When I think of dividing a field, I start to think of shapes in my mind. Where did the shape ideas come from if not from my senses? We find approximate right angles in nature so the idea could have come from our senses too. — Devans99

Sorry Devans99, but that's an extremely lame argument. You asked for an idea of something, which does not exist in nature, and I gave you one. Now you say that the example is no good because there could be approximations to this idea in nature. But an approximation is not the same thing, so your argument fails. We have the conception of a perfect circle, but there are no perfect circles in nature. That's the difference between the ideal, (perfection), and what exists in nature (the imperfect). Your position is hopelessly untenable, because I just need to offer as an example, the idea of the ideal, perfection, and clearly this is not something existing in nature. And the fact that the ideal must be absolutely perfect and in no way an approximation, indicates that the ideal cannot be derived from approximations.

Is a computer capable of truly original thought? I would say no. The outputs of the computer are determined by the inputs and logic. The logic can only deduce new ideas from existing. So the output is determined by the input. We are like computers. Our inputs determine our outputs. When we create 'new' information we use deduction/induction to turn old information into new. So there seems to be no purely new information that does not trace its heritage back to old information and eventually to our senses (our inputs using the computer analogy). — Devans99

Wow, I thought the last argument was bad, this one's even worse. A computer is not capable of original thought. We are like computers. Therefore we are not capable of original thought.

I disagree with that claim — Terrapin Station

We already agreed on this, that the student must already know how to do some different things, for ostension to be successful. I believe you called it mental activity. This aspect of language use, which you called mental activity is not learned through ostension because it is required for ostension. Why disagree now?

They have to be able to observe and they have to be able to make a mental association between things like the sound the demonstrator is making and what the demonstrator is pointing to. That doesn't require that the person has a language already.

Just where do you believe that a language prerequisite is entering the scenario, and why do you believe that? — Terrapin Station

I find it hard to believe that an intelligent person like yourself, has such a hard time to understand this. It's like you have a mental block. My claim is not that it is necessary that "the person has a language already". My claim is that in order for a person to use a language, it is necessary that the person know something which cannot be taught through ostension. Therefore we cannot provide an adequate description of what it means to learn a language simply by referring to ostension, because we need to describe how the person knows how to do this other thing which is not taught by ostension, but is required for ostension.

As I pointed out way back, if by "learning" we don't mean that odd notion that has it that one is given something wholesale where the person receiving it is entirely passive in the process--and Augustine surely isn't using "learning" that way, and neither am I, then I don't agree with Wittgenstein that learning a language can not be done via ostension. — Terrapin Station

Some aspects of language use are learned via ostension, that is not the issue. But since some aspects of language use are required, as already known, for ostensive learning to proceed, then learning language is not done entirely through ostension.

I don't see where you disagree. You agree that the student must already know how to do something, in order for ostension to be successful. So this cannot be learned through ostension. And ifsome necessary parts of language are learned through ostension, then this, what the student needs to know in order for ostension to be successful, is a necessary part of language. Now, if this, what the student needs to know in order for ostension to be successful, cannot be learned through ostension, and it is a necessary part of language, then language cannot be learned solely through ostension. What part do you disagree with?

That's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to the fact that conventionally, "learning" doesn't connote being given something wholesale where the person receiving it was entirely passive in the process. It rather connotes something where the learner was an active participant, where learning necessarily involved them thinking about what they're hearing, etc. — Terrapin Station

I know that's what you are saying, but it's irrelevant. Suppose that the activity A is required to learn X. Also, the activity B is required for the activity A. It would be false to claim that reference to activity A provides a complete description of learning X, because we must also refer to activity B as well. The fact that referring to "activity A" necessarily implies, or "connotes" activity B is irrelevant because activity B has not been included in the description, therefore the description is incomplete. A description is explicit, not implicit. In order for the description to be complete, activity B must be described.

But arguing that it's wrong where it turns out that you're simply misunderstanding the conventional connotations of the term? — Terrapin Station

You don't seem to get Wittgenstein's point. Describing the learning of language as an ostensive exercise, with or without the "conventional connotations" associated with the term, is an incomplete description of what is involved in learning language. This is because a large part of what constitutes knowing how to use language must be already known before the ostensive exercises can have the desired effect.

So if we separate in analysis, what "ostensive definition" actually refers to, from the "conventional connotations" associated with the term, and find that the "conventional connotations" refer to already having some knowledge of how language works, then we can dismiss "ostensive definition" as being an insufficient description of how we learn language. The "conventional connotations" are actually hiding the fact that one must already have an understanding of some aspects of how language works, before ostension can be effective, and therefore hiding the fact that the process of learning language cannot be adequately described by ostension.

Hence should we be aware of the significance the blue and brown books may have on this discussion? — Wallows

No, I actually think this is irrelevant. The discussion here is of the "Philosophical Investigations" specifically. An author, in philosophy especially, often changes one's mind as time passes, so to bring in other writings, as if they are part of this book, would probably be more confusing than helpful. For the same reason, if we discuss a philosophical text, we do not seek to reference the author's rough copy, unless maybe there are some specific problems to clear up. If the topic of discussion here was the evolution of Wittgenstein's philosophy, that would be another thing.

Everything seems scattered and not formed in a coherent whole, that using a companion would provide. — Wallows

That is the way that PI is written, scattered and not formed into a coherent whole. If a companion provided us with a coherent whole it would be a faulty interpretation.

