It would then be natural to ask for sufficient and relevant (non-hypothetical) examples of violations of causal closure, in order to justify such extended causation (no special pleading please). — jorndoe

I assume you realize that it would be impossible to observe , or prove, empirically, such a violation of causal closure. It would just appear like an activity without a known cause. Such violations are common, everyday occurrences. We call them free will actions.

Hi Punshhh,
Do you mean the past and future are there also?

Interesting, I don't generally see it this way, rather I consider the eternal moment, rather than a narrow boundary. — Punshhh

Right, but if the moment of the present is to be truly eternal, it cannot partake in either of the two parts of time, future or past. See, we can consider that there is time in the future, and time in the past, but "eternal" means outside of time, so if the moment of the present is to be eternal, it must make a clean division between past and future. I described a slightly different scenario in which the present that we experience consists of partially past, and partially future. The precise division is actually theoretical, such that the concept of a precise, eternal, present, as the division between future and past, is conceptual only, and doesn't adequately represent the reality of time.

However, I still allowed for the eternal (that which transcends temporal existence), by confining temporal existence to the past. Our complete conception of temporal existence, and what it means to exist in time, is based on our experience of the past. This allows that temporal existence comes into being at each moment of the present. The present then is understood under the concept of "becoming". We then have a "prior to temporal existence", which is the other side of the present, and it is what exists on this other side which determines what will come into existence at each moment of the present. This "prior to temporal existence" is where I place the eternal.

That we experience a narrow present due to restrictions imposed on us due to incarnation in the place in which we dwell. The details of our dwelling place I don't take a lot of interest in, as the science to understand it has not been done yet. — Punshhh

I agree that the narrowness of the present which we experience, is due to our physical constitution, and I think that a narrower, or wider present might be experienced by other types of beings. But if you believe that the present has breadth, then doesn't this deny the possibility that the present is an eternal moment, as explained above?

I am not sure of the extent that you consider the momentary generation and dissolution of the objects of sensory experience. Or that they have some kind of longevity?
For me these objects are in a sense eternally present with me in the moment. — Punshhh

I would think that it is necessary to believe that objects do have longevity, but this temporal duration is only in the past. So in a sense, whatever came to be, in the past, is still out there somewhere. It is not evident to us, because of our narrow temporal perspective.

"...big'' cannot be used as a noun. — hunterkf5732

Yes "big" can be used as a noun, when we refer to the concept "big" as if it were a thing. That's the point, it's just not common practise to refer to this concept, as it is common practise to refer to the concept of "existence". Say I am describing the concept of big to you, I can say "big is large". Here, big is the subject (noun), and large is the predicate. If you consider "large" itself, you will see that it is a more common practise to use "large" as a noun, this turns "large" into a thing, a concept, such as when we say "at large", large is a thing, but concept only.

If you take a word like "red", you will see that it is an adjective used to describe red things, they are red. However, within the conceptual structure it is also a colour. So when we refer to "red" as a colour, red is a noun, because we are using it to refer to the concept of red.

We use "existence" as a noun, to refer to an individual's existence, as if it were a thing separate from the individual, saying that the person has a peaceful, meaningful, or some other adjective, to describe the person's "existence". But when we do this, it is an abstract concept of existence which we are referring to, and it is only through that abstraction that we can refer to the person's existence separately from the person, and describe it as if it were a thing separate from the person.

We are, in fact, talking about "big" as a different sort of noun, also termed an "adjective". — hunterkf5732

An adjective is not a different sot of noun.

The Planck scale tells us there is a "size" below which any normal talk of spacetime or energy density ceases to be physically meaningful. So like it or not, that ought to be factored into any modern discussion of metaphysics. — apokrisis

Yes, this is good reason why we should "argue with science". Spacetime is a synthetic concept, produced through the synthesis of the previously separate concepts of space and time. That synthesis is based in certain assumptions. The analytical mind of the philosopher wants to break down this concept of spacetime into its constituent parts, space and time, to fully understand the relationship between these two. When divided into separate concepts of space and time, then we approach "the size below which", from a different perspective. If one of these two is considered to be continuous, and the other discrete, then we have a different approach to the "size below which" issue. Zeno's paradoxes can be resolved in this manner. If, as time passes continuously, spatial change occurs in discrete units of change, then in one unit of spatial change, the hare will pass the tortoise.


If time is understood to be continuous, and space understood to be discrete, or vise versa then the limitations of the Planck scale become very meaningful. Suppose, for example, that time is continuous, and space is discrete. Then, as a very short period of time passes, there are discrete changes to space. Suppose that a sub-atomic particle exists at one location, then after a short period of time passes, it next exists at another location, and this is what we call motion. From this perspective, there is a short period of time when no spatial change is occurring, but time is still passing. Spatial change is occurring in units of change, requiring a certain amount of time to pass before the change occurs. While this time is passing there may still be changes occurring to the underlying (non-spatial, immaterial, or formal) structure of reality, which will cause the particle to materialize at the location which it does, after that period of time has passed.

Like why can't we apply the PSR to existence without applying it to the concept of existence? And what does it mean to apply the PSR to the concept of existence? — Marty

Things have existence, it's an attribute, a property of things, they exist. When we abstract the property from the thing, to talk about the property itself, as if it were a thing, we are then talking about a concept. Consider other attributes for example, big, small, rough, smooth, red, green, etc.. If you think about one of these attributes, in itself, such as "big", you are thinking about the concept "big", what it means to be big.

At this point we are talking about the concept of "big", we have made "big" into a noun, to talk about it as a thing, just like the example of "existence". The PSR applies to things, so if we desire to apply it, we must treat these concepts as if they are things, and apply the PSR to these things.

