I don't see this as different from what I have suggested. — Banno

So I'll explain to you the difference.

You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them. This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts."

On the other hand, I say that these are things which we simply choose not to doubt. This does not assign to them any sort of certainty or indubitableness, nor does it categorize them as somehow outside the theatre of justification, or inherently beyond doubt. In fact, the majority of these things which we choose not to doubt, have actually been doubted, and justified many years ago. Then they appear to us as "common knowledge" past down from generation to generation by parents, teachers, and other authority figures. As common knowledge they might appear to be beyond doubt when they really are not.

The point being that I believe it is a mistake to categorize these things as "beyond doubt". When human knowledge (as a whole) grows and evolves, the principles which were once used to justify these things which we accept from the authorities, without doubting them, may become outdated and inconsistent with modern principles. This means that within human knowledge s a whole, there are inconsistencies. Over time, as the inconsistencies within our knowledge continue to glare at us with an increasingly blinding light, it becomes more and more irrational not to doubt these things which might appear to be "beyond doubt". The irrationality is compounded by philosophers who insist that such things actually are beyond doubt.

So we can place "God" in this category of foundational things, as you suggest, and I agree with you on that point. But I believe it is a mistake to portray these foundational things as beyond doubt. We must categorize them in the exact opposite way, as extremely dubious because they are ancient conclusions. We must therefore doubt them all, revisit the principles whereby they were originally justified, and establish consistency with the principles believed today. To have a human "body of knowledge" which contains inconsistencies is incoherent and contradictory. Such inconsistencies exist as a result of us choosing not to doubt fundamental principles.


You'll see that I prefer to categorize these things which Banno says are "beyond doubt" as things which we choose not to doubt. This places "doubting" as the natural human condition. We do not choose to doubt, it comes naturally when the conditions which produce certainty are not created, and we choose not to doubt with a judgement of certainty. We must choose not to doubt, suppress the urge to doubt, in order to accept and believe things without first doubting them.

This is consistent with Socrates' portrayal of the root of philosophy being "wonder". The philosopher has a desire to know, and this presents itself in its primitive form as wonder. Doubt is a type of wonder. It is only by doubting things, seeking justification for things, that we produce higher levels of certainty. Therefore I would replace Aristotle's classification, 'man is a rational being' with 'human beings are philosophical beings'. This emphasizes the role of wonder, doubt, and uncertainty, in relation to the desire, want, and lack of certainty.

So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. Most likely you have already doubted, which would be your natural inclination, so you researched material to verify what you actually saw. Now your judgement is beyond doubt to you. Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt.

To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. A debate is based in doubt, it is not based on the two opposing sides both being certain. So abstaining from, and ignoring the debate, is contrary to the natural desire for certainty, which manifests as doubt.

And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation.

But it's material existence we're stuck on, and you don't seem to get that the claim of material existence must be heretical and destructive of the essential nature of the God you appear to want. — tim wood

Why are you stuck on material existence? No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. But this does not mean that Christians believe that God's existence depends on the human mind, like other immaterial things seem to. On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.

I don't insist on dictionary meanings, though they're a good place to start. Do you care to expand on these, or do you accept them as is. — tim wood

Sure, I'll accept those definitions of "faith". Now did you read what I said Aquinas stated very succinctly, that the existence of God, and some things about God are not articles of faith, because they are known by natural reason. But they may be accepted on faith by those who do not understand the reasoning.

This is barely worth comment. I note the "can." The sense of it is that sometimes we may know the cause via effects and thinking, not that we will (nor how we might know that we do, or don't). And to be sure, he was all about plugging in just what he needed.

Again, this is all reasonable if you grant the founding argument of the existence of God. Without that, not-so-reasonable. — tim wood

The founding premise is that each and every material object has a cause of its existence. Notice that there is no presupposition of "God" here. But when we notice that the first material object must necessarily have a cause which is immaterial, we give that immaterial cause a name, "God".

Of course, if you do not understand the argument, you might accept "God" on faith, as Aquinas said, but I see no reason to reject the argument. And I've seen many who have attempted to give reason to reject the argument, but all those attempts have proven to be unreasonable. So in reality it appears to be unreasonable not to accept the founding argument for the existence of God.

IS this what you have in mind? — Banno

Yes, you might be lying. You purchased vanilla. You claimed to be able to justify your purchase with "I like vanilla". This assertion does not justify your purchase because I am not convinced that you actually do like vanilla, and I think you were buying the vanilla milkshakes for someone else. Either justify your claim or I'll continue to believe that you were buying the milkshakes for someone else.

The point being that any claim which is purported to be "beyond doubt", must be substantiated, in order to actually be beyond doubt. And to substantiate a claim is to justify it. So your claim "I like vanilla" can only act to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes if it has itself been substantiated, or justified.

The regress in justification does not end in the way that you think it does. It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. So if I trusted you for example, when you said "I like vanilla", that might put an end to the need for justification. In general, we commonly appeal to authority to put an end to the regress in justification, citing a scientific principle, or some such thing, which will not be doubted by people who trust science.

Well, yes they do. I gave you an example of one. There are plenty of others. — Banno

Your example, "I like vanilla" is not beyond doubt. Perhaps it's beyond doubt to you, but it's not beyond doubt to me. So when you use that in your attempt to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes, it may be questioned by me, doubted. Therefore you have not provided an acceptable example.

By Christians not claiming God as independently existing, I mean that the founders of Christianity, and the thinkers on it, have (near as i can tell) believed and never questioned, and, never questioning, never bothered to spread their claim to nature or natural science. In short, God is simply a presupposition of their thinking. — tim wood

This is the way you look at Christian theological thinking, as presuppositions, but it is not the way that the founders of Christianity looked at God. If you read some of the material you'll see that it's mostly all questions, with some proposed answers. St. Augustine for instance questions everything from the earth to the heavens, and especially the presupposition that God is omniscient, in relation to Augustine's own experience of "free will". Take a look at the table of contents of St Thomas' Summa Theologica for example, the entire book is a series of questions, discussion of the questions, objections, and replies. Your claim that these thinkers presupposed God, and never questioned the presuppositions, is the exact opposite of the truth. That is exactly what they did, question the presuppositions. And that is why St Thomas rejected St Anselm's ontological proof as unsound.

OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about. — Wayfarer

This is the key point which tim wood doesn't get. Certain individuals will make a serious quest toward whether there really is a God. These individuals will question (doubt) all the fundamental presuppositions, which Banno is claiming are beyond doubt, in regard to the reliability and truth of such presuppositions, which others insist are beyond doubt. Some of these thinkers, like St Thomas for example, became the most profound theologians for that very reason, that they got beyond the prior presuppositions, to establish new principles of a deeper an higher understanding.

Tim wood portrays the theologian as believing in God only because God is a presupposition. It is implied that if one doubts or questions God that person looses the presupposition and will necessarily become atheist by the very fact that the presupposition of God is cast aside. So tim does not accept the profound reality which you and I have experienced first hand, that if one makes a serious quest, the reality of God becomes evident. And, it does not require the presupposition that God is real, as tim believes, it just requires a human being with an inquisitive (doubtful) nature. Some of these human beings who seriously doubt the existence of God end up as the most profound theologians.

That's why I said, "I think...". From your survey of the posts, what did you come up with? — tim wood

You seem to have missed my post, way back earlier in the thread. I said that to think that there is such a thing as "the definition" would be a mistaken thought. So you will not get my consent on any proposed definition. And, it is evident in this thread that my position is correct, because there has been no consensus.

And I think you ned to renew your credential either/both as a Christian or someone who claims to know what Christianity is. The fundamental tenet is belief. — tim wood

I've read a considerable amount of Christian theology and never have I seen it stated "the fundamental tenet is belief". You really are just making this stuff up. Faith is very important, but faith, as that which supports or propagates belief, is not the same thing as belief. And faith itself is propagated, cultured, not indoctrinated, so faith is not even the type of thing which could be a tenet. That's a category mistake. This category mistake is very similar to the reason why Aquinas rejected Anselm's ontological argument. We cannot make God real simply by believing or having faith that God is real, we must actually understand that God is real. So Aquinas points to the human disposition which is required in order for a human being to understand that God is real.

