It is not as cut and dry as you suggest I am afraid. — m-theory

I am not suggesting that it's a cut and dry issue, actually I am suggesting something quite contrary, that things are more complex than you might think.

But I think, that in order to produce a clear understanding of temporal existence, we need to start from the most simple, and most evidently true premise that we can devise. This I believe, is the fact that there is a substantial difference between past and future. What has happened, in the past, we cannot alter, but with respect to the future, we can influence what will or will not happen. That is what is most evident to us about the nature of time.

So in defining "possibility", we have two distinct forms of that word. In relation to the past, we may not know exactly what happened, despite the fact that what has happened is fixed in time, and cannot be different than it is. This produces an epistemic possibility. With respect to the past, it is logically possible that X or Y may be the case, if we don't know which one is the case. If they exclude one another, then if X is the case then Y is not. In relation to the future, there is an ontological possibility, because neither A nor B is the case, if the time referred to has not yet arrived. The human agent may cause A to occur, or B to occur, and these may be equally possible, as with the flip of the coin.

The point though, is that each of these two types of "possibilities" only exist in relation to the intentional being. In relation to the past, there is possibility with respect to the intentional being's knowledge. In relation to the future, there is possibility with respect to what the intentional being can do. Remove the intentional being, and there is no such possibility of either type, though we could assume that the world would continue to exist

It may appear easier to understand the world by removing this fundamental principle, that there is a substantial difference between future and past, but such a move would be a mistake, since the principle is evidently true. If this means reassessing some of the principles of physics, then this is what we should do, in order to avoid misunderstanding.

Intuitively the evidence suggest that eternalism is wrong because humans experience change as something that is quite real. — m-theory

What I am suggesting is not presentism, because what is accepted as the real aspects of time, are the past and future. However, since we must recognize that there is a real difference between past and future, this necessitates that there is a boundary between these two, and the boundary is what is called the present. Since it is evident that change and motion occur at the present, it is impossible that this boundary is a sharp, crisp boundary. If the boundary was sharp, then at one moment things would be as they are in the future, then at the next, as they are in the past, without any motion at the present. But this is not the case, as we obseve. Therefore we need to assume two dimensions of time, the traditional one which marks the relationship between future and past, and another dimension to allow for the activity which occurs at the present.

I like that distinction, "wet intelligence" versus "dry intelligence".

The problem here is that the intent of ethics is not to maintain the status quo. It is not to maintain the human form. Ethics is all about improvement, that's why it is concerned with what ought to be, rather than what is. Therefore any such naturalist ethics, which derives what one ought to do, from a principle of what the human form is, misses the mark, and should be rejected because it has no provisions for improvement of the human species. And when we move to produce the premise of what the human form ought to be, there is an issue of objectivity.

Clearly, it's a very practical problem. When we produce the universal, which is the abstract concept, of "the human form", the definition of the human being, which will act as our logical premise, do we include the bad properties of human beings as well as the good? To create a true definition of what the human form is, we must include bad with good. To create a definition of what the human form ought to be, we must exclude the bad.

This is a reflection on the way we use words in general. There is "a way" in which any word is used in practise, but this includes multiple different senses of usage in different contexts, and problems with ambiguity. So when we define a word, as a premise for a logical proceeding, we restrict the meaning, of that word, assuming that certain usage is inappropriate for that proceeding, focusing on a specific definition which suits the purpose of the intended logical proceeding. Living things are active, and we may attempt to define them with respect to the activities which they engage in. In the case of "the human form", we'd be inclined to say that such acts as murder and rape are not human acts, despite the fact that some human beings engage in those acts. Those are accidentals which we must work to exclude, completely.

A problem arises if we start to go beyond the bounds of what is reasonable, in our attempts to restrict the definition of a word. We cannot force an unreal description of what it means to be a virtuous human being, despite the fact that we want the highest standards of excellence for the human race. This ties in to Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. If the proposed definition is not acceptable as a good representation of what the human form ought to be, whether having too little, or too much, restrictions, it will be rejected as a false premise.

As far as I am abreast of this subject it is still very much open for debate. — m-theory

As I said, until it can be demonstrated that a past event can be prevented, or produced, like a future one can be, then the evidence, and consequent inductive principle is overwhelming. We have to start any logical proceeding from some fundamental assumptions. If we cannot assume something which all evidence indicates is the case, what can we assume?

Without any evidence that the past and future are not substantially different, as all the evidence indicates that they are, any such debate seems pointless. That the past and future "could be" essentially the same, is an unsupported myth.

Sorry M-theory, no offence intended

I don't know if the past can change or what that means....somehow the past has become the present and I don't see how that is possible without change and I know you can't model it without using randomness. — m-theory

Actually, the future has become the past, that's what the passing of time does. We can designate a point in time, such as August 21, 2016, 12:00 noon GMT, and that point in time will change from being in the future, to being in the past, as it changes at the present.

Once it has become the past, all changes which will occur have already occurred, as they occur at the present, when the future becomes the past. Therefore it is impossible that the past can change.

As for your model, which employs randomness, I suggest that the randomness is simply a reflection of your inability to comprehend what it means for the future to become the past (for time to be passing).

I believe that IBM is working on AI projects which will make Deep Mind look rather insignificant. In fact, some argue that Watson already makes Deep Mind look insignificant.

It sounds strained to talk of the meaning of 'I am', because (obviously), what "I am" is never present to awareness, it is what it is that things are present to. It is 'first person', it is that to which everything is disclosed, for that reason not amongst the objects of consciousness. And that again is an ontological distinction. — Wayfarer

This, I believe, is a vey important point. And, it underscores the problems which the discipline of physics will inevitably face in creating any kind of artificial being. That discipline does not have a coherent approach to what it means to be present in time.

Why do you believe the laws of physics for the past are different from the laws of the present and/or future? — m-theory

It's very obvious, events which have already occurred cannot be changed, events which have not yet occurred can be promoted or prevented. This is a fundamental empirical truth, supported by all the evidence that I know of. If the laws of physics contradict, or fail to respect, this fundamental truth, how can I believe in them?

Of course not...humans designed these concepts in order to model reality. — m-theory

That might be what you believe, what I believe is that humans designed stochastic systems, and from these they produced the concept that parts of reality consist of random occurrences. Yes, it's true that parts of reality consist of stochastic systems, the parts that humans have designed and produced.

Consider that all parts of reality exist within a larger context. Some put a limit to that larger context, to assume a whole, the universe. To create a stochastic system, the human being isolates a small part of reality from the larger context That boundary is artificial, yet necessary for the existence of the stochastic system.

It is not my problem if you can't be bothered to take probability, chance, and randomness seriously. — m-theory

I take these things very seriously, as you can see, I am tying to understand them. But I think that those who take such things for granted, without properly understanding them, don't take them seriously. That's how myths are propagated, people take things for granted without properly understanding them.

It seems to me you believe that probability only applies to some future event...that is not strictly true in modern physics. — m-theory

I believe you are adequately demonstrating the myth of chance, which I am referring to. You believe, and you claim that modern physics supports your belief, that there is a possibility that a past event could be other than it actually was.

