Pivot: A premise taken to be true with no reliance on another premise for proof. Ex: God exists. Why? Just cuz — khaled

This is where I entered this discussion. The answer to "Why?" here, is not "just cuz". There are many reasons why a premise which is not reliant on another premise might be taken as true. The principal reason is experience. I agree with you that sense experience is not one hundred percent reliable, but this does not negate the fact that the reason why many premises are taken to be true is sense experience.

We get relativism because there will be multiple possible interpretations of reality all based on different choices of starting pivots — khaled

OK, but we need not settle on relativism. This is where the other form of "objective" (the one I called inter-subjective) comes into play. When we can agree on pivots, and establish conventions and norms, we move beyond basic relativism into a form of objectivity.

We allow these laws to be part of A reality. If you don't have an objective premise (as defined) (which I believe is impossible to get but I am open to having my mind changed) you will always get some defree or relativism. — khaled

Sure, one society with it's world view, conventions and norms has its own view of "reality", and another has its "reality", but is the fact that there is a variance in metaphysics, evidence that there is not an absolute truth, as is required for relativism. For example, suppose that you and I both witnessed an event. We each have different descriptions of what happened. Does this indicate that there is not an absolute truth of what actually did happen? I think not. So I think that the fact that we have different metaphysics, different conventions, and different norms, does not lead to the conclusion that there is no absolute truth in these matters. Even if we get to the conclusion that we cannot possibly know the absolute truth, this still does not support relativism which claims that there is no absolute truth.

That is a contradiction no? One can never know from the "apprehended" reality whether or not an external reality even exists or what it looks like. We may all be brains in vats. — khaled

Whether or not there is an absolute "reality" is an assumption we make. It may not be provable. To prove that there is not, would require an absolute proof, and this would be self-refuting. That there is not would be an absolute. To prove that there is would seem to require that the absolute be apprehended, and proven to be the absolute. This I believe is beyond the capacity of the human being, due to the limitations imposed by our physical constitution.

However, it is useful to assume that there is the absolute, for many purposes, and not useful to assume that there is not, because this assumption would contradict itself if it were true. If it was true that there is no absolute, this would itself be an absolute, refuting itself. Therefore the assumption that there is such an absolute, assumes as a principle, what is a useful possibility, and that there is no absolute assumes as a principle what is impossible. We must therefore dismiss the latter, as impossible, but the former might better be expressed as the "possibility" that there is such an absolute. However, that there is no absolute has now been dismissed as impossible, therefore we can claim with absolute certainty that there is such an absolute.

What if someone is for some reason adamently convinced that a magical bearded sky man created the world and will take him to heaven if he kills blasphemers. Assuming that premise to be true, it is obviously morally right for that person to become a terrorist. Additionally, that someone will not argue with anyone that does not start off with this specific pivot (that there is a magical bearded sky man) because that would be "obviously wrong" in the eyes of this individual. — khaled

I don't see the relevance of this example. Assuming that there is an absolute is different from assuming that there is a magical bearded man in the sky. And assuming that there is a magical bearded man is different from assuming that the magical bearded man will take you to heaven if you kill blasphemers. So your example might just as well start with the premise that this man believes that it is a good idea to kill blasphemers, and argue this. That is the real pivot, the point which inclines the person to be a terrorist. Then you can address individually the ideas which support this pivot.

My point is that there is so many of these irreconcilable pivots to pick from that to claim one is right is completely unsubstantiated in my opinion. This is because to claim one is right one needs to use a pivot to confirm it and THAT pivot is in turn arbitrary. I happen to pick the logic pivots but other people might not and that's where you get your relativism. — khaled

As I explained above, each pivot is supported by reasons, and the reasons are not necessarily pivots, they are usually some sort of experience, or conglomeration of experiences. So, "I am right" refers to a pivot, but it may be supported by one's experiences, rather than other pivots. If one wants to argue against "I am right", this requires addressing the experiences which lead to this pivot, not addressing pivots.

I actually also believe that a truly self evident premise is impossible because it needs the assumption that logic preserves truth but the laws of logic are all pivots which is why there are multiple types of logic. So yeah objectivity as I defined it is not even obtainable by logic — khaled

I don't really know what you mean by a "pivot", but wouldn't a self-evident premise itself be a pivot? The fundamental laws of logic, identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, are not exactly self-evident, but are required for, and therefore prior to self-evident truths. These fundamental laws, like the fundamentals of arithmetic, say something about "objective" reality as you have defined "objective", but cannot be part of it. If we remove the necessity of "objective" (as defined) from "reality", which dictates independence from thought, we allow that these laws may be part of reality.

