To have a wife who says she loves me, and yet feels that I'm not sufficient to make for a good child is insulting. — Agustino

I don't see this point. When your wife points out a fault which you have, which is truly, in her eyes a fault, in other words she truly believes that you have this characteristic, and that it is a fault, why should you be insulted by this? You need to face the reality of your deficiencies, and don't ignore them under the assumption that it is a deficiency of the one who discloses them to you.

If it is not intuited, then how do you know that one thing follows from another? — John

As I said, I really don't know what you mean by intuitive. My dictionary defines intuition as "immediate apprehension by the mind without reasoning". There is a second definition which is immediate apprehension by a sense, and a third definition which is immediate insight. Notice that all use the word "immediate". Logic is a tool which the mind uses, so there is a necessity to understand the premises, the principles of logic being employed, and how these are related, so that a conclusion is drawn. There is no immediacy here, the conclusion requires mental effort, so it is impossible that logical conclusions are "intuitive", instead, they are "rational".

The form of maple leaves for example is a general form that can only be grasped as a visualization, it will be a description that will result in a visualization, an algebraic expression which specifies the coordinates on the x/y axis which will result in a visualization, or a direct pictorial representation. — John

Again, I disagree with you. I think that it is impossible to grasp a general form through a visualization. That's the very essence of a "general" form. A visual image is always of a particular, and a general form is categorically different from this. There is an inherent incompatibility between the two. That is why the general is understood through definition, rather than through visualizing a particular. We can come to grasp the general through seeing particular instances, and abstracting certain properties, but we cannot immediately grasp the general from a particular instance. This would merely be grasping a particular, and clearly not a case of grasping the "general form", which requires understanding some general principles.

Now, let's take the example of the pictorial representation: it is probably never going to be the exact form of any particular maple leaf, because each particular maple leaf has its own form of the same general kind which can be abstracted to form a closer, but never perfect, visual representation. — John

Here is the difficulty with your presentation. Unless the representation is of a particular maple leaf, then it is not a visual, or "pictorial" representation at all. A pictorial representation, or imaginary image, is of a particular, even if that particular is only within your mind. The image consists of the particulars which your mind puts there. You can imagine the maple leaf as just a stem, with a vague shape on top, many particulars not filled in by your mind's imagining process, but this does not give you the general form. What it gives you is an incomplete particular.

So what you don't seem to be understanding is that when we abstract the form, from a particular, through sense and thought, it is always a particular form which is abstracted from that individual. The particular form abstracted will be incomplete, depending on which aspects of the form are apprehended as important. But this does not produce a general form. The general form is created by the mind adopting certain principles of recognition, and classification. This is what Aristotle described as distinguishing essentials from accidentals. By employing these principles, first to recognize the similarity between different leaves, and second, to hold that there is a classification called "maple leaf", the existence of a general form is demonstrated. Further, an individual human being is often mistaken in these principle, so the formal existence of a general form is by definition. The classification is named and the defining features are described, such that there is agreement amongst human beings, and the general form maintains its existence by means of this agreement, convention.

The point being made, is that the particular form is what is abstracted from the particular object. This is perception. The general form is something completely different, it is created by the mind. The general form exists as principles of recognition and classification, rules which the mind follows. There is a categorical difference between the two. The two cannot be conflated because there is a deep incompatibility between them, and this is why dualism is necessary.

But there is no sense in which the present form of the maple leaf existed prior to the present moment. Prior to the present moment there were a succession of slightly different forms that evolved to the present form. — John

Let me try once again, to explain this issue. As time passes, there is as you say, "a succession of slightly different forms". At each moment of the present, the maple leaf is this particular maple leaf, it is not that particular maple leaf which it was at the last moment, because it has changed. Therefore at each moment the maple leaf is a new, and different object. So at each moment a new object is created, we can call them MLt1, MLt2, MLt3, etc., each collection of symbols referring to a different object. Let's take MLt3 for example. When that object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, MLt3, or else it is not MLt3. It does not come into existence as MLt2, Mlt4, or any random thing, it comes into existence as MLt3. Therefore we can assume that there is a cause of its existence as MLt3, a reason why it exists at that moment as MLt3, and not something else. This is the determining form of MLt3. Notice that in order for the object, MLt3, to exist at that present moment, as MLt3, it is necessary that the form of MLt3 existed prior to that. This prior form is not MLt2, it is not MLt4, because these are distinctly different. It is nothing other than the form of MLt3, which exists prior to the object MLt3, and ensures that object MLt3 will exist as that object, at that moment in time.

