" does not mean "material." Describing material states is only a small part of physics. A much greater part is studying the laws of nature, which are intentional. — Dfpolis

Actually you said "physicality", and in brackets you had "material structure", so I assumed that you were explaining "physicality" as "material structure". If you now desire a separation between "physical" and "material", then that's another thing.

See, you have put yourself in a bind because you refuse to allow a separation between matter and form which is necessary to provide for immaterial forms. You want to talk about the immaterial, forms, and intentionality as if these are true aspects of reality, but then you insist that these things don't have any real existence because they can't really be separated from matter.

So you go on and on talking about forms, the immaterial, and intentionality, as if you think that these are real and you believe in them, when in reality you think that these are just the illusions of deluded minds. This is quite clear when you insist that form cannot exist independently from matter. All that other talk about the immaterial and intentionality is just a hoax, as if you're ashamed of, and trying to hide your materialism. If you're ashamed of it, then rather than trying to hide it, why don't you dismiss it?

In the same way that a vase's form inheres in the vase without being the matter of the vase. — Dfpolis

But that's exactly the question I'm asking, how can you conceive of this. If the form inheres in the vase, as the matter of the vase does, and is inseparable from the matter of the vase, then how is it anything other than the matter of the vase? If it is something other than the matter of the vase, then it is separable from it, by that very fact that it is other than it.

Do you have an example of a sign that is neither formal nor instrumental? — Dfpolis

I told you, a work of music, or art. It must be a sign because it has meaning, as is evident from the emotions which it arouses. Or are you are arguing that a thing can be meaningful without being a sign? How would that work?

Then, it is not a "sign" in the standard sense of the term. As you say " to be a sign, all that is required is to actualize meaning." Of course, you can equivocate on "meaning." I am taking a meaning to be informative -- to represent something, — Dfpolis

I'm not equivocating, you are just trying to enforce an overly restrictive definition of "meaning" in order to support your position. Defining a word such that many things which are normally referred to by that word are excluded by your definition, in order to support an ontological position, is not good metaphysics. That part of reality excluded by your definition is also excluded from your ontology.

Have I denied that the intentionality of the laws can be traced to God, or that God wills freely? — Dfpolis

Yes, you have denied this, not explicitly but implicitly. That's what I've been trying to explain to you, the implications of what you stated, that the laws of nature are inherent within matter and operative from this position as causal in the actions of matter. As such, these laws are explicitly material, and since God is understood to be immaterial, as the cause of matter and material existence in general, it is implied that the laws cannot be traced to God. If they had an immaterial source, then they would be independent from matter, and not inherent within matter.

No, I am saying that applying the laws of physics outside their verified range of application was and is unjustified. I am also saying that until well into the 20th century, we had no adequate data on whether human intentions modify the laws of nature. So asserting their invariance when human commitments are involved was unjustified. — Dfpolis

So how can you make sense of this proposition? You are saying that it is incorrect to associate invariance with the laws of nature. How are they even "laws" then, if they're subject to change?

see no real distinction between "participating in" the laws and "perturbing" the otherwise universal laws. I've never said we "overrule" the laws. — Dfpolis

Quite clearly, if you "perturb" a law you change that law. And to change a law is to replace the old law with a new version. This is to overrule the existing law. This is completely different from "participating" in the law, which is to accept the law and act accordingly.

I have already said that both our willed commitments and the laws of nature are intentional. The consequent motions are physical. So, there is no need to confine it to one "part" or another. Again, there are no "parts" -- only a whole that can be conceived in various abstract ways. — Dfpolis

It was your suggestion that the human being is a unity of intentional and physical. If these were not stated as distinct parts, then what do you mean by this?

I think you and I have completely different notions of "intentionality". I associate intentionality with the will, the intellectual appetite. So "the good", as that which is recognized by the intellect as desirable, is at the root of intentionality.

Because doing so would mean that the laws of physics are entirely inapplicable to us. — Dfpolis

This is nonsense. Human beings have physical bodies. They also have intention. To give priority to intention does not necessitate that the laws of physics are not applicable to the human body. It just means that the laws of physics are not applicable to intention.

Let's be clear, because I think you are confused as to my position.
1. Our intellect and will both belong to the intentional order.
2. "The physical," as I conceive it is not reducible to a material state. It is what we study in the natural sciences. The physical world is both material (specified by state descriptions) and intentional (having a well-defined order I am calling "the laws of nature."
3. When we apply the methods of natural science to the human mind, we can grasp its physicality (its material structure and its operations insofar as we follow the so-called "universal" laws of nature). It cannot grasp (because of the fundamental abstraction) our subjectivity (our awareness and will). Thus it misses the dynamics that allow us to exercise freedom. — Dfpolis

I see problems with 2, and 3, here.

In #2, I see that you use "intentional" in a way completely different than I would. I would say that "intentional" means to act with purpose. You see "well-defined order", and you conclude "intentionality". But you are missing a premise necessary to draw this conclusion. That premise would be that where there is order, there is intention. You haven't provided that premise, or supported it with argumentation, so your conclusion that where there is well-defined order there is intentionality is not yet sound.

Furthermore, you clearly divide the physical here into material and intentional. You assign "the laws of nature" to the intentional. But the proposition you made in the op, which I objected to, was that the laws of nature inhere within matter. So now you have contradictory positions

Now, in #3 you claim that we can understand the human mind's "material structure" by following the "laws of nature". This is problematic in two ways. First, in #2 you have assigned the laws of nature to the intentional, rather than the material. So how could we understand the material through the laws of nature, when the laws of nature are an aspect of the intentional?. Second, we cannot follow the laws of nature in the application of natural science even if we wanted to, because the closest thing we have is the laws of physics, but these are distinct.

If you merely mean "immaterial," yes the laws of nature are immaterial in the well defined sense of not having material constituents. — Dfpolis

How can you say that the laws of nature inhere within matter, yet they are immaterial? Doesn't this seem contradictory?

The laws of nature, not being spatio-temporal objects, have no intrinsic location. Instead, they "are" where they operate -- and they operate on and in matter. So they are "in" matter in an operational sense. So, if "by matter"nyou mean the empirical stuff that we can observe and experiment on, then the laws are intrinsic because they are revealed by such observations and experiments.