To get he people that claim that a morality/value/knowledge that transcends human thought exists and is acquirable by humans to defend their beliefs and to attack mine. You're not one of those people — khaled

If we remove the criteria of "objective", as defined, we can allow that morality, value, and knowledge actually do transcend human thought. It is your definition of "objective" which stipulates a separation between thought and objective reality, forcing the conclusion that elements of thought cannot be part of objective reality. Without this separation we can say that these things are part of reality which are apprehended by human thought, and that these things also transcend human thought. What thought apprehends is a part of these things, but since human thought does not apprehend the entirety of morality, value, and knowledge, these things transcend human thought. This is similar to the way that we sense objects. We see them, but there is a part of the objects, atoms, fundamental particles, etc., which transcends our capacity to sense. So we don't sense the entirety of the objects, just like the mind does not apprehend the entirety of things like morality, value, and knowledge, they transcend.

An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things. — Relativist

That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. Therefore it is impossible that "2" is a unity, one thing, without contradicting the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things. Therefore, that a group is a thing is impossible because it is contradictory.

Because of this contradiction, I suggest that we consider that the relation of the parts to a whole is something other than as a group. Furthermore, we ought to assume that numbers like "2', "3", "4', etc., refer to something other than a group, because this would result in that same contradiction.

If we take a whole, and designate it as an object, then we cannot designate its parts as objects as well, without creating this contradiction. By designating the parts as objects, we assign to them a form of independence, which negates what is necessary of them in order to be the parts of a whole. This independence annihilates the whole, rendering the parts as wholes, as does the act of division. So either the original unity is the whole (the object), or the parts are the wholes (objects), but it is impossible that both, at the same time, are wholes (objects).

Now when we take these numbers, "2", "3", "4", etc., in mathematics, we assume that they signify a whole, we do not assume that they signify groups of individual things. Each of these units, objects, "2", "3", "4', etc., have various rules about how they may be multiplied, divided, and other functions, in relation to other numbers. So "2" does not signify "two-ness" in mathematics, because "two-ness" refers to the concept of two distinct objects, whereas "2" in mathematics refers to one object with many functions.

A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7". — Relativist

So here you have given an example of that condition. Let's say that the family is an object. We can describe this object as a group of black swans which have a particular relationship to each other, validating the notion of "family", and this relation validates the claim that there is an object called "the family". The group of seven marbles on the other hand has no such validating principle, it is not an object. You have described it as seven distinct and independent objects, and any claim that it is an object is arbitrary and unsupported. You need principles, spatial relations, whatever, whereby you designate them as "a group".

Now the family, as an object has specific boundaries, which are somewhat arbitrary and unsupported in the description of your example. But let's talk about the individuals of the family now. Let's assume that each of the seven swans are objects. From this perspective we have seven objects, not one object (the family). If we want to make these seven objects into one object (a family) we need to establish some relational principles. The claim of "a group of marbles" was arbitrary and unsupported, it required some principles of relations to establish the reality of "a group". Here, we require some relational principles to establish the reality of "the family".

Here's the key point, so please pay attention. When we describe the seven swans as having familiar relations, those familiar relations are principal, or essential to the descriptions of the individuals. Therefore we are not describing the so-called individuals as individuals, we are describing them as members of a group, as parts of a whole. They cannot be understood as wholes, individuals, or objects, themselves, because the very description of them, which makes them members of a whole, negates the description of them which makes them independent, individual objects. Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.

I'm not using it to mean when people say objective in the science. I'm using it to mean when they use it in religion or ethics debates. In THOSE cases everyone uses the definition of objective as "what is there regardless of what anyone thinks about it" and pretends they have the answer. And even in the sciences it is very often that scientists themselves conflate "inter subjective" with that definition of objective and those are the people I'm targeting. — khaled

OK, so we're back to what I said earlier.

"Yes, when you define "objective" in that way, such that whatever is objective is necessarily independent from thinking, then clearly objectivity cannot be something achieved by human thinking."

Now my question is, when you define objectivity in this way, why would you expect to find objectivity in logic, which is a case of human thinking? You have given examples of how objectivity is impossible to obtain with logic, but you have defined "objective" such that it is self-evident that objectivity cannot be obtained by human thinking, and logic is a form of human thinking.

What is the point of this thread? Here's what you stated in the op:

The belief that an objective value/knowledge/morality is non existent — khaled

All these things, value, knowledge, and morality, are known to be the products of human thought. Now you define "objective" as independent from human thought. So what are you questioning? Are you wondering whether value, knowledge, and morality could exist independently of human thought? How could that be possible?

The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects. — Relativist

An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. Therefore "two-ness" is a relation between objects. I know that physics formulae are more complicated than "two-ness", but in the fundamental sense of describing relations between objects, how is there a difference? So if the relations described by physics are "physical relations", why is not two-ness a physical relation?

Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism.

That's right, you don't have to commit to mathematical realism (Platonism), just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions. However, you ought to consider that there is a reason why mathematics is so useful in making predictions. Wouldn't you say that the reason for this is that mathematics is based in something real?