But we see material object MLt3. We abstract that particular form, and this constitutes our representation of object MLt3. Our representation is a representation of material object MLt3, it is not a representation of the determining form, which exists prior to material object Mlt3, ensuring that Mlt3 will exist as MLt3.

The visual form of an object cannot be grasped as a mathematical formula, well at least I can't grasp it as such, and I have spoken to mathematicians who say the same. The form can be modeled as a mathematical formula, the formula can of course be understood in purely mathematical terms, but it cannot be visualized directly, as mathematical formula; by definition it can only be visualized as a visual form. If you still disagree then there is no point continuing, because I am just going to say you are wrong; and you are probably just going to say I am wrong, and it will be a waste of time and energy. — John

The point I am making is that the visual form of the object is distinctly different from the form of the object which precedes the existence of that object in time, causing it to be that object which it is. The visual form of the object is created by human perception following the object's presence in time. It is a representation of the object's material existence at that time. The form which precedes the object's material existence, and determines what that object will be at any moment in time, as time passes, cannot be seen visually, because it is always prior in time to that object's material existence, which is what is seen. The only access we have to this prior form is the mathematical formula, which enables us to predict, and is inherently different from the visual form. The difference, I have argued, is that the visual form is spatial, and the mathematical is non-spatial. This, I believe, is due to the fact that there is no spatial existence prior to the present moment in time. Spatial existence is created at each moment of passing time.

So I am in agreement with you, that the visual form of the object cannot be grasped by the mathematical formula. The two are deeply incompatible, and that's why I advocate dualism. Here's an explanation of this incompatibility:

We see the object, thus creating a visual form. What we see is the object's material form, and this is necessarily post-present in time. The object is present to us, as a material object, at the present, so our representation of it is necessarily post-present, therefore this particular form is post-present. As human beings we proceed to create general forms, these are generalized rules, rules for naming, classifying, right up to the general laws of physics. Then, we turn back to the particular object, applying these general rules. So we have mathematical formulae, which we apply to the particular objects, attempting to determine the pre-present form of the object. This is prediction. But the essential nature of the pre-present form of the object is that it is particular. Each object has its own particular form, proper to it, which is prior to it in time, causing it to be the object which it is. Now we have general forms, mathematical, and physical laws etc., which are not specific to the particulars of the object. So we have an incompatibility between the general nature of mathematical formulae, and the particular nature of the pre-present forms of objects.

I actually think all understanding is intuitive. — John

I don't see how such a claim is tenable. We understand many things through the means of logic, and logic is not intuitive.

But, be that as it may, this conversation started off about the forms of objects, not about numbers or mathematics. — John

But the point was, the demonstration (which you didn't grasp because it was logical rather than visual) that the form of the object is necessarily prior to the material object. This implies that the actual form of the object, the form which determines what the object will be when it comes into existence, is completely different from the form that we grasp through perception, what we call the form of the material object.

As I explained, space is proper to the form of the material object, so the form which determines what the object will be must be non-spatial, therefore more like a mathematical formula. You cannot relate directly to the form which determines the existence of the object, through the material object itself, because the material object will be a medium, a separation between you and that form. So all you see is the form of the object, you do not see the form which determines the existence of the object. It's like looking at a screen with a projection on it. All you see is the projection, you do not see what's behind it, causing it. You can do all you want to analyze the forms on the screen, but this does not get you to the forms which are behind, causing the projection. And your intuitive understanding is really a big misunderstanding.

When the form is intuitively grasped it is always grasped as a configured extension in space, however abstracted. It's quite simple, you can't have the form of the object without the spacial configuration of that form. — John

But that's not true, the form of the object is not always grasped as a spatial extension. It may be grasped as a mathematical formula. That's what field theory gives us in quantum physics, a mathematical formula rather than a spatial extension. You would deny that the field mathematics represents the form of the object because it is not intuitive, it cannot produce a spatial configuration. Nevertheless, it is just as much the real form of the object as any spatial configuration which might be proposed. The point though, is that there is a separation between the two, the object itself which is the medium between the two forms is that separation. The spatial configuration is a representation, or form, of what the material object is, while the mathematical formula is the representation of what the object will be. So the material object exists as a separation between these two distinct types of forms, and this is why dualism is required in order to understand reality.

