So no fundamental indeterminism, no pilot waves, no non-locality, no other worlds, and no weird collapse.
...
We just can't precisely measure the molecular arrangement of the screen. — Marchesk

The problem is to be found right here in these two phrases. One cannot determine "the exact" molecular arrangement of the screen without referring to non-local factors. The screen is a material object, and to determine the exact arrangement of the parts of any material object requires the consideration of outside forces, because all objects are constantly interacting with other objects in their environment. So there are always non-local unknowns, gravity of the earth, sun, galaxy, expansion of space, etc..

It is a hidden variables approach, just not of the particle, and its non-classical. — Marchesk

We have to look at the hidden variables as the unknowns concerning the activities of the universe. the passing of time in the universe. Since these unknowns are concerning the universe as a whole, unknown things about the way that time passes in the universe, then we cannot say that the hidden variables are proper to the particles or to the screen, they are proper to the universe itself, and this is what makes them appear as non-local.

Horses, were themselves, an industry. The largest horse market, in Chicago, could handle 30,000 horses. — Bitter Crank

It's amazing how many massive workhorses there were around the land less than two hundred years ago, and now they're almost extinct, just a few scattered around for show. I guess they require a lot of work to keep, for no use, and eat piles of food. Stand beside one, they are incredible animals, so big and strong, but very gentle. If the horse is a machine, it's the most gentle machine I've ever seen, but it's still got a mind of its own, so watch out! And don't mistreat it.

Nonsense. Instead of having to start with either a whole, or the parts, things start with the more foundational step of the beginning of their actual separation. — apokrisis

Such a separation is only a beginning in the sense that it is the end of the old and the beginning of the new. So we must account for the old then. There must be something which is separated. If it's the whole, then the whole is prior to the parts. If it's a whole consisting of parts, which is what you seem to be saying, then prior to that whole, is another, and prior to that another, ad infinitum. Infinite regress is unavoidable when you describe a beginning as the end of something else.

But it kills the kind of mechanistic regress you are talking about because the first step is already irreducibly complex in being a symmetry-breaking relation. — apokrisis

I don't see how the separation you speak of could kill the regress, unless the thing which separates, the symmetry itself, is something completely different from a whole and parts. In this case, the whole and parts would come into existence simultaneously at the symmetry-breaking. But if that is the case, how is it that the thing which is prior to the co-dependent whole and parts, the symmetry itself, not actually a whole, a whole with no parts, which later becomes a whole with parts? Then the whole is prior to the parts. The way I see it, either the whole is prior to the parts, or there is an infinite regress of co-dependence.

So how did you get to know what 2 means? — Agustino

I told you, 2 means one more than one. Do you think that two has some other mysterious meaning different from this?

Yeah, and we could make alternative orders, only that they're not so useful at describing our reality. — Agustino

If it's not useful, then why would it get used. And if it wasn't being used it wouldn't exist. But there are different systems of order, natural numbers, fractions, decimals. rational numbers, irrational numbers, real numbers, integers, imaginary numbers, etc..

1+1=2 isn't a relation, it's a description of a relation. — Agustino

What is described is the relation between these symbols, nothing more. It is order, pure and simple, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.. That is why mathematics is so useful, these symbols do not describe anything in particular, they have a position within a created order, and as long as the order is maintained there will be no mistake. So the symbols don't describe anything at all, that's why we have a zero, but they can be applied to anything, and that's why they're so useful.

We learn to count by putting objects together, and saying, one, two, etc. — Agustino

I did not learn to count this way, and I bet that you didn't either. I learned that two comes after one and three comes after two, and so on. I very quickly learned how to count to ten, and then to one hundred. There was no putting objects together when I learned to count.

It’s interesting to me that when taken verbatim, the same can be upheld for a metaphysics of presentism. I’m not confusing your metaphysics with that of any presentism. It’s just that for presentism to be consistent, the present will logically contain both past and future. — javra

Yes, that I believe is the only way to create a valid presentism. What validates "the present" as something real is the very real difference between future and past. Since future and past are radically different, we must assume a division between them, a boundary, and this is the present. This "present" which is assumed as a logical conclusion from the premise that future and past are radically different, cannot be a dimensionless point on a linear timeline, because we have to allow for the human being's experience of existing at the present, and nothing could exist at a dimensionless point in time.

