So, the material identity of anything consists in its unique existence; in its being a unique entity... — John

Yes, but the considerable point is that this "unique existence" involves a temporal extension. So the principle which allows us to say that the thing here now, is the same thing as the thing which was here yesterday, or over there yesterday, is the assumption of a temporal continuity. Therefore the existence of the thing, as a thing, a self, is completely dependent on this continuity, which is assumed, with good reason I might add. If there was a moment of time, in that period of time, in which the thing's existence could not be confirmed, the continuity would be broken, and the assumption that it is the same thing would not be justified.

Nothing is "identical itself" not because the logic is incoherent (i.e. "identical to itself" means nothing or is a contradiction), but rather because "identical to itself" doesn't escape posting a relation. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The relation here is a temporal one. The thing is related to itself at a before or after moment in time, and this produces the temporal continuity of existence of a thing. The point though, is that the thing is not identified as being the same as itself, through some formal principle, such that it would have the same description from one moment to the next, because the thing is naturally changing in time. So it is identified as being the same as itself through some principle of temporal continuity, not through some formal principles describing what it is and is not.

This is made clearer in Wittgenstein's elaborations in the Investigations: "'A thing is identical with itself" - there is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. — StreetlightX

As I indicated in the other thread, there are two distinct forms of identity. Wittgenstein (intentionally I believe) creates ambiguity with his use of "identity" and "same", inviting the reader to make an equivocal interpretation.

The reason for Aristotle's principle of identity, that a thing is identical to itself, is to place the identity of the thing within the thing itself, rather than the identity which is given to it by human beings who say what the thing is. This move allows for the mistaken identity which arises from human mistakes. Without allowing that there is an identity within the thing itself, independent of what human beings might say about that thing, then there is no possibility that when all living human beings agree, that such is what X is, this could be wrong. So for instance, if in Aristotle's time, human beings agreed that the sun is a body which circles around the earth, this is the identity which the sun has. Without allowing that there is an identity within the thing itself, independent from how it is identified by humans, how could this be wrong?

In any discussion of identity, it should be noted that there are two very distinct types of identity, sometimes referred to as qualitative and numerical identity. I do not believe that these terms actually do justice to the real nature of the difference, as the two types of identity may be understood as completely incompatible.

The type of identity commonly referred to in logic, is what I would call formal identity. A thing is identified by a form, or formula, such that its identity is based in "what" it is, according to the logical formula. It is impossible that the thing referred to by the word or symbol is anything contrary to what is described by the formula, or else it would not be the thing described. The other type of identity, I would call material identity. This is what Aristotle referred to when he said that a thing is the same as itself. Here, a thing is identified not by a form or formula of what it is, but by itself. The identity of the thing is not to be found in a description or formula, of what the thing is, but within the thing itself. This principle allows that a changing thing continues to be the same thing, through the course of time, despite having a changing form. For instance, I am the same person today, as I was as a child, and my car is the same car after the accident as it was before the accident, despite the fact that a new formula is required to describe what the thing is, with each such change..

The point here, is that what I've called "material identity" is based in an assumed temporal continuity. It is this assumed temporal continuity of matter which allows us to say that the object is the same object from one moment to the next, despite the changes which are going on with that thing. With reference to the op then, the digital perspective describes the world, and identity of things, by referring to formal identity, and this may be a sequence of states through time. Each state is logically different from the preceding state. However, we assume a continuity between states, such that something connects them, a temporal order, and this allows us to say that we are observing a thing which is changing, rather than a succession of different individual things. This assumed continuity is the analogue perspective.

What Aristotle demonstrated is that the two forms of identity are actually incompatible, formal identity involves itself with being and not being, what is and is not, while material identity is involved with becoming, what lies between when a thing is of one description, and when it is not of that desciption. He showed how becoming, and therefore the associated material identity, cannot be described in terms of is and is not. Leibniz, attempted to establish compatibility between the two with his identity of indiscernibles. If the formula of what the thing is, could capture everything about the thing, even its spatial-temporal positionings, the material identity could be captured by the formal identity. This would require that the formal identity of the thing would describe its form, or what it is, at every moment of time, and this would allow for temporal extension and the associated changes. But Hegel had already laid the groundwork for dialectical materialism with his dialectics of being, which allows that the formal categories of being and not being are subsumed within the material identity of becoming. This assigns reality to the continuous, analogue identity of becoming, leaving reality, as becoming, exempt from the formal laws of logic. Furthermore, Einstein's special theory of relativity renders it impossible to produce a description or formula of what is, at any moment in time, because this concept, a moment in time, is itself incoherent.

In conclusion, there are two distinct forms of identity, the formal, or logical, which lends itself to a digital, discrete world, and the material identity of becoming, which allows for the continuity of an analogue world. The two are incompatible, but a complete understanding of reality requires that one provide a position for both within the world..

Who knows, maybe the Y2K fear partly drove the economic boom of the nineties. — andrewk

Oh that's for sure - but there was a big crash afterwards. The bubble effect.

