The principle of sufficient reason cannot apply to existence (everything) without circularity, since otherwise the deduced reason would automatically not exist — which is contradictory.

Therefore, applying the principle to the whole universe, automatically/implicitly assumes something "extra universal" — which just is a subtle form of begging the question. — jorndoe

It's not begging the question. If observation of existing things leads to the inductive conclusion that all existing things are contingent, then this is a premise from which we can proceed in a deductive argument. If the whole universe is an existing thing, then the univese is contingent. You might question the method of observation, or the inductive reasoning which leads to the premise that all things are contingent, but to simply claim that the premise begs the question, is not only a pointless assertion, but it's simply wrong.

Here's an analogy. Suppose upon observation, someone determines that the colour of objects change depending on conditions external to the objects, the objects' environment. That person might employ inductive logic to produce the premise that the colour of objects is contingent on something external to the object. If we assume that the universe is an object, then we could proceed to say that the colour of the universe is contingent on something external to it.

This type of proceeding is not a form of begging the question. But if there appears to be an obvious problem with the deductive conclusion, you need to examine the premises, and determine how they were derived. What is at issue in both cases above is the concept of "the universe is an object", or as you say, "the whole universe". If the "the universe" is one whole, an object, then it is necessarily bounded, and this forces the question of what acts as the boundary.

Is an instantaneous cause temporal, though? I mean, I don't think so. Something that can be said to be in an instant wouldn't be occurring in time at all - that requires duration. I don't think this is a really discrete moment in time, like a Planck time unit, but something without duration. It's resistance to being caught into time at all. And if you think such a thing is impossible, then I would say you estimate time wholes behaving the same way as object wholes, but we might argue that time is not consistent of part wholes at all like extended objects are, and that you merely assumed such in viewing time as a spatialized continuum. — Marty

The nature of time is clearly the key issue to the cosmological argument. There are two distinct ways of looking at the relationship between time and physical (material, or temporal) existence. Change, motion and such, we can understand as inherent within physical existence. There is not problem here, we take this for granted, and this gives us "contingent" existence.

The "way" of the cosmological argument, is to analyze and understand a logical relationship between contingent existence and time. Contingent existence, and therefore all physical existence, which has motion and change inherent within it, is logically dependent on the passing of time. There is no such thing as change and motion without the passing of time. Therefore the passing of time is necessarily prior to all physical existence. The passing of time becomes comprehensible as a type of activity which is prior to physical activity.

The more common "way" in current understandings, which is the way of modern science, ties the passing of time to physical existence, motion and change, such that without physical change, there is no passing of time. I've taken time to study this issue, and I prefer the way of the cosmological argument as providing for a more comprehensive understanding of reality.

Consider what you call an "instantaneous cause". If physical change requires a certain duration of time, a planck time for example, then we know that between one physical state and the next, a duration of time has passed. However during that time period no physical change is occurring, the physical change only occurs after that period of time has passed.
.

There's no way that reading several books can be necessary to comprehend a definition. — andrewk

It's not definition which I am talking about, it's more like description. It is to describe how a word is used. So perhaps it is closer to poetry than to physics. In the case of many words, how they are used in the public domain tells us more about the meaning of the word then how it is defined in a scientific manual.

You can actually learn something from Donald Trump?

For us believing physicists, the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.” — tom

Why is that illusion so stubbornly persistent?

The reason I see Thomism as mystical is that it relies on various words that have no definition that can escape either circularity or triviality, of which 'simple' is an example. Others are 'contingent', 'conditioned' and 'immaterial'. They mostly seem to be based in ontology and connected to the Aristotelean idea of essence - another term that one either finds meaningful or one doesn't. Since no definitions are available, people either find themselves naturally accepting them as if they mean something, or they don't. I am in the latter camp. — andrewk

There is a tradition in philosophy for philosophers to develop the meaning of a term. This means that one has to read much of the philosopher's work to understand fully the application of the word, how it applies to related concepts. I think that Plato started this with his dialectics. The interesting thing which Plato demonstrated is that the philosopher doesn't even really know the meaning of the word. Instead, the philosopher will take a word, which has much inconsistency in current usage, and try to produce a coherent concept. Plato did this with many words including "idea", Aristotle with "potential", and "form", Aquinas with other words including "contingent".

But any cosmological argument is merely going to state that all we need is a contingent world. — Marty

Yes. that's pretty much the point. Contingent means requiring a cause. If we accept the premise that all things require a cause, then "cause" is necessarily prior to "thing", and there is a cause which is prior to all things. One could assume an infinite regress, but this is contrary to the philosophical disposition, as the desire to know, because it renders the wold unintelligible.

I'm sure Unenlightened won't mind me helping others to avoid making the same mistake I did... so explaining that if he seems totalitarian, that's not a reflection of how the moderators actually feel about things. — Mongrel

What a moderator posts in a reply on the forum, and how a moderator moderates the forum are two distinct things. I'm sure we all know that. But be careful replying to a moderator lest the moderator replies with moderation. Hmm, something's amiss. Try this: The moderator should be moderate in the act of moderation, but in the act of discussion in the forum, there's no need for moderation from the moderator.

But as this clarification indicates, I wrongly assumed that someone who is fucking offensive is an offensive fucker. You can put this schoolboy error down to drinking if you like, or to my usual dictatorial tone, or to some other failing, I really don't mind. — unenlightened

Yeah, I can see how, through the blur of alcohol, someone who is being fucking offensive might appear to be an offensive fucker, or if someone called you fucking offensive you might misconstrue this, as an accusation of being an offensive fucker. Perhaps even, you might recognize some as fucking offensive, and mistakenly call them offensive fuckers. I've seen a lot worse errors of interpretation and composition around here.

I'll go through the rest of your response later, but I wanted to address this because you've misunderstood what I meant. When I said external physical effect (in males) I meant an erection, which is required to complete the act of sex. And sexual hunger is what causes the erection. — Baden

This is where we meet the vagueness of the external/ internal boundary. I don't see how an erection is external. My penis is part of myself, just like my hands, feet, lungs, and heart. Why would you single out the penis as part of yourself which is external?

In any case, other than through the means of imagination, the erection is caused by awareness of an external thing, not by an awareness of an internal pain of deficiency. That is the position I am arguing. The pain of deficiency is caused by failure to satisfy.

MU wants to cut the link between sexual hunger and sex. But without the physical manifestation of the sexual hunger, you cannot complete the sex act. — Baden

Well that's the point, isn't it? There is a divide here, it's the inversion of the is/ought divide, a divide between what is desired and what is the case. We cannot proceed logically from X is desired, to the premise that there is a deficiency of X, because we cannot even say that a desire for X is necessarily recognized as a desire for X. What if the desire for X is recognized as a desire for Y? Having a sexual desire does not mean that you are aware that you have a desire for sex, nor does it mean that you are aware of a deficiency of sex, because this would require that you know that the erection is a desire for sex. That's why we have sex ed. in school. You and TGW want to jump this chasm, to proceed on the premise that if you have an erection, you are aware that you have a desire for sex.

The interesting point here is that the penis per se, is not throbbing for anything in particular. So I would say sexual desire is something far more complex than the mere throb of the knob (sorry, couldn't resist a bit of schoolboy humour O:)). — John

That's the idea, young boys play with themselves, their hands play the role of the external objects which cause arousal. They are not aware that a hard on is a desire for sex.

