A man will face years in prison because he made mistakes during the process of an investigation of which there is no underlying crime. — NOS4A2

There are reasons why those mistakes, of lying and witness tampering were made. Those mistakes are only made when the person is already guilty.

I guess two confuses you, and three - don't forget four and the rest of them. And love justice and The American Way. Superman, unicorns, dragons, all of the English and French kings - they do not exist, do they. These have no existence? Maybe we should pause here: answer: do these exist, yes or no? — tim wood

No they do not exist. In the common usage of the word "exist", which I am familiar with, fictional things do not exist. Nor do love, justice, and other ideas exist. They are conceptual only, and therefore not existing things. Notice that love and justice refer to relations between things, while concepts and imaginary fictions are ways of thinking. None of these are themselves, things, and that's why we cannot class them as existents.

Is the problem "encounterable"? Let's consider that no one "encounters" anything at all, except mediately through perception and idea. And by that standard, unicorns and their like are more purely existent than any of the furniture of the "real" world, being pure idea undiluted by perception. You really are not making sense. Why is that? — tim wood

It's you who's really not making any sense here. I simply rejected "encounterability" as the defining feature of existent, for very good reason which I explained. I don't know what you're trying to say.

Could it be possible that Trump wanted Zelensky to do the right thing, instead of this convoluted story about political dirt and future elections? — NOS4A2

Yeah, that sounds just like Trump ... "please, don't do me any favours, just do the right thing"... when "the right thing" is always defined by what is beneficial to me.

You know him well...

Notice the "if and only if", the above statement is a DEFINITION of "||". Notice that it was symbolized by another symbol from "m" which was given to marriage between individual.

Marriage between tribes (symbolized by ||) has NO meaning by itself, it is just a string of letters, the country gave it a meaning by the statement after the "if and only if" above. So you cannot say it leads to equivocation of meaning or anything like that, because its meaning is understood to be fully traceable to the specifications building it posed by the rule, in other ways that rule is a DEFINITIONAL RULE. Without it you have no meaning of tribal marriage at all. — Zuhair

The point is that the symbol "||" refers to a different situation in S||S than it does in A||B. Therefore the rule produces ambiguity in the use of that symbol, and the possibility of equivocation. If we assume that "||" has the same meaning in each case, we are deceived by equivocation. Therefore the rule is a faulty rule, and ought not be accepted.

In those rigid kinds of definitions, there is no room for equivocation or the alike. These are strict rule following machinery. Equivocation is out of question here. — Zuhair

Very clearly this is not true. Your "DEFINITION of '||" allows that two very distinct and different types of situations are referred to by "||". Therefore ambiguity is inherent within the definition itself. Your "DEFINITIONAL RULE" is ambiguous, and equivocation in the conclusion follows from that ambiguity.

Yes, you are proceeding with "strict rule following machinery", but there is ambiguity in the rule itself, the definition of the term. And this ambiguity produces equivocation in your professed conclusion, that "S||S" describes a situation similar to "A||B". That the two different situations are similar is an illusion created by the ambiguity inherent within the definition of "||".

I say it's cold because it's cold, and thereby aver that cold exists. — tim wood

Uh huh, tell me another. A big, bright and bold, vicious circle justifies nothing.

Did you read the OP? Do you remember the category of ideas/mental constructs? A hallucination exists as an idea/mental construct, subspecies hallucination. You appear to be confused about all this. — tim wood

That's one of the things I'm objecting to. By common usage of the word "exists", things created by the imagination, including ideas and mental constructs, do not exist. We say that they do not exist, because we cannot give them a spatial location. That's why I suggested location as a condition of "existence". The things within an imaginary scene, are clearly encountered, but they do not exist, and we do not call them existents.

Yes I am confused by all this. Your use of "exist" in a way which is inconsistent with common usage has left me confused. I do not know your intentions and can only assume that, as in other cases like this which I have encountered, your goal is to deceive by equivocation. Your misguided direction has left me incapable of following where you intend to be going with this unsupported principle. I see no reason for you to place non-existent things, such as things encountered in the imagination, into the category of "existents", and this move confuses me.

This is your problem, not mine. — tim wood

Not really. It would be my problem if I were to follow your misguided direction. But I choose not to follow you down this confusion filled pathway, so it remains your problem not mine.

If you wish to talk about unencounterable existents, go ahead, but I have to wonder just how you're going to go about that. — tim wood

I've been talking about unencounterable existents for quite a few posts. Now I've succeeded in getting you to talk about them as well. What's the problem? I've explained that all I have to do is demonstrate that such a thing is logically possible and it makes sense to talk about them. What doesn't make sense is to exclude this possibility as "impossible" just because it is, by definition, beyond your capacity to encounter it.

But I do! — tim wood

It's one thing to assert "I know..", but I'm asking how do you know that. That's the point. if you are creating subclasses of existents, and placing things into these categories, and you do not know what an existent is, then how do you know whether or not your proposed subclasses even contain existents?

You want to answer "how" with 'I know these things are existents because I've encountered them', but I've already explained why "encounterability" is insufficient.

Do you not think about what you write? Being cold is an encounterable. You encounter it, and you feel, think, maybe say, "That's cold." Being cold in itself means nothing more than that. Are you going to argue that because something has some characteristic it must be (or alternatively, cannot be) some particular thing? — tim wood

Correct, that's exactly why "encounterability" is insufficient.

By doing it. What, exactly, is your problem? — tim wood

My problem? I'm waiting for you to do what you claim. I've already explained why I believe encounterability is insufficient. Now I'm waiting for you to attempt to demonstrate that it is sufficient.

And please identify something that exists that is not in some way encounterable. — tim wood

I don't think I need to come up with these things to show the fault in your principle, I just need to demonstrate the possibility of these things. As I've explained, non-existent things are encountered through hallucinations and such. And, it is highly probable, due to the deficiencies and physical limitations of the human being, that there are existents which are not encounterable.

How will you demonstrate that all existents are encounterable, and all encounterable things are existents?

This suggests it is the process, not the object that is without limit. — sandman

Actually, it suggests that the "set of integers" is not an object. And, the fact that the interval between two integers can be divided indefinitely indicates that numbers are not objects.

IF the statement (50 men of tribe A are married to 50 women of tribe B) is TRUE
AND the statement (50 women of tribe A are married to 50 men of tribe B) is TRUE
THEN the statement "tribe A is married to tribe B" is TRUE.

AND is specifically the logical conjunctive article, nothing more nothing less. Now let apply this to tribe S were 50 men of tribe S are married to 50 women of tribe S, we have the antecedent:

The statement (50 men of tribe S are married to 50 women of tribe S) is TRUE
AND
The statement (50 women of tribe S are married to 50 men of tribe S) is TRUE. — Zuhair

You've just inverted the equivocation by insisting that "AND" means the same thing in each case. If we are to conclude, by following the example as a "rule", that tribe S is married to tribe S, there will be equivocation in the use of "married". The phrase "is married to" will mean something different in "tribe A is married to tribe B", from what it means in "tribe S is married to tribe S".

What this demonstrates is that the "rule" is faulty. If the rule is followed, there is produced a conclusion which is consistent with the "rule". But there is inconsistency between what "married" refers to in the rule, and what "married" refers to in the conclusion. Equivocation is created by following the rule. Therefore the so-called rule ought not be taken as a rule, rather it should be taken as something which could lead one into deception.

I am not looking for what existence is. I am satisfied that is a different question from what exists, and what exists seems to be a criteriological question. — tim wood

But how can you expect to answer "what exists?" if you do not know what it means to exist? Knowing what it means to exist gives you the criteria required to accurately answer the question of does this or does this not exist.

Encounterability, then, is a criterion of existence. — tim wood

"A criterion" doesn't give you the necessary conditions to make the affirmation. Being cold is "a criterion" of snow, but it doesn't mean that if it's cold, it's snow. Therefore there is no reason to believe that if it's encounterable it has existence, even if encounterability is a criterion of existence.

Furthermore, as I explained, it is quite possible that there are existing things which are unencounterable to us, as human beings. Therefore encounterability is unacceptable even as a simple criterion of existence. Perhaps the encounterable are one type of existent.

Is your objection that no reasonable discussion about existents can happen without first figuring out what existence is? Do you ever buy tomatoes? — tim wood

Yes that's exactly my point, no reasonable discussion about existents qua existents can happen without defining what "existent" is. There's no point to defining, or categorizing subgroups of existents without first defining the principal category, because without such a definition, the things you'll be putting into the subgroups might not even belong in the principal group to begin with.