If you mean by "matter" an abstract principle, coordinate with form, we have had that argument and come to an impasse. — Dfpolis

What I would like to know is how you conceive of the laws of nature operating "in" matter without reducing the laws to being matter itself. To be within, is a spatial concept, so you've already negated your claim that the laws are not spatio-temporal. But let me try to proceed, removing the spatial necessity, to understand "in". We would need to remove all space from within matter, so that matter cannot consist of parts in relation to each other. Therefore there is no parts, and matter is indivisible. The only relations we can talk about are the relations between one "particle" of matter and another. There are no such relations inside matter, as there is no space here, these relations are extrinsic to matter. But the non-spatial laws are here, inside matter, while the spatial relations are outside matter.

First, how are these non-spatial laws, which are inherent within matter, anything other than matter itself? If this is non-spatial, and it is the entire "inside" of matter, how is it not "matter"? Second, how could these laws act? We describe motions and activities as relations between material bodies, according to the space between them. If for instance, a law wants to put some matter in motion, from within, it could move that matter in any direction. However, other matter exists in the environment, and this restricts the possible motion. Aren't these restrictions to motion, what ought to be properly called "the laws of nature", not the cause of motion? And the restrictions are proper to the relations between matter, just like the laws of physics which describe motions are proper to the relations between physical bodies. So the laws of nature are not property of matter, or inhering within matter, but are properties of the relations between matter. And, they are not the cause of motion of matter, they are restrictions to the motion of matter. For the cause of motion, we have to look further, to intentionality.

I am sorry, but no. To actually signify a sign must actualize meaning in a mind. If it does not do this, it is only a potential sign. — Dfpolis

I'm not talking about potential signs, I'm talking about actual signs. What I am saying is that to actually signify, all that is required is to actualize meaning, to be significant. But meaning is often vague and indefinite, so the sign does not need to be formal or instrumental. This is the case with many emotions. Something triggers an emotion, that thing is a sign because it actualizes meaning. But what it signifies is unknown. So many things like art, and music, actualize meaning, they signify, and are signs, but there is nothing specific which the sign "represents".

Of course communication can be defective. Your utterance may be malformed. It may not be correctly understood. That has nothing to do with the question of what constitutes a well-formed, operational signs. — Dfpolis

No, the point is, that to be a sign, all that is required is to actualize meaning. We are not discussing what is required for "well-formed operational signs". Those are a particular type of sign.

OK, let me go back to your question.

I understand then that this other form is not a composite of matter and form. What is it? Is it immaterial? If it's immaterial, how can it change, since movement and change belong to material bodies? If it's not immaterial, then how is it even a form? — Πετροκότσυφας

The "material body" is a composite of matter and form. When the body changes the old form is replaced by a new form. Matter provides the continuity so that we can identify it as, and say that it is still the same body, only changed. Strictly speaking we cannot say that a form is "changing", because the laws of logic disallow this. So one form is replaced by another form, and the two cannot coexist, nor can there be a time in between, when the body has no form, by the laws of logic. But since this activity is going on, we say that the form of the body changes, when in reality one form is replaced by another form. The body remains the same body, but we say that the form of the body has changed when reality one form has replaced another. Matter persists, unchanged.

So the form is immaterial only to the extent that it is separable from the matter. When we talk of a material body, we tend to think that the form and the matter are inseparable. We think that there is a unity which is a material body. However when we apprehend the fact that the material body is changing, and therefore one form replaces another form, then we must understand that the form is necessarily independent from the matter, in order that this exchange of form can occur while the matter persists as the same matter.

Therefore the form is immaterial. and, this activity of change which occurs to the material body is an activity of the form. The problem that we have, as I described in the last post, is that we have an inadequate concept of time to allow for this activity of form.

I'm still having a problem with this. In my view, 'the intelligible object' has an ontological rather than a temporal priority - like, it is 'before' in the sense of 'a priori' or 'prior to', not in the sense of linear time, but in terms of being nearer to the origin or source of being. So - not prior in time, but prior to time. — Wayfarer

I fully apprehend this issue and it's a difficult one. When "prior to" is analyzed for meaning, it can only be grounded in the temporal sense. So "origin or source of being" is only intelligible as a temporal description. I know that it can be laid out in some sort of hierarchy of importance, but even "importance" needs to be grounded through a relation to a principle of validation. And any such hierarchical relation must itself be grounded in some such principle.

Take numbers for instance, 1 is before 2 which is before 3, etc.. But "before" only makes sense in relation to the temporal process of counting, and this presupposes 1 as the first in time. If we remove that temporal relation, then 3 is more than 2 which is more than 1. Now we have reversed the priority by grounding in a relation to quantity rather than to temporal order, 3 is "more" than 2 which is "more" than 1. But the numbers are said to be infinite, so if a higher quantity is of "more importance", therefore a higher priority, then we have given ourselves no end, nothing to ground this priority.

Now the issue with time, and what you say, "not prior in time, but prior to time", is avery important one, and I brought up briefly with Janus earlier in the thread. The anti-dualist will always refer to a problem of interaction. "Prior to time", or "outside of time", or "eternal" in this sense of the word, leaves such Forms as inactive because time is a necessary condition for activity. What I explained is that this problem is the result of an inadequate concept of time, which forces us to categorize immaterial Forms as outside of time. Time is conceptualized in relation to spatial change such that spatial relations define time. Under this conception of time, there can be no time passing without spatial change occurring. But this is counter-intuitive, and we know that it is logically possible for time to be passing without any spatial changes occurring. That faulty concept of time excludes this possibility, along with the possibility that non-spatial Forms are active in this time when no material changes are occurring.

That way of conceptualizing of time produces this division of incompatibility or incommensurability between the temporal, sensible world, and the non-temporal intelligible world. This issue is central to the work of St. Augustine who takes the rare position of describing this division between the sensible and intelligible, as a division between the temporal and the non-temporal. Through contemplation, the free will may be guided by the non-temporal intelligible objects, to resist the temptation of the temporal world. But when comparing the free will of human beings to the intellect of God, an irresolvable problem develops. How can the human being have free will if God knows all? At this point, the problem with the conception of time, which creates the divided reality between the temporal and the non-temporal is revealed.

The so-called "non-temporal" is not really completely outside of time, it is made to appear as outside of time because our conception of time excludes it. Under this conception of time, the Forms must of necessity be placed outside of time, because it would be contradictory to allow them within time. But this is only because we have defined "time" in such a way so as to exclude the Forms from temporal existence. When we recognize that our concept of time doesn't properly model reality, thus excluding the activity of the Forms, we realize that the concept of time is inadequate.