Do you recognize the difference between exists (present), and existed (past)? To take presently existing evidence, and make claims about what existed requires temporal theory. Paleontology relies on such theory, just like physics and some other sciences rely on theories which relate present to future, to make predictions. These principles are not produced by paleontology, they are produced by ontology. So paleontology does not make ontological claims when it talks about what existed, just like physics does not make ontological claims when it predicts what will occur, they rely on an ontology which relates past, present, and future into some sort of continuous temporal existence.

E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions. — Relativist

I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is.

As in many discussions of this sort, you pose a question about the philosophy of science, and then seamlessly slip into discussing physics (and only physics). Not all science is as abstract or heavily mathematized as is physics. Does, paleontology, for instance, make ontological claims? I would say almost certainly so: theories in that field postulate the existence of long-dead creatures who lived and interacted in a world every bit as "real" as ours. — Arkady

You are conflating what it means to exist, with what it means to say that something has existed. The paleontologist makes no ontological claims (claims about what it means to exist). If it claims that certain things "existed", it assumes an ontological meaning of "exists" as a given, or as taken for granted.

But this is the meaning of objectivity as it is usually used. Ask a scientist about why particles interact in this way or that and he will say that "It is an objective nature of reality". Ask a religious fundamentalist why he thinks God exists and he will say "It is an objective nature of reality". — khaled

I don't really agree with you on this. "Objective", as employed in science, refers to method, standards, conventions, norms. So this sense of "objective" refers to agreement amongst subjects, and is really what is called by philosophers "inter-subjectivity". "Objective nature of reality" is a philosophical phrase, not a scientific one.

My definition is what most people use and as it is used it is impossible. — khaled

Since there are many different ways in which "objective" is used, there is no such thing as the way most people use it, there is no single convention for how it ought to be used. If you want to define "objective" in such a way that objectivity is impossible, that's OK, but what is the point? If you equivocate, and conflate two distinct definitions, such that objectivity is not possible, your argument doesn't really represent how anyone actually uses "objective".

On the other hand, objectivity defined as "Agreed upon by multiple subjective observers due to the persuasiveness of evidence and practicality". Then yes many many objective things exist. I don't know why whenever people hear "skeptic" or "nihilist" they assume that individual is critiquing this second type of objective when they are critiquing the first most of the time. — khaled

But this is the way that "objective" is used in science, the method is agreed upon by many subjective observers, such that the knowledge produced is "objective" in that sense. Now you cannot take a sense of "objective" employed in philosophy, which refers to something independent of thought, and claim that this is how "objective" is used when people say that science produces objective knowledge.

There is a bit of nuance here. I do not define objective as impossible for anyone to disagree with I defined it as "What exists regardless of what anyone thinks about it". I then proceeded to show that objectivity is impossible to achieve as one never knows when he has it as you said — khaled

Well of course. If you have defined objectivity as independent from thinking then objectivity is clearly not what is achieved by thinking. That's self-evident.

When I say "an objective knowledge/morality/value doesn't exist" that is a fault of mine. I really should be saying is "an objective knowledge/morality/value is unachievable to man". That is all my argument is about. Whether or not it exists I don't care because we will never achieve it — khaled

Yes, when you define "objective" in that way, such that whatever is objective is necessarily independent from thinking, then clearly objectivity cannot be something achieved by human thinking.

The rules of logic can be taught and used by everyone however as I replied to unenlightened before if you divorce verification from logic you do NOT get an objective knowledge/morality/value but you leave people with much more leeway. — khaled

You are using an unrealistic definition of "objective". You define "objective" as what is impossible for anyone to disagree with. But there is no such thing, because there's always someone who can honestly disagree with anything. The example of schizophrenia was already brought up. Furthermore, to define "objective" in this way, is to make objectivity a property of subjects, what subjects agree to. Therefore it is not a true objectivity at all, but a form of subjectivity, better known as inter-subjectivity.

Can we have clear definitions, such that "subjective" refers to of the subject, and "objective" refers to of the object? To deny objectivity is therefore to deny the existence of objects.

That is the initial assumption in my argument and is restated in P2. I use premise and conclusion interchangeably because they are ontologically the same thing, a statement that can be true or false whose truth value can only be verified when logic is applied. There is a critical point in my definition of premise and that is:

Premise: A sensical statement WITH A TRUTH VALUE OF TRUE OR FALSE that is verifiable logically — khaled

This is your problem right here Khaled. First, a conclusion is not ontologically the same as a premise, because the conclusion follows from, and is therefore necessarily temporally posterior to the premise. Second, we do not necessarily verify premises with logic. This would make all premises conclusions, but as the explanation above shows, we cannot make that reduction. Yes, some premises are conclusions, but not all. Therefore the truth or falsity (truth value) of premises relies on something other than logical verification.

P3: only self-evident premises can be known to be true before any application of logic — khaled

So, you introduce the "self-evident premise" as the "only" way that a premise can be known to be true, without logical verification (making it into a conclusion). Then you proceed to make your argument based on this premise. This appears to be the premise of yours, which the others object to. Self evidence is not the only way that a premise can be known to be true, without logical verification. For example, we verify premises with our senses.