So what are you saying, that the ordering of numbers, and mathematical formulae in general, are intelligible, but because they are not spatial, they cannot be "intuitively grasped"? What does this mean? We understand mathematics, but we do not "intuitively" understand mathematics? Isn't this a sort of bias? You seem to be saying that because it isn't an "intuitive" understanding (whatever you mean by that), it is not a real understanding.

We were not talking about numbers, per se, we were talking about forms.
We were talking about numbers only insofar as they be used to create formulas. Formulas can specify two dimensional and three dimensional configurations. They can even specify four dimensional configurations, but we cannot visualize those. — John

Right, so this is contrary to your claim: "abstract forms are intelligible only insofar as they can be converted into visualizable forms". The fact is that some abstract forms are intelligible by a means other than visualizing them.

A mathematical formula is a type of form. A mathematical formula is grasped by a means other than visualization. Therefore not all forms are grasped by visualization.

If you can explain to me a way to intuitively grasp forms which does not involve spatial thinking then I will reconsider. — John

I already painstakingly described this, it's called "numbers". We grasp numbers through "order" which is non-spatial, it is temporal. Two comes after one, then three comes after two, then four, then five. We do not need a spatial number line to grasp the ordering of numbers.

Next, we have order, and order is a temporally based concept. We can have a succession of non-dimensional points, separated by time, and count them, one, two, three, and so on. Now we have the non-spatial unit, the point, with temporal extension, such that there is not a line, in the sense of a two dimensional, spatial line, but a succession of points, with time separating each point, such that the points may be numbered according to the order given to them by time. Now we have the fundamental mathematical concepts, the primary unity, and the ordering of numbers, and these require absolutely no spatial reference or spatial existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you still don't get it, try the concept of "God".

would say that mathematical concepts inhabit a logical space. In any case algebraic formulae for specifying the configurations of abstract forms are intelligible only insofar as they can be converted into visualizable forms. — John

As I said earlier, I really don't know what you mean by "logical space". Anyway, as I explained earlier, number is intelligible as order, and not necessarily as visualizable forms. Two comes after one, and three comes after two, and so on ad infinitum. That is how we learn numbers, we do not visualize one object then two objects, then three objects, etc., we learn the procession of numbers, one after the other. Numbers are an expression of order, not spatial forms.

And, as I said, you can insist that forms are spatial, all you want, but your only fooling yourself. What's the point in self-deception?

A form simply cannot be intelligibly grasped unless it is visualized, and to be visualized it must be as possessing spatial dimension — John

Are you telling me that you cannot grasp numbers strictly as order, without spatial dimension? If that is the case, perhaps you should go back to elementary math, and relearn these things.

I have just re-read the OP, and this is the most anti-science thing I have ever read. I know philosophy isn't enamored of science, but this is like someone raised by wolves making up their own ideas of how the human body (and world) works. I hate to be so negative, but this is bizarre. And everyone responding seems to be nodding their heads, going, "Yup. Eye-beams."

What am I missing? — Real Gone Cat

Welcome to the world of philosophy.

I can't make any sense of a form that is not a configuration, and a configuration cannot be coherently thought as being dimensionless, like a point may be able to be. — John

We are talking about intelligible objects, ideas and concepts. A form in the way that you use "form" is an intelligible object. But it appears like you now want to restrict your definition of "form", such that a form is necessarily a spatial "configuration".

I suggest to you that this is a mistake. We create mathematical formulae which are by no means spatial configurations. Mathematical formulae are applied to spatial configurations. So for example we say that the circle has 360 degrees. This allows that the circle is divided into 360 distinct rays, or angles from the centre. Mathematics is applied to the circle, such that the convention is to have 360 degrees, but we could have made the circle with 320, 376, 400, or whatever number of distinctions we desired. The number of degrees in a circle is completely arbitrary. This indicates that the mathematical formula is completely distinct from the spatial representation.

So it is rather pointless, and a dead end argument, an untenable position, to insist that a form is necessarily a spatial configuration. Clearly mathematical formulae are not necessarily spatial configurations. Furthermore, you then deny yourself the means for dealing with the existence of these non-spatial things, numbers and non-dimensional points for example. You simply segregate these non-spatial things from their spatial application. Then what will you do with them, ignore them, or deny that they are real?

In other words form is unthinkable without space. — John

So the problem is, that there clearly is concepts such as numbers and points which are thinkable without space. To exclude mathematical formulae from your definition of "form", such that all forms are spatial, is just to close your eyes to the reality that not all forms are spatial. This is like saying that all human beings are men, but that closes your eyes to the reality that many human beings are women.