Consider the concept of "being". We could pick out individual beings and apply the PSR to each one of them, but if we're talking about being in general, we are talking about the concept of being. So if we desire to apply the PSR to being, there is only the concept to apply it to. So if the principle of sufficient reason says that there must be a reason for these things, being, and existence, we must treat these things as the concepts which they are, and look for the reason for these concepts. To do otherwise would be a category error, because the PSR clearly applies to particular things. It is an inductive law, stating a generality, "everything", meaning every particular thing, must have a reason for existence. So if we apply the PSR to "existence", in general, to seek the reason for existence, it is not being properly applied because it is not being applied to a particular thing, but to a generality.

Hardly. I've said it is emergent as an equilibrium state - flux arriving at its own inherent limitations. And "time" speaks to the time it takes to run down a gradient of symmetry-breaking. Time emerges from the fact that such a change can't be instant when it comes to our Universe. — apokrisis

Ok, so prior to symmetry-breaking there must be symmetry?

As I've said, symmetry is a way to model stasis because it is the maths of differences that don't make a difference. And so it is a model of physical equilbrium situations, where there are differences, and they don't make a difference.

Math's problem is that it is timeless and energyless in being basically a spatial or geometric conception of things. So symmetry maths has a static character just due to the way maths is derived. You are risking confusing the stasis of the method with the stasis (and flux) of the world the method is used to model. — apokrisis

Now which is the method, and which is the world? If symmetry is the maths and modeling of the real world stasis, then what is the symmetry which is prior to symmetry breaking, other than stasis? And if there is stasis prior to symmetry-breaking, isn't it true that you have assumed stasis, or taken stasis for granted, as the starting point for your ontology?

My apologies Wayfarer, for any misrepresentation, it was kind of an over-simplification. But I still don't see any real support for the claim that the uncaused cause cannot exist.

Whereas everything that exists, might not exist, a necessary being cannot not exist, so is therefore beyond existence and non-existence. — Wayfarer

We qualify "exists" with "contingent", such that those existing things which might not exist are call contingent. This leaves open the possibility of a necessary being. I see you agree that if there is such a thing as a necessary being, it cannot not exist, so I assume that it exists. Isn't the uncaused cause, that necessary being? How do you proceed to the conclusion that the necessary being is beyond existence and non-existence?

You see how you keep dropping stasis out of the discussion. You simply presume the thing that gives the idea of "change" any crisp meaning can be taken for granted.

Once you start honestly asking yourself about how stasis could be the case, then the lightbulb might go off. — apokrisis

I am only proceeding now according to your assumptions. You claimed that time, and change are emergent. "Emergent" implies that they emerged from something, and this must be lack of change, stasis. Stasis is not my assumption, it is your assumption, change is emergent. Don't you assume symmetry, and isn't symmetry a form of stasis? Symmetry, stasis, is your primary assumption.

You are the one who takes stasis for granted, not I. I recognize the appearance of stasis, symmetry, and am seeking a cause of it, to validate its appearance as something real. Therefore I have not taken it for granted.

In my view, time is change. So time as we know it is part of change as we know it. — apokrisis

So how would change emerge then? Doesn't emergence imply change, such that if something was emerging, change was already occurring? If time and change emerge, as you say, then prior to change, there would be no change. What could have possibly caused this first change, which is the emergence of time? Perhaps there was absolutely nothing before time and change, but this implies something coming from nothing. If there was something, what kind of thing could that be, without any time or change? It must be eternal, being outside of time. But if it is eternal, it must be an eternal changelessness, so how could change emerge from eternal changelessness?

What important cosmological discoveries did you have in mind here? — apokrisis

Hey, you made the blanket statement, "you can't argue with science after all". I wasn't referring to cosmological designations, though they are prone to change, (like Newton to Einstein), I was referring to more simple, basic things like 40 or 50 years ago when science determined that butter is bad for you, and margarine was supposed to be the saviour. Now it seems like science says the opposite. Who really trusts what "science says" these days?

None of that changes the fact that something must be the fundamental thing from which macroscopic objects are composed. It might be fermions, it might be superstring, it might be quantum foam, or it might be something else. — Michael

Michael, how is saying that there must be a fundamental thing from which macroscopic objects are composed, therefore I assume the existence of such a thing, any different in principle, from the cosmological argument which says that there must be a first cause therefore i assume the existence of such a thing?

The actual difference, is that the cosmological argument is presented as a valid argument, whereas your assumption of a fundamental, "simple", is not. The cosmological argument demonstrates the weakness of your perspective, by showing that even things assumed to be simples actually come into existence out of something which is prior to that so-called simple. So it looks for a first actuality, which might be the cause of even the apparently simple things.

Even if you assume a simple thing, or a vast number of simple things, these things will not create the objects which we know and observe, without a cause. So the assumption of "simples" is really a dead end route of investigation. It does not look for the reason why the simples have formed into the objects, even if it assumes simples. So once we put aside this desire to locate "the simple", we can get on with the real task of looking for the cause. And this would be the cause of the apparent simples as well.

How is something that comes to us in the future, from some other source (Presuming that you don't assume that all things that exist to us are in the past)? — Punshhh

Do you understand that the present exists as a boundary between the future and the past? But since we are existing in the present, yet still sensing things in the past, then don't you think that we are also in some way experiencing the future as well? Is your mind not in the future, all the time and this is what accounts for awareness? Your mind prepares you for what may occur in the distant future, as well as what is imminent and possible, in the immediate future.

So the point is, that you are not sensing the future at all, yet you know an awful lot about the future. Where does this information concerning the future come from if not from the future itself, just like information about the past comes from the past? So your mind must actually be in the future to be receiving information from the future, in order that you can know about the future.

You might wonder, if my mind is in the future, why can't I see, touch, or otherwise sense, the future objects. But that would be impossible, because sensible objects don't exist prior to the present, they only come into existence as time passes, at the present. It must be the case that sensible objects only come into existence at the present, because human beings have the capacity to make random changes to sensible objects at any moment of the present. So your mind is actually in the future, and it can't see any physical objects there, because they don't exist there, but your mind has the capacity to move and change physical objects as they come into being at the present, because it is prior to them, in the future.