So still my answer would be the same. Metaphysical-strength axioms seem self-evident when they result from dichotomous reasoning. — apokrisis

No, the point is that such axioms result from a description of what is, reality, not from dichotomous reasoning. The dichotomous reasoning follows the description. The description is "objects are bounded", what follows from the dichotomous reason is that it is impossible that objects are not bounded. So if we assume the existence of something which is not bounded, it is impossible that this is an object.

But then as I say, my own take is that dichotomies only do produce ideal limits. — apokrisis

See, contrary to what you say here, the dichotomy produced is between the ideal (not bounded), and the practical, the description of objects. The description is not an ideal, it is a representation, a model.

So now we could talk the same way about your own proposed dichotomy here - objects and boundaries. — apokrisis

It's not a dichotomy which I proposed, it is a description, which is proposed as an axiom. It is not proposed as a dichotomy between objects and boundaries, but as a description of objects. Therefore "boundary" is to be read as a property of objects, not as dichotomous to objects.

So the idea of a bounded object is a crisp metaphysical ideal that in reality only really exists in this fashion. — apokrisis

Correct, in reality boundaries are porous, as you describe. So the question is where do we get this idea of a continuous boundary. Boundaries, as we know them, are as you describe, yet we also want to assume an ideal boundary, the continuous one. If we cannot describe how this boundary could exist, in reality, what it could be bounding, this supposed ideal is nonsense.

So on the one hand, we can easily imagine a world of bounded objects. We can axiomatise a metaphysical dichotomy in that fashion - one that is built up from ancient debates about the continuous and the discrete, the one and the many, to arrive at an atomistic conception of bounded objects. — apokrisis

I don't see where you get the axiomatic dichotomy from. We have an axiom concerning the nature of an object, that it has a boundary, and we have an ideal which is "boundless". The ideal of boundless must be described in a self-evident way to become an axiom. I believe that this was the ancient trick of the theologians, to demonstrate that the boundless (God) is self-evident.

You are contradicting your proposed axiom though. The axiom was that boundaries are continuous. I objected, saying that this is not self-evident. How does proposing two types of boundaries, continuous and non-continuous, help to solve the issue?

We can't get the metaphysical/philosophical axioms that MU mentions because meanings are context dependent. — Hoo

So let me see if I have this straight, the position you're arguing. It is useless to seek self-evident axioms, as there is no such thing, because meaning is context dependent. Therefore we should only use mathematical axioms, as apokrisis suggests, which have crisply defined, and fixed meaning within a mathematical system. This entails that anything which is logically possible is also true.

But you see the problem: Because sexual hunger has an external physical effect that is a necessary condition for the successful completion of the sexual act (in males at least) you can't in this case put the deeper instinct cart before the conscious compulsion horse without falling into obvious absurdity. — Baden

No, I don't see a problem here. The successful completion of eating requires an external physical object just as much as the sex act. That is the point of my argument, eating is the result of an awareness of external objects, not the result of an awareness of an internal hunger. Sex is the same.

We cannot deny the role of the external object here. When we eat there is a particular external object which is eaten, and in the sex act, there is also an external source of tactile stimulation. So, we can start from the fact that a particular object is the object of desire because it is particular objects (persons in the sex act) which end up satisfying the desire.

TGW has reduced this desire for a particular, to a general desire, called "hunger". Now we have the general hunger for food, and the general hunger for sex, two distinct generalized appetites. The claim is that the general appetite produces the appetite for the particular. I have no problem with this, so I'll allow it, with reservations as to how we describe "appetite". Right now, it is defined as hunger, and desire. Where TGW makes the mistake is in the unjustified premise that the desire, or appetite, is the result of, or "is" itself, a pain of deficiency, or privation. This premise cannot be verified by induction, because the evidence does not support it. People continue to eat, therefore they have the desire to eat when there is no such privation. And with respect to sex, the same is true, unless you define "lack of privation" as having sex all the time, people continue to desire sex when there is no real privation.

The conclusion is that the desire for food, or sex, "appetite", is not a deficiency or privation, nor is it caused by a deficiency or privation, this is TGW's false premise, which is unsupported by the evidence. Therefore we must look to something else, to describe this desire, as the cause of desire, or appetite. Desire itself is internal, and without an object of desire, it is complete emptiness, void, nothingness. We cannot describe it as a feeling of privation or deficiency because that has been demonstrated as the false premise. So this emptiness, void, nothingness, can only be described as desire if it is related to an object. Therefore desire, appetite, is this void nothingness in relation to an object. It can only become a deficiency or privation when it is related to an object. Then in relation to this object, the object of desire, there is a deficiency or privation.

Awareness cannot be, in the primary sense, an awareness of one' s internal deficiencies or privations, because these are all instances of emptiness, nothingness, and there is no deficiency except in relation to something else. So there is nothing there, in the internal, to be aware of. It is when the nothingness of the internal is placed in relation to external objects, and the self becomes aware of the external objects, that the general appetite for objects is formed. Then deficiency is apprehended.

But in it's basic form, it just is the latter (ask any (other) animal). None of this is to deny our obvious ability to arrange our habits around times hunger is likely to arise, but there is no room for a categorical wedge between the conscious awareness of hunger and our reasons for eating. — Baden

It is not the "awareness of hunger" which is at issue here, it is how "hunger" is defined. I describe hunger as an appetite, the desire to eat. This is necessarily directed toward external objects, therefore hunger is a feeling which is based in an awareness of external objects. TGW describes hunger as a feeling resulting from an internal deficiency. TGW's description is not consistent with the evidence.

Instincts may motivate us in ways we don't understand or that we can't fully trace, but they primarily do so by means of feelings and emotions of which we are aware. You just can't cut that link and retain a coherent depiction of the human condition. — Baden

I am not out to deny that we are aware of feelings and emotions, what I am saying is that these feelings and emotions are themselves based in an awareness of things external.

This is a good way of putting it, and I'll add to the criticism above about a feeling-based account being incapable of thought: it's only passions that can possibly provide reasons, and thus allow for thinking (reasoning). Passions compel, which doesn't move the organism in the way gravity moves a stone, since the stone can't be compelled to do anything (it just does what it does), and thus has no reasons to do anything. — The Great Whatever

I am not at all disputing the fact that passions compel, nor that we are aware of passions and their ability to compel. What I dispute is your characterization of passions. I believe that passion requires necessarily the awareness of an external object. There is no passion without an awareness of an external object. So despite the fact that passion is an internal feeling, it is consequent upon the awareness of the external object. You have declared that we become aware of passions or desires before we become aware of external objects, but this is impossible if passion and desire require an awareness of external objects.

But anyway, are bounds not self-evidently continuous? So if there are (discrete) objects, then continuity is also an aspect of your axiom of object boundedness? — apokrisis

I don't think it is self-evident that boundaries are continuous. A dotted line makes a non-continuous boundary. I think the best example of boundaries that nature gives us, is the boundary of a physical object, which we see with the visual sense, and touch, feeling it with the hand or other body part. The texture of those boundaries indicates that they may not be as continuous as they appear to be. Of course the science of chemistry indicates to us that the boundaries between substances cannot be considered to be continuous at all.

If we deny the reality of these boundaries, saying that the boundaries of physical objects are not real boundaries at all, what are we actually doing with this denial? We are denying the actual examples of boundaries, in favour of an ideal boundary. We simply assume that boundaries are continuous, as a mathematical type of axiom, an ideal which has not been justified. Then the boundaries which are shown to us do not fulfill the qualifications of the ideal, so we deny that they are boundaries. Now the ideal boundary must be justified as a true example, or it should be dismissed as not properly representing the boundaries which we know of.

