Hi Tiff, as much as I am not one to make hasty judgements about another person's character, especially someone whom I have no personal relationship with, many other people are not nearly so constrained in this way. The point I was making to Hanover, is that what I've seen in relation to the dislike for President Trump, is that it is generally speaking, a dislike for the person, rather than a dislike of the person's ideology. What Hanover has indicated since he's tried to make a comparison with President Obama, is a dislike of the person's ideology. Do you agree with my assessment of this difference?

So I thought I'd indicate to Hanover, that if we are to engage in such a comparison, we should compare apples to apples, instead of apples to oranges. And if we are starting with a dislike for President Trump, this clearly seems to be more of a dislike for the person rather than a dislike of the ideology. Then if we move to look at the dislike for President Obama, in comparison, we should look at the dislike of the person rather than the dislike of the ideology.

I am still not confident about such authenticity even when the composer attempts to please oneself as I find that we ultimately possess a social language that influences our aesthetic values. If we never had contact with any other human being since birth, would we still experience music? I don't think so; it will always be epistemological. — TimeLine

I tend to disagree with this. I believe the ability to experience music is innate, coming from deep within. Birds sing to each other. Animals in a barn are receptive to music playing. And I think that this is why a mother singing to a baby can produce such a powerful experience. There is a language here which goes much deeper than any socially acquired language.

This is why I feel musical experience can never be authentic but rather the emotional sensations music has merely ignite our imagination and enables us access to our own subjectivity; that window or access itself is authentic and not the music. — TimeLine

But what is that window, other than an innate, and authentic capacity to experience music? The capacity, the window, exists, and it is directed specifically at music, such that we can distinguish music from other noises, even as a baby. Doesn't this imply that music itself is authentic? The capacity is not directed at one of the other infinite possibilities of things to hear, it is directed at music. We are born with the capacity to experience music.

I will however, offer you a proposal for compromise. Perhaps, it is because music is an artificial sound, that it stands out to us, we recognize music because it is an artificial sound, and this allows us to experience it. So the capacity to experience music is not necessarily a capacity which is directed specifically at music, it is directed at artificial noises in general. But if we adopt this principle, then we may ask, what is it about artificial noises, which makes them stand out, such that we can recognize them as special. This will point us toward order, the temporal order of a sound. Now we go deeper than the tonal order, to the temporal order, and here we find a simpler but even more objective order, rhythm. So even if this capacity, the capacity to experience music, is based in the ability to recognize a sound as artificial, this capacity is based in something authentic, the capacity to recognize a temporal order.

However, and this I assume is where we disagree, I am of the opinion that our subconscious mind also attempts to communicate but not with language, but rather with emotion - what we call intuition - as the subconscious mind is still a form of consciousness. It is the non-linear processes [hence outside of space and time] embedded into a stable network, such as the architecture of a dream explaining experiences in an unintelligible story that paradoxically makes sense. We just cannot explain it since it is unintelligible, only, we can at conscious level appreciate the emotions that we 'sense'. It is representational. Semiotics is a way of explaining such symbolic inferential relations and that our 'quasi-mind' as Pierce denotes has levels or processes that ultimately reach reality [consciousness]. — TimeLine

I am not sure exactly what you are getting at with this description of subconscious communication. If we think of dreaming, the dream is not unintelligible, it is just the ordering of experiences in the dream that become mixed up. If we consider individual experiences within the dream, they are quite intelligible, but they get scrambled up in an unintelligible order, the experience is always being broken up and replaced by another. Thoughts are already, in a sense non-spatial, and now when you talk about "non-linear" I assume that you mean non-temporal. But notice that as soon as the temporal element is lost, then the thoughts become unintelligible. So temporal order is essential to intelligibility.

If we consider emotions now, it is the non-temporal aspect of emotions which make them unintelligible. Emotions give us the feeling of "now". I want this now, I am happy now, I am mad now, etc.. We overcome this unintelligibility by putting the emotions into a temporal context. I don't need that now, I can wait until it fits into my schedule. The reason I am happy now, or mad now, is that such and such just happened, or is about to happen, and this is why I feel these emotions now. So we put the feelings which are occurring now, emotions, into a temporal context, and this brings intelligibility to those emotions.