Are you familiar with Aquinas' concept of "aeviternal"? This concept allows us a medium between the truly eternal (outside time) God, and the temporal, sensible world. In essence, it allows for creation, because it provides that a Form can come into being in time. He uses it to account for the existence of angels which are created, immaterial Forms, having providence over material existence. Notice that having been created, they have a beginning in time, and are therefore not properly outside of time, yet their continued existence into the future is indefinite or infinite. This allows that an immaterial Form, as derived from the intellect of God, may have a beginning in time. This is derived from the Neo-Platonist conception of procession, or emanation, under which, the immaterial Forms are given a temporal order.

I understand then that this other form is not a composite of matter and form. What is it? Is it immaterial? If it's immaterial, how can it change, since movement and change belong to material bodies? If it's not immaterial, then how is it even a form? — Πετροκότσυφας

By "other form", I assume that you mean the immaterial Forms, such as the soul, number, geometrical constructs, and essences. Please read my reply to wayfarer above. If we place these Forms as outside of time, we rob ourselves of the capacity to understand their causal efficacy. But clearly though, in the minds and hands of human beings these Forms are causal in creating things, and this is something which we ought to try to understand. Therefore we must adapt our concept of time such that these immaterial things may be active in the creation of material objects. So if "movement" and "change" refer to the activities of material bodies then we need to allow for another type of activity which is the activity of immaterial Forms.

But if 'the form' is located in time, then presumably it's also located in some place. Or, perhaps it is something that unfolds or evolves, in modern terms? But then, absent 'telos' - some end to which organisms are directed - then how is the form anything other than adaptive necessity?

But then - maybe this is exactly why Aristotelianism has made a comeback as 'neo-Aristotelianism'. One of the main drivers for that, seems to be the necessity of accomodating 'telos'. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think "telos" is the key point. Notice Aristotle's comparison between natural and artificial things. It is clear, in the case of artificial things, that the form, as the idea, concept, or blueprint, is prior in time to the material thing which is produced. This is the essence of final cause, the intelligible idea is prior in time to the sensible (material) thing which comes into being, and the idea acts as a cause to bring that material thing or material state, into existence. In Aristotle's example of final cause, health is the cause of the man walking. It is the idea of health, which causes the man to walk, so "health" exists as an idea for the man, prior to the man walking, and is the cause of that material state, the man walking.

This is why "the good" is pivotal to intelligibility for Plato. It provides a principle whereby the true relationship between ideas (intelligible objects) and material existence (sensible objects) may be developed. The good is the desired end, the thing sought, and that is the final cause. The idea of the thing sought, is the cause which brings into existence the material thing. Once the existence of material things is seen in this way, such that ideas precede in time the material objects, and ideas are by way of "telos" the cause of existence of the material objects, this perspective as a fundamental principle, is extended to all of material existence. That is how sensible objects, material existence, becomes intelligible. Why did God create the universe? He saw that it was good. So all material existence is derived from Forms, by the will of God. This temporal relationship between the Forms and material existence is what Plato explores in the Timaeus.

The nature of reality, and the whole relationship between sensible objects and intelligible objects is a very complicated puzzle. But I believe that placing the intelligible as prior in time to the sensible, as the concept of "creation" does, is a key piece which facilitates the placing of many other pieces which will start to fall into place when this temporal principle is adhered to..

In time? I think it has ontological priority, i.e. prior in terms of the hierarchy of being, but not temporally. — Wayfarer

It must necessarily be temporally prior, because it concerns the coming-to-be of the thing. This is the generation of the thing. Aristotle is asking where does the form come from when a thing comes into being. When a thing comes-to-be, it is necessarily the thing that it is, and not something else. Once it is, it is this and not that. But prior to coming-to-be, there are many possibilities and the existence of the thing is contingent. So when the thing comes-to-be, as the thing which it is, the Form of the thing (which necessitates it being the thing that it is) must pre-exist temporally, the material thing, as the cause pre-exists the effect. The Form is responsible for thing being the thing which it is, and not one of the other possibilities. It is a cause, and therefore temporally prior.

So according to what we've been discussing, Metaphysics Bk.7, ch. 7, 8, 9, Aristotle compares the coming-to-be of natural things with that of artificial things. In artificial things, the Form comes from the soul of the artist and is put into the matter, and so the artificial thing comes-to-be from that Form. He states that in natural things the process is the same except that the Form comes from nature. His examples of "natural things", are living things, such as the tree which comes-to-be from the acorn.

Where does the phrase between the commas ("being a composite of matter and form (substance)") refer to? It either refers to the form of the individual or to the individual. — Πετροκότσυφας

It refers to the individual. Sorry, I didn't notice the ambiguity when I wrote the sentence. Any material thing, as an individual, a particular thing, is composed of matter and form.

*This is the second form, the non-soul form. — Πετροκότσυφας

Right, this is "form" in the sense that any particular material thing has a form which is proper to it, making it the particular material thing which it is, and not something else. It is not the "form" in the sense of the essence of the thing.

Third, our neural representations are neither instrumental nor formal "signs." Instrumental signs are things that must first be understood in themselves before they can signify. For example, we must first grasp that the smudge on the horizon is smoke, and not dust, before it can signify fire. We must make out the lettering on a sign before it can tell us a business's hours. Formal signs, (ideas, judgements, etc.) Work in a different way. We do not first have to realize that <apple> is an idea before it can signify apples. If we know it is an idea at all, it is only in retrospect, as we we reflect on the mental instruments employed in thinking of apples. So, the whole being of a formal sign (all that it ever does) is being a sign. <Apple>, for example, does not reflect light, exert gravitational attraction, or do anything other than signifying apples. — Dfpolis

I think you misrepresent signification here. For something to be a sign, for it to signify, all that is required is that it has meaning. So there is no need for the sign to be instrumental, or formal, in order that it be a sign. As long as the thing has significance, it is meaningful, and is a sign, despite how vague and indefinite that meaning might be to the mind which creates it as a sign, or which interprets it. This I think is the difficult reality of signification, we can recognize that a thing is a sign, without having any idea of what it signifies. This is to recognize something as meaningful without knowing what the meaning is. For example, when I hear people speaking a foreign language I recognize the sound as meaningful without having any idea of the meaning. And, I can say things without clearly knowing what I am saying. So there is no need that the sign be either formal or instrumental in order to be a sign. especially when that which is signified is vague and unclear. Hence ambiguity is very real.

So the body creates the world.
So you espouse fatalism? — Blue Lux

I don't follow you.

