I agree, you do not "observe" another person's meaning, you deduce, or infer it. And, you do this through the means of the meaning you produce in your mind, your own meaning. But it is often very important in interpretation to distinguish the two, the other's meaning, and your own meaning. You cannot simply assume that the meaning produced in your mind is what is intended by the speaker, or author. And if it is not, then we can argue that you have produced an incorrect interpretation. So I believe it is important to respect the possibility that one's own interpretation may be incorrect, and therefore do whatever possible to ensure that it is as close as possible to the correct interpretation. That requires empathy, putting oneself in the other's position, to determine what the other intended.

Dennett states that prior to evolution, it's a mistake to think of the world as being colored in any way that we experience color. Rather, color evolved as a coevolutionary coding scheme between plants and animals. Flowers guide insects to nectar using a color scheme, just as fruits guide mammals to spreading their seeds. Of course the actual evolutionary account is going to be a lot more complex, but those two examples suffice. — Marchesk

Here's a thought experiment. Imagine the colours of a world which existed without any organic matter. There would be some variance of colour, but the world would be quite bland. "Colour", as we know it in the bright array of flowers and other pigments, is entirely created by biological existence. Colour is not defined by individual segments of a wavelength spectrum, because colour is created by combinations of various different wavelengths.

The question of whether colour is properly understood as attributed to the perceiving subject, or the perceived object, is really insignificant, because even if colour is properly placed as existing within the object, colour as we know it is created by the biological systems of that object. Inorganic matter, without a living being to separate fundamental elements, and synthesize, is inherently bland and without colour.

No one seems to have mentioned (at a glance) the point being made in the opening about apples - that is the manner in which words are understood. We do not simple follow a set of sequential points in order to understand something. We do not apprehend the “red,” “apple,” or “five” as separate concepts when they’re uttered in the manner given. To say this is what W calls a “primitive language.” — I like sushi

I don't recognize this as a very good example, because it attempts to understand something complex through a simple division and analysis. So "five red apples" is explained by looking up the meaning of the individual words. And that's a faulty premise, from the beginning. It is not necessary to break a thing into its composite parts to have an understanding of the whole.

Wittgenstein uses this example to proceed toward the separation between language use and thought, talking about how we might understand an entire phrase as if it were one word, and this supports the later implication that thought is not necessarily required in order to understand a phrase What follows is the removal of thought, as the medium between what is wanted, and what is said. I would say that the argument is not conclusive. Just because we do not actively analyze the phrase, breaking it into parts to understand it, this does not produce the conclusion that no thought is involved. Analyzing is only one type of thinking.

Action grounds meaning which is distributed throughout an entire form of life(oversimplifying which may be impossible to avoid, which may be the point). — macrosoft

I would argue that Wittgenstein's procedure of grounding meaning in action rather than thought, does not really resolve any problems. Both thought and action are grounded in intent, what one wants. So what Wittgenstein does here is remove the medium of thought, which is generally believed to exist between intent and action. Now we need to establish a direct relation between what is said and what is wanted, without reference to the medium of thought. We could say that reference to thought is unreliable and deceptive, so we must go directly to intent. But how could the determination of intent be any more reliable than the determination of thought?

What we are left with is the direct interpretation of intent through actions. The question of course, is whether it is more reliable to determine one's intent by one's actions, or to determine one's thoughts by one's actions, and then proceed toward one's intent through that determination of thought. There is a three way relation, intent, thought, and action. We cannot completely exclude thought from the scenario, as Wittgenstein might imply, because thought is what allows for deception which is when one's actions do not properly reflect one's intentions

Re "Do you say the unshortened sentence to yourself?" Again, it depends on the person. Some people might internally translate it into something else. Some won't. — Terrapin Station

When he says "Slab!", and he means "please bring me a slab", I think: "that fucking asshole is asking me for another fucking slab again, when he hasn't even used the last one I brought him yet. Fuck off and leave me alone boss."

