I can't read that so that it doesn't sound like you simply do not understand modalities. — Terrapin Station

I'm not talking about modalities, so if you're attempting to understand this under the terms of modalities, it's no wonder that you don't understand.

I wouldn't agree that that's the case until the future thing comes to be. — Terrapin Station

Do you agree that there is a relationship between the present state, and any possible future state, regardless of whether or not that future state actually comes to be? If so, do you agree that this relationship cannot be something existing?

The more you're responding, the more of a mess your comments are turning out to be. And none of this has anything whatsoever with answering what I asked you. — Terrapin Station

You asked me to explain the reality of relationships which have no existence. I understand these relationships as possibilities. What are you failing to grasp?

If you're simply saying that the stuff we're conventionally naming red is a color, and a color is necessarily a color, I'd agree with that, or at least I'd say that I can't personally make sense of saying that logical contradictions can obtain. — Terrapin Station

No, I'm not saying that a colour is necessarily a colour, though it is this same type of necessity which I refer to. I'm saying that red is necessarily a colour. If you don't agree with that, then so be it, you don't apprehend the same need which I apprehend. It is this need, which I apprehend, that makes me say that red is necessarily a colour.

You see the need to say that a colour is necessarily a colour, and if not there is contradiction, and consequentially unintelligibility. The same unintelligibility results if you do not see the need to say that red is necessarily a colour, and all the other examples which I provided. The relationship is necessary for the sake of intelligibility.

So you'd be talking about relationships that don't exist (or subsist, or whatever similar term you'd use for them)? How would there be those relationships in that case? — Terrapin Station

As I said, they are relationships of temporal order. An existing thing is related to something in the future, which does not yet exist. These relationships are understood as possibilities. When a particular possibility (relationship of this type) is recognized as needed, it is determined as necessary, and acting on this necessity brings about the existence of the future thing.

Take a logical premise for example. It expresses a certain relationship. The relationship is a possibility, in the sense that the premise is a proposal, a proposition which may be accepted or rejected. When accepted it becomes a necessity, as it is necessary for the sake of the conclusion. The conclusion is the thing which will come about in the future, as a result of accepting the possibility (the proposition, or premise) as a necessity.

Regardless, I still feel justified in asserting that the OP is flawed - sensing simply does not extend beyond the surface of the sensing organs. — Real Gone Cat

Well sure, we've gone beyond the mistakes of the op here, but is it really correct to say that sensing does not extend beyond the surface of the sensing organism? Isn't that exactly what sensing has evolved to do, allow us to make judgements about what is out there, beyond the surface of the sensing organism?

Consider seeing, aren't you seeing objects which are way out there? So sensing must in some way extend beyond the surface of the eye. Even if the sense organ only has access to what is right in immediate contact with it (whatever that might really mean), if we have ways of interpreting what is at the surface, which can tell us with a good degree of accuracy, what is way out there, how can you say that sensing does not extend beyond the surface? If we can consistently make correct judgements about what is way out there, through the use of sense alone, then obviously, sense must extend out there. Would you insist that you are not sensing these objects which you see way out there? I really think you are sensing distant things, and therefore it is quite obvious that sensing actually does extend beyond the surface of the sense organ. What about a bat's echolocation, isn't this clearly a case of sense extending beyond the surface of the sense organ? Why attempt to limit sensation in such an unnatural way?

Say what? First, what the heck are we referring to exactly with "relationships of necessity"? — Terrapin Station

Do you agree that red is necessarily a colour? That is what I mean by a relationship of necessity, a logical relationship, one such as the relationship between red and colour. A human being is necessarily an animal. An animal is necessarily a living being. A circle is necessarily a geometrical figure.

Although we might want to just jump ahead to your idea that there are existents with no spatial location. The very idea of existents (or subsistents, or whatever you might prefer to call them) with no spatial location is incoherent on my view. — Terrapin Station

I am talking about relationships which are non-spatial, yet still necessary, such as the ones listed above. I am not talking about non-spatial existents. You really are jumping ahead, to class a relationship as an existent. Existents are individual objects, things, and relationships are the means by which one existent is connected to another. Do you agree that there is a relationship of necessity between a mother and her daughter, yet this relationship is not described in spatial terms?

But what is that relationship on your view? Where does it obtain? Just what, ontologically, is it? That's what I'm asking you. Is it part of the ink or paint or whatever? Where is it located? What is it made of? — Terrapin Station

Those are all good questions, but if they are unanswerable, perhaps they are not so good. I'll start with "where is it located?". As I've been explaining to John, the relationships of necessity which are proper to intelligible objects, forms, are non-spatial relationships. They are relationships of logical order, and "order" is a temporal concept. So "where" it is, is rather meaningless. We have to seek its temporal position.