Aquinas succinctly states that the existence of God, and other things which can be known about God by natural reason, are not articles of faith. However, to those who cannot understand the reasoning by which the existence of God is known, this can be accepted by faith.

Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach? — Wayfarer

As stated above, Aquinas assures us that the existence of God, as well as some things about God, can be known by natural reason. He explains this by describing how we can know a cause through its effect by reason. We can observe the effect, create principles based on that observance, and deduce that there was a cause, and some things about the cause.

What appears to be missing for your quoted passages is the Aristotelian distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge, made in his Nichomachean Ethics. In modern epistemology it is know-how and know-that. In post-Socratic times, the distinction between logos and mythos was mostly supplanted by the Aristotelian system.

It appears like this came about because Socrates was highly critical of ambiguity in the use of "techne". Through rhetoric and sophistry logos and mythos got all mixed together, conflated such that the combined two became techne or episteme, and there were no hard principles to separate knowldege which was based in theory from knowledge which was based in practise. And theory is not necessarily supported by sound premises. A significant portion of Aristotle's work is actually aimed toward sorting this out, starting with his fundamental logical Categories, and the designation of "substance" as what grounds logic (theory).

Did I miss a post? — tim wood

Yes, quite a few it appears. You seem to have a selective form of "consensus".

But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence. — tim wood

Are you serious? I think it is quite clear in Christian religions that human beings are dependent on God as creator, and God is not dependent on human beings for His existence. Therefore God has real independent existence for Christian based thinkers.

Try this, "God is...". Complete the sentence. — tim wood

God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that.

Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?" — Banno

Your claim was that there are unjustifiable things which could be used to justify other things.. These unjustifiable things are beyond doubt, because they are foundational, and to doubt them would undermine one's own capacity to doubt. You suggested that god might be like this.

The problem is that such foundational things which are proposed as being beyond doubt do not exist. There are no such things. If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt. That's why we can doubt god (for example). If they cannot be doubted, they are neither correct nor incorrect, as janus pointed out. But they are not foundational.

Regardless of whether "I like vanilla" justifies your purchase, it is not itself unjustifiable, and not beyond doubt. So the example does not suffice and is a digression.

But doesn't the state having a frequency require an "objective" time as a given? — Echarmion

No, that's the point, time is in an uncertainty relation with frequency. Therefore neither of these can be truly "objective". If you designate an "objective" frequency, then the determination of time is subject to whatever this frequency dictates . If you designate an "objective" time. then the determination of frequency will be dictated by this "time". It's an inescapable circle, the one is dependent on the other, but the other is dependent on the one..

One can cite "there is no accounting for taste". Maybe taste is justifiable (by saying it's unavoidable); but our knowledge of how taste develops is scanty, it is only in the early theoretical stage. We justify the differntness in preference for ice cream taste with the same blanket justification that explains all differentness: the different mutations in DNA. — god must be atheist

So you agree then, it is possible to account for taste.

A justification shows why something was done. — Banno

This is false. Justification shows the correctness of something. I've told you this already, look it up if you do not believe me. As I said, you are trying to adjust the meaning of "justify" to make it fit to your perception of the world. But your model of "the world" is an unacceptable one.

Yes, this highlights the fact that something only requires justification, and it is only appropriate to speak about it in terms of justification, if it has the potential to be incorrect in some way. — Janus

Right, I'll agree to that. One form of justifiable things is propositions, they may be true or false, so we might ask for justification of the proposition, demonstration of its truth.. However, justification goes further than this, because like in the example of Banno's purchasing vanilla milkshakes, we also ask for justification of actions.

This leaves things which are neither correct nor incorrect, as unjustifiable. Banno's proposition "I like vanilla", as a proposition, may be either true or false, therefore it is justifiable. Now the question is whether something which is unjustifiable (neither correct nor incorrect) could be used to justify something else. Notice that a proposition cannot fall into this category (unjustifiable) because a proposition must be either true or false, and true is a instance of being correct.

I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing. — tim wood

This would be an atheist's definition. A theist believes that God has real independent existence. It does not make sense to use an atheist's definition, because if you want to define a term, you must refer to those who actually use that term, to determine the definition. You wouldn't turn to someone without an education in physics, to get a definition of "quantum entanglement", you'd turn to a physicist. Likewise, you wouldn't turn to someone without an education in theology to get a definition of God, you'd turn to a theologian.

I think correctness is a superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant aspect of the preference that one has for an ice cream flavour. Your demand that it have some correctness, is meaningless, or unjustified. — god must be atheist

The demand is for justification, and this by definition is to demonstrate the correctness of the thing being justified. If Banno claims "I like vanilla", I can request proof that this claim is true, i.e. justification. Bannno has used the claim to justify buying vanilla, and implied that the claim is unjustifiable. It is not. The preference for vanilla may be demonstrated.

Flavours and numbers are different. — Banno

But justification is justification, and "because I like it" doesn't justify anything.

A religious person certainly has the world fit the words of the bible. — god must be atheist

What purpose does "has" serve here? I really do not know what you mean here. Are you saying that the person shapes the world to fit to the bible? I do not believe this, I believe the religious person shapes the words of the bible to fit to the world.

The problem with this approach is that others may take the same parts, and draw different conclusions with the same premises. — god must be atheist

This is a matter of interpreting the words differently. And that is shaping the words, just like Banno wants to shape the word "justify" to suit some personal goal. Interpretation is not an act of making the world fit to the words, it's an act of making the words fit to the world.

To make order between perceived reality, the bible's teaching, and the inner model of the world the person has, one has to fit one or the other of these three worlds to some of the extant worlds of these three — god must be atheist

You are totally neglecting the role of words here. This 'fitting' is done through the use of words. The "bible's teaching" is not "a world" to the reader, it is a bunch of words. So there is not "three worlds" here. Furthermore, I do not believe you can distinguish between "perceived reality" and "inner model of the world" as you claim. One's "perceived reality is one's "inner model of the world", the two are the very same thing. So now I have reduced your "three worlds" to just one world.

Surprisingly, the religious will not only fit the existing world to an inner model erroneously, but also in ways that are incompatible with all logic and reason. Yet they fight for the rightness of this fit. — god must be atheist

Now you introduce a fourth world, the "existing world". But you've given no ontological principles to justify the claim of an existing world, so the "existing world" is still nothing more that one's "perceived reality', of 'inner model" of the world. This claim of an existing world is no more justified than Banno's claim that buying vanilla is justified by "I like it". Justification requires demonstrating the correctness of the act, or assertion.

A secular atheist will look at the world, and form an inner model of it; and from then on, will work with the model, that is, fit the world to his mental model, until a discrepancy alerts him that his model is not a good fit with the world. — god must be atheist

Again, you are leaving out the role of words. A person has an inner model of the world, a perceived reality. The person will try to fit words to this world. There is no such thing as trying to "fit the world" to this mental model, because until the person apprehends that other people have their own inner models, (perceived realities) this is the only world that there is. So, what the person does is try to fit words to this mental world. There are two distinct types of this activity, one is putting words together to speak or write, and the other is interpreting spoken or written words. Each is a different type of shaping words to fit one's "world".

If you want to talk about shaping "the world" we would have to consider how one's inner model, one's perceived reality, comes to exist, and changes over time, because this is the only instance of "world" which has been justified.

it is true that it is not justified why Banno likes vanilla ice cream. But it is also conceivable, that not everything needs justification.

There are situations where justification is needed, but is not possible to give. (I.e. cohesion of ideals and concepts as per the Bible.)
There are situations where justification is needed, and it is given. (I.e. evolutionary theory.)
There are situations where justification is not needed. (I.e. personal preference or taste.) — god must be atheist

Right, I agree that there are many situations in which justification is not asked for. Justification is only really needed when it is asked for, and we often accept things without asking for justification. This is the case for instance when we trust the authority of the person speaking.