The cosmological argument contradicts itself. It can't use as a premise "everything has a
begining, and so a cause" and then conclude that there is a beginningless, uncaused first cause. — Michael

There is no contradiction, the conclusion is that the first cause is not a thing. There is some discrepancy between Wayfarer and I, because Wayfarer assumes that if it is not a thing, then it is not a being, and therefore does not exist. I am very hesitant to accept this, I think that the first cause has existence just as much as physical things.

The perspective I was describing to Punshhh, is that "existence" refers to what is at the present. But the present is just a boundary between future and past. Physical things are all in the past. The first cause is in the future, as that which causes things to come into existence as the things which they are, at the present. So it is no more proper to call things of the past (physical objects) existing, than it is to call things of the future (first cause) existing.

At the cosmological level, time itself is emergent and so talk of before and after doesn't work out for me — apokrisis

I've told you this before, to say time is emergent is oxymoronic. To emerge requires time, so things only emerge if there already is time. This means that it is contradictory to say that time emerges, because there must be time prior to anything, including time, emerging.

You can't argue with science after all. — apokrisis

Why not? It appears to me, like many things which "science" presents as truth, change to be not true, after fifteen or twenty years. This is what drives philosophers to seek stability in knowledge.

That is why we are better off to refer to this as a first cause, rather than an uncaused cause, because of these semantic nuances.

I do not like to remove this cause from the realm of existence, because it is just as present to us as the things which we sense. Existence refers to what is present. Everything we sense, and all empirical observations are in the past, by the time they are sensed, so sensation and empirical observation give us only what is on the past side of the present, which is a boundary between future and past. All that is, on the future side of the present boundary, is given to us from some other source. But we cannot deny all that comes to us from this other source, from the realm of existence, just because it is of the future, any more than we can deny what comes to us from the senses, just because it is of the past.

In that view, finality acts as a final cause in being the global limit that thus emerges to mark an end on change. Or at least an equilbrium state in which change no longer makes a difference.

So we are on opposite sides of this argument still. — apokrisis

Yeah sure, we're on opposing sides of the issue, because I'm convinced, and you're stubborn. Look, you place "final cause", as the end of change. But then it is not a "cause" of change at all, it is the effect. To properly understand final cause. as a cause, it must be understood as prior to the effect. That is why we understand it as the intended end, the objective.

If you had any respect for the cosmological argument, you would see the need to assume a first actuality, as the cause which makes particular things the particular things that they are, and not something else, when particular things come into existence. We could do as the Neo-Platonists did, and associate final cause ("the good") with this first actuality, or we can proceed toward a more progressive understanding of this first actuality, in light of scientific advancements. But placing "bare potential" as first, only stymies any such progression, because one then proceeds to build an ontology on this unreasonable premise. .

I would never have expected that from you. These are the basic attributes of the first cause, they're part of what the term means. — Wayfarer

When you define the fist cause as eternal, and mean by "eternal" a beginningless, or unending time, then the first cause becomes beginningless and uncaused. However, I think that the proper way of defining "eternal", in relation to God, is "outside of time". When God is described in this way, then words such as beginning, and cause, which have a temporal reference are inapplicable. But to say that these words are inapplicable is not the same as saying that there is no cause, or no beginning.

As I understand it, Aristotle's argument was that change could not have a beginning in an efficient cause. So the alternative had to be that there was no beginning to change and the cause of change was instead the eternal finality of a prime mover that thus acted constantly to "stir things up" from the outer edge of cosmic existence. — apokrisis

Yes, I agree, that was Aristotle's solution to the issue raised by the refutation of Pythagorean idealism, i.e., the cosmological argument. Aristotle assumed an eternal prime mover, as an eternal efficient cause. The Neo-Platonists however resolved the issue by assuming a final cause as first cause. History shows that the Aristotelian solution was dismissed, while the Neo-Platonist solution was upheld.

So I think you are mixing up two things. Aristotle did talk about change in general terms of the symmetry breaking of a potential, and so that is a view that fits well with the world as we know it today. And then he also had this other first cause issue with cosmic existence itself - and came up with an answer there that doesn't really work. — apokrisis

I agree, the Aristotelian solution doesn't really work. The Neo-Platonist solution does work, while respecting the principles of the cosmological argument. Your solution is to throw away the cosmological argument.

Here again you seem to be demanding that a process that may be seamlessly variant, both temporally and spatially, must consist in series of static moments, and an aggregation of discrete parts. — John

What do you mean by "seamlessly variant"? Perhaps that's an oxymoron? Anyway, the way that we understand such a reality, is descriptions which apply at the moment. Unless you allow that there is some reality to such states, then you are assuming that our entire understanding of reality is baseless, and wrong. Further, you are claiming that reality is fundamentally unintelligible. This is contrary to the philosophical mindset, which is a desire to know. If we assume that reality is unintelligible, as you do, we kill the desire to know.

Which is what? That there's a beginningless, uncaused cause, i.e. God? That contradicts the initial premise that everything has a beginning (and so a cause). — Michael

Why must God be beginningless and uncaused?

I agree with you and the rationale, but what does it prove? Does it prove the existence of God, an uncaused cause, or that from the human perspective there must be an uncaused cause at the beginning of our known causal existence? — Punshhh

What we have, is a cause which is not within the realm of physical existence, because it is the cause of physical existence. There are many directions which one can proceed from here. The concept of physical existence needs to be analyzed, the concept of causation needs to be analyzed. To conclude an "uncaused cause" is somewhat equivocal, or ambiguous at best. Such a cause is "uncaused" in the sense of a physical, efficient cause, but it is necessarily in another sense, like final cause, that it is a "cause" because it is impossible that it is a physical, efficient cause. So in "uncaused cause", "uncaused" refers to a different sense of "cause" from what "cause" refers to.