In simple terms, for example, when two or more sentient beings in any way interact, their frame of spatiotemporal reference will synchronize, and this may be further argued to result in the past being fixed, the present being a reality of active interaction, and the future being a realm of possibilities contingent on the fixedness of the past in conjunction with the interactions of the present. — javra

A new trend in presentism is to give the present a separate temporal dimension, I call it breadth. From this assumption, time has two dimensions. There is the familiar temporal dimension which is the directional line or arrow which we are all familiar with, traditional time, but also there is width to that line, which allows for the activities of the present. It can be described like this. At the present, the future is continuously becoming the past. The moment in the future from now rapidly becomes the moment in the past from now, as the now of the present appears to change its temporal location. But we should not represent this as the now moving, the now is our static reference point, what is changing is that future time is becoming past time. As a "becoming", this is a process which itself takes time. So this "becoming", the "active interaction" of the present must have temporal dimension itself, to allow for such activity at the present. Therefore we need to introduce a second dimension of time to account for this activity which occurs at the present, which itself is a fixed division between past and future. What happens is that the present is now not a dimensionless point, but a point with its own dimension.

But the relation described by 1+1 = 2 can't be invented. — Agustino

Why do you say that this relation can't be invented? I see no other possibility except that it was invented. It's called counting, start with one, add another one, and you get two. "One" is invented to stand for something, and "two" is invented to stand for what you get when you add another "one' to the original "one". That is the entirety of the relation and it appears to be completely invented. What do you think I am missing?

My argument is simply that any instance of a present occurrence which we refer to, can, upon analysis, be determined to be a combination of part past and part future. This is also the case when we refer to a present experience, what we refer to is part past and part future.

Some who refuse to recognize this, claim that we can be mistaken with respect to the past, and mistaken with respect to the future, but we cannot be mistaken with respect to out present experience. But clearly this is wrong if what we refer to as the present is nothing more than part past and part future.

I'm waiting for your example of a currently occurring event which is not partly in the past and not partly in the future. Until you provide that example, it's quite clear who is speaking nonsense. Great argument!

It's a matter of fact that any presently occurring change is part in the past and part in the future and that's why it's so easy for me to say this about any example you supply. And when you deny this, it's just that "you don't comprehend the most rudimentary aspects of how to use the language you're communicating in".

It is arguably a category mistake to exploit problems of fundamental physics or worse even metaphysics in order to dismiss notions such as the present. — jkop

There is no category mistake here. The claim has ben made that we cannot be mistaken concerning our present experiences. But if fundamental physics demonstrates to us that "the present" is just an illusion, then "present experience" is itself a mistaken concept.

If it's currently occurring there's no part in the past — Terrapin Station

I am currently pouring myself a coffee. The starting of the pouring is in the past, and the end of the pouring is in the future. That's stated as if you don't comprehend the most rudimentary aspects of how to use the language you're communicating in.

Sorry to have to inform you Terrapin, but unless you can demonstrate a currently occurring event which has no part in the past, and no part in the future, your assertions amount to nonsense.

I answered what the present is when you asked me the first time. The present is the changes/motion that are occurring. — Terrapin Station

Well I don't agree with this at all. All changes or motions require a period of time to occur in. That time may be in the past, in which case the change is in the past, that time may be in the future, in which case the change is in the future. If that change or motion is currently occurring, as you say for the present, then part of the change is in the past and part of it is in the future.

So I think you are just trying to set up a vague notion of the present, according to which, changes are occurring, but you cannot differentiate which part of the change is in the past and which part of the change is in the future. If you cannot differentiate between which part of the change is in the past, from which part of the change is in the future, then you cannot be mistaken with respect to that judgement, simply because you refuse to make that judgement. This denial, I assert is itself a mistake.