What Banno was arguing, is that there are things which are unjustifiable, personal taste for example, and that these unjustifiable things form the basis, the foundation, of all justifications.

I think that this is a misunderstanding. What forms the foundation of all justifications is things which we do not ask for justification of. These are things which for some reason or another (perhaps we trust the authority of the person speaking), we do request justification for. This is very distinct from Banno's claim that these things are unjustifiable.

The things which we do not ask for justification of, which Banno calls "unjustifiable", are in fact justifiable, and all we have to do is doubt them, and ask for justification, to get someone motivated to move on justifying them. Banno wants to claim that they are somehow beyond doubt, because it would be ridiculous to ask for justification of them. But this is an incorrect approach, because it is by doubting these foundational things, asking for justification, that we expand our knowledge beyond the limits set up by those people, who at one time, were the authorities whom we would not ask for justification.

So Banno, claims "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable. But that doesn't prevent me from asking for justification. Prove to me that you like vanilla by showing me when you have eaten it, and describing to me what it is about it which you like. It is false that the claim "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable, and false to claim that it ought not be doubted because it is unjustifiable. If Banno insists that it is unjustifiable, this is just a ploy to avoid having to justify it.

In quantum physics, space and time are static givens, whereas under relativity they're dynamic properties. — Echarmion

I don't think this is quite true. I believe that according to standard formulations of the uncertainty principle, energy and time are conjugate variables. This is due to the uncertainty relationship between time and frequency inherent within any Fourier transform.

An informal, heuristic meaning of the principle is the following: A state that only exists for a short time cannot have a definite energy. To have a definite energy, the frequency of the state must be defined accurately, and this requires the state to hang around for many cycles, the reciprocal of the required accuracy. — Wikipedia uncertainty principle

Even if one accepts this, "I like vanilla" is sufficient to justify my purchase. — Banno

If this were true, I could justify "2+2=5" with "I like it like that". But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification.

And you seem to have misunderstood direction of fit. — Banno

it's not that I've misunderstood your "direction of fit", I see right through it. As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. Clearly your sense of direction is askew. And you even exemplify this, attempting to make the words fit to the world, in practise, by trying to shape "justify" to the way you that perceive the world.

The problem, as I explained, is that justification requires success. And you've failed. Sorry.

To state it succinctly, modern theories of "chance", which propose that the universe originated in quantum fluctuations, are simply incoherent. Space-time is understood as a property of the universe, which emerges with the universe. The quantum "fluctuations" which are responsible, as cause of, the universe's existence are necessarily prior to the existence of the universe. Such "fluctuations" without space or time are incoherent. In this case "fluctuation" is a term referring to an impossibility, activity without space or time.

1. The universe appears to be “fine-tuned”: the slightest variation beyond certain physical constants would not result in the universe as we understand it. — ModernPAS

This is the argument Aristotle put forward thousands of years ago, concerning the existence of any object. In this case, the op, the object is called "the universe".

Each object is distinct and unique from every other object. Every object has a 'form" which is proper to itself alone. What gives an object its uniqueness is what he called accidentals. The accidentals are what separates one object from another, when numerous objects are judged as being the same type of object, or the same class.

The law of identity is used to recognize the distinctness and uniqueness of each particular object. Even if two objects are judged to be the same according to kind or type, they are unique according to accidentals, and, each object must have all the accidentals specific to that object, in order to be the unique object which it is. Accordingly, each object, when it comes into existence, must be the exact and precise object which it is, or else it would not be the object which it is.

Now, the argument is that an object is not random matter, and cannot be random matter, because to be an object requires that matter exist in an organized way. it must have a form. So when we put this premise with the one above, "each object, when it comes into existence, must be the exact and precise object which it is, or else it would not be the object which it is", we find that "what the object is", (the form of the particular) must necessarily precede the existence of the object. If the form of the object did not precede its material existence, then the object could be something other than it is, and this is contrary to the law of identity.

Therefore, when we consider the existence of "the universe", as an object, it is necessary to recognize that "what the object is", the "form" of that particular object, is necessarily prior to its material existence.

For those so inclined, I think natural theology is justified in claiming that there's a prior cause. But what I think they're not entitled to claim is that this is something that can be proven. After all, for the believer, the Universe is evidence; that's what makes them believers! — Wayfarer

Actually the cosmological argument, if properly formulated, provides such a proof. What is require though is an understanding of the principles. Those who do not understand the principles reject the argument as incoherent.

The key principles to the argument are the dichotomous distinction between potential and actual, and the premise that only something actual may act as a cause. This excludes the possibility of infinite potential, as such a thing would be incapable of bringing into existence anything actual.

A simple representation of the argument goes like this. We observe that the potential for existence of an object precedes in time, the actual existence of that object. By inductive reason therefore, in the case of every object, the potential for existence of that object precedes its existence. However, a potential can only be actualized by something actual. Therefore the potential for existence cannot precede actual existence in an absolute sense, because that potential could never be actualized. We put this together with the inductive conclusion that the potential for the object always precedes its actual existence, and we find that it is necessary to conclude that there is an actuality which is prior to all objects.

Much modern speculation refers to the infinite potential of quantum flux or some such thing infinite potential. But these speculators ignore the necessity imposed by the cosmological argument, of an actuality which acts as a cause, to bring an actual object into existence from the proposed field of quantum flux, or 'infinite potential'. This means that the proposed quantum flux which is supposed to be prior to the universe, is not a true "infinite potential", and is really limited by this pre-existing actuality. The need to recognize this pre-existing actuality is ignored when these speculators posit the emergence of time as "space-time".

Why not?

I like vanilla. There's no reason that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what? It explains my purchase, too often, of a vanilla milkshake. I don't wee anything untoward in this little story. Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase. — Banno

It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it.

Notice that explaining something requires no judgement of success or failure, while justifying something requires success. You say something, you believe that what you have said explains something, and that is your explanation, regardless of whether anyone understands it, let alone believing or agreeing to it. To justify on the other hand requires agreement, that's where "the correctness of" comes into play.

But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it. — Pfhorrest

That's right, providing the reason for an act does not justify the act. One must provide a "good reason" for the act This is evident from the fact that providing a bad reason (unsound argument) cannot justify an act. That's why it's very difficult to justify acts, as well as beliefs, through reference to "feelings". This is contrary to the common belief that we justify by referring to sensations ("I saw it" for example), which just provides us with appearances and no real principles.

The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.

And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus. — Banno

Right, error is common place, and that's why this notion of "fit" is not a good principle to base such judgements on. One person's method of judging a "fit" is completely different from another person's method. What method does your auto-correct use? You might notice here at TPF that some people have very odd ways of choosing words. I find it very odd that you would be judging whether the world fits to the words rather than judging whether the words fit to the world. When making a "fit" something must conform to the shape of the other. We conform the words to fit to the world, not vise versa.

You clearly use a completely different method for judging the "fit of wold-to-word" from me. You judge that "justified" is a word which fits your vanilla purchase, when all you've said in your attempt to justify, that you buy vanilla because you like it. I see that you are trying to conform the word "justify" to fit your perception of 'the world', but I reject your proposed conformation as a misunderstanding of the world.

Actually, no. If multiverse then the universe is in the multiverse. Either way, as defined we live in a (the) universe. — tim wood

"Universe" signifies the complete whole of all that exists. It's contradictory to say that the universe is in something else (multiverse), because this implies that there is something outside of, therefore other than the universe.

Acceptance of multiverse as an ontology leaves the concept of "universe" as incoherent.

Does a rabbit not live in a rabbit hole if his rabbit hole is on a mountainside where conjecturally at least there might be other rabbit holes? — tim wood

How is this relevant? "Rabbit hole" doesn't signify the complete whole of all that exists, so of course there might be more that one rabbit hole. But this doesn't justify the contradictory notion that there could be more than one universe.