There is plenty of source material you could review to get a better grasp of modern physics and the role probability plays. — m-theory

Why would I want to do that, and support such an incoherent myth? I already know the truth, that a past event is what it is, and that it is impossible to change it. Until someone demonstrates that a past event can be changed, I'll continue to believe the inductive logic which says that it cannot. Therefore, there is no possibility that a past event could be otherwise. Once the accident happens, or whatever happens in the world happens, there is no possibility of reversing this. There is of course the possibility that the event which occurred, could be other than the way I describe it, or remember it, But this is a different sort of possibility altogether.

I don't see how I can further your understanding except to say that you are making classical arguments that do not lend themselves well to modern understanding of how physics work. — m-theory

So the myth of chance permeates through physics as well as biology. There is a chance that past events could be changed?

In probability theory, a purely stochastic system is one whose state is randomly determined, having a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analyzed statistically but may not be predicted precisely. In this regard, it can be classified as non-deterministic (i.e., "random") so that the subsequent state of the system is determined probabilistically

Look, the passage here refers to a state, and a subsequent state which is predicted, determined probabilistically. It doesn't at all refer to a past state which is determined probabilistically. Why do you insist that physics treats past events, events which have already occurred, as probabilistic?

You may well be right to argue your point...but what I was hoping to impress upon is that you are arguing an interpretation of current understanding and not indisputable facts of reality as we currently understand it.

If the universe ultimately is random or deterministic may well be an unanswerable question in science.

I happen to believe randomness is very real and is fundamental to our universe, that would mean that evolution would be truly random as well, however I do realize that this is interpretation and not fact.
I cannot prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it is true. — m-theory

The reason why I haven't given consideration to the perspective you describe, is that I haven't found a way to make sense of it yet. And it's not that I'm not tying. What I want, is a way to understand what you mean when you say that you believe "randomness is very real". As I explained, I can see how the outcome of a future event, like tossing a coin, could be said to be random, or chance. Further, I can understand that if an event like this occurred in the past, at that time, prior to the event occurring, the outcome of such a proposed event could have been said to be random. But when we look back, now, at the past event, there is no randomness. The coin was tossed, and there was a particular outcome. The randomness, or chance element of the event has been removed by the passing of time. Therefore randomness, or chance, is only something which exists at the present. And, it exists only in relation to the future, not in relation to the past.

In any case, since you believe that randomness, and stochastic systems are real, and so do I, with the temporal qualifications described, here's the relevant question. Do you think that a random event, or stochastic system, could exist without being designed?

If that were so, possibility would be incoherent because only what happened could occur. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You are not distinguishing between past and future, as I did. What I said is that what has already occurred in the past, cannot possible be different. We cannot change what has already occurred. Even if this is true, as I think it obviously is, it doesn't exclude possibility from the future. So with respect to the future, there are many things which could occur, are possible, may or may not occur, despite the fact that with respect to the past, things cannot possibly be different. The truth of this is supported by the empirical evidence that there is a substantial difference between past and future.

No matter what I end rolling, it is true the other five number were possible-- that's why one of the many numbers I rolled was a possible outcome, rather than the necessary one. I had chance to roll other numbers, I just didn't. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It is true, that at that time, before rolling the die, there were six possible outcomes. But with the passing of time, you rolled the die, one outcome was confirmed, and therefore the other five possibilities wee excluded. So it is no longer correct to say that there are six possible outcomes from that roll of the die which already occurred, there already was one outcome, and the other five are impossible. The passage of time, has removed the element of chance, from that roll of the die. This is the difference between before and after

Free will is actually one of the best examples to demonstrate this. If we were to believe your account of possibility, no-one could make a choice between two possible options. What they end up doing would be the only action the could have taken, as them acting in a different way, in that time and space, would exclude any possibility the might have acted otherwise.

For free will to function, possible options have to be available, no matter what someone ends up doing. That's how we can say the murder had a choice about whether to kill someone. Despite the fact they acted one way, it was possible they could have acted otherwise. Other outcomes at points in space and time have to be possible if free will is to be coherent. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, at the time, now, there are many options open to the organism with free will. But with the passing of time, many of these options disappear, The option to choose otherwise from what one did choose, is never available to the free will organism. When the choice is made, it is in the past, and cannot be changed to another choice. Therefore, all possibility that one might have acted otherwise, is in fact excluded by the passing of time. But this does not exclude free will. That is because free will allows us to act freely at the present, it does not allow us the possibility to change how we acted in the past. So as time passes, we can choose future acts, but we cannot choose past acts, they have already been chosen.

Yet, it is also true there is no reason for any causal relationship. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That the reason for something is unknown is distinctly different from there being no reason for that thing. When the reason for something is unknown, it is illogical to proceed to the conclusion that there is no reason for that thing, simply because the reason for that thing is unknown. When you consider the possibility of design, then you cannot logically proceed from "the reason for causal relationships is unknown", to "there is no reason for causal relationships".

I am saying...like in the coin example.
That no laws of physics are violated and both outcomes are possible but only one outcome at a time can occur because the effect (head or tails) are mutually exclusive of each other.
You can't get heads and tails.
When more than one outcome is possible we have to use probability, randomness, chance to model things. — m-theory

OK, this explains the future event, there is a chance that the outcome of the coin toss could be heads, and there is a chance that it could be tails. I assume the probability is equal.

If you find a coin on the street facing heads down...that violates no laws of physics.
If it had been heads up instead...that too would violate no laws.
Both outcomes are physically possible...just not at the same time. — m-theory

You're still talking about a future event here, "if you find a coin on the street". In this event there are the same chances of heads or tails.

Now let's look at a past event. You have found a coin on the street, in the heads position. There is no chance that it could have been found at that time and place in the tails position, because it was in the heads position. The fact that it was in the heads position excludes the chance (possibility) that it was in the tails position.

So concerning the past the probability that an event occurs does not have to be different it will remain the same. — m-theory

This is incoherent to me. You cannot look at the past, and talk about the chance of an event occurring, because events don't occur in the past, they occur at the present. In the past, events have already occurred. I am not talking about Laplace's demon, I am simply making a proper distinction between future and past.

When we say an event occurred in the past and we are dealing with probability we are saying the outcome could have been any number of things all with equal chance to occur just because only one of these occurrences happens does not mean it is not random it only means that any given occurrence is mutually exclusive of the other occurrences. — m-theory

Let me get this straight. By "outcome", I infer effect, rather than cause. So are you saying that when a particular event occurred, in the past, the outcome (effect) of that event could have been other than it was? How could the outcome of an event be different than it was, without actually changing the event? In which case, it would not be the same event. So it would not be the case that the said event had a different outcome, it would have been a different event altogether. Therefore it appears to me, that to say that the outcome of a past event could have been different is incoherent. To have a different outcome would require a different event, such that there could not have been a different outcome from the same event. A different outcome would require a different event.

His demonstration relies on the logico-metaphysical analysis of the concept of the human form, a specific instantiation of the concept of a form of life. — Pierre-Normand

What do you think is meant by "the concept of a form of life"? In Aristotle's biology, "On the Soul (De Anima)", soul is defined as the first actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. Bk. 2 Ch.1. Under Aristotelian definitions, an actuality is a form, and he is careful to distinguish between a natural body and the form of the body.

Thus he proceeds to differentiate between two senses of "actuality", corresponding to "possessing knowledge", and actual exercising of knowledge. Each of these are forms, or actualities, but one, "possessing knowledge" can be understood as inherently a potentiality, because possessing knowledge is what gives one the capacity to act. This is the type of actuality which Aristotle assigns to the soul.