Say you bought some beefsteaks and some romas. How would you know that what you bought are tomatoes if you don't even know what a tomato is? Likewise, how would you know that the thing you encountered was an existent if you do not even know what an existent is?

"Encounterability" is a noun. — tim wood

If "encounterability" is a noun, then it is used to refer to a thing, or class of things. So how do you propose to use this word such that it describes what all existent things have in common, existence?

The truth of the matter is that the quality of encounterability is a quality of the object in question, not some individual or specific class of individuals that may or may not either encounter or be able to encounter the object. — tim wood

Despite your assertion ("the truth of the matter is..."), that's not true at all. "Encounter" necessarily implies something encountered and something doing the encountering. It's a two part experience, a "meeting". So "encounterability" (my spell check thinks that's a nonsense word), depends as much on the capacities of the thing encountering as it depends on the thing being encountered. Consider for example, the term "edible".

This isn't about existence for, rather it's about criteria for existence qua. — tim wood

I agree with this point, but that's exactly why "encounterability" will not suffice. It implies the necessity of assuming something which will act as the encounterer. Therefore "existence" will be defined in relation to that encounterer, "existence for" the encounterer. Why must "existence" be a relative term? You are insisting that in order to "exist", the existent must exist relative to something else, the thing which could encounter it.

Here's a suggestion for you categorization schema, absolute existents, and relative existents. The former are not related to encounters, the latter are.

I mean, you can't really miss existents, and there's not much of a complement to contrast with. — jorndoe

Yes you can miss existents, and that's the point of one of my objections. Fundamental particles are supposed to be existents, and I don't encounter them ever. There may also be all sorts of other existents which human beings haven't encountered, and may not even be encounterable to us. It is a mistake to define "existents", as things which are evident to me, or even to us.

"Exist" is fairly basic, and categorizing different sorts of "existents" seems more fruitful, like tim wood has been doing. — jorndoe

The process tim wood and the others are engaged in is absolutely fruitless, for the very reason that they express no idea of what it means to exist, and so have no principles for categorization. For example, they assume that a "force" exists. But "force" just represents a system we use to quantify an interaction between existent things.

I once thought S and TS were one and the same person.

Perhaps this. Materiality just means encounterability (in some way or other), whether or not the the thing be encountered. I'm sure you will almost immediately again see circularity in this, in that presupposed is the thing encountered. But to go back, toe-stubbing was listed as "an" absolute qualification, not the only. So it seems difficult not to beg-the-question. But the way out of that is to acknowledge that things exist, and to try to identify sufficient conditions for existence. I nominate encounterability as a sufficient condition and an improvement over toe-stubbing and capacity-for. Yes? No? Improve? — tim wood

No, I don't agree with "encounterability". First, because it restricts existence to the encountering capacities of the thing doing the encountering. I assume that the thing doing the encountering is supposed to be human. Now "existence" is limited to the encountering capacities of the human being. this appears as a form of Protagorean relativism, "man is the measure of all things". And I think that there may be some existents which the limitations of the physical composition of the human being prevent us from encountering.

Also, on the other side of the coin, human beings sometimes encounter things which are imaginary, like in the case of hallucinations. The person may not be able to distinguish a true encounter from a false encounter, so encounter cannot be used as a principle for judging existence, because it provides no principle to distinguish true encounter from false encounter, which is what we need, to be able to judge whether a thing exists or not. And if we want to restrict "encounterability" to true encounters, we would need some way of determining what makes an encounter true. So we're really not gaining anything with this term. We're back to a sort of Parmenidean position, existence is truth. But what does that mean?

So perhaps “object” would be a more precise term for existing things. “Object” also proves difficult to define but I think has at least these qualities:



it is finite
it moves as one
it is bounded by a surface
it has a position relative to other objects
it acts — NOS4A2

I think in mathematics, an "object" may be infinite.

Not least bcause even any discussion towards an agreement on terms seems impossible, never mind reasonable argument. — tim wood

That is called "Platonic dialectics", where agreement on terms is not forthcoming. it might just be, that this type of philosophy is the heart and soul of the philosophy of religion. It is an acknowledgement of certain circumstances in the real world, where the prospect of working together from agreed upon principles, is not a reality. If you have no inclination to partake in the philosophy of religion, because it appears to you like irrational mumbo jumbo, then simply put your will power to practise and stay out of it.

Two stones are near each other, and no others are close. That must be two, yes? No. the two is in the mind of the observer who associates the idea of two with the two stones. — tim wood

The problem though is that there is something "real" to these relationships which is not simply made up by a mind. The closeness of the two stones to each other, in relation to other stones is something not created by a mind. We want to say that this relationship exists independently of all minds.

I offered this above as tentative:Maybe I should offer a tentative definition of existence, or at least that which falls out of my two categories above: objects of thinking or sense or some combination, but in combination reducible to either object of thought or sense by parts. — tim wood

As Berkeley demonstrated, these two categories are reducible to one, being "perceived by a mind". Then we have no principle by which to justify the claim of anything outside of minds.

1a) Material existence shall be an absolute qualification for existence - the materiality, obviously, being demonstrable. If you might stub your toe on it, then it's difficult to see how it isn't. — tim wood

Here is the heart of the difficulty. You take for granted that "materiality" is obviously demonstrable. But attempting a rigorous definition of "matter" will show that this is not the case. The premise, "if you stub your two on it, then it is material", does not capture "materiality", because there are many things which you wouldn't stub your two on which we would still say are material. Therefore we would need a more adept description of what it means to be material to include these other material things into that category.

So the difficulty is that some things which are material are easily demonstrable as such, when the materiality of rocks and things you might stub your two on, is taken for granted. But the material existence of other things, like fundamental particles for example, cannot be demonstrated in this way. So unless we have a rigorous definition of what it means to be material, this categorization doesn't help us in determining what type of existence things like fundamental particles have.

Will you accept an amendment to, "Having the capacity to be present in some sense or some way"? Meaning that lacking any such capacity means non-existence. Is that what you meant? — tim wood

I don't understand the reason for such an amendment. It's like you're saying that if something has the capacity to exist, can we say it's existing. "Capacity" is just a judgement which we as human beings make. We say that a thing is X, but it has the capacity to be Y. If Y has no presence in space or time, yet we say that there is the capacity for X to be Y, how can we say that Y exists?

This is the problem which "the future" hands us. Y may or may not come to be in the future, when there is the capacity for Y to be. So we cannot say that Y has a presence in time (in some eternalist way) because Y may not ever come to be. It may be prevented from coming to be. And, having never existed in the past, Y has absolutely no spatial presence. Since the capacity for Y might not be actualized, we cannot assign to Y any temporal presence (in the future) either. So despite the fact that there is the capacity for Y, we cannot assign to Y any form of existence. This is why we do not assign "exists" to things like capacities, which are properties only of the mind. There are no principles by which such things can be said to "exist".

How can you make any claim to consistency when one day you write this:

You and your ideas, in their proper context, are among the world's finest, most durable, productive, and honorable... — tim wood

And then you follow it up with this:

What absolute dishonest nonsense, MU. A disgrace. — tim wood

To be brief, I think the evidence of the site is that a philosophical discussion of religion is not possible here. — tim wood

From personal experience, it's people like you who make discussing the philosophy of religion difficult.

There are two distinct ways of being present. One is to be at a certain place, and the other is to be at a certain time. Therefore I suggest that there are two different ways of existing.

Don't we need a definition of what it means to "exist" before we can proceed with an inquiry like this? The difficult thing is to get a definition which we can all agree on. If you define "exist" as "being material" then you'll be accused of being a materialist begging the question. So I propose something like "being present' as defining what it means to exist.

Nothing about my point was about my mind or your mind or anyone else's mind. It was about your claim that there exist independent non-material "things" that are not ideas/mental constructs - nothing to do with mind at all. — tim wood

Right, I have made the conclusion that there are immaterial things which are not mental constructs of human beings. I have produced the argument which necessitates that conclusion. You have rejected the argument and asked me to "exhibit these demonstrations for us". My obligation is to take it very slow and easy to facilitate understanding by even the most simple minded human being. First step, do you agree that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) independent of your own mind?

Nor were we talking about causes. — tim wood

Of course we were talking about causes, where have you been? That's the crux of the argument, as Aquinas said, we can know the existence of God through His effects. Am I talking to a board? Second step, you logically conclude that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) which are independent of your own mind, from sense observations of the effects that the immaterial things have on material things.