The point I am interested in with physical differences, sub-par to optimal, is that whatever one is physically, it is part and parcel of who we are as persons. — Bitter Crank

What about those chemical washes though?

We are governed by all sorts of chemical washes arising from our glands, brains, and guts (from which arise, among other things, all sorts of issues about sexuality) . Our bodies have a fabulously complex Central Nervous System which sometimes (often?) makes a nuisance of us by its devious, clever, subtle and often destructive maneuvers. — Bitter Crank

Is it not true that we can substantially alter these chemicals washes by choice? And if we take those drugs we become someone else, other than the person that our body wants us to be. What's that all about?

Wouldn't any form, being extended and configured, have to be thought to inhabit some kind of a space, whether its a logical or purely conceptual space, or an actual or perceptual space? — John

No. that's the thing, you are not allowing the form to exist separately from the material object which it is the form of. We know that the form of the object is separable from the matter, because that's what we do in abstraction, when we come to know the object, the form exists in the mind, therefore it must be separable from the material object. The material object is what we know to have spatial existence, we cannot simply assume that the form also has spatial existence, especially since we need some principle whereby the material object itself is different from the form of the object, which can exist in the mind, separate from the object itself.

I don't know what you mean when you suggest that the form could inhabit a "purely conceptual space". We conceive of space as a necessary condition for the existence of material objects. The concept of "space" is the means by which we understand the object's existence, so we can conclude that space (real space) is necessary for the object's existence. Space is what all material objects have in common. We do the same thing with "time" and change. We produce the concept of time to understand changes to the object, so we can conclude that time (real time) is necessary for change. Time is what all changes have in common.

When we look at concepts, especially pure concepts, such as mathematical, we see unity and order as the fundamental principles which represent space and time respectively. Unity though, in its fundamental form, does not require spatial extension. We can conceive of a non-spatial point, as a single unit. That conceptual point does not require space for its existence in conceptual form. It is only when we utilize the point, to position the point within a spatial realm, that it becomes related to space. So the point, as a single, non-dimensional unit, is completely free from space, and this is why it is so versatile as a spatial implement. It also demonstrates that the concept need not inhabit a "conceptual space". The conceptual point is free from space, in an absolute sense. In fact, there are many ways to demonstrate that the non-dimensional, conceptual point, is fundamentally incompatible with space. These involve the problems with infinite divisibility, Zeno's paradoxes, the irrational nature of pi, and such issues. No amount of dividing space can give us the non-dimensional point, nor can any amount of non-dimensional points accumulate to produce a line. Each non-dimensional point adds absolutely zero in spatial extension.

Next, we have order, and order is a temporally based concept. We can have a succession of non-dimensional points, separated by time, and count them, one, two, three, and so on. Now we have the non-spatial unit, the point, with temporal extension, such that there is not a line, in the sense of a two dimensional, spatial line, but a succession of points, with time separating each point, such that the points may be numbered according to the order given to them by time. Now we have the fundamental mathematical concepts, the primary unity, and the ordering of numbers, and these require absolutely no spatial reference or spatial existence.

I could totally subscribe to a philosophy by dogs. — 0 thru 9

My dog patrols my property. I own the property, but that is an arrangement made with other human beings. My dog knows, with a very high degree of certainty, that she is the ruler of that domain.

I don't see your point. When the engineer creates something in thought, sense data is used. When my mind creates my experience sense data is used. Where's the difference?

Does your mind create sense data which doesn't exist in experience and then constructs it in your experience?! If so then sorry to tell you, but you're hallucinating. — Agustino

I didn't say that the mind creates the sense data which it uses to construct the experience. Why do you think that it is necessary for the thing which creates, to create the material which it uses in the creation? That's not the way we create things, we take existing materials, and construct something out of them, that's what creating is. Sense data is the material element, the mind takes that and creates the experience.

Look, there is sense data, and there is experience. These are two distinct things. The existence of sense data does not necessitate an experience, something must take the sense data and cause the experience to occur. This is the mind. Therefore the mind creates the experience, by collecting sense data and causing an experience to occur. Why is that so difficult to comprehend? If you're so certain that the mind doesn't create the experience, then what do you think does?