It's clear that §19 is meant to answer the question (2) in the negative (it does not consist in thinking in some form or other a different sentence form the one you utter). In place of 'thought', what is offered is 'a form of life'. Witty does not at this point comment too much on what he means by this, but as a start, §19 is meant to pick apart the equation of 'wanting this' with 'thinking'. — StreetlightX

Most often, we are thinking something different from what we utter. That's why we ought to separate meaning from intent, what the person says, and what the words mean, does not accurately, or truly reflect the person's intentions. If we do not recognize this separation, and think that what a person says necessarily reflects what the person thinks, the deception has been successful. For sure, what the person wants, and what that person says, are quite distinct.

So at #21, "five slabs" has no definitive meaning because the meaning has been separated from the intent. It might be a command or it could be a report. It has a "sense" according to how it is being used.

After the first sentence, I did not even bother reading it. — eodnhoj7

Right, you just proved the point I was making. There is no necessity to proceed.

No. I don't agree with any of that. For one, I more or less agree with the "intentional fallacy." — Terrapin Station

I'm just going by how the word "meaning" is commonly used, and defined in the dictionary. The meaning of a word is what is meant by that word, and what is meant is what is intended. Words have various different "senses", different ways in which they can be used, and we determine the meaning in a particular instance of use by referring to the context, what is meant by the speaker, or author.

So I'm following the rules of the language-game that I'm playing, while you're playing some other game. I haven't the foggiest idea of what you mean by "intentional fallacy", so that's lost on me.

Isn't that rather patronizing and arrogant on your part? — Terrapin Station

No, I don't think so, it's what I honestly believed, that you didn't give much thought to what you said. And since you didn't try to explain, your reply just reinforced that belief.

I don't see how this exposition on the character of the soul relates to "attributes of brain states." — Valentinus

Well, let's say that attributes are properties, so you're asking about the properties of brain states, like harmony is a property of musical notes. If the soul must act to create the property, how could it be the property? Now consider your quoted passage. The soul must act to direct and control the elements of the human mind to bring about the desired disposition. Human disposition is an attribute of brain states. The disposition (attribute of a brain state) is not itself the soul, it is the result of the activity of the soul.

I don't believe that's the case at all. As long as the involved parties parse things as going smoothly, consistently, coherently, etc. it doesn't matter what they have in mind, exactly.

Of course, language very often doesn't go smoothly, consistently, coherently, etc. to some parties who are paying attention. But sometimes it does, and it can regardless of people having very different things in mind. — Terrapin Station

Sure, it's not absolutely necessary, and it can go smoothly, but misunderstanding is likely the case.

I don't agree that there are any wrong interpretations. It's not wrong to be different. — Terrapin Station

But isn't it necessary to understand what the author intended, to interpret, isn't that what is "meant"? If an interpretation is not consistent with what was meant, can't we say that it's wrong?

Are you thinking maybe I'm in a loony bin? — Terrapin Station

More like you didn't seem to give much thought to what you said. Perhaps in that case there is no such thing as the correct interpretation.

One, people may very well wind up with different things in mind for the same terms, and two, what happens is that people observe various instances of pointing (literally or figuratively) and "grunting" (or making marks or whatever) and they attempt to formulate abstractions and make deductions so that various occasions of pointing and grunting make sense/are relatively consistent observationally, including re related pointing and grunting. — Terrapin Station

Yes, people "may" wind up with different things in mind, but to be able to use language successfully we must avoid that. And we do learn to use language successfully, so we must be able to avoid that. That's the issue, when there is a multitude of possible interpretations, each correct according to a particular set of rules, where does the capacity to avoid the wrong interpretation, by choosing the appropriate set of rules, come from?

Natural laws are one example. (Whether we believe that there really are natural laws or not.) — Terrapin Station

As I said, that's problematic. Would you argue that inert matter is capable of interpreting natural laws in order to know how to behave? Or how would these natural laws exist, and act to influence the behaviour of matter?