So, despite the fact that it is defined as an actuality, soul is described as a potentiality. This is a substantial ambiguity which manifests with considerable significance in such fields as ethics; "ought" being associated with potential, and "is" being associated with actual.

The difference is this. Traditional logic accepts as what actually is, a defined state, this is the form of what is, the first sense of "actuality". But in the process of change, there is activity which occurs between one defined state and another. This produces the second sense of "actuality", the exercising of knowledge, the activity which exists between two temporally separated, defined states.

The activity which produces one state from another is described in terms of potentiality, or possibilities, because one state doesn't necessarily lead to another, there are many possible states which may follow any particular state. So the determination of a desired state (the end), dictates what "ought" to be carried out (the means), for achieving that end. Then "ought" refers to the activity which occurs between two definable states (actual logical forms), but is itself a type of actuality which is described logically in terms of potentiality, in order to separate it from logical actualities (forms of what is).

I'm a bit confused. Would anyone like to try setting out exactly why a meta-ethics based on an empirical concept of the human form of life is such a bad thing? — jamalrob

The problem should be evident if you can decipher what I just said. We have two distinct types of actualities, and therefore two distinct types of forms. The logical form is the defined "what is", and this is your "the human form of life", the human description of itself. But this type of form is inherently inconsistent with the other type of actuality, or form, which is the activity itself, that occurs between such described states of what is. So to base an ethics in this artificial description, "the human form of life", rather than in the activity which life is involved in, simply misses the mark of what ethics should be all about.

The reason randomness is necessary is because many causes may have the same probability of occurrence such that any particular cause is therefor unknown. — m-theory

Fine, but consider this in relation to an event which has already occurred. You cannot say that this event has the same probability of occurrence as some other events which did not occur, because this one occurred, and the others did not. You cannot apply probabilities to past events in that way. Prior to the event, there was a chance that it may or may not happen, but afterwards, that knowledge is only useful in relating to other similar situations. To relate back to that particular occurrence, and say that it has a probability of occurrence, is nonsense, because it already occurred.

There is plenty of technical dissemination of information surrounding how randomness and chance play a role in causation within the context of evolution. — m-theory

By saying that randomness and chance "play a role", you imply that these things are acting in a causal way. The only way that randomness and chance can play a role is through the mediation of intention. Heads I win, tails you win. But the intentional agent must set up the parameters of the chance event (choose, and flip the coin), and fix things such that one outcome will cause X (I win), and the other outcome will cause Y (you win). Otherwise, the coin is just lying on the table and it doesn't play a role in anything. And even if you assume that coins are just naturally flipping, it makes no difference whether they land heads or tails, unless the intentional agent sets something up, such that heads will be interpreted as I win, and tails as you win. Without intention, randomness and chance, if they could exist without being designed, couldn't play a role in anything, they would be just continuous, ongoing, randomness and chance.

For example, I eat food primarily because I'm hungry, but I don't eat it in order to remove a bad feeling necessarily but also because I desire to experience the pleasurable food. — darthbarracuda

I think that what Is actually the case is slightly different from this. It is generally not because you are hungry that you eat food. We establish eating habits such that we eat before we get hungry. If you always waited until you were hungry, you would always get that bad feeling, and be eating to remove that bad feeling. So we should ask, how is the habit produced, and maintained, and here we find pleasure. We create an experience of pleasure which is associated with the desired eating habits, and the pleasure produces the habit.

So in the sense that pleasure accompanies pain in the cycle of desire and need, pleasure becomes merely something that makes an act permissible, but does not act as a reason to do an action. — darthbarracuda

So I think, contrary to this, that pleasure truly does act as a reason to do the act. That is what habits are all about. We get pleasure from a certain thing, so we want to do it again, The difficulty is in developing good habits and minimizing bad habits. Also, when we know that some specific action is good, we need to devise a way to make it pleasurable, such that it will become a habit, a good habit.

Claiming that non-conscious objects have a purpose is, in English, an abuse of language. — charleton

What makes you think that this is an abuse of language. Do you not believe that plants produce seeds for a purpose, and, that plants are non-conscious objects?

As I explain to Michael already, the abuse of language here is being carried out by those who want to restrict "purpose" or "intention" to conscious choice. Clearly there is purpose in non-conscious activities, so to tell me that I am not correct in using the word this way is nothing more than a mistake on your part.

If you accept the Popperian conception of knowledge, that it is a type of information that, once instantiated on an appropriate environment, causes itself to remain so, then the genome certainly possesses knowledge if not purpose. — tom

Yes, knowledge is another word which is not well understood. Traditionally, "to know" would mean to be aware of, to be conscious of. Now, many epistemologists desire to give "knowledge" substantial existence, such that it is a thing independent of the conscious knower, who knows by being aware of something. We have to give knowledge a more substantial existence in order to account for things which we know, but are not presently aware of (principally things in the memory). Thus knowledge becomes understood as some type of information, which can be independent from consciousness, in the memory, and as some would argue, in the library, Under this definition, it would be difficult to argue that the genome does not contain knowledge. Where do you think it gets that knowledge from, experience?

Chance, in science, is not a "myth", it is a tool for making predictions about nature. A valuable tool that cannot be avoided at this point in scientific understanding. — m-theory

Yes I agree, but we've been through the two distinct meanings of "chance" already. When referring to a possible future event, we refer to a chance that it might happen. This is the principal use of "chance", to refer to a future possibility, and this may be a useful tool in making predictions.

The other meaning, which I have a problem with, is when we refer to a past event, as a chance or random event. This would mean that the particular event is claimed to have no cause, neither efficient cause nor final cause. Unless it is known that the event had no cause, then why would anyone claim that the event was chance, or random? And why is it common to hear people talk about chance, or random genetic mutations?

No, I don't believe that Tom. We often try for things we cannot obtain, or simply fail in our attempts, even if we do have the capacity. We've already discussed trial and error, which is a purposeful action, without knowing how to achieve the end.

I think, that if you look closely at intention, through introspection, you'll find that intention, which gives you ambition, is a vey general sort of thing, lying below the level of consciousness. It manifests, through consciousness, as particular "intentions". The particular intentions, are toward the things we know through past experience, will bring us satisfaction. However, these particular intentions are things intended as the means toward further ends. So if A is intended for the sake of B, which is intended for the sake of C, an infinite regress would render intention unintelligible. But seeking an ultimate end looses one in generality, such that we don't really know why we do A, B, and C. We are faced with the question of why are we alive. You could posit something as the ultimate end, like Aristotle did with happiness, but such assumptions are so general that they don't have a lot of specific meaning, and no direct way of "knowing how to achieve the end".

Because of these difficulties, we tend to just assume that there is some sort of ultimate end which we strive for, such as happiness, but we assume it without knowing it. Failing to assume this ultimate end leaves our lives meaningless due to the infinite regress.

Did you want to distinguish now between sentience (in jumping spiders), consciousness (in squid) and self-consciousness (in language-equipped humans) now? — apokrisis

No, but I definitely don't want to talk about random motions, that's just the type of talk I believe is nonsense. To believe in such a thing is to believe in a myth. And to talk about such a thing is to propagate that myth.

I was just emphasizing the point that it is not nonsense to talk about non-conscious things behaving purposefully, and therefore intentionally. So we have two opposing views here, mine being reasonable, but varying from common social habits of word use, yours employing a nonsense myth.

