Check out some Inuit throat singing.

I don't understand what you are saying here. Most of our principles are arrived at by inductive reasoning. Are you saying it is not right to say the purpose of the eye is to see, and not wrong to say that the purpose of the eye is to smell? Even if you believe only in evolution and not also God as part of the human design, evolution would not retain a body part which served no purpose. — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm saying that inductive reasoning does not determine purpose. For example, every day that we see the sky, it is blue, so we conclude by inductive reasoning that the sky is blue. This does not imply that the purpose of the sky is to be blue. Also, we observe that water flows down hill, but we cannot conclude that the purpose of water is to flow down hill. So when we see that the nose smells, and the eyes see, we cannot conclude that the purpose of the nose is to smell, and the purpose of the eyes is to see. To claim purpose we must look at the action of the thing as a part, with a function, in a larger context. So in relation to the human being, the eyes have a function, a purpose, and that is to see. The eyes, as a part of the human being, see for the human being, and that's why we can say that they have a purpose.

Yes, we pick a type of goodness in the judgement, but once picked, the type of goodness is objective. — Samuel Lacrampe

How does choosing something change it from subjective to objective? I do not understand your argument. Take your example of a circle. We decide to judge a shape for circularity rather than squareness. What, in your mind makes this type of goodness objective? We have some principles by which we determine circularity, but these exist in, and were created by, the minds of subjects, therefore they are subjective.

Since the essence of things is objective, then the purpose inherent in the essence is also objective. — Samuel Lacrampe

The "essence" of a thing is how it is described by human beings. If a paper cutter's purpose is by definition to cut paper, then this is how human beings define "paper cutter". Definitions are produced by subjects, they are subjective.

Thus if I say "Person A is taller than person B", 'taller' is relative to A and B, but is objective to the system which is A and B. We know it is objective because objectivity implies a right and wrong; and the statement is either right or wrong, not a matter of opinion. — Samuel Lacrampe

The "system" here is produced by human minds therefore it is subjective. The judgement of something as right or wrong is carried out by subjects, so such a judgement is necessarily subjective. How do you get to the point of concluding that such a judgement could be subjective?

Anyone try microdosing LSD?

Could you expand on the idea, if you don’t mind? I think i was following up until the last three lines of the quote, especially the last sentence. (Or maybe I wasn’t following as well as I thought! :wink: ) — 0 thru 9

OK, I'll see what I can do. Consider the existence of an object. It has a temporal extension past and future. From this perspective the present is irrelevant, the object has a period of time when it exists, and so be it. But if you consider changes to the object, they only occur at the present, as time is passing. We might say that changes occurred in the past, and will occur in the future, but they only actually occur at the present.as time is passing. So the present presents us with a certain discontinuity of existence of the object if we allow that change occurs at the present.

That's one way of looking at the present, as the discontinuity of existence. Another way is to look at it as the time in which we (subjects) exist. This separates us from objects which extend into past and future, allowing the concept of immortality as something which doesn't partake in past or future, but is always at the present. This makes the present a continuity of existence.

So we have two distinct ways of thinking of the present, one is as the time when change to physical objects occurs, and the other is as something distinct from past and future. Since we associate the self, with being at the present, these two ways give two distinct approaches to self-identification. One is as a source of change in the physical world, and the other is as something distinct from the physical world. The problem is that there seems to be reality to both perspectives, so it would appear necessary to establish compatibility between them. To establish compatibility requires recognizing, in a sense, that they are both wrong. So we need to dismiss them both in order to come up with a real representation of the self.

I can't just decide to believe in Jesus. — CasKev

Why not?

I have to first be convinced of his existence. — CasKev

I think you have this backward, believing in it is what convinces you of it. That's known as "faith". One has faith in Jesus (believes in Jesus), practises religion, and becomes convinced. How does this differ from having faith in CBT? You believe in CBT, practise it, and become convinced of it, just like a religion. Faith and belief are first. Practise follows. When the practise works, one becomes convinced. It's like learning how to play a musical instrument, if you do not believe in your ability, you will not succeed, because the practise will appear useless for one reason or another. Belief is prior to practise, conviction follows from practise.

Such an idea, however, is subjective rather than objective. Continuing with the electron example, let's take electron A and electron B. No scientific analysis can distinguish A from B. So, we conclude A = B or, in your case, we give up the notion of identity altogether.

Not to be nitpicky but there is a difference between A and B electrons. They're at different loci in space. Don't you think, therefore, that we can still retain the concept of identity for such situations? — TheMadFool

There is something called the Pauli exclusion principle which I think distinguishes electron A from electron B. I believe it is based in a combination of distinct properties intrinsic to the electron, and relative positioning as well. The electrons have different energy values and this is very important in chemistry, contributing to the concept of valence. An electron may lose energy, releasing a photon, but this must be more than just a change of location, it must be a physical change to the electron itself.

The relation of time to itself (past, present, future) and to us (past me, future me) is one of the main philosophical topics for sure. It touches on physics and metaphysics, mortality and morality. — 0 thru 9

I think that the notion of immortality is derived from the idea of being at the present. If one could truly exist at the present then that person would not take part in the past or the future, and have an existence which is non-temporal, eternal. But on the other hand, when we look at a thing's continued existence in time, we consider that it has existed in the past, and will continue existence into the future, neglecting the importance of the present. The present is the only time when change occurs, and to understand change we must allow for a discontinuity at the present. The immortal self is a continuous existence at the present. The mortal self is an object with continuous existence through the past and into the future. The discontinuity of the present annihilates both these selves.

I’ve wondered about the nature of time, as everyone probably has. Like for instance, the direction of time. Does time move from past -> present-> future ? This is the time-line view. Or does it move from future -> present -> past ? This is like being in a car and seeing up ahead a mile or so. Then that space ahead is soon where one is at, becoming the present. Then it is in the rear view mirror, representing the past. I tend towards the latter view, though I don’t dismiss the former. It seems to be relative to the point of view. — 0 thru 9

I agree with the conceiving of time in this direction, future>present>past. That's why I said that the future is like a force of oppression on us. We can consider that at the present, the past is coming into existence. As time passes, there is always more and more past, so the past is coming into being at the present. If we were to assume a beginning of time, there would be no passing of time prior to this, therefore no past. But we cannot eliminate the possibility that there was a future, at this point, when time started to pass. So if something forces time to pass, or causes time to pass, that must be the future.

I like your car analogy, but this is the way I see it. All we are seeing is the past. That is all that is evident to any of our senses. It takes time for light to reach the eyes, from what is seen, so what is seen is always in the past. Likewise, it takes time for the neurological activity required for any sensation, so everything sensed is in the past by the time it is sensed. Say you are looking out the back window of the moving car. In the case of time, unlike the car, you can imagine the present as a static observation point, and everything else is moving past you, into the past.

Everything is coming from the future, and what you are seeing is things flying by you and disappearing into the past. We can't turn around and face the front because the nature of sensation does not allow this. We only grasp the future with our minds, its existence is a logical necessity to account for where everything is coming from, but our senses cannot sense anything there. It is like a black wall in front of us, where sensation cannot go, when we face it directly. But now that we've turned around to face the true forward direction, we must account for this "turning", and this is where we need the "rear view mirror" analogy. When we were facing the past, and learning about things from our senses, we didn't realize that we were looking backward in time. Our minds, however, were always oriented to look forward into the future, we being intentional beings, so when we were "facing the past" with our senses, we weren't really facing the past, we were looking into a rear view mirror, while our minds were facing the future. The mirror inverts the appearance of directions, so when we establish the real orientation, of facing the future which is coming at us, we need to account for this, sort out, and "deconfuse" all the confusion which was caused by thinking that what we see while we are looking into the rear view mirror, is really what is in front of us.