Why does Socrates then reject the harmony view? — joe b

If I remember correctly, Socrates dismisses the harmony theory because the soul must necessarily rule over the body, and therefore not be harmony which is derived from it. There is an issue with illness and evil actions, which is used to discredit the harmony theory. If the soul were a harmony there would not be such discordance.

In relation to emergence and property dualism, a harmony is produced by the appropriate order of the physical parts of the physical body (musical instrument). Therefore the harmony is emergent. Socrates would argue that the physical body, the musical instrument, does not necessarily produce a harmony, it might just as well produce discordance. So the soul cannot exist as the harmony because it is required to produce the harmony, and is therefore prior to the harmony.

What is ironic about this is that in a sense Feser, as a representative of the Roman Catholic orthodoxy, is less spiritual in regard to this example than is physics. The physical analysis, which is that 'everything depends on everything else' is essentially similar to the Mādhyamaka notion of Emptiness and Dependent Origination. — andrewk

it's debatable whether Feser is "less spiritual", but what he does do is remove the temporal connotations from the concepts of "potential" and "actual", allowing that what is actual, and what is potential, are equal in relation to reality, at the present moment. Classically, what is actual at the present moment is what is real, and potential, referring to future possibilities does not share equally in reality. In classical Christian theology, actuality is given priority, precedence over potentiality. It is only by removing this precedence, and assuming actual and potential to have equal status at the present, that Feser is able to transpose the temporal hierarchy of temporal order, to a physical hierarchy, an order of things.

The problem is that the precedence, or priority, of actual over potential is given, validated, or justified by the nature of time. Past existence is actual (real) while future existence is potential (requiring actualization to become real). When "actual" and "potential" are removed from this context, the validity of any order, and consequently the validity of Fesesr's hierarchy, is also removed. So Feser creates his hierarchy by referring to the priority of actual over potential, but by removing actual and potential from the temporal context he negates the validity of that priority.

I agree. What Valentinus asked for is to cover a large amount of complex and varied material in a short period of time.

I nominate I like sushi as "the leader".

If P=P requires -P=-P to exist and is incomplete without -P then what is incomplete is void on its own terms as it must exist through further axioms.

Because it must progress to further axioms, considering it is only a part, it does not exist on its own terms. — eodnhoj7

P=P, does not itself need to progress to further axioms. It has meaning on its own, as the law of identity, indicating that P exists and is identifiable as an entity. What "must" progress, and what is represented by "logical necessity" is the human mind carrying out the logical process. Logical necessity, ("must progress") is within the mind. The freedom of choice is self-restricted as the mind is compelled to proceed toward the logical conclusion. The mind desires to know, and therefore restricts its own capacity to choose by enforcing :logical necessity, as the means to that end, knowing. The compulsion to proceed further, toward a related axiom, is produced by the existence of, and the understanding of, the primary axiom P=P. So it is not the case that P=P requires the further progress for its existence. The further progress is enabled by its existence.

The completion sought is within the mind and follows from the identification of the object (P). The desire is for a completion to the understanding of the identified entity. It is first identified, and therefore designated as existing through the act of identification, but the understanding of it is recognized as incomplete. So the mind is compelled, by the desire to know, to proceed toward further understanding.

There is a separation between the object (signified as P) and the understanding of the object, a separation which is necessitated logically, by the incompletion of the understanding. The object is identified as one whole, P, not a part, and therefore complete in and of itself, but the understanding of it is incomplete. Therefore there is a separation between the object itself, identified as P, and the understanding of the object. The understanding is what progresses. P=P signifies the first step of understanding. Recognizing the existence of the object, as an entity, a whole, and giving it identity is the first step of understanding. P=P is not void without further axioms, it just does not provide a complete understanding.