A tryptych of recognition is explained in Pierce' process of semiosis [representation, object, interpretation] and though inter-related is nevertheless modelled under the general assumption that they are distinct from one another. Working in parallel to accommodate the distinctions, once an interpretation has been reached it is enabled to interpret other objects and representations that continues to define and trigger other definitions and so on. We falter in this process only when we attribute incorrectly through habitus. This is why you would supress your feelings when you mistakenly think it is your mother's guitar. — TimeLine

I think there is more to faltering then making incorrect association due to habit. The true fault lies in the production of the association in the first place. The "feeling" which is associated with a particular sound is inadequate for properly remembering that sound. The feeling is a generality, and may be related to numerous similar sounds, yet the sound itself is particular. So when the feeling is reproduced, an indication is made to the conscious mind that the same sound has been heard, but this is not really the same sound. This is why the conscious mind must turn to other things, sight for example, and other memories, to determine in what sense it is the same sound, or just a similar sound. I believe we need to consider multiple levels of interpretation then, at the subconscious, and at the conscious level. It is through these multiple levels that we work to avoid mistakes.

Obama's ideology leans socialist, which is less individualistic, less self reliant, and less religious. He also is very uncomfortable with the idea of American exceptionalism, that America is superior to Western Europe by virtue of its Constitution and values and its duty to protect the world from all evil. The left is generally uncomfortable with patriotism, flag saluting, and overt celebrations of national pride.

That is the America the right feels was abandoned by Obama. Your questioning this might have to do with Obama's race was such a non sequitur that I just took it as a standard liberal ad hom diversion. — Hanover

What you refer to here, is Obama's ideology. And when we look at ideologies, what we find in general, is that the policies of the left are not liked by the right, and vise versa. So government carries on, and the two sides dislike each other's policies. The fact that we dislike the policies that the other side puts in place, does not generally produce the feeling within us, that these policies are a threat to the country.

In the case of Trump, it is not the person's policies which are seen as a threat, but the person's character, so it is the person himself which appears to be a threat to the country. Look at what AWAT says above, "Trump is a strong mix between both parties and that is what I think is so confusing." So it's not his rightist or leftist ideology which people feel threatened by, it is his lack of ideology, and personal character, moral integrity, which people dislike (and this is evident from the nature of the demonstrations against him) and therefore they feel he is a threat to the country.

So you need to distinguish between a person's ideology, and the person himself, and realize that what is seen in Trump as a threat to the country is the person himself. And if you want to make this comparison with Obama, which you have brought up, what is it about Obama, the person, which people dislike, and thought of as a threat to the country?

Cripes. So social constructionism is the work of the Devil. — apokrisis

I don't believe it is good to make generalized judgements like this, casting a blanket of good or bad over an entire 'ism. That appears to be your approach to reductionism. But many such 'isms are epistemological only, providing principles of guidance within particular epistemic categories. It is how these principles are related to what is outside the category, how we relate an epistemology to an ontology for example, which is where we should make such judgements of good and bad. So in the case of social constructionism, some might belief that social constructs are natural, and some might believe that they are artificial, and others might simply use some of the epistemological principles without making such a judgement..

I'm not calling the right racist. Quite the contrary actually, I'm trying to separate the right from the racists. So I'm asking, is it the right which felt their America was threatened by Obama as president, or was it the racists who felt this? I know some right leaning Americans, and some whom I know voted for Trump, and I don't recall that they ever claimed to have felt that their America was threatened by Obama. But they're not racist though. Those whom you say felt that Obama was a threat to their America, are they racist?

What puzzles me is why the left can't appreciate that the right felt just as strongly that Obama posed a threat to America as the left now feels Trump poses. — Hanover

Is it the right who felt this way, or is it the white supremacists who felt this way?

I think the words of comparison we use (better, more beautiful, most ugly, etc) betray an innate desire to quantify things. — TheMadFool

As much as I don't believe that, it still may be the case. But how would you back up that claim? How do you justify it? For instance, I like hockey better than football, so for me hockey is better than football. How does this indicate to you that I have an innate desire to quantify things? I have no desire to quantify these things, I simply prefer watching hockey over football.

We've found that quantification is a good way of judging things. The fact that we quantify many things indicates that we have a desire to judge things. So the logical premise should go this way, "if one has the desire to quantify, then one has the desire to judge, quantifying being a means for judging. You want to commit the logical fallacy called affirming the consequent. You want to say that since we have the desire to judge, therefore we have the desire to quantify

You have forgotten to consider how we compare one distinct quality to another. All of your examples are of how we take one quality, one category, and compare within that category. Now you need to consider how we compare apples to oranges, one category to another. This is what we do in morality, we compare distinct types of activities to see which is better. But as I said before, better is not quantifiable. So as much as it may be true that all quantifications are modes of comparing qualities, it is not true that all qualities may be compared through quantification.