Anyway, everyone here should realize 'the uncaused cause' could not exist. — Wayfarer

I agree with the others, this depends on how you define "exist" and I would not define it that way. We still say that non-physical, immaterial things, such as concepts, and even the soul, exist. Is this your claim that these things do not exist? We couldn't say that they have some other type of being, so what could we say about them, like God, what supports their reality if not some type of existence?

So what is the cause of the totality? — Hoo

Which totality, do you mean the inductive principle which classes all caused things together as contingent? The cause of that totality would be the human mind which uses the inductive reason.

But all of this gets projected "up" for application to the totality. (PSR) and to abstract propositions that admit of ambiguity (LEM.) — Hoo

What do you mean by this, "projected 'up'"?

As I explained to apokrisis, if you take a process perspective, the same problem arises with respect to change in motion, acceleration. If at one moment, the object has X value of momentum, and at the next it has Y value. We need to assume that a change has occurred between X and Y. We could assume an intermediate, Z, but then we head to infinite regress.

Furthermore, our understanding of motion, always is such that it assumes that there is something, a static thing, which is moving, even if that "thing" is just energy. So it is very naïve to think that we can get rid of the assumption of a static thing, by assuming a "dynamic view of being", because in all of our conceptualizations of activity, there is always that underlying static thing.

However as I have pointed out, philosophy is unequipped to address the issue to begin with. — Punshhh

I don't see the issue, it's straight deductive reasoning, based on inductive premises. First, things which have a beginning have a cause. To dispute this inductive premise you simply need to find things which have a beginning and have no cause. Second, all things have a beginning. To dispute this inductive premise, you need to find things which do not have a beginning. The deductive conclusion, all things have a cause.

It is not the case that philosophy is unequipped to address the issue of the cosmological argument, we have been addressing it for thousands of years. What is evident here, is that some people still refuse to accept the obvious conclusion of the cosmological argument. So instead of assuming the philosophical position which it gives us, and proceeding from there, to make reality intelligible, they waste effort of looking for loop holes, and reasons for denying the conclusion.

On edit: actually, reading further into the SEP article, it seems that logical possibility isn't sufficient for freedom, according to Leibniz; one also needs to act in accordance with one's complete individual concept (as determined by God -- who ensured that the best possible world was actualized) and this actuality is certain albeit logically contingent. See the last paragraph in section 4 of the SEP article linked above. — Pierre-Normand

I was very skeptical about Mongrel's representation of Leibniz' concept of free will. It really didn't seem reasonable to me, that a man of Leibniz' calibre would define free will in this way.

So this is the next point, and this is what makes free will so difficult to prove. Not only must both P and not-P be logically possible, but also the free willing agent must be capable of proceeding with either one of the actions, P or not-P. If the free willist chooses P, and proceeds, the determinist will say that was determined, and if the free willist chooses not-P, the determinist will say that was determined. It is impossible for the free willist to choose, and proceed with both actions, P and not-P, so it appears impossible for the free willist to prove that one is capable of proceeding with either P or not-P. Even if the free-willist flips a coin to decide to proceed with P or not-P, this does not prove free will.

Do you take this to be an objection to the Leibnizian conception of freedom, specifically, or to compatibilist accounts of free will generally? — Pierre-Normand

I haven't seen anything to suggest that the Leibnizian conception is really compatibilist, other than misrepresentations, like Mongrel's. I have no faith in compatibilist accounts, from what I've seen, free will and determinism are genuinely incompatible, and to make them appear compatible requires self-deception, misrepresenting one concept or the other, or both.

This sounds like his discussion of Zeno's paradoxes. But I would say that more generally Aristotle takes the position that nothing comes from nothing. Being begins in potential and actuality is about the move or change from there towards contrary or dichotomous limits. So non-being becomes then a privation or lack of some predicate - a positive kind of absence or negativity! If a horse can be white, it also can be not-white. That is a potential change that can take place, being a complementary and LEM-like crisp possibility. — apokrisis

This is what we observe in the existence of things, the potential for a thing is prior to the actual existence of that thing. However, when we ask, why does the thing come to be the thing which it is, and not something else, we realize that there is a further actuality which acts on this potential.

So in its way, Aristotle's take is the kind of Anaximander/Peirce tale of organic development in which we start with a naked potential or vagueness and then this becomes crisply something by separating towards its own logically dichotomous limits. Change inheres in potentiality in metastable fashion because potentiality is already poised, suspended, between two alternative states of development. The question then is what tips the balance so things move in one direction or the other? — apokrisis

You are simply ignoring an important part of Aristotle's work, in your assertion that he assumed existence starts with a "naked potential". This is exactly the position which he worked to refute with the cosmological argument. As I've explained, according to Aristotle the naked potential is impossible, that is why he assumed eternal circular motion. The eternal circular motion is an eternal actuality which he assumed because he concluded that naked potential is impossible.

However where Aristotle goes wrong is that he takes reality's basic condition as stasis rather than flux. — apokrisis

The problem is the same, or very similar whether you take reality's basic condition as stasis, or flux. The problem is the problem of change. Whether it is a static thing which changes, or a motion which changes, the issue is the same. As a static thing, the issue is the intermediate between being and not-being of the thing. As a motion, the issue is acceleration, the intermediate between moving in one direction, then moving in another direction. Just like there must be a cause which acts in the interim between being and not-being of the thing, there must be a cause which acts in the interim between moving in one way, and moving in another way.