Isn't that what "the present" represents, a zero dimensional point in time which separates past time from future time? What else did you have in mind?

Here's another way to look at it. There's a principle called the relativity of simultaneity which is commonly cited against presentism. It indicates that events which are simultaneous from one frame of reference are not simultaneous from another frame of reference. Therefore if we produce a baseline of events which corresponds with "the present", some events would be present from one frame of reference but not from another. So, since my hands and feet are often moving in different directions relative to other parts of my body, I don't see how there could be one single "present", which is proper to my entire self. Therefore I don't think it is proper to say that my self has a present experience.

So on your view, you don't exist at present, and you can exist in the future? — Terrapin Station

Correct. I don't see how the present can be anything more than a point in time, which divides the future from the past, and therefore I think it's impossible that anything could exist at the present, a point in time. That I exist at the present is an illusion, I really exist partially in the past, and partially in the future. That is why I dispute you claim that we cannot be mistaken concerning our present experience, "present experience" itself is an illusion. Unless you are using "present" in a different way, I don't see how you can avoid this.

I've said it hundreds of times now. When things begin, both parts and wholes would be maximally vague. It is in their co-dependent arising that they together dispel the mists of unformed possibility to revealed their mutually supported actuality. — apokrisis

Perhaps this makes sense to you, but it is unintelligible, and therefore nonsense to me. All you are saying here is that when you look toward the beginnings of things, you cannot determine which comes first, the part or the whole, because the beginning is lost in vagueness. But as I've explained to you many times now, by logic, the whole is necessarily prior to the parts. You recognize this fundamental principle when you say that the whole constrains the parts. Co-dependence is unacceptable because it produces an infinite regress with no beginning. Therefore the assumption of co-dependence is a negating of the beginning rather than a looking at the beginning.

Since your perspective, for looking at beginnings, renders the relationship between parts and wholes "maximally vague", when logic tells us that wholes are necessarily prior to the parts, then we may conclude that your perspective is inadequate for understanding beginnings, and therefore unacceptable.

Gravity? You mean space-time curvature I hope, and no, space-time is real. — tom

Oh the fantasies that people make up to justify their beliefs.

As far as I know the role of mathematics in science is by default considered to be that of modeling a certain part of reality: — Babbeus

Yes that's a good point. And we should not confuse the model with that which is being modeled, that would be like confusing the map with the terrain. But I think the issue here is that the math is not actually the model itself, it is the tool which is used to create the model and to interpret the model. Therefore we have a medium between the map and the terrain, and this is the mathematics. The mathematics is used to create the map and to interpret the map. But now the mathematics may be perceived as the medium between the creation of the map and the interpretation of the map, and some may mistakenly apprehend this as the terrain itself.

Your mind only knows what you (presently) intend to type. Something can (and sometimes does) interrupt you before you actually type it. When we debated whether final causes can be in the future, you took the position that this intention is the final cause of the outcome, and on that basis insisted that it must always be temporally prior to the outcome. Have you changed your mind about that? — aletheist

The final cause is temporally prior to the outcome in the same way that the future is temporally prior to the past. If you consider time itself, the time which will be in the past is always in the future before it is in the past. So for example, January 8th is in the future before it is in the past. So I haven't changed my mind, I just understand time in a different way from you. We can consider material things which exist in time, and those in the past are prior to those in the future, but if we take time itself, as an immaterial object, then any part of time itself, is always future time before it is past time. I understand that the future is always becoming the past, as time passes.

Your mind has the capacity to imagine what would be produced in the future, if certain conditions come about; and only some of these are within your control. Unless you are omniscient and/or omnipotent, you cannot guarantee in the present what will be in the future. — aletheist

Of course I cannot "guarantee" what will be, in the future, in any absolute sense, that's the point of the thread, we can always be mistaken. I might think that I am typing "mistaken", but actually type "mistakwn", or something like that. The capacity for my mind to produce what will be, physically, in the future, is very limited, because of the limitations of my body. But this does not mean that the capacity is not there.