By existential tangibility I mean something that remains true even through an external disembodied perspective. I.e., ''matter exists'' is found to be true even if we imagine leaving our human perspective of these senses we have no choice but to be familiar with and imagine looking at the world like an invisible spectator. — Albert Keirkenhaur

The problem here is that without the human perspective, there is no one to interpret the meaning of these words, "matter exists". So it's really pointless to discuss whether theses words could be true from a different perspective, because how would you determine what the words would mean from that perspective?

...once it is done you are constrained by the fact that you have done that thing and no other.. — John

That's the point then, once it's done, the act has been externalized, and you're constrained by that external fact, prior to this you are not constrained by the internal possibility. You can decide to do something, then change your mind and decide not to, as long as the act has not been externalized, you are not constrained.

Now we are faced with this fundamental principle, that the internal is prior, and the external is posterior, that is, unless you still deny such a distinction. But I suggest that it is a very important distinction in relation to the passing of time. This principle conflicts with emergentist claims that inner possibilities are derived from external constraints. That is impossible, because for each external constraint which exists, the internal possibility for that constraint is necessarily prior to it. Therefore, if we want to seek a constraint which is prior to possibility, which limits possibility such that possibility is not infinite, we need to look for a constraint which is inherent within the internal possibilities. Such a constraint, actuality, or form, is radically different from the external forms or constraints which we know, being inherent within, and prior to possibility itself.

I tend to be a monist though, and to think that ultimately the 'internal' and the 'external' are not two separate realms at all. The distinction between the internal and external environments is a useful one to be sure; but I think it has no ultimate ontological force. — John

This is why you've been denying the distinction I've been trying to make then. Tell me, do you believe that there is a difference between casting your gaze outward, toward a bigger and bigger space, and looking inward toward a smaller and smaller space? If you believe that there is a real difference between these two directions, how can you say that the internal/external distinction has no ontological value?

And I disagree that external constraints, unlike internal constraints, limit our freedom but do not at the same time enable it. If there were no external constraints then there could be no freedom; one could not do anything of any significance because anything we did would be of equal value, that is of nil value, to everything else we might do. — John

That's only true under your assumed principle that there is no ontological difference between internal and external. The fact though, is that we assign values to potential acts, therefore activities have values assigned to them prior to even existing in the external world. So even if there were no activities in the physical world, this would not deny the existence of values, which are assigned to potential activities. This is what the concept of energy, the capacity to do work, signifies, a value is assigned based on what can be done, potential activities. Lack of external constraint would not leave freedom without value, it would allow unlimited possibility, and this is extremely valuable.

You think consciousness is amazing, but I think Life is also amazing, and we know that Life is a physical process. It is a physical process we are beginning to understand rather well, but if you look at the physical theory that explains it, there is no mention of "say, a force particle/wave or a matter particle". — tom

I see you haven't read that little bit which Wayfarer recently referred. If so, perhaps you wouldn't be so sure that we're starting to have a good understanding of life. In the study of biology, each significant advancement has proven to expose us to a vast new realm of unknowns.

And I guess I need to remind you, there is no adequate "physical theory" which explains life, that's why people turn to abiogenesis, as a default hypothesis.

You really need to read more carefully; you're "pointing" me to a "mistake" I didn't make at all, based on something you apparently think I said, that I didn't say at all. I was merely drawing an analogy between the two kinds of constraint. — John

Perhaps, based merely on the quoted passage, but then you went on to criticise the basis of my categorical distinction. What you wrote was not an analogy, but a criticism of the distinction itself. To attack the principle by which a distinction is made, is not to make an analogy, but to question the validity of the distinction itself. This is what you wrote:

Why should it be necessary that the self wills these logical constraint conditions into existence any more than it would be necessary that the self wills gravity and the nature of the physical world into existence? Why would you think the latter isn't as much a curtailment of free will as the former? — John

Since the distinction I was making, was that logical constraints are the same type of constraint as moral principles, ethics, and legal systems, and these are artificial (willed into existence), while gravity and other constraints of the physical world are natural, it was evident that you had not grasped the point.

Do you recognize the difference between artificial things and natural things, the former being dependent on the human will for existence, the latter not? If you recognize that some things are created by the human mind, and some things are not, why would you ask me such a question as in the quoted passage? Clearly, it is necessary to assume that certain forms (constraints) are willed into existence, to account for the existence of artificial things. Do you not agree, that the constraints of logical systems, along with the rules of language, political and legal systems, as well as moral and ethical principles, all belong in this category, as artificial, constraints which have been willed into existence?

And of course, we shouldn't forget that the United States has always been a close ally with Israel. So the following statement is really nonsense:

This situation or present state of affairs all stem from the singular event of 9/11. — Question

Arguably, and demonstratively so, the war on terror has made the world a more dangerous place and has incited pronounced hostility of Arab nations towards the U.S since 9/11. — Question

Hostility of Arab nations toward the U.S. did not begin in 2001. Were you alive in the late seventies during the Iranian revolution, and the hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of demonstrators shouting death to America?

Asked why X occurred, we deduce X from a ascending chain of more and more general laws, but crucially from the just-because postulation at the top. — Hoo

This is the nature of conceptualization, the more specific is explained by reference to the more general. I do not believe that this leads to an infinite regress though, nor does it lead to a "just-because". It leads further into generalization until the meaning is lost in an extremely vague generality. So for example, we explain what it means to be a human being by referring to mammal, then mammal, we explain by referring to animal, and animal by referring to living, and living by existing, such that we approach a conceptual vagueness which escapes true understanding.