That is why I suggested earlier in the thread, that we consider the boundary between future and past, in time. Perhaps this boundary can justify the ideal continuous boundary which you desire as an axiom.

Actually, it appears to me to be insane because it is. — The Great Whatever

It appears to be X, therefore it is X, is faulty logic. You have no premise to exclude the possibility of mistake. You can look at others, and draw your conclusions about feelings and emotions, based in some appearances, and unsound deductive reasoning, or you can look at your own feelings and emotions and see how far they are from the logic you wish to apply. You seem to derive some pleasure from the former.

Referring back to the op, not only do we reflect, or introspect, when we desire to please others, but when we see others insisting on false principles, such as you do, then we are forced to reflect upon our inner selves, to determine the truth. In either case, it starts with a recognition of the other.

That's right. Once you have axioms, you are good to go with the deductions. It all unfolds mechanically in a predestined fashion.

But what is the meta-theory about forming axioms - the semantic residue animating the unfolding syntax? — apokrisis

There is an important issue here. In philosophy, an axiom is a self-evident truth. In mathematics, an axiom may be anything which does not contradict the mathematical system which it is put to use within. So in philosophy, an axiom is necessarily true, while in mathematics, an axiom is a logical possibility.

We can posit the axiom of continuity - having identified it as one of two choices. Reality could be fundamentally discrete or continuous. Well, let's pick continuous for the sake of argument and run with that, see where it leads. — apokrisis

So, as a philosophical axiom, we cannot just pick any axiom, it must be self-evident. We have evidence that objects are bounded, and "object" may be defined in such a way that an object is necessarily bounded, so we could pick an axiom such as "objects are bounded".

With respect to continuity though, as I stated earlier in the thread, that some aspect of reality is continuous, is implied through observations of reality, and inductive reason. Since it is implied, that some aspect of reality is continuous, this is not self-evident, we cannot pick continuity as an axiom. The assumption of continuity must be justified.

This is insane. — The Great Whatever

To you, it appears to be insane, because you haven't taken the time to consider the reality of these issues. You simply accept as true, something which appears as logical to you, without delving into the complexities of the issue. Plato did much work on this subject, work which you display complete ignorance of.

Fascinating. Can we apply this to other appetites too? I mean it totally explains my sex life. — Baden

Yes, I think it applies to all the appetites, this is the principle which Plato pointed to through many dialogues, and it is fundamental to morality. Pain and pleasure cannot be opposed in a system of logic, as the sophists tried. This is because, as Plato demonstrates, pleasure is not simply a relief from pain, nor is it a lack of pain. We naturally seek pleasures which cannot be described as a lack of pain, or a relief from pain. Consistent with this, many activities such as sex, and eating, are naturally sought because they are pleasurable, they are not sought as a relief from pain.

The ramifications of this principle, into moral ethics, are extensive. We are inclined to act toward a perceived good; not because we are presently suffering in a state of deprivation, but because we apprehend some form of pleasure which may be derived from that apprehended good. This allows us to remove pain and suffering as a necessity in obtaining the good. We can define "the good" in relation to a pleasure that is sought, rather than in relation to a prior pain or deprivation.

The fact that this fundamental moral principle is utilized, and works, is evidence that our actions are not primarily motivated by a desire to relieve ourselves from pain. The principal motivation of action is a perceived pleasure. This allows us to develop morally, through seeking rewards, without having to be first punished.

How am I even supposed to respond to this? — The Great Whatever

I eat every day at pretty much the same time. If I miss this eating time, then I get hungry. Maybe you always wait until you get hungry before you eat, but I know with certainty that it is not hunger which compels me to eat.

First up, I thought we were speaking about animals, not about humans. — John

Do you not consider a human being to be an animal? If you want to understand what causes animals to behave the way that they do, why not look at yourself?

In any case, you say that "at the first level it is habitual", but that can't be right since otherwise newborn animals would not feed. — John

This is just an issue of the direction of ordering, As evident to me, my awareness, habit is first, then instinct is deeper.

You say that "at the deeper level it's instinctual" but what could the instinct to eat be other than the felt urge to eat? — John

The instinct to eat, is the deeper urge to eat. The instinct to eat is not the feeling of hunger, it is classed with the habit of eating, which is clearly not the feeling of hunger, that is the point. These are two distinct things. Sometimes, if I don't eat when I normally do, I get hungry. If I reflect on this feeling, I will associate it with not having eaten, then I may get a strong desire to eat if I cannot quell this thought. That association, between the feeling of hunger, and not having eaten when I normal eat, takes a fairly high degree of intelligence to draw. I do not think that primitive animals have the degree of intelligence necessary to make this association.

Do you think that a worm has the intelligence required to make an association between the feeling of hunger, and not having eaten when it should have? Do you see the issue here? The instinct to eat compels us to eat when we ought to eat. Hunger only begins, as a feeling, if we have not eaten when we should have. Therefore hunger is not what compels us to eat, it only begins as a feeling, if the mechanism which compels us to eat has failed to do so.

One would do well to reflect on Plato's disassociation of pleasure and pain. Pleasure is demonstrably something other than a relief from pain. To place pleasure and pain as logical opposites, pleasure being logically equivalent to not-pain, is a mistaken approach

Yes, I agree that we can establish such a distinction, whether it is a "proper" or improper one is an open issue, but in any case I can't see the relevance to the argument of our being able to establish such a distinction. Animals cannot establish such a distinction, and I think we must imagine that they eat when they feel the pangs of hunger, if food is available, or they go in search for it if it not. Alternatively we may say that they eat when they feel the urge, but whatever way we want to express it ,it is a feeling, an awareness, within the animal that motivates it to eat. And I had thought that you were arguing against TGW's position regarding "inner affection". — John

What I am arguing against, is the idea that human beings, as well as other animals, are "aware" of inner feelings, like the urge to eat. I think that the fact that we refer to these as "instincts" demonstrates that we are not aware of such things. An instinct is something which motivates us which we are not aware of.

The point was just that if you stop something from feeling hunger, it can die as a result, vitiating the (IMO absurd) claim that hunger doesn't compel eating — The Great Whatever

Since, as I pointed out to John, hunger only kicks in when the mechanism which compels us to eat when we should eat, fails to do so, then preventing something from feeling hunger would not cause that thing to die immediately. And, we all die eventually.

Hunger is not a signaling of any state of the body whatsoever to the organism, who need know nothing objective about its own body at all in order to be hungry. — The Great Whatever

If this is the case, then by what principle do you argue that hunger is a type of awareness? This is what is at issue here. To class "that which compels one to eat" as a type of awareness, we have to stretch, to absurd extents, the description of one, or both of these two.

Seeing is first of all the feeling of light, color, and contour. — The Great Whatever

OK, but isn't the light, colour, and contour something external? So isn't this "feeling of light", an awareness of something external?

The frog only needs to be compelled by hunger and instinct to behave in a certain way... — The Great Whatever

As I explained, I don't think it is hunger which compels one to eat. And being compelled by instinct cannot be classified as a form of awareness. Perhaps awareness could be classed as an instinct, but not vise versa.