I'm not sure the mathematical example you said works. I forgot to mention it, but the scholastic PSR states: "everything that is has that by which it is." Which is a weaker PSR. It talks about things that exists, real being, not that there is a reason for things like mathematical equations. That would be a rationalist version of it. — Marty

This was might point, "existence", as Jorndoe used it in reference to the PSR, refers to a concept. So we cannot apply the PSR to the thing called "existence", as Jondoe tried, unless we apply it to the concept of existence. This would be to consider the concept of existence as a thing. In this case we would be looking for the reason for the concept of existence, which, like the reason for mathematical equations, is probably the desire to understand, or to know. In any case, the PSR would still apply to concepts if we understand them as things, and there is no exception to the PSR, as Jorndoe suggested.

The logical possibility at issue in Leibniz's conception of free will would thus be a conditional possibility: it is conditional on the logical restrictions imposed on future states of the world by the past and by physical laws. — Pierre-Normand

There is a problem here, because "physical laws" are laws which are produced by human beings to describe the processes of the world. So they are internal to the agent, what the agent claims about the world. If, by creating such laws, the human being is given the capacity to impose restrictions on future states of the world, we need to determine how a law which describes the world, can be used to impose restrictions on the world.

With this in mind, the described internal/external distinction breaks down. If the past imposes restrictions on the world, this is the feature of determinism. If physical laws impose restrictions, these are created by the human mind, so the question is, how does the human mind impose restrictions by creating laws? There must be something more than just creating laws, which allows human beings to actually impose restrictions, otherwise I'd create a law which would allow me to grab a hold of the sun.

If the human being cannot impose any restrictions whatsoever, on the external world, in what sense can you say that it has free will? To have free will, it must be logically possible that P, or not P, thus the human being must be capable of imposing the necessary restrictions to make this logically possible. The human being cannot make "P or not P" logically possible simply by asserting that it is logically possible, or else I could make it logically possible to grab a hold of the sun, by asserting that it is logically possible to do such.

Can you provide citations that make that clear? I think the point was to avoid the idea that something could come from nothing in fact. — apokrisis

I can't remember the precise context, but he argues, I think in Metaphysics, that adhering fast to the LEM creates absurdities. This is how I remember the demonstration. When an object comes into being, there is a change from the not being of that particular object to the being of that particular object. In between this not-being and being, is necessarily a change. If we ask what exists at this intermediate state, we could identify, and describe another object, what exists between the not-being and being of the original object. But now we must assume a change which occurs between the not-being, and the being of this intermediate object. We could identify another object at this point. And onward, ad infinitum. We never get to the point of actually describing change, or becoming, by following this manner of logic. Instead, we must simply assume a change, or becoming, which takes the middle position between the not-being and being of an object.

Is this really Aristotle now - who offered a variety of analyses - or more the latter scholastic overlay? — apokrisis

I believe this is Bk 9 of his Metaphysics, where he refuted Pythagorean idealism, and certain forms of Platonic idealism already developed by that time. He explains how ideas have the nature of potential. They are only given actual existence by being discovered by a mind. Prior to being discovered, they can exist only potentially. Therefore if ideas are eternal, they are an eternal potential. Then he explains how it is impossible that anything eternal could be of the nature of potential. This would mean that potential is prior to actual, and such a "pure potential" could not have the capacity to actualize itself, this requiring an actual cause. Therefore if there was such a thing as "pure potential", there would be eternally pure potential, without there ever being anything actual.

So the principle of sufficient reason (with its focus on particular causes determining every particular effect) goes out of the window. — apokrisis

Throwing the PSR out the window is not something to be taken lightly. This allows for randomness. Once you allow randomness into your schema, you can't get it out. Then you are left without the means to account for any consistency or coherency in the world. There cannot be a reason for consistency. In other words, any form of apparent consistency in the world would actually be the result of some random, chance occurrence. And this is absurd to think that consistency could emerge from randomness, without any reason.

Leibniz is dealing in logical possibility. So let's consider whether there really is any other kind of possibility. What argument would you put to Leibniz to convince him that there is? — Mongrel

I could choose to do something which is logically possible, but physically impossible, such as I might decide to grab a hold of the moon, or the sun, and bring it into my house with me. This demonstrates that what really determines what is and is not possible is something other than logic.

Let me get this straight. Suppose I did X. How could it not be contradictory to say that I did not do X? It appears like you have defined free will in a way which makes it logically impossible. If it is possible that I did other than I did, then I have free will.

Perhaps you could explain what you mean by "free will just amounts to the absence of contradiction in some alternate action being performed", so that I can judge whether it's consistent with how I understand free will.[/quote]

That was Peirce's switch on Hegel too. First the bare potential - the vagueness as that to which the PNC does not apply - and then its symmetry-breaking dichotomisation and eventual transformation into the stable regularity of a habit. — apokrisis

To say that the PNC does not apply to bare potential, is the Hegelian conception, not the Aristotelian conception. Under the Hegelian conception, being and not being are subsumed under becoming. Therefore the PNC can not apply to becoming, as it consists of both opposing properties. Under the Aristotelian conception, becoming is the middle, between being and not being. "Bare potential", such as prime matter is ruled out, as impossible, by the cosmological argument. So as much as it might be a useful concept, like the perfect circle and such, the concept doesn't refer to anything real, it is an impossibility. Starting with bare potential is the Hegelian switch on Aristotle.

The pre-individual is the state of pure potentiality where the PNC does not apply - as Hegel and Peirce and Anaximander all agree. Before a symmetry is broken, the two poles of contrary or dialectical being that the breaking will reveal, are not in existence, just in a state of potentiality. So the PNC does not (yet) apply. — apokrisis

I think Simondon points to the problem with this perspective. If the pre-individual is a state of pure potentiality, then there is no reason for the thing which comes into being, to be the thing which it is. The principle of sufficient reason would not apply, there could be no actuality to cause that thing to be any particular thing, it would come into existence as any random thing.

And here is where the LEM comes into play in more Aristotelean fashion.