What this indicates is that a conceptual structure cannot be grounded in itself. Knowledge cannot consist of coherency alone, because justification will always lead to this conceptual vagueness. That is why we must include correspondence as an essential part of knowledge. We often must refer to sense experience, and principles derived from inductive reasoning, rather than having all knowledge produced by that ascending chain of more and more general laws.

If you've convinced yourself of that, I won't bother to argue the point anymore. But now all you've done is defined logic as any type of association. But clearly we distinguish between logical and illogical associations. So you've just gone around in circle, of contradiction, and unreasonable definition, trying to support an untenable position.

So, as I said, the self is free to think whatever it likes within the constraints of logic, and those very same logics constrain every self, just as the self is free to do whatever it wants within the constraints of gravity and the nature of the physical environment. — John

See, this is the mistake I pointed you toward. You want to reduce the constraints of logic, to nothing other than a constraint of the physical environment. But this is completely wrong, the constraints of logic are self-imposed, they are necessary for a purpose, to understand. The constraints of the physical environment are not self-imposed, and they present us with a completely different type of necessity.

Why should it be necessary that the self wills these logical constraint conditions into existence any more than it would be necessary that the self wills gravity and the nature of the physical world into existence? — John

There is a particular type of necessity which exists within the physical wold, it is described by the laws of physics, and such principles. In order to understand the physical world, the thinking being must will into existence rules of thought, laws of logical necessity, which are consistent with the necessity which exists in the physical world around it.

If you consider a variation of Willow's proposition of contingency, the world does not have to be the way it is, it could have been existing in many different ways, with many different possible laws of nature. The living being, when life came into existence in this world, must have been capable of adapting to any possible world which it might be born into. Therefore its mode of thinking cannot have been fixed by any specific form of logic, it must be free to produce logic according to the necessities (laws of nature) of the physical world it has been born into.

Truth is, the very idea of freedom loses all its sense if you think it (or more accurately if you try to think it: because you can't really think it) in a context of no constraint at all. — John

Yes, I believe that this is a valid point. But the point I am making is that there is a real need to differentiate between the constraints which are imposed on the living being from its environment, and the constraints which are inherent within that living being. These two types of constraint cannot be reduced to one category of similar type constraints. The reason that they are completely distinct is that the external constraints act to limit our freedoms, while the internal constraints are what allow us to maximize our freedom, in relation to the restrictions of the external constraints. Therefore they are completely opposed, and cannot be reduced to two of the same kind. The external constraints limit our freedom, while the internal constraints maximize our freedom.

So, what are you saying, that there is potentially an infinite number of different ways to truly describe any particular situation?

The reason I claimed it would have been much easier for there to have been nothing, is because the very thing you need for any existence of any kind is space. — Albert Keirkenhaur

The big bang theory is a consequence of space-time conception. If you separate space from time in this way, the big bang no longer makes sense.

Have a browse of the essays of Steve Talbott at the New Atlantis. He's not an advocate of semiotics as such, rather a kind of independent philosopher of biology, more aligned with Owen Barfield (although there is some commonality). Have a look in particular at Logic, DNA and Poetry, which touches on some of the themes suggested by the above quote. (He's a friendly guy, too, I wrote to him a few times and he was very responsive.) — Wayfarer

Here's a passage from that article on "Logic, DNA and Poetry".

The problem is that their insistence upon textual mechanisms blinds them even to the most obvious aspects of language — aspects that prove crucial for understanding the organism. If I am speaking to you in a logically or grammatically proper fashion, then you can safely predict that my next sentence will respect the rules of logic and grammar. But this does not even come close to telling you what I will say. Really, it’s not a hard truth to see: neither grammatical nor logical rules determine the speech in which they are found. Rather, they only tell us something about how we speak, not what we say or who we are as speaking beings.

If geneticists would reckon fully with this one central truth, it would transform their discipline. They would no longer imagine they could read the significance of the genetic text merely by laying bare the rules of a molecular syntax. And they would quickly realize other characteristics of the textual language they incessantly appeal to — for example, that meaning flows from the larger context into the specific words, altering the significance of the words. This is something you experience every time you find yourself able, while hearing a sentence, to select between words that sound alike but have different meanings. The context tells you which one makes sense.

Although the focus is on "context", notice the last line, "...to select between words..": Poetry is a meaningful use of words, which, through careful word selection, provides a degree of ambiguity. The ambiguity allows freedom of interpretation. The freedom of interpretation allows the poetry to be relevant, meaningful, to the masses of people, despite the fact that I derive a different meaning than you do, from it. This is why we can discuss endlessly the meaning, or content of such art.

But the freedom has two sides, not only is there freedom to interpretation, but there is also freedom in composition. Freedom in composition is of the essence, because it is this freedom which allows for freedom of interpretation.

↪Metaphysician Undercover Image recognition software doesn't possess qualia either. — tom

Why not, if you define "qualia" as "what it's like"? Clearly, the computer, with the software must recognize what the image is like, to make the determination. But if you define "qualia" as "what 'it's like as experienced by a human subject", then obviously not.