But I would repeat that on some level, separateness has a certain reality. A relative and impermanent and maybe ultimately illusionary nature, but still having a certain superficial factual nature. Like the difference and physical boundary between the United States and Canada. Sure, it is totally artificial, except for lakes and such. But one disregards that boundary at their own risk. But anyone who completely and absolutely denies the distinction between self and other... please contact me! I am accepting monetary donations, and will give you my Paypal address! — 0 thru 9

I agree with the need to accept the reality of boundaries, individuals, and separate objects. After all, this is what we sense, especially with our eyes. We sense boundaries and separations. The problem is that the existence of these boundaries is not a good starting point because they are so difficult to define. We cannot define these boundaries because we really do not know what they consist of. This problem foils any analysis which proceeds in this direction. Analysis is dependent on creating such divisions, so if the division cannot be created cleanly, the analysis is doomed to failure. The temporal division between past and future however, gives us a much cleaner boundary to start an analysis, than does the spatial separation between individuals.

That sounds ad hoc. Why is purpose subjective? The purpose of the eye is to see, and that of the nose is to smell. It would be objectively wrong to believe that the purpose of the eye is to smell, and that of the nose is to see. — Samuel Lacrampe

To see what, to smell what? There is no objectivity here, just a general principle produced by inductive reasoning. The eyes sees things therefore it's purpose is to see. The nose smells things therefore its purpose is to smell. But not everything can be seen, nor can everything be smelled, so these senses are selective and not objective.

How do you reconcile this idea with the idea that there is a worse, better, and best circle? — Samuel Lacrampe

I already explained this, the judgement of a worse or better circle is made relative to some principle or principles. We have an idea of what a circle ought to be, and we judge things accordingly, as a better circle or worse circle, This is a relative good. it is subjective because the principle by which the thing is judged to be good or bad, "circleness", is chosen. The same thing which is good relative to this principle, is bad relative to the principle of "squareness". So the same thing is both good and bad, depending on the principle it is related to.

The good which an object has, by it's very existence, is an absolute, objective good. This good inheres within the object simply by being an object, so it is objective. It is not a particular property of the object so it requires no relation to a principle for judgement of that property, the object is just said to be good, by virtue of being an object.

This definition of 'good' effectively makes the term superfluous: any thing is by definition a good thing, and a bad thing would be a contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

It only appears to be superfluous if you do not recognize the possibility of not-being. If to be is good, then not-being is bad. How is this superfluous? It is, by definition, good to be a thing, and to be nothing is bad.

This almost sounds like what I am saying in the OP, with the exception that you make all purposes subjective, and I make them objective. We should therefore clarify this. — Samuel Lacrampe

Go ahead then, and explain to me how purpose is objective, I'll explain why this is impossible. "Objective", means of the object, adhering within the object. "Purpose" is to have a function. So if an object has a purpose, this means that it has a function relative to something else. This "something else" may itself be an object, so that the original thing is a part of that larger object, but the purpose of the original object is always external to that object, determined by its relation to some larger object. So the purpose of any object can never be property of that object, it is not "of the object", nor does it inhere within the object, it is dependent on that object's relation to something else.

No sir. If the "other" can judge a person as being good or bad, it follows that the purpose known is the human purpose; not the other's purpose. Here is an analogy: The purpose of a tugboat is to tow larger boats. Say the tugboat does not know its purpose, but we do. We can judge the tugboat by its action, relative to its purpose. Note that it is its purpose and not ours, even though we know it and it does not. The same goes for the conscience and the "other" when judging humans. — Samuel Lacrampe

You left out one critical premise required for your conclusion. How does judging good or bad determine a thing's objective purpose? The tugboat tows boats and is judged to be good because of this. The "purpose" is in the one who judges, this is the desired end, to have boats pulled. The judgement is subjective. How does this put the purpose into the tugboat so that you can say objectively, that the tugboat's purpose is to tow boats. Consider this. I dig in the ground with the claws of my hammer. We can say that the hammer's purpose is to dig in the ground. But that is a subjective purpose, dependent on my desired end. How can we say objectively that the hammer's purpose is to dig in the ground?

Yes, in that post which was being referenced I was describing self-identities. One of which (let’s call it the non-dual identity) is still technically a self-identity. But since in this example one is reaching beyond oneself on a radical level (what am I? who am I?) it could conceivably satisfy the conditions of being “disidentification” , which is our made-up term. — 0 thru 9

I think that to dissolve identification, to "disidentificate", it is necessary to acknowledge the dual nature of identity, one way or another. When you see that it is impossible to deny the duality of identity, then the idea that you have "an identity" seems very doubtful.

I find the division to be quite readily drawn along the division between past and future. There is a "myself" of the past, and a "myself" of the future. These two cannot be the same because the one is defined by what I have done, and the other by what I will do, and these are distinct. Consider what unenlightended says:

Now suppose I were to tell the story of Posty-depressed becoming Posty-elevated, by means of enlightenment philosophy. Alas, that story would make the connection, identify them as the same, and thus drag depression back into the world of Posty-elevated. The two identities are mutually dependent on their independence, the way my identity as not going to parties is dependent on the parties I don't go to, and my continuing no to go to them. — unenlightened

Notice that unenlightened makes the same point. The "me" of the past is distinct from the "me" of the future, and having this attitude, knowing this, allows us to change as human individuals, and improve ourselves.

Now let me tell you the difficult, counter-intuitive part. The "me" of the past, and this is what I called the identity assigned to you by others, according to the acts you have carried out in the past, is actually produced, or created by the "me" of the future. I can identify with what I want to be, in the future, and act accordingly, such that as time passes these activities become the new "me" of the past, and the new identity of me in the past. So Posty wants to become elevated, and unenlightened wants to not go to parties. As "what you want", this is the half of your identity which is in the future, it is the future "you", your future identity, the part of your identity which is not evident to others. Posty begins to act in ways to become elevated and unenlightened ceases going to parties. Then this becomes your past identity, Posty is elevated and unenlightened does not go to parties.

It is counter-intuitive because we think of causation in the sense of activities of the past causing the future situation, in the determinist way. But in the case of self-identity, the past part of my identity has always been caused by the future part of my identity. When I want something, this is the future part of my identity, inspiring me to act. After the act occurs, it becomes a part of my past identity. Now when I was young, I wanted to play guitar. I couldn't even hold the instrument at that time, so playing guitar wasn't a part of my "identity", in the sense of past identity. But that "want" was still a part of my identity at that time, so I give it reality as the part of my identity which was in the future at that time. So I was inspired and I practised, and now playing guitar is a part of my identity in the sense of past identity. I can analyze aspects of my "past identity", which by inductive reasoning make me "what I am" today, and try to determine the future part of my identity which was active at that time creating this identity.

I’m not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that one’s “true identity” IS one given by others?
Or just asking if Posty thinks it is? — 0 thru 9

Yes, just asking. it's a rhetorical question, it can't really be properly answered, but it was devised to make Posty think about the question, and ultimately to consider the dual nature of identity.

1. As far as the individual is concerned, there are two sides (or poles) of reality: Self and Other. — 0 thru 9

Let me ask you to try on something new 0 thru 9. Forget this Self/Other distinction which the mode of thinking that you have been trained in, has conditioned you into believing are the two sides, or poles, of reality. Consider that perhaps the real fundamental two sides, or poles of reality, which the individual is concerned with are past and future. The individual is concerned with distinguishing memories from anticipations, and establishing relations between these. This is basic, and the self/other distinction is secondary.