Man was granted a mind capable of controlling the brain, resulting in a conscious form of consciousness. I use 'mind', because I dislike the word 'soul'. I do believe animals have souls, but I do not believe they have the same form of consciousness humans do, although some humans are only marginally more conscious than animals. — Tzeentch

This is why we need to differentiate between mind and soul.

Mind refers to the thing which is responsible for thinking and controlling the activities of the physical body. Thinking requires memory, which requires a physical body with temporal extension, for storage. So mind requires a physical body, as those who promote emergence are quick to point out.

Soul, on the other hand refers to the thing which is responsible for life in the body. All living things have soul, by the fact that they are living. The soul is responsible for the direction of all physical activities within the living body. Since the living body consists of physical activities, the existence of the soul is necessarily prior to the existence of the living body. The soul, by means of directing physical activity creates the physical body.

The mind is a property of the soul, whereby the soul uses the living body to think and control its own activities. We ought not confuse soul with mind, because soul is necessarily prior to the living body, while mind is necessarily posterior to the living body.

Oh. I see. I use "separation" to mean physical distance and "distinction" to mean logical difference. What you are calling "separation" I would call "distinction." — Dfpolis

The problem is that it's not a logical difference though, it's an ontological division. That's because "the logical" is in the one category, and the other category is outside of this. So just like you cannot say that the distinction between the physical and non-physical is a physical separation, you cannot say that the division between the logical and the non-logical is a logical distinction. All logical distinctions occur within the category of "logical", and therefore cannot separate the category itself.

I don't see this. There is no reason we can't have two different objects with identical properties, say two atoms or two molecules. — Dfpolis

The question is, are they "the same". If they are two different objects, then they are not the same, by one account of "the same". If you call two different objects the same on account of them having identical properties, then you are using "the same" in a different way. Since there is a difference between these two uses of "the same", we must be careful not to equivocate, by respecting the separation between them.

Yes, but distinguishing the meanings of identity is not the same as physical separation. — Dfpolis

Of course, but not all separations are physical separations. I was talking about a categorical separation, not a physical separation. For example, it would be illogical to class the separation between the physical and the non-physical as a physical separation. Yet there must be a separation or else we cannot have the two distinct categories.

This is a result of not understanding that there can be no sensation or cognition without the ding an sich being sensible or intelligible. In sensation and cognition we become one with the object perceived and known because of the joint actualization of sensible or intelligible and of the subject's capacity to sense or to be informed. — Dfpolis

In Kantian metaphysics though, "the object perceived" is the phenomenon, it is not the noumenon. So, just like in Aristotle's epistemology, the knower becomes one with the abstracted form, but the matter, or thing in itself remains separate This is the same categorical separation as referred to above. We hand identity to the abstracted form, the perception, so the perception, the abstracted form, has an identity. Now, as Aristotle insists, we need to go beyond this, and allow that material things, what Kant calls noumena, also have an identity in themselves. Do you understand the need for this separation, or do you deny the need for it.

Only at one instant in time. As I noted, over time many properties can change without a loss of dynamic identity. That is why some aspects, such as life, are essential, while others, such as hair color, are accidental. — Dfpolis

No, it's not a case of "only at one instant in time". That's the whole point, a thing, or object, has necessarily, temporal extension. Temporal extension is necessary for real existence. There is no such thing as a thing at an instant in time. And, to be the thing that it is, any thing, or object, must have the exact same properties that it has, at every moment in time, or else it would not be that thing, it would be something else.

When we allow identity by temporal extension (material identity), we can point to something, then point to it again, a moment later, and claim that it is the same thing, without knowing any of its properties. What properties it has are irrelevant, because its material identity, as "a thing" is based in temporal extension. This is how the same thing can have all sorts of different forms, from one moment to the next. That is how energy can be referred to as a thing, with real existence, despite the fact that it is just a potential, the capacity to do work. It has temporal extension, so we can say that the same energy is transferred from one form to another, through the means of some field mathematics, all the while it maintains its identity as the same energy.

I understand an ontological claim to mean, roughly, a claim about what exists in and of itself. I understand an epistemological claim to mean a claim about whether or not one is justified to have a particular doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief, degree of belief, suspension of judgement, etc) toward a particular proposition.

Classical physics seems to make ontological claims, or claims of the form “a particular set of particles exist and move about through space-time in a particular way”. However we know that classical physics is incomplete in that it does not accurately describe reality at very small scales. — Bearden

I think that you misinterpret physics, to state that it makes ontological claims rather than epistemological, according to your definitions. Physics takes fundamental assumptions, premises, theories and hypotheses, like Newton's laws, and the theory of relativity, and demonstrates with evidence whether one is or is not justified in believing these fundamental principles.