To say that there is more than one universe requires changing what "universe' means. How would one define "universe' in this case?

But here's what we know: there is a universe. — tim wood

This is doubtful, and that's what multiverse speculation makes evident. "Universe" is to say all is one. "Multiverse" is to say all is a multiplicity. The two are incompatible. That's why there's a gap between quantum principles and general relativity, and the theory of everything is nowhere to be found.

The argument is simply that if system X is one which helps me achieve my goals it is justified that I maintain it. — Isaac

This is clearly false. If your goal is an unjustified one (a bad one), then system X as aiding in reaching this goal, is not justified. If your goal is to have so and so dead, using a gun to shoot that person in the head is not justified just because it helps you achieve your goal.

I'm talking about the having of goal, something which is common to every intentional creature. — Isaac

The problem is that a system is not used to achieve "goals" in any absolute, or general sense, any strategic system is geared toward a particular type of goal. To judge the system as to whether the use of that system is justified or not requires judgement of the good or badness of the particular goal which it is used toward achieving.

In order to be satisfied with that justification, one only need to also have goals and consider whether one would also maintain a system useful in helping to achieve them. It's about empathy. — Isaac

This again is false. We were not talking about judging whether the use of systems toward reaching goals is justifiable (in the most general sense), as you imply here, we were talking about justifying the use of a particular system. And to justify the use of a particular system requires judgement of the type of goal which it will be useful for bringing about.

You're conflation unrighteous (in a moral sense) with incorrect (a technical sense). Say a criminal mastermind sets up an elaborate trap to kill millions. He has used (to achieve his evil goal) the system of 3d spatio-temporal relativity. Is that system now wrong? Wat if he calculated how many guns he'd need using arithmetic, is arithmetic now wrong? — Isaac

You do realize this thread concerns ethical principles don't you? I do not know what you would mean by "incorrect" in a technical sense. But you now appear to have come across an important point. The same system may be used toward good goals, and toward bad goals.

In your example, it is the use of the system toward goal A instead of goal B, which is wrong. Perhaps we have been barking up the wrong tree, and you and I can move toward a compromise here. It is not the system which we justify, but the use of the system. Would you agree with this? A system is not the type of thing which we justify, but a particular way of using a system is what we justify. This allows that a "system" exists in a general sense, as an aid, or tool for assistance in achieving goals, but the system is not itself bad or good, because these are terms reserved for judging the goals. We might judge a system as more efficient than another, or something like that.

If we start referring to the efficiency as "good", while we also judge the goals as "good" we might equivocate.

Because you have to use a 'system' to judge the righteousness of the goal. Must you then justify that system? — Isaac

I think that if you start to understand the nature of particular goals, without referring to "goals" in general, you'll find that we do not apply a "system" for judging goals. This is why the nature of morality is so difficult to understand, and why there is so much variance in the ethical codes; systems produced by moral philosophy. Notice the system of ethics is derived from the moral judgement; a judgement which is based in some sort of intuition or something other than a system.

No, I know. I just thought I'd get it out there now. It's the subtext behind all of your philosophy. You don't seem capable of investigating any matter without forcing it down some path which ends with "...because God". — Isaac

I'm sorry, I'm just seeking the truth in these matters. If, where the inquiry leads offends you, then I apologize for the offence.

And apparently you would doubt doubt. Where does that leave you? — tim wood

It leaves me doubtful. Some people here at TPF claim it's impossible for me to doubt some of the things that I doubt, therefore my doubt of my doubt is warranted. Perhaps I'm misusing the word "doubt". This possibility warrants the doubt of doubt as well.

Do you think there's something wrong with claiming to doubt doubt? I think it's better than claiming to know that I know. There's an infinite regress implied here, and infinite regress is conducive of doubt. So there is nothing wrong with claiming to doubt doubt, while there is something wrong with claiming to know that I know.

You haven't 'explained', you've asserted. There's a difference. — Isaac

An explanation is a series of assertions intended to elucidate. That's what I provided. If what I am saying still remains unintelligible to you, then I have failed in that intention. I have "explained", but my explanation has failed.

Why not? You haven't explained your main objection. Why is utility not a justification for adopting a system? All you've done so far is asserted that it isn't, not provided any explanation as to why. — Isaac

OK, I clearly failed in my attempt. I'll try again. Utility is determined in relation to a goal. A thing is useful for obtaining such and such a goal, and that determines utility. Now, goals are inherently subjective, varying from one subject to another, due to the fact that they exist relative to one's intention. Intention is the property of an individual.

Justification, as it is defined, and generally understood, requires that one demonstrates the correctness, or rightness of what the person is claiming. This means that for the justification to succeed, and actually be a justification, there must actually be success. Notice the difference between explanation and justification. I can explain without success, but I cannot justify without success.

Demonstrating that a system is useful for obtaining my goal, does not demonstrate the correctness of the system because it requires that my goal is judged by the other person to be correct. If the system is useful for obtaining a goal which the other person believes is not a righteous goal, the system will not be justified no matter how useful it is. The utility itself will be judged as unrighteous, incorrect, and therefore unjustified. And an unjustified utility will not justify use of the system. In fact there will be the reverse effect. The more useful the system is for obtaining an unrighteous goal, the more unjustified the system is.

Therefore, I must first demonstrate to the other individual the correctness of my goal, before the utility of the system for obtaining my goal can be judged as justification of that system. And, the utility of a system, as justification for that system, is completely dependent on justification of the goal which the system is useful for obtaining. Are you not familiar with the phrase "the end justifies the means"?

Is that a better explanation?

Must it? Must everything be justified? How does that work non-circularly? If 'The Goal' is what I feel what am I supposed to do on finding that it is not justified (by your method which you've yet to reveal)? Am I supposed to now not feel that way? — Isaac

Where's the circularity? If the goal is not justified, then the means for obtaining that goal (the system) is not justified. Isn't this straight forward and obvious to you? It seems pretty basic.

So religious commandments have all of the criteria you list above, or lack them just as much? — Isaac

I haven't said anything about religious commandments, I'm addressing your deceptive claim that a system is justified by its utility.

Is there a philosophy of good, such as the epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge, and ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with morals, and aesthetics is the branch that deals with beauty. — god must be atheist

I would say that the philosophy of good is moral philosophy. Morality involves distinguishing good from bad. Morality may be subsumed within metaphysics, as a branch of metaphysics. It is necessarily prior to epistemology because the "correctness" which epistemology relies on is a form of "good". That is what Plato demonstrated in The Republic. It is metaphysics because of the requirement of determining the ontological status of "good".

Good is wholly undefinable. That something is good or not is a subjective judgment, and therefore to justify X as good because it leads to Y where Y is also good, is only justifiable by personal subjective means. — god must be atheist

This is exactly why the ontological status of "good" needs to be determined. Your claims about "good", that it is "undefinable", and that whether something is good is a "subjective judgement" are themselves subjective judgements. So it appears like the nature of subjective judgements, and the ontological status of such, needs to be understood in order to understand "good". Do you believe that subjective judgements are real things, with real ontological status, the nature of which may potentially be understood?

If you or anyone else justifies moral actions on whether they are good or not in intention or in final result, then you or anyone else is walking on thin ice. — god must be atheist

How else would you propose that one might justify moral actions?

Omnipresence. IF there were a god, wouldn't His presence be utterly overwhelming? This seems to be what many of the devout describe. — Banno

What the heck is "presence"? By the time I say "now" it's in the past. I'm afraid the presence of anything is not overwhelming. It's actually very difficult to affirm what it means to be present.

There are things that stand outside the tournament of justification, because they are needed in order for that tournament to take place. Isn't god just the sort of thing that would justify everything else? — Banno

I believe this is contradictory. Such a thing would be unjustifiable. And an unjustifiable thing cannot itself justify anything. Placing god in this contradictory category only makes the reality of god impossible. It would be an atheist definition. If we want to understand how a theist sees, apprehends, understands, or defines "God" an atheist definition is not helpful because clearly these two apprehend the meaning of that term in completely different ways.