But also it would be odd if Wittgenstein thought that Augustine was saying that. — Terrapin Station

That's the force of Wittgenstein's argument against Augustine though. He argues that Augustine's description of learning through ostensive definition is wrong because it only provides a partial description. As well as ostensive demonstration, the student must also already know how to do something, distinguish kinds of usage, and this in itself is an important part of language. So he argues that the person already has an important basic understanding of language prior to being able to learn through ostensive definition. This understanding, is a knowing how to do something, which makes the student active in the ostensive learning. So it is only by removing the student's active participation in ostensive learning that Wittgenstein has an argument against Augustine. So this is how he presents Augustine's position, as if the student is passively receiving ostensive definition. I would say that it is not so much Wittgenstein's intention to attack Augustine's description, but to use the obvious inadequacy of Augustine's description, as a platform to launch into his own position.

Haha. No, i wouldn't say that any conflation is valid. — Terrapin Station

Conflation is a form of synthesis and there is no law of logic which says that it is an invalid form of synthesis. Any claim that such and such conflation is invalid would need to be justified with an argument. It doesn't suffice to simply dismiss someone's position as a "conflation" because "conflation" on its own does not imply any illogical, or invalid procedure.

Do you believe that Augustine would have said that learning implies being given something wholesale where the person receiving what was learned is entirely passive in the process? — Terrapin Station

No, I believe that Wittgenstein most likely misrepresents Augustine's position, creating a straw man, though I haven't checked the context of that passage. It is a useful straw man though because many people believe that ostensive definition is the foundation of language, and Wittgenstein demonstrates that this is very likely not the case, as there are other elements required which could be more fundamental than ostension.

Notice that in the quoted passage from Augustine, he refers to the intention of the teachers, and that after he learns words, he can express his desires. What Augustine is missing here, and what leaves him open to Wittgenstein's attack, is the desire of the student to learn. This is the other half of the ostensive definition, the other thing required, as we have been discussing, which leaves ostension itself insufficient. One must have the desire to learn, as this is what inspires the student to engage in those necessary activities we discussed.

You'll see, following StreetlightX's analysis, that the learner's half of the ostensive equation, this desire to learn, manifests for Wittgenstein, as the capacity to differentiate kinds. But there is another whole side to this, which is the capacity to distinguish individuals. So we could use Wittgenstein's own analogy against his own position. The capacity to differentiate kinds is only a part of what one needs to know for ostensive learning, just like board games are only a part of what "games" are. Ultimately, I believe any such description needs to be replaced by the more appropriate "desire to know".

That's conflating the notion of knowing something with the idea of learning a language. — Terrapin Station

Don't you think that this is a valid conflation? To "know" something as commonly defined in epistemology requires language. If it is the case that it is required that we know something, in order to learn a language, then the common epistemological definition of "know" is incorrect and misleading.

I would guess the latter. A person sees rocks on several occasions, notices the similarities, and forms an idea of a rock, say starting after the third or fourth sighting and solidifying at about the tenth sighting. — andrewk

What is it about this experience which would warrant it being called a "direct experience"? You describe numerous past experiences These would be remembered and therefore not direct, at the time of creating the idea. You also describe an act of noticing similarities. Would this be the "direct" part of the experience, which constitutes the existence of the idea?

So for instance, at the time, after numerous encounters with rocks, when the person sees a rock and is able to say instantaneously, "that is a rock", would this instantaneous recognition qualify as a "direct experience". Or, is it the thinking which is going on around the third or fourth time, in which the person is comparing similarities which qualifies as "direct experience". Perhaps both? If the idea consists of "direct experience", then it doesn't consist of the past memories, being synthesized, it consists of the activity which compares and associates past memories.

The idea of the right angle is not created directly by the mind; the mind first solves the problem of how to divide the fields, then observes that the result contains a new idea; the right angle. — Devans99

Doesn't this describe the mind directly creating something, though you are saying that it isn't a direct creation? At one time, there was a problem which existed, and there was no such thing as "the right angle" at that time. Some minds resolved the problem by coming up with a new idea "the right angle". Surely this is a description of the mind creating a new idea, "the right angle". The problem was solved by creating the idea. On what basis would you say that this is not a case of the mind creating an idea?

So it seems in addition to synthesising new ideas from existing ideas, we can also observe new ideas that fall out of mental constructions. But a mental construction is really just picturing something from nature in our mind, so I'm still not convinced we are capable of a truly original thought. — Devans99

Why are you going back to this refuted premise? We've just agreed that the mind came up with the right angle not by picturing something in nature, but by solving a problem. And now you've gone back to re-state this refuted premise that mental construction is just picturing something from nature. Haven't you ever noticed that artificial things look completely different from natural things? So it is impossible that mental construction is just picturing things from nature.

Yes I wouldn't support that argument. I think the notion is that ideas are either things we have directly experienced - like a colour - or a combination or relation between things we have experienced. With that approach the grounding that ends the regress is the ideas that have been directly experienced. — andrewk

I wonder what it would mean to directly experience an idea. This, what you say here, might provide the appearance of a resolution to the infinite regress, but I think it's just an appearance because it doesn't really say where the idea came from. Did it just pop into existence, as something experienced, or does it rely on prior experiences? What does that really mean, to be a thing, like an idea, which was experienced?

