It's just a matter of whether it's a fact or not. It's a fact that a lack of bias isn't possible. — Terrapin Station

Sure, and it's a fact that no human being is morally perfect, but that doesn't prevent us from trying not to be immoral. You are simply rationalizing bad behaviour by claiming that it is a fact that no one is perfect. Why don't you just admit that you do not believe that being prejudiced is wrong, that you think it's good, and we should all try to be this way?

If you're going to go with the snobby/we-disagree-because-you're-inferior-to-me approach to criticizing my views, at least have a handle on basic reading comprehension and reasoning skills. — Terrapin Station

This is what you said:

I deem things absurd or nonsense when I believe that they're incoherent, basically. It's not at all the case that just in case I disagree with something, I think it's incoherent. But some things I believe are incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Clearly your last sentence says that you believe some incoherent things, not that some things believed by others, you believe to be incoherent. I suggest that you quit attacking my reading skills, and pay some attention to your own writing skills. If you didn't say what you meant to say, so that I misunderstood you, that's not my fault.

Of course it's a crime! Speeding is an offence under statute (the Road Traffic Act here in UK). You can't be fined for a civil offence, you'd have to be sued! — Barry Etheridge

Where I live, speeding is not a criminal offence. Such things vary from one country to another.

You seem to have completely missed the fact that marriage is a civil contract and that breach of said contract is therefore a tort and not a crime — Barry Etheridge

What's that got to do with it, I get punished for speeding, and that's not a crime.

Sure, I'm not advocating that it is ideal that people should cheat on one another, but you are not addressing the issue; which is whether the person who cheats should be punishable by law. — John

Well, I've clearly argued that the person who breaks the vow ought to be punished, or else the vow is pointless. Now, if it isn't going to be the law, the state, which imposes such punishment who is it going to be? Punishment is not something we can just be handing out to one another, unless we establish a law which allows this. But wouldn't this just be a different form of being punished by law?

Marriage has become a legal institution, rather than a religious one. If certain vows are included in that institution, then the legal system is responsible for the punishment of breaking such vows. Here, I think we come to a very important distinction between the approach of religion, and the approach of the state, toward this type of issue. Most religions are structured toward encouraging success of morality, in distinction from the state, which is structured toward punishment for failure. This directly relates to Bitter Crank's point:

This time around, let's spend less time figuring out how to punish people who commit adultery and spend more time figuring out how to help families be successful. — Bitter Crank

It is much more productive, and constructive, to provide as many means as possible to assist individuals in keeping the vow, rather than simply punishing those who break it. The problem is that instead of taking the very difficult "good" route, which is to help those who need help, prior to them doing something wrong, encouraging success, we so often choose the not so good, but easy route, which is to punish those after they have done something wrong.

If the state has taken on the responsibility of the institution of ,marriage, then it must either discontinue such vows altogether, or structure its laws to support the vows. If such vows are continued, then the state must be structured such that keeping them is encouraged, and breaking them discouraged.

If one makes a promise to another who is important to one then the disapprobation of the other and in extremis, the loss of relationship with her or him is sufficient punishment, I would say. — John

But this does not take into account the pain caused to the other party. The one who is cheated on deserves no punishment, yet is forced to suffer the same punishment as the cheater.

Further to my last post, and more direct to the op, why make a promise if you don't expect to get punished for breaking that promise? What purpose would the promise serve, if there wasn't punishment involved with breaking it?

What's the point of a vow if you are not somehow bound by that vow? If I go around making promises which I will soon be breaking, doesn't the word "promise" lose any sense of meaning? Instead of being used to establish a meaningful relationship, the promise becomes a means for deception.

I don't believe that a lack of bias is possible. — Terrapin Station

Well that's a nice way of rationalizing being prejudiced, by saying that you don't believe a lack of bias is possible. I suppose you could rationalize any form of immorality in this way, by saying that you don't believe restraining from such an immoral act is possible.

I deem things absurd or nonsense when I believe that they're incoherent, basically. It's not at all the case that just in case I disagree with something, I think it's incoherent. But some things I believe are incoherent. — Terrapin Station

So you're saying that you believe things which are incoherent, and also, incoherent things you deem as absurd, and nonsense. Why do you choose to believe things which you deem as absurd, or nonsense?