3. The distinction between Self and Other is often relatively distinct, but it is not completely black-and-white. It is not an absolute yes or no question.
4. The distinction between Self and Other is a fluid, moving boundary. Like the heap of sand Sorites paradox. — 0 thru 9

That is the problem with the self/other distinction, it is far too vague. The past/future distinction offers a much more clear-cut division. Further, there is nothing inherent within the self/other distinction which makes it an essential aspect of human nature, it has just been chosen as an analytical principle, and many have addressed its flaws. It is based in the spatial assumption that objects are separate from each other. But we know that objects really overlap by gravity and other fields, and that's why the self/other division doesn't make a good boundary, there is no such boundary in reality.

When a person is a child, one is probably very fuzzy about the difference between themself and their surroundings or mother, for instance. But put in a positive way, children seem in general to be very aware of the “connectedness” of things. They are in the moment, in the flow of life. Thus they often seem to have wisdom beyond their years. Adults gain the critical knowledge of individuality, but often lose the sense of immersion or connection with anything beyond oneself. The goal (as some have said) is to have the ability to recognize both, in whatever proportion is necessary at the moment. To be deficient as a part, or as a whole is to be an incomplete human. For an individual is a whole, which is a part of a another whole. Not unlike viewing energy as both a wave and as a particule. — 0 thru 9

See, this very passage demonstrates that you really believe that the self/other distinction is not the fundamental division of the individual's reality. The child doesn't recognize this division, but is taught it, and learns it through social training, so much so that the adult often forgets that it is an artificial, manufactured division. But this social convention doesn't approach the real fundamental boundary, which is the division between past and future, a division which is recognized by children, naturally, without requiring social conditioning.

I would agree that one’s self identity is in relation and in context to others and the surroundings. That actually what I was getting at, obviously it is not really a radical idea. But why I think it is a crucial point is because it is possible to believe that one is almost completely separated from the rest of the world. At least as separate as possible while still interacting with the world. Here I’m speaking from personal
mental or psychological experience. There have been times when I viewed people and objects like a bunch of marbles bouncing off each other, but having absolutely no commonality, no intersection. Now, I view things and people as deeply intertwined and interrelating in some shape or form. Even strangers who will never meet, or even exist at the same time. Even if I can’t imagine or dare to speculate HOW and WHY they interrelate. But let me add that the marble metaphor above was not totally inaccurate. It reflects a certain reality, the reality of separation which is real. Relatively real, only partially real, but nonetheless real. — 0 thru 9

This is the inevitable (bad) result of upholding this social convention of the self/other division, isolation. Propagating this ideal cannot lead anywhere else but to isolation because once the separation is produced, it cannot be bridged except by a further manufactured, or artificial principle, and this would leas us a further step into the unreal..

I think what I am most interested in and focusing on (for therapeutic value, personally at least) is the BOUNDARIES of what one considers “self” and “not self”. Like I mentioned before, our bodies are made of water, minerals, gases, plant, and animal materials that were somewhere else, were something else before they were part of us. So there is a connection physically, and I would imagine in other ways as well. — 0 thru 9

You ought to consider the possibility that these boundaries aren't real. Our bodies are made up of water, minerals, gases, etc., but there aren't boundaries separating these things. We are made up of atoms, and molecules, but they are not separated by boundaries. Neither is there a boundary between self and not self. If you want to analyze a real boundary which is fundamental to human identity, you ought to check into the boundary between past and future. When this becomes your fundamental boundary in analysis, then there is no need to create the artificial (and divisive) distinction between self and other.

If someone says “everyone is a liar, so don’t believe a word anyone says”, then one naturally wonders if that statement includes the speaker, or somehow the speaker is exceptional. — 0 thru 9

Rename this the Trump paradox.

I think 0 through 9, did a better job at describing disidentification than I did. Reference to his post in case I might have made things ambiguous. — Posty McPostface

But it seams to me, that what is being described is self-identity. How could it be possible to detach oneself from self-identity in general, by giving oneself a new self-identity? Isn't your true identity the one which others have given you?

My take on disidentification is akin to the Eastern “large mind” as opposed to the “small mind”. When one strictly and absolutely only identifies with their own existence and body/mind, is seems to me something is missing. Like a wonderful radio that isn’t plugged in or something. Now, that is somewhat of a theoretical example. I truly doubt many people are completely self-contained and solipsistic. Any kind of relationship or caring for someone or something brings one “out of oneself”. Also theoretical is completely identifying with the world outside oneself. A balance needs to be struck. But it seems many lean towards the self-contained, myself included. — 0 thru 9

This distinction is common in philosophy, expressed in different ways. It's sometime expressed as semantics (intrinsic meaning), and context (external relations). It may be expressed as content and form, and there are other ways to express the same sort of distinction. Notice how this distinction exists in theory, but the division cannot be made in practise. You might think, for instance, that any given word has a meaning proper to it, regardless of its context, but in reality context plays a big part in determining the meaning. So the two are not readily separable. Likewise, the identity of "I", "self", though it is separable from the "others" in theory, when it comes to applying that theory, it's fundamentally impossible because the meaning of "what I am", which is my self-identity, is given by context.

This is why I prefer the temporal analogy, because it allows us to remove the spatial representation which is implied by terms like "internal/external", and context, etc.. The spatial representation, because of this implication, tends to extend to the self/other distinction, and this produces the difficulty. If we make a temporal representation instead, we can produce a much cleaner division. The past is "other", it is the context, the external. The future is "self", it is what is within me, what I want, what I can do.

Notice that in the nature of time itself, the division between past and future is very sharp and clear. There cannot be any mixing of past and future, because this is completely contradictory and impossible. it is a very clean divide. However, the things which exist in time appear to extend across that divide. So. when I identify myself as a thing, existing in time, (and this might be how others identify me), it appears like my existence straddles the division between past and future. From this perspective, that I am a thing extended in time, the clear sharp division between past and future is lost. My identity is a straddling of that very clean divide. But this clear sharp division is of the utmost importance to maintain, in order to avoid the contradiction of the past mixing with the future. If you allow your identity to straddle this division, all your descriptions of yourself will be lost into the confusion of this contradiction. That identity, as a thing straddling this sharp divide, which nothing can straddle without self-contradiction, is the identity which must be released.

The identity which the others give you is your past. They've known you, and hand you your identity based on what they know about your past The identity you want, the ideal self, is your future. The problem is that you cannot disidentify with your past, you cannot remove the identity bestowed on you by others, because this is beyond the power of your will. Therefore you cannot have, in the future, the identity which you want, the ideal self, either, because what you want is impossible.

Wouldn't that just be assigning yourself an identity though? How could you detach yourself from this "ideal identity" you've assigned to yourself, without turning back to the identity which others have assigned to you?

So which identity is it that you are seeking detachment from, the identity you have assigned to yourself, or the identity which others have assigned to you?

My question would be what is identity in the sense being used here, as one's personal identity? Is your identity what others assign to you? In this case detachment would be to separate yourself from this, and create your own identity. Or is your identity what you give to yourself, in which case detachment would be to separate yourself from this and allow others to give you your identity. What is your "existing identity" and which way are you going in your detachment?

Yes, I understand; but, how does this relate to 'disidentification'? I can see some relation to it in terms of the futility of disidentification in regards to confronting the present if that's all possible as you say. — Posty McPostface

To tell you the truth, I've been reading this thread, and haven't yet figured out exactly what disidentification is. Maybe it involves recognizing that we live in the past and future, rather than at the present. Therefore there is no such things as "I am", only what I was, and what I will be.