It is especially inappropriate to use the word “representation” with reference to neural conditions when Antonio Damasio (as well as Sherrington, Edelman, and Crick) thinks that perception involves constructing an image in the brain: — Galuchat

This is why apokrisis' semiotic approach to the act of perception is much more realistic. What the mind constructs, the so-called "image", is only a representation in the sense that a symbol is a representation. The "image" is more like a symbol, which has a specific meaning to the mind. So there need not be any sort of resemblance, likeness, or representation in that sense of the word, if the image is just a symbol constructed by the mind, having meaning to that mind.

That's not a straight forward question, but I think you'll find the answer in Metaphysics Bk.7, specifically ch.6. I believe that in the case of material things, according to their accidents, the individual is not the same as its form, so an individual in this sense is a unity of matter and form. Matter allows that the thing is potentially other than it is, so what it is (its form) does not cover the entirety of the thing, that it is potentially otherwise. Therefore the form of the thing is not the same as the thing because the thing consists of form and matter.

But if there are self-subsistent things, like the Forms are said to be, it is impossible that the essence of the thing is other than the thing itself. It is impossible that the essence of the good is other than the good itself. So when Forms are said to be substances, then the form of the individual cannot be anything other than the individual, as the individual is a Form, because that form is a self-subsistent Form.

There is noting to "adhere" to. The analogy only explains the naming convention, not a prescriptive rule. — Dfpolis

OK, but the usage in the analogy is other than your usage, so it doesn't actually explain your claimed convention. In the analogy there is a God who imposes law and order on nature, through His free will choices, but in your usage there are laws inherent in matter, with no free will act involved.

This is a little too facile. While the laws of nature exist independently of our knowing them, our knowledge of them depends on actual study. If physicists have not studied a dynamical regime, that regime will not be in physics' verified range of application. We saw this in the early 20th century when the descriptions of Newtonian physics broke down for relativistic and quantum regimes. So, until we studied the effects of human intentions on the laws, we could not say what those effects were. Now that we have some data, we can be assured that our intentions do perturb the laws. — Dfpolis

This doesn't make any sense. You are saying that Newtonian laws of physics were broken down by human intentions, therefore human intentions perturbed the laws of nature. Do you not maintain the distinction between laws of physics and laws of nature?

You have not exhausted the possibilities here. The third option, which now appears to be the case, is that we do follow the laws of nature, but they vary in response to human intentions. So, physical change does follow the laws of nature, but our will is a factor in determining those laws. — Dfpolis

This third option only results from you nonsensical equivocation between "laws" of physics and "laws" of nature. That's why I insist that "laws of nature" ought not be used. It fosters deception through equivocation.

We have simply not put 2 and 2 together to conclude that to do so, they need to perturb the laws of nature. — Dfpolis

But we do not need to perturb the "laws of nature" to have free will, if we properly expose, and represent "laws of nature". So there is no issue of putting 2 and 2 together. This assumption of the need to perturb the laws of nature only arises if you assume that the laws of nature inhere within matter, which is a false representation. Then, to have free will we need to override these laws. But if there are no such laws inherent in matter, as the concept of "matter" is normally understood, then matter is free to be moved according to infinite possibilities. This allows for the possibility that free will acts "participate in divine providence", as you suggest, by participating in the laws which move matter, rather than by overruling, or perturbing the laws.

Since human beings are physical and intentional unities, our will, as part of that unity can be said to "inhere" in us. So, there is no intrinsic conflict a principle of action inhering in a physical being and exercising freedom. — Dfpolis

If you describe a human being as a unity of "physical" and "intentional" aspects, then you have distinguished these two parts as distinct. If the "principle of action" inheres within, then we must identify which distinct part it inheres within, the physical or the intentional. If it inheres within the physical part, as you claim, then it is impossible that the intentional part could exercise freedom of the will, because it is already bound and determined by the activity of the physical part. The intentional part would need a further principle of action which is more powerful and active than the principle of action of the physical part in order to exercise freedom. But why complicate things in this way? Why not just place the principle of action in the intentional part, such that it can exercise freedom over the indeterminate physical part, thus allowing for freedom of will?

I am not sure what your objection to immanence is. Surely you reject the notion that there are substantial laws, extrinsic to the matter whose actions they order.

All forms are "immaterial" (not made of matter), even those that cannot exist without material support. I have never said that the laws of nature can be actual without material fields to order. Physical things are not forms, they are informed matter. — Dfpolis

Do you recognize that a law is a form? If so, how can you say that all forms are immaterial, yet also reject the notion that there are laws extrinsic to matter. It appears like you do not recognize that a law is a form, and that is why I must keep harping on your use of "law". In all cases where the word "law" is used, descriptive and prescriptive laws, the law describes either what is or what ought to be, and a description is a form. In no way is "law" ever used in any way other than as a formula, so your usage is completely nonsensical.

The laws of nature have an ontological rather than an temporal priority (as does God). To have ontological priority is to be an actualizing or an informing principle. But such principles must be concurrent with the processes they actualize and inform, or they could not fulfill their dynamic roles. — Dfpolis

To say that God, as the creator of physical existence is not temporally prior to physical existence, is simply false.

What "move to materialism"? Have I not been discussing the essential role of intentionality as an immaterial aspect of reality? — Dfpolis

Placing laws (Forms) as inherent within matter is clearly materialist. How do you support an immaterial aspect of reality when you have already stipulated that the part of reality which some assert to be immaterial, i.e. laws and Forms, inhere within matter?

wonder if that "form of the individual" is anything else than the individual (the substance) and if it is, what it is (and where in De Anima Aristotle talks about it), and if it's not, why fail to say just that. That substances change. — Πετροκότσυφας

This topic is discussed in Metaphysics. As Aristotle described, when an individual thing changes, the form which comes to be in the material object, must come from somewhere. In the case of artificial things it comes from the soul of the artist. In the case of natural things it comes from nature. He states that we ought to question "why is there what there is rather than something else".

When anything comes to be, it is necessarily the thing which it is and not something else. This is fundamental to logic, the law of identity, and non-contradiction, while the law of excluded middle is supported by the thing being something rather than indeterminate. It is impossible that the thing comes to be as something other than what it is. We can conclude that the principle, the Form, which determines what the thing will be, is prior in time to the material thing which displays that form to us.