There are many types of relationships which are not well understood by human beings. Consider the relationship between the earth and the moon, which we call gravity. Gravity might be a property of these two physical objects, such that the two objects are interacting with each other through the means of gravity. But this would mean that a part of each object reached out and touched the other object, and that the existence of these two objects actually overlapped each other. This is counter-intuitive because it implies that the two objects exist at the same place, gravity being a part of each object, and overlapping. Relativity theory separates the gravity from the objects, such that the gravity is understood as a property of space-time. But space-time is a conceptual medium so there is a category separation between the real objects, earth and moon, and gravity which is a property of the conceptual medium, space-time. So that representation of this relationship called gravity, is unacceptable as well.

This leads us to a third possibility in which gravity is real, existing with the real objects, earth and moon, but the gravity encompasses all the physical objects, as one (invisible) entity, while the individual objects, the earth and moon, are just the visible parts of that one entity. In this way, the solar system is one object, with visible parts; the unity (relationships) which makes it a whole is to be found in the existence of gravity.

It is a logical necessity which would force us to assume that these visible objects are part of an invisible whole. The thing which produces the relationships, gravity, and causes that entity (the solar system) to exist as a whole, is completely invisible. This is just an example of how difficult it is to understand such relationships.

What you ask about is the relationship of representation, and this is often present as meaning. We could say that meaning is one type of such a relationship, though some would equate relationships of representation as relationships of meaning. I am not so sure about such an equation. In any case, here, we have an object and the object represents. I think you'll agree with that. Do you agree that the thing which the object represents, is something which will only come to be in the future? So there is a relationship between the object, being the symbol (the representation), and something else, which will exist in the future. That is the type of relationship we are talking about here, a relationship between a present object and a future object.

The perfect form is just the idealized form, which is the same as the general form. Not just maple leaves have stems and veins. Another kind of leaf may have the same specific number of points, too; it is the averaged configuration of those points and the average length of the edges that join them that count as the general form. Growing on a maple tree is not a general form it is an attribute or associative definition. — John

I really think that you're not grasping what a general form is. The general form gains it's intelligibility by participating in, or being part of a larger, more general concept. The concept "red" obtains intelligibility by its relationship to the concept of "colour", not by a visual representation of a red object. The concept of "human being" obtains intelligibility through its relationship to the concept of "animal", not by a visual representation of a human being. Notice that these are relationships of necessity, red is necessarily a colour, and a human being is necessarily an animal. This necessity is what makes the general form intelligible, as a concept. The visual representation does not provide this.

In the case of the maple leaf, it necessarily grows on a maple tree, so this is the necessary relationship which distinguishes the general form "maple leaf". You continue to adhere to this notion that a "form" is necessarily some sort of spatial representation, when I've already explained to you with the example of mathematical objects, that this is not the case. There is no necessity there. That is an illusion of necessity which has left you confused. Try to recognize that forms, or concepts are based in a logical order, an order of necessity, rather than a spatial representation.

I have no idea why you purport that an object cannot come into existence without their being a (presumably) pre-existent general form which predetermines it to be what it is. What evidence could you possibly have for that claim.? What could such a "pre-existence" look like? — John

I have been referring to a pre-existent particular form, that is my argument. There is a particular form of any particular object, which is prior to that object. Since we only understand the pure nature of forms, as general forms, because these are what is present within our minds, our approach toward understanding the particular forms is through our understanding of general forms. I've been through this logic, which demonstrates the necessity of a prior form, already twice for you. I'll reproduce it again, and you let me know what confuses you. But please release this idea that such a form must "look like" something. That is what we learn from the nature of general forms, they have no visual representation, they exist by the logical necessity of order.

Please read the following, and address your concerns directly to me. Don't ignore it and come back a few days from now complaining, I have no idea what you're talking about.

Let me try once again, to explain this issue. As time passes, there is as you say, "a succession of slightly different forms". At each moment of the present, the maple leaf is this particular maple leaf, it is not that particular maple leaf which it was at the last moment, because it has changed. Therefore at each moment the maple leaf is a new, and different object. So at each moment a new object is created, we can call them MLt1, MLt2, MLt3, etc., each collection of symbols referring to a different object. Let's take MLt3 for example. When that object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, MLt3, or else it is not MLt3. It does not come into existence as MLt2, Mlt4, or any random thing, it comes into existence as MLt3. Therefore we can assume that there is a cause of its existence as MLt3, a reason why it exists at that moment as MLt3, and not something else. This is the determining form of MLt3. Notice that in order for the object, MLt3, to exist at that present moment, as MLt3, it is necessary that the form of MLt3 existed prior to that. This prior form is not MLt2, it is not MLt4, because these are distinctly different. It is nothing other than the form of MLt3, which exists prior to the object MLt3, and ensures that object MLt3 will exist as that object, at that moment in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is just one thing, the world, which entails all the configurations or state of affairs between objects. — Question

Well, if you cannot see that it is explicitly contradictory to say that "there is just one thing", and that this one thing is a multitude of configurations of things, "objects", such that you would keep insisting on the same contradiction, then I give up on trying to help you.