In any case, would such a postulated prior temporal existence be an objective existence in our spatio-temporal world or would it be an existence in some other spatio-temporal order? — John

Being non-material, these forms are understood to be non-spatial. And as I explained, being prior to material objects, implies a temporal relation. I don't know what you mean by "objective existence in our spatio-temporal world", but clearly the existence of these forms is as objective as anything can be, though their existence may not be spatial, in the sense of 3d Euclidian space.

If it were in a separate spatio-temporal order then on what grounds would you say it could be temporally related to our spatio-temporal world such as to justify the claim that it would be temporally prior? — John

In reply to this, I can only say that I believe that the best understanding produced by human beings at the present time, of the relationship between space and time, comes nowhere near to being adequate for a true understanding of that relationship. So the spatio-temporal order referred to here is completely different from the spatio-temporal order which you refer to, but this is because human beings presently misunderstand the relationship between space and time.

Except that it's the other way around. The mind merely structures the data received from outside - it doesn't CREATE anything. — Agustino

Right, just like human beings merely structure the elements around us, they don't actually create any trains or cars or computers. Your answer is a farce.

This is a wrong analogy. The buildings created by human beings don't stand in the same relationship to human minds as their perception does. — Agustino

No, you're refusing to face the facts, human beings create things. Your claim that there is a significant difference between creating something material with your hands, and creating something immaterial in your mind is unjustified and untenable. Look at the architect, or the engineer, the idea is drawn up in the mind, put on paper, then produced with material. The initiating aspect is the work of the mind. The mind is what creates, not the hands. As I said, your claim that the mind doesn't create anything, is a farce.

Do you mean logically prior or temporally prior? — John

I believe all forms of priority are reducible to temporal priority. If logic proves that X is necessary for Y, and therefore prior to Y, then Y cannot occur until after X occurs. So any time there is a demonstration of logical priority, it is also necessarily a temporal priority, whether it be a matter of efficient cause or final cause.

Considered abstractly they are general, considered concretely they are particular. Particular forms are instantiations of a general evolution of forms. Is it reasonable to posit the prior existence of the general form of the rhinoceros, prior to the advent of actual rhinoceri? Would it be reasonable to posit the pre-existence of the the particualr form of a particualr rhino prioir to its birth? — John

Clearly we are talking about particular forms here, as indicated by our discussion of the "conceptual shape" of an individual object. And, according to my explanation, it is not only reasonable, but also necessary, to posit the pre-existence of the particular form prior to the existence of the particular material object. This is demonstrated by the fact that the material object always comes into existence as an object with a particular form. The form is therefore prior to the material object.

To answer your question about the particular rhino, it is necessary that you understand the nature of "change", in the same way which I do, before I proceed with any explanation. The existence of change demonstrates that any object can cease being, and become something other, another object, at any moment in time. This necessitates that we assume that each object ceases to exist, and is recreated according to the form, at each moment of time. But change demonstrates that the form itself is actively changing at each moment. The DNA of the rhinoceros has the capacity to keep changing the form of the object, from one moment to the next, such that a baby rhino develops.

I am proposing only that that body would have optimal characteristics of the human species as we know it now (not as we might know it millennia from now). — Bitter Crank

But what determines optimal characteristics of the species? The characteristics of the species seem to be defined by a sort of average, what is normal. When someone has a body which escapes the range of normal, is this automatically bad, or is it sometimes good to be outside the norm? How could one determine whether a certain instance of outside the norm is good or bad?

Because the kind of body we are influences the type of social skills and confidence we are likely to have in our abilities, and how robust our expectations are likely to be. — Bitter Crank

So for instance, when I was young, my eyesight wasn't quite up to normal standards. I never knew this though, until it worsened in my teenage years. Because my eyesight was a little off from normal, I developed social skills in a slightly different way. As an example, when approaching others, the other would know who I was before I knew who the other was. I think that this type of thing, along with being not so sure about things as others were, because I could not see them as well as others, had a significant influence on my development, and who I am now.

The point, is that being deficient in one way, may influence one to become more efficient in other ways. So if we are to judge the optimum body for the human species, how can we account for the fact that some minor deficiencies can inspire some individuals to become much stronger in other ways?

This question is about cognitive science. It has to do with stereoscopic sound resolution, i.e. your ears are several inches apart, your brain triangulates the sound to provide an approximation. It's not that good in h. sapiens, but in owls and bats, it's phenomenal - enables owls to pinpoint the heartbeat of a field mouse from hundreds of meters away, and bats to catch mosquitoes on the wing. — Wayfarer

This capacity in birds is utterly amazing; so much so, that I think there must be more to it than simple triangulation. Bird watchers have cell-phone apps with bird calls. When you locate a bird by hearing it, or seeing it flitting around in the trees, you can play the call. The bird will instantaneously fly precisely to the source of that sound. As you say, it's phenomenal. I asked a bird watcher, how do you think the bird can do this. He said it has good ears.