SO there must be stuff that is beyond doubt. — Banno

I didn't think you were an idealist Banno, but that is the affirmation of an ideal. The only thing beyond doubt would be something perfectly well known, and such perfection is proper only to an ideal.

Now, if there were a God, wouldn't it be that sort of thing? — Banno

This may be the case, but I know you well enough to know that you will deny that the "stuff that is beyond doubt" is 'ideal'. You will claim that this "stuff" is some sort of foundational belief such as "this is a sentence of English", which is not an 'ideal' at all because it actually can be doubted. I can for instance doubt that it is a "sentence" because the "t" in "this" is not capitalized. and if that is not supposed to be the sentence referred to, what does "this" refer to? In fact, your example is a complete misrepresentation of what an ideal is supposed to be.

Try looking at mathematics, where each symbol is supposed to directly represent an object (mathematical object) instead of meaning something. When the symbol directly represents an object instead of having meaning, (such as the numeral "3" represents the number 3), there can be no doubt as to what the symbol means. Therefore we have ideal representation. Ideal representation is what is required to put an expression beyond the reach of doubt. The problem though, is that the whole system may be cast into doubt, by doubting the existence of such ideal objects.

There simply is no law that criminalizes collusion between a political campaign and foreign government. — NOS4A2

There sure is.

Now if god were real, wouldn't one expect belief in him to be of this sort? If there were such a creature, woudln't it be unreasonable not to believe in him? — Banno

How does this make any sense to you? It's like saying 'if what I tell you is true, then it is unreasonable for you not to believe me'. But of course your reasons for believing or not believing me are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether or not what I say is true. Likewise, our reasons for believing or not believing in god are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether there is or is not a god.

Circular reasoning involves using your conclusion as a premise in the same argument. In order to form the conclusion 'there is no other source for order', you already have to assume there is no other source for order- i.e. that natural cases of order are not caused by something other than a designer. — aporiap

The conclusion does not involve the prior assumption of "no other source of order". That is the conclusion, and this comes about from understanding the distinction between order and disorder, and the fact that order cannot come from disorder without a cause. That cause is design. That's simply what creating by design is, and ordering things is something only done in the act of creating by design. So when things are ordered there is design at work, because that's what ordering is. And things could not be ordered without having been ordered, by way of contradiction.

Randomness and chaos are intrinsic to the world. You will have to explain why there is chaos. — aporiap

I already discussed this with someone else in this thread, maybe you should go back and reread some sections. There is no randomness and chaos in the natural world, as the world appears to us. All that we sense is orderly, and this is because human beings are so disposed so as only orderly things are sensed. If there were unordered things out there we would not sense them. One might create a system where it appears like randomness and chaos prevail, but that would be a created system, and therefore it would be designed and ordered simply to produce the appearance of randomness and chaos, when the system is actually ordered to do this.

In that example we know the precise reason, it is the randomness of the inputs to the system. When you replace the random inputs with ordered inputs, the order of the pendulum swings goes away. — aporiap

But the system itself is created, which is what a "system" is, and is therefore ordered by that act of creation. For example, we create dice to give a random roll. But that system is created for that purpose, so it is inherently ordered, and this will not suffice as an example of natural randomness for that very reason. The pendulum system is set up (ordered) with random (unknown) inputs, just like the roll of dice gives unknown outputs. Since the system is artificial, and made to be this way, it is contradictory to say that it is not ordered.

I don't know what you mean by effective. By definition, probabilistic models incorporate randomness. It will not tell you the coin will be heads or tails after you flip it. It tells you it could be heads or tails. You could imagine there's a 'predictable pattern' though, if you knew all the variables you could know if it would be heads and so there's still a pattern. But fundamentally there is no predictable pattern of movement of a particle or the state of its properties (whether it spins in one or another direction, whether it's in this location or that location). It is fundamentally random. — aporiap

If there is no predictable pattern, then Schrodinger's equation would be useless. So when you talk about "no predictable pattern" you are not talking about the universe according to Schrodinger's equation, and that's why I accused you of contradiction. There is a predictable pattern, but some aspects are not predictable. Again, I went though this earlier in the thread, the overall system, as a whole, is orderly and predictable, though some aspects (what we call accidentals) are not predictable.

You 'infer', by analogy, 'order' in nature is designed. — aporiap

It's not inferred by analogy, it's an understanding of the word "order", what it means to be ordered. You seem to have no understanding whatsoever of what it means to be ordered, and you go off using the word in strange ways, as if when human beings set up a system like a random number generator, this is not an ordered system. Isn't it obvious to you that these systems are designed to produce these so-called random results and are therefore ordered?

To infer in the latter case, you necessarily need to distinguish between order and design because prior to inferring the order is designed, you are implicitly acknowledging the thing has a pattern i.e. order and yet, at that moment, it is not known whether that pattern is a design or not. — aporiap

You seem to misunderstand. To say that a thing has order is to say that it has been ordered, and this implies "by design". There is nothing else which orders things but a designer.

I see you mention "pattern", and you might want to go to Isaac's position, and argue that a pattern is completely subjective. Isaac said there is no order inherent within the thing, it is only in the observing subject's mind. Is this what you are saying? But if the pattern or order is within the thing itself, it must have been put there by design. Otherwise we could not call it a pattern or order, could we? If the things were positioned by some random force, then it would necessarily be just some random positioning of the parts. Don't you agree? It might look like a pattern to one of us, but we'd have to say that it's really random positioning. What could make it not-random, other than being positioned by design?

There is no person with a predetermined goal trying to make proteins. — aporiap

Who said there's a person involved? Trial and error is a process not restricted to human activities, and your description sounded exactly like trial and error:
"For every functional protein [e.g Hemoglobin], there are hundreds of 'pseudo' genes that failed to function in the process of attempting to make that one."
Do you not understand that "function" implies purpose? You write phrases like this, then in total self-contradiction you proceed to deny purpose. I really don't think that you have a good understanding of what you are saying.

The point is an object can do very different functions in very different contexts and be considered 'useful'. The definition of a purpose or final cause Aristotelian sense, is the singular intrinsic function of something [candle to light house, seed to form adult plant]. How can there be a fundamentally intrinsic function of something if it can function in multiple contexts? Sure we say a candle as having the purpose of lighting a room, but it can be used in many other ways that have nothing to do with that. — aporiap

You seem to misunderstand Aristotle's "final cause". The final cause is the goal, or end, what we might call purpose, and this is specific to the circumstances. Yes, it might be true that each particular thing has a singular final cause specific to itself, but that's because each particular thing exists in its own particular set of circumstances. You might say that this object, if it were in a different context, would serve a different function (in a counterfactual way), but the fact is that each object only exists in one unique set of circumstances.

How so? We can't continue to justify a system by logical measures (like non-contradiction). At some point it's just a faith and the justification is utility. — Isaac

Just as I explained. That X is good, because it is efficient for bringing about the desired effect Y, is not a real justification, it's an illusion of justification. It is required that Y be demonstrated as good, in order for the justification to be real. That utility is justification is an illusion, because utility is relative to the goal, or end which grants the thing its usefulness, and this goal must itself be justified. That's why Wayfarer referred to the need for a "summum bonum". So your claim that non-religious systems are more easily justified is false because the 'justification' you are referring to is not justification at all, but an illusion of justification.

One major difference between religious systems and non-religious ones is that faith in non-religious systems is more easily justified by their utility at helping to provide useful strategies... — Isaac

This may be true, but strategies are applied as the means to ends. We still need to judge the ends themselves, to produce a true justification, a justification which is more than just an illusion. This requires that the ends are put in relation to further ends, as the means toward those ends.

It's like the distinction between a valid argument and a sound argument. One can say my logic is valid therefore my conclusion is justified, but this is just an illusion of justification, because the premises might not be sound. Therefore we need to put the premises in relation to some further principles of truth, to judge how "good" they are, in order to produce a true justification.