OK, we can, in theory. separate the activity which is moving the body, from the activity which is the act of sensing.

I can sit in quietly in my backyard and sense my surroundings - I feel the hardness of the chair, hear the birds in the trees, watch clouds drift by. What actions am I taking? — Real Gone Cat

The activity of sensing is neurological, and by coincidence, the activity which moves the body is neurological as well. Are you sure that the proposed separation is tenable?

All that "each and every one has in common" is that they approximate the perfect (that is ideal) form. — John

Well clearly, this is where we differ. I don't believe in the perfect, or ideal maple leaf. I don't think there is any such thing. I believe that the general form of the maple leaf is the things which they all have in common, a stem, veins, a specific number of points, and growing on a maple tree. To that extent, all maple leafs are perfect, in the sense that they fulfill the conditions for being a maple leaf.

No, that's plainly wrong. From a drawing of any triangle, I can see immediately that it has three straight sides and three angles; and that is precisely the definition of a triangle. — John

You're not seeing the point. If you see a drawing of an equilateral triangle, and someone tells you "this is a triangle", there is nothing to prevent you from believing that all triangles must have equal sides and angles. That is the problem, you cannot, as you claim here, infer the general from an instance of the particular. It is impossible because there is no way of knowing which of the aspects of the particular is essential to the general, and which is accidental. You just make the above claim because you already know the definition of a triangle, so of course you can see that definition in any triangle which you look at. But if you did not know the definition of triangle, you could not, with any degree of certainty induce the general definition from one instance of the particular.

My argument with MU was actually over his assertion that there is a general form which is temporally prior to the advent of any particular form. — John

What my original claim was, is that there is a form of the particular, which is necessarily prior to the existence of the particular material object. The form of the particular object exists prior to the material object itself. This is inferred from the fact that an object must have a particular form. And when the object comes into existence, as the object which it is, it must be predetermined what it will be, or else it will not come into existence as that object, or as any object at all (because every object is a particular object).

What about logically prior? I would suggest that a general form is a continuum of potential forms, and a particular form is an actualization of one such possibility. — aletheist

The point being then, that prior to the existence of any material object, there is the potential for that object's existence. But the potential for that object's existence is also the potential for the existence of many other things instead, so that general potential cannot necessitate the existence of a particular object. That is the nature of potential. We can call this potential the general, or universal. Now, in order that a particular object comes into existence out of this general potential, something must choose, or select, "cause", that particular potential. This particular potential is the form of the particular object, which is necessarily prior to the material existence of the object.

Okay, so how, outside of someone thinking about it this way, does a set of marks on paper or a piece of metal or whatever stand for or refer to something other than itself? — Terrapin Station

Through the relationship which was established by the one who made the marks. When the person made the marks, there was a relationship between the marks, and the thing represented by the marks, which was produced by that person. If you deny that relationship, then you deny the reality of representation. What could ever happen which would annihilate that relationship?

So in what way is sensing anything other than passive? — Real Gone Cat

It is an internal activity of the thing which is sensing. Therefore the thing which is doing the sensing, the sensing being, is necessarily active. However, the things which are being sensed, the objects lying around outside, are not necessarily active, they are passive.

Sensing is passive, not active. We do not get to choose what is in our visual field, other than by making gross decisions such as, "Do I walk into the living room where the cat lies?" Our sensations are dependent on what is present at the time - cat or no. — Real Gone Cat

This where you're wrong, sensing is not passive. There is an enormous quantity of activity occurring within the human body which constitutes sensing. Have you ever considered the activity required to touch something, or to taste something. Notice how some animals more primitive than human beings, but even babies as well, use taste as their primary sense for recognition.

Sensing is hardly passive but it is passively identifying what is sensed, for example, the cat. — jkop

I think this is a mistake though. You recognize, and admit that sensing is not passive, then you represent it as "passively identifying what is sensed". So this is a misrepresentation, you are taking something which is recognized as an activity, and representing it as something passive.

So to claim that sensing-a-cat is caused by the sense organs is not the usual way that the situation is understood. — Real Gone Cat

The "usual way that the situation is understood", is to fall for this misrepresentation claimed by jkop, to understand the activity of sensing as something passive (passively identifying). And so the "usual way" is a misunderstanding. It should be understood as actively identifying. To identify requires activity, it is not something passive.

Sensing is passive, not active. We do not get to choose what is in our visual field, other than by making gross decisions such as, "Do I walk into the living room where the cat lies?" Our sensations are dependent on what is present at the time - cat or no. — Real Gone Cat

Well we do make choices about where we look, and things like that, but that is not really relevant, because the activity of sensing is more of a non-voluntary activity. The question here is whether the internal activities of the sensing being, or the external things being sensed, are properly called the "cause of sensation". I think it's quite clear that the former is correct. Notice that it is impossible for the sensing being to sense if it were completely inactive, it would be dead, yet the sensing being can sense something which is inactive. So contrary to what jkop has claimed, the sensing being is necessarily active, yet the thing being sensed, like the chair across the room from me, may be completely passive.