It seems to me that I read (once upon a time) a statement that the ancients thought that vision was caused by something like a beam of light from the eye. — Bitter Crank

The theory is described well in Plato's Theaetetus, if I remember correctly. At that time in history, the nature of light, and how we see, was not at all understood. The theory is described as a very awe inspiring, speculative theory, held by those high in science, which may or may not be true. I consider it similar to a bat's radar, but I think that the ray coming from the eye is supposed to meet with a ray coming from the object, and bounce back, this would account for why we can't see in the dark.

Take vision for example. My visual perception feels as if I am focusing my eyes upon objects which exist 'out there' in the world around me. — dukkha

I consider that we project ourselves into the world, and this is where intention and attention unite. The desire to know what is going on at a particular point "out there", causes one to project oneself to that particular point, in an attempt to determine the activity there, in the case of sound, or just to determine what is there, in the case of sight.

This can be understood even better with respect to the temporal aspect of reality, than it can with the spatial aspect. We live at the present, but we continuously project ourselves to points in the past, in our efforts of remembering, and we project ourselves to points in the future in our efforts of predicting. It seems like what we do is abstract from our experience of presence, and project this to an artificial, created, presence at a past time, or at a future time. We don't actually send our minds to these different times, just like we don't actually send our senses to these different places, though in some ways it appears like we do.

I read a bit about 'embodied cognition' but stopped to wonder: that very phrase implies that the body is some sort of wrapper. — mcdoodle

I think that the op intends that the body is some sort of rapper.

We are bodies. Usually not perfect, sometimes quite deformed. Our capacities are spread wide, from profound deafness to very acute hearing; blindness at birth to poor vision onto excellent vision (but never as good as some animals).

...

Most of us are not severely impaired, but very few possess perfect bodies. — Bitter Crank

You imply that there is such a thing as the perfect body. You also speak of our capacities. I assume that the perfect body would in some way have perfect capacities. Since you seem to think that there is such a thing as the perfect body, how would you describe it, omnipotent?

The point that is getting lost here is that it is the modern conception of 'scientific materialism' that is monistic, i.e. there is only one kind of substance, that is 'matter-energy', and everything science knows (what else is there?) is the product of that, via the processes described by physics and evolutionary biology — Wayfarer

When "matter" and "energy" refer to two very distinct things, how can these two be conflated to claim only one kind of substance? We have a very similar problem with wave/particle duality. Through a wave or through a particle, are two very distinct ways that energy moves. Instead of properly separating two very distinct aspects of the universe, under dualist principles, there is an inclination in modern science to deny dualist principles, and conflate.

The desire to simplify ontology produces the inclination toward a monist metaphysics. This desire itself is very complex, probably coming from an atheist denial of God, and the denial of the reality of anything which cannot be seen. Seeing is believing, so what cannot be seen cannot be believed. But the monist metaphysic is nothing other than the conceptual premise that the intelligible (form) is inseparable from the unintelligible (matter). Failure to separate allows that the unintelligible permeates through all aspects of the universe, rendering the entire universe unintelligible.

Objective Idealism as represented by Hegel and Peirce I take to be the position that says that objects are always in conceptual shape, so to speak, even when they are not being looked at. This is very clearly not to say that objects are dependent on minds, whether human or otherwise, but that being in conceptual shape or form is altogether independent of minds, just as being visible is altogether independent of actually being seen. I think the same can be said for Plato's Forms. — John

For an object to be in conceptual shape would be for it to have an intelligible form. All objects have intelligible forms otherwise they would not be objects. — John

OK, let's assume that an object is always in what you call a "conceptual shape". You also agree that the object must be in a conceptual shape, or else it is not an object. Do you understand the logic which leads to the conclusion that the conceptual shape must be prior to the material object itself? Everything in the world is changing, such that all objects come into existence at some time. Whenever an object comes into existence, it must be predetermined by the "conceptual shape", what that object will be when it comes into existence, or else it will not come into existence as an object (it would be something completely random and therefore not an object with conceptual shape).