We would naturally divide things up into squares of rectangles as those shapes fit together flushly without any wasted space. So we would probably arrive at the right angle as part of the solution to the question 'how do we divide these fields up efficiently?'. So we solved that problem and observed with our senses part of the solution to the problem was the right angle? — Devans99

Notice, that in your description observing with the senses came after the solution to the problem, not before it. This is the way that science works as well. The mind comes up with the ideas which solve the problem, and empirical observation confirms that the problem has actually been solved.

So if we're defining things so that it's impossible to learn anything solely via ostension, why would we even ask the question in the first place re whether it's possible to learn a language via ostension? — Terrapin Station

The answer to that is quite obvious. Augustine had described language as being learned by ostension. So the question "is it possible to learn a language via ostension?" was asked, because the proposition that this is how language is learned was already made by Augustine. Wittgenstein was exploring the truth or falsity of this proposition, hence asking that question. He seems to have demonstrated that this is an incomplete description of how language is actually learned.

Of course, in that case, it would seem that maybe we're using an odd definition or description of the term "learn," because normally we'd say that we can learn some things via demonstration, via ostension, etc. — Terrapin Station

Sure we might say that we can learn some things, like language, through ostension, but as Wittgenstein demonstrates, this is a type of falsity because it is an incomplete description of how we actually learn those things.

Go back and take a look at #2, #3. Augustine's description of how we learn language is incomplete in a similar way to if a person who was asked to describe what a game is, described what a board game is. The description, of learning through ostension only captures a part of what learning a language is, but it doesn't capture the entirety of it.

Now consider this quote from #30:

One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be
capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?

This is the problem, if ostensive definition is a matter of assigning names to things, it is revealed that we must already know something in order to learn by ostension. So we cannot really capture the nature of learning, what the process of learning involves, by simply referring to ostension, because ostension requires that we already know something. Therefore ostension cannot account for the learning of this, what we already know which is required for ostensive learning. And this, what we already know prior to ostensive learning, plays a large role in learning language.

No, as I explained above, arriving at the right angle was due to the necessity of creating parallel lines to survey plots of land. It has nothing to do with finding the mean between obtuse and acute angles, these angles are defined by the right angle, not vise versa.

I would say that it is impossible to learn anything solely via ostension. Ostensive demonstration is an activity which is completely carried out by the instructor. And, as you indicated, learning requires active participation by the student in the form of different sorts of mental activity, thinking. If the sole means of learning is the ostensive activity, then the student is absolutely passive in the act of learning. So it would be a false description of what learning is, to refer simply to the ostensive activity, without accounting for the active participation of the student.

I believe that this is why Wittgenstein argues that St. Augustine's description of learning language through ostensive activity assumes that the student already knows a language. We have to account for the student's capacity to interpret the ostensive demonstrations, and if the student already has the capacity to interpret, then the student must already know a language.

But where did the idea of shapes come from if it was not the study of form in nature? — Devans99

Well, consider this. We do see a wide variety of shapes in nature, but when we go to make a shape, drawing or something, we never exactly replicate a natural shape. It may be that sometimes we might try to replicate a shape, but more often than not we are attempting to create a shape which is useful for some reason.

Now think of "the right angle" for example. We do not find right angles existing in nature. The ancient Egyptians found that the right angle was very useful to produce parallel lines in order to layout and divide plots of land, so they developed a system for creating right angles. Later, Pythagoras developed the mathematics required to produce a right angle. The right angle was created, it was not found in nature.

So it seems to me that the idea for different shapes is developed from a need to produce these shapes for pragmatic purposes, not from studying these shapes in nature. After we learn how to produce and define various shapes, we might look for them in nature, but we would have to have already developed the shape prior to looking for it, in order to know what we are looking for.

This thread is long and no-one has yet come up with a single undeniably original idea which lends a lot of weight to the OP opinion. — Devans99

If the Op is not refuted by my earlier argument, and you really need an example for rebuttal, try the "right angle" then.

Let's not get caught up in how we categorize phenomena (this is my fault for including that controversial statement) and focus more on the question at hand, which is, can we learn to generate concepts, ideas, etc,?

Some would say we don't need to learn because the process is inherent in our minds. But, I find it to be too crude and ill-governed as it is presently and I wonder if we could develop it further into a scientific process that can be designated as creation or conception?

Can we take the little we know of this mental process and develop it into a scientific discipline? — BrianW

The process is often called "intuition". You'll find a brief discussion in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics on whether intuition is innate or learned. He seemed to conclude that it was a combination of both, but also indicated that he didn't think that it was very important to answer this question, only that it is important to recognize the role of intuition within knowledge. But if intuition can be learned, as you suggest, then we might develop a discipline toward cultivating it.

Sorry I mean ideas are inspired by our senses. Maybe the wheel is a good example. Presumably the idea came about from seeing how circular things roll in nature. Stones and such perhaps. So it's the image of a round stone rolling which creates the idea of 'round' and 'rolling' in the mind. — Devans99

I still think that this expresses a gross misunderstanding of inspiration. An individual living human being, as a composite 'whole", with a multitude of experiences, creates the idea of 'round' within one's mind. It is not the image of a round stone rolling which creates this idea.

So our senses map to neutrons in the mind somehow. The visual ideas of 'round' and 'rolling' appear in the mind. These ideas are then cross domain mapped to domain of tools/handycraft where the anonymous inventor of the wheel has his idea. — Devans99

Again, I think that this expresses a gross misunderstanding.