The specific example Aristotle used was the problem of the future contingent - who would win the battle tomorrow. — apokrisis

This is the only empirically valid example of potential which we have, the future contingent. To extend the concept of potentiality to include a "pure potentiality" is like assuming a future without any past. If we could imagine a point, prior to the passing of any time, at which point no time has passed to create any sort of actual existence (no constraints), this would be pure potentiality; the possibility for absolutely anything. But assuming this point is unjustified and unwarranted. It is unjustified because to say that there is a future, is to assume that time will start to pass, and this presents a necessity. Such a necessity denies "pure" potential. If we remove this necessity, that time will start to pass, then there is no future, and no potentiality. The assumption is unwarranted because until we gather a better understanding of the nature of time, it is meaningless to speculate about such beginnings. This is speculation about the beginning of something we haven't even established principles of identity for.

This Aristotelean way of thinking led him to put being before becoming (and MU to put material cause before final cause). — apokrisis

Matter is potential, so I think it is you who is asserting the priority of material cause.

There are definitely six logical possibilities. When we say "The 2 has a 1/6 chance of appearing face up.", we're talking about logical possibility.

The other kind of probability would make an assessment of some number of die throws... say 1000. Note that this kind of probability has no bearing on a unique event. The number in the denominator would be 1, so whatever the outcome turns out to be, it had a 100% chance of happening. This is all just a side effect of the fact that every event has only 1 outcome. — Mongrel

We treat the possibility as different from a logical possibility. We assume that the way in which one throws the die will influence the outcome. Therefore we assume that before the die is thrown, whatever the outcome turns out to be, did not have "a 100% chance of happening". How do you account for the incompatibility between this and your claim " whatever the outcome turns out to be, it had a 100% chance of happening"?

The point being, that despite the fact that every event has only 1 outcome, we treat "the event" as if it is not predetermined, and can be influenced by our activities. Therefore the nature of "an event" is such that it has no specific identity prior to occurring.


Thanks for the clear explanation Pierre-Normand. Here's one thing I still have a question about:

The "histories" of the many-histories interpretation of QM just are specific possible trajectories of individuals who make sequences of observations/measurements of their surroundings. The specific history one finds oneself in is determined post-facto. Hence, from any time-situated empirical perspective of an agent, at any given time, her *future* history isn't fully determined yet. — Pierre-Normand

According to what you have just told me, all of the histories are determined post-facto. But any particular history must have temporal extension, or it is not a "history". So from the perspective of being within a particular history, as it occurs, or even from the perspective of properly observing one of these histories, we would need a distinction between future and past, within the history itself, to account for the "flow of time" within the history.

Let's assume the empirical perspective of an agent now. If there are many-histories, which are "possible trajectories", how does the observing agent compare the position of the boundary between future and past, in relation to the different possible histories? Suppose we have a number of possible histories. Are each of them supposed to start and end at precisely the same moment in time, from the perspective of the observer, and proceed at the same rate of time passage in relation to the observer? Or, shouldn't we allow for some discrepancy here?

I think there is at least a fourfold distinction between logical, metaphysical, historical and epistemological possibilities (and there likely are several grades of metaphysical possibility). But you are quibbling away from my very simple point -- in initial response to your initial question -- that what is known to be actual (or epistemologically possible) from someones point of view extends further than the immediate present, such that it makes sense to speak of that person's history rather than our being constrained to talking merely of her present knowledge of her immediately present situation. — Pierre-Normand

You don't seem to be addressing the point. The point was that there is a fundamental difference between talking about someone's future, and talking about someone's past. By saying that we can talk about something other than someone's "immediate present", really misses the point, because I never mentioned the present, and I don't know what would be meant by someone's "immediate present".

But, regarding the future only, can one know what will happen not merely through inferring it from known present and past constraints, but also through deciding what to do. — Pierre-Normand

Let me put it this way, it is impossible to know what will happen without knowing what one will do. And, it is impossible to infer, without a doubt, what one will do, "from known present and past constraints". So it is impossible to know what will happen, simply by knowing present and past constraints.

Although the peculiar asymmetry that stems from this specifically agential perspective (i.e. our ability to control the future, and our inability to control the past) is relevant to the freewill and determinism issue, it is quite unconnected to anything that general relativity or quantum mechanics teaches us about the physical world, it seems to me. I think your concerns are completely different from Question's. — Pierre-Normand

If the principles of special and general relativity lead one to believe that there is no substantial difference between past and future, then we cannot say that the two are unconnected.

That's very simple. When Ceasar crossed the Rubicon, this became a historical fact. It will remain true in the future that Caesar crossed the Rubicon -- and similarly for everything this facts entails logically or nomologically. — Pierre-Normand

You seem to be missing the point of the question. You describe past events such that we know that they are true, because we experience them. We experience Caesar crossing the Rubicon, by reading about this. How can you say the same thing about future events? Can we read about what will happen in the future, then conclude that we have experienced this event by reading? Do you not find that there is something wrong with this principle? Do you really think that we can experience an event, and therefore know that it is true, by reading about it? Reading about an event gives us information about it which is other than the information given in experiencing it.

If the die lands with the 2 face up, it is impossible that any other number also is. So in what sense were there 6 possibilities? Only logically. — Mongrel

By saying "if the die lands with the 2 face up", you have produced a proposition which indicates that this has actually happened, the die has landed with the 2 face up. If this occurs, then it is in the past. The only way that the die can land with the 2 face up, is if this event is now in the past. Prior to this though, when the throw is in the future, there are six possibilities.

It is for this reason that we must maintain a clear distinction between past and future. Prior to the event occurring, it is a possibility, along with other possibilities. After it occurs it is an actuality.

In other words, is there in fact some sort of metaphysical guarantee that the process of individuation would have necessarily given rise to this individual, and not another? — StreetlightX

This is what Aristotle outlined as the fundamental question for metaphysics. It is not to inquire of a thing, why it is rather than not, in the most general sense, it is to inquire why it is what it is, rather than something else. The assumption is that when a thing comes into existence, it comes into existence as a particular thing, the particular thing that it is, and not something else. If we put that premise together with the premise that what a thing is, when it comes into existence, is not something totally random, we can conclude that what a thing will be, when it comes into existence, is predetermined.