I'm highly sympathetic to dualism, but I think everyone is flummoxed by the idea of how 'res cogitans' coud be a 'non-extended substance', because the very idea of 'non-extended substance' appears self-contradictory. (I think I know how to resolve that, but I am never able to explain it.) — Wayfarer

Actually when you come to fully grasp the concept of "substance", especially in light of modern physics, the very opposite becomes apparent. Spatial extension refers to the form of an object. Following Aristotelian logic, the existence of matter is assumed to substantiate the independent existence, the particularity, of such objects. In order that what we say about things may be true, and applicable to particular things, and our logical proceedings may be properly grounded, we assume matter, as substance. Matter is inherently distinct from form, and this is Aristotelian dualism. Therefore it is impossible that substance, as matter itself, has spatial extension because this would be to say that it has a form.

The problem which modern physics has, is how to come to grips with "non-extended substance". Non-extended substance has been assumed in the concept of "point particle", which derives from the way that gravity has been modeled, as centred on a point. This is inherent within the concept of mass. But non-extended substance may be given properties, such as charge, and spin, in a way that extended forms would have such properties. If the difference between extended and non-extended existence is not properly determined, through some form of dualist principles, and upheld in the principles of physics, mistakes are inevitable. The use of non-extended substance, in conceptual form, has run rampant through physics, with complete disregard for any need to distinguish between spatially extended and non-spatially extended existence, to the point that we now have things like virtual particles.

Exactly. I mean who needs a physics textbook to know about physics, or a neuroscience textbook to know about brains? Just make the damn shit up to suit yourself. — apokrisis

I've read a lot of books, but I do this to enrich my own mind, not because I think it will make me part of some fictitious "group-mind". The problem with your group-mind idea is that it makes the false assumption that society is some sort of whole, a unity, without determining the real principle "God" which validates this unity. So it is God which is the true unity, and the group-mind is just an unsuccessful attempt to conceptualize that unity without the necessary and essential aspect of that concept - God.

This is the sin of Lucifer, Satan, the fallen angel. Because of his great power, given to him by God, he believes that he is God. That is the sin of self-deception, and God has no recourse but to exile that angel. By saying that human beings create a group-mind, without attributing this unity to God, you assign to the human race the property of God, and commit the sin of the fallen angel.

If there are such philosophers as 'reductionist dualists', I would be interested to hear about them. — Wayfarer

I'm pretty sure I'm dualist, and apokrisis has repeatedly affirmed that I'm reductionist, so where does that leave me?

You meant conceptual activities really, didn't you? — apokrisis

No, I meant that hearing people speak, and reading books are acts of sensation. Don't you agree? And how the individual neurological system deals with these acts of sensation can be understood just like any other act of sensation. We can refer to those concepts of attention and habituation, which you like. Why should we refer to some concept of social constraints in order to understand these acts of sensation? The act of sensation is not being constrained by some aspect of society, it is just a matter of the individual focusing one's attention.

Or at least some of us read books and listen to people talk to gain access to the group-mind. It kind of defines the line between crackpot and scholar. — apokrisis

I don't read books, or speak to people to gain access to any "group-mind". Whatever that is, it sounds like a crack-pot idea to me.

I expect the majority of utilitarians might object to that claim. — Cabbage Farmer

I'm sure they might, but I would argue that this is an example of where the use of mathematics is harmful, when one thinks that mathematics is useful, but it is not. This person produces conclusions believed to be right, with the certitude associated with mathematics, which might actually be wrong.

I'll say, if one finds mathematics useful in his own moral thinking, let him use it; and likewise with every other field of endeavor. — Cabbage Farmer

Why would you say this? If you saw an individual applying logic to false premises, and proceeding to act on the conclusions, wouldn't you feel obliged to inform that person that the conclusions are false? And if that person was acting immorally because the mathematics told him to, do you think that this is ok? Maybe the mathematics told him that if he robbed a bank he would have more money and more money would allow him to buy more things, and having more things would allow him to me more generous. So he thought that robbing the bank would improve his moral character.

