Are you aware of the effects that the thinning of the ozone layer have had on the climate of the planet?

I think Jaydison exposed the problem on the first go around of the thread. It is the issue of self-referencing. Self-referencing usually takes the form of definition, but here it does not. So it's like saying "this definition is not a definition", which is contradictory nonsense. We could make other nonsense statements like "this chair is not a chair", or "this table is not a table". That is the form of this sentence.

Consider "this sentence is true". That doesn't say anything, as TS says, there's no substance. It's like saying 'this sentence is a sentence", "this chair is a chair", etc..

My point here is that it is rational and not at all arbitrary to reject the conclusions of someone you find lacking credibility. What would be irrational would be to fully accept the credibility of the scientists but to simply refuse to accept their inconvenient conclusions. I don't think that is at all what is happening. I think what is really happening is that the general public (myself included) has no idea what sort of experiments have been conducted or what sort of data has been collected, but we are all asked to accept the conclusions because most scientists say it's valid. If tomorrow they report they were wrong, I suspect you'd change your mind. Whether placing trust in the consensus of the experts is reasonable and rational is debatable because polling scientists is a not a scientific act. It's a political one. — Hanover

The credibility of climate change science is dubious at best. H2O and CO2 are very similar in greenhouse capacity, yet the amount of H2O in the atmosphere is many times more (perhaps hundreds of times more) than the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and constantly varies by an amount many times more (perhaps hundreds of times more) than the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere.

If the thing is actual, then it has to be either purple or not-purple; it cannot be both or neither. — aletheist

Whether or not the thing is purple depends on a judgement concerning the definition of purple, and a judgement as to whether the thing fulfills the criteria of that definition. If we cannot agree, on those judgements, then we have to accept the likelihood that the thing is neither purple nor not purple, or possibly both. To say that the thing must be one or the other, despite the fact that there is no agreement on this, is an appeal to fiction.

If you and I are looking at an object, you say it's purple, I say it's not, your claim would be that it has to be one or the other, there must be some objective truth to that subject. I say this claim of objective truth is a fiction. To say that it must be one or the other is a fiction, because whether it is purple or not, depends on your perspective. To me it's one, and to you it's the other. This is where we find vagueness, amongst actual things. The description of the thing depends on one's perspective.

If the thing is possible, then both purple and not-purple are still possible. — aletheist

Whether the thing itself is possible or actual, has no bearing on the applicability of the law of excluded middle, which is being applied to the attribute, "purple", not to the subject itself, which may or may not be an actual thing. When I say "the ball is purple" it makes no difference whether "ball" refers to an actual or a possible ball, when I proceed to say "therefore it is impossible that the ball is not purple. . Both possible and actual things can be either purple, not-purple, or indeterminate, the difference being that a possible thing may not have actual existence.

As I said before, this entails that what we call "free will" is an illusion. If there are no real possibilities, then whatever actually happens had to happen; there were no real alternatives. — aletheist

No, free will is not an illusion, because there are two distinct types of actuality with dualism. To say that something is actual does not mean that it is necessarily constrained by efficient causation. Efficient causation, and determinism is what creates the idea of "whatever actually happens had to happen". But we can allow that the soul is free from efficient causation and therefore free from determinism.

The soul and God are actualities which are inherently free from the constraints of efficient causation (the actuality involved with material existence), God being free in an absolute way, the soul having some degree of this freedom. Possibility refers to material existence in time, and we need to allow our minds to completely transcend this material existence in order to understand the pure actuality which is prior to, and the cause of, all material existence. Possibility is the essence of the material world, as it appears to the mind which partakes in the realm of pure actuality. But this, "possibility", is the abstracted form of matter, how it appears within the mind, it is not matter itself, and this is why "possibility" is an illusion. It is not the case that the soul is not free. By means of partaking in the pure actuality of God it is free. But it is the case that the actuality of matter appears to the free soul as "possibility", and this is an illusion of misunderstanding.

It seems you have never discussed a thought experiment before. If you had, you would know that this statement is totally irrelevant. — aletheist

Most thought experiments I reject, because they tend to ask you to imagine something fictitious, which is usually impossible, like your proposed boundary between P and not-P.

So now the "boundary" is between purple and not-purple with respect to anything that is actual, and therefore determinate; the law of non-contradiction prevents anything from being both purple and not-purple, while the law of excluded middle prevents anything from being neither purple nor not-purple. — aletheist

As I said, if we look at the edge of a purple thing under a microscope, we will see that the boundary between purple and not-purple is vague. Even if we took the concept "purple", we would see that it is a mix of red and blue. But if there is not enough blue in the mix it might just be said to be red, and if there is not enough red in the mix, it might just be blue.

In reality, the boundary between a purple thing and non-purple is vague, so the law of excluded middle fails here. And also many colours, depending on how they are blended, would cause disagreement between people as to whether they are purple or not, so the law of excluded middle fails here as well. Your though experiment is asking me to assume something which is impossible. But we are talking about reality here, and if I accept your impossible premise, we are no longer in a world of reality, but in a world of some claimed "logical possibility" which is really an impossibility. This can only be a negative procedure when we are talking about reality.

On the other hand, generality means that the law of excluded middle does not apply; neither purple nor not-purple can be attributed to a real general, even though each actual instance of it must be either purple or not-purple. — aletheist

So I think you have this backwards. It is with particulars that the law of excluded middle does not apply. We look at a particular purple thing under a microscope, and find that there is a vague boundary between purple and not-purple. We look at particular coloured items and find that in some instances we cannot agree as to whether the item is purple or not-purple.

In the case of the general, we can provide a very clear and concise definition of what it means to be purple, so that generals can exist with no vagueness. Vagueness can be excluded from universal principles by means of definition, and this is very evident in mathematics and geometry. It is when we look at a particular, to class it according to the general principle, that we face vagueness. So vagueness, and failure of the law of excluded middle is a property of the particular, not the general. By positioning vagueness as a property of the general, rather than as a property of the particular, you produce a misrepresentation of reality, a reversal of what is actually the case.

On your view, how can a possibility that has not been actualized be real at all? — aletheist

That's exactly what I'm arguing, a possibility cannot be real at all. "Possibility" refers to the way that we relate one actuality to another, therefore it is entirely something produced by the human mind, and is not real at all. That possibilities are real is an illusion.

By being real per the definition that I gave, despite not being actual per the definition (of existence) that I gave. — aletheist

I don't understand why you would equate "actual" with existence, instead of with "real", as per standard dictionary definitions. What's the point in producing inconsistent definitions? As I understand, "existence" refers to all being, including both forms of actualities and their relations. Thus potential, or possibility, is included within existence, as relative, or illusory being. In dualism, the human being occupies a position which consists of both types of actualities, allowing for numerous illusory possibilities.