"narrative" I think is the word you missed. Anticipation happens, but in the absence of narrative thought, which is the sense of self, the music plays itself. — unenlightened

Yes, I see that now, your reference to a "state of mind that is devoid of narrative thought", and perhaps were not so far apart in our opinions. Would you agree that narrative thought refers to past? So anticipatory thought, referring to the future, still occurs in the absence of narrative thought. Thought about "self" refers to the present. When we recognize that reality consists of past (referred to in narrative thought), and future(referred to in anticipatory thought), then we see that thought about the present (self) is delusional.

Problems are literally made of thought. Situations exist independently of our minds. Problems are our relationship with a situation, ie. thoughts. — Jake

A "problem", so described, is not the cause of suffering, it is the result of suffering. The problematic situation, which is suffering itself, induces the mind to create "a problem" in an effort to bring about a resolution to the problematic situation. Problems are things which the mind can solve, and as such, they are tools by which the mind acts to bring about an end to the problematic situation (suffering).

When we talk about the good, I mean specifically the objective good. I agree with you when it comes to subjective goods like best song or best flavour of ice cream. But when it comes to objective goods, like best circle, hammer, math homework or health, that best is objective, and hence not a matter of opinion. Surely you must agree that the best circle is something like this, and not this. — Samuel Lacrampe

If good is associated with purpose, how can there be an objective good? Good would be determined relative to one's intention, and intentions vary. Your example, "best circle", is not an example of purpose. I think if we are talking about a supposed objective good, we must remove the idea of purpose.

This type of belief forces you to forfeit terms like change, good, and potentiality; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's not necessarily true. A thing's perfect nature, could be a changing nature. All I am saying is that a thing's perfect nature cannot be other than what the thing is, or else that is not that thing's perfect nature it is something else's perfect nature.

Good: You would need to forfeit terms like good, bad, better, worse, etc; because for you, all beings are perfect beings as you said. This means there is no such thing as a bad health state, but only "the health state which currently is". — Samuel Lacrampe

No, it just means we'd have to define "good" in another way. That's an objective good, good is in the object, by virtue of being the object which it is, it is good. Now we might relate one object to another, and say that one is better according to some principle like a "purpose", and come up with a relative, or subjective good. We could do this with human beings for example and compare them in terms of "health", and say that one is better than the other.

All that it means is that we recognize two distinct meanings of "good". One, the objective good, is what is proper to the object, by virtue of existing as an object, any object is good. It is said that is why God created existence in general, He saw that it was good. So every object according to the fact that it has existence, is good. Existence is good, and that is the objective good. But there is also a more common, subjective meaning of "good", and that is a relative good. When we compare things, we use a principle of comparison, or measurement, and that is the subjective good, because we are free to choose which principle to use.

I agree with everything you have said up to that point. The distinction is between metaphysics and epistemology. As per the definition of good, if there is a real degree of good, then there is a real purpose, regardless if we know it or not. Indeed, if we don't know the purpose, then we cannot know or judge what is good; unless the judgement comes to us by another which knows the purpose. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point is that if you want a true "objective good" you must dismiss the notion of purpose, because "purpose" is inherently subjective. Therefore we cannot know "objectively" the purpose whereby we would judge degrees of good, because this is inherently subjective. That is why theologians turn to the other sense of "good", the one I outlined above, the good of existence, the good which is inherent within every being by virtue of it being, to find an objective good. This does not mean that the subjective good is rendered as "useless", but we must be careful to maintain the separation, and not represent the subjective good as if it were objective.

So, at first we don't know our purpose so we cannot judge of what is good. But we are told what is good by another which we call conscience. Assuming that our conscience speaks the truth, then what is judged to be good is a real good. This therefore implies a real purpose, which the conscience must know. — Samuel Lacrampe

You are just repeating the same mistake. Conscience apprehends "good" which comes to us from the source of "other". It doesn't apprehend the purpose because the purpose inheres within the other. It only apprehends that this or that is good. We can relate "good" within our own intentional minds, to purpose, and assume that the good which comes to us from "other" is also associated to some purpose, but we cannot conclude that the conscience must know this purpose.

I think he was referring to the term 'flow' in music or being in the 'zone'. One is in the present moment and doesn't deviate from it. — Posty McPostface

The present is a division between the future and the past. There is no "present moment" because by the time you say "now" it is in the past. So what we call "living in the present" is not living in that moment which is a dimensionless boundary between past and future, because there is no such thing. What we call "living in the present" is living in a time which is partially past and partially future. Depending on what we are doing, and thinking about, we might sometimes focus more on the past part, and other times more on the future part. We can't focus on the present part because there is no such thing. That would be delusional. In doing something like playing music we must be very much focused on the future part "what is coming", and very little focused on the past part, "what has just happened".

I can suppose verification would show something hasn't been proven false, so in that light it would make an assumption of truth rational, but aside from particles verifying only brings light to truth, but it can't create it. — Cheshire

I don't think so. To show that something has not been proven false does not verify that thing, it only verifies that the thing has not been proven false. So it is not at all rational to assume as true, the thing which hasn't been proven false.

As for "verifying only brings light to truth, but it can't create it", that assertion hasn't yet been justified. Do you think of truth as correspondence? How could one thing correspond with another without some sort of judgement? And how could there be a judgement without some form of verification?

I'm not really reading Janus quite the same way. If we count 1000 things as true, we'll probably discover some amount were actually not true at a point later in time, so allowing for this inevitable seems worth while to me. To be counted as true allows for errors, to simply be true ignores the reservation. — Cheshire

It appears to me, that when you and Janus say such and such "counts as true", what you are really saying is that such and such is justified. So you're not talking about what it means to be true at all. If you want to talk about what it means to be true, then we must move on from this talk about being "counted as true", because this is just another way of saying "justified", and that's not truth at all.

I'm not a surfer, but a musician, and I assume that riding the wave is similar. And my experience is that when it is going well, one is focused on what one is doing and not the future; the music plays itself and one rides it, content to be in the groove and singularly un-oppressed. It is, to be specific, a state of mind that is devoid of narrative thought, and thus psychologically timeless as to past and future. — unenlightened

I am a musician as well, but I do many other things, and I know that being focused on what one is doing means being focused on the future, even if that future is just a split second ahead. That's why making a mistake is not a problem for a good musician, it's in the past as soon as it's made, and the musician's focus is on the future. If the mistake distracts you, your focus sips from the future to the past, and a worse mistake will follow.

I don't know what instrument you play, but can you play it without looking at your fingering? If you can, then the fingering is done correctly by being focused on where your fingers will be, and making sure that they move to get there on time. If you rely on your sight to make sure that your fingering is correct, you see where you want your fingers to go and you move them there. So either way, you are actually always focused on the future when playing music. You must always be prepared to play each note when the appropriate time comes to play it. If you ever take the time to think about what you are doing when you play music you will see that timing is incredibly important, and timing is impossible without being focused on the future. Each beat must be anticipated by every member of the band or orchestra, or else the band is out of synch. I've never before heard a musician say "the music plays itself". Playing music is not a cinch.

What is meaning. then?

I sugest it is the understanding of, and interpretation of - the use of - our utterances.

Again, meaning is not in the head of an individual. — Banno

You're only contradicting yourself. You say that meaning is the understanding and interpretation of utterances. But clearly this is what goes on in the heads of individuals. Then you say that meaning is not in the head of an individual.

I suggest that we define meaning differently. Isn't meaning what is inherent within things like utterances, statements, and propositions? These things are a representation of what was meant by the author, so we say that they have meaning. I think meaning is what was meant.

Do you acknowledge a difference between saying something, and therefore meaning to say what was said, and interpreting or understanding what was said? What was meant must be interpreted, and the interpretation is not necessarily a correct, or even an adequate understanding of what was said, therefore understanding and interpretation is something other than meaning.