Come to think of it—if I remember my history right—the theory of relativity was reputedly first conceived during a dream of sleep, this according to Einstein. (If wrong, may I be corrected.) Hence, not by the awoken conscious ego but by the unconscious mind’s thoughts while the total being was sleeping (though dreams are to me a complex subject when it comes to experience and awareness—we as egos are after all aware of our dreams while dreaming). — javra

For a long time, I've known that my most creative, and inspirational time of day is first thing in the morning. More recently, I've come to realize that a lot of my most creative ideas are derived from things which have come from dreams, though I previously didn't recognize where the creative ideas came from because I didn't remember them as coming from dreams, I just had these ideas in the morning. A few times now, I've awoken with ideas that have come directly from dreams, remembered from the dreams and recognized as useful, I've transferred them into actual useful creative ideas.

But I think we pick up ideas from our senses. The first ideas would have been about things around us. The idea that a certain berry tastes good would come from our senses. We would then have maybe observed a peanut plant with our senses and cross domain mapped the idea 'tastes good' into the domain of peanuts. So all ideas have an eventual heritage to ideas deduced from our senses? — Devans99

Do the ideas exist within the objects that we sense, and we "pick up" the ideas from the things through sensation? Or, are the ideas created in the act of sensing, so that the ideas are distinct from the object sensed? I think that the latter is the case, and it is foolish to think that we pick up ideas from the objects sensed.

How could ideas be "deduced from our senses'? Senses cannot deduce. Nor can senses produce ideas. ideas are required for deduction, so we cannot say that deduction is responsible for creating the primitive ideas. If some form of logic were responsible for creation of the primitive ideas it would be more like induction or abduction. Maybe some primitive logic could work with images from memory, or something like that, to produce ideas from something which is not actually ideas.

The thing to remember though, is that the images, and memories created by a mind are distinct from the objects which are remembered or represented by the memories. So basing ideas in a more primitive mental activity doesn't get us past the problem that I'm presenting, and that is that the things within the mind are distinct from the things sensed. The things within the mind therefore cannot be said to be created from, synthesized from, or in any way consisting of the things sensed.

Sorry about the incoherent statement. It should have read,

Mathematics may seem like a new creation until we realise that all of its relations are derived from natural phenomena which would still exist without our knowledge of mathematics. — BrianW

I still don't think I agree with you. Suppose someone observes some natural phenomena and creates some ideas concerning these phenomena. In a sense, you can say that the ideas are "derived" from that phenomena, but the person does not take elements from the observed objects and use those within the mind, to produce something. The person creates representations, images and symbols, and creates something from this. We cannot properly say that representations are taken from, or "derived" from the observed objects because they are more like symbols, signs and images created to represent what was observed, That's how memory works through representation.

This separation between what was observed, and the memory of it, is the separation that Kant refers to, which makes direct realism unappealing. It is also this separation which supports dualism, and it doesn't suffice to just dismiss the separation because we don't like dualism. The separation is very real and must be explained, and understood.

That is, instead of imitating nature, we could generate something as unique in its characteristics as if it were a natural phenomenon itself. — BrianW

But isn't imitation itself the creation of something new? The imitation is not the thing imitated, it is distinct. Where does it come from? The imitation does not come from the thing imitated, it comes from the desire to imitate. So it is a false proposition, or false representation, to say that the imitation is derived from the thing imitated.

David Hume made this argument in his Enquiry concerning human understanding', saying:

We shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert, that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and at that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source — David Hume
His notion was that every new idea is a connection between other ideas. eg a flying horse puts together the ideas of a bird and a horse. Strangely, he then went on to suggest that the notion of a 'missing colour blue' is an idea that is not just a connection between existing ideas. Nobody can work out why he did that, and personally I don't agree that it is a new idea. — andrewk

There is a real problem with the argument that all ideas come from other ideas, and that is the infinite regress in the existence of ideas. This is very similar to the problem Plato approached in the Meno, I believe it was, which is represented today as the theory of recollection. It was argued that all knowledge consisted of elements recollected from before. So learning something new is simply a case of recollection of things from previous lives. The glaring problem is the infinite temporal regress of existence of ideas. But assuming this infinite regress as the accurate understanding, is what supports the Platonic notion of eternal ideas.

Now, we know that human beings and thinking life forms have not been around forever, so we cannot support this notion that new ideas are just a new arrangement of older ideas. If thinking beings came into existence, then the ideas which they think must come into existence as well, or else we'd have ideas prior to thinking beings. So it makes no sense to say that ideas just come from other ideas because of that infinite regress, and the fact that thinking beings came into existence, in time.

Simultaneity of events being dependent on the observer fell out of the maths I think rather than it being a genuine new idea? — Devans99

"Fell out of the math"? Don't you mean that understanding the math fostered the generation of this idea?

Can anyone refute this with an example of a genuine new idea? — Devans99

There is no need to produce a "genuine new idea" to refute this notion. All we need to do is to refer to the temporal infinite regress of ideas, I've explained above. If every new idea requires an old one prior to it in time, then since we have ideas now, existing, there could be no prior time without any ideas. Now, if we insist on this position, we have to account for the existence of ideas prior to the existence of thinking beings, because the thinking beings necessarily got their ideas from prior ideas. This would force us into some sort of Platonic realism.