A person who is an ontological realist and yet thinks that one should follow ethical ideals, could be a Christian who believes this world was created by God as a world material through and through, which He has made intelligible to the human soul by giving it a conceptual shape. — John

The reason why "God" is necessary, is that we have to assume an act whereby the conceptual shape is given to matter, to produce the object. (Matter itself being the principle of unintelligibility.) This is the act of creation, because as you say, without conceptual shape, there is no object. So this is the act whereby the object gets its existence. Prior to this, it is only a conceptual shape, but not yet a material object, it is the conceptual shape of what will come into existence. But this "will come into existence" is contingent rather than inherently necessary, due to the unintelligible nature of matter itself, time and possibility. It is better stated as what could come into existence at that time, depending on this act. So we appeal to a free will act of God to account for the existence of objects..

It may be said that moderation is the key to long life. But never ever take moderation to the extreme.

Plato was certainly no idealist, as he thought the world of the forms was the real world and he certainly did not think it was dependent on the mind, human or otherwise. Rather the reverse in fact. Plotinus maybe although he did not speak in terms of mind, but in terms of "the One"., from which all reality emanates. — John

You seem to be reluctant to separate ideas from mind. I think that is a materialist premises which clouds the issue. Ideas are seen to be dependent on the human mind, and the human mind is dependent on the brain. In order to understand idealism you need to allow for the separate existence of ideas. You need to accept the idealist proposal, for the sake of discussion, that perhaps ideas are prior to minds.

I think that the true question of idealism is the issue of whether ideas are dependent on the human mind or not. Platonic Idealism in its modern form assumes that there are Ideas (mathematical, geometrical, and such) independent from human minds. As Wayfarer indicated this is sometimes called realism. Aristotle argued convincingly that ideas could not have actual independent existence, but left the back door open, for the assumption of independent Forms. So the Neo-Platonists assumed independent Forms.

Now we have a distinction between human ideas and Forms (which are like human ideas, but independent). It is demonstrated that there is a necessity to assume that the Forms are prior to the existence of material objects, because when a material object comes into existence, it comes into existence as what it is and not something else. (It has a particular form, and is not something random, thus we assume a Form as that which determines what it will be when it comes into existence). So the Form of the object, which is similar to a human idea, but not a human idea, is necessarily prior to the material existence of the object.

What in the fluck?! It must take you like 37 years to read a single book haha. — dukkha

It usually doesn't take long for me to imagine things. Most novels are quite simple and the scenarios generally come to my mind as fast as I can read them, though I have to stop and go back over things once in a while. Some things like "70 trees" I would imagine in a vague way. Non-fiction is much more difficult for me, sometimes requiring a good deal of effort to understand. Some philosophy I have to read over and over, and yes, I have been reading some of the same books of philosophy for about 37 years. If that's what it takes, and your interested, why not? I guess some people learn faster than others. I'm hoping that someone can teach me the trick.

If they are created from within you, then it follows precisely that your experience bears no relationship at all with reality, which is nonsense. — Agustino

I don't see how that follows, I said that external things affect the experience which is created by my internal being. How does it follow that my experience has no relationship to reality? There is no logic to that kind of nonsense. Why do you bother saying something like that without thinking about it first?

Human beings create all kinds of things, buildings, cars, trains, planes, computers etc.. All of these things came from within the minds of human beings, they had absolutely no existence prior to being created by human minds. Would you argue that these things are not real because they were created by the minds of human beings? Why do you insist that the human experience could not be real if it's created by the human mind? That is what is nonsense.

You can't imagine a guy chopping down seventy trees unless you literally picture a tree chopping event seventy times over in your head? — The Great Whatever

You didn't read what I wrote? First I imagine what a tree chopping event is. Then, I can imagine 70 by putting it into context with numbers like 60 and 80, but this is a bit vague and doesn't give me a good understanding of how many trees seventy is. I can imagine it better by imagining how many things seven is, and taking that group of seven, ten times. I find it is a bit difficult to imagine how many times ten is, without actually counting out ten, so I find it easier to imagine ten as two groups of five. Then I can imagine chopping seven trees, five times, twice. That's a lot of tree chopping.

I've described how I imagine a guy chopping down seventy trees, you seem to have a hard time believing that this is how I actually do that. Why would you think that I am lying, unless you imagine this described act in another way? So I'll ask again. How do you imagine a guy chopping down seventy trees?

These things affect my experience, they don't create it, or cause it. That I interpret my surroundings as a lion approaching me, is something created from within me. If my mind is not working properly, I might not even see it as a lion, and be eaten by it, while experiencing something completely different from being eaten by a lion.