My question would be, how do we produce a definition of "qualia" which excludes my experience of what it's like from being the same as your experience of what it's like.

I'm not going to waste any more time replying to false accusations of contradiction. Put your magnifying glasses on and read it again properly this time. :-} — John

Ok, you refuse to acknowledge your contradictions. Let me explain this issue. It's quite straight forward, but metaphysically important. Your claim that logic constrains thinking cannot be upheld, because logic is a specialized way of thinking which is created by thinking itself. Therefore thinking is necessarily prior to logic, and not constrained by it. That thinking is constrained by logic is an illusion. Dispelling this illusion will open your mind to a vast component of reality, which this illusion has laid inaccessible to you, like Plato's cave people.

The freedom in thinking is described by the concept of free will, and it is an important aspect of reality which should be understood by anyone doing metaphysics. Just like moral principles, and the laws of the land, we are not constrained by the laws of logic, we willfully consent to them. This consent is described by the concept of free will.

When you assume, premise, that thinking is naturally constrained by logic, that it is inherently constrained in such a way, you remove the necessity for this free act of will. So you produce a metaphysics which represents thinking as just naturally constrained, without any reference to this act of will, which is an essential component of any such constraint system. That's the essential component which you and apokrisis are leaving out from your metaphysics. You fail to recognize, that such constraint systems must necessarily be willed into being. Because of this, such metaphysics avoids the very important issue of approaching the thing which does the willing.

This thing which does the willing is excluded from your reality, it is not real, and therefore not approached. That is why recognizing the true relationship between thinking and logic, is important. Once willing is understood as an essential aspect of such a constraint system, then this principle must be extended to all semiotic constraint systems. There is a very clear need to assume a thing which wills such a constraint system into existence.

But if I merely present a number of thoughts with nothing at all to connect them, then that would not really be thinking; it would just be presenting or laying out a set of random thoughts. It cannot be a process if it is just a series of disconnected thought events; so I say it cannot be counted as 'thinking'. — John

See, here you approach the same contradiction. How can you set out a set of random thoughts without thinking? Any act of setting out thoughts is necessarily thinking. How could you set out thoughts without thinking? Where would these thoughts come from? A serious of disconnected thought events is necessarily an act of thinking because thoughts cannot be produced from anything else but thinking. You want to deny that this is thinking, but then the thoughts have no source, they come from nothing, or some random act which is not an act of thinking. But how could thoughts spring from some random act which is not an act of thinking? That's illogical, contradictory, to say that thoughts are produced from something other than an act of thinking.

What we can think is obviously both augmented and constrained by language, for a start. (Note: just to anticipate a possible misinterpretation I think you are likely to commit, I am not saying thought is impossible without language; it might be reasonable to claim that, but that would be a stronger claim than my argument relies on, so I don't need to make it here). — John

Now you contradict yourself again, here. You say that what we can think is constrained by language, then in brackets you say that it is not really constrained by language, thought extends beyond the constraints of language. Which do you believe is the case? Is thought constrained by language, or does it extend beyond the confines of language? If thought extends beyond the constraints of language, as you say in brackets, then your original claim, that what we can think is constrained by language, is clearly false.

Why keep contradicting yourself, in an effort to support an untenable position?

Any sot of recognition indicates the existence of what you call "what it's like" knowledge, "qualia". That's what recognition is based in, knowing what it is like, in order to recognize similar occurrences. My dog recognizes me, so clearly my dog has this type of knowledge.

A tool is a effective cause. A logical constraint is a formal cause. So you are confusing your Aristotelean categories here. — apokrisis

As a cause of change in the wold. logic is a formal cause. But as we know, there are causes of causes, and thinking is the cause of this formal cause, which we call logic. Yes, logic is a formal cause, but it is not the formal cause of thinking. If we were to seek the cause of thinking, we would turn to final cause, which is itself a type of formal cause, but a distinct type. You do not seem to provide a proper separation between the vey distinct formal cause and final cause.

You are ignoring the part where I suggested that what we might call "thinking illogical thoughts" is really nothing more than associating concepts or names or mental images that don't have relation of logical entailment between them together. And even those kinds of 'thoughts' must have some kind of associative logic (as with poetry) or they are nothing more than utter nonsense; just meaninglessly contiguous pictures created by language. They are certainly not cogent thoughts. And you haven't risen to the challenge to present a thought which is not logical, so that we can see what kind of things you have in mind when you say that thoughts are not necessarily logical. — John

You've lost me in apparent contradiction. You say that we can think illogical thoughts, but this is not really thinking. We can establish mental relations "that don't have relation of logical entailment", but even those thoughts "must have some kind of associative logic". Do you see the contradiction?

The things is, thoughts can jump from one thing to the next, without any apparent logical association, as is evidenced by dreams. And this appears to be the way that brute animals think, their thoughts jump around, depending on what attracts their attention. The human being has the capacity to focus the attention, with intention, thus giving them the capacity to perform logical proceedings.