If it is not pangs of hunger that motivate animals to eat, then what is it? Lions, for example, will not show any interest in prey when sated. It seems obvious they are aware of being sated, and stop eating at that point. — John

It is the desire to eat, which motivates one to eat. At the first level it's habitual, at the deeper level it's instinctual, but pangs of hunger are not what stimulates the desire to eat. Compare how many times that you have had the desire to eat with how many time that you have had pangs of hunger, and check how valid your inductive reasoning is, which tells you that pangs of hunger motivate an animal to eat. Yes, after one eats, an animal is sated, and stops eating, but how does that imply that pangs of hunger motivate one to eat?

Animals don't need to "make an association" between pangs of hunger and a need to eat. They simply become aware of the urge to eat and then do what they do to satisfy it; all without any conception of satisfying an urge we would probably think. — John

Can we not establish a proper differentiation between pangs of hunger, and the urge to eat? Do you not agree with me, that these are two completely different, and very likely completely unrelated things? If the urge to eat only came about from pangs of hunger, there would probably be no obesity in the world.

I don't think there is any such thing as awareness that's not self-awareness. All feeling is feeling of oneself, of the movements of one's own body. — The Great Whatever

Why do we have separate terminology then, awareness and self-awareness? I wouldn't say that "all feeling is a feeling of oneself". Sensation may be defined like this, classically, as an awareness of the activities of one's body parts, but I don't think that this is a correct description of what is occurring. Is seeing being aware of your eyes, and what your eyes are doing, or is it more properly described as being aware of the things which are being seen? Without a mirror, or poking you fingers in your eyes, you might not even know that you have two of them. Is tasting being aware of your taste buds, and what they are doing, or is it being aware of what is tasted? I never knew I had taste buds until long after I was tasting things.

The frog need not be aware of anything external to survive: it only needs to respond to certain motivating passions in ways that have evolved accidentally to result in an unintended external effect of which it's unaware and can't understand. Any tiny miscalibration here will result in it dying, and it will be unable to appeal to what is around it to save itself, because it doesn't/can't understand. — The Great Whatever

Are you saying that the frog is aware of all of its internal activities which cause it to catch the fly, but is never aware of the fly itself?

No prior awareness of the hunger of the self for subsistence then? — John

I would not call pains and pangs an awareness. Furthermore, I do not believe that it is the pain of hunger which motivates one to eat. Eating is an habitual activity which is generally not at all associated with the pain of hunger. It takes a higher form of intelligence than what most animals have, to make this association between the pain of hunger, and the need to eat.

I think it's backwards: you can get to exteriority from auto-affection, but not vice-versa. If you begin with the outside, you only get a sad facsimile of the self, as 'another inside of me.' — The Great Whatever

The problem is, that awareness is prior to self-awareness, and to be aware is to have a particular type of relationship with your surroundings. All living things derive their means for subsistence from their environment, so awareness of the surroundings is developed from the necessity of subsistence. There is no such necessity to drive the evolution of the awareness of an inner self.

Logic is itself a branch of maths in its highest state of development you realise? — apokrisis

I would instead say that maths is a branch of logic. It's a specialized form of logic, and that's what makes it so precise. But the same thing which makes it so precise, its speciality, also limits its scope, or range of applicability.

So first you are not talking about a different method of reasoning and measurement, just advocating for a less crisply developed level of reasoning and measurement. — apokrisis

It is not reasoning which I am talking about, it is observation. So I beg to differ. Description refers to qualities in general, measurement refers to quantities. A quality is an attribute, or property of a thing. A quantity is a particular type of attribute. So if you carry out a scientific method of empirical observation which deals only with measurements, quantities, then the qualities which cannot be measured are neglected.

I am not "advocating for a less crisply developed level of reasoning and measurement". I am advocating for a more comprehensive form of observation, one which considers all qualities, not just those which we have the capacity to measure.

So your call to a more verbal and "picture in the head" level of metaphysical exploration is not actually an alternative method, just a return to a more primitive mode of scientific reasoning. — apokrisis

Again, I beg to differ. I am not calling for a more primitive mode of reasoning, I am calling for a less narrow minded form of observation.

Now there is no harm in doing some of that too. That is the way we would expect to start to develop some actually fresh insight which - if it works out - could be properly mathematised. — apokrisis

That is the point, precisely. It is truly an alternative method, because science has now progressed to the point where all credible (objective), observations must be measurements. But if you consider, as I suggested, that there are qualities within the world that we haven't got the capacity to measure as quantities, then to understand those qualities, we need to proceed with observations which are not measurements. As we've learned from the past, it is only after we've developed an adequate understanding of different qualities, through observation, that we devise the appropriate mathematics required to measure them.

Ramachandran argues that evolutionarily, it's probable that we learnt to recognize 'other minds' long before we learned to recognize our own, and that in fact, self-awareness in fact 'piggy-backed' on our ability to recognize others in the first place. — StreetlightX

I find this very agreeable. It is by recognizing that others are living, thinking, beings, that we apprehend the mind as an object which needs to be understood. We then find that we have to reflect back on our own manner of thinking in an attempt to understand why the others are acting the way that they do. This causes self-awareness. In a sense then, self-awareness is the result of reflection, which is carried out as an attempt to understand others.

In any case, there is no difference in kind between self-awareness and other-awareness. Now, Ramachandran's work is interesting to the extent that not only does it uphold this thesis, it in fact says that we perceive others even before we 'perceive' ourselves as 'having selves'. By stipulating that mirror-neurons are responsible for this fact, Ramachandran actually provides a neurobiological mechanism by which such recognition would takes place: "self awareness is simply using mirror neurons for "looking at myself as if someone else is look at me" (the word "me" encompassing some of my brain processes, as well). The mirror neuron mechanism — the same algorithm — that originally evolved to help you adopt another's point of view was turned inward to look at your own self. This, in essence, is the basis of things like "introspection'." — StreetlightX

This, I would not agree with though. I find that reflection, introspection, reveals to us that there are aspects of others which we cannot hope to know, implying inherent differences between us. Self-awareness is caused by looking at myself for the purpose of understanding others. The result of this is the conclusion that there are aspects of others which I cannot possibly understand by looking at myself. Nevertheless, introspection, and self-awareness proceeds, continues, not as a "looking at myself as if someone else is looking at me", it is a recognition of the opposite, that I can look at myself in a way that others cannot possibly do. It exposes a privileged perspective. Because of this, introspection magnifies the difference between self-awareness and other-awareness, it does not dissolve that difference.

Streetlight. I have to be brief for lack of time, so here's a simple question to cut-to-the-chase: what precisely is our model of the "intensive"? How are we supposed to understand it? — Aaron R

Check my preceding reply to Hoo, for an interpretation of this issue.

Kind of... in electronics, we think of ideal square waves, knowing that in the real world, instantaneous changes of that kind don't happen. — Mongrel

Well, the description of a square wave, as a wave which instantaneously changes from crest to trough, and vise versa, seems somewhat naïve to me. Wikipedia suggests that the effect is produced though the use of harmonics, and filtering out unwanted aspects.

This is deep water, because I'm not sure how much of a gap there is between reason and the conception of reason. — Hoo

Try this. Consider that reasoning is something which you do, and it is also something which others do. Therefore it is something which goes on inside your mind, and also something which goes on in other places of the world, external to your mind. If we produce a conception of reason, we are describing all these external instances of reasoning, and making a concept of what it means to reason. Since we cannot see into the minds of all these thinking human beings, we look at their activities, compare the activities with how "I" would be thinking at the time of making that activity, and come up with a conception of reason.