No matter how powerful a microscope you use, you will always see black on one side of the boundary and white on the other. More below. — aletheist

It seems you have never looked through a microscope before. If you had, you would know that this statement is totally incorrect.

In mine (ink blot), a boundary is not a third thing at all - it is the demarcation between two things that do not intermix. — aletheist

My argument is that there is no such thing as a demarcation between two things, which do not intermix. That is why I said to look at the ink blot in a microscope, there is intermixing. Any time there is two substances side by side there is some degree of intermixing, you might just have to take a more microscopic perspective to detect that intermixing. The only way to prevent intermixing is to put a third substance in between, but then you have mixing on each side of that boundary.

By being real per the definition that I gave, despite not being actual per the definition (of existence) that I gave. This is why the terminological distinction is so important - it obviously makes no sense if you insist on treating reality and actuality/existence as synonyms. — aletheist

You said that existing things interact with other existing things, and this is what it means to be actual. But "real", you say is something beyond this. So I ask you how is it possible for a real thing to interact with an actual thing, without that real thing itself being actual? If an actual thing is interacting with something else, as per your definition of existing, isn't that something else necessarily an actual thing? How do you sneak in this real thing to interact with actual things, without itself being actual? By your definition, actual things interact with other actual things.

A more pertinent case is the "boundary" between P and not-P with respect to anything that is actual, and therefore determinate; the law of non-contradiction prevents anything from being both P and not-P, while the law of excluded middle prevents anything from being neither P nor not-P. — aletheist

But this is not an actual boundary, it is just fictional. You have assumed a fictional thing, P, and claimed that there is a boundary between P and not-P. This is exactly why we need to restrict such fictions from reality. Otherwise you can claim any logical possibility as a reality, and all kinds of sophistry follows. "P" is not an actual thing, it is just a symbol which signifies absolutely nothing. If P signified an actual object, we could go to that object with microscopes and find out that the boundary between P and not-P is vague. But your P and not-P are totally fictional, so there is no boundary between them because each of them refer to absolutely nothing. You are making this all up, saying that there is a P and a not-P with a boundary between them.

This implies that the only real possibilities are those that are actualized - i.e., determinism; there are no genuine alternatives when we make choices. Since I did not actually ignore your message, it was not really possible for me to do so. Is that your position? — aletheist

No, that's not what I said, the so-called real possibility is based in an actuality, it is not one that's been actualized. The possibility for you to ignore my message is based in the actuality of there actually being a message from me. Without that message, the possibility is fictional, unreal. The existence of the actual message is what substantiates the possibility.

My argument is that the possibility itself is not real, it's just a way of interpreting the actuality. You interpret the situation as the existence of a message, and assume that you are capable of reading it. There is one actuality which is the situation to be interpreted, and another actuality of you, as an active living soul, which is interpreting, and between these two, is produced the possibility of reading the message.

But a boundary between two areas cannot itself be an area, it has to be a line. If it is an area, then there are two additional boundaries - in your diagram, the boundaries between the area that represents possibility and the areas on either side of it that represent the two kinds of actuality. — aletheist

No, what I am talking about is the grey area which is the boundary. Take your black ink spot on the white paper, and look at it under a microscope, the boundary looks completely different from how it looks to the naked eye. The description, or defining, of the boundary depends on the perspective. Different perspectives produce difference in defining of the boundary, and this creates possibilities.

Did you somehow miss this post from yesterday? — aletheist

No, that's the post which I demonstrated supports my position. How does "reality means being whatever it is regardless of whether any person or finite group of people thinks it so" differ from "actual means being whatever it is regardless of..."? That's what I brought up, as you were arguing a difference between real and actual. You replied that the difference is evident based on the "technical definition" of "real". I'm still waiting to see that technical definition which demonstrates the difference.

Are you monitoring my ongoing conversation with Terrapin Station? A real law of nature governs actual things and events, but the law itself is not actual - it has to do with what would be under certain conditions, not what was or is; not even what (determinately) will be. — aletheist

None of this makes any sense to me, you've got some explaining to do. How can a non-actual thing govern an actual thing? You imply that the actual thing is active, acting in events. How is it possible that a non-active thing can have any causal influence (in the form of governing) over an active thing? This is why I said that dualism solves these problems, it allows for another class of actual things.

But a boundary between two areas cannot itself be an area, it has to be a line. If it is an area, then there are two additional boundaries - in your diagram, the boundaries between the area that represents possibility and the areas on either side of it that represent the two kinds of actuality. — aletheist

This is where you are wrong, unless you propose a third thing, which separates the two things, the boundary is always an area, it is an area where the two things on the opposing sides of the boundary are intermixing. In my model, the third thing, possibility is not real, so there is no third thing. There are two actualities, with intermixing at the boundary between the two, because the boundary is vague. This intermixing of the two actualities creates possibilities. But possibilities aren't real, they are an illusion created by the fact that the two actualities are mixing where thy meet at the boundary, i.e. the boundary is vague.

However, to be fair, state borders are arbitrary creations of particular human minds, and thus do not qualify as real in the sense that we are discussing. — aletheist

But how can any boundary be itself real unless you assume a third element which acts as a separation between the two contiguous elements? This would be a real boundary. And if you assume a third element which acts as the boundary, then we have the problem you referred to, two more boundaries between this element and the two which are separated. I assume no such third element. The two elements are contiguous, nothing between them, but on one side of the boundary is the one element, and on the other side the other, like the boundary between water and air, or the boundary between water and the glass which it is in. However, depending on your perspective (as explained with the microscope example), the boundary is more or less vague. It is this vagueness which gives rise to possibility.

Again, this way of thinking is only true if you are locked into standard issue reductionism. In a holist, four cause, view of causality, existence becomes self organising development. — apokrisis

As you may well know, I don't belief in this concept of self organising development. I think such organising requires a cause, and the cause is something active, and necessarily prior to the self which comes to be from the organising.

Thus given an initial condition where everything is possible, that most general possible state is already going to suppress the actualisation of most of that possibility. — apokrisis

As I am arguing with altheist, I don't think possibility is real. When we refer to a "real possibility" it is only said to be real because it is supported by some actuality. The actuality is the substance of the possibility which makes it real, and therefore the essence of why we can call the possibility real. The possibility isn't actually real then, it is the actuality which is real. We call the possibility real simply because it is supported by something real. Therefore a "condition where everything is possible" is not a real possibility. That described condition is actually impossible, it's just a fiction, because according to the description, there is no actuality, no substance to make that a real possibility.