The cases actually happened. — The Great Whatever

The point it that the cases are irrelevant to the question at hand.

What icounts as cognition? — John

What counts as cognition, is being aware of, and this leads us to perception, sensation, and the external objects. That is what I've argued for the entire thread.

Is linguistic ability necessary for the sort of cognition that requires that the re-cognizer conceives of the re-cognized as a separate entity exterior to itself and/or is merely 'picking out' of the re-cognized as a kind of bare gestalt "affordance" 'to-be-responded-to' sufficient to qualify as what we would call 'recognition'? It seems that something like that must be the foundation, in any case. — John

Clearly, linguistic knowledge is not necessary for an animal to recognize separate entities, like my pets recognize me. All this requires is sensation, perception, and the ability to apprehend one thing as distinct from another.

But now you want to change the subject, and discuss whether my pets recognize me "as a separate entity", this would require that the pet knows what "a separate entity" is, and that's a completely different question.

There's never been any shortage of people believing absurdities, nonsense, etc.

..

Sure, for work that I feel is good. — Terrapin Station

There's no shortage of prejudice in the wold. And you demonstrate it well. Unless another's belief feels right to you, you deem it absurd nonsense.

It was an ironic statement, MU. — John

Terrapin doesn't seem to think so.

Language is required to recognize other people? My cat recognizes me. My dog recognizes me. What does language have to do with recognition? Language is irrelevant here.

The passing of time is an abstract conception, like the marking of instants. There is no marking of instants or passing of time independently of us; I would say. — John

So back to the other question then, is there change, or motion, without human beings? If change, or motion is real, and independent of human beings, how could this occur without time passing?

But, yeah, as I said before of course you may be able to find grounds to disagree with this; just as you may be able to find grounds to disagree with anything that could be said on the subject. — John

I don't agree with this, I think there are statements concerning this subject which cannot be disagreed with. Would you disagree with the fact that we recognize a distinct difference between future and past?

Case studies have been done with naturally occurring feral children that are the result of neglectful parenting. You can feed a child without speaking to it or cuddling it. — The Great Whatever

Still skeptical, and you cannot say that feeding a child, and providing the necessities of life is not "significant interaction with others". That is contradiction.

You should recognize that your argument makes absolutely no sense. The child is fed, and given the necessities of life, by other human beings. Your claim appears to be that the child goes on to learn how to supply itself with food and the necessities of life, without ever having noticing the existence of those who previously provided it with food.

Respect?..understanding?.. what does it matter?...it's all just personal opinions, anyway...Jesus! — John

Do you think that the philosophy taught in universities is just "personal opinions"? If so, couldn't we say that the science taught in universities is just personal opinions as well?

incidentally, I have told this anecdote before - some years back, there was a sensational news story that an archeologist claimed to have found physical remnants of Jesus. (in the form of an ossuary, although it was discredited very quickly). — Wayfarer

I think that Mormons believe Jesus came back from heaven and settled in North America with his followers. Perhaps they know where his remains are.

Not exactly how I would frame it. Time passes only by virtue of its being marked off; and this would seem to involve the idea of instants or points of reference. Otherwise the marking off is in terms of events; but where there is merely a succession of events that can never be truly discrete, there would seem to be no passing of time, but rather a seamless movement or transition within time. — John

This doesn't make sense to me, there can't be any time passing unless there is someone making off instants. How would someone act to mark off instants unless time were passing? Also, don't you think that there was time passing before human beings were making off instants?

Of course, I think some philosophers who were trained as philosophers suck, too, but that's another story. — Terrapin Station

Do you have any respect for philosophy whatsoever Terrapin?

I dismiss it by (1) there being no evidence of such a thing with respect to the multitude of vague ways that people have defined it, (2) the idea of nonphysical existents being incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Do you think the idea that concepts are nonphysical existents, is incoherent? Why then is this idea taught to us in university, in philosophy classes? It never appeared incoherent to me when it was taught to me in school. Do you think that philosophy, in general, is incoherent, because this appears to be one of the fundamental principles taught in philosophy?