Claiming that the future is already actual amounts to determinism. — aletheist

No, determinism is the claim that the actuality of the past determines absolutely what will happen in the future. I can claim that the future is actual, but it doesn't consist of material things, it is immaterial, without implying determinism. That is the advantage of dualism, we can appeal to two distinct actualities, material and immaterial.

So you'd say that awareness isn't in the past because you'd say it's in the past and the future? — Terrapin Station

Right, I am aware of the past as well as the future. But I don't think my awareness can be in the present, because the present is an infinitesimally short period of time which divides future from past, which is so short that nothing can exist within it. Surely I am not aware of anything which occurs in a only Planck time length which would divide future from past. So I put these two things together, the fact that I am aware of both the past and future, and the fact that the present is too short of a period of time for me to be aware of anything, to produce the assumption that my awareness must be in the past and the future.

It seems more accurate to say that your activities of moving your body are responses to a prediction of what would be in the future, given your awareness of your sensations and some assumptions about what they entail. — aletheist

No, I don't think that's the case at all. I definitely would not characterize it like that. When I am moving around doing things, typing on the keyboard, getting something to eat, etc., I am not responding to predictions about what would be in the future, my mind is actually in the future. My mind knows what I will type before it is typed, and it is not the case that it is responding to predictions about what could be, it is actively creating what will be in the future. My mind has the capacity to actually produce what will be, in the future. This is not a case of responding to predictions, it is a case of my mind being in the future, and ensuring that when that future comes to pass, for my senses, things will be, as my mind wants them to be.

The future is not yet actual, so you cannot (strictly speaking) be aware of it yet. — aletheist

I don't see how you can draw this conclusion. All the things which I have experienced, all the things which I have sensed, are in the past. I am fully aware of these things even though they are all in the past. What principle do you use to deny that I can be aware of things in the future? What principle allows you to say that being in the past is actual, but being in the future is not actual?

Right, I wouldn't say that awareness is exclusively in the past, because I am also aware of some things which will occur in the future.

But if we just consider sense awareness here, I realize that everything which I am sensing is necessarily in the past by the time that I am aware of it, because sensing is an activity which takes time.

This is why I must conclude that my awareness is in the future as well as in the past, because if I was only aware of what I've sensed, I would not be able react quickly to get out of the way when something is coming at me. All my actions, my "doing things", indicate to me that my awareness is just as much in the future as it is in the past. My awareness of my sensations is an awareness of what has been, in the past, but my activities of moving my body are an awareness of what will be, in the future.

So your claim is that the existence of the parts precedes the whole, in a manner of vague existence? And from those vague parts comes a whole which constrains the parts?

If the parts are pre-existing the whole, in this unconstrained, vague fashion, where does the whole derive the power to constrain the parts, when the whole doesn't even exist yet? Do you not think that it's logically impossible for something which does not yet exist, to act as a constraint on existing parts, in order to bring itself into existence? The point to understand is the verb "to act". It is contradictory to say that something non-existent may "act" as a constraint, to bring itself into existence. And if the claim is that something can constrain without acting, or having any actual existence, this needs to be justified.

You have it back to front. — apokrisis

And I said the same thing about you. We might have to agree to disagree.

Except, I still believe that the present is very real. It must be real because there is a very real difference between future and past. This difference, between future and past necessitates a real present. If there were no difference between future and past, there would be no need to assume a real present. We live on that boundary, between future and past, and look both ways. What that boundary is, is just as elusive as what life is.

We have current raw experiences. I feel warm. My back is sore. — andrewk

I would describe this as a persistent experience. I have felt warm, consistently, for a while, and conclude inductively that I will continue to do so in the near future. So I say "I feel warm". Likewise with the back ache, it has been persistent in the recent past, and I infer that it will continue, I conclude "my back is sore".