No, not given the technical distinction between real/reality and actual/existence. — aletheist

Well I'm asking you to give me the technical distinction. What you gave me supports my position as well as yours. You say that it doesn't support my position, "given the technical distinction", but I haven't been given the technical distinction.

but the realist holds that there are some realities that are not actual. — aletheist

If you accept this, that some realities are not actual, I want to see your principles, your reasons, what gives substance to this idea? That is the whole problem which Plato ran into with Pyhtagorean Idealism, the Ideas were described as passive entities which individual human minds partake in. But he slowly came to realise that this passive existence, independent from minds, could not be supported. Then he introduced "the good", which threw a whole new light on the intelligible objects, allowing him to understand Ideas as active Forms, active in creation. From here, Aristotle soundly refuted Pythagoren Idealism, while the Neo-Platonists went on to develop the concept of actual Forms.

No, that does not solve the problem. What separates the unreal (possibility) from each form of the actual? Merely making a distinction does not "draw a boundary," and even if it did, the boundary would (by definition) be on neither side of itself. What color is the perimeter of a black ink spot on a white piece of paper? In what state is the border between Colorado and Wyoming? — aletheist

You are exactly making my point for me. The boundary is nothing real, as you demonstrate with your examples. I assign "possibility" to the boundary, because if the boundary is vague, there is the possibility of assigning the area within the boundary, to either one of the two actualities.. So possibility is nothing real, just like in your examples, it is a boundary. What is separated by the boundary is two distinct actualities. It is the vagueness of the boundary, which makes possibility appear to be something real. Consider that there is a grey area, between the black spot, and the white of the paper, or a grey area in the Colorado/Wyoming border terrain, such that in this area, it is not definitively one or the other, we are open to possibilities. It is the failure of the human being to properly define the boundary, which creates the illusion that possibility is something real.

I am still not following you at all here. What do you mean by "inductive principles"? What do they have to do with the realism/nominalism debate? — aletheist

I didn't know we were involved in a realism/nominalism debate. I for one, do not know the fundamentals of these positions, and I am not arguing one side or the other.

Inductive principles are any conclusions derived from inductive reasoning. Say, liquid water always freezes to solid ice at the same temperature. That's a generality produced from numerous observations of particular occurrences, an inductive conclusion. You have asserted that some such generalities are real, and some generalities are unreal. How would you differentiate between real and unreal inductive principles?

So, New year's resolution to quit philosophy?

Sorry, I just assumed that you were reading all of the posts in this thread. Briefly, reality means being whatever it is regardless of whether any person or finite group of people thinks it so, while existence means reacting with other like things in the environment. — aletheist

So, doesn't it make sense to say that whatever is, regardless of whether any person says so, actually is, and therefore real is synonymous with actual? And how would you support the claim that a possibility is anything other than what some one says is possible?

However, whether we can distinguish between real and unreal possibilities is not germane to whether there is such a distinction. In other words, it is a real distinction. — aletheist

But don't you see the problem here? Whatever it is that creates the boundary between real and unreal cannot itself be real or else it would be part of the real, and therefore not the boundary between real and unreal?

Huh? This would entail that the distinction between the actual and the non-actual likewise cannot be something actual or non-actual. Is that your position? — aletheist

Well, you might state it like that, what lies between the actual and non-actual is the possible. But that's simplistic, and incorrect, as the possible is the non-actual. The problem may be resolved through dualism though. I'm dualist, so I allow two distinct forms of the actual, both are real. What separates them is the unreal, possibility.

Where did I say or imply anything about "inductive principles" being "real and unreal"? — aletheist

You said "not all generals are real". I assumed inductive principles are generals, so I asked how would you distinguish between real and unreal inductive principles. If they are all unreal, then what type of generals would be real?

But that is certainly not the technical definition within philosophy, especially in the context of the debate over the reality of universals, which is the thread topic. — aletheist

Well I have no clue of what you mean by "the technical definition". Unless you specify it, where is that technical definition supposed to be found? To say that real is a broader term than actual does not provide a technical definition.

The claim is not that all possibilities are real, it is that some possibilities are real. Likewise, the broader claim is not that all generals are real, it is that some generals are real. — aletheist

What then, distinguishes between a real possibility and an unreal one. It cannot be something real, nor can it be unreal, because it has to create a boundary between these two. In your system of definitions, what creates that boundary between a real and an unreal possibility?

And if you say that there are real generals and unreal generals, then I suppose there is a similar boundary between real inductive conclusions and unreal deductive conclusions. None of that makes any sense to me. All inductive principles are of the same type, "inductive", some are better than others. To say that some are real and some are unreal would create a categorical separation within that category, and this is an unnecessary complication. Furthermore, you still need to account for something which substantiates your distinction between real and unreal inductive principles, this boundary cannot itself be something real.

But I just said this: the better approach is to simply talk about what's present in an individual's mind on a particular occasion of an utterance. — Terrapin Station

I agree with this, what is present in the individual's mind is the proper context of the utterance. We tend to want to place the utterance in a context of the speaker's environment. So when the speaker says "the cup is on the table", we look to the immediate environment for the meaning, a cup on a table. But this is demonstrably inadequate, as the speaker is often talking about a distant place or time. And, when it comes to abstract conceptualization, it is often necessary to ignore the environment completely, and focus directly on the mind of the individual who is speaking, giving the words the proper context within that individual's mind, in order to grasp the conceptualization.

No; you are ignoring the distinction between "real" and "actual," and instead treating them as synonyms. Realism regarding universals/generals is the view that the real is a broader category than the actual, such that possibilities and regularities (for example) are just as real as actualities. You are simply asserting nominalism - the opposing view that the real and the actual are one and the same. You cannot refute realism by simply insisting on a nominalist definition of "real." — aletheist

I was just following the accepted definition of "real", which defines real as actual. I find there is a problem with your suggestion, that possibilities are real, because then all logical possibilities are equally realities. Unless we allow for some way to distinguish real possibilities from unreal possibilities, then we have all sorts of counterfactuals, possible worlds, multiverses, and many worlds, as realities, simply because they are logically possible. If we attempt to separate real possibilities from unreal possibilities, we do so by grounding them in what is actual. But if a real possibility is one that is grounded in an actuality, then why not just adhere to the proper definition of real, and maintain that what is real here is the actuality, and that the so-called "real" possibility is somehow related to the actuality. Then we have different types of possibilities, depending on the way that they are related to (or lack of relation to) what is real, actual.

There exists some x such that Ralph believes y(y is a spy) of x. — mosesquine

This is a faulty formalization, because it doesn't properly represent what is expressed by "Ralph believes there is a spy". What is expressed is Ralph believes that there is some x, such that y (is a spy) is a property of x.