Yes exactly, the boundaries are "completely artificial", that is why I say they are "abstractly conceived". I think it is more accurate (to experience at least, if not to abstract thought) to say that "there is simply duration and the point instants are just conceptual"; in fact that is just what I have been saying. The point instants are real, abstractly speaking, however, insofar as they are really thought; but they are not phemonemologically real, insofar as they are not really experienced as such. — John

So I take it that instants are irrelevant to the passing of time then, time passes regardless of whether human beings mark off instants. Then the following paragraph should be perhaps considered, as wrongly stated:

Considered abstractly the moment is an infinitesimal point-instant, and just as a series of infinitesimal points constitute a line, so a series of infinitesimal point-instants constitute a duration. Abstractly considered passing from one moment to another can only consist in a traversal across further infinitesimal point-instants. So the moment-as-point-instant is not anything we could be in. — John

Duration is something other than a series of point-instants. A series of point-instants is a measured time, abstracted, or conceptual, but unmeasured, there is just duration without instants. A series of point instants might be how one represents a duration, but it is not duration itself.

... apparently feral children raised with their physical needs met, but with no significant interaction with others... — The Great Whatever

I'm very skeptical about any such experimentation. Wouldn't that be harsh cruelty, punishable by law, to keep a child locked away, and only show up with food and water now and then? Were do you find these "feral" children, and how do they live after being born if there is no one feeding them? How can you take a baby and meet that baby's physical needs, then claim that the child has had "no significant interaction with others". Clearly you are in contradiction.

On the production side, they master the first person pronoun before the second. — The Great Whatever

Of course, for the child, it's all about "myself", what "I" need. So "I" might be learned prior to "you". But this doesn't indicate that the child does not recognize the mother as the one fulfilling the needs, prior to recognizing the needs themselves. As I argued earlier, the act which satisfies the need (involving external object) is recognized before the need itself is apprehended.

In many cases, "mommy" or "daddy" is the child's first word, not "I" or the baby's name, so obviously you're barking up the wrong tree.

And in fact we do use "seems to me" to be a preliminary for something. It seems to you that my argument is wrong. It does not seem this way to me. — darthbarracuda

I didn't say that we don't take "seems to me" as a preliminary, I said we don't take it as justification.

Now it seems to me, like you haven't produced an argument. You have simply asserted that the existence of a soul is "highly unlikely", without justifying this claim. I receive this statement as a proposition. I can either accept it as a premise, and proceed toward wherever the logic you produce takes me, or I can ask you to justify your proposition. I like to see propositions justified before proceeding, otherwise the logical process may be a meaningless waste of time. If the only reason for your proposition is that such a premise is necessary for you to reach the desired conclusion, then you are begging the question. That is why I ask for justification of such propositions before accepting them as premises.

From a more naturalistic point of view, I can. There is no being 100% sure (even about this claim). Truth is estimated by likelihood. — darthbarracuda

It does not justify your proposition to say that from my "point of view", a naturalistic one, the proposition is self-evident, because now what is required is a justification of your point of view. If by "naturalistic", you mean that all things are natural, I would dismiss this point of view as unjustified, because it excludes the possibility of anything artificial. And isn't your "point of view" itself artificial? If your claim is that the distinction between artificial and natural should not be upheld, then I'd like to see this justified.

The definition of death is the ceasing of biological functions, and unless we posit the existence of a soul, which seems to me highly unlikely even in the Aristotelian sense of it... — darthbarracuda

You can't just dismiss the possibility of a soul, by saying it seems to be highly unlikely. You may be one who lives your life making decisions based on what "seems" to be the case, but this is philosophy, and we don't take "seems to me" as justification for any such assertion.

I don't think it makes sense to speak about the passing of time between moments, and no passing of time within the moment, rather passing of time is a movement through or across instants, but yet the movement itself is made up of instants. There are no actual instants, they are abstracta, so in a sense there can be no actual movement of time, because it is also an abstraction; apart from its phenomenological dimension as pure duration or persistence. — John

Let me see if I understand what you say here. Movement is made up of instants. The passing of time is a type of movement, occurring across instants. There are no actual instants, because these are abstractions. Does this mean that from your perspective, movement is not real either? Is movement simply an abstraction as well?