If you deny that what is identified as P is a real object, a whole, claiming that it is instead a part of a whole, then you invalidate that entire logical structure. You cannot therefore, proceed from P=P to further axioms, if your claim is that P represents a part rather than a whole, because you now need to validate the existence of P. P=P has been invalidated, P does not represent a thing with its own existence, as itself,, but it represents a part of a thing. This would require proceeding backward to a prior, more fundamental axiom, which would necessitate the identify of P as part of a whole, rather than as an individual thing, itself.

I just said in the above P=P is incomplete in the quote. — eodnhoj7

Right, you've now changed your tune. Before you said "P=P requires -P=-P to exist". Now, P=P is simply incomplete without -P.

I am saying P=P but the statement is incomplete. — eodnhoj7

Now you're changing your tune. Before you said that P=P requires -P in order to have any meaning. Starting to see things my way now? Now that you're starting to see the deficiencies of your principles, should we go back and reassess all the deficiencies of your various arguments?

Let's consider pi and the line. A line is a relation. Pi is a relation. Does this mean that pi is a line? Or can there be different types of relations, pi being of one type and a line being of another type?

My point is that your ramblings are illogical. And there appears to be group consensus on that.

My point is made. — eodnhoj7

You mean my point is made. And yours is disproven.

Actually the law of identity leading to the law of non contradiction, and vice versa observes them as connected and required to defined eachother. — eodnhoj7

The law of identity leads to the law of non-contradiction, and not vise versa. It's a one way street, like the law of non-contradiction leads to the law of exclude middle and not vise versa. As proof, consider starting with the law of excluded middle, and you'll see that it's nonsense without the law of non-contradiction. It doesn't make any sense because it requires the law of non-contradiction to establish a relation between is and is not. However, we can establish the relation between is and is not, without the law of non-contradiction, because one follows the other and not vise versa. Likewise, the law of non-contradiction makes no sense without the law of identity, but the law of identity makes sense without the law of non-contradiction. One follows from the other, but not vise versa,

They collaborate, and Brian agrees to this fact of "collaboration" if you look at the above posts. — eodnhoj7

No. Brian said:

The three laws of logic, as are commonly known, are corollaries of each other:
1. The Law of Identity.
2. The Law of Non-contradiction.
3. The Law of Excluded Middle.

By corollary is meant, each law naturally inferences the other. — BrianW

Notice how the inference goes one way. Law #3 requires #2 which requires #1. But the inverse is not true, while #3 clarifies or expounds on #2 which clarifies and expounds on #1.

P=P requires P cannot equal -P considering "equal" and "not equal" are not defined except through there relations. — eodnhoj7

No, this is incorrect. P=P leads to the conclusion of P cannot equal -P, it does not require it. Do you see the difference? We can say whatever we want about P, and this says nothing about -P, nor does it in any way require a -P. It only says stuff about P. However, by saying things about P we can draw conclusions about -P through the law of non-contradiction.

Considering "=" is defined in accords to (P,P) equality effectively is defined as "(=)P(=)" where it exists if and only of there is P. — eodnhoj7

As I told you already "=" in the law of identity signifies "is the same as". So what "=" indicates is that P is defined by P, P is the same as P. To understand "is the same as" does not require turning to "is not the same as", though understanding "is the same as" is prior to, and prepares one for an understanding of "is not the same as". One is the negation of the other, and negation can only follow after affirmation.

..

Sure, -P=-P is consistent with P=P, and it may be argued that -P=-P follows logically from P=P if P=P represents the law of identity, because -P=-P could also represent the law of identity. But in no way does P=P require the existence of -P, or imply the existence of -P.

You have things reversed, -P=-P may follow from P=P (as the law of identity), but P=P does not require -P at all. P=P means simply P=P, it says nothing about -P and does not require -P.

What I am arguing is that the standard laws, as directed through eachother lead to contradiction. P=P requires -P=-P to exist if P cannot equal -P. So -P exists through P=P and inherently defines it. — eodnhoj7

There is nothing about P=P which requires -P, or implies the existence of -P whatsoever. This is your false assumption.