I believe that this is how we use inductive reasoning to produce conclusions about what "is". We have notice in the past that the sky has been blue. This is persistent, and so we have good reason to believe that the sky will continue to be blue in the future. We conclude "the sky is blue". All the objects which exist around us, we have noticed a certain continuity of their existences in the recent past, so we assume that they will continue to exist into the near future, therefore we say there "is" a chair over there, and there "is" a table over there, etc. The "is", appears to refer to the present, but it really refers to what we have noticed in the past, and we conclude by induction, will continue into the future.

One's interpretation of one's raw experiences as emanating from a tree may be mistaken. One can also have an illusory memory of a raw experience of a visual pattern or roughness against one's fingers. But one's current experience of the pattern or the roughness cannot be mistaken. — andrewk

So I think you're somewhat wrong to say "one's current experience ... cannot be mistaken". First, I don't think there really is such a thing as one's current experience, it's a subjective division of time to say what is "current". So this assumption, of a current experience, is itself mistaken. As described above, that which is current, "what is", is itself an interpretation of what has been, and utilizing a very basic form of induction, we claim it will continue to be. But we know that induction is not beyond doubt, so the interpretations which we call "current experience", may well be mistaken.

The physical constraints that might in retrospect be recognised as the "primeval ecosystem" can be "crisply informational" for purely accidental reasons. — apokrisis

I don't see how information can be accidental. The word implies a necessity, the necessity which is required for knowledge. Without some form of necessity there can be no knowledge and no information.

So - remembering that we are talking about the development of the coding side of the biosemiotic relation - the syntax might seem physically definite in the primeval condition, but the semantics is still maximally contingent. And being uncertain or indeterminate, that makes it spontaneous or vague. — apokrisis

You continue to represent this in you inverted, mixed up fashion. What you call "the syntax" is the pre-existing "language", and this is the context in which the messages come into existence. It is not the syntax, it is the context and therefore semantic. As the context, this pre-existing 'language" provides the semantics, the meaning, and as the necessary condition for the existence of the messages, it is not contingent. Syntax is produced posteriorly, as what you call "the regularity of a habit". When the messaging proves to be sufficient for fulfilling the needs of the "language" there is reliability, stability, and this produces syntax. Simply stated, the rule follows after we notice what works, while the first messages might come off in a trial and error way.

What comes first is a vague state of semiotic relations. So chimps grunting in contextually meaningful, yet ungrammatical fashion, is at least some kind of messaging system. — apokrisis

Did you read the article by Pattee? He argues that it is necessary to assume that prior to any semiotic relations there exists a "language" itself. The semiotic relations are a function of the parts, the switching, the messaging, but prior to this is the "language" itself, the whole, and this "language" provides the context within which the semiotic relations will emerge. He argues that the language is prior to the symbols. So even if chimps grunting is considered to be a meaningful messaging system, he claims that these meaningful messages can only come into existence within the pre-existing "language". The "language" provides context, which is necessary in order that the grunts may have meaning. What Pattee does, is take this right back to the most primitive form of messaging, molecular switching, and claims that this switching must have come into existence within the context of a pre-existing "language".

Huh?

At any rate, so MU and Real Gone Cat, are you claiming that your awareness is in the past? — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying my awareness is in the past, I'm saying my experience is in the past. Do you see a difference between these two? Awareness implies anticipation of future events as well as experience of past events.

Are you saying, "Oh look-a tree" in the past? — Terrapin Station

By the time I've said "Oh look, a tree", that's in the past. So "oh look a tree" is necessarily in the past.

Okay, but that's what I'm talking about--the present mental content, whatever it is. — Terrapin Station

Why do you believe that there is such a thing as "the present mental content"? If you have to say "whatever it is", it seems like you have no idea as to what such a thing as the present mental content might be. Yet you claim that the present mental content cannot be doubted. That's rather ironic, you don't know what it could be, yet you cannot doubt it. I suppose if there is nothing there, there is nothing to doubt. How could there be any such thing as the present mental content? As soon as it's there, it's in the past, in an infinitely short period of time.

I think that mental content consists of memories of the past, and anticipations of the future. There is no present mental content.