Considered abstractly the moment is an infinitesimal point-instant, and just as a series of infinitesimal points constitute a line, so a series of infinitesimal point-instants constitute a duration. — John

Isn't the boundary between one infinitesimal point instant and another simply artificial, completely conceptual? Otherwise, how could you say that the instant is an abstraction? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that there is simply duration, and the point-instants are just conceptual? If not, what evidence do you have, that such point-instants are real?

I suppose my perspective as I am presenting it here is a mystical conception in which all time, space and being is present in one point in space and time and what we experience as the present and the passage of time is a fraction of the whole, rather like a thread following an incarnate arc across the span of a certain combination of parts of the whole. — Punshhh

Could you explain what you mean when you say that all time, space, and being, are present in one point? is this an extremely large point, or what type of "point" are you talking about here, some type of black hole?

Well, it's particular type of "thing" - namely the entire world. Definitely not an object/subject in the usual sense, but it's surely not a concept. — Marty

Yes, you can do this. You can put all existing things together in one category, and call this "existence". But don't you see that this is a conception? How can you say that apprehending all as one, is not conceptual?

Also, this doesn't make any sense with other universals. What about the universal redness? Does that mean you can't apply the universal redness to existing things? — Marty

Yes, that's right. Take a look around your room at any object there. How would you propose to apply the universal "redness" to any object in that room? You could apply red paint to an object, but you can't apply redness, the universal. If you name that object "X", you make it a subject, and through predication you can say "X is red". You apply the universal to the subject, not to the object. You apply red paint to the object.

If the Law is the seed, then Christ is the flower :) The flower and the seed have a necessary connection with each other, even though the flower transcends the seed. — Agustino

How does the flower transcend the seed? Isn't it more likely that the seed actually transcends the flower?

When you say it "would create the impression that if Jesus was resurrected, the laws of nature were transcended," it seems to me that that mainly points to our faulty understanding of the laws of nature. — saw038

Why would you say this? It appears like very little is known about the actual process whereby Jesus was resurrected. Much that is said about this appears to be unsubstantiated speculation. So if one doesn't properly understand what is meant by "resurrected", when people say "Jesus was resurrected", it could be the case that this individual believes that "resurrected" necessarily implies that the laws of nature were transcended, when perhaps "resurrected" wasn't being used in that way.

Now, our faulty understanding of the laws of nature may also result in a misunderstanding of Jesus' resurrection, but I find that the two are intrinsically related; therefore, it would fall under option number 2. — saw038

This is another possibility as well. We may understand the laws of nature in such a way that we would define "resurrection", as logically impossible. This would mean that we assume premises of "laws of nature", and we define "resurrection" in such a way that it contradicts these premises. This falls into option #2. But if these "laws of nature" are incorrect, then "resurrection", as defined, might not actually be physically impossible. To maintain the position, that resurrection is impossible, we would have to correctly identify the applicable laws of nature, and redefine "resurrection", to maintain the logical impossibility.

It is the conception of the moment as a series of nows which is incorrect. — Punshhh

I can understand why you say that the series of nows is incorrect. The now is an assumed point which we use to mark the beginning and end of a period of time. One could say "now", then proceed to measure the passing of time, with a clock, until "now" is spoken again. Under this assumption, the now is an assumed point. We can also project that point, to yesterday at 6:00 AM for example, and tomorrow at 6:00 AM, then claim a period of time between these two assumed points. The problem is that no time passes at the now, it all passes between the nows, so it is impossible that time could consist of a series of nows.

Notice that these points, "nows", or "moments", are simply assumed. They are somewhat transcendent to time itself, because time passes at both sides of the moment, but not at the moment itself; and the moment is simply placed there, artificially, by the human being who says "now", or 6:00 AM, or some such thing. The moment can be moved around to any place in time this way. Any particular moment is created in that way, by taking the general moment, which is just a point, and placing it somewhere in the duration of time.

The duration is what you call "one continuous period". Without a beginning or an end, we could say that the continuous period is "eternal". And if we assume that the moment which produces beginnings and ends to periods of time is completely artificial, as described above, then there is no beginning or end, and the continuous period is eternal.