Yes, we do figure out a lot of new stuff. But, they are only new to us. — BrianW

Don't you think that some people figure out stuff that's new to everyone? What about Einstein's idea about the relativity of simultaneity? Wasn't this a new idea?

Mathematics may seem like a new creation until we realise that all of its relations are natural phenomena which could still exist without mathematics. — BrianW

How does this make sense to you? Mathematics is relations which could exist without mathematics. What's that supposed to mean? Mathematics could exist without mathematics? How is this supposed to imply that mathematics actually could exist without mathematics?

I don't know much about dreams but I think that it's impossible for them to contain elements which are not borrowed from memory or derived from perception. To me, even the fantastic in dreams seems just as much a montage of objects/subjects of our perception as well as other already formed concepts. — BrianW

Just because you think that it's impossible for dreams to contain elements not borrowed from memory, doesn't men that this is the case. I've had a lot of dreams, and I'm very sure that there are a lot of elements there which didn't come from memory or perception. Why do you think that this is impossible? Have you no imagination? Suppose an artist takes a canvas and paint, and produces a piece of art. Would you think that all the elements which the artist produces on the canvas must represent something the artist has already sensed? Why can't the artist create something new, like an abstract work?

Everything we imagine or generate in our minds is a product of an already existing element. — BrianW

I disagree. If this were the case, then nothing new could have ever been thought up. But clearly subjects like mathematics demonstrates that all sorts of new stuff is thought up all the time. Also, consider dreaming. I don't know about you, but in my dreams I see all sorts of new things which are clearly not a synthesis of existing elements from my memory. They are new creations..

I don't see how we have such opposing conclusions. Let me make a simple deductive argument out of your premise concerning active participation, and you tell me how you disagree with the premises I propose. Learning a language requires active participation by the student. Active participation by the student is something other than ostensive demonstration. Therefore learning language requires something other than ostensive demonstration.

Or do I misunderstand what you are saying altogether?

Re your second part, you then go on to treat "learning" as if it might refer to something completely passive, lol — Terrapin Station

Are you serious? I guess not, judging by your use of "lol".

For me to agree or disagree we need to clarify just what learning amounts to. If learning is the idea of someone giving something to you wholesale, where you don't have to do anything in order to gain it (sometimes people seem to have that, or something close to it, in mind with "learning"), then no, I wouldn't disagree that it's impossible to learn language solely through ostension. — Terrapin Station

Isn't it clear that learning is not a case of someone simply giving you something. This would make the learner completely passive, when surely the learner must be an active participant. If the learner is completely passive, then learning cannot be totally ostensive because nothing accounts for the learner's ability to receive what is given.

If learning, however, includes the notion of figuring things out on one's own via deduction, contemplation, etc., in response to presentations that are made to one (which is what learning should imply in my view), then yes, I'd disagree that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension. — Terrapin Station

So this would be a more accurate description of learning, in my opinion, making the learner active. If the learner is active, in what you describe as sorts of thinking, then this accounts for the learner's ability to receive what the demonstrator is giving. But if this is the case, then is learning properly attributed to the ostensive activity, or to the thinking activity of the learner? And even if it requires both, isn't this just another way of saying that learning requires something more than simply ostensive demonstration? It requires active thought on the part of the learner as well. So even in this case it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension, because the right sort of thinking is also required.

Sorry, I've jumped ahead a little bit, toward what I consider as the "conclusion" of this part of the text. He discusses very explicitly, the relationship between rules and the play of the game, at 31. He builds toward the "conclusion" at 32, 33, that if we learned language through ostensive learning, as described by Augustine, it would be necessary to already know a language in order to learn a language. At 32 he describes this as a foreigner learning a new language, and suggests that this is all that Augustine's description is good for.

Yeah, considering that rules are not yet discussed at this early stage, one is hard pressed to know what MU thinks he is talking about. — StreetlightX

I don't like to have to be nitpicky, but "rules" are implied by Wittgenstein whenever he refers to "games", as he clearly understands games as consisting of rules. This is quite evident from the very first page of the book

3... It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games.

At this point, #3, he explains that Augustine's description of language is descriptive of only a part of overall language use, as if when someone was asked to describe what a "game" consists of, they gave a description of what a "board game" consists of.

I do agree, that at this point it is not evident whether Wittgenstein believes that all games consist of rules, but he does consistently mention the word "game", and talks about various language games. This word, "game" implies through most forms of common use "rules". And the talk of various language games implies various sets of rules. So even when he is not mentioning "rules", nor does he explicitly state "all games consist of rules", rules are implicit in his mention of "games", due to the common understanding of the word "game".

Of course there is a way of using "game", if someone is "playing games with us", in which "rules" are not necessarily implied. But that's another issue, perhaps for later, as there is no evidence that Wittgenstein's use of language is a matter of him "playing games with us". That would be a form of deception.

The problem is that if all you can say about X is that it is not Y, you are attributing only a negative property to X, and nothing real can have only negative properties. — Herg

It's not the case that the thing has only negative properties, it is the case that the things property's are unknown. The thing has been identified, as outside of time, non-temporal so it is a real thing, having been identified, there is no issue there. Therefore the real issue is to establish method a toward understanding this thing, a process whereby we can come to say something about this real thing which has been identified.