The essential difference here would seem to be that we call purpose conscious when it involves a conscious choice. That is, when the organism knows it is doing one thing and not another. — apokrisis

But this is more a description of being self-aware, and this is quite different from consciousness, which is simply being aware. Intention is proper to both of these, and, as I've argued, to some non-conscious beings as well.

So when we watch a creature act, we might be able to see it could have acted differently, but is that a choice it was aware of? — apokrisis

Even in a conscious, intentional act, we do not need to be aware of the other possible choices, in order that the act is intentional. There are often vast numbers of other possible choices which we do not consider. Also, I don't think that a conscious decision requires being aware of any other possibilities, like when someone asks me something, and I reply immediately, without thinking about what to say. I don't consider other possibilities. So an individual can make a conscious decision without considering any other possibilities, even while having the capacity to consider other possibilities. Likewise, a being might make an intentional (purposeful) act without even being aware (conscious of the fact) that it is an intentional act.

There are other zones in the pleasure/pain nexus. Aristotle, for instance, discusses the 'pleasure' in the 'good' of recovering from illness, and points out that this is hardly a good or a pleasure we would in general seek or regard as good. — mcdoodle

I would really like some indication as to what exactly, pleasure is. Enjoyment has been mentioned, but this doesn't tell me much. It might imply that pleasure is a state of mind, and cannot be isolated to any specific part of the body. Pain though, does seem to be often associated with particular parts of the body.

Let's assume that pleasure is some state of mind, of enjoyment, or feeling good. I would think that health, and lack of pain, are fundamental to enjoying oneself. However, depending on the severity of the pain or illness, I think that one can still experience pleasure when one is in pain, or ill. The pain or illness, if acute, may overcome one's ability to experience pleasure though.

Can we identify pleasure by looking for the capacity, or ability, to experience pleasure? Many things, like pain, illness, stresses, and other instabilities may affect this capacity. What produces this capacity though, giving us the ability to experience pleasure, if it has not been taken away by pain or some such thing? Is it something which we must be trained in, like knowledge, which gives us the capacity to figure things out, and other habits which we learn? Is it the case that we must be taught how to experience pleasure?

I just want to suggest that if one is arguing for a telos, one can dispense with intention, which has strong connotations of conscious purpose, even if it can be defined to exclude all psychology. Aristotle himself doesn't depend on any psychology in his notion of final causes, i.e., on intention as conscious purpose. — jamalrob

Intention is directly related to purpose. Do you believe that purpose is necessarily conscious purpose? Let's assume that life evolved form consisting completely of non-conscious beings to having conscious beings as well, and that there is a vague boundary between the two, a grey area, such that it would be debatable whether certain creatures are conscious or not. How are we going to decide whether a being is conscious or not?

If we watch the creature's behaviour, and notice that it appears to act with purpose, we have reason to believe that it acts with intention. However, we see all kinds of creatures that we know are not conscious, which appear to act with purpose. Therefore, acting with purpose, or intention, is not a good indicator as to whether or not a thing is conscious. In this vague boundary, between conscious and non-conscious, all the creatures appear to act with purpose, or intention. Don't you think that we should dismiss this misleading idea that intention is necessarily conscious intention? All it does is create confusion when we attempt to distinguish conscious from non-conscious.

.

Well what makes a fluctuation intentional rather than just actually being random noise? — apokrisis

An intentional act is one which is carried out for a purpose. That means that it is a part of a lager whole, the means toward an end. The whole, being something which will come to fruition in the future, is not immediately evident. Therefore it may appear as random noise, but this description would be a failing to recognize it as a part of a whole which has not yet come into existence.

Local intentional acts are possible. We humans - as the most complex kinds of thing - produce them all the time. But here we are talking of physics - the metaphysics of simplicity. — apokrisis

Physics is not metaphysics. So if you are reducing your metaphysics, such that it becomes a form of theoretical physics, just so that you can exclude the relevance of local intentional acts, you are either not engaged in metaphysics, or a very sloppy, lazy form of metaphysics.

You are just persistently grabbing the wrong end of the stick every time you face some fresh example — apokrisis

Each end of the example you hand me has to make sense, or else what is the point of making the example? You could hand me a valid conclusion with false premises, or excellent premises with an invalid conclusion, each is equally pointless.

So when you say "regardless of beginnings, context is what rapidly matters", I receive this as a premise because you have not provide the logic to support it as a conclusion. But as a premise, it has complexities which are difficult to understand without contradiction. Within a context, an event cannot properly be called a beginning. "Context" implies that there is a presupposed extension surrounding that supposed beginning, contradicting the meaning of "beginning".

If by "beginning" you mean something which comes into existence that is not directly part of, or caused by, the context, then we have to look for a cause outside of the described context. This is when we look for intention as a cause. But when we look at intention as a cause, the context which is evident is not what really matters, because the cause is part of a bigger whole, which will only come into existence in the future.

So sure, the tale feels significant if you have a metaphysics dependent on every big event having its tiny triggering cause. But instead this is about how regularity arises from randomness in a self-organising fashion.

In that light, efficient causes become a metaphysical red herring. Or at least, it only makes sense to talk about them in retrospective fashion from some perspective where a form or purpose is said to have been achieved. — apokrisis

The point is, that at every point in time of the "big event", every stage of proceedings, from the first triggering cause, to the finality, the event must be guided by intention. This means that at every moment of time, along this extended occurrence, there must be more and more tiny triggering causes, to keep the big event from going off track. The event can only be said to be "self-organizing" if each tiny triggering event emanates from within the context of the whole. That is, the cause of the organism must be truly immanent. Then each tiny efficient cause is of the utmost importance, in directing the "self-organizing", and clearly not a metaphysical red herring.

Yet really, what it says is that the critical event was no better than random noise. — apokrisis

This is exactly the kind of thinking which I am being critical of. Instead of singling out, and understanding the particular acts themselves, to see which one has which effect, they are all lumped together as random noise. However, within all that seemingly random noise, one intentional act may have a huge outcome over an extended period of time.

In real world full of interactions - like a chaos of billiard balls rattling around a table - any new ball you fire into the mess is going to have a high chance of being redirected. Most of the collisions are going to decelerate your ball, although there is also the slim chance that some collisions send it going even faster in the direction you intended. But either way, your initial act of acceleration to the ball will have exponentially less to do with its actual continuing behaviour over time. — apokrisis

But you were clearly referring to how things "begin". So your analogy, that there are balls already rattling around, doesn't suffice. Introducing a new efficient cause into a sea of efficient causes does not describe a beginning. This is what you said:

It doesn't really matter how things begin. Any old fluctuation will do as the fluctuations simply represent the infinity of particular ways to get rolling towards the one waiting generic global outcome. — apokrisis

So if we're not talking about the beginning now, we are talking about a universe with organised structures, not the random noise, of your chaos of billiard balls. With organized structures, a strategically placed, tiny efficient cause, can have a huge effect over an extended period of time, just like the butterfly effect.

Either way then, the direction of the tiny event may have great significance over the final outcome. At the beginning, there is no random noise, so the first event sets the direction for everything. In the middle, there may be what appears to be random noise, but all this apparent random noise is really part of the organized structures which we observe around us, the earth, solar system, galaxies, etc.. Here, an intentionally placed, minute efficient cause, could also significantly effect the final outcome.