This leads to Neo-Platonist idealism, which assumes immaterial Forms as the determining factor. We can find a similar position in Deleuze's virtual reality of Ideas. The principal difference appears to be in the Neo-Platonist One, and Deleuze's multiplicity. The difference appears to be based in the way one might approach the concept of potential, or possibility. We can identify individual possibilities, and as such, there is a multiplicity of possibilities, but when we allow that possibility has actual existence, it is no longer individual possibilities, but simply possibility, or potential. I think that from the Neo-Platonist perspective, all possibilities emanate from the One, which is an assumed actuality, made necessary according to Aristotle's cosmological argument. So the existence of what appears to us as a multiplicity of possibilities, is supported by an underlying actuality which is One. This underlying actuality is the determining factor, such that when a particular thing comes into being, it is what it is.

Unfortunately, notes Simondon, the problem with taking the individual as a starting point is that it presupposes that this individual is a necessary outcome of the process of individuation which gave rise to it. In some sense, this is true. Given this or that individual thing, it's clear that it is necessary (on the account of it's being there) that the process that gave rise to it did so. But, the question is whether or not it could have given rise to something else instead. — StreetlightX

This is the key point to understand. The nature of possibility, potential, is such that it will not necessitate any particular thing, the same potential has the capacity to bring about many different things. So the underlying actuality, which is responsible for the thing being what it is and not something else, which actualizes that particular potential, is understood to act as a cause in the same sense as final cause (telos), according to the concept of freedom of choice.

To quote Simondon again, "The individual ... would then be grasped as a relative reality, a certain phase of being that supposes a preindividual reality, and that, even after individuation, does not exist on its own, because individuation does not exhaust with one stroke the potentials of preindividual reality." — StreetlightX

This thought, might be vey closely related to Deleuze's "repetition". If an act of individuation occurs at a moment in time, a similar but different act of individuation occurs at the next moment, the present being the only time capable of supporting the existence of individuals.

One consequence of this thought is that it also requires us to rethink the status of the law of the excluded middle, or indeed logic in it's classical form. For Simondon, unity and identity are the result of an operation which exceeds it insofar as Being, understood in it's full sense, comprises of not just the individual, but also the pre-individual. Simondon again: "The concrete being or the full being, which is to say, the preindividual being, is a being that is more than a unit. Unity (characteristic of the individuated being and of identity), which authorizes the use of the principle of the excluded middle, cannot be applied to the preindividual being... Unity and identity are applicable only to one of the being's stages, which comes after the process of individuation. — StreetlightX

This demonstrates a return to the Aristotelian understanding of "becoming", and "potential". Aristotle demonstrated a deep incompatibility between becoming and the fundamental laws of logic, which produced paradoxes, and allowed sophists to prove absurdities. He insisted that the law of non-contradiction ought to be upheld, and defined the category of potential, in which the law of excluded middle was to be excepted. Hegel offered another understanding of becoming, in which the law of non-contradiction becomes inapplicable. These are two distinct understandings of "becoming", which appear quite different. The issue which may arise though, is with the way that the three laws of logic are tied together, and whether we can simply exclude one, without rendering the other two as useless. Aristotle offered a unique form of identity, which allows that potential may be identified, as matter, but matter itself has no inherent form, so the issue of non-contradiction is skirted, as irrelevant.

The principle of sufficient reason is just not unconditional. As per earlier posts, you can find examples to which the principle does not apply, so you have to rule those out before applying it. — jorndoe

There are no cases where the principle of sufficient reason does not apply, if there were, they would be unverifiable as unknowns. Your claim is a trick of definition, the magic of self-deception. The cosmological argument is directed toward contingent existence. The premise is that things are contingent. The conclusion is that the premise, which defines all existence as contingent is a mistaken premise. It does not lead to the conclusion that there is something outside of "existence".

The principle of sufficient reason cannot apply to existence (everything) without circularity, since otherwise the deduced reason would automatically not exist — which is contradictory. — jorndoe

The magic trick of self-deception which you are pulling off here, is that you are attempting to apply the PSR to a generality, a universal, "existence", when the PSR clearly only applies to particular things. When you make such categorical errors you should expect any manner of paradoxical results. "Existence" is what existing things have. If we attempt to apply the PSR to an attribute or property, which has been separated from the object of which it is a property, we should have no expectations that the PSR would apply, because the separated property exists only in abstraction, not as a thing which the PSR would apply to.

It matters little for the purpose of the present discussion whether the events that are part of this history are past (inferred), presently observed, or reliably predicted. Consider the case of Schrödinger's cat. When we open the box, and find that the cat is dead, we can infer that it died more than an hour ago (because its body is stiff and cold, say), and also reliably predict that it will remain dead in foreseeable the future. — Pierre-Normand

Actually it makes a big difference. Do you recognize a difference between the numerous logical possibilities of what may have occurred in the past when it is believed that only one of these possibilities is what actually occurred, and the ontological possibilities for the future, when it is believed that any one of these possibilities may actually occur?

When our attention is directed toward the past, we assume that one thing actually occurred, yet if we do not know what actually occurred, we allow logical possibilities for what actually occurred. We may proceed towards narrowing the possibilities, and determining what actually happened. When our attention is directed at the future, we assume many things may actually occur, these are ontological possibilities. We may choose a possibility as a preferred one, and proceed toward ensuring that this occurs. Do you recognize the difference? With respect to the past, we determine the possibilities, then choose the one most representative of what actually happened, i.e., what has been determined by the passage of time. With respect to the future, we determine the possibilities, then choose the one which we prefer, and cause it to occur.