What I tried to allude to, is that if we consider that the reason why we cannot say anything about this thing, is that we have misidentified it, as "non-temporal", then this gives us an avenue of approach. It has been designated as "non-temporal" because of a faulty definition of time. So "non-temporal" is a misnomer for this thing. the misnomer has come about from a misunderstanding of time. which dictates that anything temporal is necessarily physical, and this excludes the non-physical from the temporal. From this misconception of "time", the non-physical is necessarily non-temporal as well. So when we switch to the other understanding of time which I offered, this allows that the non-physical has real, actual, and active, existence within time. Now the thing is identified as "non-physical", and we have an avenue toward understanding because we can assign the positive attribute, of "temporal".

Definition of point of origin. : the place where something comes from : the place where something originates. The package's point of origin was somewhere in the U.S. the point of origin of the fire that burned the building down. — eodnhoj7

Right, now do you agree that "where something comes form" implies a temporal priority of one thing in relation to the other? And if one is temporally prior, its existence cannot be dependent on the other. Though the existence of the posterior may be dependent on the prior, it isimpossible that the existence of the prior is dependent on the posterior.. The second may rely on the first, but the first cannot not rely on the second. Therefore if one is the point of origin, the two cannot be "phenomena that exist as each other through each other.

If there is no center point then how do you get the diameter or the radius as half of the diameter stemming from the center of the circle? — eodnhoj7

You cannot get the exact diameter, or radius of a circle, from the circumference, you only get an approximation due to the irrational nature of pi. So you can only get an approximation of the centre, because there is no actual centre.

Your phrase 'something other than "time"' is empty of meaning, unless you can suggest some of the properties of this supposed 'something'. — Herg

I do not agree with this. To say "X is something other than Y" is not to say something devoid of meaning, as it distinguishes X from Y. I agree that it says very little about what X is, but it may be considered as a start, and therefore not devoid of meaning. Are familiar with the process of elimination?

In fact I did not use the word "physical" in my post, and I see no reason to define time in terms of the physical, unless we can say for sure that there is no non-physical form of existence, which I don't believe we can. Even the physicist John Wheeler didn't define time in terms of the physical; he defined it as "what prevents everything from happening at once", which I think is a very good definition. — Herg

Yes, this supports the point I was trying to make: "this would all depend on how one defines time". You asked me "why would it?", but I see you already have an understanding of why it would. Say time is as you suggest "what prevents everything from happening at once". If this is the case, then a timeless god is not incoherent as you claimed. The timeless god would be the one which makes everything happen at once. And this is not incoherent at all, as we know from the special theory of relativity that simultaneity is frame of reference dependent.

And the axioms existing through eachother is circular "Point 1 exists through Points 2 and 3 as points 2 an 3" while maintaining a progressive expansion as point 1 progresses to point 2 and point 2 to point 3. — eodnhoj7

I agree that if they exist through each other, then they may be circular. But what you do not seem to understand is that if this is the case, that they exist through each other, then none of them may be considered as a "point of origin". Do you know what "point of origin" means? It means first, as in existing prior to the ones which follow. So do you see the contradiction in saying that they only exist in relation to each other, and also that one might considered as a point of origin?

Wow...you are actually a liar...the "Point has no Center point?" — eodnhoj7

Why misquote me just to support a false accusation of "liar". I said the circle has no centre point, and this is clearly demonstrated by the irrational nature of pi.

Pi is dependent upon a diameter and the diameter is dependent upon the radius. — eodnhoj7

Right, and pi is indeterminate because the centre point of a circle is indeterminate. There is no centre point.

Going back to the premise of the thread, if material is the medial, what is a medial? — eodnhoj7

A medal is the reward you get for your excellence in misunderstanding logic.

. All axioms are points of origin; hence all axioms as progressive linear definition and circularity are points of origins. The point of origin progresses to another point of origin through point 2 and cycles back to itself through point 3 with this linear progression and circularity originating from themselves, through eachother and point 1.

Point 1 is original and exists through points 2 and 3 as points 2 and 3. — eodnhoj7

That's not a true circularity. To be a true circle, there can be no difference between point 1,2, and 3, in relation to "point of origin". To be truly circular, any of the points must be equal as potentially the point of origin, such that there cannot be an actual point of origin. So to refer to any point of a circle as a point of origin is to utter a falsity.

Fallacy of Authority if referencing the nature of the circle as pointless. Pythagoras and the Hindus with the Monad and Bindu (respectively) observed the point as the origin of the circle. — eodnhoj7

You seem to misunderstand. My argument is not that the circle is pointless, but that there cannot be a point of origin.

The circle cannot do this would stemming from the point, with the point as origin simultaneously being beyond movement in one respect and void in another. — eodnhoj7

Even this can be understood to be incorrect. There is no reason why the centre point would be the point of origin of the circle. In fact, the irrational nature of pi indicates that there cannot be an actual centre point to the circle. Therefore the centre point cannot be the origin of the circle. This argument is unsound, based in the false premise that a circle actually has a centre point. The irrational nature of pi indicates otherwise.

3. The standard intepretation of the circle as pure movement, observes the circle originating from nothing (the center point). The circle cannot exist without an origin and this origin is the point through Pi. — eodnhoj7

The irrational nature of pi indicates that we'd have to do an infinite reduction to determine the actual centre point of the circle. This is impossible therefore there is no actual centre point. Since there is no actual centre point, it is impossible that the centre point is the origin of the circle.