I ask you to kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. -and you simply ignore the question and keep on going. — tim wood

I already answered this for you, it's very simple. Thinking moves the human body, producing material change, effect in the material world, creating material things. This is the essence of free will. If you are deterministic, and insist that these actions may be explained by material causes, rather than the immaterial cause of intention or free will, then this explains your stance toward immaterial things.

If that's the case, then I can only tell you that I see inconsistency in your principles. You allow that mental constructs exist as immaterial things, but you deny the efficacy of these immaterial things. How could the material chair come into existence if the immaterial idea does not play a causal role?

So I'll repeat myself. The idea of the chair which the carpenter builds, is necessarily temporally prior to the material chair, and, the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the material chair. This necessity indicates that the idea is a cause of existence of the chair.

To demonstrate causality does not require a demonstration of "how", it just requires a demonstration of necessity. We do not need to demonstrate how cold temperatures freeze water to show that cold temperatures are a cause of water freezing. The immaterial idea is necessary for the existence of the chair, therefore it is a cause of existence of the chair, regardless of whether we can demonstrate how it acts.

That's right.

In a nutshell, right here. Did you not see and read the "by itself"? What am I to make of this misreading? If nothing else, and as charitably as possible, it's suggestive of a very unrigorous even uncritical and undifferentiated understanding of what a cause is. — tim wood

The "by itself" is irrelevant. You're just trying to create a distraction here. No cause works "by itself", it works on what is existing at the time. The cause of free will works from within an existing human being.

Perhaps you deny the point. Well, then, kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. — tim wood

What is the point? It's you who is deny the point. The point is that the world is full of things created by thinking. Why do you deny this fact?

I do agree. but you have added the qualification, "such as the ideas in your mind." Until now, your claim as I have read it, is that there are independently existing non-material things that are not ideas/mental constructs. — tim wood

I added the qualification to get agreement, a starting point. Now let's see if we can proceed slowly and cautiously from this agreed starting point. You agree that there are immaterial things independent of your mind. Do you also agree that you do not have direct access to these other immaterial things (ideas of others)? You conclude that there are other immaterial things, independent of your mind, through judging the material things which you sense. Now, is it not the effects of those other immaterial things, on the material world, things like words, artifacts, and human actions, which justify the conclusion that there are other immaterial things independent of your own mind?

With respect to particular chairs, that are the result of the process you describe, yes. It seems to me debatable without any conclusion how the first chair, or ideas or notions of chairs, came about. But maybe that's not to the point. Yes, the blueprint for this chair preexists, and the general concept of chair (by now) preexists, any recently made or thing used as a chair. — tim wood

OK, that's a start, you agree that the idea pre-exists the chair. Do you also agree that the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the chair? The immaterial thing, the idea, is necessary for the existence of the chair, and is necessarily prior to (pre-exists) the chair. The material chair could not exist if the immaterial idea to make it, was not there first. Doesn't this necessity justify the claim of "cause"?

The reference set, eg. the set of integers, is a mental construct, used in the process of counting, a practical convenience. Counting is the most fundamental process of measurement, the answer to 'how many'. The nature/identity of the elements is a matter of definition, what attributes must the elements have to be a member of a set. — sandman

So, in relation to the subject of this thread, is a mental construct, "the set of integers" for example, properly called "an object"? If so, then we have an infinite object, which seems incoherent because objects are known as objects by understanding their boundaries. If a mental construct is not an "object", then what exactly is "the reference set"? If we use the reference set for comparison, making a one to one relation in the act of counting for example, and if the reference set doesn't exist as an object, how does it exist?

Thinking by itself produces nothing material. — tim wood

But this is wrong. With will power we move our bodies and this produces material things. So thinking clearly has a material effect. Thinking produces material things. The evidence for this is all around us in the form of artifacts and engineered things.

But no one has ever been able to produce that chair. — tim wood

Chairs are produced by human beings, and the idea, of what will exist, precedes the material existence of the chair. Do you agree with me?

You want your notions to be non-mentally-constructed, non-material, independently existing real "things." Then make the kind of demonstration that reveals them. That's part of the program of "putting to the question": a compelling to meet a standard; the standard, one hopes, crafted so that with respect to the thing sought, it becomes a sine qua non. — tim wood

This is a misrepresentation. All my ideas are mentally constructed in my own mind, I agree with you on that. However, there are immaterial things independent of my mind, such as the ideas in your mind. How can you not agree with me on this?

The concept of the soul is integral to the judeo christian framework. It is the focal point for responsibility and human personhood. But it doesn't hold up to scrutiny:

Either the soul depends on brain function to act or it doesn't.
If it does depend on brain function then how can it be held responsible for its actions, since they are actually determined by brain function. The soul never acts independently of the brain, so how can it really be said to effect any acts? The soul is really just along for the ride. — dazed

I think that this is a misunderstanding. All living things are endowed with soul, so it is not true that the soul is the focal point of responsibility and personhood. The rational mind, which is a property of the human soul, with intention and free will, is the focal point of responsibility and personhood.

MU, if you and I are going to continue it is clear to me we are going to have to start at the very beginning.

For example, I am content to acknowledge there such things as chairs, and this simply as a practical matter. And that the chairs are material things. At the same time I am aware that this language of "chairs" and "material" is equivocal and ambiguous - but not in the practical context of chairs. This language in its context is absolutely meaningful.

I also know that there is love, justice, three, and all abstract ideas. These are all manifestly somethings. Equally manifestly, they are not material. It seems accurate to call them ideas/mental constructs, In the sense of no mind, no idea/mental construct, nor can you ever sit on one. I call them ideas, and for as long as we can keep in mind that our use of the word "thing" has two least two very different referents and thereby avoid confusion, "thing" is a convenient word to use. And this I made clear several post ago — tim wood

OK, I see this as an acceptable starting point. You have described two distinct categories of "things".

But now you present it as an immaterial thing in minds that we call ideas. Perhaps you mean the same thing I mean, but in inverting the order you make me very suspicious. — tim wood

Yes I do invert the order, and there is very good reason for this, clearly explained in Plato's Republic. Do you recognize that the idea of "the chair" exists in the mind of the carpenter before the carpenter builds the material chair? Therefore the material existence of the chair is dependent on the immaterial "chair" in the carpenter's mind.

An idea/mental construct is a product of thinking (thinking broadly defined) that is immaterial, and that for convenience we can call it a thing, and that in doing so do not at all imply that ideas are in any way material. Agreed? — tim wood

I agree with this. Now, do you agree that there are material things which are the product of thinking, just like there are immaterial things which are the product of thinking? We see these engineered, artificial things all over the earth.

Since both types of things, according to your categorization, immaterial and material, may be the product of thinking, the question we need to address is if it is possible that there are any things which are not the product of thinking.

You've defined the immaterial category of "things" in such a way that this type of thing requires a mind. Consequent to this definition (your definition) of "immaterial thing", all immaterial things are the product of thinking.

Now here's the problem. Aristotle demonstrates in his Metaphysics, (and this seems to be where your point of denial lies), how it is necessary to conclude that the "form" of each and every material object is prior in time to the material existence of that object. From this argument, we can conclude that every material thing is dependent for its existence, on an immaterial thing, just like the chair is dependent on the carpenter's idea, in the example above. Incidentally, this fact (where your point of denial lies) is empirically demonstrated by particle physics.

I see two possible solutions to this problem. Either we adjust your definition, allowing that there are immaterial things such as "Forms", which are not the product of a mind, or we propose a "divine mind" to account for the existence of these immaterial things. Choose your poison.

And this. You have every reason. — tim wood

I don't understand how you can make this assertion. Check these reasons:
1) I can only make conclusions concerning the existence of immaterial things based on logic, because I cannot sense immaterial things.
2) There is very strong evidence of immaterial things independent of my mind.
3) There is evidence, not quite so strong, that there are immaterial things in the minds of other animals.
4) Plato, Aristotle, and even modern physicists, have demonstrated the need to assume immaterial things as prior to all material things.
5) You have given me absolutely no reason why we ought to restrict our definition of "immaterial thing" in such a way that immaterial things are necessarily dependent on a human mind.
Therefore, I have no reason to restrict "immaterial thing" in the way you suggest. In fact, I have very strong reason against this. So I just can't understand your assertion that I "have every reason" to do this.

"Very true," "logically deduce," "logical process." You are the one making these claims. I merely trying to get you to put your money where your mouth is. So far you have not. — tim wood

This is false, just like your claim above, that I have "every reason to". I provided the logical argument in a number of different formats. You and 180 have both asserted that it is fallacious, but neither one of you has "put your money where your mouth is".