So this is my presentation of thoughts which are not logical, thoughts which jump around from one thing to another, with no apparent consistency or coherency. This inconsistency is due to the inability of an individual to focus one's attention. That is what is required to carry out a logical proceeding, to focus one's attention, on a particular subject, for a span of time. Without this, one may think, without logic. What is required in order to focus the attention is to exercise the power of intention over attention. That is what human beings do, which enables them to carry out logical proceedings.

You seem to want to deny the distinction between rational and irrational thought, this exercising the power of intention over attention, insisting that all thought must be in some way rational. But this is simply not the case, and there is clear evidence of this. What would you call this, what we call illogical thinking, if not a form of thinking? If we move to deny that this is thinking, as you seem to suggest, then we have nothing to call this. But clearly it is a form of thinking, and that's why we call it thus. Therefore it is you who is trying "to dissolve these valid and useful distinctions in order to support your own agenda", not I. I recognize that logic, and cogent arguments emerge from thinking, which is itself more of a random, "free" process, not constrained by logic.

You and apokrisis alike, seem to be obsessed with this preconceived notion that the freedom within, the local freedom, is necessarily constrained by a larger, global constraint system. But this is clearly not the case, if there are prior constraints on the local freedoms, these must be inherent within, and not of a global character at all. That is why we have substance dualism, to account for the two types of constraints, forms. We have constraints which are inherent within the local freedoms, denying that these freedoms are absolute, acting as upward causation, and we have global constraints, which act as downward causation. Apokrisis does not distinguish between internal and external constraints, and this is a real failing of that metaphysic.

There is a coherent distinction between thoughts, thinking and logic; the inherent 'something' that determines how we think and which we formulate as logical principles that are understood to govern thinking, thinking which is the production of thoughts. — John

This is false though, logical principles do not govern thinking. We choose which principles we wish to apply, and some may not be logical . You even admit to this:

...we can think illogical thoughts... — John

If we can think illogical thoughts, then something other than logic is governing our thinking. Therefore logic is not understood to govern thinking, thinking often goes in illogical directions, invalid arguments are often produced. There is a multitude of fallacies. So you need to consider a different relationship between logic and thinking, because clearly we do not understand logic as governing thinking.

The terms probability, randomness, and chance are all used to indicate that exact predictions cannot — m-theory

That's the ambiguity I referred to earlier. "Chance" when speaking about a future event, refers to a possibility. This could be interpreted as probability. "Chance", when speaking of a past event as a "chance event", implies equal possibility, like the flip of the coin. "Random" refers to equal chances in relation to both, past and future.

Since "random" refers to equal chances, it is useless for prediction. But any probability other than random is useful. So random is a particular type of probability which denies all possibility of prediction. That is the difference, probability is used in predictions when exactitude cannot be obtained, randomness does not allow for prediction at all.

Are you wanting to dissolve all and any distinction between 'intention' and 'tendency'? — John

Tendency and intention are two distinct things. Tendency is a leaning toward a particular action, it might be a habit or something like that. Intention is the purpose of the action. Two distinct things, we can identify a tendency, without knowing its purpose. And, knowing the purpose of a particular action will not necessitate that action, like a tendency will.

You assume your own conclusion that logic is dependent on mind, by saying that logic is a process of thinking or reasoning. Logic is what inherently constrains our thinking and reasoning; we don't actually know 'where it comes from'; how could we? — John

No, you are redefining "logic" to suit your purpose. Logic doesn't constrain our thinking, it is thinking, a particular type of thinking, reasoning. Without thinking and reasoning there is no logic. So you could say that thinking constrains itself, through logic, but that is not what you're saying. You're saying that logic constrains thinking, and that is false, because you are making logic, which is a passive tool of thought, into something which actively constrains thought.

The most often argument against homunculi is it results in infinite regress. Each instance of experience is given in terms of the identity of a different being, so it results in an endless run of homunculi with homunculi. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't see any infinite regress here. Let's say that there is something within me which I call "self", and this self experiences. Why would there need to be another self within that self, and so on? The self is within me, and carrying out the function of experiencing, why would there need to be another self within that self? As an analogy, let's say that there is a part within my computer which carries out the function X, why would you assume another part inside that part carrying out X, and so on.

The homunculus is incoherent by identity. If my experience was of a homunculus, I wouldn't be myself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You are misrepresenting. No one would say that my experience is an experience of a homunculus experiencing, what they would say is that there is an inner part of me which is experiencing, and this inner part is the homunculus experiencing. it is not that I am experiencing a homunculus experiencing, that would be absurd. It is that I am experiencing, and this experiencing, is the inner part of me, the homunculus, carrying out the function of experiencing. I am breathing, but it is my lungs which are carrying out this function of breathing. No infinite regress with respect to breathing.

You seem to be missing the point.
Arguing that probability is just a misunderstanding about physics is an interpretation. — m-theory

I have no problem with "probability", I believe it is very useful. What I have a problem with is "chance", or "randomness". Do you see the difference? Chance, or randomness, is when probability is inapplicable for the purpose of prediction. So chance and probability are inherently incompatible. Probability provides the basis for prediction, chance does not.