That is the problem with your claim that faith in non-religious systems is more easily justified, the justification referred to here is just an illusion.

Your word salads are nearly unreadable. — NOS4A2

You mean inedible?

No—we will find out soon enough. — NOS4A2

You keep saying things like this. And when we find out that you were wrong you just go on to some other falsities.

Now, what I asked was: Did you believe Trump colluded with Russia to help him win the election? — NOS4A2

Colluded? He's a fucking puppet. The Russians said 'run for president, we'll get you in'. At first he didn't believe they could do it, but he really wanted it, so he went along with it. The deal with the devil. He let them groom him, creating the public image which got him to where he is now, president of the USA; giving up his soul in this pact. And that's all he is, as president, an image which the Russians have created.

Hey, NOS4A2! I can shoot the shit just as well as you. But my BS has a kernel of truth, yours has a kernel of falsity, true BS through and through.

First of all the argument is circular. Your discounting natural cases of order as having an alternative source of order depends on your [in all honesty, narrow-sighted] conclusion that there are no other sources of order. — aporiap

I don't see how the argument is circular. You accept that it is a "conclusion", therefore there is logic behind it. One of the most useful aspects of logic is to exclude from the category of "possible", things which are actually impossible. If this is what you call being narrow-sighted, then so be it. And I've already explained why it is illogical to think that order could come from anything other than design, so call me narrow-sighted, if that's what being logical is. I'd rather be narrow-sighted than believe that something impossible is possible.

This is despite the dis analogies in man-made and natural cases of order pointed out by Isaac - i.e. (1) that hurricane Katrina, black holes, snowflakes, the spherical ordered tangle of the rubber bands in my pocket, and mars, were not made with any clear purpose or intent; (2) that natural order results from self organization as opposed to an external agent or individual. These clearly provide enough justification to assume the things generating natural and man-made order are different . — aporiap

We went through this in this thread already. "Self-organisation" is a bogus concept. Organisation is already presupposed, required as an initial state for any system self-organizing, so it is just a matter of one form of order creating another form of order.

Furthermore, the fact that we can point to instances of order which we do not know the reason for that order, does not justify the claim that there is order with no reason for that order.

Secondly, there is a chicken and egg dillema here. The thing which allows humans to be intelligent, the their brain [we know this unambiguously because of lesioning studies, in which damage to the brain directly causes deficits in intelligence], is itself a natural object operating by universal natural principles. — aporiap

I really don't know what you might mean when you say that the brain operates by "universal natural principles". I tend to think that you're just spouting words, and you don't know what you're saying.

So, 'design', then isn't really the result of 'designers', it is fundamentally a result of the way the universe is intrinsically structured. So, in this view, there is only ever one ultimate source of order [and disorder] which is nature itself. — aporiap

Yeah sure, but the universe, as an ordered structure was necessarily designed itself, so how does this help your case? This is the same issue with your reference to the brain. The brain, as an ordered structure, was itself designed. So saying that the brain operates according to "universal natural principles" doesn't really say anything, because designed things operate according to such principles. In fact, that's how they are designed, through the use of such principles.

Anyway I've gone on a limb and did a cursory search for clear examples of order arising from entirely unpredictable, random processes. I was able to find a nice article which provides an example of pendulums which take on an orderly state of swinging when swung at in entirely random ways. In this case the ordered properties of the system - the orientation and swinging of the pendulums - results entirely from the disorder of the inputs to the system. So here is one case in which order comes out of disorder. — aporiap

I'll repeat myself, citing instances of order occurring, in which we do not know the reason why the order occurs, does nothing to support the claim that order could arise for no reason. So you might as well give up your search for these examples, if that's the reason why you're looking for them.

Of course we also know the universe is fundamentally indeterministic or random - this is why schrodinger's equation is a probabilistic model, not a deterministic law. — aporiap

This is contradictory. If a probabilistic law is effective, then the system is not random.

You've just decoupled 'intelligence', 'external agent', and even 'external cause' from 'designer'. How do you distinguish design from order? — aporiap

That's the point, any attempt to separate design from order is illogical.

Aristotle's entire framework of causation is just that, a framework. It doesn't necessarily map to reality. To give a real world example: There is nothing to suggest that proteins are made to function the way they function. For every functional protein [e.g Hemoglobin], there are hundreds of 'pseudo' genes that failed to function in the process of attempting to make that one. — aporiap

Ever heard of 'trial and error'? Trial and error by its very nature is a designed procedure. It requires a predetermined condition of success.

And proteins don't have singular purposes, they are multifunctional. In fact it's precisely this cognitive bias we have [ functional fixedness ], of assuming purpose, that leads to so many mischaracterizations of proteins -- we fail to realize just because they're important for something in one context, doesn't mean they have entirely different functions in others. To carry the example, hemoglobin, most well-known for carrying oxygen in the blood and most expressed by red blood cells in the blood. Carrying oxygen seems the 'purpose' of hemoglobin, but hemoglobin is also expressed in numerous other tissues. In those cells it plays roles completely different than its role as an oxygen carrier. This also discounts the non-bodily uses of something like hemoglobin. We repurpose proteins all the time, taking them out of their natural contexts to do other things. — aporiap

I'll repeat again. Just because we do not know the purpose, or in this case if someone says 'X is the purpose' when this may be proven false, that does not mean there is no purpose.

While I agree that the religious acts were created FOR humans, it is not always believed they were created BY humans. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is the problem with such exclusive definitions. It is quite possible, and probable, that acts which fulfill the requirements for "religious acts" were being carried out before animals evolved so as to fulfil the requirements of being human.

This tactic of exclusion is common with philosophers who argue to prove a position rather than to learn the truth. We find it in definitions of things like "language", "meaning", and "intention". It is argued that these things are exclusive to human beings ("created BY humans") when evidence from the science of biology clearly demonstrates otherwise. Evidently it is profoundly wrong to assert that these things were "created By humans".

But I do not think it is correct to say that they were "created FOR humans" either. That appears to be some form of inverted anthropomorphism, or a misinterpretation of the purpose, or final cause which is apprehended as being the reason for existence of these things. To say that some prior creatures, or even God, did such and such acts "FOR" the sake of human beings, rather than for the sake of something else, with a lack of understanding of the intention behind those acts, therefore without sufficient proof, is to make an unjustified conclusion.

There is a need to prove that there exists an object in absolute rest because there are only two contradictory possibilites:

1. An object in absolute rest

or

2. Everything in relative motion

Since you're denying 2 then 1 must be the case. So, prove it. — TheMadFool

I was not denying 2, I was critical of anyone who would say that absolute rest is impossible, without first defining what "absolute rest" means. Now you have made progress toward a definition, saying absolute rest involves an "object" at absolute rest. Since I consider "absolute rest" to be an ideal, I don't agree with this requirement, unless an ideal is an object. Are you saying that an ideal, like "absolute rest", is an object? If so, in what way is it an object?

Let's try again...

Suppose there is an object, A, in absolute rest i.e. at rest relative to everything else.

But we know that there exists at least 2 objects in relative motion of the displacement kind i.e. the distance between them change e.g. a car moving towards you.

Is it then possible that A is at rest (absolute) relative to both the car and you??

There are three points: object A, the car (B) and you (C) forming a triangle.

We know that the distance BC is changing. Can the distance AC and AB remain constant i.e. can A be at rest relative to both B and C?

I think it's impossible. The pythagorean theorem proves it. — TheMadFool

You ought to see that this is nonsense. "Absolute rest" would be the standard by which all motions are measured. Therefore everything would be in motion relative to "object A" (absolute rest), unless there was something else which was at absolute rest. Only things at absolute rest would be unchanging relative to absolute rest, everything else would be changing relative to absolute rest.