Now, do you see a difference between "meaning" and "value"? Can you apprehend interpretation as a form of valuation, or even evaluation? It's a matter of judging importance. We all view things through a veil of personal values, and this determines what is important to us. So when we interpret we must fit the words into our own structure, or hierarchy, of values or else we cannot understand what was said. We only remember what has importance. What you call "shared meaning" is more like a shared value structure by which we may have compatible interpretations of meaning.

The future is not oppressing us. The future doesn't even exist. Our RELATIONSHIP with the future is the issue, and we do have some level of control over that. — Jake

Do you have control over the passing of time? If not, the future is oppressing you. Some level of control over what you do does not exclude the possibility that you are being oppressed.

Put more precisely, it's not clear to you. And to be fair, not clear to very many people, including some very bright folks. — Jake

The "bright folks" see the logic which you are missing, thinking is not the source of suffering. I suppose it's clear to you that the sun orbits the earth? Sometimes what appears to be very clear, is not really the case, and that might be why "some very bright folks" are saying otherwise.

Next, the assumption is that it is also truthful; its info is correct. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is where we disagree. There is a disconnect, a gap of incompatibility between "goodness is judged according to purpose", and "goodness is judged by conscience". "Judged by purpose" allows for many possible purposes, so goodness is relative, what is good for one purpose is not good for another. "Judged by conscience" is different from "judged by purpose".. If "conscience" is adapted to allow for many possible purposes, it becomes completely useless because it looses the capacity to say that one purpose is better than another purpose, and conscience cannot judge goodness, as goodness is relative to purpose. If "conscience" is supposed to determine which purpose is better than another, then we judge goodness by conscience, and not by purpose at all. "Good" according to conscience and "good" according to purpose are distinct and have not been made compatible.

As such, its purpose is clear: to inform us on which behaviour is morally good and morally bad. Next, based on particular data from conscience, we induce general moral laws like the Golden Rule or Kant's Categorical Imperative. Finally, based on the common language that what we call a "good person" is a morally good person, we deduce that the human purpose is to abide to the general moral rules. — Samuel Lacrampe

So you proceed here to say that goodness is judged by conscience. This means that goodness is not judged relative to purpose, these two are distinct. So we must dismiss the premise of good according to purpose. We had two incompatible "goods" which have not been made to agree with each other, so if we choose one we must dismiss the other. Since purpose has been dismissed, we cannot "deduce that the human purpose is to abide to the general moral rules". That would be equivocation.

Shall we say, then that, there is a kind of thought that creates the thinker, as part of, the centre of, thought - call it identifying thought, and a kind of thought that is purely external, about the world, about the present, that does not add to the suffering self?

I think that is the joy of the surfer, or the musician, that she is fully present, remembering the tune, and where she is in it, but concerned with the expression of this note, and unconcerned about the missed note in the last section or the difficult passage coming up. I wonder if it is possible to do philosophy like that? Thinking it through to the logical conclusion but unconcerned with the conclusion? — unenlightened

I wouldn't say that it is so easy to make such a division of kinds of thought. There are different ways of being "fully present", and maybe some ought not actually be called "fully present" at all. The surfers, musicians, entertainers, sports players, are all engaged in activities which require a keen awareness of the future. Being focused on what one is doing, is really a matter of being focused on what one is about to do. As the future unfolds, it oppresses us with the need to make decisions, this is the real source of suffering, the oppression of the future forcing itself upon us. Other than suicide, we have no choice but to cope with this oppression. That is something beyond our power of will.

This is why I said that placing oneself into the context of a particular activity forces the content of one's thought. And since the person is practiced, it is a familiar, and comfortable place, mentally. We look at the person performing, and think about how difficult it must be for that person, but the difficulty of that act which you call being "fully present", is in the physical performance, forcing back at the future, so that the future will be as you will it to be, and the performance will be flawless. The mental difficulty of that act is all in the past, the training, through which one fights the oppression of the future, learning how to make it be as you will it to be, allowing yourself to find comfort in that place we call the present.

The nature of time is such that comfort requires effort. That is why "relax and be comfortable" is self-contradictory

THINKING: If thinking is nourishing our life, ok, let's think. When thinking starts generating suffering, we can take break from thinking. — Jake

The problem is that the future is always oppressing us, that is its nature, and we cannot change it. Because of this there is always an inclination to think. You can say "relax, live in the present, sit on the couch and take a break", but that doesn't stop the coming of the future, so it doesn't stop the inclination to think either.

If that was true then we would have long ago stumbled upon the correct thought content and we'd all be happy. What we see instead is that suffering in one form or another, to one degree or another, is universal property of the human experience. This clearly points to the source of suffering being something that we all have in common. — Jake

There's a bit of unsound logic here. You are missing a very important premise, and that is that at every moment of time the world is different from how it was at the last moment. The "correct thought content" is directly related to how the world is. Therefore the correct thought content changes at every moment, and it is impossible that we could have determined the correct thought content a long time ago, and left it at that.

However, I think you are correct to say that suffering is a universal property of human experience. But since thinking can provide us with relief from suffering, and we only blame thinking for our suffering when it fails to provide relief, it is clear that thinking is not the source of suffering. As I described to unenlightened above, I believe the source of suffering to be the oppressive nature of the future.

Here again, you think meaning is in one person's head, I think it is something we build together. I'm right. — Banno

We're not talking about meaning, we're talking about the understanding of, and interpretation of meaning. To understand, and to interpret are things which happen within each of our minds. That's evident.

Again, you're practising this act which I've noticed is prevalent in modern metaphysics. You are changing what we are talking about, redefining to suit your purpose. If meaning is what we are talking about, you might be right. But we are not talking about meaning, we are talking about the understanding of meaning, so you're not right. I'd wish you good luck on trying to change reality to suit your metaphysical principles, but that's really bad metaphysics, and I'd prefer that you would just quit, and start adapting your principles instead..

OK, now that we've settled that we can stop thinking about it.

But here's the problem. Not only is suffering made of thought, but so is happiness. Contrary to what you claim, the problem really is the content, not the act of thinking itself. Consider your example of surfing in the wave. This activity doesn't make the thinking go away, it forces the content.

As everyday conversation demonstrates, we do share such understandings. — Banno

How does conversation show that we share an understanding? Talking about the same things is a far cry from sharing an understanding.

So you think it's OK to believe things without having any rational justification for doing so? If that's true, then why bother trying to practice philosophy at all? — Janus

I don't see how believing things without justification is incompatible with practising philosophy. Perhaps I practise philosophy in an attempt to understand why I believe things without justification.

And again you seem to have failed to notice (just like MU) that I did not say that every truth requires a justification, but that everything we count as being true requires justification. Can you not understand that distinction? — Janus

You haven't answered my criticism. How can you count that being justified is equivalent to being counted as being true, unless you believe that being justified and being true are one and the same thing? If you do not believe that being true and being justified are one and the same thing, then being justified counts as being justified, and nothing more. But being justified cannot be equivalent to being counted as being true if being justified and being true are counted as two distinct things..

Could you hope to find a better example of blatant self-contradiction than is exemplified in these two statements? — Janus

I suppose I'm not so good at finding "blatant self-contradiction" as you are. Perhaps you could help me by showing me where to look.

[

Here you appear to be using "verification" for some form of interpretation - so are you saying that in order to be true a proposition must be understood? How would that be different from saying that in order to be true a proposition must be a proposition?

Hence, I do not understand your point. — Banno

Yes, in order to be true a proposition must be understood. Under your definition of "proposition" though, a proposition must have a special type of understanding, a shared understanding. But this is impossible because understanding is not the type of thing which a person shares with another. My understanding is mine, and yours is yours. So propositions as they exist, are not "propositions" according to your definition.