Exhibit these demonstrations for us; let us see how very true they are, how they are logically deduced, the result of logical process. If you cannot or will not - and of course you cannot - then you're just a snake-oil man. a thief of language and ideas, a sophist and not a very good one, a troll, and the only correct thing to do is to challenge you as a seller of nonsense. — tim wood

You're so fucking full of shit that it frustrates me Woody. I produced the argument at least twice. Each time, you said something like "that argument doesn't cut it", and "I don't buy it". After this, you said "please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to". So I re-presented the argument again, and you said "thank you for re-presenting". Now you're right back to "Exhibit these demonstrations for us". Sometime I feel like I'm "Tied to the whippin' post, tied to the whippin' post."

Thus '4' is a reference set to match one to one to an unknown set to determine its 'size' or quantity. — sandman

OK, now what happens if we remove the "unknown set" which is matched to the reference set, so that we can just deal with the reference set itself? Is the reference set an object itself, does it contain objects, or what does it mean to be a "quantifier"?

Lack of evidence, special pleading, lack of definition, equivocation, failure in defining terms, begging the question - really, there is more wrong than I have words to name. In some respects I'm like the horse that refuses to advance over a rickety bridge. — tim wood

You agreed that there are immaterial things in human minds, called ideas. If you want to take that back, because of the rickety bridge it leads to, then go ahead. But you are in denial.

Kindly tell us what immaterial thing is in your mind that is not some sort of idea or mental construct, or in short a product of your mind (being mind, presumably thinking, whether voluntary or involuntary), but that is instead an independently existing thing. And in the mind of others that you deduce from your apprehensions of your environment. — tim wood

You clearly did not understand what I wrote. Please go back and reread. Or if you prefer, pay attention and I'll state it very simply for you. There are immaterial things in my mind, mental constructs, ideas. From the existence of artificial material things, and the actions of other human beings, which I sense, I deduce that there are immaterial things independent of my mind, i.e. in the minds of others. I have no reason to believe that there are not immaterial things independent of all human minds. According to theologians, the existence of natural material things is evidence of immaterial things independent of all human minds.

Why do you see a problem with this? It is very clear that we do not have direct mental access to immaterial things which are independent of our own minds, yet it is very true that there are such things. We logically deduce that there are immaterial things independent of our own minds, through observing the existence of material objects. It is this logical process which leads us to the existence of God.

I think of Aristotle as a thinker who, finding himself in a world with few or no good accounts of it, tried to find and provide those accounts, his tools comprising mainly logic and reason as he understood them. If he could craft in words a good account, that would be his account of that part or aspect of the world. And so heavy objects fall faster than light objects, smoke "falls" upwards, & etc. You, near as I can tell, uncritically misuse both the force and substance of those arguments to draw conclusions that only stand within the framework of the thinking that produces them, and not elsewhere. — tim wood

It appears to me like you haven't read any Aristotle. I've read all his work except some which is debatably not properly attributed to him. And, the majority of his work I've read multiple times. If you think that I attribute to him a kind of thinking which is 20th century thinking, this is simply because his principles are still relevant today.

You seem to have a bias against ancient principles. "If it's ancient then it cannot be of any value." Actually the opposite is true. A principle which was written thousands of years ago, and is still accessible today, has stood the test of time. Principles which have little or no value are dropped and disappear.

Christian thinkers didn't fall into that particular trap. They themselves established their own form of the Kantian divide between faith and reason 1500 years before him. It's all faith, and if within the faith some reason can be employed, all the better. And faith can be a very good thing. But at the boundaries, where the iron meets the rest of the world, all is rust and corruption at the hands of people who don't know any better, and as well those who do. And mainly what they do is claim that matters of faith are matters of fact. I do not imagine the phenomena of these corruptions unique to Christianity. — tim wood

We aren't talking about faith, we are talking about reason. This is the hole which you have dug for yourself, and seem to be incapable of escaping from. Religion is based in reason, not faith. Faith only exists where it's supported by reason. In your deluded state of denial, you refuse to accept this fact.

But his was preeminently the effort to explain nature, to make it conform to reason by inventing the reason, but in any case not to "put nature to the question." — tim wood

Yes, it's quite clear from this passage that you have not read Aristotle. Precisely what Aristotle did was "put nature to the question". For example, read his Physics, De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics. These books very explicitly "put nature to the question". His logical principles are put forward to prepare the student by developing a critical mind. Remember, Aristotle partook in the tradition of Socrates and Plato, criticizing the knowledge of the day. His logic is aimed at the demise of sophism, and this same goal was later maintained by the Skeptics.

Unless you're prepared to argue that concepts are non-mental immaterial independently existing things I see no need to continue. — tim wood

What's your reasoning for this? Why can't reality be such that human concepts are immaterial things which do not exist independently of the human mind, yet there are other immaterial things which do exist independently of the human mind?

Here's an example. I know there are immaterial things within my mind because I have contact with them, and apprehend them with my mind. I do not however, have direct contact with immaterial things independent from my mind. But I apprehend all sorts of things in my environment, words, writing, and other artificial things, which indicate to me that there are immaterial things which are independent from my own mind, in the minds of others. Even a human being itself, I observe as a material object, but I conclude from this object's activities, and my own experience of immaterial objects, that there is an immaterial cause of these activities. And that immaterial cause is independent of my mind.

Therefore, based on my own experience of immaterial things, and the material evidence of other immaterial things active In the world, the conclusion that there are immaterial things independent of my human mind is very sound. Aquinas' arguments state that based on the evidence of existing material things, we can conclude that there are immaterial things independent of all human minds. This is done in the very same way that I conclude that there are immaterial things independent of my own mind. We see in our environment, the effects of immaterial things, and based on our own experience with immaterial things within our own minds, we conclude that there are immaterial things independent of our minds. On what principles would you base an argument to deny this?

(a) At best the argument is unsound. — 180 Proof

If this is your opinion, let me state to you, a simplified version of Aristotle's cosmological argument, and see if you can tell me why it is unsound. Remember, it is the argument which Aristotle used to refute Pythagorean idealism, what we now call Platonic realism. But it also demonstrates that "prime matter" is an impossibility, as unintelligible.

Through observation we see that the potential for the existence of an object precedes in time, the actual existence of that object. And, the actual existence of an object requires a prior actuality (this you might interpret as a cause). If the potential for existence of objects preceded the actual existence of objects, and there was nothing actual, then there would always be the potential for existence of objects, and nothing actual. We observe that there is actual existence, therefore there is something actual which is prior to the potential for existence of objects.

Please, point to the fallacies which you claim are inherent within the argument, so that I can rectify my thinking. I will grant you, that the premises can be demonstrated as unsound through a process ontology, which denies the reality of "objects". But process philosophy ends up with the related problem of temporal continuity, the temporal extension of an event or process. So process philosophers end up turning to God to account for the observed continuity (consistency in the observed world) from one moment to the next.

Any religions? ergo any g/Gs? That's as vapid as saying "the very existence of 'Star Wars conventions, websites, merchandise, books, films & fan clubs' is public evidence for the efficacy of ... 'The Force'". C'mon, MU, you can do better than that. — 180 Proof

Well of course it is. "Efficacy" means to have an effect on. Clearly the existence of these things, conventions, websites, etc., demonstrate that these concepts... "The Force", etc, have efficacy. the concepts have an effect on the way people behave. C'mon 180 Proof, think about what you are saying for a minute before you blurt it out.

There seems to be a modern determinist/materialist movement to deny the idea that concepts have efficacy. This is pure nonsense, because all we need to do is to look around at all the marvels of the engineered world around us, which couldn't have been accomplished without concepts, to see first hand the efficacy of concepts. That movement is simply determined to isolate concepts and ideas in some Platonic realm of eternal existence, banishing them from our world, such that it is impossible for them to have an effect on our world. This is exactly the type of nonsense which Aristotle's cosmological argument was intended to combat. The cosmological argument brings immaterial objects, human concepts and ideas, right into our world, as natural objects in our world, existing as the property of human beings. This allows for the overwhelming evidence, that these ideas and concepts have causal efficacy in our world. That is the reality at the basis of "ideology".