Notice the difference between I am reasoning, which is a particular instance of reason, reason itself, and the other person is reasoning, which is an instance of a human activity which implies reasoning. Now consider Deleuze's distinction of intensive/extensive, as outlined by StreetlightX a couple of pages back, in relation to reason as an object of analysis. We now look at reason as an object to be analyzed for intensive and extensive properties. In looking at other human beings, we have access only to the extensive properties of reason, we can measure and judge the individual's activities for reasonableness, based solely on the extensive properties. But within ourselves, we have direct access to the intensive properties of reason. We can observe sensations, feelings, and emotions, internal things which have direct influence on reason. These things are fluid continuities, which only become particular, "digitalized" instances when relegated to memory. But in memory, the intensive properties, the fluid continuity of an undivided one moment to the next moment (reasoning in action), is removed. Thus in memory, the intensive properties of reasoning are removed, and when the memory is remembered, it is placed into the context of the intensive properties of that moment. This is also what occurs when I communicate a thought to you, the intensive properties of thinking are removed from the thought when it is expressed verbally, or written in phrases; you perceive extensive properties, as the thought comes to exist within the intensive context of your thinking mind.

From this, we may produce assumed "states" of mind which can be projected onto others, being understood as extensive properties. I have not actually read Deleuze's work, but I believe that he assigns a deep incompatibility between intensive and extensive properties, such that any conversion, which is to understand intensive properties as extensive is deficient. Therefore we cannot truly get at the intensive properties of another individual's reasoning, because we only get there through being exposed to the extensive properties, and tying to infer the intensive. Nor can we get to the intensive properties of any existing thing by understanding them as extensive. However, we do have a certain understanding of the intensive, through inductive generalities, laws.

It's connected to the issue of the world-for-us versus the world-in-itself. But the world-in-itself or the world-not-for-us looks necessarily like an empty negation. It marks the expectation that we will update the world-for-us (which includes the model of the filtering mind enclosed in non-mind that it must manage indirectly, conceptually, fictionally.) Is there a place for reason in this "real" non-mind enclosure? — Hoo

So we can turn this world-for-us versus world-in-itself relationship upside down, invert it. The world-in-itself has intensive properties. Other than understanding those intensive properties as things which are described by laws, we can only have direct access to those intensive properties through our internal selves, and reason is necessarily there. Therefore the attempt to conceive of a world-in-itself as a world without reason is an exercise in futility. The world has intensive properties which must be accounted for in our conception. Our only means for producing a proper conception of the intensive properties of the world is through ourselves, because this is where we have direct access to intensive properties, and here we necessarily find reason.

I'd say that we only embrace the destabilization of an investment/prejudice in order to prevent the destabilization of a greater investment/prejudice. — Hoo

Here we approach what Steetlight has identified as "goalseeking system". A prejudice, or investment as you call it, is a past act, with a view toward the future. Sometimes, as time passes, and the view toward the future does not pan out, it becomes time to consider dropping the investment. The issue I referred to is that all of the goals are interrelated. So what I am referring to is not an issue of dropping one investment in favour of another more important one, it is a more complex issue. It is an issue of dropping one seemingly small investment, which has become evidently a wrong judgement. That small wrong judgement though, may support other larger, more important investments. So the question becomes one of should I maintain this small wrong judgement, which I know is wrong, and seems very insignificant, but it supports other significant, and more important things, or should I drop it, and destabilize those important investments.

The point is all in the way that we relate significance to insignificance. The judgement which has come to the mind as being a mistake, or wrong judgement, is now judged as being small, slight, or insignificant, in order to justify maintaining it, in spite of now knowing that it was a wrong judgement. It is deemed "insignificant", so that dropping it is seen as unimportant. But the motivation not to drop it, and therefore maintain it, despite it being now understood as wrong, which produces that designation of "insignificant", is the fact that it will destabilize more important investments. This fact indicates that it really is significant, not insignificant, and the designation of "insignificant" is just another wrong judgement, carried out to support the original wrong judgement..

Digital data is typically a square wave (although multi-level digital formats were discussed at one point). — Mongrel

Oh good, here's someone with some technical knowledge. Can you explain what a "square" wave is, or is that just a metaphor in itself?

Well if all this is a mistake, what is your alternative? Can you even define your epistemic method here? — apokrisis

I explained the alternative, it involves first, the recognition that our measurement techniques are inadequate for measuring some aspects of the world, in particular, the aspects associated with the assumed continuum. So we need to go back to a method of focusing on description rather than measuring. This is where the scientific method began, and made its greatest advances, developing out of practises such as alchemy. It involves endless observations, defining words and developing new words to avoid inconsistencies and contradictions between the observations of different individuals. The individuals concern themselves with producing a coherent and consistent description of the phenomenon, based in many varying descriptions.

In the act of describing, the digital method (rules of logic) is applied to the tool of description, language. In the act of measuring, we tend to believe that the digital method is applied directly to the thing being measured, but this is an illusion. In reality, the limitations of the digital method have been incorporated into the language of measurement. The result is that any observations that are measurements, are necessarily theory-laden, due to the restrictions which are inherent within the measurement system. That is the position to which science has progressed today. Scientists rarely give themselves the freedom of separating the logic of digital restrictions from the language of description, to produce feely described observations. They cannot produce varying descriptions of the same phenomenon while using the same measurement system. Instead, they are constrained by a language of mathematics which has restrictions inherent within, to produce observations which are bound by those restrictions. In other words, the perspective from which one observes, is completely restricted by the measurement system, such that the possibility of varying descriptions of the same phenomenon, has been excluded.

I think what troubles you is this apparent loss of veridicality. You want the kind of knowledge of the world that is literally analogic - an intuitive picture in the head. — apokrisis

Well of course that's what I want. If you assume that there is an analog continuum in the world, yet you describe, or model it as being digital, would you be satisfied with that? Either your assumption or your description is wrong. Can you live happily, knowing that you are involved in such self-deception?

For me there are different senses of 'know'. First there is the knowing of participation, familiarity. I believe animals do this; it seems obvious. With symbolic language come recursive and discursive forms of knowing which may be more or less 'digital'. But remember, within linguistically mediated forms of knowing there are metaphorical, which is to say analogical, modes as well as more precisely propositional ( digital) modes. And the differences between these modes of knowing do not themselves constitute a sharp dichotomy (although it may be conceived as such) but a series of imprecise locales along a continuum. — John

I don't dispute that there are different senses of "know". But I think that they all involve some form of identity. Familiarity involves recognition which is a form of identification. I do not think that it is correct to extend "knowing", right down to primitive life forms, and then restrict "identity" to a function of human language.

As to "unreasonable," I think we need a notion of pure reason to ground any notion of pure unreasonableness (I think you'll agree). — Hoo

Yes, I agree with this, but the point I was making to apkrisis, is that when two terms are seen to be opposed in conception, this does not indicate that the two things referred to are mutually dependent on each other, nor does it mean that one is not prior to the other. So in the case of reasonable and unreasonable, we fist make a conception of what qualifies as reasonable, then based on this description of reasonable, we can determine unreasonable. However, that the concept of reasonable is prior to the concept of unreasonable, does not mean that reasonableness exists prior to unreasonableness in nature. So I do not think that you can proceed to your conclusion that "reason itself is on fire", because what you are referring to is the conception of reasonable, and unreasonable, not "reason itself".