That is one sense of the word eternal, an unending time. But in another sense, the point, the moment, or "now", as something which transcends time, and is therefore outside of time, is eternal. I think that to understand the true nature of "eternal", we must approach this point, this moment, not the continuous passing of time. This moment is at once, the end of one period of time, and the beginning of the next. That is the moment of the present, it is the end of the future, and beginning of the past.

We can consider that this moment of the present, which is the end of the future, and beginning of the past, is itself active, not static, because as soon as we say "now", it is past. This activity makes the boundary between future and past, which is the moment of now, somewhat vague. And that is what special relativity theory assumes, that the relative position of this moment of now is dependent on one's perspective. The particular perspective which we have, is dictated by out physical bodies, as you say, so we don't see that there are other perspectives, we all have similar bodies. But if we consider other possible perspectives, this gives us the breadth of the moment.

1) The linguistic sign indicates the mental state of the speaker. — The Great Whatever

This would not be too accurate, because rather than the mental state of the speaker, the sign indicates what the speaker wants, or more precisely, what the speaker wants you to think. The more precise qualification has to be kept in mind to account for the fact that it is possible to deceive.

Surely I know what the sign means in virtue of my linguistic competence, and not in virtue of my ability to mind-read; and furthermore the word would mean the same thing, in the sense we're interested in (logicity), regardless of who said them, excluding first-person indexicals and so on. — The Great Whatever

We can only say that you know what the sign means if you interpret the sign in the way that the person who put it there wants you to. Your linguistic competence may or may not enable you to do this, depending on your capacity in relation to the norms employed by the sign producer. Therefore "linguistic competence" does not suffice to give you "the meaning of the sign". It only possibly gives you that meaning. Linguistic competence gives you the capacity to produce an interpretation of "what the sign says". But "what the sign says", in actuality, is that a very particular mental process, is desired from you, one which you may or may not produce. If you produce the appropriate mental process, you have "correctly" interpreted the sign.

Is there a third option? Jesus' resurrection is a true story which doesn't transcend the laws of nature? In this case, a misunderstanding of either the laws of nature, or of Jesus' resurrection, or both, would create the impression that if Jesus was resurrected, the laws of nature were transcended.

Sorry Marty, if I've confused you. I didn't mean "categorical error", I meant "category mistake".

The PSR says that for every existing thing, there is a reason for its existence. A universal, or generality is a concept. Therefore a universal, or generality, is only an existing thing as a concept. So we have two principal categories, particular things, and universals, or generalities. To treat a member of one category as if it were a member of the other category is a category mistake.

Why? I can obviously apply it to existence it-self, not the concept. — Marty

If existence itself is a particular thing, and not a concept, can you point to this thing, or describe to me where I might find it.

I agree with you philosophically...but the problem is, no matter how hard I try, I am still stuck in this world of past and future. I think the revelation of present can only be conceived in specific moments of time. — saw038

That's the difficulty I have. If the present is conceived of as specific moments, how does this become eternal? If we define "the present" in relation to the world we're "stuck in", then it becomes some sort of boundary between past and future. This could only be eternal if we assume that time keeps going forever.

There is a breadth to the moment, with a second or two of past and future appearing to us as now. — Punshhh

If this were the case, how could we distinguish which part of the now is past, and which part is future? It all simply seems like now, but if part was really past, and part was really future, shouldn't we be able to distinguish which is which?

But the moment I am thinking about is a mental thing and considers a reality in which mind, or soul is more real than the external world. — Punshhh

I wonder how this moment, the moment of the mind, could be conceived as being eternal.

Also, without looking too far ahead to the third chapter, if the category of indication seems a little fuzzy, it's perhaps best to consider it a purely negative category for now; it is everything that does not fall under the ambit of expression — StreetlightX

I am not too comfortable with this position, as it creates the complete disunity within the concept of "sign", which was briefly alluded to. This, is/ is not perspective, implies that there are two distinct ways of using "sign", and to mix the two would be equivocation. That is, unless we remove one "expression" for example, from the category of "sign". But what sense does it make to say that an expression is not a sign? And, if we approach the expression as if it is a sign, what gives it the appearance of a sign? Is it the act of interpretation which makes it appear like a sign, or is it something about the act of expression itself, which makes the expression appear to be a sign. If the latter, then sign, and indication, are inherent within the expression, whether or not all expressions are indications..