Physics does not make claims about what exists in and of itself (ontological claims). Any claims that it makes of the sort "what is the case", or "what will occur" are restricted, qualified to "what is the case, or what will occur, if X principles, or premises are true". Following this, we can judge the truth or falsity of the fundamental principles according to their capacity to provide us with an accurate indication of "what is the case", or "what will occur". That is the scientific method.

OK then, being old and experienced as you are, I won't worry about you ... unless you start to tell me that your gaydar can work over the internet.

There are people I wouldn't approach for so much as the time of day, even if I had a stack of affidavits stating that they were definitely gay and available. — Bitter Crank

Isn't that just personal preference though? You know, we all have innate inclinations to be attracted to this rather than that. Or are you talking about the capacity to discern a person's character just by looking at them? Is that a valid judgement, which is properly derived from experience, or is that a form of bias which manifests as racism in the extreme?

You were talking about the requirements of thought. I asked if that's conflict or questioning. Schopenhauer would say conflict, I think. — frank

Yes, I think that type of conflict is a requirement for thought.

IF one is quite mistaken, a situation of intense conflict might ensue, the outcome of which may be a more refined sense of how precarious existence can be. — Bitter Crank

When the gaydar fails it could turn into a gay bashing? That precariousness scares me.

Is it conflict? Or questioning? Both? — frank

In my OED there's a definition of conflict in psychology as "the opposition of incompatible needs or wishes within a person". So yes, I think this is conflict.

scan with gaydar — Bitter Crank

Scan with gaydar?

This is because, the only way for him/her to trigger the idea of the mailbox, is by encountering one. — SicklerTroy

Have you never heard of association? What triggers "the idea" is association, not encountering the very same object again. The encounter of the mailbox triggers an association and the person encountering is inclined to think of the thing encountered as a mailbox. To trigger the idea of a mail box does not require encountering one, it requires an association.

When I hear a certain song, it triggers the idea of my mother, because she used to sing that song to me when I was a child. It is clearly not the case that the only way to trigger the idea of my mother is by encountering my mother.

Your argument is supported by a false premise.

There is also conflict within, the inability to decide. This inspires thought. Without this conflict, would there be no thinking?

How would you describe "effective philosophy"?

I don't understand what you are saying here. Would you explain how separation can flow out of identity? — Dfpolis

So here's perhaps a better answer to your question. The logical identity of a thing is based in essential properties, this is qualitative identity. However, we also allow, following Aristotle's law of identity, that there is an ontological identity of a thing, numerical identity, and this is based in the accidentals. Do you see the separation between identity by essence, and identity by accidentals?

Sorry Df, I somehow missed this part of your reply.

This is yet a third meaning of identity. It is the thing as understood. For example, when we speak of gender identity, we mean what gender a person understands themself to be. If it is self-assigned, the result of self understanding, it is an intrinsic property. If it is "handed" to something, it is not intrinsic, but relational: the thing as understood by us. — Dfpolis

I am not talking about a third meaning of identity here, and this is the key point. To identify by properties is "the thing as understood". Properties are what we perceive of the thing. This is the Kantian distinction. the properties are not of the thing itself, they are how we perceive the thing. This is why qualitative identity, to identify by properties (to give a thing its identity), is distinct from numerical identity which is to say that a thing has an identity regardless of its properties, or whether it has been identified(given an identity).

Dynamic continuity allows us to know that we are dealing with the selfsame thing, but it is not the source of the thing's existence. We know this because a thing must exist before it can have dynamic continuity. — Dfpolis

Right, that's the point, that is the way that we identify the self-same thing, not by its properties.

This is not quite right. As you point out, dynamical continuity allows me to say that I am the same individual at different times, yet many of my aspects have changed. I am no longer the same height and weight, nor is what hair I have left the same color, as when I was a child. So, some properties are "accidental" -- changing them does not make me a different individual or a different kind of thing. — Dfpolis

As I said, we proceed in this way to avoid the unresolvable quagmire involved with the assumption that there is a real distinction between essential and accidental properties. These are logical divisions, applicable only to qualitative identitythe identity we give to the object. That there is no such thing as "accidentals" in the identity which an object has of itself, is key to understanding Aristotle's law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. Everything which could be identified as a property, of any existing thing, is essential to making that thing, the thing which it is. Each and every aspect is necessary or else it would be something different, and therefore have a different identity.. This is also expressed, in an inverted form in Leibniz' "identity of indiscernibles". .

The distinction does not depend on who uses "identity," but what they mean in using it. Numerically identity refers to the selfsame object. Qualitative identity means distinct individuals have the same properties. — Dfpolis

Right, qualitative identity allows us to say that things with the same properties are the same thing. That's the way logicians use "identity". Regardless of whether temporal continuity of the object has been established, if the properties are judged to be the same we say that it is the same object. This issue is what Wittgenstein referred to when he asked how do we know that the chair in the room is the same chair that was there yesterday. The chair here today has the same properties as the one yesterday, but someone might have switched it overnight. Do you see the difference between this and numerical identity, which identifies the self-same object, through temporal continuity? Despite the fact that some properties of that object might have changed, it is still the self-same object. This is the ontological use "identity" established by Aristotle. Being the self-same object does not require having the same properties, as the properties of an object change with time..