All points of origin are nothing in themselves, hence observed through the other laws progressively and circularly with laws 2 and 3 being points of origin in themselves with law 2 progressing to 1 and 3 and law three cycling through 1 and 2. — eodnhoj7

Again, I'll reassert what I already told you. If the axioms of logic are related as circular, it is impossible that any one of them could be understood as a point of origin. This is your contradictory argument.

If we can take the law of identity, or any one of the other laws, as a point of origin, then the laws of logic are not circular. If the laws of logic are circular then we cannot take any one of them as a point of origin. Therefore your argument employs contradictory premises, that the axioms may be taken as points of origin, and that they are circular.

If time is defined in relation to physical change, then it is necessary for physical change to be occurring in order for time to be passing, hence a universe is required for time, and it makes no sense to talk about anything "before" the universe. If God creates this universe, God is outside of time, and timeless. This is not incoherent, it just requires referring to something other than "time" to account for God's actions, God being non-physical and time being constrained to physical existence.

But if time is defined in some other way, such that time can be passing without any physical change occurring, then there is no need for a physical universe for there to be time, and talk of a time before the universe would be coherent. This allows that God's actions occur in time, therefore God is not timeless in this conception, but God's actions are at a time when there is no physical existence

Good question. He would at the very least have to change from not yet having created the universe to having created the universe, which implies that he is a god who changes; and since change requires time, a god who changes is not a timeless god. I infer that the notion of a timeless creator god is incoherent. However, a god who changes within his own time but sees all of our time at once is not incoherent. Having said which, I personally see no evidence for any kind of god. — Herg

This would all depend on how one defines "time".

This leads to the conclusion that there could be no Space! Most Cosmologists would say there was no Space before the Big Bang. The Space and the Energy were created by the Big Bang. — SteveKlinko

This is exactly why we need to consider the 0th dimension, a dimension with no space. When we realize that there could be a time without space we need to allow for this in our representations of the relationship between time and space. The logical procedure is to model time as the 0th dimension rather than as the 4th dimension, such that 3d spatial existence follows from time, rather than modeling time as the fourth dimension which follows from 3d spatial existence.

Here's a question, a point of interest. Does anyone disagree with what Wittgenstein is arguing, that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension?

The argument might be put this way. To learn how to understand meaning requires learning some rules. However, there are multiple sets of rules, corresponding to the variety of different ways that words are used. Determining which set of rules is applicable, in a particular situation (context), is required to learn language. We cannot appeal to a "set of rules" for determining which set of rules, because we'd fall into infinite regress of needing to determine which set of rules is applicable. So the argument appears to be that this ability, the capacity to choose a particular set of rules as applicable in a particular context, cannot be taught through ostension, as a set of rules.

If I have represented the argument correctly, I would be interested to hear some opinions as to whether or not this is an acceptable position. I believe that Terrapin Station, for one, disagrees with the position.

23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion,
question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different
kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And
this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new
types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a
rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form
of life.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following
examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now,
this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should
hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular
man did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on. One might (using
the language of chemistry) call this picture a proposition-radical.
This will be how Frege thought of the "assumption".
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.
(Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.}

[1] "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered." — Galen Strawson

There is a category mistake inherent within this premise. The "way we are" is a passive state, expressed as a static description. It cannot account for an action, as an action requires an active cause. So if someone asked me why I acted in a particular way, at a particular time, to say "I acted that way because that's the way I am", would be a meaningless category mistake, because it doesn't say why I acted that way. What it is, is an avoidance of the question, which appears like a possible answer to the question, when it's really a category mistake.

To explain an action requires reference to other actions, as cause. So when someone asks why I acted in a particular way, at a particular time, I cannot refer to "the way I am" (as this is a category mistake). I must refer to other activities which were happening or happened at that time, or things which I desired to make happen in the future. To explain an action requires reference to an action, it cannot be explained through reference to a state.

There is a further experiential point worthy of reflection. Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature. Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails. — Dfpolis

So the point to consider here is that the activity of a physical system cannot be explained through reference to its "present state". That would be to make the same category mistake. To explain the activity of a physical system requires reference to the temporal extension of that system, and this means something beyond the "present state".

On the other, the entire point of our massive facility with language is to generate something like the same meaning in each consciousness. Stressing the difference ignores exactly what makes stressing that difference possible. Your speech act presumes that we can share meaning in some sense -- call it what you will. — macrosoft

I find that to say things like this is to make a statement which simplifies something that is complicated, but it doesn't really make sense. It's like you're saying something, and it would be accepted by many people, simply because it sounds good, but it's actually quite unreal. This proposition glosses over the complexities of something extremely complicated, making that thing appear to be very simple, so let's accept it, and proceed on our way as if we have an understanding of that complicated thing.

The fact is, that in no rigorous sense of "same" can we say that each consciousness has the same meaning. People will argue, as your statement implies, that it must be the same or else we couldn't communicate. But I think that this actually obscures the true nature of communication, and that is that we get by on something which is merely adequate, and is far less than a perfect understanding. Language, communication, does not require, in any sense at all, that we "share meaning". It is this assumption which creates the illusion of simplicity that obscures the true complicated nature of language.

This is like the word "inter-subjective". There is a massive quantity of extremely complicated interactions between human subjects. Instead of attempting to understand these relations, let's just hand some objective reality to the "inter-subjective", and pretend that words like "language" refer to a real object rather than to the relations between individual people. So you say that there is a real object which is called "meaning", and we each share in this object, instead of representing the individuals as individuals who interact and their interactions create the illusion that there is such an object called "meaning".