So I maintain my accusation that this line of thinking amounts to an intellectual laziness. Instead of determining particular causes, this line of thinking lumps them altogether as some type of random soup, with no particular cause of existence of that soup, yet an assumed particular final outcome (effect). Doesn't this seem contradictory to you, a determined effect, from an indeterminate cause?

Plato did much analysis of pleasure and pain, I'll see if I can recall some of the principles put forward by him. To begin with, pleasure is not to be opposed to pain, because despite the fact that release from pain does bring a type of pleasure, there are other pleasures such as the pleasures of virtue, and the intellectual pleasures, which are not derived from a release from pain.

So the adverbialist theory is that pleasure and pain are attitudes towards experiences, and pleasure and pain are on a kind a subjective scale, similar to how different kinds of dances are on a scale of slow-fast. — darthbarracuda

Here, you have opposed pleasure and pain, which is what Plato advised against. The reason why we should disassociate these two is so that we can seek pleasures which have no associated pains. If it is the case that we only get pleasure through satisfying a desire, and desire, being a deprivation, is a pain, then we will always have to go through pain in order to get pleasure.

I mean I legitimately have fun when I play a video game, or read a book, or go for a walk, read philosophy, etc. I desire to do these things, and I have fun doing them. — darthbarracuda

Perhaps there is a subtle difference in types of "desire", which you need to consider. If, throughout your work day, you find yourself constantly desiring to play a video game, or read a book, then this is like an addiction, and it may develop into a form of illness. If, on the other hand, you know that these options are available to you, when you have time, and so you choose to do them, when you have time, without ever really desiring to do them, then you can derive the pleasure without ever suffering from the desire.

The question, though, is whether or not the satisfaction of a desire is always equally valuable as the lack of any desire in the first place. I think this is only true is the satisfaction of a desire does not somehow play a part in the overall well-being or "happiness" of a person like eudaimonia. So eudaimonia would, in virtue of its definition, requires the satisfaction of certain desires. And eudaimonia seems to be a good thing. — darthbarracuda

The issue I see, is that desire is never good. It is always caused by some deprivation, whether a real physical deprivation such as food or water, or a psychological one. You might think that the desire for food, hunger, is good, because it makes you eat, but it really means that you haven't eaten when you should have.

Now what Plato found, was that when pleasure is properly separated from pain, such that it is not associated with desires and release from pain, it becomes very difficult to say what pleasure is. That is because it is easier to understand what pain is, and when pleasure is opposed to pain, we can simply say that releasing ourselves from pains and desires is to have a pleasure. But this gives us no goals or objectives for producing pleasures which will provide the means for avoiding the pains and desires in the first place, and altogether, giving us true pleasure.

So I see that the closest thing to a description of pleasure in this thread, is a referral to "enjoyment". Is this the term which people would be most likely to use in describing pleasure, "enjoyment"? What does "enjoy" mean, and how else might one describe pleasure?

More important is the way events snowballed. And even more important is that there was some generic attractor - a global finality - towards which any such snowballing fluctuation was always going to tend. It really never mattered what might be said to break the initial symmetry as all paths were going to lead to much the same eventual outcome. — apokrisis

Why does this appear to be so opposed to you example? In the example, a small event such as the butterfly flapping its wings, could have a huge difference in the final effect, either nice weather, or a big storm. And proceeding from there, the difference would only get bigger and bigger, as the big storm would cause damage, etc.. Are you attempting to deny that a small event can make a huge difference over a long period of time?

This is exactly what we see as evidence in the evolution of life, a very small change occurs, then over a longer and longer period of time, this manifests into a bigger and bigger difference.

But then you make a conclusion completely opposed to these observations, all paths are going to lead to the same eventual outcome. Where is your evidence, or what kind of principles are you following?

So this is the ontic message of dissipative structure theory. It doesn't really matter how things begin. Any old fluctuation will do as the fluctuations simply represent the infinity of particular ways to get rolling towards the one waiting generic global outcome. It is formal and final cause that tell the story. — apokrisis

Again, this principle is completely opposed to the evidence. Changes closest to the beginning of any event have the most potential to change that event. This is due to the reality of momentum. From any point in space, motion can begin in any direction. Since such a beginning is necessarily an acceleration, the difficulty in adopting a different direction is exponential with the passing of time. Therefore the act at the beginning, being furthest back in time has the greatest influence over the final outcome.

Then you are saying that "the plant intends to produce seed" just means that there is a chance that the plant will produce seed. — Michael

No, to say that the plant intends to produce seed, is to say that it has as a goal, purpose, or objective, to produce seed. We've been through this already. The fact that there is a chance that it will not is irrelevant to this point. I know that you don't agree with me, you don't believe that any non-conscious thing could intend anything, or have a goal, objective, or purpose. But I think it is obvious, and you are in denial of basic facts of life.

I think this is just a consequence of your habit of usage of the word. You are in the habit of using "intend" and "intention", only to refer to properties of conscious beings. Since your usage has been restricted by this particular habit, you have come to believe that this is the only way that the word ought to be used. Your habit is the habit which others ought to have. I, on the other hand have a different way to use the word. I've spent much time now, with dictionary definitions and examples, trying to explain why I think my way is better than yours. You have merely repeated your assertions, only conscious things intend. Why do you think that your habit of use is better than the way I've explained to you?

So, rather than arguing that "chance within evolutionary theory is simply a myth", as you say in the OP, you're actually arguing that it isn't a myth. — Michael

I already went through these two substantially different ways of using "chance". One, the one I just used, refers to a future possibility, as a chance that something may occur. The other, the one I object to, refers to a past event as a chance occurrence, or random event.

"Intention" and "will" are identical. — charleton

No, when Michael said "the plant will produce seed", "will" I believe, was used as a synonym for "shall". It is another sense of the word "will" which is associated with intention. We must be careful not to equivocate, but I think that it was clear from the context.

I don't see how this explains the difference between "the plant intends to produce seed" and "the plant will produce seed". Are you saying that the former means "the plant has a chance to produce seed"? — Michael

To say that the plant intends to produce seed implies that it is recognized by the speaker of the phrase, that it is possible that for one reason or another, the plant will not produce seed. To say that the plant will produce seed implies that the production of seed is a necessity. The former recognizes the act as a contingent act, while the latter implies that it is necessary.

You could start with this book:

The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time — tom

Yes, the title of the book, betrays the problem I referred to, assuming that time has a physical basis. Here's a quote from what little I have access to, without paying, through your links:

"More recent conceptions of time in physics may instead be understood as a complete elimination of absolute time, and hence of absolute motion. This approach is equivalent to the construction of 'timeless orbits', ...".

I suggest you read something like theoretical physicist Lee Smolin's "Time Reborn", for an outline of the problems faced by physicists with respect to the ontology of time, and an explanation of the inadequacies of "entropy".

Entropy, to me, refers to the affect which the passing of time has on the physical world. But this concept reveals a deep deficiency in the thinking of physicists. In physics, time is not considered to be a real property of the physical wold, it has been conceptually removed through the synthesis of space and time, and the conception of four dimensional space. Yet engineers who work with real physical things need to employ the concept of entropy, to account for the fact that the passing of time has a real affect in the physical. This means that the passing of time is understood by these engineers to be a real causal agent in the physical world.