To say that moral thinking or moral phenomena can be "quantified" in this way, and that there may be some use for such quantitative approaches, is not to suggest that such practices could displace ordinary moral reasoning and intuitions, or should be required for responsible moral discourse. — Cabbage Farmer

The issue though, is what would be the case if moral issues cannot be quantified in this way. If they cannot, then the person who uses mathematics in this way will inevitably go wrong. But by assuming that mathematics can be used in this way, that person will be convinced by the mathematics, that he or she is right, and will proceed to act in the wrong way, claiming to be right. So before one proceeds to use mathematics this way, one ought to demonstrate that moral issues can be quantified in this way.

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But again this is reductionist to the extent that you're treating the subject - namely the human - in a biologistic way - explaining human nature in terms of systems, reactions, models, and so on. It's adequate on one level of description, but not on others. — Wayfarer

All modelling is reductionist ... even if it is a reduction to four causes holistic naturalism. And as I say, even the brain is a reductionist modeller, focused on eliminating the unnecessary detail from its "unified" view of the world. The brain operates on the same principle of less is more. — apokrisis

I don't understand the bad reputation which reductionism has received. If it's the way toward a good clear understanding, then where's the problem? I can see how a monist materialist reductionist would meet a dead end in the quest for understanding, at the Planck level where the material world becomes unintelligible, and this would appear as the limit to intelligibility, but a dualist reductionist would not meet the same problem. The dualist allows non-spatial substance.

To explain human behaviour, you then have to turn to the new level of semiosis which is linguistic and culturally evolving. So you can't look directly to biology for the constraints that make us "human" - the social ideas and purposes that shape individual psychologies. You do have to shift to an anthropological level of analysis to tell that story. — apokrisis

I don't see this need. We hear people talking, we read books. These are perceptual activities. Why can't we treat them like any other perceptual activity? Why do you feel the need to look to something else, like social ideas, cultural constraints, to understand what is just another perceptual activity? In reality this is just the individual interpreting what one hears and reads, just like we interpret any act of sensation. The only difference is that when we interpret these sensations, speaking and writing, we assign a special type of meaning to them because we recognize the context of having come from other minds.

For the Scholastics like Aquinas, metaphysics was basically some kind of sublime activity that brought one closer to God in virtue of studying creation and all that. Without God, the world exists, but there's no independent, transcendent reason to study it. It's not inherently valuable or intrinsically important, or perhaps more specifically, obviously valuable. — darthbarracuda

But for the Scholastics there is no such thing as "without God the world exists". For them, it was just a clear, undisputable fact, that God is the creator, just like for us it's a clear undisputable fact that the earth orbits the sun. To even doubt that God is the creator would be considered an unreasonable doubt. So from that perspective, studying the world brings one closer to an understanding of God. And if one wants to understand God, then studying the world is inherently valuable. If you remove God from the scenario, studying the world is still inherently valuable, due to the human being's philosophical nature. This is described by Socrates and Plato as the desire to know, the love of knowledge.

Without God, the world is not required to be perfectly rational or intelligible or even good. — darthbarracuda

But God has nothing to do with whether or not we should believe that the world is intelligible. The world does not conform itself to be suited to the capacities of the human intellect. The human intellect is a living, evolving thing. It must conform itself to the realities of the world. So when an aspect of the world appears to be unintelligible, we must devise the modes of reasoning required to figure it out. Why would one ever adopt the defeatist position that some part of the world is unintelligible, regardless of whether or not that person believes in God?

But I think it is more accurate to use the more banal-sounding form 'What shall I do?' That 'do' includes not only bodily actions, but also speech acts, thoughts and spiritual practices. Expressed in that way, the verb 'to live' is not part of the question, and one does not need to dissect it in order to answer the question. — andrewk

I think that Aristotle assigned the highest virtue to the contemplative act. Notice that this act, thinking, is hardly even an act at all. So if you're wondering, "what shall I do?", then to engage in thinking is a good option, because it's highly unlikely that you will do something bad if you're only contemplating. But this is very close to what I said anyway, I said that to be a good philosopher one should read much philosophy. And reading, like contemplating, allows one to be active in a way which is very unlikely to be harmful. Furthermore, reading gives one material to contemplate.