I have shown you the texts and the logic of the case. — Dfpolis

Actually what you have shown me is illogical. Rather than accept Aristotle's definition, and his general overall usage of "matter", which renders it impossible that matter is "dynamic", you impose an interpretation on specific sentences which you think imply that matter is dynamic. Since you clearly indicate that you recognize Aristotle's definition of matter as "never a principle of actuality", yet you insist that he says matter is dynamic, you are asserting contradiction, which is illogical.

Furthermore, there is no logic which indicates that we must consider matter to be dynamic. The proper conclusion to the problem you presented is that of the Neo-Platonists, that there are immaterial Forms which account for the apparent dynamism of matter. This is the direction which Aristotle pointed when he compared coming-to-be in the case of artificial things, where the form comes from the soul of the artist, and coming to be in the case of natural things, where the form comes from nature.

So you've changed your tune. Baseball is entertainment, not an end in itself. — frank

An end in itself, is something which is sought for the sake of itself. Doesn't "entertainment" fulfill this description. It is not sought for a further end, entertainment is sought for entertainment sake. And isn't sport a form of entertainment?

Is it entertainment (as opposed to work) for the very reason that it's pointless? — frank

I don't understand this question. Are you suggesting that anything which is an end in itself, sought for the sake of itself, is pointless, because it serves no purpose beyond that?

Isn't sport a form of entertainment? And isn't entertainment sought for the sake of being entertained?

Perhaps baseball doesn't entertain you. But we all have different tastes with respect to entertainment.

If this DNC Russian hack narrative turns out to be false, based on proof given by Assange, the first of wave of DNC and swamp lies is exposed. — wellwisher

You may stretch your imagination in which ever direction you want, describe it, and stick an "if" in front. When you get good at it you can remove the "if" and write good fiction.

But what is the point of a sport like baseball? — frank

Perhaps, the purpose of the sport of baseball is sport. You know that "sport" is something other than "military action", or preparation for military action, so why not see sport as an end in itself, rather than for the purpose of something else? To me, baseball is a sport.

You finally see the contradiction then? Matter for Aristotle is "never a principle of actuality", that we agree on. Yet under your interpretation, Aristotle also says matter is a "dynamic potency". You interpret Aristotle as contradicting himself. I deny "dynamic potency" as your misinterpretation, and find Aristotle to be consistent.

The underlying analogy is that as civil laws order social behavior, so laws of nature order natural behavior (an analogy of proportionality). — Dfpolis

OK, so the question is, will you adhere to the analogy? As civil laws order social behaviour through the means of the free will choices of human beings, do you assume that the laws of nature order natural behaviour through the free will choices of matter? If not, then you have no analogy. If so, I would object on the basis that matter has no soul and no free will to make such choices.

So, to respond to your objection, if the universal laws of nature, as described by physics, fully determined the actions of knowing subjects, then yes, free will would be of no avail. But, we have no reason to think that the laws, as described by physics, apply to more than the abstract world physicists have chosen to study. Specifically, we have no reason to think that these laws fully determine the actions of subjects, given that natural science has chosen, ab initio, to exclude subjects as such from its consideration. — Dfpolis

What physicists choose to study is irrelevant, because the laws of nature, as you have described them are independent of what physicists study. The point is, that either matter is bound and determined to follow the laws of nature, as you claim, in which case there can be no free will, or matter is not determined by the laws of nature, in which case free will is possible. If the laws of nature inhere within matter as you have stated, acting to cause the activities of matter in this way, then it's irrelevant whether these laws are known to scientists or not, matter is still determined by them, and the human body being composed of matter is thus determined by the laws of nature. it is impossible that matter could behave in a way other than what is determined by these laws, and free will is impossible.

I wish you'd said this earlier. When I started this discussion, I pointed out that the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science prescinds from the consideration of the knowing subject. The knowing subject is also the willing subject. So, when I am discussing the laws of physics and the laws of nature they describe, I'm not discussing reality in all of its complexity, but only the aspects of reality delimited by the Fundamental Abstraction -- which does not have the data to justify conclusions on knowing and willing -- on subjective awareness and freedom.

To forget the self-imposed limitations of natural science is to commit Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness. We cannot assume that a science adequate to the physical world in abstraction from the knowing and willing subject is adequate to dealing with subjects knowing and willing. I began turning my attention to this yesterday in an exchange with Janus beginning with: — Dfpolis

Again, this is irrelevant, and you are only trying to create the illusion of free will. Either the activities of matter are determined by the laws of nature, or they are not, regardless of what the laws of physics say. To imply that there could be an undiscovered law of nature which allows for free will is to state a deception intended to give an illusion that free will is possible under your assumptions. However, this undiscovered law of nature would have to allow that the activity of matter is not determined by the laws of nature. And this is contradictory to your fundamental principle which holds that the laws of nature inhere within matter and therefore the activities of matter is determined by the laws of nature. The "undiscovered law" would have to be exactly contrary to your stated first principle. So it is deception, because you imply that your fundamental principle could actually allow for free will, but it would only allow for free will if there is an undiscovered natural law which contradicts your fundamental principle.

As I discussed in more detail with Janus (and in even greater detail in my book), since both the laws of nature and human commitments are intentional (species of logical propagator), it is reasonable to ask whether human intentions might not perturb (modify) the "universal" laws of nature. Experiments provide us with statistical certitude that human intentions do perturb the so-called universal laws. So, we have every reason to believe that human actions are not fully determined by the "universal" laws of nature. — Dfpolis

No, I think it's impossible that human actions are not fully determined by the laws of nature, or that human actions could modify the laws of nature, if the laws of nature inhere within matter. A human action is an action of a material body. If a human being could act in a way which is inconsistent with the laws of nature, this would indicate that the laws of nature are not inherent within the matter of the human body, causing the activities of that matter. So it must be one or the other. What you propose would be contradictory.

Clearly, the laws of mature must act immanently to order natural processes. — Dfpolis

I would like to know how you base this assumption that the laws of nature must act immanently. Traditionally, there is a duality between what you call "the laws of nature" (immaterial Forms), and material forms, (physical things). The Forms act to order natural processes because they are prior in time to these material processes, as God is prior to nature, being the creator. It is only when one decides to abandon this dualism that it becomes necessary to say that the laws of nature act immanently, in order to account for the fact that matter behaves in an orderly way.

However, this move to materialism leaves intentionality unintelligible. It denies the possibility of free choice which is essential to intentionality. Without a separation between matter and that which causes matter to behave the way that it does (Forms, or laws of nature), there is no room for possibility. Matter must behave the way that it does because it has no choice as to which laws it will follow, if the laws inhere within it.