Stop projecting. Criticism of your fallacious arguments and incoherent statements is not a sign of "being offended" by them. Get over yourself; I'm not offended by your idle woo, MU, sometimes it even amuses me. — 180 Proof

I invite criticism, that's how we learn. Please, be my guest and criticize the argument. But simply throwing every term for every form of fallacy which you can muster, stating "the argument is unsound", "it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction", "there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise", "compositional fallacy", etc., is just random nonsense.

If you have something constructive to say about the argument, please point to the fallacious parts. I assure you that I can address all of your seemingly random criticisms. Here's an example:

a) The argument appears unsound to you because you misunderstand the premises.
b) The idea that the potential for an object precedes its actual existence is not an incoherent induction. If it were false, there'd either be eternal objects, or objects which come from nothing. Since none of these have been found, and these ideas are unreal, the induction is coherent, and the premise is very sound.
c) I see no attempt to make "a posterior argument justify an a priori premise". That's just a random claim, probably derived from a misunderstanding of the argument.
d) No, there is no composition fallacy. If the argument is applied to "the universe", (which I didn't do in the first place, I referred to a "first object"), then "the universe" refers to an object. The composition fallacy would be associated to a straw man, produced by those who make "the first object" into "the universe", and claim that "the universe" is not a natural whole.
e) The fact that others might refer to God by another name is irrelevant. Aquinas for example concludes that this is what "we call God". There is however, a problem with referring to the conclusion of the cosmological argument as consistent with "QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic". In fact, this is exactly the type of Platonism (giving reality to a statistical model) which the cosmological argument attacks. Symmetry-breaking theoretical systems do not account for "the act" which breaks symmetry, and that is why they are inconsistent with the cosmological argument.

First things first. You clearly have not thought through the meaning of the words "material" and "things." On using those term uncritically, your argument fails. Now lets move on. ("Material" and "things" are abstract terms applied to abstractions.) — tim wood

I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept. If you think that the argument fails due to a misunderstanding of "matter", then you need to present an interpretation of that concept which demonstrates that the argument fails.

Think. e.g., about what a chair is. — tim wood

"What a thing is" refers to a thing's form, and the form of a thing is distinct from its matter. So thinking about "what a chair is" doesn't give me any understanding of matter. The same matter which composes the chair could potentially, exist in many different ways. That's why matter is understood by the concept of "potential".

And this presupposes a first material thing without defining "first." And I'll note right now that my objections would be absurd and ridiculous in most arguments, but are substantial here. — tim wood

I told you, it's a temporal order. "First" means earliest in time. You do understand that "cause" is a temporal concept, or do you not?

And the final cause, intention. I agree immaterial, but a thing-as-idea; i.e., an idea. Your reification of this, if that's what you're doing, is slipshod manipulation of an ancient word thorough multiple filters. But at the same time your usage may be revealing. — tim wood

As a cause, final cause or what we call intention, in Aristotle's principles, is real, just like "the good" is real in Plato's principles. This is very clear in Aristotle's principles. To make intention into something unreal, as you are doing, and accuse me of reification, is a distorted interpretation which leaves the existence of artificial things as unintelligible. The world is full of such things, and if we trace a chain of efficient causes to account for the existence of any such thing, the chain stops at the intent of the creator. The concept of free will disallows that the actions of the creator can be accounted for by efficient causation. So to say that the intent of the creator is not a real cause, is to say that the artificial object just happened, by chance, to get the form which it has, instead of recognizing the reality, of final cause. Then you deny the fact that the form of the object was given to the object by the mind of the creator.

Question: do you hold the Pythagorean theorem to be an immaterial existing thing not a mental construct? — tim wood

I believe the Pythagorean theorem to be a mental construct. But this does not mean that this mental construct (or model of reality) is not intended to represent something real and independent of human minds. The concept's usefulness is dependent on the accuracy of its representation.

Aristotle presents two premises by which Pythagorean idealism (and the idealism of some Platonists he says) is refuted. The first is that these ideas exist only potentially, prior to being actualized by the human mind. Despite the fact that the potential for an idea like the Pythagorean theorem exists prior to it being "discovered" (which Aristotle calls actualized) by the human mind, it is the human mind which gives the idea actual existence. The second premise is Aristotle's cosmological argument. This argument proves that it is impossible for potential to be eternal. Therefore it is impossible that ideas have eternal existence prior to being "discovered" by the human mind, as Pythagorean idealism, and Platonic realism claim.

It is this argument which separates modern Platonic realists from Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians. The Neo-Platonist and Christian theologians respected Aristotle's cosmological argument, and went on to posit separate "Forms". The "Forms" are distinct from human ideas, having actual existence independent from human minds; "form" being actual under Aristotle's principles. It is necessary to respect this separation between ideas and Forms, in order to understand human fallibility. Human ideas have problems because of imperfections in the human mind. Therefore the human ideas do not perfectly map reality as intended. Pythagoras himself was extremely bothered by the "irrational" ratio which relates two perpendicular sides of a square. The square root of two does not resolve and this indicates a fundamental deficiency in the Pythagorean theorem's representation of reality. There is a basic incommensurability between one dimension of space and another (also evident in the irrational nature of pi), which indicates that this way of conceiving "space" is somewhat faulty.

But we need a starting place. Let it be with your first premise and the words therein in question, "material" and "thing" and "material thing." These are all concepts based in practical knowledge. That is, descriptive in functional terms. As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things. And that just is that all of these terms are ideas! Now, is that your understanding of God, an understanding of God as God? That is, as a functionality that you attribute to a Him? In short, an idea? — tim wood

Before you can say what a "material thing" is, you need to apprehend the concept of "matter". "Matter", as derived from Aristotle's Physics, is completely theoretical, it is not a practical concept at all. What we observe is that things change as time passes. Logically, if something changes it is no longer the thing which it was; it requires a new description, having a distinct form. In pre-Socratic times, sophists could perform all sorts of magical tricks with this fact. Fundamentally, at every moment of passing time, the existing object ceases to exist, and is replaced with a new distinct object. What we observe however, is a temporal continuity of things staying the same, with only certain aspects changing.

So Aristotle posited the existence of "matter" to account for the continuity of existence, the things which stay the same as time passes. Now, the form of the object might be changing as time passes, but we can still say that it is "the same" object, based on the assumption that the object's matter is not changing. Aristotle has a division of reality into matter and form in order to account for the two aspects, what stays the same as time passes, and what changes as time passes. Form is what is active, actual, and changing, whereas "matter" is a theoretical principle, posited to account for the observed reality that some things do not change as time passes. In Newton's laws, "matter' is replaced by inertia, what he posits as a fundamental property of matter.

These considerations and more are reasons that some - many - most old ideas are suitable for museum cases only. Relegated to the mothballed fleet of curiosities that modernity has ruled will never again - if they ever did - stand in the line of battle where knowledge is won. On your understandings, you cannot even speak intelligibly on these matters. You reject the only possible grounds, yet claim grounds that cannot be. You wave some words around that you cannot use correctly, announce "proved," and think you've done something. — tim wood

Clearly it is you who has not said anything intelligible about what "material" refers to.

And indeed we must - agreed. But this not a warrant to make nonsense of science. And it is you who claim independent real immaterial existence. Throw out the understandings that condition our overall understanding of the world, and you can claim to walk through walls. You can claim anything you like, and adduce "arguments" that will prove every claim. But unless you meet the criteria of reason, they will all be unreasonable nonsense. — tim wood

What Aristotle's cosmological argument demonstrates (and this is fundamental to his Metaphysics) is that it is impossible for matter to exist without any form. This means that for any material existence, there is always, necessarily, a "what it is". To think otherwise is to think the unintelligible, and to allow yourself to be consumed by contradiction. However, he also explains in his Metaphysics, that the first question of being (ontology), is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, and not something else. And, it is also a case of thinking the unintelligible if we propose that there is no reason (as in cause) for an object being what it is instead of something else. These two principles together indicate that the form of an object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that object. This is why post-Aristotelian metaphysicians posited independent Forms. The Neo-Platonists have a procession, or emanation of Forms from the One, whereas the Christians have a hierarchy of angels from God.

Question: what is the standing or kind of your argument/conclusion? Is it a piece of physics? Religious apologetics? An exercise in drawing conclusions as a matter of logic? Maybe another way: if you had to give a billboard statement of it as if it were an ad for a motion picture, what would you say? — tim wood

It's a simple deductive argument, with two premises, the first an inductive conclusion drawn from observation (material things have a cause of existence), the second a logical statement concerning the nature of temporal order (there can be no material thing prior to the first material thing).

He calls them logical arguments. How about you, what do you call them? — tim wood

I agree that Aquinas' five ways are logical arguments.