As far as I understand, time is included within a frame of reference, so there is no such thing as neither past nor future relative to a frame of reference, that would require an non-temporal frame of reference.

I definitely took the bait — m-theory

That's what the Pope says, you took that shit and ate it.

The question in my mind, is how do these people make shit look appetizing? Is it a skill of the one who offers it, or is it a problem in the mind of the one who receives it? Maybe it's a bit of both, we have a slight illness within our minds, (perhaps it's only a healthy curiosity though), which draws our attention to such shit, and those others take advantage of this, making the shit look good enough to eat.

What you can't be mistaken about is (1) your present phenomenal experience as your present phenomenal experience, and (2) your present evaluations/assessments as your present evaluations/assessments. — Terrapin Station

What do you man by "present" here?

I don't think we can be mistaken about our current experiences, but we can be mistaken about past ones. — andrewk

Every experience, by the time it has occurred, is in the past. This, along with your statement as a premise, produces the logical conclusion that we can be mistaken about all experiences.

Worry about a deeper conspiracy. — Bitter Crank

I see that there is worldwide concern about Russian campaigns of disinformation. In the Wikipedia article on disinformation, it is said that Pope Francis compared consumers of disinformation to coprophagy. He has a way with words.

Hate to say it, but Pattee is just talking about the necessity of vague beginnings. — apokrisis

Actually I think he is saying the exact opposite. The idea of vague beginnings is what he is dismissing as the wrong approach. He proposes that we reject the idea of meaningless messages slowly becoming meaningful, in favour of the idea of messages which come into existence within the context of a pre-existing environment of a background language. This is what he calls the "primeval ecosystem". The pre-existing language must consist of specific constraints in order that any messages which come into existence can make sense. "A molecule becomes a message only in the context of a larger system of physical constraints which I have called a "language" in analogy to our normal usage of the concept of message." (p.8) As the "language" provides specific rules or constraints, this cannot be construed as "vague beginnings".

He then proceeds to discuss how "reliability, stability, or persistence" of a function is obtained. This occurs when the conditions required by the context, "the language" are fulfilled. The point he seems to be making is that while the meaning of any particular messages, which manifest as the different switches, appears to us as vague, because there are so many complex systems of switches, the primeval language itself, the basic rules or constraints, must be very simple and concise, and therefore not vague at all. This is exemplified by the speed at which the fundamental messaging occurs. Vagueness is in the messages, not in the language itself, which pre-exists the messages.

So the argument is that the primeval "ecosystem language" (and note Pattee is talking specifically about the code half of the dichotomy here) would have condensed out of vaguer, analog, conditions in the same way that the formal grammar that (used to be) taught every kid in school is a "written down" distillation or idealisation of the more informal habits to be found in spoken language. — apokrisis

In making this type of analogy you must be sure to maintain a proper temporal order so as not to confuse cause with effect. The child is taught formal rules of grammar, but these come about following the use of messages, these are derived from the messaging systems which have vagueness inherent within, due to the nature of the messaging system. What Pattee is referring to is the rules or constraints of language which exist prior to any messaging coming into existence. So the messaging system comes into existence, and is formed in such a way as to fulfill the requirements of the pre-existing language, but what the child learns is rules which are derived from messaging system. The former is truly prescriptive, while the latter is descriptive.

What's with all the bogus news stories these days, they seem to be popping up everywhere, even getting picked up by mainstream media agencies some times? Is this the new trend for pranksters, or should I be worried about a deeper conspiracy?

So what shapes a switch? Is binary logic "real" in your book? (I say yes - as real as any physical circuitry it engenders.) — apokrisis

But the question is where does the binary logic derive from. In the article the author is look for origins of life. He implies that it is somewhat mistaken to look simply at the emergence of switching systems, because switches are useless unless they come to exist in an environment of a language. So he proposes what he calls a primeval ecosystem. The issue is, where does this primeval ecosystem come from, within which the switching systems can emerge,

In that article, I see "switches" spoken of, which are just parts. There is also the necessity for a "primeval ecosystem language", which the author discusses. Where is this background environment of "language" supposed to have come from, God?