From what I can read, Metaphysician Undiscover is saying something akin to "it's the ball hitting the window that caused the window to break" and jkop is saying something akin to "it's the boy kicking the ball that caused the window to break". — Michael

I don't think that's quite a fair analogy. There are three things at play here, the sensing being, the thing being sensed, and the sensation. So let's say that the boy is playing with the ball, the boy is the sensing being, and the ball is the thing being sensed. The sensation is the "play". Whatever it is that the boy is doing with the ball, whatever game he is playing, this is the sensation. So the boy is causing the game, or the "play", but the ball is a necessary part of the game. The game could not be carried out without the ball. Likewise, the sensing being is causing the sensation, through the act of sensing (playing), but there could not be an act of sensing without a thing being sensed (the ball being played with).

Do you agree that representations stand for or refer to something other than themselves? — Terrapin Station

Yes I agree, that is the nature of a representation. Where we seem to disagree, is on whether or not something can be a representation, i.e. exist as a representation, without having a mind actively determining that it is a representation. Do you not think that if a mind could potentially determined that the thing is a representation, then the thing actually exists as a representation?

So what's the nature of the special kind of relationship between marks on paper and some other thing such that the former represents the latter? Is it a physical relationship? Is there a special chain of atoms that connects the ink to something else (and only that something else)? — Michael

No I don't believe that this special relationship is a physical relationship. But I don't think that any relationships are actually physical. Things are physical but I don't think that relationships are physical. Suppose that there are two atoms which are assumed to be related to each other, in the sense that they are part of a molecule. If we talk about the molecule, this is a physical object, a whole. If we talk about the individual atoms, then we have divided up the whole into parts, such that each atom is a physical object, a whole. If we want to talk about what makes the atoms exist together, as a molecule, we should consider that this is something non-physical.

I'd say that the relationship is a conceptual one (i.e. we have a particular kind of cognitive attitude towards the ink), which is why it can't exist outside of people's heads. — Michael

I think that non-physical relationships exist outside of peoples heads, because all relationships are non-physical, and there are real relationships outside of peoples' heads.. The relationship between the earth and the sun is non-physical. The relationship between two atoms, is non-physical. That is why these relationships can only be understood by mathematics, because they are non-physical, and mathematics is non-physical. But that relationships are non-physical does not mean that they only exist in people's heads.

This is where we disagree. It is an act of creating relationships, and interpretations and understanding involve creating meanings. There are no meanings outside of individuals' heads (more specifically, outside of their brains in particular (processual) states). Intending marks one out down to stand for something occurs only in that creator's head. It doesn't somehow transfer or embed meaning in the marks themselves. The marks are just marks. Meaning remains in person's heads. — Terrapin Station

We are not talking about meaning though, we are talking about representations. A representation is a relationship between things. Relationships between things are objectively real, and exist outside of individuals' heads. "Representation" refers to a type of relationship. Unless you can show how this type of relationship, a representation, is a special type of relationship which only exists within peoples' heads, then you have no argument.

But to express the most general character of the edges of the leaves minus all the particular differences from straightness that exist on all the edges of all the dissections of all the maple leaves as a straight line is to represent the universal perfect form of the maple leaf. — John

To express the general form is not to express the "perfect form". That is a mistake. It is to express what each and every one of the particulars has in common. It is an inferred necessity. That is why you cannot draw it as a visual object. Each time you draw it as a visual object, it will contain particulars peculiar to that particular drawing, which will negate the essence of the universal, as that which all the particulars necessarily have in common.

Consider the triangle. Any time you draw a triangle, it will be of a particular shape, and therefore will not properly represent triangles of other shapes. You will not understand what "triangle" means from that visual representation, or even a number of them, you will have to refer to the definition. Even the circle is the same. Any drawn circle is of a particular size. You will not know truly what "circle" refers to, just from visiting visual representations, that it is necessarily two dimensional, and the relationship between the circumference and the diameter (pi), etc., without referring to the definition.

There's none of that stuff per those names, sure. It's important not to conflate the names (and concepts, and meanings, etc.) with the objective stuff, though. I used certain names for it because I have to since I can only type words to you here. — Terrapin Station

OK, so I assume that without a person to name the stuff, there is nothing there, no "objective stuff"? Or, do I assume that the objective stuff is there, without any names? If the latter, then we can assume that the representations are already there without that name, as they are objectively representations. They are still existing without the name of "representation", just like the drywall, and right angles, are existing without these names.