I am comfortable with considering the world where all mental states are attributes of physical states. — Valentinus

The question here though, is how is it that a physical state which is capable of having a mental state is created. If you're comfortable with it, you can forget about that question, and be happy with the assumption that physical states just naturally have mental states. But if you're philosophically inclined, you'll realize as Socrates does, that a physical state doesn't just randomly produce a harmony of notes, nor does a physical state just randomly produce a mental state. So if what is required is a very specific type of physical thing, like a musical instrument, or a brain, and that specific thing must behave in a very particular sort of way, then the philosopher will ask, what is the cause of this peculiar situation.

Socrates didn't know about brain states. — Valentinus

Doesn't your quoted paragraph indicate the very opposite of this statement? The soul is said to consist of all these elements, the body and brain. But in order for the brain to think in the correct way, the soul must exercise power over it. Why would you think that Socrates didn't know about brain states?

In this context, what does it mean to distinguish the non-physical from the physical? What is being separated? — Valentinus

That's a good question, and it probably depends on what is meant by "irreducible" here. Let's assume a brain state is physical and that a mental state is non-physical. Now, try to reduce the non-physical mental state to some further non-physical source, like the soul, like Socrates does, claiming that the non-physical soul is required to produce the physical brain state.. The property dualist would disallow such a reduction, claiming that the non-physical mental state is completely dependent on, as an attribute of, the physical brain state, disallowing that the non-physical mental state is dependent on some further non-physical thing like the soul. In the mean time one would be arguing that the physical brain state is in no way dependent on any further non-physical thing like the soul, because the non-physical mental state is dependent on the physical, as an attribute of it.

. All axioms are points of origin; hence all axioms as progressive linear definition and circularity are points of origins. The point of origin progresses to another point of origin through point 2 and cycles back to itself through point 3 with this linear progression and circularity originating from themselves, through eachother and point 1.

Point 1 is original and exists through points 2 and 3 as points 2 and 3.

As original Points 1,2,3 are extension of eachother as one axiom, while simultaneously being nothing in themselves as points of origin that invert to further axioms respectively; hence originate as 1 and 3 through 1 and 3 as 1 and 3 laws — eodnhoj7

I can't agree with this, as I see a fundamental error. If you are talking about circularity then you cannot refer to a "point of origin". This is fundamental to circularity, no point may be a point of origin. That is why Aristotle designated a perfect circular motion as an eternal activity, it cannot have a beginning or ending.

If I look at the sentence:

"The dog ate the cat." These words are inhernent axioms as points of origin in themselves and effectively exist as point space.

Using "(x)∙" as a symbol for point space, which as an axiom is in itself a point of reference to the observer denoting that these laws are not just limited to language but language as symbolism is not just limited to the written word but thoughts within the observer, the sentence can be observed geometrically as:

(The)∙ (dog)∙ (ate)∙ (the)∙ (cat)∙



This sentence in itself is an axiom as a point of origin and can be observed as:

((The)∙ (dog)∙ (ate)∙ (the)∙ (cat)∙)∙



While the same applies to the letters which form the sentence:

(((T)∙(h)∙(e)∙)∙ ((d)∙(o)∙(g)∙)∙ ((a)∙(t)∙(e)∙)∙ ((t)∙(h)∙(e)∙)∙ ((c)∙(a)∙(t)∙)∙)∙


And The paragraphs, pages, etc. as well (this will not be observed for brevity). — eodnhoj7

So, what you are doing here, is assuming that an axiom is a "point of origin", as a premise, then building upon this an argument which premises that a point of origin as impossible (circularity). Really, all you have is two contradicting premises, the premise of a point of origin and the premise of circularity.

Even if we grant that ultimately the brain is quickly processing sense-data, the experience of others' meaning is far more automatic and instantaneous than that. — macrosoft

I don't agree. The automatic, and instantaneous meaning is one's own meaning, the meaning produced by one's own habituation. It is not the other's meaning (the speaker's meaning). And the hearer's own habituated meaning is only consistent with the meaning intended by the speaker when the hearer and the speaker have similar cultural conditioning. So when the meaning interpreted automatically and instantaneously by the hearer is consistent with the meaning intended by the speaker it Is not the case that the interpreter is processing the speaker's meaning. It is only when the interpreter takes the time to consider nuances and subtle differences, putting oneself into the speaker's shoes, through empathy, that one is actually attempting to experience the other's meaning.

If it is true that "human disposition is an attribute of brain states", then there doesn't seem to be any purpose to maintaining a dualism. Nothing is just dumb unformed matter any longer.
Using an "idealist" model may be useful for some things but this sounds like a misuse of it. — Valentinus

I don't see your point. As Socrates' argument demonstrates, we still need to turn to the "soul" to account for the existence of "brain states". Where's the misuse?

I agree, you do not "observe" another person's meaning, you deduce, or infer it. And, you do this through the means of the meaning you produce in your mind, your own meaning. But it is often very important in interpretation to distinguish the two, the other's meaning, and your own meaning. You cannot simply assume that the meaning produced in your mind is what is intended by the speaker, or author. And if it is not, then we can argue that you have produced an incorrect interpretation. So I believe it is important to respect the possibility that one's own interpretation may be incorrect, and therefore do whatever possible to ensure that it is as close as possible to the correct interpretation. That requires empathy, putting oneself in the other's position, to determine what the other intended.