But because things (other than animals and humans) have never, so far as we know, been observed to suddenly begin behaving radically differently, then we do abductively derive the idea that the behavior of things may be invariant across time and space; and this hypothesis; which is incidentally necessary for the coherent practice of science, is rationally warranted insofar as all we have to go on is what has been observed and recorded thus far. — John

Well John, you give an exception to animals and humans, but these are exactly the kinds of things which we are talking about here. We are talking about this type of thing, a living thing, which can suddenly start behaving radically different. So when this occurs, do you think that this is just a random change in the plant or animal, or is there some reason for such a change?

Either it is homuncular in requiring a self that stands outside "the realm of brute experience" to do the experiencing of the qualia. — apokrisis

Could someone explain to me what is wrong with the homuncular approach? People speak as if this is some big fallacy, but until the homuncular approach is proven wrong, why should we be afraid of it?

Do we? Might it not be the other way around: that minds are logic dependent? — John

No, I don't see how it could be that way. Logic is a process of thinking, reasoning. Clearly thinking and reasoning is what minds do, and it is not the case that thinking and reasoning is a process which starts without a mind, and then proceeds to produce a mind. I think that such an idea requires a misguided definition of "mind".

Addendum: that is what apokrisis calls demystifying metaphysics.

Yeah, apokrisis introduces a Logic which is actually illogical because it is supposed to exist independently of any mind, and this Logic is what structures the world. We all know though, that logic is mind dependent. Then with a big turn around, this Logic is called "mind-like". But this claim of "mind-like", or "mindfulness", is completely unjustified because this Logic has been thoroughly separated from mind in the premise.

So intention, attention, thinking, sensation, feelings, emotions, and all these things which are normally associated with mind, and are properly "mind-like", are irrelevant to apokrisis' metaphysics. Apokrisis has assumed a nonsense form of Logic, which operates within the wold, acting to structure it, operating independently of a mind.

You mistake me - I didn't say that 'the world is unintelligible'; I said that it may well be the case that something as abstract as 'the world' doesn't submit to the criteria of intelligibility at all - that it may well be neither intelligible or unintelligible; the very notion of intelligibility may not even apply to something as strange as 'the world' - whatever that even means. Put it this way - I know what it means to 'make sense' of this or that phenomenon: 'how does that work?', 'what contributes to function of that process?'; but when you ask these questions of 'the world', the questions themselves start to lose any cogency. — StreetlightX

Yes, I see your point, but now we're not talking about the meaning of "intelligibility", we're talking about the meaning of "the world". I don't think "the world" is a strange concept at all. It implies a unity of all that is. Of course it has been mostly replaced by "the universe", and now the reality of this unity has been called into question by some, with concepts such as "multiverse". But to deny the reality of the universe, is not to question the intelligibility of "the universe", it is to deny that this concept represents anything real. Sometimes it is the case that a highly useful, and therefore intelligible concept, doesn't represent anything real, like the circle evidently doesn't represent anything real, it's conceptual only. But this ideal, is a very useful standard, for judging real things, with respect to how closely they approximate the ideal circle.

I happen to believe that "the world", or "the universe", as an expression of the oneness, or unity of being, is highly intelligible. So when we ask about "the world", we are not asking about this or that phenomenon, we are asking about the totality of phenomena, as a whole. Does it make sense to talk about the totality of phenomena? Can they all be classed together, as one category? Sure it makes sense, because I've already classed it together, as the "phenomena".

But what if we knew of something which could not be classed with the other phenomena? How could we establish consistency, saying that the world is a unity of all, yet there is something which cannot be classed with the others?

For one thing, to make something intelligible is always to do so against the background of a certain (set of) interests - for whom, for what purpose, to what end is the intelligibility of the thing sought? Things and phenomena are not simply 'intelligible' tout court; there is no intelligibility-in-itself; it is always a question of relevance - in what context and under what circumstances does intelligibility come into question? — StreetlightX

This is just like Plato's "the good". The good, as described in The Republic, is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. It is as you say, that background set of interests, the purpose, which directs the intellect toward understanding this, and not toward that Whatever it is which becomes intelligible to an individual intellect, is dependent on one's interests

If measurement is the only way of understanding the world (what I see as empiricism), then either is must be shown how philosophy utilizes measurement, or it must be seen with skepticism. — darthbarracuda

Right, measurement must be viewed with skepticism. All forms of measurement are methods of comparing one thing to another. The validity of such comparisons must be analyzed. This means that all forms of measurement should be scrutinized.

But calling measurement objective is a little ironic given that it is so completely subjective now in being dependent on understanding the world only in terms of dial readings. Science says, well, if in the end there is only our phenomenology, our structure of experience, then lets make even measurement something consciously a phenomenological act. — apokrisis

Measurement need not be subjective. It gains objectivity through an understanding of what the "dial readings" mean. The dial reading may mean something to you, and something different to me, depending on our purpose, what we are using it for. But if we look at how the dial reading was produced, what it actually signifies, here we find objectivity.

So this is an example of how science does think through its metaphysics. As already said to you in other threads where you have rabbited on about the nature of purpose, a naturalistic systems view demystifies it by talking about final cause in terms of specific gradations of semiosis.

{teleomaty {teleonomy {teleology}}}.