I don't understand what you are saying here. Would you explain how separation can flow out of identity? — Dfpolis

You apprehend that there are two forms of identity. Why do you not see this as a separation? Do you see the difference between a logical subject, being identified by it's properties, and an ontological object, being identified by temporal continuity?

This post is golden. There is much food for thought, and for further study, there. Thanks! — Pierre-Normand

My pleasure.

I don't understand what you are saying here. Would you explain how separation can flow out of identity? — Dfpolis

Are you familiar with the two forms of identity? You'll find them on SEP referred to as qualitative and numerical. Qualitative, what logicians use, implies that a thing is identified by what it is, but this really refers to a logical subject rather than an object. The thing's identity is what we hand to it, what we say it is. In ontology we want to identify a thing itself, and ensure that the identity is proper to that thing and only that very same thing, this is numerical identity. For example, qualitative identity could allow that you and I drive, "the same" car because it is the same year and model, we can call it the same. Numerical identity allows only that my car is the same as my car, and your car is the same as your car.

Aristotle introduced ontological identity as the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself", because the logical form of identity was being abused in sophistry. As you can see, two distinct things could be said to be the same thing, by being the same type. However, the difference between the two forms of identity is substantial. Ontological identity is based in a thing's temporal continuity, it's temporal extension, and is supported by the matter of the thing. Having temporal extension is what gives existence to a "thing". But this allows that a thing has an actively changing form, while remaining the same thing. A change to a thing does not make it a different thing. Logical identity identifies by the form, so that the identified thing cannot have a different form. A different form implies a different thing. Recognizing the two forms of identity allows us to avoid the problems of distinguishing accidentals from essentials. Every aspect of the thing itself is essential to it, making it the unique, particular thing that it is.

Aristotle was still a religious contemplative by today's lights. Maybe he was less mystical than his teacher, but when he talks of 'contemplation of the eternal ideas', he's not talking about anything utilitarian. Another John Uebersax page, Contemplative Life is Divine and Happiest. — Wayfarer

Aristotle does not support "eternal ideas". That is his principal disagreement with Pythagoreans, and such Platonists. He assigns to ideas the nature of "potential", and demonstrates logically that anything eternal must be actual. Therefore eternal ideas are impossible. That is his famous refutation of the "eternal ideas" of Pythagorean idealism.

However, he does refer to contemplation as a divine activity. Notice though, that even contemplation, and its highest form, the divine activity of a thinking which is thinking about thinking, is an activity. And as an activity, it is direct by intention, final cause, so it must be the means to an end. This is why contemplation and divine thought do not suffice, and he must proceed onward beyond divine thought, to determine a final end, which he designates as happiness.

So the Pythagorean idealism of "eternal ideas" is dismissed because their principles cannot support "actual" ideas. This is replaced by the activity of thinking, which for Aristotle is what gives actual existence to ideas. But as an intentional activity, even thinking must be directed towards an end, so in the Nichomachean Ethics he sees the need to determine a final end.

So, of course, I agree that the approach of modern science is deficient in that fundamental sense. But what has been lost or forgotten is the original sense of there being a 'higher knowledge' (which is the subject of the 'analogy of the divided line' and also 'the analogy of the cave'.) So the general idea is that we don't 'see things as they truly are' - the philosopher has to 'ascend' to that through the refinement of the understanding. — Wayfarer

If you describe dianoia as working with intelligible objects, as application of them, and noesis as understanding intelligible objects, which requires an adequate approach to their very existence, you'll see that the deficiency of modern science is that by its very nature, as a method of application, it is limited to dianoia.

Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics, provides a simplified and I believe a more realistic version of the principal divisions of knowledge. He divides theory from practise, such that in comparison to Plato's divisions, theory is assigned to the intellectual realm, practise to the visible. As with Plato's structure, the divisions aren't really "there" within the knowledge, they are artificial, principles of guidance to help us understand the nature of knowledge. In reality, all knowledge consists of a mixture of the two elements, theory and practise, the visible and the intelligible. So even in the highest levels of noesis, contemplation and thinking only with intelligible objects, elements of eikasia, opinion associated with one's practise, enter into the knowledge. No theory (intelligible object) can escape the influence of practise (the visible world), and no practise (activity in the visible world) is free from the influence of theory (the intelligible realm).

So, at the two extremes of the line, the fundamental opinions of practise in the visible world, and the highest levels of theory formulation in the intelligible, Aristotle places intuition. Intuition accounts for how the two extremes of the divided line must directly intermix. This allows for the existence of the person who has good practical intuition, knows the numerous theories which are applicable to a particular situation in the visible world, and how to best apply them in that situation, and also the person who has good theoretical intuition, which is to be well acquainted with the many observances of the visible world in order to understand and produce intelligible theories of a high level.