However the more I learned the more my hopes have been replacing with growing suspicion that the horizons open by complexity science led to desert filled with mirages. — miosim

I see that you've learned to see through those mirages, as the hollowness of structures without a cause.

If the sentence is meaningless, then it can't be true. — Marchesk

The sentence is not meaningless, because Jaydison posted it in the op with intent, purpose, to discuss it's meaning. Therefore it must have meaning, Jaydison meant something with it. But, as I explained in my last post, what was meant by it, what Jaydison was doing with it, is something completely different from the meaning which appears from a reading of the words. What appears is some form of meaninglessness. Therefore the sentence is actually posted as a form of deception. And this can be seen as the essence of all such sentences which appear to be paradoxical, they are simply posted as a form of deception.

I don't recall having askied a yes or no question. Have you confused me with Lower Case NUMBERS?

But we do say things like that on occasion. For example, "This party is not a party", meaning it's a party in name only. I'm pretty sure I have said something akin to "this chair is not a chair" when being forced to sit on something uncomfortable that served as a chair. I've also said, "I'm not myself today", which would seem to be a violation of the law of identity, but clearly it's not meant to be taken in literal terms. — Marchesk

That's very true, but what is at issue here is the semantics, what is meant by the statement. In your examples, what is expressed, is that the thing is misnamed. The get together of people should not be called a party, the thing you are sitting on should not be called a chair. That is the meaning expressed.

Also, there is this very big counter to the claim that the liar sentence is without meaning:

"This sentence is meaningless."

Which would be true if the liar sentence is meaningless, but then we get ourselves into another regress. — Marchesk

The liar sentence is not without meaning, it is used as an example, this use indicates meaning. So people like philosophers bring it up to discuss, and this is its context, which gives it its meaning. But there's very little difference between it and other self-contradicting, self negating examples, like "the square circle". It just demonstrates that we can say things, which according to the placement of words, appear to be meaningless due to self-contradiction, and ask others what is meant by this.

That is the meaning of the liar sentence, it is used by philosophers to demonstrate that we have the capacity to use words in this way. It should be of no surprise to anyone, because we have the capacity to deceive. And this means that we can say things which are completely different from what our intentions are. So when I say "this circle is square", or "this sentence is false", what I mean by this (what my intentions are, or what I am doing with those words), is something different from what the words appear to mean, just like common forms of deception. Again, we have exposed that separation between what is meant by the author (the author's intentions, what the author is doing), and what the words, on their own, appear to say. And this simply demonstrates our ability to deceive.

As I understand it (not well at all) the relationship between the ozone hole and climate warming is rather complex. CFCs are a green house gas, yes? I don't think ozone depletion is a major factor in warming. — Bitter Crank

Actually, it's the effect of CO2 which is quite complex, the effects of ozone thinning is rather straight forward. Ozone absorbs solar energy in the high atmosphere (stratosphere). Ozone thinning allows that energy to reach the surface of the earth. What has been observed by NASA (which we can be logically attribute to ozone thinning) is a lower temperature in the upper atmosphere, and a higher temperature at the earth's surface.

This should be taken into account by anyone who attributes higher surface temperatures to a build up of CO2. A correlation between two things does not necessitate that one is the cause of the other. A claim of causation must be justified.

H2O precipitates out easily, the atmosphere can only hold so much under usual conditions. — Punshhh

That's the point, the amount of water in the atmosphere varies greatly, due to precipitation and evaporation. It varies by an amount many time greater than the total amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. If H2O and CO2 are similar in their capacity as greenhouse gases, how is a doubling, or even tripling of CO2 going to have a significant effect on the climate, when the amount of H2O already continually varies by an amount many times more than this?

In other words, CO2 is the constant, and H2O is the variable. The effects of the variable are far more substantial to the subject at hand, than the effects of the constant. How does any credible science treat the variable as a constant, thereby allowing the constant to be treated as a variable?