Notice the difference. In your representation the object x, which is believed to have the property y, is assumed to exist. In my representation, the object x, which is assumed to have the property y, is believed to exist.

Hi. Respectfully, does this not bring us back to the ambiguity of "exist"? Does there exist a fixed, context and practice independent meaning for the word "exist"? Does the straight line exist anymore than this central point except as a sort of less complex idealization? — R-13

Our subject is reality, what is real, and this is somewhat different from "exists", because "real" implies a genuine, or actual existence. So even if we allow that ideals or "idealizations" have some sort of existence, what we are trying to determine is their place relative to an assumed genuine, or actual existence, reality.

Again, if "thing" refers only to an actual individual, then that statement is true; but if "thing" can also refer to a continuum, then it is false - there is such a "thing" as a potential (not actual) aggregate of possible (not actual) points that are in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point. This is a real relation, not an existing object. — aletheist

To say that a possible, or potential thing (non-actual thing) is real, is self-contradictory. "Real", by definition refers to the actual thing, as indicating its difference from the possible, or non-actual thing..

My point is there is no way to account for why our models are useful if those models are not of something real. — m-theory

You've made this or similar assertions numerous times and all that it demonstrates is that you do not understand what "useful" means. That is why my posts get so long winded, because I have to say it in so many different ways, trying to get through to you what usefulness is. If you don't read it, then how are you going to understand what is present to my mind, when you use the word "useful".

Do you agree that "useful" is used to refer to something which can bring about desired results, goals or ends? Tools are useful because they can bring about a state which is desired. So the useful thing earns its title "useful" in relation to this desired goal, this end, which is an "ideal". Therefore a model is deemed "useful" according to its relationship to an ideal.

Unless we can establish as a fact, that ideals are what is real, or at least some sort of relationship between ideals and reality, there is no basis for your claim that models must be "of something real", if they are useful.

The irrational nature of pi simply means that we cannot precisely measure the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter; it has no bearing on whether that ratio is real. — aletheist

What the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that a circle cannot have both a circumference and a diameter, in any absolute, or "ideal" sense. These two are incompatible, the diameter and the circumference, as the ratio between them cannot be resolved, in any absolute sense. This has nothing to do with our capacity to measure, it is this way by definition. Since the line of the diameter is what indicates the position of the centre of the circle, it is therefore impossible that a circle has both a centre and a circumference.

This is because the point, which is assumed to indicate the centre of the circle, as non-dimensional, is inherently incompatible with the line, which is dimensional. Even an infinite number of non-dimensional points could not produce a dimensional line, we must assume something in between the non-dimensional points, line segments. Non-dimensional points, and line segments are incompatible. In the case of the straight line, the segments between the points are one dimensional. In the case of the curved line of the circumference, the segments are two dimensional. So in a similar way to the way that the point is incompatible with the line, one being non-dimensional and the other being dimensional, the straight line is incompatible with the curved line, one being of a single dimension and the other of two dimensions. So the circumference is incompatible with the diameter, one is two dimensional, the other is one dimensional.

It is very real that our models are useful.

Or are you suggesting that this is only imagined as well? — m-theory

I'm not suggesting something else, I agree that models are useful. But "useful" implies purpose. So if it is real that models are useful, then purpose is just as real.

The models that assume nature are consistent are useful because...nature does indeed appear to be consistent. — m-theory

Ok, but now consistency is something different than usefulness. And I would agree that observed consistency is useful, but I don't think we should jump the gun, and conclude that since some things in nature are consistent, and useful, therefore nature is consistent.

Maybe you will consider the following. Consistency is useful. Human beings (as well as other living things) desire to fulfill ends, i.e. they seek to satisfy their wants and needs. Therefore human beings will focus their attention on the consistent aspects of reality, because this is useful for fulfilling their wants and needs. But it would be a fallacy to conclude that all of nature is necessarily consistent.

I thought I had done this.
Why is producing reliable results not an end? — m-theory

Reliable results are meaningless unless those reliable results can be used for further ends. That is why reliable results are just the means to ends. To produce reliable results is not an end in itself. Suppose I could accurately predict winning lottery numbers. Unless someone is to act on these "reliable results", this would be nothing more than an interesting party trick. It is what the reliable results are used for , which is important here. And. it all depends on what is wanted, what is the end, that dictates the type of reliable results which we seek. Depending on what we are doing, we might want reliable results in weather predictions, stock market predictions, whatever.

So this generality "reliable results" cannot be an end itself, because it is always used for something further. Furthermore, this "something further", which is desired, dictates where we will be seeking reliable results. So for instance, what is wanted, dictates whether we will be seeking reliable results with respect to the weather tomorrow, the strength of the concrete poured in the bridge, the size of the furnace installed in the house, etc.. Reliable results is dependent on what is wanted.

Getting back to the question posed by the thread title, it depends on what we mean by "thing" and "real." If "thing" refers only to an individual and "real" is equivalent to "actual," then that statement is true and no one (except maybe a Platonist) regards universals as "real things." However, if "thing" can also refer to a continuum - a quality or regularity - and "real" encompasses whatever has its characters regardless of whether anyone ever thinks so, then that statement is false. — aletheist

Well, M-theory seems to base reality on usefulness, and this means successful at achieving an end. I don't have a strong objection against this basic point, but it is where we proceed from here which is critical. If anything which is successful at achieving ends is reality, then we have fictions and other nonsense as reality. So I think that it is only when a model is useful toward a particular type of goal, or end, that we can establish a relationship between the model and reality. This leaves the question of what type of end is best related to reality.

In this sense, any potential aggregate of possible points that are all in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point is a real circle. — aletheist

But what the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that there is no such thing as the aggregate of possible points equidistant from a single point. That single point which is supposed to be the centre of the circle, with equal lines to the circumference, is non-existent, just like the point where a tangent is supposed to meet the arc of a circle, is non-existent as well. Simply put, the curved line is incompatible with the straight line..

That is not the point that you believe them separate things.
The point is how should they be useful at all if they do not relate to reality? — m-theory

No, the point is that you are drawing the conclusion that if they are useful, then they are "of reality". So the onus is on you, to justify this claim, by supplying an acceptable principle which would necessitate this conclusion. I've already given you the reason why I do not accept that conclusion. I see that in cases of lying and deception, it's very clear that models which are not "of reality" are indeed useful. And, as I tried to explain to you, in cases of simple misunderstanding, models which are not of reality, are still very useful.