Not it is NOT justified! Because we are using the "AND" in the GENERAL case of definition of marriage between any tribes A,B (whether A, and B are the same tribe or not), the general rule is:

IF
[50 men of tribe A are married to 50 women of tribe B
AND
50 women of tribe A are married to 50 men of tribe B]
THEN
A || B — Zuhair

You are refusing to acknowledge the equivocation in your use of "AND" in the rule. In the case of "A is married to B", quoted above, "AND" is used as a conjunction between two phrases which refer to two distinct sets of circumstances. In the case of S is married to S, "And" would refer to two distinct descriptions of the same set of circumstances.

So, in case (1), of "A is married to B", you have situation Y ( "50 men of tribe A are married to 50 women of tribe B") "AND", situation Z ("50 women of tribe A are married to 50 men of tribe B").
But in the case (2) of "S is married to S", you have the situation X, with two different descriptions of X ('50 men are married to 50 women', "AND" '50 women are married to 50 men').

See, in case (1) you are saying there is situation Y, "AND" situation Z. In case (2) the conjunction "AND" joins two descriptions, saying of the situation X, this description "AND" that description are true. Therefore there is equivocation in the your use of "AND", which is unacceptable for a "rule", one says 'there is situation Y "AND" situation Z', while the other says 'this "AND" that are true of situation X'.

Just substitute S instead of A and S instead of B, and you get the conclusion S || S. No equivocation at all. — Zuhair

Making such a substitution alters the meaning of "AND" Therefore the example employs equivocation.

But you are right in fact. I am not paying the slightest attention to your argument. — fishfry

Bottom line I have no idea what you're talking about. — fishfry

I assume then, that you still do not understand the distinction I made between what a symbol means, and what it refers to, or stands for. Perhaps if you read up on the kind/token distinction, that will help you.


When you say "S is married to S", it is quite clear that one S represents the fifty men and the other the fifty women. But you claim S represents the whole tribe. Hence the charge of equivocation.

50 men of tribe S are married to 50 women of tribe S,
AND
50 women of tribe S are married to 50 men of tribe S." — Zuhair

Your use of "AND" as a conjunction between the two expressions above provides the necessary ambiguity for your equivocation. "S is married to S" can refer to one situation only. Yet you use two distinct expressions. Since you allow that "S is married to S" represents the two distinct situations expressed above, the charge of equivocation is justified.

You said it’d be illogical to think there is any source for order other than a designer.

Your justification is that every instance of things we conventionally define to be ordered, derives from a ‘designer’. You infer from all instances of design-designer you’ve seen, that order in the natural world must also be from a designer. — aporiap

There's a further aspect which I explained earlier, which you don't seem to be accounting for, and that is that it is impossible that we will ever find an instance of order which we can justifiably claim came into existence without a designer. This is why I told Isaac that this is a pointless position to take.

I’m just extending the logic here. While it’s true everything we define to be ordered has a designer, it’s also true that all designers are intelligent terrestrial animals. — aporiap

This is illogical, and not an extension of my logic. We find designed order within the bodies of animals and plants, about which we cannot say that the designer is the animal and plant itself. The design comes from the genetics and underlying processes. So an animal such s a human being, designing something, is just an extension of this underlying designing which is occurring in all plants and animals all the time.

Therefore your proposed extension of logic is a composition fallacy. You are proposing that what is true of some instances of design, that the designers are "intelligent terrestrial animals", is true of all instances of design. But in reality we see design in lower level life forms, without intelligence, so we cannot restrict our conception of "designer" in such a way.

What we do, in philosophy and metaphysics is observe very closely, and analyze the intentional acts of human designers, which are very evident to us, so that we can develop an understanding of the underlying designing process which is responsible for the existence of living bodies. This designing is what Aristotle called final cause.

There is nothing to suggest designers could be otherwise because we’ve never seen any other possible designer, in the same way we’ve never seen any other source for design. So it would be illogical to assume that the universe could be designed by anything other than intelligent terrestrial animals — aporiap

Again, this is unsound logic. We often see designed things where the designer is nowhere to be found. You are not respecting this obvious premise, which along with the fact that our spatial-temporal perspective for observation is extremely limited, makes it very likely that there are many designed things where the designer is not evident to us. So when we see a thing which looks like it was designed, yet we cannot see the designer, there is no reason to conclude that it wasn't designed. In fact, this is the conclusion which I explained is pointless, because it can never be justified. And a conclusion which cannot be justified is an unsound conclusion and ought not be accepted.

You don’t see design in plants, you instead conclude that the order in plants is designed, which you ultimately infer from the fact that all man-made designs come from human designers. — aporiap

Right, strictly speaking, we don't "see" the design in plants. We see the order, and with the aid of equipment we might say we "see" the DNA etc., but we don't "see" the design. And this is consistent with human designs. We do not "see" the person's intent, or plan, it exists immaterially in the mind of the person. This is why understanding the nature of final cause, and how the object, as the goal, exists immaterially before it has material existence is very important to understanding the nature of design.

So, we know how to recognize order. And, we know a little bit about how ordered things come into existence through acts of human intent. So, when we see other things which have order, we can apply these principles, toward understanding how that other order (things ordered by design other than human intent) came into existence through design. Then we find consistency between these two, and we know we are on the right track. Your criticism appears to be that since there is not a necessary connection between order and design, we ought not proceed in this way. To answer your criticism, I would say that you need to understand the relation as one of probability rather than as one of necessity. It is this lack of necessity which validates the concept of "free will". There is not a relation of necessity between the thing ordered, and the design which orders it, there is a "free" act required.

By the bolded's logic, the universe must be designed by a terrestrial animal capable of design. — aporiap

But we see design in plants as well, so design is not limited to animals. It's not the argument which is ridiculous, it's the way you interpret it which is.

You all deny/critique that <all objects are in relative motion>

If you all are right then there is must be an object at absolute rest.

Can you prove that? — TheMadFool

There is no need to prove that. The person who claims that all motion is relative needs to prove that there is no such object as absolute rest. Until it is proven that all motion is relative, the critique of this premise is justified.

We're not talking about chairs. Four chairs over here are different than the four chairs over there. — fishfry

You asked for an example, so I gave it. What objects do the two 4s in "4+4=8" refer to in the example, if not the group of chairs here, and the other group of chairs over there?

Once again you are avoiding the question. We are talking about 4 + 4 = 8. You claim the two instances of '4' represent or stand for or refer to or mean two different things. — fishfry

No, you're not paying attention fishfry. I very specifically made a distinction between what the two 4s refer to, or stand for, and what they mean. They each mean a very similar thing, that there is a group of four objects representedby the symbol, but they refer to, or stand for, distinct things, like the two distinct groups of four chairs.

I implore you, please try to understand this. It's as if you refuse to distinguish between what a word means and what a word refers to. Here's an example. I might talk about my "computer". Do you know what "computer" means? Do you understand, that what "computer" means is something completely different from the object referred to when I talk about my computer? What it means is something completely different from what it stands for or refers to. These two are categorically different and to conflate them is a category mistake. That's the distinction I'm trying to make when I say there is a difference between what "4" means, and what the two 4's each refer to in the expression "4+4=8".

You have claimed that mathematicians use the word equality when they really mean congruence, equivalence, or isomorphism. — fishfry

That's ridiculous. I've repeated over and over again, that mathematician use "equality" to mean equality as defined by the axiom employed. And, the axioms do not define "equality" as identity. It is you who keeps making the incorrect assertion that mathematicians use "equality" to mean identity.

I ask you to introspect on the point that if you can't come up with specific examples, perhaps you don't understand your own ideas as well as you think you do. — fishfry

I gave you so many specific examples, like using 4+4=8 to recognize that putting two groups of four chairs together makes eight chairs. and also the very the act of counting things. Are you unable to read or something?

I stand by that order doesn't imply designer for the reasons I mentioned to — aporiap

I demonstrated that your so-called "reasons" are unreasonable, so why are you falling back on this unreasonableness? Let's look again.

I don’t think order implies a designer - part of that is because the examples of natural, order - snowflakes, molecules, galactic filaments- are so numerous and we know the mechanisms and none of them require an external intelligent designing agent for their generation. — aporiap

You now agree that we don't know the mechanisms well enough to say that these processes do not require an external intelligent designing agent. And now, all you say is that this idea of an intelligent designing agent is "ridiculous", without any reasons for this claim.