It is only by allowing for this, intuition, that we can get beyond the realist vs. nominalist trap, which tells us that the foundations of knowledge are to be found in either eternal intelligible Forms, or the norms of society. Intuition allows us to see that it is neither of these, but something else, that which gives us intuition.

As I read Kant, the noumenal chair cannot be the phenomenal chair because in knowing the phenomenal chair, we know nothing of the noumenal chair. If they were the same being, in knowing one, we would necessarily know the other. So, why add a noumenal chair, when, ex hypothesis, we have no way of knowing it? — Dfpolis

The problem with this perspective is that "chair" refers to the phenomenon, so there really cannot be a "noumenal chair". All of our concepts of what it means to be a chair, as well as other things, are based in phenomena.

Aristotle on the other hand provided us with a law of identity which identifies the thing itself. His law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. What this does is create a separation between the individuation and identity which we hand to reality (we individuate and identify "a chair" for example), and the identity which things have, in themselves. So it allows that there are actual individual things in reality, and each has an identity, a "whatness" (what it is) which is proper to it and it alone, regardless of whether human minds have properly individuated and identified the things.

Representations are made by minds. What is the thing that is an emergent mind? What is the emerging itself? — schopenhauer1

What would you mean by "emergent", and is this an appropriate adjective for "mind"?

We can't deny that our knowledge comprises, in part, sensory impressions, and in part judgements and comparisons, right? When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is a considerable amount of work involved in ‘creating’ it as an object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the lightwaves reflected or emanated from it, your mind organises the image with regards to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will (hopefully) recall its name, and perhaps know something about it.

And that is the understanding behind 'constructivism', and it's very different to representative realism. So in that respect, Kant is completely different to Locke - in fact, Locke was just the kind of empiricist he had in mind when he said 'percepts without concepts are blind'. — Wayfarer

I think this is very well expressed, and it is an issue which Dfpolis ought to take into consideration. Dfpolis consistently describes the sensory and neurological systems of beings as reacting to the environment, being caused by the environment to produce sensations, in a physicalist and representative way. Df does not seem to have respect for the possibility that the being is actively creating sensations, and is therefore the proper "cause" of sensations.

The problem is that DfPolis has also argued in this thread, that teleology, final cause, intent, is widespread throughout the biological realm. This appears as inconsistency in Df''s position. If we recognize final cause as a constructive element in the biological realm, we ought to also recognize its role in the construction of sensory experience.

So for an analogical example, we see that a house is built with final cause as the principal cause. It is not a case of the appropriate material, formal, and efficient causes coming together, by chance, to build a house. These other causes are directed by the agency of final cause. Likewise, if we recognize final cause as active throughout the biological realm, we ought to see the construction of sensory experience in a similar way. Sensation is not a case of the appropriate material, formal, and efficient causes coming together through some random chance, these are directed by final cause, such that sensation is a constructed experience.

7. would only follow from 6. if Presentism and Eternalism were the only two possibilities.

Sorry, but I'm not accustomed to your use of "instantiated". Could you explain?

Thank you for the reference, but note that it is not the conclusion, only a step in a two chapter analysis of the nature of time. The conclusion at the end of ch, 11, is: "It is clear, then, that time is 'number of movement in respect of the before and after', and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous." "Number of movement" is "measure of change" in other translations. — Dfpolis

Quit playing games. Read the passage and change your opinion of what Aristotle wrote to reflect what he really wrote. It very clearly states: "number we must note is used in two senses". And, it states "time obviously is what is counted, not that with which we count". This is not an issue of translation. Furthermore, the following passages, culminating at Ch.12, 220b, clearly verify this through explanation. If you would simply read Bk.4, chapters 11&12, you would clearly see that there is no doubt as to what is meant. Your objection is nothing but a denial of what is written.

Not quite. Since we cannot see time, we can't measure it. We can see change, so that is what we measure to determine the passage of time. — Dfpolis

By what principle must something be seen to be measured? Do you see the air temperature in your room? The passing of time is real, and it is measured, but it is not seen. It is not a physical thing.

But I am taking a step back to its ontology. WHAT is "doing some symbolic modeling" without being self-referential? What is this "symbolic modelling" in and of itself? It turns into just word-games on the concept of mind. — schopenhauer1

I don't see the issue you're trying to point out, perhaps you could elaborate. Of course there must be some sort of "self", we're talking about intention, and intention is a property of something, it's not self-subsistent. But even "self-subsistent" implies self, intention would itself be a self..

I don't recall such a statement, which seems very unaristotelian. Do you have a reference? — Dfpolis

OK, I'm going to get you the reference, but we've been through this game before. Please do not dismiss my references as if they aren't really what Aristotle meant, just to support your crazy ideas about Aristotle, as you did the last time we played this game.