Yeah, again the marks on paper or whatever are there, but it doesn't represent anything without thinking about it in that way. Again, this is just like concepts, meanings, etc. in general. — Terrapin Station

You seem to be missing the fact, that the representation is a representation regardless of whether any individuals interpret, or know what the representation represents. It is a fact that the marks on the paper are a representation, because they were put there to represent something, just like any other thing in the universe is a thing, regardless of whether it has name. If you want to deny that there are actual things existing, without being perceived as things, then that's another matter. There might be some substance to your argument, from that premise, because a representation is necessarily a thing.

Something is a representation by virtue of standing for or referring to something other than itself. How do the marks do this in lieu of anyone thinking about them that way? — Terrapin Station

The act of determining what the marks stand for, is an act of interpreting. Therefore it is an act of understanding existing relationships. It is not an act of creating relationships. So it is necessary that the relationships exist prior to the act of interpreting, otherwise interpreting would not be interpreting, but an act of creating. Interpreting is to determine meaning which is already there, not to create new meaning. The act of creating has already been performed by the one who put down the marks intending them to stand for something.

Well, there is just one concrete thing, the world. — Question

OK, let's start with this premise, there is just one concrete thing, the world. Now, in your last repy to me, you said "all truths are equal, depending on the relations between different objects". The premise that there are different objects contradicts that other premise, that there is just one concrete thing. So according to these two premises, which are contradictory, the idea of truth appears to be a fiction.

So, this makes truth uniform with respect to any potential configuration of objects and things in the world. — Question

No, it makes a "configuration of objects and things in the world" impossible. There is just one thing, the world.

The materials exist, just like marks on paper do (re what people think of as representations). There's no concept or meaning etc. of it as a house outside of people thinking of it that way. But there's still the drywall set at 90-degree angles, with a roof, etc.--the materials exist whether anyone does or not. — Terrapin Station

By that logic, then there's no drywall, or 90 degree angles, or anything nameable without someone there naming it. But surely these things are there, the drywall, the 90 degree angles, and also the house, without someone there naming it as such. Likewise, the symbol, or representation is there, without someone there to name it as such.

Re explaining myself--I did. Again, re a representation, all that exists outside of someone thinking about it as a representation is a set of marks on paper or whatever the particular material is that we're talking about. — Terrapin Station

You call it "a set of marks on paper", I call it "a representation". I think we're both right, but for some reason unbeknownst to me, you think I'm wrong to say it is a representation. But clearly it is a representation because it was created by someone for the purpose of representing. You are completely unjustified in your claim that the set of marks on the paper exist, but they are not a representation. Clearly the marks on the paper are a representation.

The general form is just an 'averaging out' of the particular forms. — John

It's a category error to say that a group of particulars is a universal, or general form, because it requires reasoning to produce a general form from a group of particulars. And, an average is not the same thing as a universal, it is an average. If you follow Aristotle, the universal consists of the essential properties while leaving out the accidental properties.

Of course it never will be the perfect form... — John

The universal is not meant to be the perfect form, it is meant to represent the essential aspects of the named class of things. So, "triangle" is three sided figure. That's the essential property. Whether it is isosceles or equilateral, or otherwise, is accidental. You can not expect to draw a "perfect form" of the triangle, expecting this to be the best representation of the general form "triangle", because the class of triangle has to include all the possible different types.

I'm confused. You seem to be making an issue about degrees of truth or different categories of truth. In logical space all truths are equal, depending on the relations between different objects. — Question

This appears to be a problem. Do you recognize the fundamental distinction between a correspondence theory of truth, and a coherence theory of truth. In practise, this manifests as two distinct types of truth, true because it corresponds to reality, and true because it is logically valid. It seems like you believe in only one type of truth, coherence. That's fine if all space were logical space, but from this, how do you gain any real knowledge about real objects in real space?

Is it possible to see a cat if one has never been in your presence? It should be, if the mere act of sensing causes the sensation. — Real Gone Cat

Why would you say that? A spark can only cause a fire if there is fuel. Cold temperatures can only cause ice if there is water. Sensing only causes the sensation of a cat when there is a cat. Your logic seems to be way off somewhere. Who knows where? Which premise allows you to say that if one has never sensed a cat without a cat present, then sensing cannot be the cause of the sensation. This is like saying that if a spark has never caused a fire without fuel, then a spark cannot be the cause of a fire.

You and jkop both seem to think that "to cause" means to create something from nothing. So that when I say the act of sensing causes the sensation of a cat, you think that this means that the act of sensing can create the sensation of a cat without a cat being present. Why do you think like this? We all know that "to cause", or "to create", is not to make something out of nothing, that is impossible. So if it is necessary that there is a cat present, in order for the act of sensing to cause the sensation of a cat, why does this produce a problem for you? How does this make the act of sensing not the cause of the sensation of the cat? If it is necessary for there to be fuel in order for the spark to cause a fire, how does this make the spark not the cause of the fire?