Most of "common sense" or our prejudices have to remain intact while we judge and edit a particular prejudice. Pleasure and pain are the hammers that re-shape this edifice. But the pain can be cognitive dissonance, and the pleasure can be a sense of status. It's not at all just bodily. — Hoo

I see the point with the ship analogy, but here we are concerned with fundamental ontological principles. Can we assume that massive conceptual structures rest on fundamental principles? If so, then when we are examining these fundamental principles, should we judge them according to common sense, and good intuition, or should we judge them according to other fundamental principles, so as to maintain consistency with these other principles, and not to rock the boat? I think the former, if the fundamental principles are not consistent with common sense, and good intuition, then there is a problem with those principles, and that must be exposed, despite the fact that other principles might be destabilized in the process. .

The idea that there is something beyond prejudice can itself be described (though not finally, since description is apparently never final) as one more prejudice. This threatens the distinction itself of course which we need in order to get to this threatening... — Hoo

I don't know if this can be called "prejudice". Prejudice implies a preconception. What I refer to is the potential for a method to go beyond conception, to observe, and describe, in an unbiased and objective way. If, the idea that this is possible is considered as a preconception, then I guess there is prejudice here as well. I don't see that it is possible to get beyond all prejudice, even common-sense, and intuition are inherently prejudiced, as there are prejudices inherent within our language.

I'm not sure what you think I'm arguing here. It has been my point that we impose our frameworks of intelligibility on the world.

But then a dialectic or dichotomous logic ensures that this process is rigorous. In being able to name the complementary limits on possibility, we have our best shot at talking about the actuality of the world, as it must lie within those (now measurable) bounds. — apokrisis

What I am arguing is that this dichotomous logic is the framework of intelligibility which is being imposed on the world. And this is the mistake. It is a mistake to think that the world must fit within our systems of measurement, the "bounds" which we imposed. We must adapt our systems of measurement, shape them to the world. But even this requires a preliminary understanding, which cannot be given by measurement because the system for measurement will be created based on this understanding.

In order to properly understand the world we must start with a coherent system of description. Despite the fact that dichotomous logic can, and does, place restrictions on how one can describe, it does not attempt to restrict the thing being described to fit the system of description. We shape the system of description to fit the thing being described. We accept the fact that a description may not be precise, that your description may contradict my description of the very same thing, etc.. This is the mode of description, we do not attempt to force the world into our devices of measurement, we keep describing, and re-describing, working at the description and altering our descriptive terms, until we are satisfied with it. We then devise a means for measuring that described thing, based on the desciption.

So if you want to talk about "time", then it is only going to be an intelligible notion that we can project onto reality in a measurable fashion to the degree we have formed a crisply dichotomous model of it.

...

So we have a variety of ways of thinking about time - all of them models that try to impose some kind of fundamental dichotomy that would make time an intelligible, and thus measurable, concept of the thing-in-itself. — apokrisis

This is where I believe the mistake lies. You equate intelligible with measurable. But measurable is restricted by our capacity to measure. A thing is only measurable in so far as we have developed a way to measure it. However, a thing is intelligible to the extent that we have the capacity to describe it, and description does not require measurement. John, above, would argue that the capacity to recognize familiarity makes the thing intelligible. So how we proceed toward understanding the world, is to first develop ways to describe its qualities, then to develop ways of quantifying those qualities (measuring). Therefore, when talking about a thing like time, it is only practical to discuss our ability to measure it, to the extent of our ability to describe it.

Thank you for your series of assertions. — StreetlightX

That's what a difference of opinion amounts to, your series of assertions versus my series of assertions. The question is, who's series of assertions makes the most sense, and here we have only intuition to refer to. How does it make sense to choose a series of assertions, to believe in, which are counter-intuitive, but are chosen simply because they support an ontological position which is chosen for some reason other than that it makes sense intuitively? Isn't that choice of ontological position supported only by an unreasonable prejudice?

We can double back and edit chunks of common sense, so the real is unstable or "on fire." — Hoo

Is that really possible though, or more precisely, is it a correct procedure? It may be possible, but also incorrect. To "double back and edit chunks of common sense" implies that there are principles, based in something other than common sense, which exist, and which we can refer to, for use in a judging of common sense, to edit common sense. Isn't any such principle demonstrably supported by nothing but prejudice, as described in my reply to StreetlightX? It is the very description of prejudice. What would provide you a principle whereby you could judge intuition or common-sense, a principle which could be excluded from the charge of "prejudice"? Refer back to Deleuze's "there ought to be a concept of difference not subordinated to differences in the concept". Such editing of common sense is precisely that, subordinating your concept of difference to difference within the concept. But in judgement, these pre-conceived principles are called prejudice.

In that case, what is known is the formal relations, the logic of the conceptual structure, and these relations are identified. It is simply a difference between identifying natural things, and identifying formal relations. In each case, the thing known has been identified. It is simply nonsense to say that you can know something which you have not identified, because once you claim to know it you have identified the thing you claim to know. But it is not nonsense to say that you have identified something, and you know not what it is..

True, but to identify is a necessary requirement of to know, a step in the process of knowing. You cannot know what you have not identified.

By the way, I think this thread has developed into a very interesting discussion. Thank you StreetlightX, and others who have participated, for some very informative, and thoughtful posting.

We try to breath the "spirit" of the intuitive continuum into the "letter" of our relentlessly discrete symbols, because we want to have objective or inter-subjective discussions about this intuitive continuum. But we have to build it from digital sets, so it's arguably not the "real" continuum of intuition. — Hoo

Hoo, do you think that "intuitive continuum" refers to anything real? Isn't it more than just intuition? Would you think that continued existence, what is expressed by terms like momentum and inertia, is simply an intuition, and not supported by anything factual. If you give the status of "factual" to such terms, how can you say that the continuum is simply intuitive.

Is there any continuum-in-itself apart from the one we know? — John

How can there be a continuum which we know? If what we know is the digital, how could a continuum be known? This seems to be the problem. There are indications of a continuum, so we claim to know that there is a continuum, but the continuum cannot actually be known. So how do we validate our claim to know that there is a continuum? What if we are mistaken on this point, and the thing which we are calling 'the continuum" is actually discrete? Would we then have to designate something else as "the continuum", to support our claim to know that there is a continuum? That is the importance of identifying the thing which we claim as "the continuum", to see if it really is the continuum. If it is not, then either our claim to know that there is a continuum, or our claim to have identified the continuum, is wrong.

It appears like StreetlightX is arguing that we cannot even go so far as to identify the continuum, because to identify it is to imply a sameness, when the continuum is necessarily difference, as per Deleuze. My argument is that to identify it as difference is still to identify sameness, and this defeats the claim. I think that this pushes us back toward some type of mystical position, claiming that this assumed continuum is something that we cannot even talk about, like the ancient mystics used to claim about "matter".

It would be ridiculous to think that neither the future is prior to the past, nor the past is prior to the future, when the concept of "future and past" is dependent on one being prior to the other. The terms describe a temporal priority, so to deny that one is prior to the other is to negate the concept of future and past, rendering any talk of future or past, nonsensical.

If you would maintain that what the words "future" and "past" refer to, is purely conceptual, then what they refer to is a purely conceptual opposition. There is no need to assume a priority, because each is dependent on the other in conception. But if you look at what these words refer to, in the real world of experience, rather than something conceived, then they express a priority.

So this expresses the difference between understanding the word simply by relating the word to a concept, and understanding the word by finding the thing in the world which the word refers to. If we don't go to the world, to understand the word, then all these dichotomies, big and small, hot and cold, etc., are filled with words which express a co-dependency. You rely on the one word to express the meaning of the other, as a negation, an opposition, thus it appears as if the two things referred to are ontologically co-dependent. It is only by turning to the world of sensation and experience, that you can see what the words actually refer to, and the real difference between these two supposedly opposed things.