If I may, the underlying argument looks like this:

1) There are things, i.e., material things.
2) These things are caused; i.e., have efficient causes.
3) If things are caused by things, then there cannot be a first thing as cause, because it itself would need a thing to cause it.
4) Therefore the first thing is caused by an immaterial cause, that we call God.

Please accept this formulation as an agreed starting point, or edit or provide your own for me to agree with. — tim wood

The thing I'd object to here, is 2). The cause of "a thing" is not necessarily an efficient cause, because an efficient cause is itself a thing, so an efficient cause cannot be the cause of the first thing. It is the understanding of this principle which makes the argument fit. The cause of a thing may be a final cause, and final cause, such as intention, can be understood as immaterial. This is why the human will is understood as "free", it is free from efficient causation. So in human acts of intention, we have an immaterial cause, (free will), working with immaterial objects (ideas), which causes things. This is how we can understand the reality of immaterial cause through the examples of intentional human acts.

Contrary to what you claim, the idea of an immaterial cause is highly intelligible. The problem is that the scourge of determinism has set into the minds of the many, punishing these minds by banishing them from associating with the free, immaterial world of the soul, to the point that only purge can rectify.

In passing, Aquinas acknowledged that God is unknowable, but that we can have indirect knowledge through "negative" theology - what I call above a neither/nor argument. — tim wood

As I said earlier, Aquinas clearly states that the existence of God and some things about him can be known by natural reason. it's in your quoted "Reply to Objection 1".

Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. — tim wood

See, "faith presupposes natural knowledge". So we first know the existence of God through natural reason, and by having this natural knowledge of God, we are then predisposed toward accepting on faith, other things, which other say about God. And so we have as "Reply to Objection 3", that from His effects, the existence of God can be clearly demonstrated, and known, though we cannot perfectly know God "as He is in His essence.

As apologetics, I have no issue with Aquinas. And as well for us who are not Thomas, it becomes an exercise in what we want to believe, the presuppositions that stand as axiomatic to those beliefs, and what emerges from that mix and for what purpose. Inevitably this involves some close and careful definitions, themselves to be demonstrated if they're not granted. All trending towards a medieval-style argument of granting major and minor premises, agreeing to forms, and so forth. — tim wood

I think there is a problem with classifying Aquinas as an apologetic, depending on how you understand "apologetics". Prior to him, Aristotelian principles were generally not accepted into Christian theology. Aquinas adapted Christian principles to accept his interpretation of Aristotelian principles, so he was more of a shaper, or creator of Christian principles than a defender of Christian principles.

Theology is always "an exercise in what we want to belief". It is accepted that we have free will, and can believe what we want. The question is whether we are ready to accept the truth. Many, as yourself it seems, are not ready to believe the truth, so you find excuses not to accept the very simple and straight forward arguments demonstrating the existence of God, casting them aside because they are not consistent with what you want to believe.

That, or we can jump right away to an evaluation of the argument in modern scientific terms. — tim wood

There's no point to evaluating the argument in "modern scientific terms", because it's not written in modern scientific terms. That would be like trying to play chess using the rules of checkers, it's fool's play. The terms are metaphysical, used in a metaphysical context, to be understood by metaphysicians. Either you have a desire to understand these terms, and understand the truth in these matters, or you do not. If you do not have such a desire, you can leave it well enough alone, and perhaps accept on faith the existence, or non-existence of God. But you are in no position to argue the non-existence of God without understanding the terms.

Why modern scientific terms and standards? Because ultimately that's what you're insisting on (as I understand the argument of you and others). That is, you insist on the efficacy of yours or Aquinas's arguments in absolute terms beyond their original scope. If you want to be medievalist in your thinking and exhibit examples of that thinking as examples of what you believe, have at it and I stand aside. But as in any sense scientific is simply an absurdity - and a curiosity. And it might be argued that one should just let it pass in silence, but we live in a world that for too long lets too much pass in silence that is harmful. As someone apparently versed in the details of these quaint pursuits, you ought to know better! Do not even think of asking what harm! — tim wood

I can't understand what is meant by this passage at all. it seems very confused. Are you suggesting that only scientific terms are meaningful? Science has no position on God, so clearly we must look beyond scientific terms for a philosophy of religion. Are you suggesting that medieval writings are not meaningful? The "original scope" of these referred writings is religion, and the existence of God, exactly the scope of this thread. Why would you think that referring to these articles, in a discussion about God is an attempt to take them beyond their original scope? In reality, God is beyond the scope of science, so it is you who has the desire to take something beyond its scope. You want to use science to judge metaphysics, when metaphysics is not a subject of science, and therefore cannot be subjected to science. I agree with you, that this is harmful.

On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as? — 180 Proof

We could start with the cosmological argument, but if you're really interested, you'll have to pick up some books and read the material yourself.

Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions. — 180 Proof

Actually, this claim is false, because the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God. Clearly "God" has an effect on us, so we cannot remove that concept from the category of efficacious, just like we cannot remove "quantum entanglement" from that category.

I'm referring to the alleged "completeness of scientific knowledge". By definition and practice the natural sciences are defeasible, approximative, & fallible. (e.g. Feyerabend, Haack) Conflating scientism with science is objectionable, whether or not it's an atheist conflating them; and MU's claim is certainly not representative of most scientifically literate positions. — 180 Proof

I was talking actually talking about some atheist who profess scientism. I wasn't referring to "most scientifically literate positions". Your claim of strawman is unfounded, because clearly there are many people who fit my description of the type of atheist I dislike. Please don't ask me to name names because I won't. But you, being offended by my claim without having been named, and seeing the need to defend those persons described, says something about you.

And to MU Metaphysician Undercover, please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to. I have said that for cause you would not. Show me at least in this mistaken (or point me back to where it is so that I may look at it). — tim wood

Where have you been tim? I presented the argument at least twice in the last few days, you first ignored it, and when I referred to it, you said you don't "buy it", and "it doesn't cut it for existential truth", without ever addressing the premises.

On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion. — Coben

This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded. But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God.


Please reconsider my point now. If we are to define "God" we must refer to those who have real use for the term. It's wrong to say, "this use makes no sense to me so let's make a different definition". That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do. Therefore, if theologians see a real need to conclude that there's an immaterial cause which they call "God", it's wrong to say that an immaterial thing with real causal existence makes no sense to me, so I'm going to steal there term "God" and make it refer to something else. That is not philosophy of religion.

In Banno's terms, if the theologians are playing "chess", then we can either learn the rules which they've laid down, and join in, or else we stay out of their game. But it's wrong to say I don't like this game called "chess" that they're playing, and I have no inclination to abide by the rules and play that game; but I'm going to make another kind of similar game, one which better suits my inclinations, and I'm going to call this game "chess", just to spite the others.

The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely. — Coben

I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. They tend to believe that there are physiological conditions which correlate to the psychological problem, but the correlated physiological are not necessarily identifiable. This may be a type of compromise, but it's most likely just a justification for treating the psychological problem with medication. If it's a real physiological, medical problem, then the use of medication to treat it is justified.

IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God. — Coben

I think what I meant is that the closed minded agnostic believes that we can never know whether there is or isn't God, so we ought not even talk about this, or try to determine the answer to this question. In other words, if we cannot know whether there is a God, what's the point in saying anything about God? This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism.

Just this you have not done. And I am pretty sure that you never will, here or anywhere else. Because (as I'm sure you know better than I) the argument, notwithstanding validity or internally consistency, simply doesn't cut it for existential truth as that is understood to be. — tim wood

Adding fancy words like "existential truth" to your claim that the argument does not "cut it", does not refute the argument. You need to show how the argument is existentially false. That you happen to be of the opinion that non-material things are not real doesn't cut it as a criticism, because the premises do not refer to any non-material things. The real existence of a non-material thing is necessitated as a conclusion.

It is akin, then, to an argument as to whether superman could beat aquaman under water. Maybe great fun, or even at one time considered substantive and therefore serious. But not today. As substantive, it's from the chest of toys in the attic and nothing for a grown man to waste time on beyond an appropriately few moments of remembered pleasure. — tim wood

In other words, it's extremely obvious that the argument is very sound, so there's no point wasting time trying to refute it.

Why claim reality? — tim wood

Quite clearly, that's because the logic is beyond reproach.