So we're right back to the same place we were. And I think you really do understand my point or else you wouldn't have demonstrated it so succinctly with your post.

Here's an issue relative to the "history of metaphysics" . There is a trend in modern metaphysics to define words in unorthodox ways. So for example we have earlier in the thread Collingwood's definition of "presupposition" which allows for an "absolute presupposition", and here, your definition of "proposition". Then the unorthodox definition is use to support a metaphysical position. The problem is that the definition doesn't reflect the real use of the word, so the "presuppositions", or in this case "propositions", which are described are articles of fiction, they are not the presuppositions or propositions which are talked about in normal discourse. So the metaphysics supported by the arguments which utilize the fictional definitions are simply illusions, they do not reflect reality. That's bad metaphysics.

Not at all; I have explained many times now to apparently little avail, considering Banno's responses (only Michael seems to have understood) that I count being justified as equivalent to being counted as true. — Janus

That's exactly what I said, you confuse justified with true. Here you just admitted so much by saying that you count being justified as equivalent to being true. Therefore you see no difference between being justified and being true.

Would it makes sense to say that we count anything as true without justification? — Janus

Yes, it does make sense to say that. I think we often say that we believe something is true without being able to justify why we believe it is true. This is the case with intuition, it inclines one to believe in the truth of something without justification for that belief.

Verification: the processor instance of establishing the truth or validity of something.

The question is whether something can be true without this verification process which establishes that it is true. It is very similar to the question of justification. Some argue that a belief can be justified without a process of justification. It is not the same question though, because "true" is not the same as "justified". So the process which establishes "truth" is not necessarily the same process as the process which establishes "justified". Since "verification" can refer to one or the other, the process which establishes truth, or the process which establishes justification, the Banno and Janus discussion reflects a failure to separate these two.

Janus seems to confuse justified with true, and Banno argues that a proposition can be true without any act of verification which would justify the proposition. But Banno doesn't seem to recognize that an act of verification, perhaps a different sort of verification, is required in order that a proposition may be true.

The only out I could see for you is to go back to something like Meta's position: — Banno

See, my position avoids the problems of yours (the need for a true interpretation), and the problems of Janus' as well (the disrespected distinction between being true and being judged as true). It really is the only out.

You refuse to accept what I tell you or offer a sound reason to reject it. — Dfpolis

As I've explained to you, these are two distinct modes of description which may be applied to the very same acts, not two distinct types of acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is that not a sound reason? Are you going to support your claim of two distinct types of acts, intentional acts and physical acts, or not?

While your argument is valid, its conclusion unreasonable, as it fails the Law of Parsimony. — Samuel Lacrampe

When this occurs, that the argument is valid, but the conclusion unreasonable, then we must verify the premises. This is how we may test premises. If certain premises can produce unreasonable conclusions, then we know that there is a problem somewhere with the premises. The premise which appears like it could be faulty is the idea that conscience may be a chance occurrence. If we dismiss this premise, then there is a reason for conscience, let's say it serves a purpose.

Further, for the sake of argument, let's associate purpose with good, as you suggested. To judge a being's goodness, we need to know that being's purpose. The obvious question is how do we get from knowing that there is "a purpose", to knowing "the purpose". See, judging goodness requires knowing the purpose of something, and I have admitted that conscience serves "a purpose", so now we need to know "the purpose" of conscience in order to know that what conscience determines as good, is really good.

More importantly however, let's recall why conscience was brought up. The argument from degree is based on the hypothesis definition that good is the measure of how close a being gets to its perfect nature or function. You attempted to falsify it by pointing out that we perceive persons as being more or less good despite not knowing the human purpose. Thus conscience was brought up to explain how we are able to perceive goodness in persons without the need to know human purpose. Whether or not conscience is a reliable source of data, its existence is sufficient to counter the objection. — Samuel Lacrampe

The simple existence of conscience does not suffice to validate judgement of the degree of goodness. As the definition dictates, the degree of goodness is judged according to the designated purpose. This requires knowing the purpose. Conscience tells us that there is "a purpose", and free will allows us to choose "the purpose", so we have a number of possible purposes to choose from. The degree of goodness is therefore dependent on the choice of purpose. This is why a person's act may be judged by one person as good, but by another as not good, or even judged this way by the same person, in relation to different purposes. Therefore conscience cannot be used to validate our judgements of goodness. We still need to determine "the purpose", as knowing that there is "a purpose" does not suffice.

Regarding the terms ideal, quantity, quality: I don't mind trying to adjust the terms to apply to your meanings. As for me, I can find other terms to fit my meanings as intended in the OP. Thus what I meant by 'ideal' or 'maximum degree' can become 'perfection' or 'best'. — Samuel Lacrampe

OK, that was my main objection with the argument by degree, "maximum" implies quantity. So let's remove this term and see what happens to the argument.

P1: If there exist beings with varying degrees of a property, then there must exist a being with that property to the maximum degree. — Samuel Lacrampe

Notice how "maximum degree" implies more in quantity. Any time we compare quantities, there is a distinct judgement of more or less. And, if a number of different quantities are compared, there is always one which is the most, "the maximum". So if a property is numbered, graded by quantity, we can make a judgement as to which quantity is the maximum.

Now, instead of "maximum", let's assume that we judge a property by "best", or "ideal". We cannot say that the highest quantity is "the best". Further, what is best for me is not necessarily the same as what is best for you. So there is my judgement of "best", your judgement of "best", and all the other judgements of "best". Why would you assume that there must be a being with the best of any particular property, when "the best of that property" is a number of varying degrees of that property, depending on who is making the judgement. Doesn't it seem more logical that it is actually impossible that there is a being with the best of that property, because this would mean that the being would have to have a number of different degrees of that property at the very same time, to satisfy what every different person considers as "the best" of that property?

Now what is goodness? Rather than seeing good and bad as two separate and opposite beings, it is more correct to see good/bad as how close/far a being gets to its perfect nature or function. — Samuel Lacrampe

Now let's continue, and analyze your conception of goodness. What is a being's perfect nature? Any being is the being which it is. If it were something other than the being which it is, it would not be the being which it is. This "otherness" would be an imperfection to that being's nature. So every being, by its very nature of being the being which it is, is perfect in goodness because if it had any otherness, this would be an imperfection to the nature of that being.

That is to judge goodness by the being's "perfect nature". Every being is that particular being's own perfect nature because to have a different nature would make it other than the being which it is, and it's perfect nature would then not be the nature of the being which it is. So it's impossible that a being's perfect nature could be other than what the being actually is.

If you want to judge goodness by the being's function, then this is something completely different. To judge the being's function is to place it in relation to something else, give it context in relation to a larger being for example. Now we are not judging goodness according to the being's perfect nature, rather we are judging it according to another being's nature.

This is not my position. — Dfpolis

If that is not your position, then can you explain to me the principles whereby you class an act as either physical or intentional. That's what I'm trying to get you to explain. As I've explained to you, these are two distinct modes of description which may be applied to the very same acts, not two distinct types of acts. When we attempt to describe an act, we choose to describe the physical aspect of it, the intentional aspect of it, or both. I think that I've satisfactorily demonstrated that many acts of living beings may be described as both, they have an intentional aspect, and a physical aspect.

It appears to me, like your position is to assume a dichotomy between physical acts and intentional acts, such that they are mutually exclusive. But I see that this exclusive categorization presents problems, such as the assumption of activities which have no physical dimension. Therefore I am trying to get more information from you, concerning these activities which are assumed to have no physical dimension.