There is a principle of efficiency here. One can be using a model, which gets the job done, until another person comes along with a completely different model that is much more efficient at getting the job done. Two completely different models and they are both useful, but one is much more useful than the other, because it is more efficient. Perhaps the more efficient one covers a wider scope, has less exceptions to the rule, or just makes the mathematics easier. The more efficient model might be useful to achieve many more different ends, replacing many different models, or it might just achieve the one end with much less effort. We cannot say that "being useful" is the principle of judgement for the reality of the model, because even the inefficient model was useful. We need to give "usefulness" some parameters, which can relate it to reality. Useful in which way, for what?

This is why we need to define the ends, what are we trying to achieve with the model, in order that we can properly judge its usefulness. If the goal is to deceive, then clearly being useful does not indicate that the model is "of reality". If the goal is to get more funding, then we have to consider the possibility of deception, because we know that the prospects of money may influence some to deceive.

To me it seems you are appealing to some teleology here.
How can you be sure that in order for something to be real it must rely upon teleology? — m-theory

If your means for judging a model in relation to reality is "usefulness" then it is you who is implying teleology. Usefulness necessarily implies purpose, and you have designated this as your principle for judging the reality of the model. So your "reality" is necessarily tied to the purpose for which the model is judged, according to usefulness toward that purpose. Your reality is therefore teleological.

So, doesn't this fact, that being simple, and leaving out many details, makes the model more reliable,and more useful, indicate to you that being useful, and being a representation of reality are two distinct things, not necessarily associated with one another?

If our models were not of something real then it seems to me that they should not produce useful results. — m-theory

The truth of that statement depends on what you mean by "real", and what qualifies as a "model". I haven't seen any indication from you as to why you believe that a useful model is necessarily "of something real". Perhaps we could say that the useful model is something real, but why must it be "of something real"? We can create a very useful number system, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., and set the rules of this model such that 4 is 1 more than 3, and 5 is 1 more than 4, etc.. Does this qualify as a model? If so, how does it represent something real? Is it that 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., are symbols which represent ideas, and the ideas are real? or is the whole system itself something real?

How about the concept of a circle, does this qualify as a model? How is this concept "of something real"? There is no such thing as a real circle, and this is evident from the fact that pi is an irrational ratio. A circle cannot have an exact centre. Despite this fact, that there is no such thing as a real circle, the concept remains very useful.

We could go on with many examples, and it is quite evident that there is a disjoint, a separation between what the model says, or indicates, and what actually exists in reality. I say it's two kilometres from here to the store, but it's really about 2.1. We say there's 365 and a quarter days in a year, but it's really closer to 365.24. You see, it's not necessary that the model is "of something real" in order that it is useful. So you might insist, that it's not necessary for the number, 365 and a quarter, to be exact, but it's necessary that the sun and the earth are real things. But that's not the case either. "Sun", and "earth" refer to our apprehensions, so again what is signified by these words here is something conceptual. If our concept of what the sun and the earth are, is not absolutely correct, how can we say that these words refer to something real?

Do you not think that we would be better of to say that the model is something real? Then we don't have to worry whether or not the model represents something real, because that requires a stretch of the imagination anyway. If the model is useful, then it is something real, and what exactly it is useful for is a completely different issue.

Truth! .. its the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of truth as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of truth is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which truth is the halo

Our minds reproduce what occurs in nature and not that nature arranges itself to conform with what occurs in our minds. — m-theory

I didn't say that "nature arranges itself to conform with what occurs in our minds". What I meant is that we individuate, separate, distinguish, and differentiate things in ways which make sense to our minds. So we arrange nature in a way which conforms with what occurs in our minds. That makes sense doesn't it? We arrange and classify natural things in ways which make sense to us.

Also this does not really answer my question.
How do you know that these things do not occur in nature.
That you have a mind is not proof that these things do not occur without minds. — m-theory

I don't see the meaning of your question. I am talking about what minds do, individuate, separate, differentiate, etc.. Why would I even consider that such a thing might happen without a mind? What would that even mean? I know that minds do this, so if I want to understand what this means, to individuate, separate, distinguish, etc., I should look at how minds do this. Until I get a good understanding of how minds do this, and exactly what minds are doing when they do this, how would I even know what to look for if I wanted to determine whether something other than a mind can do this?

We must know the ends that justify the means or we can not be sure the means are real. — m-theory

Yes, this exactly the point, you are putting forth means (to navigate reality) without any ends to justify these means. To navigate is to follow a course, but unless the course is plotted (the end is determined), there is nothing to navigate.

That is not what I asked, I asked why should they be useful at all if they are not models of something real? — m-theory

The models are useful because they help to achieve some end, that's what being useful is. Whether or not they are "of something real" is irrelevant to whether or not they are useful. To make this conclusion, which you want to make, you would have to demonstrate how being useful is related to being real. I don't see this relationship, because one can make up fictions and deceptions which are useful for achieving some ends, but this usefulness does not make the deceptions real.

Maybe it doesn't answer the question of where we are going, but it does seem odd, to me at least, that we should regard reality as a thing unknown and then marvel at the miracle that our arbitrary quantification of reality should meet with any results. — m-theory

What I've been trying to demonstrate, is that these moves, as any other human actions, and the actions of other living beings, are not completely arbitrary. They are directed toward certain ends, goals, things which these living creatures want. So human choices are not completely arbitrary, they are directed by what the human being wants.

The problem is that you want to bring "quantification of reality" into this. But our wants, desires, ends, or goods, are judged as qualities. So there appears to be an inherent incompatibility here. We proceed in these acts of individuation, separating, and differentiating, according to our judgements of quality, what is good and useful. As far as I can tell, that is reality. On what basis then, do you say that quantification is a "quantification of reality"? I don't see the relationship between quantification, and reality, which you apparently see.

Or it could be that our quantification are not arbitrary they are tuned to obtain real results in a real world. — m-theory

So I agree, the quantifications are not arbitrary, they are "tuned", as you say, but tuned to produce satisfaction. What is left is to determine the relationship between the satisfaction which they produce, and reality. As noted above, fictions and deceptions are not reality. And, as we know from the nature of different pleasures, satisfaction can be deceptive.

And my point is how do you know that it takes a mind and that it does not occur in nature without minds? — m-theory

Because these are things which are done by minds, and all of our examples of them, are done by minds. If it happens in nature, then this is something other than what we are talking about, because we are talking about the instances which are done by minds. Why would we assume that the thing which minds do, happens in nature without a mind? We see that minds do very special things, creating products, manufacturing, and all sorts of artificial things. Why would we think that what a mind does would happen naturally without any minds?

What do you mean by justifiable end? — m-theory

An end is a goal, so to be justifiable means that the end is demonstrably good.