And neither you nor others seem to grasp that what you have as idea is endless possibility. — tim wood

Actually, the fact that "endless possibility" is truly impossible, is the key premise to Aristotle's cosmological argument. This is the principle which the Neo-Platonists use to prove that God is necessary. Endless possibility, if it were reality, would exclude any actuality. Therefore if this were something real, there would be nothing actually existing.

Make your case, then make it real. That would convert me. — tim wood

You've yet to address the argument. Which premise lacks existential truth, relative to your presuppositions? Is it that material things are contingent? Or is it that there's a first material thing?

WE ought take care about what exactly our topic is. Yes, people may be uncertain about what it is that is being said. That is a distinct point.

Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess. — Banno

Right, we were not talking about chess. You said there is certainty in language, and you tried to justify this by referring to the game of chess. Stay on topic. When we use language we are rarely playing chess, so this is irrelevant.

Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting. — Banno

Excellent, I can almost agree with you here. However, there are many instances where you can be intelligible and interesting without being clear about what it is you are doing. Ever read mysteries, for example? Interest is created by the suspense cause by not being clear about what is going on. Then there is poetry, where intentional ambiguity seems to rule the day. The poetry is still intelligible, and interesting, without being clear.

Furthermore, there's a very curious aspect of ambiguity which allows the author to create a huge audience. If I say something extremely ambiguous, it could be meaningful to you, and meaningful to various other different people, each having different reason for the meaningfulness, seeing different meaning in it. The simple, ambiguous phrase may be meaningful and interesting to all sorts of people from all different walks of life, while the precise expression of a clear thought will only be interesting to a few.

There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading. — Banno

The theologian doesn't play by the rules, you ought to have picked up on this by now. Rules are man made, and the theologian turns to God, who lets us know that we have free will. I think that was Moses' downfall, he wrote rules and pretended that they came from God. Jesus tried to rectify this by rebelling against the supposed rules of God.

Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) — tim wood

This is where we disagree. As the argument I presented shows, there is necessarily a non-material cause which is prior to material things. This cannot be a human idea because the existence of human ideas is limited to after the existence of human beings.

So it is very clear that your definitions which assert that only material things are real, and that immaterial things are dependent on the human mind are unsound, incoherent in relation to other known principles, and need to be replaced with definitions which are closer to the truth.

don't buy this argument. But I note that in it you make the material/immaterial distinction. If you then deny that God is an idea, your work is cut out for you. — tim wood

The argument I presented is quite clear, expressed in very simple terms, and easily understood. "I don't buy this argument" does not demonstrate any weaknesses of the argument. However, the argument demonstrates weakness in your definitions. Therefore, without further ado, your definitions are rejected.

No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it. — Coben

But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it? Did you not look in books, or online to confirm that what you thought were pumas, actually were? I assume you were not a specialist on the physical characteristics of pumas prior to seeing them. It's only this activity of confirmation, which is inspired by doubt, which leads you to the position of having "no good reason to doubt". So the situation is not "at some point I would" doubt it, it's 'at some point I did'.

When the judgement is made, doubt is removed, and then a reason is required to revisit the issue with fresh doubt. These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before.

But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible. — Coben

At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt".

agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case. — Coben

Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved.

I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.

I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all. — Coben

OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved.

I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put. — Banno

This is where the majority of our difference lies. I think there is no certainty in language use. Look at the way you use "justify" compared to me. Look at this thread, and the different ideas of what
"God" means to different people.

You might claim that there is certainty "in the use to which the language is being put", meaning that you are certain of what you are saying, and certain of the effect you desire to get from that use of words, but this does not mean that you are certain that you will get the desired effect when you use words. If you are, then this is a false sense of certitude, because there is always the possibility that the other person will misunderstand and you will not get the desired effect. That is why we must choose our words carefully. This is the case with all things that we do, as human beings, there is always the possibility of failure in any endeavour. So we cannot take success for granted and we must proceed with care and caution, always aware of that possibility of failure, lest it be actualized due to carelessness. That false sense of certitude actually causes carelessness and therefore failure.

So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less. — Banno

Oh no, this is completely false. The bishop doesn't do a thing. The player moves the bishop, and does so by choice. If a player decides to make a move which the other player thinks is contrary to the rules, they might consult the rules to decide who is right. The rules are there to resolve such doubt. It is not the case that moving the bishop in a row is beyond doubt, because one who has never played the game, and does not know the rules, will have doubt as to how to move the bishop. However, it is the case that doubt as to how to move the bishop is quelled by wanting to play the game, and understanding the rules. Then the player chooses to move the bishop in the correct way.

You must see that it's pure nonsense to say of the bishop moving diagonally, "that's what it does; no more, no less", when in reality this is what the player chooses to do with the bishop. What about the end of the game, when the bishop moves back into the box, isn't this a little more? And when a player gets frustrated and throws the board, the bishop will fly threw the air, and "that's what it does", but it can do a lot more and it can also do a lot less.

One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se. — Banno

Sure, but in the case of language use there is no rule which says that we must play this language game, and not some other language game. So you might be playing chess, while I'm playing checkers and tim wood is playing backgammon while wayfarer is playing Ouija, etc.. There's a lot more than four games to play with language so how do you propose to determine what game it is that another person is playing?

So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess. — Banno

If this is your mental exercise, then don't you see that the theist is not playing chess at all? You are saying that you'd have to change the rules of your game (chess) to produce a coherent theism, without recognizing that the theist is actually playing a completely different game. Are you ready to play another game, or is chess all you are interested in?

If by "immaterial cause" you mean, "I - we - don't know," and further that "God" is just a shorthand expression for the "I-don't-know", and, the "I-don't-know" itself is meant to imply that we think that there is something to be known, then no further comment from me. — tim wood

The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial.

I find I'm obliged to suppose that those heavy thinkers understood this entirely well but felt for reasons sufficient to them that the idea of God had to be made both real and flesh for most people to find it both acceptable and accessible, as well as to make fate a little easier to reconcile to. . — tim wood

You've just gone off on a tangent without paying attention to a word I've said. First, instead of addressing the logical argument which proves why God is necessarily real, you replace the conclusion with "I don't know". Then, in your ignorance of that argument which demonstrates why God is real, (ignorance professed by "I don't know"), you go off to say that the thinkers "felt" that they had to make the idea of God real. Can't you see that it's not a case of having "felt" this or that sensation, or whatever type of feeling, it's a case of understanding the nature of reality, and therefore knowing that God is real?

Do you see the word "unless"? Suppose an object is assumed to be at absolute rest. All other objects would be in motion relative to this object "unless there is something else which was at absolute rest". To have an object which is not moving relative to the object which is at absolute rest requires that this object is also at absolute rest.

Therefore the fact that all objects are moving relative to another object does not negate the possibility that this other object is at absolute rest.

I don't see this as different from what I have suggested. — Banno

So I'll explain to you the difference.

You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them. This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts."

On the other hand, I say that these are things which we simply choose not to doubt. This does not assign to them any sort of certainty or indubitableness, nor does it categorize them as somehow outside the theatre of justification, or inherently beyond doubt. In fact, the majority of these things which we choose not to doubt, have actually been doubted, and justified many years ago. Then they appear to us as "common knowledge" past down from generation to generation by parents, teachers, and other authority figures. As common knowledge they might appear to be beyond doubt when they really are not.

The point being that I believe it is a mistake to categorize these things as "beyond doubt". When human knowledge (as a whole) grows and evolves, the principles which were once used to justify these things which we accept from the authorities, without doubting them, may become outdated and inconsistent with modern principles. This means that within human knowledge s a whole, there are inconsistencies. Over time, as the inconsistencies within our knowledge continue to glare at us with an increasingly blinding light, it becomes more and more irrational not to doubt these things which might appear to be "beyond doubt". The irrationality is compounded by philosophers who insist that such things actually are beyond doubt.

So we can place "God" in this category of foundational things, as you suggest, and I agree with you on that point. But I believe it is a mistake to portray these foundational things as beyond doubt. We must categorize them in the exact opposite way, as extremely dubious because they are ancient conclusions. We must therefore doubt them all, revisit the principles whereby they were originally justified, and establish consistency with the principles believed today. To have a human "body of knowledge" which contains inconsistencies is incoherent and contradictory. Such inconsistencies exist as a result of us choosing not to doubt fundamental principles.


You'll see that I prefer to categorize these things which Banno says are "beyond doubt" as things which we choose not to doubt. This places "doubting" as the natural human condition. We do not choose to doubt, it comes naturally when the conditions which produce certainty are not created, and we choose not to doubt with a judgement of certainty. We must choose not to doubt, suppress the urge to doubt, in order to accept and believe things without first doubting them.