It seems fairly clear to me that you suggest to position the cat within the sensing being since we were talking about a cat that you see. — jkop

I said let's position the activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being. I am saying that seeing occurs within the sensing being. How in hell do you misconstrue this to think that I am saying let's position the cat within the sensing being?

Now if "the referred" does not mean the cat that you see, then what? — jkop

I said "the referred to activity", not the referred to thing. The referred to activity is the act of sensing.

With respect to the OP which concerns the relation between sense organs and experience the location of the act of sensing is hardly an issue here. Obviously sensing is located within the one who's got the sense organs, not elsewhere (we're not discussing whether remote sensing is possible, are we?). — jkop

OK, now we're getting somewhere. You've come around to agreeing with me that the act of sensing occurs within the being with the sense organs. Do you agree that the act of sensing is the cause of the sensation? If so, then why do you keep insisting that the object, the cat is the cause of the sensation?

can't exist as that outside of someone thinking about it that way, though. — Terrapin Station

Why not? Explain yourself.

Yes it does. It doesn't matter what it was "made to be." Outside of someone thinking about it as a representation, it's just a set of marks on paper, pixels on a screen or whatever. — Terrapin Station

Do you think that if something was "made to be" a house, it doesn't exist as a house without someone thinking of it as a house?

Let's take quantum theory - for example - irrespective of what interpretation of quantum theory is right or wrong (true or false), we know that quantum mechanics is apparently true. The laws of nature are absolute, intelligible, and unchanging. Now, I don't think many will doubt the validity of the preceding statement. — Question

Here's where your problem lies. There is a distinct difference between the "truth" concerning the mathematics of prediction, and the "truth" concerning the description of the predicted event, true interpretation. So the mathematics of prediction may give us a true "law" which is accurate for prediction, but it doesn't give us the whole truth about the event. It doesn't give us why the law holds, and therefore it doesn't give us the complete truth about the event. This can only be provided by the appropriate interpretation.

For example, human beings could map for years, the exact position and time, when and where, the sun rises on the horizon, every morning. From this, they could project, and make predictions, far into the future, the exact place and time that the sun would rise, day after day. This would constitute the mathematical law of prediction. It would be a very true law, because it would predict with great accuracy the position and time of sunrise each day. The problem is, that this predictive law tells us nothing about the real relationship between the earth and the sun, why this event of sunrise occurs as it does, with the changes that it incurs, and why those changes are so predictable. The whole truth is not revealed until this "why" is uncovered, and this is a matter of interpretation. As you can see from the example, the mathematical truth of prediction, constitutes a rather small portion of the overall "whole truth", and it is really just a starting point in uncovering the whole truth.

You're not correcting anyone by "positioning the referred" cat "to activity, seeing" within the sensing being, because then you'd neither refer nor see the cat, only your own activity of sensing (e.g. "data" or ideas or hallucinations of an invisible cat). — jkop

Can't you read? I'm not positioning the seen cat within the sensing being. I am positioning the sensation of the cat within the being, and saying that the cause of the sensation is the act of sensing. It is clearly not, as you claim, the cat which is the cause of the sensation.

Our biology causates perceptual activity as the sense organs interact with physical force, radiation etc.. This activity is constituitive for seeing things, but it is the presence of a cat in your visual field which causes your biology to see a cat. The cat is what the perceptual activity is about when you see the cat. — jkop

Then instead of addressing the correction which I made, to your mistaken proposition, you simply repeat it over again, using slightly different words ("...it is the presence of a cat in your visual field which causes your biology to see a cat"). Can't you see that you've already insisted on the possibility of hallucination, so you've already implied that it is possible to see a cat without the presence of a cat. Therefore it is impossible that the presence of a cat is the cause of seeing a cat.

And after all, a drawing by itself can't be a representation in the first place. What makes something a representation is someone thinking about it that way. — Terrapin Station

When a person draws something as a representation, it was intended by that person to be a representation, and so it exists as a representation, according to that intention. This is the case with John's drawing of a maple leaf. It was intended as a representation of the general form of the maple leaf, produced as such, and so it exists as such.

That is also the case with language in general, it is produced as symbols, representations, and exists as such. It doesn't require someone thinking about it as a representation to actually be a representation, because it was made to represent. But to determine what it actually represents (its meaning) requires someone thinking about it.

Of course it is a particular, but it is not a particular leaf, it is a particular drawing of the generalized form of the maple leaf. — John

So what? Isn't a real maple leaf just a particular instance of the generalized form of the maple leaf? What is the difference between you drawing a representation of the general form of the maple leaf, and the tree creating a representation of the general form? And we could carry that principle to inanimate things as well, the earth creates representations of general forms, rock, water, individual molecules of H2O, and atoms such as carbon, and hydrogen.