The outside world? Sorry, the outside world is not part of my experience. Please exclude things which are not part of my experience when speaking about my experience. That only causes confusion.

I don't see how my experience could be something other than something I create. I'm an active, living being, my experience is a property of myself. Where else could it come from but myself?

What are you asking, if human beings participate in their own experience, and alter it by doing such? That doesn't make sense, because they create their experience.

This guy does it better than you. So what? All that we mean is that the "ordinary" table behaves so and so, because we play with it in "ordinary" circumstances. The "scientific" table behaves so and so because we play with it in different circumstances. In truth they are one and the same table, and all we mean by ordinary and scientific is the different circumstances we play with it. — Agustino

But this is exactly where the falsity lies. They are not one and the same table. Playing with it in this way makes it different from the other table which we play with in that way. The moment a table is "touched" by someone it becomes different from the table it was, as untouched. The idea that human beings can play with things without changing them is clearly false. And this points to the falsity of the premise of human beings as passive observers.

Really? That seems exhausting and pointless, and not the way people imagine things. — The Great Whatever

Well, it's the way that I imagine things. I can't help it if it's not the way other people imagine things. Now you tell me, how do you imagine this?

I wouldn't say that it's pointless, because it's how I come to a real understanding of what has been said to me, by imagining it. I agree, it does take effort, but that's a simple fact of life, understanding requires effort.

I know that in many of my everyday conversations I simply assume that I understand what has been said to me, without taking the time or effort to imagine it, and I respond accordingly. But those cases I am not imagining what has been said, and sometimes I'm wrong in the assumption that I understand; the result is misunderstanding. So whenever someone says something to me, and I don't feel certain of what they mean, I have to take the time to imagine it. This often requires questioning of the other person, and it may be annoying to that person, but I think it's better to annoy the person in this way, than to misunderstand the person.

So I get the feeling that this is the case right now. I think that I don't really understand what you mean by "imagine", so I'm asking you to clarify this, in order that I can imagine what you mean by "imagine". Since you refuse to answer, I get the impression that I am just being annoying.

No, which makes me think these notions of imagination have to be wrong. — The Great Whatever

I'm just speaking from my experience, that's how I imagine such a thing. I picture in my mind, a person with a saw, going and cutting a tree. Then I tell myself seventy times. And to imagine this, seventy times, I try to picture 70 in relation to other numbers like 60 and 50, but this seems somewhat vague. So I picture seven in relation to one by counting in my mind, and tell myself ten times that. Then I picture ten as two groups of five. Now I can imagine ten groups of seven, and this is the number of times that the person cuts trees. In this way I can avoid picturing the person cutting a tree seventy times.

I strongly believe that we all think differently though, thinking is an idiosyncratic matter. That's why I'm asking you, how would you imagine such a thing?

The continuity of existence is what we take for granted. But how is this continuity real?

Yes — The Great Whatever

Good, if you're sure that you can do it, then I assume that you've already done it. So, how did you imagine it then? Did you picture someone going out and cutting some christmas trees, or did you think about what it means to cut a tree, and then multiply that by seventy? Or did you use some combination of imaging and thinking about the meaning of the words? Did any images enter your mind when you thought about what it means to cut a tree? I'm interested to know what process you use to imagine something without picturing it?

Right, imagining something, and conceiving something, are two distinct things.

I'm not even sure I can consistently picture seventy trees together (as opposed to sixty-nine, after all), as if all in a visual or olfactory image. Yet I can imagine such a situation without difficulty: so you must be wrong. — The Great Whatever

When you say "I can imagine such a situation without difficulty", are you really sure that you can, or are you just saying that? Did you try to actually imagine that situation? If so, how did you do so without trying to picture it?

To put it another way, then, you can't criticize language without using language. You can't argue against argument without using argument. You can't fully disprove or withdraw from reason without using reason in the process of doubt. — darthbarracuda

But we're talking about skepticism, and doubt, here. Why do you need language to doubt? Why do you need to "argue against" in order to doubt? And most of all, why would you think that you need to "fully disprove" something in order to doubt it? That is clearly contradictory. Fully disproving is to rid oneself of doubt. So all these things which may come about as the result of doubt, it appears like you want to equate them with doubt. But that's a mistake if these things are cause by doubt, then doubt is prior to them.

What about conceiving of things which have no sensible existence, such as is the case when the conception precedes the existence of the thing?