Now we have a ontological gap to bridge. Theoretically, time is not a real, active thing within the physical world, it is not actively passing, and therefore could not be a causal agent. In practise, the affects of time passing must be accounted for. The gap manifests as the micro/macro division. This can be related to the internal/external division, because the micro necessarily requires the assumption of a boundary for its creation. The gap can then be modeled as the difference between the bounded and the unbounded. Entropy is proposed to account for the difference between the unbounded (real time), and the bounded (conceptual space-time).

Models of spontaneous symmetry breaking have to introduce a material efficient cause to break the symmetry. There must be "a fluctuation" that disturbs the ball enough that slope and gravity take over.
Then the ball rolls until it falls off the dome and reestablishes a state of symmetry - sitting still with all forces in equilibrium. — apokrisis

Here is a reductionist attempt to bridge that gap. The reductionist will not consider the possibility of a real, non-physical, (unbounded), immaterial cause, to assist in understanding the role of time in the universe. Hence an efficient cause is assumed to set the ball rolling. But this is so blatantly contradictory, because prior to symmetry breaking there could be no time passing, therefore no efficient causation.

That is why the discussion of entropy here is completely misdirected. It is simply a way of circling around the real issue, while still avoid a direct approach. However, the focus on entropy is somewhat useful for bringing the specifics of the problem into view. Modern science really has no understanding of time, and other non-physical, or immaterial things. Unbounded things fall out of the scope of the scientist's carefully controlled experimentation. Furthermore, it has no approach, or method, for gaining an understanding of these things.

The habits of thought, which would make someone posit something like a chance fluctuation, to facilitate one's metaphysical belief, have developed into a particular form of laziness which permeates the intellectual society.

What's the difference between saying that the plant intends to produce seed and saying that the plant will produce seed? — Michael

There is a chance (chance in the proper, primary sense, as possibility) that the plant will not produce seed. There is a big difference between things which have already occurred, in the past (they are necessary), and things which may occur in the future (they are possible). It seems like many choose to ignore this difference.

Perhaps MU is using 'intend' to mean something like 'inward tendency'. The inward tendency of plants to produce seed could be said to be a function of the earlier instantiations of plants' relationships (in terms of viability) to the later instantiations of those plants, as it affected past (to us) but future (to the earlier plants) instantiations of those plants. — John

You could use the word tendency, and "tend" lends itself to care, attend, and intend. But tendency itself tends to imply a form of habituation. And if we keep looking for earlier instantiations, we must approach a first, because it is known that there was a time with no life on earth. So "tendency" does not approach the root of the issue, which is the cause of the tendency. "Intention" on the other hand is understood as a cause, final cause, and therefore gives us an approach to the issue, which is an issue of causation.

Entropy could be understood also as a tendency, with the same problem. it doesn't give us an approach to the cause. Instead, we are left to assume a chance fluctuation.

So you're saying that plants see, give heed to, or look upon the future? — Michael

They definitely have a relation to the future, but my favourite would be "let one's course be affected by" the future. That's exactly what I've been describing. From the day it starts growing, the plant intends to produce seed. It has as a purpose for growing, and that is to produce seed.

We disagree, so what? We each understand "intend" in a different way. I think you're wrong, and you misunderstand intention. You seem to think the same way about me. Now we can each go home and realize that someone else understands "intend" in a different way. I already know this though, because I've already been exposed to this type of narrow-minded thinking.

I'm not saying that they don't provide for the future. I'm saying that they have no regard for the future. To have regard for something is to think of or consider it. — Michael

Michael, I'm really tired of your childishness. You have an off-handed way of defining words for whatever suits your intention, with total disregard for accepted dictionary definitions. This only demonstrates that you are not well educated on the subject.

There is no definition of "regard" in my dictionary, which mentions "to think", or "consider" as you claim regard means. There are definitions which refer to "see", "give heed to", "look upon", "have relation to", etc., but why do you insist on "think"?

Raining provides water for people to drink, but it doesn't then follow that the clouds have a regard for the well-being of living things. It doesn't then follow that the clouds intend for plants and animals to drink and survive. — Michael

My laptop has foresight. It tells me it will shut down unless I plug in the charger, and then if I don't, it shuts down. — unenlightened

I never claimed that intention is essential to foresight, so I do not pretend that anything with foresight necessarily has intention. Unenlightened brought up foresight, and I agree that foresight may be an indication of intention, in the sense that foresight might be an essential aspect of intention, as unenlightened implied. But all this means is that anything with intention, also has foresight. It does not mean that everything with foresight has intention. So if you want to argue that rain, and laptops, provide for the future, and therefore have foresight, this does not necessitate that they have intention.

But I suspect the intention lies with the programmer. — unenlightened

That's right, I totally agree, and we went though this already, the difference between intention imposed from an external designer, and intention of an internal source. This is when Michael asked if I was making an appeal to the supernatural. So long as we maintain strict principles which define intention as inherent, immanent, intention remains as a natural thing, inhering within living beings, and not the property of an external, transcendent, designer of living things.

The intention externally imposed upon the components of the computer by the designer, and artificer, allows us to say that the parts exist in a specific relationship to each other, due to intention. That the computer exists in this designed way, is evidence that the relations of the parts is intentional. But intention itself, in its natural form, is within the designer. So despite the fact that the thing exists in a designed form, intention itself is separable from the designed form, and is attributable to the designer, as inherent within the designer, not within the designed form itself.

Due to the relationships between parts, we can conclude that DNA is a designed form, the parts exist in purposeful relations, so as to indicate that it is intentional. But intention is not necessarily within that deigned form, nor is it necessarily imposed from an external designer. It may inhere deeper, within a subatomic, immaterial agent, which creates that physical form.

I'm saying that the intentional agent must be conscious. — Michael

And I am saying that it is quite clear that this is a mistaken assumption. It doesn't matter how many people agree with you, a mistaken assumption is still mistaken. And to change the definitions of common words, to support your mistaken assumption does not make the mistake go away either.

Direct from OED:
purpose: "an object to be attained; a thing intended"
foresight: "regard or provision for the future"
Accordingly, any act of self-nourishment, which is carried out for the purpose of subsistence, is done so according to foresight. Therefore I maintain my charge that your attempt to restrict my use of words, in the way that you are, is unjustified.

Plants don't intend to do anything. — Michael

I'm sorry to have to shatter your illusions, but you're just plain wrong. And the fact that you will go to the extent of redefining words, to support your incorrect premise, indicates that you are steadfast in your refusal to recognize how wrong you are.

Plants have no regard for the future. — Michael

You can deny that self-nourishment and photosynthesis are acts of providing for the future, and that producing seed is an act of providing for the future, all that you want, but you're only fooling yourself.

I'm not assuming this. It simply follows from the common definition of "intention"/"purpose"/"design". You're misusing these words. — Michael

I am not misusing these words. You are attempting to impose unjustified restriction on my use of words. Look, "Intend" means to have as one's purpose. Purpose is defined as an object to be obtained. There is no reason to assume, that necessarily, what is referred to by "one", is a human being. Therefore a beaver may intend to build a dam. A bird may intend to build a nest. .

What is an intentional agent if not a conscious thing with (as unenlightened explains) a motivating foresight? — Michael

I already answered this. Plants are clearly not conscious, yet they carry out intentional acts such as photosynthesis. The plant produces sugar, with the "foresight" that it needs sugar within the flower to attract bees for reproduction. The plant produces seeds with the "foresight" of future generations. Foresight is defined as regard or provision for the future.