Strange, cause I quoted a passage where it is argued that the soul can't be moved (only incidentally) and I quoted this passage because you said that the soul changes, which means that it's in motion. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't think I said that the soul is moved. It is said to be "actual", or active. Change and motion are descriptions of material bodies, the soul is immaterial. Aristotle's cosmological argument demonstrates the need to assume an actuality which is prior to the material body to account for its existence, as the cause of the of the particular form which the body has. This is what makes any individual thing the thing which it is rather than something else. Neo-Platonists assume immaterial Forms, and the Soul is of this category, an immaterial thing. So the soul is active, in the sense of being actual, yet it is not in motion, nor is it changing, as these are terms which describe material existence.

If this is what you wanted to say, I think you failed, — Πετροκότσυφας

The failure was my fault. This is not an easy topic to discuss, and apparent contradiction abound in any attempt. One can read Aristotle, and quote numerous contradictions, one after the other. The challenge is to make sense of the apparent contradictions, work them out such that they are not contradictions, making for consistency in your interpretation. This requires great effort.

Words fail to express the intended meaning sometimes. The difficulty here involves our conception of time. If the concept of time is derivative from changing material existence, then it appears like time requires change in material existence. But in reality, if all change in material existence requires time, then material change is dependent on time. This allows for time outside of change in material existence. If time is passing, yet no material change is occurring, there could be something like the soul which is active, or "actual", without any change in material existence occurring.

So, yes, there are different actualities, but, no, there aren't different forms. There's one form, the soul, and it does not change. Aristotle does not seem to allow for formal change in De Anima. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, there are different forms. Let me attempt an explanation again.

A material body is described by Aristotle as a composite of matter and form. An individual thing, a particular, such as a man or a horse, being "substance" in the primary sense of the word, changes as time passes. These changes are said to be "accidental", because the individual thing continues to be the same thing, a man or a horse, despite the changes. Nevertheless, these changes are changes to the individual thing's form, as each thing, each instance of substance, has a form which is proper to itself. The form of the thing is "what" the thing is, so that each particular, or individual thing, has a form proper to itself, making it what it is, and not something else. This "form" must consist of all the accidentals, and this is the basis for Aristotle's law of identity.

On the other hand, when we say "what a thing is", in the sense of its essence, we also refer to its "form", but this is not it's particular form, but a universal. In this case, "form" indicates the essence of the thing, such as when we say that it is a man, or a horse, we refer to the thing's essence. When we refer to the thing's essence, as its form, "what it is", i.e., a man or a horse, we allow that the thing's form (its essence) remains the same, despite accidental changes to the form of the individual.

Therefore the thing has two forms, the particular form, which is the form that is proper to the individual, by the law of identity, making it what it is and not something else, which also changes in the case of accidental change, and also the universal form, or "essence" of the thing, making it the thing which we call it, a man or a horse, which is not changing in the case of accidental change.

As you can see, we must assume two distinct forms for each individual thing (substance), a universal form (its essence), and a particular form (its identity). This allows for accidental change, which is change to the thing that does not make it into a different thing altogether. The form of the individual, being a composite of matter and form (substance), is changing as time passes. Yet the individual's "form" in the sense of its essence, remains the same despite these accidental changes.

When you write "Change is described as an altering of the form, via the contraries, from has to has not", you merely seem to repeat what Aristotle argues against. — Πετροκότσυφας

It appears like you are not respecting this fact, that Aristotle refers to "form" in these two completely distinct ways. One form of the thing changes in the case of accidental change (the form of the substance), while the other form of the thing (its essence) does not. This is causing you confusion in your interpretation of what I am saying, making it appear as if I contradict myself because you do not separate these two distinct uses of "form".

That is the argument of Parmenides that Aristotle answers with the concept of dynamic potency in hyle. Matter is never either the old or new form. It is always a principle of potency, never a principle of actuality -- that is what form is. Thus, there is no violation of the principle of contradiction. — Dfpolis

To say both, that matter is a "dynamic potency", and, "never a principle of actuality", is itself contradictory. Your second statement is a correct representation of Aristotelian principles, matter is "always a principle of potency, never a principle of actuality". Your first statement, "the concept of dynamic potency in hyle" is not. You appear to have allowed the modern concept of energy, which allows for "dynamic potency" to influence your interpretation of Aristotle. For Aristotle matter is "always a principle of potency, and never a principle of actuality". Therefore "dynamic potency" is excluded as contradiction, regardless of whether he considers this possibility in passing, as indicated by your quotes..

Which accounts for the possibility of the immortality of the soul, does it not? — Wayfarer

According to Aristotle's cosmological argument, no potency can be eternal. The soul is a form, actual, it is not material, or a potency. Potencies are what the soul has. If there is "underlying dynamics", which underlie the potency of matter, as dfPolis claims, they must be formal in nature, just like the soul is a form, and not of the matter itself. Df is trying to negate the need for the underlying Forms, which is illustrated by Neo-Platonism, by assigning dynamism to matter. This clearly contradicts Aristotelian principles.

If you are describing "what is," your description is based on reality. I am calling that reality, the one being described, a "law of nature." — Dfpolis

OK, so my point is, that if the thing being described is reality, then why not call that thing being described "reality" rather than "laws of reality"? And if the thing being described is nature, then why not call that thing "nature", rather than "laws of nature". To say that the thing being described is "laws of nature", rather than "nature", just because the descriptions are formulated as "laws", makes no sense.

This is not an argument about reality, but about what to call the aspect of reality effecting the continuing order. I am quire flexible on naming conventions. What name do you suggest/like? — Dfpolis

Since you seem to have lost track of my objection, replying to so many different people, allow me to refresh your memory.

Matter behaves in particular ways which are regular, orderly, and which we describe with laws, the laws of physics. I think we both agree on this. Where I disagree is when you jump to the conclusion that there are another type of "laws", "laws of nature", which are inherent within matter acting within matter, causing it to act in these regular, and orderly ways. I've been asking you to support this conclusion, or assumption, whatever you want to call it, but you've been beating around the bush.