What exactly is the property dualist concept of mind?

I think this forum has rules against soliciting.

Yes, the sun is killing us, right now. UV rays can cause skin cancers, some deadly. The majority of UV radiation from the sun, which reaches the earth, is absorbed into the atmosphere by ozone. However, certain synthetic chemicals have caused ozone depletion and what is called the "ozone hole". An international treaty (The Montreal Protocol) has been put into effect to prevent further ozone depletion. But the chemicals are there, the damage is done, and recovery is slow.

The HIPERION report of 2008 indicates that the increase of solar UV at the earth's surface has pushed surface measurements to dangerous levels in equatorial regions: http://exa.ec/HIPERION-Report_files/The-HIPERION-Report.pdf

I think you've left out the crucial part of the argument, what he spends the majority of the pages talking about, and that is how we could distinguish the way in which the word is being used, through ostensive demonstration. That is where the difficulty is. I think that's what the numerous examples are meant to convey. The conclusion is that language cannot be, and therefore is not, learned through ostensive definitions because this would require that one already know a language, in order to learn a language.

I think the premise which forces this conclusion is that some kind of language is required to clarify the ostensive demonstration in reference to the way that the word is being used. So as a simplistic example,(Wittgenstein's appear a bit complex), if you point to an object and say "red", the student needs to know that you are referring to the colour of the object, not the name of the object I.e. the student needs to be able to determine the way that the word is being used, the type of aspect of the world it is meant to signify, as pointing cannot provide this.

so the fact that learning rules requires that one already knows some rules ... wouldn't imply that the language game can't be learned on top of the rules that one already knows. — Terrapin Station

This is problematic because it would require that rules could exist in some form other than a linguistic form. How could that be?

. .

Suppose, however, someone were to object: "It is not true
that you must already be master of a language in order to understand
an ostensive definition: all you need... — W

I'll offer this: Wittgenstein starts from the assumption that language is learned from ostensive definition. He proceeds to describe problems with this assumption. It appears like ostension cannot account for the different "ways" in which the same word may be used. He calls language use in general "a game", but each different way constitutes a different language-game. He concludes this analogy by describing how learning a game requires learning rules. But learning rules requires that one already knows some rules, so it appears like learning a game requires that one already knows a game. So learning a language cannot be accounted for by ostensive procedure, because this requires that one already knows some rules of procedure. You'll find this argument at 30-33.

in conclusion, I would say that Wittgenstein argues that language is not learned by ostension, because ostension will not demonstrate the way that the word is being used, the "sense" of meaning. All words have different ways of use, different "senses", and the learner must be able to distinguish the sense. A different sense would constitute a different game, and a different game would have different rules. The learner must be able to determine which game is being played, and this implies that the learner already knows some sort of game.

15:02 Prof. Feser argues otherwise. — Walter Pound

I don't agree with Feser's argument on that point. Notice he refers to multiple universes, which implies that this universe, as a thing, does have a beginning, coming into existence from a previous universe. So instead of actually addressing the issue, that it is impossible that our universe, as a particular thing, doesn't have a beginning, he obscures it in "many universes", dismisses it, and proceeds to talk about his preferred way of understanding the relationship between potential and actual.

I want to ask, what is it about cognitive distortions that give rise to faulty reasoning? Specifically, what are cognitive distortions? — Posty McPostface

Some of those examples of cognitive distortions describe me, when I get a lack of sleep. When the insomnia kicks in and I go day after day with less and less sleep, the cognitive distortions intensify and feed the insomnia. Maybe those cognitive distortions can result from other forms of tiredness, like an overworked, under-rewarded, or frustrated mind.

If the universe is a "thing" then we conclude that it has a beginning in time, (requiring the potential for that thing to precede the actual thing) like all things do, as #6 of the op states;

6.) Things can only exist, however, if it has the potential to exist which is actualized. — darthbarracuda

.