(1) We observe purely intentional acts such as knowing and willing by introspection, so they are observable. They are not intersubjectively observable, it is true, but that is of no epistemological consequence. — Dfpolis

OK, let's assume that there are mental acts, which we know about through introspection. Introspection tells me that even these acts have a dimension which is non-intentional, they are about something physical. And so there is a problem. These intentional acts of knowing and willing cannot be completely separated from their physical dimensions. Furthermore, we know that there is physical activity, (brain activity), which goes along with the intentional activity of thinking. So why propose a separation between these? If we want a clear representation of what is really the case, then why not allow that these are two different aspects of the same activity? I assume that the separation you propose is proposed as a principle, a tool for analysis, such that we might seek to understand the intentional aspect of the act separately from the physical aspect of the act, and understand how they relate to each other.

If we take this route of analysis, dividing the intentional from the physical, there is a problem which the physicalist is very happy to point out. ,Knowing and thinking may simply be the result, the effects of, physical brain action. The real activity here may be as the physicalist argues, neurological activities, while thinking and knowing are the results of these internal physical activities. This presents a problem for introspection. We can only observe through introspection, the thinking, knowing, and willing, aspect of these activities, we cannot examine the brain activity through introspection. So it is a problem much like that described by Kant's phenomena/noumena division. All that we can observe through introspection is how these activities are presented to the conscious mind, as thoughts, knowing, etc., but we cannot get to the "activities-in-themselves", which are much deeper within the living being.

So the problem is, that these acts, thinking and knowing etc., already consist of both physical and intentional aspects. The physical is the brain activity, and the intentional is what the thinking is about. Introspection does not allow us to go further, and separate the intentional and physical, in analysis as you suggest it might. So introspection doesn't allow us to observe purely intentional activity without the mix of physical activity, because all that is evident to introspection is thinking and knowing etc., which is already a complete mix of physical and intentional activity. This means that if we want to do the analysis which you propose, to separate the intentional from the physical, we need more than introspection, we need logical principles.

If you contrast the intentional with the physical, then the intentional must be non-physical. This implies that the intentional is, as I suggested, completely unobservable. As you can see, the purely intentional is not observable through introspection. Now, we need some principles whereby "an act" may be non-physical. How would you describe such an act? How does it relate to the fundamental principles of physics, space and time? Is this act outside of space and time?

False.

I certainly agree that, since the laws of nature are intentional, all physical acts, which are guided by those laws, are intentional wrt to God. They are not all intentional with respect to finite minds.

So, just to be clear, I do not see physical acts as lacking intentionality. That they have intentionality was my whole point in beginning this thread. Still, pure intentional acts are not physical acts. — Dfpolis

This is your assertion, that it is false that any act may be described physically without reference to intentionality, as is the physicalist's assumption. I challenged you to support this assertion, and you gave me an example or two, "knowing that...". As I explained to you, your examples represent eternal states, without change, and these are not "acts". A state is not an act. So the challenge is still there for you to support your assertion that there is an act which cannot be described as a physical act.

We need first to establish what good is in general. My definition of good refers to any type of good that is objective, not merely moral good. Thus it applies to circles, hammers, homework, health, morality, or really anything that has a nature, an identity. People may not all agree about the moral system, but all can agree that this circle is a better circle than this circle. Thus I believe that the definition of good is fitting. Once established, then we can move on to the next objections. — Samuel Lacrampe

The mistake is in referring to the one which is better than the other, (the circles for example), in terms of quantity, "the maximum". The "best" is the nearest to the ideal (the perfect conception), it is not the "maximum", which implies a quantity.

Both are existentially dependent upon language. So the difference doesn't make a difference here. — creativesoul

Seems you do not know the meaning of "number".

I presume you are not a physicalist because you, like me, see the errors of physicalism. Therefore, it is absurd to rest your case on a position we both agree is defective. — Dfpolis

If this is your opinion, then you're completely missing the point of my "case". We both see that physicalism has errors. Perhaps though, we do not see the same errors.

The physicalist claims that if an action can be described without reference to intention, it is not an intentional act (P1). Further, every action can be described without reference to intention (P2). Therefore no acts are properly called intentional. The error of physicalism which I see, is the first premise, that if an action can be described without reference to intention, it is not an intentional act. That is false, as my explanation, and example demonstrate. Intention is not observable, so when any act is described it is not necessary to include intention. If intentionality is referred to, it is added as an extra, unobservable part of the description.

My "case" is that you make the very same error. Your distinction between intentional acts and physical acts is based on how we choose to describe the act. The second premise above, is true, as my example of "walking down the street" demonstrates, any act can be described without reference to intention. Because you make the very same mistake as the physicalist, defining "physical act" according to the description of the act, and it is clear that any act can be described without reference to intention, your division between an intentional act and a physical act is completely arbitrary and absolutely meaningless.

There is a book called "The Hidden Life of Trees", by Peter Wohleben. The author has an extraordinary writing style, he refers to the intention behind all the different sorts of activities which trees are involved in. It is an uneasy read at first, because the man is well versed in the biology and science of arboriculture and the mix of the terminology of science with that of intention is unusual, requiring that one adapt to this writing style. The use of "intention" in reference to the acts of trees appears like the writings of a quack, yet this use of "intention is backed up, and supported by all sorts of scientific facts. The point now, is that the man is not incorrect to use "intention" in this way, describing all these activities of trees as intentional acts. It is just our custom and habit to restrict the adding of "intention" to our descriptions, such that we only use it in reference to conscious human acts. However, "intention" as per its common definition is found in activities everywhere throughout the biological world, and we really ought to start describing the intentional aspect of these activities, following the example that Mr. Wohleben sets. To leave intention out of the description, and describe these acts as "physical acts" is to provide an incomplete description of the act, in the erroneous way of the physicalist.

I wonder how much hope goes into willpower. — All sight

I think willpower is completely based in hope. Hope is what drives ambition and ambition is what feeds willpower. Without hope there is nothing to support willpower.

Do some people have more willpower than others? — All sight

Of course, we all have different dispositions, and therefore different forms of hope, and different degrees of willpower.

If I define "x" as "a sentence that does not exist.", what do we have then?
"x" - as a letter which refers to
"x" - as the idea of it being a variable which refers to
nothing (a sentence which does not exist)

We still can talk about x and sentences that do not exist: Such x'es do not require much typing. — Heiko

I think the issue here is that you have identified something as "a sentence that does not exist". So "x" signifies this thing which you call by that name. This is just like when we said "a" stands for an abstract entity. We have identified a thing which is being called an "abstract entity", and "a" represents that thing. Likewise, you have identified something as "a sentence that does not exist", and you represent this thing with "x"..

There is no problem with identifying and talking about abstract entities, and non-existent things, so long as we adhere to the law of identity. The thing identified must be the thing identified, and not something else. It's when we allow that the thing which is identified is something else, other than what it is identified as, like it has another identity as a distinct different thing, that we run into problems. I believe this is what happens in QM, there is a problem with the continuity of existence of the identified thing, so the thing is given another identity to create the guise of continuity. But the continuity is false because there are two distinct identities for what is said to be one and the same thing.

Rubbish.

Numbers are names of quantities. Numbers are existentially dependent upon language. Quantities are not. Quantities exist prior to numbers. Thus, there were quantities prior to numbers.

A quantity is not always a number of units. — creativesoul

You seem to have confused "number" with "numeral". There's a difference between these two, and that's why there are two distinct words with two distinct meanings. And so the "rubbish" is what you have written.

I see your point; but we need here to introduce another notion to show that the reasoning is not circular: Conscience or Moral Compass. When we observe a person as being morally good or bad, this is information that comes to us, not from us. This makes sense because if the moral judgement of men came strictly from men, then the whole exercise would be circular and pointless, like a prisoner being its own judge.