Here's the reason why I do not agree with you. If there are such laws inherent within, and acting within, matter, then free will is impossible. Matter cannot act in any way other than the way determined by the laws of nature. Someone who adopts your position might appeal to some sort of compatibilism, but it is quite clear that there is no room for free will here, because matter cannot behave in any way other than what is determined and dictated by the laws of nature. This is contrary to the concept of free will, which allows that the human soul, and mind, has the power to move matter in the way that it wills. The will's capacity to move matter cannot be forcibly restricted by the matter itself (having laws inherent within), or else it would not be free. However, experience demonstrates to us that the will is in fact free from any confines of matter, as the constraints on the will are completely formal. So your position of laws acting from within matter must be rejected.

If instead, you want to continue with your position that there are real "laws of nature" acting in the universe, then you ought to place them outside of matter. These "laws of nature" would be not much different from Neo-Platonic Forms. They must be independent from matter though, because they are responsible for the very existence of matter. Have you ever considered that matter itself must have come into existence, and so there must be a cause of it? This would be the "Forms", or "laws of nature". They cannot be inherent within matter though, because the thing which inheres within is dependent on that thing within which it inheres for its existence. In the case of the relationship between the laws of nature, and matter, it seem quite likely that the existence of matter itself is dependent on the laws of nature, therefore the laws of nature are most likely independent of matter.

It would be best to research your sources before making claims. Let's read a bit of Newton's Principia. In the preface, he tells us "I had begun to consider the inequalities of the lunar motions, and had entered upon some other things relating to the laws and measures of gravity, ... and the figures that would be described by bodies attracted according to given laws..." [italics mine]. — Dfpolis

See, Newton is referring to "laws" as human constructs, like "measures".

Please! Where have I said any such thing? To say that there is a law of gravity is not to say gravity is unreal, but that gravity acts in a consistent way over space and time -- something essential to the practice of astrophysics. — Dfpolis

Now you are conflating descriptions with causes of action. Look what you wrote. "To say that there is a law of gravity is not to say gravity is unreal, but that gravity acts in a consistent way over space and time -- something essential to the practice of astrophysics." So, you say "gravity acts in a consistent way". Gravity is the thing which is acting. How can you replace "gravity" with "the law of gravity", or any "law", to say that it is the law which is acting rather than gravity which is acting? Either it is gravity which is acting, which is understood as a property of mass and energy, or it is a law which is acting. But the "law" here is only understood as a description of how gravity is acting, so it is impossible that the law, rather than gravity, is acting. The two are clearly quite different

Do you recognize the difference between descriptive laws and prescriptive laws? Descriptive laws, like the laws of physics, are just that, descriptions which are formulated as "laws". Prescriptive laws tell us, human beings, what we ought, and ought not do. Descriptive laws are not causative in the actions of matter. Prescriptive laws my influence the activities of the matter of the human body, through the means of the human mind, intention, and free choice. These laws are causative in the sense that they influence the way that we act with our bodies. However, there is a medium of free choice, free will, which exists between these prescriptive laws and the activities of the matter of the human body, caused by them.

You are proposing another type of causative laws, laws of nature. But the only model we have, of laws acting in a causative way on matter, is the one which has the medium of free choice between the acting law, and the actions caused by the law. Are you prepared to allow for a medium of free choice between your proposed acting "laws of nature", and the actions of matter which are caused by these laws?

Only a discontinuity in form, not in all relevant aspects of being. — Dfpolis

OK, I agree with this, the discontinuity is with respect to form. Now the question which Aristotle asks, is where does the new form come from. It cannot come from the old form, due to this discontinuity. It cannot come from the matter because then the matter would have both the old form and the new form, at the time prior to the substantial change, and this would be contradictory. Aristotle says that in the case of art, the new form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature it comes from nature. Please acknowledge that the new form could not come from the matter, because this would mean that the matter had both the old form and the new form, at the same time prior to the substantial change, and this is contradictory.

Remember, in describing matter and potential, Aristotle is explicit in his claim that the law of non-contradiction ought not be violated. Instead, he opts to violate the law of excluded middle. So he describes matter and potential in terms of what may or may not be, rather than in terms of what is and is not. But this creates a separation, in principle, between matter and form, such that the new form cannot come from within the matter which already has the old form. The matter only provides the potential for the new form, as it provided the potential for the old form. The new form must actually come from something other than the matter.

You seem to be expressing an ontology of dialectical materialism, within which it is customary to allow for the violation of the law of non-contradiction, to account for the existence of matter. But Aristotle is strictly opposed to allowing for the violation of the law of non-contradiction. So the dialectical materialist cannot claim to adhere to Aristotle's principles.

Was that statement tweeted by Donald Trump after he was first accused of colluding with the Russians?

Unfortunately, Dr Benjamin Libet believed that we only have free will in cancelling our urges. He was also unsure about "mysterious what" triggers Readiness Potential. — Damir Ibrisimovic

Aren't these the two essential aspects of free will.. First, we need to cancel our urges so that our actions are not merely reflections of, or "caused by", reactions to our surroundings. That's will power. Second, while will power is suppressing all urges, it needs to maintain the capacity to freely trigger, when necessary, a selected action. What more is necessary, and why the "back in time" assumption?

I guess that the existence of our free will is now accepted. — Damir Ibrisimovic

Do you think that anyone ever seriously doubted the existence of free will? And people like Libet, aren't they just trying to understand free will rather than to prove that there is no such thing?

When something ceases to be, or comes to be, this is, by definition, discontinuity. One is when a thing which was, now is not, and the other is when a thing which was not, now is. To say that there is such a thing as ceasing to be, or coming to be, without discontinuity, is contradiction. We cannot say that something has come to be, or that something has ceased to be, unless we allow that this is a discontinuity of being. That's what "beginning" and "ending" signify, a discontinuity.

Effectively, you are saying that, regardless of their misguided philosophical beliefs, they practice physics as if there are laws operative in nature. When "They work to ... establish new ones," are they making up the new laws out of whole cloth -- as a fiction writer would -- or are they looking at the results of experiments and observations to see how nature actually operates? If they wish to retain their positions, I am sure they are doing the later. In other words, they are seeking to describe what is. — Dfpolis

I don't see your point. You appear to have misunderstood me.

Further, when they posit a new or improved law, do they merely see it as describing the results of past experiments and observations, or do they expect it to describe future phenomena? All the physicists I've worked with expect the latter. — Dfpolis

Right, physicists expect things to continue to be, in the future, the way that they have been in the past, just like we expect the sun to shine in the day, and it to be dark at night. This has nothing to do with whether or not they believe that there are laws acting to ensure that this will continue, that's just your ontological assumption.