Though you may be a competent scientist, I don't know, you are simply uneducated, and in complete denial with respect to the facts of life. You attempt to justify your denial by claiming that I am misusing words. But no manner of restricting the use of words can change the reality of living beings.

I fail to see how one can intend without foresight which is based on memory and projection to a future. — unenlightened

Yes, there is always some type of foresight or projection toward the future with intention, but it may be very basic, to the extent of the will to continue, to subsist. The will to subsist is a projection toward the future. This projection into the future, intention, causes the act of self-nourishment.

Intention is based in desire, want, and this is based in a deficiency, or deprivation of existence. So for instance, because of a deficiency, I am hungry. So I have a desire, or want to eat. Thus I intend to eat. This is all derived from my instinctual projection into the future, my inherent will to subsist.

From this perspective, the subsistence of a living thing, which requires nourishment, depends on this projection into the future. This projection into the future is a fundamental feature of, and therefore an indication of, or evidence of, intention.

I see no reason to impute such things without evidence at the intra-cellular level at which genetic interpretation occurs. — unenlightened

So there you have your evidence, survival is itself a projection into the future. With respect to "genetic interpretation", we still need to assume something which does the interpreting. This "something" is the thing which acts with intention. What do you think performs genetic interpretations? I think it's the soul.

A designer is someone who makes conscious decisions to achieve some desired end. So, again, you're misusing words (or arguing for some sort of intelligence that makes genetic mutations occur). — Michael

No, I am arguing for an agent which carries out the act of reading DNA and doing such things. It is your assumption, that anything which could carry out such an intentional act must be "some sort of intelligence", which makes you conclude that I am arguing for "some sort of intelligence that makes genetic mutations occur".

What's the difference between X being the result of a natural, non-conscious intention and X being the causal consequence of prior physical phenomena? — Michael

Intention is understood to be non-physical. We understand the intentional agent, a human being for example, to choose the appropriate efficient causes (physical causes), required to bring about the desired end. This is a free will action. Thus intention is understood as a cause which creates a physical activity (efficient cause), without itself being such a thing. What is not understood is how the intentional agent starts a chain of efficient causes. A determinist doesn't allow such a chain of efficient cause to start in this way. That is the difference.

I might point out, because it is not clear in the thread, that selection, in the short term of plant breeders and so on does not rely on novel mutations but variability within the gene pool of populations. There is a nice sloppiness about a gene pool that allows the peppered moth to adapt to the industrial revolution and then adapt back without having recourse to happy accidents of mutation and then of re-mutation. — unenlightened

Now, consider what StreetlightX says:

It's not even that genes can be 'turned on and off'; it's that even when they are 'on' they can do 'different stuff'. — StreetlightX

So here's an analogy. Consider that genes are like words, which, together in combination, produce something. You might think that if you select the proper words, you will create a sentence with one fixed meaning. But this is not the case, due to variance in the meaning of individual words, the meaning of the sentence might be different depending on the individual who interprets the sentence. Likewise, the same genes might have a different effect on the phenotype, depending on the individual. This means that there is something deeper which acts to determines the phenotype, rather than just the genes. That is, something deeper than the genes, which actually interprets the genes, like a mind is necessary to interpret words. And it is due to this factor, the necessity of something which "interprets", that words, nor genes, have a fixed meaning.

I don't see how you get from "X successfully achieves Y" to "A intentionally uses X to achieve Y". — Michael

X is an attribute, a property which is necessarily attributed to something, and this implies the existence of A, which X is the property of. You say "photosynthesis produces sugar" (X achieves Y). So where's the intention?" I say the intention is in the plant, A. You remove the plant, and you remove the intention.

When you remove the part from the whole, and analyze the function of the part, there is no intention to be found here. Intention is found in the relationship of the part to the whole, the purpose that the part has with respect to the whole. Your computer, for example, has many components, each of which, on its own, has a function. Put together, they make a computer, and each part's function has a purpose in relation to the existence of the computer as a whole. Since each part has a purpose in relation to the whole, we can conclude that it was put together with intention. If someone analyzes the computer itself, the fact that the parts have a purpose with respect to the whole, implies design, intention.

You want to deny the validity of this inductive conclusion, that when the parts of a thing have a purpose in relation to the whole thing, the thing was created with intention. You do this by denying that there is intention involved, in places where there really is. That is simple denial of reality. How can you deny that photosynthesis is useful to the plant? And if it is useful, how can you deny that it is purposeful? And if it is purposeful, how can you deny that it is intentional?

To say that I intend to do something but that I haven't consciously decided to do that thing strikes me as a very obvious contradiction

What, exactly, do you mean by the word "intend"? What does it mean for an habitual act to be carried out intentionally? — Michael

To say that an act has purpose in relation to a larger whole, is to say that it is intentional, it is carried out intentionally. There is no need to assume that the thing which carries out an intentional act, does so consciously. In the example of your computer, each part plays a role with respect to the whole. This makes "the role" an intentional act. What the part does, in relation to the whole, is an intentional act, it was produce with intent, but the part is not conscious. Intention is not acting within the computer, as it does in living things, it is imposed from an external source, and this is called design.

Earlier in the thread, I stressed that we should separate intention as imposed from an external source, design, from intention which inheres within. The former we infer by analyzing artificial things, the latter we infer by analyzing natural things.

Mitosis and meiosis are reactive events that occur in response to physical changes in their environment. It's not much different to a computer turning on in response to a button being pressed. — Michael

Intention is implied within each of these acts. That the computer turns on when you hit the button implies that the computer was created with intention, designed. That the living cell divides when the time is right, implies that it was created with design. So, we look for the designer. The computer has an external designer. The living cell appears to have an internal designer.

What, exactly, are you suggesting? You haven't been very clear. Are you arguing against the notion of physical causation and in favour of a supernatural explanation? If so then what's the evidence, and if not then what view are you attacking? — Michael

What I am attacking is the false representation of intentional acts, commonly referred to as "chance". What I believe is that intention is not evident in observations of physical causation, it must be inferred. It is inferred in a method similar to what I described above. When a part plays a role in a larger whole, then intention is implied. We have much evidence where intention is involved in human artifacts. Artificial things are often separated from natural things. Rather than argue that artificial things are supernatural, I would argue that the exclusion of intention from natural things, is a mistake.

The modern perspective sees intention as something imposed externally. This implies an external designer of the intentional thing, such as the computer. Some may proceed to assume an external, transcendental Designer, of the entire natural world. But this neglects the natural, real existence of intention, as something within. So when we consider intention as it really is, in its natural state, we find it as something inherent within nature, immanent. This is where we find intention, through introspection, inhering within us, each, individually. And this intention is natural.

So to exclude intention from nature, as you want to do, and to say that those who apprehend purpose, or intention, within the natural acts of plants and animals, are invoking the supernatural, is a mistake. We simply see "nature" in a different way, a more comprehensive way, one which allows intention to be a natural thing.

Yes, I think that photosynthesis is not a purposeful act. A purposeful act is an act done by conscious determination. — Michael

This is where we have a difference of opinion, as to what constitutes "purposeful". I think that the carbohydrates produced by photosynthesis are useful in the plant's future, perhaps in the flower, to attract bees. Therefore the plant produces this sugar with the intention of producing a flower, and that is done with the intention of attracting insects, and that with the intention of fulfilling reproductive needs. You restrict "intention" to "that which is carried out with conscious determination". But there is no need for such a restriction. Intention has been observed to go much deeper than the conscious level. Habitual acts are carried out intentionally, without conscious direction.