That is the lesson of Plato's "Theatetus" . They went looking in the world, for this thing called "knowledge". They had a preconceived notion that what the word referred to was something which included truth, and excluded falsity. It was a determined relationship between these two opposing terms, true and false. In the real world of things which were called "knowledge", they couldn't find any reliable way that falsity was actually being excluded from the thing which was being called "knowledge".. Therefore they were forced to conclude that their preconceived notion, "including truth, and excluding falsity", was not a proper definition of knowledge to begin with, because this did not fit with what was actually being called "knowledge" in the world, they were looking for the wrong thing. Their preconceived notion of what "knowledge" is, made it impossible that the things which people were calling "knowledge" was knowledge according to the conception. What could they do? They could not tell everyone that what they were calling "knowledge" is not really knowledge because it fails the standards of their preconceived notion, leaving the world with a concept of "knowledge", with nothing in that world to apply the name to. The only viable option is to admit that the conception is wrong.

This is a very real issue, especially with terms of ontological or metaphysical significance. We have a conception of future and past for example. This conception models these two as pure opposition. Take a point, on one side of that point is past, the other side is future. We could build a massive epistemic structure on a conception like this. The problem is, that in the real world, and common understanding of future and past, there is an implied necessary temporal priority, past has gone by, and future is yet to come. The conception, of pure opposition, two sides of a point, fails to take this into account. Therefore any conceptual structure built on this concept is completely illusory, it fails to take into account what we are really referring to when we use the words "future" and "past".

It is when you start pulling in Deleuze and "aesthetics" and other such baggage that it loses analytic clarity and becomes a romantic melange of allusions. — apokrisis

What's wrong with Deleuze? I find him to be one of the very few modern philosophers who actually seemed to know what he's talking about.

But if it agreed that the digital is itself a product of boundary setting, then, in Deleuze's terms, there ought to be a concept of difference not subordinated to differences in the concept (read: genera). That is, there are differences which are not digital differences; in the context of the thread, these are referred to as intensive differences. — StreetlightX

See, he is simply saying that there ought to be a concept of difference, which refers to difference itself, rather than referring to our judgements of difference. That seems like a good honest principle to me. How are we going to come to understand "difference" by looking at the way we measure difference rather than looking directly at difference itself?

But this already assumes that there is such a thing identified as "difference". And so, within this identity is implied a certain sameness. If we can refer to everything that we see as a "difference", then by using this same word, "difference", aren't we really saying that everything which we see is the same? Therefore, it doesn't really matter what we call it, "difference" or "same", as long as we are referring to the same thing, what difference does our choice of words make? It's when we refer to different things with the same word, that confusion rolls in.

This is the really difficult to get bit. But it means that the reductionist instinct to make one aspect of being prior or more foundational than its "other" is always going to mislead metaphysical thought. Does the digital precede the analog, or the analog precede the digital? The whole point of an organic and pansemiotic conception of this kind of question is to focus on how each brings its other into concrete being. — apokrisis

This, I will steadfastly argue, is a mistake, the fallacy of synthesis or some such thing. We take two things, future and past for example, and rely one upon the other to understand the two. Then, because our understanding has developed in this way, that we use one to understand the other, and vise versa, we assume that the two are naturally co-dependent. But this is only a reflection of our understanding of the two, we bounce one off the other to get an understanding of both. It doesn't say anything about the real things which are referred to by "future" and "past", in their natural existence, it only says something about the way that we understand these two. Then we might be inclined to say something ridiculous like neither one of these is prior to the other, they are co-dependent. Because we see that future and past are co-dependent in our concept of "present", we might forget the obvious, and make such a silly claim.

Difference or intensity (difference of intensity) is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears." (Difference and Repetition). — StreetlightX

Such a difference implies a necessary underlying continuity, sameness, and this is the underlying analog principle. My argument is that this underlying continuity is simply assumed, deemed necessary in order to make difference intelligible, and therefore assumed. Any such assumption needs to be justified.

"Every diversity [read: identity - SX] and every change refers to a[n analog] difference which is its sufficient reason. — StreetlightX

So the assumption that there is an underlying analog difference, as "sufficient reason", must be justified. We cannot just say "it must be so or else the world is an illusion", the reason why the world is not an illusion, must be itself be made intelligible.

You can head towards the two poles of "the discrete" and the "continuous", but you could never go past them - as how can the discrete be more discrete than the discrete? And you never really leave either behind either as the only way to know you are headed towards discreteness is because it is measurable - plainly visible - that you are headed away still from continuity. And vice versa. — apokrisis

The problem is, that the pole of "continuous" is an arbitrarily posted pole. It is simply assumed. Therefore the thing which has been designated as continuous may prove to actually be discrete. Then, if it still appears necessary to assume a "continuous", a new post is set, so we are in fact, always going past the pole of "continuous".

Having a psi of 40 at point A is materially incompatible with simultaneously having a psi of 50 at point A, and in that sense the former excludes the latter (and vice versa). Crucially, the magnitude at A is not the magnitude at B quite regardless of the activities or even the existence of ens vitae. — Aaron R

In this example, the psi provides the material content, while the value assigned to it, is what has changed. "Psi" is unchanged, therefore providing us with a continuity between point A and point B. We are talking about the same thing at point A as at point B, but something has changed about that thing, such that we have to give it a different value.

Now, we could deny the continuity, and say that point A and point B are completely different instances which are being compared. If someone is to say that "the same thing" is being measured at point A as is being measured at point B, this claim needs to be justified. So the concept of psi has to be exposed, and analyzed, to determine whether we are actually measuring "the same thing" at A and at B. If there is not something real, which "psi" refers to, there is no continuity, and the claim that we are talking about the same thing having a different value at point A from point B, is false. It is an unjustified assumption.

We can see this issue in modern physics with the concept of "energy". As an attribute of an object, energy can pass from one object to another. This object has energy, and the energy it has may be transferred to another object. Someone might claim, that after transferral, it is the same energy now in the second object, as was in the first object. But this gives identity to the energy itself, and the energy must have identity in order that we can claim "the same energy", a continuity between the energy being in the first object and then in the second object. Under this assumption now, the energy is not a property of a thing, but is an identified thing itself.

We are faced with a metaphysical dilemma. We may hold fast to fundamental ontological principles, and say that energy is a property of things, and can only exist as attributed to a thing. In this case, we must face the problem of how the energy appears to transmit, or radiate from one object to another. The continuity between the first and second object has been denied as an unjustified assumption, by restricting the existence of energy to being a property of an object. Now we must look for another mechanism by which the energy transmits. The other possibility, is the route taken in physics, we allow that energy itself is an identifiable thing. Now the continuity is justified by this assumption, that energy is a thing itself. But the concept of energy now needs to be exposed, and analyzed, just like the concept of psi above, in order to determine whether "energy" actually refers to a real thing, and not just a property of things, and then the continuity would be justified.