Each atom of hydrogen was produced as a representation of the general form. The general form must have been prior to the individual atom, in order that the atom could come into existence as a representation of it. Just like the general form of the maple leaf is prior to any maple leaf that comes into existence, including the one that you drew, as a representation of the general form of the maple leaf.

Without a negative value to birth, it makes no sense to deny potential children existence, for any reason. — TheWillowOfDarkness

What the hell is a potential child? If we made every potential child become an actual, existent child, wouldn't the earth be so overrun with children that they'd pile right up to the moon or something?

As I said, these crude visualizations cannot provide one with an understanding of the concepts. These are simply symbols. A depiction of symbols is in no way a visualization of what is meant by the symbols.

The act is the sensation/seeing, the act cannot produce the cat that you see, only its presence in your visual field can. — jkop

I didn't say that the act of sensing is the cause of the cat.

You claimed that the cat is the cause of the sensation of the cat ("the present cat is the cause of sensing/seeing the cat"). I merely corrected you, by pointing out that the act of "sensing", is the cause of the sensation of a cat. The cat is not the cause of sensing nor seeing the cat. Rather, the living being which senses is the cause of this activity of sensing. Let's position the referred to activity, seeing, where it truly is, within the sensing being, not within the thing being sensed.

Unless you're hallucinating the present cat is the cause of sensing/seeing a cat. — jkop

Try this jkop. Say "I am sensing". This means that the subject "I" is engaged in the activity of sensing. This act produces sensation, perhaps the seeing of a cat. How do you conclude that the cat causes that sensation? Isn't it clear to you, that the subject, "I", is engaged in the activity of sensing, and this activity of sensing has caused the sensation, which is the seeing of a cat? How do you misconstrue this such that the cat is understood as the cause of the sensation?

"Eugenics" as a term has been used to describe societally enforced gene pools as well as things as simple as prenatal care. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugenics . I think if we work with your definition (forced breeding practices and the like), this is a simple question, with NAZI Germany offering sufficient empirical evidence of its horrors. — Hanover

This is the issue with morality in general. It's debatable whether we are forced into acting morally, or we choose to do so. I don't think anyone would argue that morality is not good, and should be avoided, because it is something which is forced on us. But surely it can be argued that morality is forced upon us.

Have you ever come across the word "simulation" before?

What's causing our perceptions is a 'thing-in-itself' (if it's perceptual, then our sense organs are literally the cause of their own existence), but if knowledge doesn't apply to 'things-in-themselves', then it makes no sense to say they cause our perceptions. So the whole notion of perception having some cause dissolves. — dukkha

Yes, the living being causes the existence of the sense organs, and sense organs cause the perception. So the perception has a "cause", to this extent, it is caused by the living being. It is really not appropriate to say that the thing-in-itself causes the perception. When you realize this, then you can notice a disjoint between the perception and the assumed, thing perceived. It is the way that you reconcile this difference which forms the basis of your epistemology.

Physicists spend a great deal of time and computing power creating images of what they are studying, including new fundamental particles: — tom

The problem is, that these images don't adequately represent concepts which cannot be represented by images, so all they're doing is making an appeal to the sensibilities of common people who enjoy such phantasms. That they spend a great deal of time and computing power on this is an indication that they need public funding.

, do you recognize that the drawing of the maple leaf you have presented to me is a particular? You have presented it to me as a representation of the general form of the maple leaf. Therefore it is not the general form of the maple leaf, it is a particular which is intended as a representation of the general form. So if we are talking about the true "general form" of the maple leaf we are talking about something other than such a particular representation.

The difficult factor to understand is that each representation such as that, is a particular. The general form is a universal, and therefore cannot be any particular. So it does not matter how many times you try to represent the general form as a particular, what you present to me will always be particular representation, and not the general form.

I don't believe we can visualize extremely complex objects except to kind of mentally traverse the charateristic features we are familiar with that make them the uniqely particular objects they are.

So I wouldn't agree with Feser that we can have a mental image of a chiliagon at all, other than kind of vaguely imagining what it might look like by analogy with something we can visualize like a hexagon or octagon.

I am basing what I say on my own experience, on what I find I can and cannot visualize. Others may well be able to do things I cannot. — John

Do you agree that you can understand the meaning of "chiliagon", as a 1000 sided figure, without having to visualize it? You can understand it by placing it into relationships with other things. You know that it is a 1000 sided figure, that it is different from a 1002 sided figure, and that it is different from circle. Simply by the means of such descriptions, you can understand it. This is how we understand the principles of mathematics, not by picturing 2 items 20 items, 200, or 2000 items, we understand through described relationships, order. The symbols are assigned an order, and the order is understood and maintained. You can understand what a trillion is, not because you can picture it, but because you know that it has a position in a very specific order, and you know that it cannot be otherwise from this very specific position. That order is not represented spatially.