It seems like what premise 2 and 3 are saying is that change exists only if "actuality" and "potentiality" exist, but this does not seem obvious at all; consider this alternative: change is the inherent nature of the universe and that for every event there is a temporally precedent event that is its cause.

In this alternative explanation of change, change needs no explanation outside of itself since the existence of change is due to it being the inherent nature of the universe. — Walter Pound

But this explanation does not describe "change", as the word is commonly used. "Change" refers to the difference between two states. If your two states are two different events, one following the other in time, as you describe, then to explain change requires that you explain why the two events are different from each other. To say that one is the cause of the other does not explain the change from one to the other, i.e. why the one is different from the other.

That is why "potentiality" and "actuality" are introduced. At the time of the prior event, when the prior event is actual, there is the potential for the latter event. The latter event only potentially exists at this time, because even if the prior event is known to cause the latter event, something could interfere, and prevent this from occurring. So the nature of "change" is much more complicated than just a series of events.

To reject the principles of logic is to be illogical. If your framework rejects logic as a failure, then naturally your framework is illogical.

OK, that makes sense, your intent is to replace the existing logical framework with a new one. That explains why everything you say appears to be so illogical, it really is.

You said, taking a law of logic (the law of identity) as an authoritative statement is a fallacy according to the laws of logic. So I assume that taking any laws of logic as authoritative is fallacious, and logic is illogical. Isn't that what you are arguing?

Of course, if you do not accept the laws of logic then for you, everything is illogical.

So you shoot for a balance between clarity and simplicity, as much (or little) of each as is deemed necessary?

Taking it an authoritative statement is a fallacy according to the standard laws of logic. — eodnhoj7

So following the laws of logic is a fallacy according to the laws of logic, and logic is illogical?

I am simply following the fallacies of logic, unlike you...who is more logical? — eodnhoj7

If you think that the law of identity, is a logical fallacy then it's quite clear that you are being illogical.

In my firmware designs (admittedly a quite different 'target'), I pursued simplicity and clarity, usually above all else. — Pattern-chaser

Aren't these two, simplicity and clarity, mutually exclusive? To state something in a simple way is always to allow for ambiguity, and to state something in a clear way requires the inclusion of complexities.

P = P... it means that P is equal to itself...facepalm... — eodnhoj7

If, and when, "P=P" is used to signify the law of identity, it signifies that P is the same as itself, because that's what the law of identity states. It does not signify that p is equal to P.

Sorry to be the one to inform you of this (though I know others such as brianw have already told you this): you appear to be incredibly, terribly, inept at interpretation. But I know your game, it's intentional, as deception.

Actually it does considering a length observes a connection between specific localized points, I may walk 30 feet from Point A to Point B, where that 30 feet is the connection in space and time with Point A and Point B. — eodnhoj7

How does this indicate that if length is a relation, then all relations are lengths?

A line is a relation between points, and all axioms are relations of other axioms. A length is a relationship between points as well, under these terms Pi as a relation is Pi as a length. — eodnhoj7

If a length is a relationship, this does not imply that all relationships are lengths. Give it up eodnhoj7, it's a lost cause.

How can something be equal to itself unless it is seperate from itself? — eodnhoj7

Gee eodnnoj7, can't you read? The law of identity doesn't say that a thing is equal to itself, it says that a thing is the same as itself. So it's not expressing the equality of two distinct things, it is expressing the identity of one thing. That's why it's called the law of "identity". It implies that a thing has an identity, to itself, and that the thing cannot be other than its identity. Leibniz carries this further with the "identity of indiscernibles", stating the converse, if it has the same identity, it is necessarily the same thing, meaning that two distinct things cannot have the same identity.

There is no issue here of two things being equal, the issue is identity. I went through this already, "2+2" is not the same as "4". They are distinct, having a different identity, despite the fact that they are equal. One line is equal to an infinity of lines, but these two are distinct, having different identities, ergo not the same thing.

And what evidence is that? — eodnhoj7

Try the above for example.