Or in more regular language, {propensity {function {purpose}}}. — apokrisis

If you think that this demystifies the metaphysics of intention and purpose, you're in a dream. How does a vague explanation full of ambiguities, equivocation, and contradiction, demystify?

This doesn't automatically mean that 'the world' is or isn't intelligible - 'the world' may not be an object of intelligibility at all. But things 'in' the world, local structures, as it were, of which we make sense of everyday in our interactions with them - perhaps sometimes because of our interactions with them - means at the least that if it doesn't make sense to speak of an 'intelligible world', there is at least a suffusion of intelligibility - sense - throughout it. — StreetlightX

I don't think that this makes any sense at all, to think that "the world" could be unintelligible, yet local structures are intelligible? Are you disassociating local structures from the world, such that they are intelligible but the wold is not? How would you support such a separation?

If the world appears to us as local structures which are intelligible, yet you assume some transcending "world", which is unintelligible, how can you create consistency, coherency, in this type of thinking? How could local structures, which are intelligible, be a part of an overall world which is unintelligible?

Wouldn't you prefer to use a principle of inductive reason, and assume that if all the local things, which we come into contact with on a day to day basis, are intelligible, then the parts which we do not come into contact with are also intelligible.

We can prove that no particular observer is necessary for the laws of physics.
That is to say different observers measure the same outcomes which proves that those measurements are not dependent upon any given one. — m-theory

Your talking about "laws" now, here, and we were talking about randomness. Randomness is a failure to follow any laws. So you appear to be trying to conflate two distinct, and even contradictory things, activity which follows laws, and random outcomes which do not. The coin flip, toss of the dice, lottery, etc., each possible outcome has an equal probability, so there is no law to determine outcomes.

Having possibilities entails that we must model them with randomness as the current state of knowledge stands now. — m-theory

Having possibility does not necessitate randomness. That's where the mistake is. Randomness can be produced from possibility, like we do with the coin toss, and the lottery, but these are artificial, intentional products. Possibility in its natural state is understood by means of probabilities. The fact that possibilities can be understood through probabilities indicates that there are underlying laws, and therefore random outcomes are not a natural process.

And science is a deeply metaphysical exerercise, explicit in making ontic commitments to get its games going. — apokrisis

Science is a deeply metaphysical "exercise"? How so? Making an ontic commitment is just that, making an ontic commitment, it is not an exercise. Determining which ontic commitment ought to be made is a metaphysical exercise, but this is directed by interests other than science.

But now - through science and maths - we have discovered how structure in fact arises quite naturally in nature through fundamental principles of thermodynamic self-organisation. Disorder itself must fall into regular patterns for basic geometric reasons to do with symmetries and symmetry-breakings. — apokrisis

"Thermodynamic self-organization". That sounds like some speculative notion, without any real science. Why do you call it "fact"?

Here's a definition of self-organization I came across at BusinessDictionary.com: "Ability of a system to spontaneously arrange its components or elements in a purposeful (non-random) manner, under appropriate conditions without the help of an external agency."

There are a number of questionable issues here. First, what defines "purposeful" other than a relation to some intent? If the intent is internal to the system, then who's intent is it. If the intent is external, the intent of the individual making the observation, then the system may simply be judged as purposeful (non-random), and the prior state judged as random, for the sake of claiming "self-organization". What would distinguish purposeful from random, except the intent of the one making the judgement? Secondly, "under appropriate conditions without the help of an external agency" is itself contradictory. If appropriate conditions are necessary for such "self-organization", then clearly such appropriate conditions are acting as an external agency.

Another definition I came across relied on "interaction rules". The components could only produce a self-organized system by following some interaction rules. Where would such rules come from, and how could the components know how to follow these rules in order to produce a self-organized system? Why were the components not following these rules in the disorganized state preceding the self-organized state? Did they suddenly decide to start following the rules?

From an idealist perspective, "the world" is something created within our minds, and so it is necessarily intelligible. We exist as independent minds with separation between us. "The world" is a concept, created in an attempt to understand this separation. It is necessary to assume that this medium between us, the separation, is itself intelligible, or else our attempts to understand it are self-defeating.

However the alternatives (such as philosophy as being First Inquiry) must be justified in itself. There needs to be an explanation as to why science cannot tell us these things, a meta-philosophical question. Why is science limited in its scope, and how do we know science will never answer questions we typically assign to philosophy or even theology/mysticism? — darthbarracuda

The scientific method proceeds from speculation. Speculation itself cannot be said to be scientific or non-scientific, as science is a particular means by which speculation is tested. The direction in which individual human beings speculate is influenced by interests which cannot be said to be scientific either.

When individuals such as yourself, speculate that perhaps the world (the medium) is unintelligible, you approach that self-defeating assumption. If you understand the necessity in concluding that the medium is indeed intelligible, (a conclusion produced by logic rather than the scientific method), you will adopt this idealist premise. If you do not understand the logic behind this premise, you may assume as a premise, that the world is unintelligible. Therefore the world (the medium) will be unintelligible, to you.