It only comes to be called a continuum in crisp distinction to the digital or the discrete within the realm of symbolisation or signification. It is a logical step to insist the world must be divided into A and not-A in this fashion. — apokrisis

Yes, the continuum comes to be called such to distinguish it from the digital or discrete, but this does not imply that these are properly opposed. That's what must be respected, that different from digital does not mean the opposite of, or the negation of digital. So the analog, or continuum, may be different from the digital in the same way that colour is different from red. Therefore this "logical step" is not a valid logical step at all. We cannot assume a proper A and not-A relation between the analog and the digital

So the situation is the reverse of the one you paint. We don't need to begin in certainty — apokrisis

I do not claim that we need to start in certainty, this is more like what you imply. You imply that if a thing is different from A you can establish the logical certainty of not-A of that thing, but this is not the case. If the thing is said to be different from red, we might still be talking about colour, and it would be false to characterize colour as not-red, because colour includes red. What I said, is that we have to get an idea of what this thing, continuum, is, by looking directly at the thing, and describing it. Saying what it is not, will never tell us what it is.

We can always divide uncertainty towards two dialectically self-grounding global possibilities. The thing-in-itself must be either (in the limit) discrete or continuous. — apokrisis

So this is the mistake, these two, discrete and continuous, are not properly opposed and therefore are not mutually exclusive, as you imply. We have discrete colours, red, yellow, green, blue, within a continuous spectrum

As I said above, the analog is not at all anything like a 'thing-in-itself'. It is eminently knowable in the most trivial of ways; it's just that unlike 'digital knowledge' which is denotative and representational, analog knowledge deals with relationships. — StreetlightX

You may be missing the force of the argument SteetlightX. "The analog", continuum, or whatever you wish to call it, is the very same as the "thing-in-itself", in the sense that its existence is simply assumed. We experience the appearance of some sort of continuity within the world, so we assume a continuum to account for this appearance, just like we experience the existence of real substance in the world, and assume the thing in itself..

Accordingly, anything you might say about this analog existence, this continuum, is based only in this assumption. So in order to say anything true about the continuum, your assumption of a real existing continuum must be first validated, justified. Only by validating this assumption does the nature of the continuum become intelligible. To simply assume a continuum, and say that it is of an analog nature, and completely other than the digital, is just an assumption which is completely unjustified, until it is demonstrated why this is assumed to be the case.

Now we must start without the assumption of an analogue continuum, and justify this assumption. We cannot start with the assumption of a continuum, with all the connotations of meaning (identity) which go along with such an assumption, we must demonstrate the need for this assumption, and this demonstration will expose the character of this so-called continuum. In other words, rather than assuming a "continuum", or "analog" existence, with all the features of identity associated with those words, we must bring this thing which we are trying to describe, into focus, such that we can accurately describe it.

Recall that to institute any digital logic, a continuum must distinguish a part of itself, from itself. — StreetlightX

To begin with, this is self-contradictory. If a continuum could distinguish a part of itself from itself, it could not be a continuum. A true continuum would not give any principles for making such a distinction. And if an arbitrary distinction was made, even the points of boundary would consist of something other than the continuum itself, so it is impossible that a continuum itself is distinguishing a part of itself.

This is why it is vital to define 'continuity' and 'discontinuity' in terms of negation: negation provides the unassailable index for what counts as continuous (analog) and what counts as discontinuous (digital): if a system includes negation, it is digital, if it does not, it is analog. — StreetlightX

And this approach cannot be satisfactory. The discontinuous is what we can know, the is and is not, so to describe the continuous as that which is opposed to the discontinuous is to employ negation and the tools of logic. But the continuous has already been noted to defy such rules of logic and negation. We cannot use such logical principles to describe the continuous. The existence of the continuous is assumed, based on our experience of living and sensing, so this is what we must refer to in our description of the continuous.

In our living experience, we observe two types of boundaries, spatial boundaries between existing things, and a temporal boundary between the future and past. If one, or both of these boundaries appears to be unreal, then we have reason to assume continuity. Spatial boundaries, between individual entities appear to be real, but the temporal boundary between past and future may not be real, and it is this lack of a real boundary in time, which drives the need to assume continuity.

But there are very real difficulties here. As much as time appears to be a continuum, without any real boundaries, our experience also indicates to us that the boundary between past and future is very real. Time appears to be a continuum, but it also appears to have a real boundary between past and future.

Now, the interesting question that has been raised a few times - and that I've avoided talking about - has to do with the status of the boundary itself. Does it belong to the continuum itself, or does it belong to the instituted digital system? The answer can only be that the boundary belongs to neither. It cannot belong to the continuum, because if it did, the continuum would be already-digitized; on the other hand, it cannot belong to the digital system because it is the very condition by which the digital is instituted. Like Russell's barber who both shaves and does not shave himself, the boundary's status is constitutively undecidable. — StreetlightX

The boundary's status is not specifically undecidable, its appearance is paradoxical, and this is what makes it seem to be undecidable. It is paradoxical because the continuum presents itself to us as essentially indivisible, continuous, but, as constituted with a boundary. The way to avoid the paradox is to understand the continuum as the boundary itself. But this makes the continuum a real identifiable entity, a boundary.

Part of my argument here is that what you refer to as material identity is a kind of hypostatization or transcendental illusion in which 'numerical' (formal) identity is projected (mistakenly) onto nature. I write of course, from the perspective of a kind of philosophy of process where any attempt to think in terms of brute identities ought to be rendered suspect from the beginning. With respect to formal logic, one can see how something as simple as the subject-predicate relation [P(x)] is fraught with metaphysical issues. — StreetlightX

The real issue here, I think, is the question of whether the natural (analogue) continuum has any identity whatsoever. Aristotle identified it as the same as itself, and called it "matter". If there is nothing real which is being identified here, then our whole understanding of nature beaks down, because it is based in the assumption that the continuum is real, that something real has been identified as "the continuum".

So even if numerical (digital) identity is projected onto the (analogue) continuum of nature, in the act of measurement, during the attempt to understand nature, this should not be characterized as mistaken. There is an age-old philosophical principle which states that like cannot recognize like, and this manifests in the tinted glass analogy, when like is projected onto like, it causes deception. Mistakes occur when the projection, and the thing projected upon, are not properly separated, because this produces a failure in distinguishing between the characteristics of what is projected and what is projected upon. That is why each, the formal digital aspect, and the material continuum, must each be properly identified, and understood as separate.

Digital systems are what happens when a continuum distinguishes an element of itself from itself. — StreetlightX

This may be an example of such a mistake. The continuum can only be identified as One. To separate one part from another would produce a contiguity which consists of separate parts. So if the digital, numerical system is projected onto the continuum, to separate out parts, such boundaries which are created are not a natural part of the continuum, but an artificial separation. The continuum itself, must be understood to remain whole, indivisible, despite any such acts of recognition, because to distinguish an element of itself, from itself, and claim that such a distinction is based in something real, within the continuum, would contradict its identity as a continuum. Allowing that the continuum has an identity is the only means for avoiding a descent into confusion.

I don't think so. I think that the whole of myself exists today, and the whole of myself existed yesterday, and the day before. I don't think of the self of yesterday, and the self of today as just parts of myself, otherwise I couldn't call these occurrences occurrences of myself, I'd have to call them parts of myself.

And that denies material identity. There is no longer the temporal continuity of a thing extended in time. There is one part at one moment, another part at the next moment, etc.. We no longer have the identity of the thing itself, with a temporal extension, only different parts related to each other .

Relations to others have sense, relation to self has no sense; it is not metaphysically robust; and is thus 'lacking in sense' or 'non-sense'. — John

Surely there is sense in a relation of self to self. I can relate myself of today to myself of yesterday, and my potential self of tomorrow. By establishing these relationships we learn how to better ourselves. And this is very important.