I'm sure you are aware that in modern physics there is a large number of sub-atomic particles. The existence of the particles are understood with mathematics. When speaking to physicists, they will often caution you, not to try to visualize the things which they are telling you about. The words used, such as "particle", tend to bring up certain images, but you are told by the physicists not to refer to these images. The concepts are purely mathematical, and the words in the context of particle physics, refer to these mathematical concepts, rather than any image you can make in your mind. So they have "particles", and the particles have "spin", but these concepts are purely mathematical, and not something you can imagine. The fact that no one cannot imagine these concepts does not indicate that the physicists do not know what the words mean.

By maintaining faith in the numerical order we can come to understand all kinds of wonderful things which we cannot possibly imagine. You may be inclined to question that faith, but it's really not much different from the trust you give to your ability to imagine. You pass me a drawing of a maple leaf, and I trust you, that this is really what a maple leaf looks like. Now I know what a maple leaf looks like, but that knowledge depends on the veracity of that trust. In a similar way, if I multiply 465 X 43, I now know that this makes 19,995. But even after I confirm my ability to multiply, I only know this through my faith in the numerical order. The numerical order is not represented spatially, and this is why mathematical understanding is based in faith rather than visual representation.

Why then don't I have that choice? — Agustino

As I said, it would be something you discuss, and choose together, as husband and wife. It is not your choice, it is not her choice, that's how that type of union works, you choose these things together.

The whole idea of her having a child holding her genes, and me not having the option to have a child with my genes - because my genes are crooked and inferior - that whole ideology speaks of oppression and abuse. — Agustino

Why do you see a matter of choice as oppression and abuse?

And I might as well add that if she wants to be my wife, then she better accept what is forced upon her from me (referring to the genes) - otherwise she can find another man. I don't see why I should bow down before anyone if they don't like me for who I am. What you think I'm a masochist? You think I will go around like that torturing myself on purpose? Like for real now... I actually thought you were joking >:O — Agustino

Yeah, you go ahead and force your genes upon your wife in a non-consensual way, after all, she's your wife and it's her duty to allow you to do that. Do I sound like I'm joking? If so, I'm a pretty sick joker, and that might be why I mostly refrain from joking.

Understanding a complex logical argument results from the associating of its parts, The parts consist of immediately apprehended insights and the associations between them are also direct insights. What else could the associations be but further direct insights ? They cannot be composed of mechanically following rules without any insight, because then you would need further rules to tell you how to follow the rules, creating an infinitely regressive and complex proliferation of rules which would make any understanding or following of logical arguments impossible. — John

So you've rendered all forms of thought as intuitive. There is no distinction for you between things known intuitively and things known by reason?

Whether you draw the general form of the maple leaf or merely imagine it, it cannot be the exact form of any particular maple leaf. It is a kind of 'averaged' form. — John

When you draw a maple leaf, it is a particular form which you have drawn. It is not the general form of the maple leaf.

I am not going to attempt too address any of the rest of your long post. I think these are the salient points, anyway, and discussion will be much more manageable if we just deal with them. — John

It appears like you do not distinguish between a particular and a universal. We would need to come to some agreement on this before we could produce any progress in this discussion.

Any particular instance of a maple leaf, whether it is drawn, or growing on a tree, is a particular. On the other hand, there is a class of things which we call maple leaves. "Maple leaf" is the title of that class. So there is a universal which is called "maple leaf". Any individual person has rules or principles which one follows, guiding one to class a particular thing as a maple leaf. When we refer to "the general form" of the maple leaf, we refer to these guiding principles by which we distinguish the class "maple leaf", and we judge particulars as maple leafs. The general form, cannot be any particular instance of a maple leaf, it is the defining features of the class. That is why it is understood that a general form exists by definition. You can see this clearly in geometry, things like "triangle", "square", "right angle", "circle", are all general forms which exist by definition.

If such genetic manipulation was the norm in our society, and something you and your spouse could choose as an option, it would just be one more thing which you would have to discuss and make a decision concerning. Right now, if you want children, and one member of the partnership is impotent, then you have to make decisions concerning that issue. Perhaps in the future, couples will be able to choose from a genetic bank, to decide what kind of child they will have. I don't see why the issue of your spouse wanting to choose genetic material, rather than having to accept what is forced upon her from you, or even from her own family, is something which should be insulting to you.

It's one thing that I have a character defect, and another to think that because I have a character fault, my child will inevitably have it, and furthermore she'd rather have someone else's child than mine for this reason. — Agustino

If the fault is hereditary then so be it, a fact is a fact. Face up to the facts instead of being insulted. You might be a good lay, and good at other things, but your lacking in genetic material. So she's going to get that somewhere else. So what?

She certainly isn't telling me that I have a character fault and therefore she won't have a child with me and we need to engage in artificial insemination or adoption instead, is she? — Agustino

I think that's exactly what she'd be saying to you. How do you understand otherwise?