Are you saying that Derrida misrepresents Husserl when he says things like this:

"Let us pursue our reading. Every expression would therefore be gripped, despite itself, by an indicative process."

"In order to do that, he must therefore demonstrate that expression is not a species of indication even though all expressions are mixed with indication, the reverse not being true."

The point being, that Derrida represents Husserl as saying that "all expressions are mixed with indication". Then we have the quote from you, revealing where expressions "no longer function as indications".

Do you think that this is meant to demonstrate that Husserl contradicts himself? Or, is this meant to display a complete separation, disjunction, or disunity, between expression and indication, such that they operate in separate domains? Then the fact that an expression is indicative would be some sort of random coincidence.

Maybe?
How can you have a thing already, except it doesn't "have existence"?
Predicate ontologization or existence as ground?
Something's amiss. — jorndoe

I don't see your point. We sense differences around us. We single out one thing as separate from its surrounding, and say that this individuated thing, "exists". Clearly the thing could have been individuated, recognized, named, and even picked up and used, by many different human beings, before some decided to say that this thing "exists".

The issue you refer to seems to be involved with predicating other properties to a subject, prior to attributing existence to that subject, and then falsely concluding that the subject must "exist". In other words there is a category error in assuming that a subject is an object. An assumed subject does not necessarily exist, as we can assume many types of fictitious subjects. When we predicate existence to that subject, we designate that it is an object. To conclude that a subject is necessaily an object, without the appropriate premise is invalid procedure.

Importantly, Husserl wants to argue the opposite. — csalisbury

Do you mean Derrida wants to argue this?

Is expression a sub-species of indication, just one kind of indication?

...

if there really is no species-genus relation between indication and expression, and the two are strictly distinct. In what sense then are both 'signs' at all? — The Great Whatever

This is what I see as the principal issue, and the answer depends on how clearly, or ambiguously, one defines these terms, expression, indication, signification. Husserl denies that expression is a sub-species of indication. But if expression and indication are distinct forms of signification, then how do we account for the intermingling of the two?

Here is a question to keep in mind. Is it really true that all expressions contain indication, and not all indications are expressions? Or is this an assumption of convenience made by Husserl, to support an argued position? I think that we may be able to find examples of expression which are not indications. And, the problem in saying that not all indications are expressions, is that if we take examples of indications which are not expressions, it can be argued that all these so-called "indications" are really
false indications. It may be argued, that only an expression is a true indication.

From this perspective, Husserl may have things backwards.

So for Derrida, the question becomes "what is the sign in general". We must determine the essence of this broader category, "sign" in order to see how the sub-sets fit within, to judge Husserl's position. In this respect, there are a number of issues raised, "unity", and "truth", to begin with. I see "unity" as the most difficult issue here, and one which must be surmounted before we can even approach "truth".

(Can there be multiple first causes anyway?) — jorndoe

That's a good question, but it is only by assuming the reality of free will, or at least giving it the status of being a logical possibility, that we can proceed to enquire in this direction. Are all cases of free will part of one first cause, or are they separate, individual cases of first cause? If one is a determinist denier, that individual will not even make the effort to proceed toward understanding how one instance of a free will act relates to another. But if we allow for the evidence, that there is free will, we can ask what is it that separates one instance of a free will act from another, and in what sense can this separation be considered "real".

Believe whatever, but free will is notoriously strange (and controversial) in philosophy and other disciplines. — jorndoe

Well, isn't that a surprise? Don't you think that all things in philosophy are strange and controversial, otherwise they wouldn't be philosophy?

It would then be natural to ask for sufficient and relevant (non-hypothetical) examples of violations of causal closure, in order to justify such extended causation (no special pleading please). — jorndoe

I assume you realize that it would be impossible to observe , or prove, empirically, such a violation of causal closure. It would just appear like an activity without a known cause. Such violations are common, everyday occurrences. We call them free will actions.

Hi Punshhh,
Do you mean the past and future are there also?