Even in those cases (most usual!) where our observations are observations of events that already are determined (as a result of the quantum wave-function of the observed system already being 'collapsed') -- such as our learning on the basis of historical documents that Caesar crossed the Rubicon -- we also are 'experiencing' (in the relevant sense) events that belong to our past history, and thus can rule out the possibility of our being part of an history in which Caesar wimped out. — Pierre-Normand

OK, let's say that we infer from relevant documents, that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, just like any observation of any event, we infer from the relevant evidence, what has occurred. In this way, we are as you say "experiencing" the event. Now, how do you propose to extend this principle to the future, such that we "experience" what may occur?

All the relevant evidence, in relation to the future, indicates to us what may happen, what is possible to happen. But there is no way to experience the future event until it actually happens, in which case it is a past event. The evidence of "what may happen" cannot be construed as an experiencing of the event, in the same way that the evidence of what has happened can be.

Decoherence views (no-collapse), as opposed to collapse views (e.g. Copenhagen) have the advantage that they don't require actual measurements performed by intelligent agents to explain how macroscopic quantum systems become entangled and thus 'measure' each other, as it were. — Pierre-Normand

Well, I suppose I could I ask the question again, what do you think causes decoherence? All you've told me is what doesn't cause decoherence, measurement.

Michel Bitbols' work on the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics is related to this and it directly adresses the issue of the cognition of time. But, as is the case with all of the above, however metaphysically enlightening, it has little direct relevance to the alleged problems of free will and determinism, on my view. — Pierre-Normand

What do you mean by "cognition of time"?

How can you say that this is not relevant to the problem of free will? Free will, to be real, requires the intuitive substantial difference between future and past. The fundamental principle is that we cannot change what has occurred,

Sorry, I meant to say "consistent histories". It is relevant since, as I suggested, the timeless wave-function describes a superpositions of all the consistent histories that we, as sentient observers, may experience, and hence its static nature doesn't entail determinism at the empirical level that interests us. — Pierre-Normand

There seems to be some inconsistency in your choice words here, which creates ambiguity. You refer to all the "consistent histories" which we "may experience". Correct me if I'm wrong, but "histories" refers to past events which may or may not have been experienced, and it is nonsense to speak of histories which we may experience.

The latter, as well as our experience of time, is a result of the decoherence of the timeless wavefunction into multiple independent consistent histories. — Pierre-Normand

What do you think could cause such a decoherence? Since our experience of time is key to our understanding of free will, then this decoherence must be of the utmost importance to this issue.

@Metaphysician Undercover, spatiality and objects are related much like temporality and processes, and they're all aspects of the universe.
At least when going by common ontological terminology. — jorndoe

It's not so straight forward as you make this out to be. Space and time are concepts. They are the means by which we understand objects and processes. Sure, concepts are aspects of the universe, but if our concept of space, or our concept of time is inadequate for a true understanding of reality, then it would be in some sense, wrong, or incorrect. In that case, the space, or time, represented by the concept would not be an aspect of the universe. The concept would be, in that respect, fictitious.

You can conceive of space and time as attributes of objects and processes, or you can conceive of them as the necessary conditions for objects and processes. The difference is significant. You can also conceive of one as an attribute, and the other as a necessary condition That's what I prefer, space is an attribute of physical objects, and time is a necessary condition for processes.

Is there some way to know which discussions I have taken part in, and even how recently? I'm too old and alcoholic, so I keep forgetting where I am active, can't remember what I did the day before. I guess I can just keep refreshing the "mentions" to find out if I've inspired a reply from anyone.

I think that by the time we engaged, we were off the OP anyway. Then StreetlightX acted to revisit or revise the OP, such that my original comments were not too relevant to the revised OP anyway. Actually, StreetlightX's revision. or "clarification" seemed to render the OP meaningless.

I'd rather say instead that both self and other are derivative notions which become (roughly) sedimented into place based on a variety of developmental factors, both biological and social
...

For example, the child developmental psychologist Daniel Stern notes the basic 'awareness' in infants probably takes the form of what he refers to as 'vitality affects', which are kinds of 'life-feelings', or life-qualities':

...

Importantly, these vitality effects do not find their locus in a 'self' but are simply experienced 'as such':

...



In other words at this most basic level, there simply is no self-other distinction - there 'are' simply vitality affects.


...

Difference does not occur through the stratification of self and other or inside and outside. Difference emboldens processual shiftings between strata that foreground and background modes of experience, each of them affected by incipient reachings-toward, a reaching-toward not of the subject, but of experience itself. Senses of coherence emerge that unfold as feelings of warmth, intensity, texture, anguish." — StreetlightX

Seems like there are "vitality effects" which just randomly occur, in nature, not within a self, or in a particular location where there is a thinking being which has established an internal/external differentiation, but there are just random occurrences of vitality effects, and therefore "experience", around the world.

That's a problem with how we describe the way that we learn. We observe our teachers, and we say that we are learning from those people. In actual fact, we are observing, applying our own logical processes, and producing conclusions. We are actually learning through observation, and our own logical processes, not from the others. So the problem occurs when we observe others who are not actually teachers, or intending to teach us, and we say that we are learning from them. This implies that they are teachers and are teaching us.

The awareness is a desire for sex / the sexual hunger is a form of awareness. If it wasn't, it wouldn't work too well. Evolution may not know what it's doing but it ain't stupid. So, you're still a long way from solving the problem of my paradoxical sex life. I guess I may have to ask Dr. Phil. — Baden

I still haven't found this paradox you are referring to. The problem appears to be that you are incorrectly describing your erection as "desire for sex". It is not, and you are invalidly proceeding from the described situation, "having an erection", to the conclusion of "desire for sex". To exemplify this invalid procedure, we could explicate completely what "having an erection" actually means, and what "desire for sex" actually means, and find that there is a huge gap between these two. You assume that there is no difference between these two, and this causes your apparent paradox.