You are completely missing the point. It is impossible to transfer knowledge from one mind to another. — tom

This all depends on what type of existence you think that knowledge has, which is determined by your metaphysical perspective. Some would say that knowledge exists only in minds, like you do. Some would say that knowledge exists externally to the mind, in the artefact, such as in the books, in the library. It is also possible to produce an inclusive metaphysics, which includes both these aspects of knowledge. In which case knowledge passes from one mind to another, having an active and passive form.

But the present does contain elements of both the already-established (past) and the to-be-established (future). By thinking of the present as a "division" you are artificially cutting into the flow of time or events; and also trying to think the present as 'pure' which can only suggest a kind of infinitesimal point instant. I don't think that way of thinking about it is either comprehensive enough to capture the quality of the living present or even really intelligible at all, other than in the most abstract 'mathematical' kind of way. — John

Why would you say that thinking of the present as a division between future and past involves "cutting into the flow of time"? It is not even established that there is such a thing as a "flow" of time. I suggested the division between past and future, as a fundamental principle, because it is what we can conclude as true, from empirical evidence. Notice that "flow" is not supported by empirical evidence, it is derived from deductive logic. It is not the same time now, as it was a while ago, such a change requires flow, therefore time must be flowing. What I think is that if you want to introduce a "flow" to account for this change, we must do so in a way which remains consistent with the first principle, that the past is distinct from the future.

We do not need to conceive of the present as a pure point of division, such as a non-dimensional separation. Modern science has given us many different perspectives, from huge galaxies, to sub-atomic particles. The division between past and future need not be the same from each of these perspectives, just like if we're talking in centuries, years, or in nanoseconds, we have a different perspective of that division. Still, I think it is more useful to devise a clear division from each of the different spatial perspectives, rather than to say that there is one extremely vague division, allowing that future and past overlap each other within this vague "present". Future and past being properly opposed, it would defeat logic to allow them to coexist at the present. So we need to do something such as allow that the division is different depending on the perspective, to account for the apparent vagueness of the division. The human being for instance uses five senses, and the division between past and future may be slightly different from each of these different perspectives. From the human being's perspective then, as a whole, the division is vague.

No this is simply wrong...unless you mean to suggest that sub atomic particles are intentional beings. — m-theory

Do you believe that a sub-atomic particle, in its natural state of existence, without human interference, would be behaving in a random way? If you do believe this, how would you proceed to demonstrate that it is true?

However if possibility is real there is a tremendous survival advantage in being able to understand that possibilities exist. — m-theory

That there are possibilities does not necessarily entail that there is randomness. Randomness must be created, and this requires intention. That is my argument, not that nature is intentional, but that nature does not consist of randomness. Randomness though is intentional. I believe there are ontological possibilities within nature, but the fact that possibilities can be understood through probability demonstrates that possibility does not logically imply randomness. If natural possibilities were random, they could not be understood through probability, they'd be random. Randomness does exist naturally though, it is created intentionally, through the human being's understanding of probability. Human beings create circumstances with equal probabilities, and this produces a random outcome.

The government should play no role in morality; the government has no right to prescribe what is right and wrong on the citizenry. — Mustapha Mond

If the government isn't going to tell you what's right and what's wrong, then who is going to tell you this, your mother? If everyone's own mother decided for them what is right, and what is wrong, how could there ever be any consistency in morality?

What the human happens to be and what the human can become can conceivably be contained in the concept of the human form of life. — jamalrob

But it's not a case of what the human form can become, it's a case of what it should become. And this produces the problem of subjectivity. There are possibilities, potentialities, to choose from, and all these potentialities must be apprehended to be conceived of. There may not be the empirical evidence required to apprehend the possibilities. The direction that the intellect turns, must also be a part of this description of what should be. That's why Plato turned to a transcendent "good", which is beyond intelligibility. This leaves the form which should become, indeterminate, something which we may not even be able to conceive of in our present state of intelligence.

Aristotle positioned contemplation as a highest virtue, but he left a degree of ambiguity as to whether contemplation is properly an activity. This question has repercussions with respect to the issue of free-thinking. If thinking is properly a human activity, then it need be controlled by moral principles, such that the defined "human form", describes the proper way of thinking for a human being. But if thinking is simply a potential for action, and not activity itself, then freedom of thought is required in order that all of the possible actualities may be apprehended.

Sorry but this was just inserted with no justification.
There is no reason to create an intentional being to understand nature when probability does a fine job of describing nature without the existence of an intentional being. — m-theory

Then you don't understand the point. Probability, possibility, and chance, only exist in relation to an intentional being. That is why it is necessary to bring in the intentional being.

Epistemic possibility, logical possibility, exists only as a property of the intentional being's knowledge. Ontological possibility exists only in relation to what the intentional being can and cannot do. That the intentional being can flip a coin to produce a 50/50 probability, roll a die, create a lottery, or create a stochastic system, all of these being artificial creations of randomness, provides no evidence that such a thing as randomness could exist naturally. Therefore any claim that probability is something natural is what is unjustified.

Or, we can think that the present moment contains, or better, encompasses, both past and future; that it is 'stretched' so to speak and not a dimensionless point instant. — John

You could think that way, but it distracts from the principal point, that the future is substantially different from the past. Then you have to attempt to unite these two incompatible things, future and past. I think it is more productive to think of the present as a sort of division between future and past.