Read Physics Bk.4, Ch. 11, 219a:
"Time then is a kind of number (Number we must note is used in two senses--both of what is counted or the countable, and also of that with which we count. Time obviously is what is counted, not that with which we count: these are different kinds of things)"

Then read Ch.12, 220b, where it is clearly explained that time is what is counted, and we measure it with movement, while we also measure movement with time. This he says is natural, (not circular) because movement is over distance, and that (distance), is what is measured with time, while time itself is measured with movement. Movement has two aspects, distance and time. The distance aspect of movement is measured by time, while time itself is measured by movement.

So after describing how time is the thing which is counted, what is measured, but in another way it is also what measures, he then proceeds to describe how time is a measure of movement.

No, what is measured is some change, like the apparent motion of the heavens, the flow of sand, or atomic oscillations. — Dfpolis

You seem to be forgetting the fact that there is a process whereby the time which is future to us, becomes the time which is past to us. Tomorrow, in two days will be yesterday. So as I sit and write this, there is becoming more and more past, and less and less future. This process, whereby the future becomes the past, I call the passing of time, some call it the flow of time. That is what is being measured the passing of time. The measurement tool is the clock, what you call "the apparent motion of the heavens", "the flow of sand", "atomic oscillations". What these clocks are measuring is the passing of time.

The results of the double slit experiment appear to defy logic. Who misspoke and what did they say? — frank

This is a good example. Wave/particle duality is contradictory. Energy can move from one place to another in the form of a wave, or it can move as a massive object. The same energy cannot move as both, that is contradictory, therefore illogical. Since logic dictates the correct and incorrect way of speaking, we can conclude that this is an incorrect way of speaking. This description of that phenomenon is incorrect.

So when we come across something illogical, we have said it wrong, and look for a way to say it right. — Banno

Now you're catching on. It is not a case of "we cannot say it", but a case of "we can say it wrongly". Forget about that claim that logic dictates what can and cannot be said. It's completely unreasonable.

What is the limit of a representation? If a clock is a representation of time passing, is the conscious observer a representation of some symbolic modelling? That doesn't seem to jive though. A clock is a representation of time passing for an observer- it is instantiated in the observer. What then, does the observer of the clock instantiate in? Or is it self-instantiated? If so, what is that nature of the instantiating? — schopenhauer1

If you speak of a conscious being as an observer, then the specified act which the being is involved in, observing, is an act of representation. That is the being's function, as identified, observing, and observing requires noting and representing. Therefore to speak of the conscious being as an observer is to imply that the being is doing some symbolic modeling.

A clock is artificial, made, produced, with the intent of representing time passing. As such, it does not need to be observed to be a representation, like the written word does not need to be observed to be a representation. That assumes a realist perspective with independent existence of a physical thing, and independent existence of "what" the thing is. The meaning, what is meant by the symbol is put into the physical symbol by the intent of the author, and exists there independently of being interpreted. So what the thing is, is put there by the intent of the author. But from another perspective one could argue that the symbol must be observed, and judged to be "a symbol", in order to actually be a symbol, if one declines the notion that the thing's meaning is put there by the intent of the author.

So to answer your question more directly, I would say that from the realist perspective the limit to a representation is the mind of the author. But if we deny realism and allow that interpretation produces the limit, then there is no real limit. It is the multiplicity of interpreting minds which produces the limitless, infinite nature of a representation, whereas the one mind of the author may act as a limit. That is why the realist has an escape from the infinite possibilities of meaning, information, by assuming that it is limited by the intent of the author. But in the context of the information (meaning) within natural existence it's only just an appeal to God. .

Specifically, space and time do not exist independently of being measured. Aristotle famously defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." So, space and time are not independent existents (a la Newton), but the result of measuring space-like and time-like measurability, in conformity with Aristotle's general understanding of quantity: — Dfpolis

Don't forget though, Aristotle also said that in another sense, time is that which is measured. So we really have to understand "time" in these two ways, as that which measures, and that which is measured. I don't think it is appropriate to say that the thing which is measured is "time-like" because as the thing measured, it is the real thing. It is more appropriate to refer to the thing which measures as "time-like", because this is just a representation of the real time, that which is measured. See, we make a representation of time passing, with a clock of some sort, and we use this to measure. But this measure is not the real time passing, it is a representation of it, so the measure is what is "time-like", not the thing measured which is real "time", passing.

Here's the problem with the assumption that there is such a thing as what cannot be said. You can assume such a thing, just like I can assume a square circle, but these assumptions don't make these things real.

Logic is developed from the intention of allowing us to know everything. That is the will of the philosopher, the desire to know, and this means everything, without exception; all is to be placed in the realm of knowable. We cannot designate anything as unknowable because then we'd lose the will to know it, being already designated as unknowable. To say that there is something which cannot be said is to say that there is something which cannot be known, and this is contrary to the first principle of philosophy, which is to render everything as knowable.

Therefore nonsense statements, as in the example, are sayable, and also knowable, but they are known as nonsense. And your claim that some things can't be said is also knowable as nonsense.