The reasoning thus goes like this: Through conscience, we acquire information that some persons are better than others; and from this, we induce the human purpose; which coincides with the moral ideal. — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm not sure of your use of "conscience" here. Conscience is an inner feeling, an intuition, so how can you say that it does not come from us? If it came "to us", it would not have that inner source, which it clearly does have. So you appear to have a contradiction here. Conscience is clearly an inner thing, within, yet you say that it comes to us, as if it comes from outside.

To resolve this, let's suppose it comes from within, like any inherited thing, genetic features, etc.. It appears to us to be the deepest within us, yet it really comes to us through inheritance, so it comes from outside the person. So inner things like intuition and conscience come to us from a seemingly "external" source, but it is not really external in the normal use of the word, because it comes to the individual from the internal, evidently having a source which is other than the individual, so it appears to be external. It comes from "outside" of the person, but that "outside" is really through the "inside". So we have two distinct boundaries which separate what is "me", from what is "not me". One boundary separates me from what is outside, and the other boundary separates me from what is inside.

The reasoning thus goes like this: Through conscience, we acquire information that some persons are better than others; and from this, we induce the human purpose; which coincides with the moral ideal. — Samuel Lacrampe

By considering this "internal" source of conscience, I can avoid the circle, but infinite regress looms. We can trace our heredity through humanity, and even follow genetics back through evolution, but where does it end? It may end at the beginning of life, but if life is just a random occurrence as some suggest, there is no real beginning here. Unless we know the reason why life began, we cannot find the human purpose here. So as much as "conscience" may lead us in specific directions, we cannot validate that it is leading us in the right direction, toward the real human purpose, because conscience itself may just be a chance occurrence, directed by random environmental events, like an evolutionist might argue. We need something to assure us that conscience is leading us in the right direction, and this can only come from knowing the purpose of life. So once again we're back to the circle.

It is odd to define 'ideal' as the scale rather than as the maximum degree of a property. In common language, the ideal grade for a homework is clearly 100%, not the percentage scale. — Samuel Lacrampe

An ideal exists only as an idea. Further, it is the best idea, the most perfect conception. So when you say "the ideal grade for a homework is clearly 100%", you really distort the meaning of "ideal". On this use of "ideal" you might say "I got 100% therefore my paper is the ideal paper". But that doesn't really make sense because others might have 100% and you cannot all have the ideal paper. That's because you give "ideal" a different meaning here, it is not the highest idea, or most perfect conception, it is a work on a paper with a mark on it.

When you see the ideal as an idea, a conception, you'll apprehend the ideal as the scale by which things are graded (the conception), rather than as a particular grade. The "perfect grade", the ideal, is neither the minimum nor the maximum, but perfection is to be found in the scale which gives us the most veridical, or objective, measurement of gradation. Consider the example of heat. The ideal is not the maximum heat, nor is it the minimum heat, the ideal is the scale which gives us perfect veridical measurements. Think about all the different qualities which come in degrees, the ideal, the most perfect, is never the highest quantity, or maximum. That's why Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, when discussing virtue, is so important. Virtue is not found at either extreme, he says it is in the mean.

You define 'quantity' as "that which can be measured", and thus cannot be infinite; but a length can be measured, and the length property can go to infinity. — Samuel Lacrampe

It is impossible that something has an infinite length. This would not be "a length". A length is something definite and infinite is not definite.

In common language, 'quantity' simply means that we can put numbers to it, and numbers go to infinity. — Samuel Lacrampe

That's what I said, "quantity" means that it is measurable, that we can put numbers to it. The problem, and where we disagree, is that we cannot put numbers to infinity, this is impossible because the process of putting numbers to it would never end. Therefore we could never put numbers to it. All we could do is try, but it would be a futile effort. By definition, infinity is that which we cannot put numbers to, it is indefinite, unlimited. Therefore it is impossible by way of contradiction, to have an infinite quantity.

You define 'quality' as "that which cannot be measured as a definite quantity", and therefore can go to infinity; but 'red' is a quality, not a quantity, and we know that there is a pure red, and red to the maximum degree. — Samuel Lacrampe

There is no such thing as "red to the maximum degree". There is a range of light wavelengths which are said to be red. Further, there are many different combinations of light wavelengths which are said to be red. There is not one single wavelength, or combination of wavelengths, which can be said to be "red to the maximum degree".

Can you give examples of what you call real units vs arbitrary units? As I understand it, it doesn't make sense: Say I am counting spoons. A spoon is a real unit. Yet there is no possible maximum number of spoons. — Samuel Lacrampe

At any given time, there is a quantity, i.e. a countable number, of spoons that exist. This is the maximum number of spoons which you can count. You cannot count more spoons than the number of spoons which exist, so clearly there is always a maximum number of spoons which you can count. But let's say you arbitrarily make up something not real, like unicorns, and start counting unicorns in your mind. There is no limit to the number of unicorns you can count, you can keep counting them forever.





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The question is, whether an "abstract entity" qualifies as an entity to which the law of identity is applicable. The abstract entity is a class of things, a type, like horse, dog, cat, etc.. So if the "a" signifies an abstract entity, then one instance of "a" is the same as another, by being the same type, an "a", just like one horse is the same as another, by being the same type, a horse.

It is doubtful whether the law of identity applies in the identification of a type, as an abstract entity, but let's suppose there is such an entity, an abstract entity, which is signified by "a". Each time you use "a", you signify this abstract entity. It is not the case that each instance is "the same symbol", but each time it is a different instance of an "a", and therefore a different symbol, but each instance of the symbol, despite the differences, is recognized as symbolizing the same abstract entity.

I am not a physicalist. Are you? The rest of your paragraph wanders aimlessly, not responding to my question. "How would you describe my knowing that God exists physically?" — Dfpolis

No, I'm not physicalist, so I would not describe you "knowing that God exists" in a physicalist way. The point is, that a physicalist would describe it in that way. So you need some principles whereby you can demonstrate that the physicalist description is wrong. You have provided no such principles, just alluded to the assumption that if your thought is about "God" instead of about "myself, or about "another person", or about something else, that this amounts to a substantial difference which cannot be described physically. In other words, you insist that since you describe this act as intentional, that act as physical, therefore they are as stipulated, despite the fact that others describe them in a different way.

As Aristotle notes, the soul is the actuality of a potentially living being. While some of our acts are intentional, the mere fact that an act is our does not make it intentional. Your "logic" is rather like saying that since a paint factory can produce black paint, all its paint must be black. — Dfpolis

I haven't shown you the logic whereby I conclude that all acts of living beings have an intentional aspect, so you have no place to criticize the logic I haven't yet shown you. However, I can use your analogy of the paint factory to demonstrate how your position is faulty. First, do you accept the premise, as I explained, that the existence of intention cannot be observed in an act? Now, if we know that a particular being is capable of carrying out an intentional act, we cannot exclude the possibility of intention from any act carried out by that being as we cannot observe whether the act is intentional or not. If we know that the paint company turns out some cans of black paint, and none are ;labeled, we cannot exclude the possibility that any can has black paint. So when you deny that any particular action of a living being (such as the leg spasm) has any intentional aspect, this is what you are doing, denying that the paint in the can is black without knowing whether this is the case or not.

So, when you apprehend from the vast evidence, the fact that every living being produces intentional acts, (they have acts which are about some purpose beyond the immediate act) you have no reason to deny the possibility that any particular living act has an intentional aspect. But when you are in denial, and refuse to acknowledge this fact, you will tend to designate some living acts as "physical", without an intentional element, and this seems to be your inclination.

I think I have spent enough time with you on this. — Dfpolis

You really don't seem to take having your ideas criticised very well. Instead of defending your position, and backing up your principles with reason, you prefer to end the discussion.