Further this does not answer the question of why, if it is as you say one arbitrary abstraction is as good as the next, is it that our models prove so useful? — m-theory

I don't think I said that one abstraction is "as good as the next". What I mean is that "as good as" is determined in relation to a particular end, a goal. So one abstraction may not be as good as another with respect to one particular end, but with respect to another end, it might be better. Usefulness is determined with respect to the end.

So whether or not our models are useful is not at all an issue. Of course they are useful, or else we would not produce them, we only produce them for a particular purpose, and if a model did not fulfil that purpose it would be thrown away, and we'd choose another instead. The issue is "what is that purpose".

To "navigate reality" does not answer that question at all, because this only constitutes a coherent purpose in relation to a further purpose, which tells us where we want to go in our navigation. Navigating is meaningless nonsense unless there is some place where you are going, because "navigating" refers to the means (how to get there) rather than the end (where you are going).

How is it that minds cause things to exist as they do, why should there not be 6 when we count at one time, and 8 when we count the next? — m-theory

The point is that it takes a mind to distinguish one time from another time. So perhaps things "exist as they do", but it takes a mind to distinguish this time from that time, in order to say what exists at this time, and what exists at that time.

If there is no consistency in reality, as this is what you seem to be claiming? — m-theory

I'm not claiming that there is no consistency in reality, the opposite actually. When there is consistency, as there is, what, other than a mind, separates out parts of that consistent reality to individuate separate entities?

Except it is not arbitrary, it is necessary to navigate reality. — m-theory

That's exactly the point, such individuations, distinctions, separations, are necessary for the mind to navigate reality, so the mind creates them. But the mind produces them in a way which is conducive to its own ends. That is the type of necessity we are referring to here. So to say that reality is necessarily individuated in any particular way (in the sense of some logical necessity), would be equivocation, because what we are referring to here is "necessary" in the sense of "needed" for a particular purpose (and that purpose is "to navigate").

The arbitrariness of the choice is only negated by demonstrating the reality of the end, and the end is what determines the direction. With respect to "navigating reality" then, what is "necessary" depends on which way one wants to go. And without demonstration as to why one way is better than another, the choice as to which way to go, is arbitrary. So all these distinctions, individuations, differentiations, are all arbitrary unless there is a particular end which is justified, and these determinations are demonstrated as necessary for that end. To "navigate reality" is not a justifiable end, because it fails to give us any direction, which is what an end is supposed to do, and it leaves "what is necessary" as completely arbitrary.

The fact that an animal gives birth to a litter of 7 is not in itself an abstraction. It is an event. It is only when someone comes along and says 'aha, seven pups' that it becomes an abstraction. — Wayfarer

That's correct, and the dog may give birth to numerous litters, so to single out one litter and say she gave birth to seven pups, is something which requires a mind to perform that abstraction.

7 is a real quantity without minds.
Understanding that there is 7 of something requires minds sure, but that there can be 7 things requires no minds. — m-theory

The point being made is that a mind must separate these seven things from the rest of reality, such that there actually is just seven things. You want to say that without a mind, there is those seven things, and that's fine, but there is all the rest of real things as well, and what, other than a mind, separates those seven things from all the rest? So perhaps all the things which exist, exist without a mind, but there are no numbers of things, because they exist as "all the things" and it require a mind to separate out groups, as Wayfarer says, of "like" things. Contrary to what you say then, "that there can be seven things", does require a mind, to individuate those things, and group them as like.

I believe that this principle is more easily understood if you think of reality in terms of events. We may talk about one particular event, such as me writing this "word". But really that particular event is just a part of a larger event which is me writing all these words. And this is part of a large event, my life, which is part of a larger event. We experience all the passing of time as one continuum, and there are no real breaks within the passing of time which allow me to validate writing that word, as a separate event from writing this entire passage, except as an arbitrary choice. This separation of a period of time, to create "an event", is a totally arbitrary division carried out by a mind.

So any time that we individuate an individual object in existence, we arbitrarily separate out a period of time which is proper to that object, allowing for its existence. This is completely arbitrary, and carried out by minds, in order to assume the existence of individual objects. Within a certain arbitrary time period, I am an object with existence. Within a larger period of time, I am just a small part of the existence of a larger object, the human race. Within a larger period of time human beings are part of a larger object, life on earth. Within a larger period of time, the earth is just a part of something else. The point now, is that to validate the existence of individual objects, and therefore "a number of objects", it is necessary to assume a particular time period, and this is an arbitrary thing carried out by minds only.

Ha, where do you get the infinite regress from? You seem to have forgotten that I started my description by referring to intention, and intention produces ends.

You're the one with a problem of infinite regress. You want to start with the assumption of a whole which imposes restrictions on the parts, but your whole is not a valid whole, as I've demonstrated. So now you face infinite regress. The army is just a part of a particular society, which is a part of humanity in general, which is a part of life on earth, which is a part of the universe, which is a part of a multiverse. Any whole you assume is actually just a part of something larger, until you lose yourself into the vagueness of infinity. And infinity cannot be a whole.

I start with the part, the individual human being, and see that there is a desire within that human being, intent, to be a part of a whole. The physical whole only comes into existence upon fulfilment of the intent of the part. But the non-physical whole, in the form of the design, necessarily pre-exists any physical whole. And, it must pre-exist all the parts as well, in order that when the parts come into existence, that non-physical whole has imparted to them, the intent, which is the necessary condition for producing the physical whole.

The laws of nature are what order it toward that end. God is one explanation of those laws, but obviously not the only one. The final cause would still be there, even if it turned out that there is no God; belief in final causes does not entail theism. Final causation has to do with regularities in the universe, not just the intentions of intelligent agents. — aletheist

Those who understand it as God ordering it to an end see it as final cause. Those who see it as the laws of nature, see it as efficient cause. There is no end to the laws of nature, efficient causation continues onward indefinitely. The hand strikes the match, the fire lights the cigarette, the man smokes the cigarette. The man dies from cancer. The body rots into the ground. None of these are ends.

No, the match is ordered towards the end of fire by its chemical composition and the phenomenon of friction. — aletheist

But fire is no longer "the end". When you remove the intention you no longer have an end. The fire of the match lights something else, and so on. Sure you can say that the match is ordered toward the "end" of fire, but you are just imposing that judgement. It is not a description of what is really happening unless you allow that there is intention ordering the chemicals to an end. It is intention which produces the chemical composition, and intention lights the match. With that intention we have final cause. There is nothing about the chemical composition of the match which gives it an inherent "end" of fire, it could just as well get rained on and rot into the ground. "End" refers to the intended purpose.

If the same chemicals happened to come together to produce a match stick, without being produced by human intention, this would just be a case of efficient causation. There would be no final cause unless we said God did it. And if a match happens to catch fire by something other than being struck by a hand, this is just efficient causation in action. There is no final cause unless we say God did it. Final cause directs specific efficient causes toward ends. But without intention there is no such "directing", and no final cause.