This is consistent with Socrates' portrayal of the root of philosophy being "wonder". The philosopher has a desire to know, and this presents itself in its primitive form as wonder. Doubt is a type of wonder. It is only by doubting things, seeking justification for things, that we produce higher levels of certainty. Therefore I would replace Aristotle's classification, 'man is a rational being' with 'human beings are philosophical beings'. This emphasizes the role of wonder, doubt, and uncertainty, in relation to the desire, want, and lack of certainty.

So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. Most likely you have already doubted, which would be your natural inclination, so you researched material to verify what you actually saw. Now your judgement is beyond doubt to you. Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt.

To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. A debate is based in doubt, it is not based on the two opposing sides both being certain. So abstaining from, and ignoring the debate, is contrary to the natural desire for certainty, which manifests as doubt.

And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation.

But it's material existence we're stuck on, and you don't seem to get that the claim of material existence must be heretical and destructive of the essential nature of the God you appear to want. — tim wood

Why are you stuck on material existence? No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. But this does not mean that Christians believe that God's existence depends on the human mind, like other immaterial things seem to. On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.

I don't insist on dictionary meanings, though they're a good place to start. Do you care to expand on these, or do you accept them as is. — tim wood

Sure, I'll accept those definitions of "faith". Now did you read what I said Aquinas stated very succinctly, that the existence of God, and some things about God are not articles of faith, because they are known by natural reason. But they may be accepted on faith by those who do not understand the reasoning.

This is barely worth comment. I note the "can." The sense of it is that sometimes we may know the cause via effects and thinking, not that we will (nor how we might know that we do, or don't). And to be sure, he was all about plugging in just what he needed.

Again, this is all reasonable if you grant the founding argument of the existence of God. Without that, not-so-reasonable. — tim wood

The founding premise is that each and every material object has a cause of its existence. Notice that there is no presupposition of "God" here. But when we notice that the first material object must necessarily have a cause which is immaterial, we give that immaterial cause a name, "God".

Of course, if you do not understand the argument, you might accept "God" on faith, as Aquinas said, but I see no reason to reject the argument. And I've seen many who have attempted to give reason to reject the argument, but all those attempts have proven to be unreasonable. So in reality it appears to be unreasonable not to accept the founding argument for the existence of God.

IS this what you have in mind? — Banno

Yes, you might be lying. You purchased vanilla. You claimed to be able to justify your purchase with "I like vanilla". This assertion does not justify your purchase because I am not convinced that you actually do like vanilla, and I think you were buying the vanilla milkshakes for someone else. Either justify your claim or I'll continue to believe that you were buying the milkshakes for someone else.

The point being that any claim which is purported to be "beyond doubt", must be substantiated, in order to actually be beyond doubt. And to substantiate a claim is to justify it. So your claim "I like vanilla" can only act to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes if it has itself been substantiated, or justified.

The regress in justification does not end in the way that you think it does. It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. So if I trusted you for example, when you said "I like vanilla", that might put an end to the need for justification. In general, we commonly appeal to authority to put an end to the regress in justification, citing a scientific principle, or some such thing, which will not be doubted by people who trust science.

Well, yes they do. I gave you an example of one. There are plenty of others. — Banno

Your example, "I like vanilla" is not beyond doubt. Perhaps it's beyond doubt to you, but it's not beyond doubt to me. So when you use that in your attempt to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes, it may be questioned by me, doubted. Therefore you have not provided an acceptable example.

By Christians not claiming God as independently existing, I mean that the founders of Christianity, and the thinkers on it, have (near as i can tell) believed and never questioned, and, never questioning, never bothered to spread their claim to nature or natural science. In short, God is simply a presupposition of their thinking. — tim wood

This is the way you look at Christian theological thinking, as presuppositions, but it is not the way that the founders of Christianity looked at God. If you read some of the material you'll see that it's mostly all questions, with some proposed answers. St. Augustine for instance questions everything from the earth to the heavens, and especially the presupposition that God is omniscient, in relation to Augustine's own experience of "free will". Take a look at the table of contents of St Thomas' Summa Theologica for example, the entire book is a series of questions, discussion of the questions, objections, and replies. Your claim that these thinkers presupposed God, and never questioned the presuppositions, is the exact opposite of the truth. That is exactly what they did, question the presuppositions. And that is why St Thomas rejected St Anselm's ontological proof as unsound.

OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about. — Wayfarer

This is the key point which tim wood doesn't get. Certain individuals will make a serious quest toward whether there really is a God. These individuals will question (doubt) all the fundamental presuppositions, which Banno is claiming are beyond doubt, in regard to the reliability and truth of such presuppositions, which others insist are beyond doubt. Some of these thinkers, like St Thomas for example, became the most profound theologians for that very reason, that they got beyond the prior presuppositions, to establish new principles of a deeper an higher understanding.

Tim wood portrays the theologian as believing in God only because God is a presupposition. It is implied that if one doubts or questions God that person looses the presupposition and will necessarily become atheist by the very fact that the presupposition of God is cast aside. So tim does not accept the profound reality which you and I have experienced first hand, that if one makes a serious quest, the reality of God becomes evident. And, it does not require the presupposition that God is real, as tim believes, it just requires a human being with an inquisitive (doubtful) nature. Some of these human beings who seriously doubt the existence of God end up as the most profound theologians.

That's why I said, "I think...". From your survey of the posts, what did you come up with? — tim wood

You seem to have missed my post, way back earlier in the thread. I said that to think that there is such a thing as "the definition" would be a mistaken thought. So you will not get my consent on any proposed definition. And, it is evident in this thread that my position is correct, because there has been no consensus.

And I think you ned to renew your credential either/both as a Christian or someone who claims to know what Christianity is. The fundamental tenet is belief. — tim wood

I've read a considerable amount of Christian theology and never have I seen it stated "the fundamental tenet is belief". You really are just making this stuff up. Faith is very important, but faith, as that which supports or propagates belief, is not the same thing as belief. And faith itself is propagated, cultured, not indoctrinated, so faith is not even the type of thing which could be a tenet. That's a category mistake. This category mistake is very similar to the reason why Aquinas rejected Anselm's ontological argument. We cannot make God real simply by believing or having faith that God is real, we must actually understand that God is real. So Aquinas points to the human disposition which is required in order for a human being to understand that God is real.

Aquinas succinctly states that the existence of God, and other things which can be known about God by natural reason, are not articles of faith. However, to those who cannot understand the reasoning by which the existence of God is known, this can be accepted by faith.

Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach? — Wayfarer

As stated above, Aquinas assures us that the existence of God, as well as some things about God, can be known by natural reason. He explains this by describing how we can know a cause through its effect by reason. We can observe the effect, create principles based on that observance, and deduce that there was a cause, and some things about the cause.

What appears to be missing for your quoted passages is the Aristotelian distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge, made in his Nichomachean Ethics. In modern epistemology it is know-how and know-that. In post-Socratic times, the distinction between logos and mythos was mostly supplanted by the Aristotelian system.

It appears like this came about because Socrates was highly critical of ambiguity in the use of "techne". Through rhetoric and sophistry logos and mythos got all mixed together, conflated such that the combined two became techne or episteme, and there were no hard principles to separate knowldege which was based in theory from knowledge which was based in practise. And theory is not necessarily supported by sound premises. A significant portion of Aristotle's work is actually aimed toward sorting this out, starting with his fundamental logical Categories, and the designation of "substance" as what grounds logic (theory).

Did I miss a post? — tim wood

Yes, quite a few it appears. You seem to have a selective form of "consensus".

But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence. — tim wood

Are you serious? I think it is quite clear in Christian religions that human beings are dependent on God as creator, and God is not dependent on human beings for His existence. Therefore God has real independent existence for Christian based thinkers.

Try this, "God is...". Complete the sentence. — tim wood

God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that.

Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?" — Banno

Your claim was that there are unjustifiable things which could be used to justify other things.. These unjustifiable things are beyond doubt, because they are foundational, and to doubt them would undermine one's own capacity to doubt. You suggested that god might be like this.

The problem is that such foundational things which are proposed as being beyond doubt do not exist. There are no such things. If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt. That's why we can doubt god (for example). If they cannot be doubted, they are neither correct nor incorrect, as janus pointed out. But they are not foundational.

Regardless of whether "I like vanilla" justifies your purchase, it is not itself unjustifiable, and not beyond doubt. So the example does not suffice and is a digression.