All the physicists I've worked with expect the latter. And if you ask if this is a rational expectation or a baseless faith position, surely they would say it is entirely rational, i.e based on some reason. Certainly they are not such egotists as to think that they, or the description they have formulated, is the reason why nature will continue to operate in accord with the order it exhibited previously. So, despite any errant philosophical views, they expect nature to continue to conform to their description, not irrationally, or because of an extrinsic reason, but for reasons intrinsic to nature -- reasons we call "laws of nature." — Dfpolis

I agree that there must be reasons why we expect that things will continue to be, into the future, as they have been in the past, but I disagree that the reason why we expect this is because we believe that there are laws of nature acting to ensure this. The reason why we expect this is that we have experienced it in the past, and it has been consistent. We have experienced in the past, that things continue to be, into the future, as they have been in the past, except when something acts to change this, so we conclude by means of inductive reasoning, that that this will continue.

We do not expect that things will continue to be as they have been because laws of nature are acting to ensure this, and this is evident from the fact that we allow that things change. When we act, for instance, we can break this continuity, destroying and creating things. So clearly we recognize that there are no laws acting to ensure continuity, unless we as human beings are allowed to play God, and override the laws of nature. So it is impossible that we expect that things will continue to be into the future, as they have been in the past, because we believe that laws of nature are acting to ensure this, because we commonly act to override this continuity, thus that would be contradictory.

Why do I say that the concept <law of nature> is instantiated here? Because the phenomenon is not a "one of." Similar phenomena, exhibiting the same underlying order, occur through space and time. That is how Newton came to understand that the laws we formulate here, in the sublunary world, are universal -- operative throughout nature. Of course, we can forget Newton's great insight, but then we have no rational ground for thinking we understand the dynamics by which the universe developed or life evolved. If the order we describe here is not universal, anything could have happened at any time -- and we'd never know. It is only by positing that the same laws act now as in the past that we are able to understand the time-development of the universe. — Dfpolis

Newton's laws refer to the activities of "forces", they do not refer to the activities of "laws". To interpret newton's laws in this way, as referring to the activities of laws, is a gross misunderstanding of Newton's principles.

So, it could be magic? — Dfpolis

Why would anyone think that the cause of uniform activity is magic? That would be even more ridiculous than thinking it is laws which cause uniform activity. It's quite obvious that uniformity of activity is caused by similar conditions of existence. If the conditions of existence are the same here as they are over there, then there ought to be a uniformity of activity between these two places. When we determine those conditions of existence we will see exactly why there is such a uniformity. Why must you posit something more, like magic, or laws to account for the uniformity of activity? Are you suggesting that the laws act like magic, to ensure that activity is uniform?

Second, I would challenge you to test your suggestion that gravity is not real by stepping off a tall building, but charity prevents me from doing so. Remember, "real" does not mean "substantial." The real need not stand alone. It can be an intelligible aspect of something else. — Dfpolis

It is you who is suggesting that gravity is not real, not I. I recognize that the activities we attribute to gravity are caused by a real thing, gravity. You suggest that these activities are caused by some magical "laws of nature", which are forcing matter to behave the way that it does.

I understand that you see the laws of physics as generalizations of past events -- events that are similar, not for any objective reason, but purely by chance. — Dfpolis

What did I ever say to make you think that? That's ridiculous.

The existence of a medium is completely immaterial to the question of interaction. A number of media lay between us, still we are interacting. Media are only relevant to how we are interacting. — Dfpolis

Strictly speaking, that's not true. I am interacting with the media, and you are interacting with the media, and we are not interacting with each other. By ignoring the media which separates us, you create a misrepresentation, (which is completely wrong I might add), of our activities. For all I know, you're a bot. And what do you know about me, which makes you believe that we are actually interacting? I think you know enough about physics to understand that two objects do not directly interact, there is always a medium between them.

According to current scientific understanding mass warps spacetime, and this is a universal phenomenon which is called 'the law of gravity', or simply 'gravity'. Gravity is not an "appearance" it is an action or effect. The "activity" is not caused by the law, it is the law. — Janus

This makes no sense to me. Sorry, I can't follow that statement, that an activity is the law.

Here's a coupe questions concerning that quote from Einstein.

What principle do you think he uses to claim that inductive reason cannot derive A (the axiomatic structure of a theory) from E (the experiences of the world of perceptions)?

Also, in the last sentence, what do you think is the difference between "pure reason", and "pure thought"?

He seems to deny the capacity of pure reason to derive A from E based on the assumption that there are no rules of logic which will allow for this. But are rules necessary for "pure reason"? There are no specific rules which one follows in inductive reasoning. So Einstein seems to be denying the capacities of inductive reasoning based on this assumption. The problem is that one can deny the certainty of the conclusions of inductive reasoning, based on this assumption, but you cannot deny that the conclusions are being made. So in reality, A is derived from E by means of inductive reasoning, but since inductive reasoning is free, and lawless, the certainty of those axioms is dubious.

Now we need to consider the relation between "pure thought" and "pure reason". If one of these is necessarily controlled by laws, as Einstein implies that "reason" is, and the other is not, then we have a distinction. The agent which acts to control thought, to abide by rules, is the will. The will, as it is free, may allow thought to proceed outside the constraints of rules, allowing knowledge to evolve. This free thinking appears to be classed outside of "reason" by Einstein. However, the reason why A cannot be derived from E, appears to be that "inductive reason" does not follow rules. Therefore to even call induction "reason" would be contradictory. It ought to just be called "thought".

If gravity operates always and everywhere then it just is a natural law; that's what the term means. — Janus

The appearance of gravity is dependent on the existence of mass or energy, therefore it is a property of these things. The occurrence of gravity induced activity is the effect of the existence of these things of which it is a property. The activity is not caused by a natural law.

As I understand it, to say there is a universal law just is to say that there is a universally invariant form of action, a natural behavior which operates at all times and all places regardless of human awareness and opinion. — Janus

To claim an "invariant form of action", is to make a generalization about action. How do you jump from making such a generalization about action to the conclusion that there is a "natural law" which is the cause of that type of action which is described by the generalization?

Suppose that every time you drop an object in air, it falls. This indicates an "invariant form of action", so you can make a generalization. What principle allows you to say that there is a "natural law" which is the cause of this action, rather than something else, like gravity, which is causing the action?

Furthermore, isn't the real "cause" of the action you picking the objects up and dropping them? So you think that there is a natural law which causes this "invariant form of action", when the "invariant form of action" is really caused by you carrying out that similar procedure over and over again.