Other people ... it seems to be quite difficult for you.

I would, and so would others. Per Wikipedia, citing Edward Feser's book on Aquinas: "Finality thus understood is not purpose but that end towards which a thing is ordered. When a match is rubbed against the side of a matchbox, the effect is not the appearance of an elephant or the sounding of a drum, but fire. The effect is not arbitrary because the match is ordered towards the end of fire which is realized through efficient causes." — aletheist

But the Thomistic tradition, which is what Feser refers to, assigns this final cause to the Will of God. When something like the ball on the hill is ordered towards an end, it is God who is doing this ordering. There is no such thing as "the ball being ordered to the bottom of the hill", except by the Will of God. If we remove the Will of God here, as you desire, there is no more final cause here. The claim of final cause is supported by the assumed Will of God.

In the case of the match, it is an artificial thing, created by human beings, so we can say that "the match is ordered towards the end of fire", by the will of the human being who struck the match. And the will of the human being who produced the match ensured that this would be the case. Again, without the will of the human being here, there is no final cause here.

You are confusing what was a simple point.

Under hierarchy theory, the whole is more than the sum of its parts because it has the power to make the parts less than what they were. The whole contrains the parts with a common purpose and this limits the freedoms they may have "enjoyed".

If you believe this is not how armies are, then you must have no clue about military life. Why do you think boot camps were invented? To aid recruits in discovering their truest selves? ;) — apokrisis

You have not demonstrated how the whole has the power to do anything. As I pointed out, it is the parts which are active, and being active they are the ones with the power. You have not demonstrated how "the army" has the power to do anything, other than by the power of the individuals. Do you think it is "the army", rather than the individual commanders who have the power over the recruits?

So even a particular form is "all essence".

...

So all form is tolerant of accidents to some degree. And particularity arises from generality by narrowing the definition of the accidental - making it also more particular. Or crisper. — apokrisis

I don't see how this can work, because the essence of the particular is that it is a material object, while the essence of a universal is that it is an abstract generality. You seem to want to remove the matter from the particular, making it purely form, or essence, but this actually denies the true essence of the particular, which is the matter. So even when we allow that a particular has a distinct form, we remove that form from the particular in abstraction, so we do not have the true particular form. That particular form is proper to the object itself, and cannot be abstracted to exist within the mind. This takes it away from the matter which is essential to it. If the desire is to allow that this form is somehow distinct from the matter, we must do this by other principles.

Yet it contradicts dialectical reasoning to not accept that there must be the unintelligible for there to be the intelligible. It can make no sense to claim the one except in the grounding presence of its other. So as soon as you commit to crisp intelligibility, you are committed to its dichotomous other - vague unintelligibility - as a necessity. — apokrisis

I don't see the basis for this claim. You are simply asserting that all things have a dichotomous other or else that thing is unintelligible. But the essence of the particular is that it is other, but not in the sense of a dichotomous other, as opposition, because it is still in some sense the same as the things which it differs from. And this is why its form may partake in universals, by being the same (in some sense) as the things which it is other from. So I think your claim that the only type of "other" which is intelligible is a dichotomous "other", is unjustified, because difference as a type of "other" which is not a dichotomous "other" is in fact intelligible.

So the principle of dialectical reasoning which you assert here will render the particular as unintelligible, and this is contrary to the philosophical mindset. We want all things to be considered intelligible, thereby denying the possibility of the unintelligible. Therefore all things are the same, in the sense that they may be classed as intelligible, but the difference between them, which makes them other, is not itself unintelligible, because as each one is different, they are by this designation of "different" all the same. So the same principle which makes every particular thing intelligible as a particular, also makes the difference between them intelligible, such that there is no such thing as the unintelligible.

But you need vagueness to make its inverse an intelligible possibility. The difficulty is then to represent this in some fundamental metaphysical framework. — apokrisis

That's not the case though. We do not need unintelligibility or vagueness to make intelligibility possible. Vagueness itself is intelligible. "Difference", which is essential to, and inherent within the material particular, and constituting the vagueness of matter, is itself intelligible. It is intelligible because it is itself a sameness. And since it is the most universal of all properties, the inherent difference, which is proper to all material particulars, it is actually the most highly intelligible. So the very thing which appears to us as other than intelligible (therefore unintelligible), because it is the basis for difference rather than the intelligible similarities which produce universals, is really the most intelligible because it is the most universal similarity. This is matter itself, it gives us the appearance of vagueness and unintelligibility, but it is really the most highly intelligible of all because it is consistently the same, as different.

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Non-living things, such as a ball at the top of an incline, do not have intentions or act with purpose; yet they have final causes, such as coming to rest at the bottom of the incline. — aletheist

I would not say that a ball which roles down a hill is caused to do this by a final cause. The religious way of thinking might assign this activity to the Will of God, but I would not, I would deny that there is any final cause here. The ball does not move down the hill because it wants to get to the bottom, it does so because of gravity. And if it did act from final cause, the bottom of the hill would not be "the end", because gravity "wants" the ball to move to the centre of the earth. But the ball is impeded from this end by other things which make up the composition of the earth itself. So if we look at gravity from the perspective of final cause, gravity wants many things to be in the same place at the same time, but this is impossible. Unless we can see some purpose to this, it doesn't really make sense to say that gravity "wants" this, so it doesn't make sense to say that this is a final cause. But that's why Aristotle identified different types of causation, it is probably more appropriate to speak of gravity in the sense of material cause.

But the army is what has the idea of what it needs the individuals to be. — apokrisis

I don't buy that. Individual human beings have ideas. I don't see the basis for your assumption that the army has an idea. There may be seasoned veterans, commanders, who hold the idea of subordination, and impress these ideas upon the rank and file, but I think it is a mistake to say that "the army" has the idea.

But the intention comes from the whole and it's common goal, as you just agreed. So the most you can argue for is a lack of effective resistance - some other goal in play. Materials only need to be pliable. — apokrisis

The point though, is that intention is the property of the individuals, it does not come "from the whole", it comes from the individual parts. And in your example of the army, the entire existence of the whole, the army, is dependent on the intentions of the individuals. The army only exists through the intentions of the individuals. The whole only exists because the parts will it into existence. So if you want to argue that this act of the parts willing into existence the whole, is really an act of the whole exercising constraint over the individuals, you need to describe how the whole may influence the will of the individual. And, since the individuals must act willingly to bring the army into existence, the whole (being the army) must act on the wills of the individuals before that whole even comes into existence. At this time, the whole (the army) exists only as an idea within the minds of the individuals, and yet it still must have the capacity to act on the wills of the individuals in order that the individuals move to bring the actual army into existence.