Meanwhile, I've demonstrated that the only way we know of, that order could possibly come into existence, is from an intelligent designing agent. And, it is unreasonable, and illogical to think that we could ever know of order coming from another source.

So who's position is really the ridiculous one?

I don't mean to be pestering, but what quantum mechanicals unknowns? All the quantum mechanics needed to understand basic subatomic interactions is well characterized: orbital geometries, bonding interactions between orbitals. The activities of the relevant subatomic particles - electrons and protons, are well known. — aporiap

How the particles move is an unknown. Some aspects of their movements are predictable, but that only means that the movements are orderly. The capacity to predict does not imply that the movements are known. For example, one could predict that the sun will rise in the morning, and predict the precise time of the rising and setting, while believing that a giant dragon is moving the sun around the back side of the earth every night, in an orderly fashion, therefore not knowing that the earth is actually spinning. If the movement of an object is orderly, its appearance is predictable, but the ability to predict its appearance doesn't mean that its movements are known.

If what you mean by "we cannot say they haven't been designed to behave the way in they do" is that until we have an explanation for why they behave that way, we can't say they haven't been designed to do so, then I'd also disagree saying it's not the forming of snowflakes that's designed, it's the fundamental constants and forces that are designed to be the way they are. — aporiap

Right, that's what design is, don't you think? To say that something was designed, doesn't imply that there is a person standing there making by hand, each designed object. We set up the production equipment, in the manufacturing plant, and pump out the objects. Of course those objects are designed. To argue that in this case, the objects are not really designed, only the production plant is, doesn't make sense. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to argue that the snowflakes are not designed, only the fundamental constants and forces which make them are.

The issue with "design" which you seem to be missing, is that things are designed for a reason, a purpose, that's fundamental to "design". So if these constants are "designed", then there is a reason for their being.

The designer would have to be explained as well as, by being able to interact with matter, it must have some sort of form or mechanism of interacting. This implies there's a logic or order to the way the designer works. This order would then need to be accounted for. — aporiap

That's not a very good argument. It's like saying "that's a dark and scary place, I'm afraid of what might be in there, so I'll just assume that there is nothing in there, that way I won't need to go in and look. People commonly say this about God, if you assume that God created the universe, this doesn't get you anywhere because now you have to determine what created God. But this is a false argument, because accepting God actually gets you one step closer. You must accept that there is God before you can start to understand God. So when the evidence points to God, as creator, it doesn't make sense to deny God on the account of, we still need to determine who created God. To recognize the reality of God is one step on the ladder, and regardless of how many steps there are, one step is still progress.

We are working with different definitions of inertia. Your definition, the tendency of parts of an object to remain together over time, is not the same as the traditional definition of inertia, the tendency of an object to maintain its state of motion - either continuing at a certain velocity or remaining at rest. I don't think either of these require a designer. — aporiap

It's the very same definition. The parts within an object are in motion, and that motion must remain uniform or the object will cease to exist as such. It's a matter of stability in motion.

The first case can be explained by just fundamental forces at work - at small scales [electron to maybe hundreds of kilometer range] electromagnetic force is most influential contributor to bodies maintaining their composition; at larger scales gravity is the most influential contributor.

The second case can be explained by general and special relativity. — aporiap

This is a good example of what I mean by the capacity to predict does not imply that the motion is understood. The capacity to predicted is based in the assumption of uniform motion, Newton's first law. But Newton's first law takes uniform motion for granted, it doesn't explain why the motion of a body remains constant from one moment of time to the next. And, when we get down to tiny particles, in short times we see no reason why this law ought to be upheld. Yet it is.

These explanations you refer to are not real explanations at all. To say 'mass is created by fundamental forces at work', really doesn't express an understanding of mass.

Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition. — tim wood

This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition. They start out with a preconceived notion (a sort of definition) of what "knowledge" is. Then in all the proposed examples of how this supposed "knowledge" might actually exist, they find that the examples are lacking, and cannot assure them of what they are looking for within their defined essence of "knowledge", i.e. truth. At the end of the dialogue they realize that they were misguided by their own preconceived definition, knowledge as it exists cannot fulfil the criteria of their definition. The definition mislead them

This is why the method of Platonic dialectics is to not accept, as "the definition", any possible definition, but to respect them all, as exactly that, possible definitions. Then by analyzing possible definitions we proceed to get a firm idea of how the word is actually used. From here we can develop an idea of "the thing" which is referred to by the word.

No, I'm saying there is no such thing as 'actually' order. Order is entirely a subjective judgement, no 'actually' about it. — Isaac

OK, but now it's clear that you and I have completely different views of "order". I think order is something that the physical world exhibits to us, you think order is totally within the mind of the subject. I take it then, that if a person designs and creates something, this is not case of putting order into the physical object, by your definition of "order", because the physical object can never really have any order.

I don't agree with your interpretation. I think it defines away the meaning of intent. Why is 'carrying the dice' and intentional act and not just 'going about my day' (which happened to involve carrying dice), or 'living my life'. — Isaac

I think the answer to that is very obvious, and I don't understand why you would ask it. We are intentional beings, and act intentionally, so 'going about my day' is itself acting intentionally. Are you trying to argue that you are not an intentional being, and that your actions are not intentional? If so, I would say that this is just a ploy in an attempt to avoid legal responsibility. Trust me, it won't work, in the eyes of the law we are intentional beings and therefore responsible for our actions. You cannot avoid the fact that you are an intentional being, by claiming that you are not. That's why the argument of determinism does not absolve you from legal responsibility. No matter how much you insist that you have no intentional control over your actions, such assertions do not convince people that this is the case.

The subject wanting to justify some judgement does not in itself mean that they must then be capable of doing so. I want to fly but I can't. — Isaac

That of course is the very problem with your claimed stance, that order is completely subjective. Any claim of order cannot be justified. Even if the subject wants to justify that claim, it is impossible to. I see that our discussion on the topic of "order" is completely pointless now, because you very clearly have claimed a definition of "order" which renders any claim of order as absolutely unjustifiable. This means that "order" can be whatever you want it to be. You say "there is order here", and by your definition there is necessarily order there, regardless of what you are referring to as order. What's the point to insisting that this is what "order" is when you've made this concept into something which could refer to absolutely anything? And of course, for me to discuss "order" with you is a complete waste of time because you can say about anything, that there is order there, or there is not order there, and by your professed definition, what you say would be true.

Snowflake formation, molecule formation is known with sufficient detail. — aporiap

This is obviously untrue, as evidenced by the unknowns within quantum mechanics. Just because we can observe enough of the process to make us believe that we understand it, doesn't mean that we actually understand the activities of those subatomic particles involved in these processes. And until we understand those activities of those subatomic particles, we cannot say that they haven't been designed to behave in the way that they do.

How does inertia require a designing agent? — aporiap

Do you understand that every massive body is composed of parts? And, the parts within a massive body are not necessarily arranged in the way that they are, so as to make that particular mass. However, as time passes, the mass retains its composition, (parts not flying off in different directions), and this is inertia. This requires that the parts are "ordered" to maintain the existence of that massive body. As I explained to Isaac (who has now ignored my explanation and opted for an absolutely useless definition of "order"), the only way that we know of, by which these elements could be ordered like this, is through design.

I don’t think order implies a designer - part of that is because the examples of natural, order - snowflakes, molecules, galactic filaments- are so numerous and we know the mechanisms and none of them require an external intelligent designing agent for their generation. — aporiap

Actually, we do not really know these mechanisms. We can describe these processes to an extent, provide a partial description of them, but not enough to say that a designing agent is not necessary. As I explained a couple posts back, the fundamental aspect of such processes, which we take for granted, inertia (the tendency for things to remain the same as time passes), which is how we describe temporal order, cannot be accounted for without an appeal to a designing agent.