What is the distinction between an "internal" and an "external" cause? I understand these terms as referring to the spatial location of an object, such that a thing located on one side of a wall, under a roof, is inside the house and a thing located on the other side of the wall, under the open sky, is outside the house, and that a thing located between my chest and my back is inside me and a thing located between my chest and your chest – whilst facing each other – is outside me.

You seem to be using the terms in a very different way, so I'd like it explained. — Michael

Yes, this is a good description, so I am not using terms in a very different way. You distinguish between the internal and external of an object. Now consider an object, a body, in relation to Newton's first law. That body will continue in the state that it is, unless acted upon by a force. Let's say that the force is the cause of change, or motion. The force could have a source outside that body, or it could have a source from within that body. This is the difference between internal and external cause.

So, in my post, I questioned:
"the activities of DNA, such as mitosis, whatever it is which "acts" at this level. I don't think biological science has properly identified what it is which is acting, because it must be acting at a sub-atomic level to produce such molecular changes".
Consider activities such as mitosis and meiosis. What do you think is the active agent in such activities, what is acting? We could say that the cell is acting, then we assume an internal cause. What is this internal cause, or force?

Plants don't act purposefully, they act reactively — Michael

This is the misunderstanding that we must reject in order to properly understand the existence of life. Do you think that photosynthesis is not a purposeful act?

And what do you mean by "internal source of movement"? — Michael

Reread my post, I think there is a preliminary answer to this question there. If you have a specific problem, please address it to me. But don't ask me to rewrite what I just wrote, if you skipped over the passage, not taking the time to understand the words.

So yes, humans are individuated within a historically-evolved social context. We are the product of a system of constraints. We are shaped by the culture within which we have no choice about growing up. — apokrisis

That said, the only way I know how to make sense of a telos in this 'third' sense you mention here is through the notion of entropy, where the (necessary) cosmic dissipation of energy prompts the formation of local (contingent) negentropic — StreetlightX

Now you have both turned to an external telos. But there is no reason to drop the notion of immanent telos, which is prior to, and acts as the cause of living organisms. Just because the science isn't there, to understand this immanent telos, doesn't mean that to speculate in this direction is a lost cause. Nor does it mean that we cannot produce a coherent understanding in this direction. What is needed is a proper understanding of existence in relation to the passing of time.

Living things have intentions (assuming some level of consciousness), but they don't have the power to intentionally alter their genetic code (the emerging field of genetic engineering not withstanding). — Michael

I do not conceive of intention requiring consciousness, I understand consciousness as requiring intention. This positions intention as prior to consciousness. This is consistent with observations that plants and animals which do not appear to have developed consciousness, still act purposefully. Therefore intention (purposefulness) appears to inhere within all living things. It appears to exist primarily as an instinctual directing of the activities of living things. This goes right to the molecular level, and the activities of DNA, such as mitosis, whatever it is which "acts" at this level. I don't think biological science has properly identified what it is which is acting, because it must be acting at a sub-atomic level to produce such molecular changes. But this thing which is acting, is clearly acting purposefully, or intentionally. And it is also responsible for genetic changes.

The key to this conceptual scheme is to understand all living activities as caused from within. The external shapes and affects the internal activities, but does not cause them. This means that we distance ourselves from Newton's first law, which implies that a thing will persist unchanged until acted upon by an external force. We must dismiss this law to account for living activities which have an internal source of movement. Now the determinist, physicalist, models, which represent the living organism as being caused to do this or that, by external causes, are rejected, in favour of a model which represents the cause of living activity as emanating from within, and being affected by external obstacles.

The difference is between a telos which is in some way 'pre-existant' and 'external' to the system, and a telos which is generated internally by the system itself. A difference between transcendent and immanent telos. — StreetlightX

I think immanent telos is a good idea. But immanent implies inherent within, so to think that it is generated, or emergent from the system is somewhat contradictory, it must be inherent within the system. Besides, we know that the existence of the intention (telos) is always prior to the existence of the thing created (in this case, the system itself). So I prefer something more in line with John's description.

But, a third possibility, I think, is that of a telos that is "pre-existent" and yet not "external to the system", not transcendent but nonetheless infinite and eternal, and yet a fully immanent telos. — John

Thus Apo is perfectly right to note that the necessity of survival itself 'makes' the contingencies involved 'matter', and that it is the interplay of necessity and chance that drives the evolutionary process as a whole (Why he thinks I somehow deny this is beyond me, then then again, confrontation and disagreement is simply his modus operandi).

In any case, the question is about the modality of these necessities themselves. — StreetlightX

I think that you, as well as apokrisis, are too quick to jump to this conclusion (premise) of necessity. Where do you draw this "necessity" from? As extinction demonstrates, existence is just as much a contingency as anything else.

But there is also another view that can be developed by focusing in the necessity and teleology involved. — apokrisis

The whole point of teleology is that there is no necessity, that is what gives us free will. We are free to choose our ends, and the means. Necessity is artificial, created, it is not natural. We, as individuals, historically have created a sense of what's needed, food, shelter, etc. From this we develop a communal necessity, morality, laws, and eventually a logical necessity. Logical necessity is derived from this need, what is desired for a purpose, and this need is chosen.

We cannot confuse the two basic senses of "necessity", logical necessity, and that which is designated as necessary for a particular end, needed. The latter, is actually a contingency, and open to choice. The former being artificial and therefore unnatural, is a refined form of the latter.

I'm not convinced that we really can "account for the generation of necessity" at all, or even, more modestly, account for necessity. Necessity is always presupposed in all our thinking and we are hobbled by the inevitably mechanical, that is deterministic, nature of our models, which is really to say the same thing. — John

This is not logical necessity referred to here, above, it is necessity in the sense of needed for an end.

And that's what is meant when it is claimed that genetic mutations are chance occurrences; that the mutations weren't made to happen intentionally. — Michael

When you consider the immanent nature of intentionality, purposefulness, and observe that it is inherent within all living beings, it is hard to deny that it is prior to living bodies, and realize that mutations were intentionally made to happen.

There's no intelligent designer or genetic gremlin that realises that a certain mutation needs to happen for the organism to survive and so works to make this necessary change. — Michael

It is not that "a certain mutation needs to happen". It is the case that the living being does not know what mutation needs to happen, because the organism emerges in an environment of unknowns. Therefore, seemingly random mutations need to happen, in order that they can be judged in a process of trial and error, as the organisms become accustomed to the environment.

Absence of design <> discoverable cause. You're working with an incoherent notion of chance. — StreetlightX

Are you saying that "chance" in the sense of an occurrence which has neither a design nor a determinable cause is an incoherent notion? I tend to agree, because as I argued earlier, random occurrences must be designed to be that way. The toss of the coin, or dice, the lottery, the random number generator, they're all designed.

My contention is that the scientific community propagates a myth of "chance" in this incoherent sense of "chance", insinuating that there are random occurrences which are "chance" events.

According to neo-Darwinism, whatever physical process brings about variation, there is no mechanism by which that physical process can be systematically affected by the environment. — tom

What would you mean by "systematically affected"? Doesn't consistency in the world fulfill the conditions of "systematic"? So if the world behaves in a consistent way, as it appears to according to the laws of physics, and the way that the world behaves affects the evolutionary process, wouldn't this constitute "systematically affected"?