If you require every final cause to be identical to some intention in some mind, then I agree that this is the only approach that works; but since it effectively presupposes theism, obviously non-theists will reject it out of hand. — aletheist

But I don't require that intention be related to some mind, I told you this earlier, so I'm in more of a position similar to your beliefs. I associate intention with purpose though, as it is associated by common definition, and I see no reason why purpose requires a conscious mind. That was your claim, that you could not conceive of intention without a conscious mind, but I don't see the need for a conscious mind. I think that this restriction is brought about by habitual usage.

We so often hear, and use "intention" to refer to the conscious decision making of human beings, that this is the most common sense of the word. Since it's seldom used now, we've forgotten about the more general sense of the word, which allows that anything with purpose is intentional. So if we compare human beings with other creatures, we get a very vague boundary between self-conscious, conscious, and non-conscious living creatures, but purpose and intention crosses all these boundaries, such that they all act with purpose (final cause, intention). And, we can see that within the human being, intention crosses the boundary between conscious decision making, and subconscious acts. We are sufficiently habituated in our ways of acting, we just respond to the situations which we find ourselves in, without making conscious decisions, the acts are initiated by habit, but these acts are still intentional.

Intention is defined by purpose, and I see that living things in general, act with purpose. Purpose (intention, final cause) is inherent within living things, it is essential to life, and we don't need to assume that these things have a conscious mind to understand that, only that living beings act with purpose, intention. Conscious decision making is a highly developed form of intention.

Quantum states are fundamental to QM. The Schrodinger equation describes how the quantum state of a quantum system changes with time. — Andrew M

We're going around in circles. These quantum states are inherently probabilistic. That's the issue here, you want to say that they are not, but it's inherent to the way that states are assigned to the active energy of an active system, due to uncertainty, that these states are probabilistic. That is why they are epistemological rather than ontological, the epistemology has not overcome uncertainty to enable such an active system to be represented as states.

Take a human level example of an army. For an army to make itself constructible, it must take large numbers of young men and simplify their natures accordingly. It must turn people with many degrees of freedom (any variety of personal social histories) into simpler and more uniform components. — apokrisis

Let me reflect on this example for a moment. The army's capacity to "turn people" into "uniform components" is dependent on the willingness of the individual to be turned this way. So it is highly debatable as to whether this "turning" is a function of the army as the whole, or a function of the individual, as a part. In other words, I would argue that this whole in your example, is really a product of the willingness of the individuals to turn toward a common goal.

So wholes are more than just the sum of their parts ... in that wholes shape those parts to serve their higher order purposes. Wholes aren't accidental in nature. They produce their own raw materials by simplifying the messy world to a collection of parts with no choice but to construct the whole in question. — apokrisis

Following your example then, if it is true that wholes actually "shape those parts to serve higher order purposes" they must do this through the intention of the part. The part must willingly serve the higher order purpose. So if it is actually the whole which shapes the parts to serve the purpose of the whole, as per your example, then the whole must be shaping the intention of the part.

But we do not normally assume intention, or purpose, as final cause in cases where no human is involved. Again, a seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline has a final cause, regardless of whether any intelligent agent (i.e., God) wills it to be so. — aletheist

I think there is a problem with this statement. Some people would see final cause in these instances that you mention, and most of those people would be religious people, and attribute this intention to the Will of God. Also, many science minded people would not see any instance of final cause here. Physicalists for example claim that all instances of causation are reducible to efficient causation. This is the basis for determinism. So they don't see final cause here at all. If some people, such as yourself, attribute final cause to these instances, yet they do not believe that this final cause is the Will of God, then I think they are of the minority, and I would not agree that this is what we "normally assume".

Which has nothing to do with the claim you made. Your claim was about the conditions required for comprehensibility. — Terrapin Station

So you think that you can use a word to mean whatever you want it to mean, and this would be comprehensible? I think not, it is the continuity of similar usage from one person to the next which produces comprehensibility.

We are not discussing "the source of telos in natural things," we are discussing what that telos is itself. While I am a theist, it seems problematic to me to require the existence/reality of God in order for natural things to have final causes. It also seems highly dubious that Aristotle himself would have endorsed such a view. — aletheist

I don't think it is necessary to assume God, and I agree that Aristotle probably didn't think this way either. What we do is assume intention, or purpose, as final cause, without claiming to know the source of that intention. Intention as a cause is supported by evidence. All we are doing is making an account of the evidence, a description of how intention causes the production and manufacture of things. However, even in human beings who act with conscious intention, and provide us with much evidence of intention as cause, the source of intention is unknown. And this is of concern to some people.

So we can conclude from the evidence of human beings that intention is a cause, this is the cause of artifacts, artificial things. Then we can proceed to acknowledge this type of causation in other things as well. This does not require that we assume the existence of God, it is just a matter of concluding that intention is a cause, and looking for that cause in various places. However, in theology they want to go beyond this, to account for the existence of intention in general, as it appears to be a very unusual (unnatural) form of causation.

This is a Philosophy Forum, not a theology forum. You are effectively conceding that there are no final causes apart from willing agents, which - as I understand it - was not Aristotle's own position. — aletheist

No I'm not conceding that, this is the theological argument which introduces God as the source of telos in natural things. Aristotle did not seek the source of telos, he just affirmed that it was there. So there is no inconsistency between Aristotle saying that the seed develops with intention, but not determining the source of that intention, and the theologian claiming the source of that intention as God.

That's a claim for which you're supplying neither any empirical evidence nor any argumentation. — Terrapin Station

I told you, the continuity of usage is within theological principles, try reading Aquinas' fifth way. Furthermore, that continuity of usage continues in modern day philosophy as is evident from the definitions you provide which define "final cause" with "goal", "end", "telos", and "purpose".

It appears we have two choice of interpretation:

1) My interpretation, supported by thousands of years of tradition in theological principles, as well as the definitions provided by you. This interpretation allows for an immaterial final cause (intention), which despite being immaterial, is nevertheless something real

2) Your interpretation, supported by you and alethist. This interpretation allows that something with absolutely no existence, is a final cause.

The choice is clear, unless you can show me something that I am missing.

A seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline does not have any intentions, yet each has a final cause - the full-grown plant and coming to rest at the bottom of the incline, respectively. — aletheist

In theology, the intention (Will) of God is assigned to such cases of final cause. And the intention of God is not necessarily within the object which acts with final cause. As an example, I explained that the components within my computer act with purpose, toward an end, which is the operation of my computer. The intention involved here is proper to the human beings which made the computer, the intention is not considered to be within the computer itself, though the parts act with purpose (final cause).