I wonder, did that rejection shape them? Would the proponents have come up with the same philosophy if they had not been spurred on by ideas they wanted to refute? It's a little like the question of whether Kant would have written CPR if he hadn't been goaded into it by wanting to try to refute Hume (his attempts to refute Hume - unsuccessful IMHO - are the least interesting part of CPR, and yet there is so much value in the work in other parts, that may never have been written if he had not been spurred into action by Hume). — andrewk

I agree that there is something peculiar about "dislike", which tends to inspire one to action. Like what Plato said in The Republic, the person who makes the best ruler of the state is the one who wants the job the least, recognizing that it is the most difficult job. And this person will only move to become the ruler when the conditions under the present government become so bad, that it's worse than being the ruler. In any case, we tend to look at intentions, goals, and morality in general, from the perspective of human actions being directed toward what is wanted, "the good". Maybe it's more accurate to say that human actions are directed away from what is unwanted. Perhaps it's the unbearableness of the bad which actually drives one to act.

But I'm interested in this question of whether the value of some philosophies may be in goading others to attempt refutations, which may contain helpful elements. — andrewk

OK then, let's assume that there may be value in putting out low quality, even false or deceptive philosophy, if it may inspire someone to produce good philosophy. This would be like saying some computer hacking is good because it demonstrates to the security companies where the weakness are. But is this really a morally acceptable principle? Would it be good to steal from someone if it's going to inspire that person to better guard one's property? In that case clearly not. What about general conditions, such as working conditions on your job, or the mess in your house, or something like that? If conditions are not so good, could it be justifiable to make them worse in order that someone will clean it up? I doubt it, because the right course of action would be to either fix the situation yourself, or ask someone else to do it. So what about the bad philosophy? If its only value is in "goading others to attempt refutations", can we really say that this is a value?

To be clear, I am not saying that the hardware/software analogy furnished a good or unproblematic model for the body/mind relationship. The purpose of the analogy is quite limited. It is intended to convey how top-down causation can be understood to operate unproblematically, in both cases, without any threat of causal overdetermination or violation of the causal closure of the lower level domain. — Pierre-Normand

I think that the whole hardware/software analogy is an unproductive distraction. What is at issue here is the electrical processes of the computer, what that energy is doing. The hardware and software work together in unison to control what that energy is doing, so there is no real division here to speak of.

But if we look at the neurological activity of the human being now, what the energy is doing, we can understand a real division which Querius points to. There are controls over the activity which are clearly aspects of the physical neurological system. But then we also have immaterial ideas, in the mind, which appear to exercise some control. So if our neurological activity is proceeding according to the constraints of the physical system, how is it that with our minds, and the use of immaterial ideas, we can decide which direction to go?

The Dems didn't lose the election, they won the popular vote by a margin wider than most historical presidential elections. The argument that they did not listen to their grass roots is mistaken. They lost in the states where the Electoral votes counted the most. They were out played, out strategized, by the Republican political machine. — Cavacava

There's a deep irony here. Of all those millions of votes cast, there's only a few, "strategic" votes which make the difference between who wins and loses. Many people vote religiously for their party, believing every vote counts. I must vote, I must do my part to keep my democracy strong. These are not the strategic votes. The strategic votes are the people out there who believe that it doesn't really matter whether I vote or not, or who I vote for, I'm just one vote, and one vote really makes no difference. Isn't it ironic, that the people who truly believe that their vote really makes no difference to the outcome, are the ones who actually make a difference.

Well that brings us to one of the key fault-lines in consideration of philosophy - between those who believe that a necessary criterion for being a good philosopher is to be knowledgeable about most major philosophical streams, and those who believe instead that necessary criteria are having wisdom about how to live, and being able to communicate that wisdom effectively. — andrewk

Even the question "how to live" is extremely complicated. We're all different, with distinct aspirations, so the answer of that question for you will be different from the answer of that question for me. Remember Plato's Republic, justice is claimed to be each person doing one's own thing, without interfering with the others. For me, to answer that question "how to live" requires an understanding of what it means "to live". For some though, perhaps you, as long as they're told the "how" part, they feel the question is answered.

It's academic vs moral philosophy (or life philosophy), Kripke vs Comte Sponville. I am of the latter group of partisans - my favourite philosophers being people like the Dalai Lama, Mohandas Gandhi and the Buddha, with the only academic philosophers that really interest me being the ones that had useful and inspiring things to say about ethics. But I think there is as much hope of attaining agreement between the two sides as there is of obtaining agreement between Idealists and Materialists. — andrewk

There's very surely a relationship between the academic and the moral, because what it means "to live", is a question for academia, while the "how" is moral. Some things, such as what it means "to live", are not given to us by the moral principles of "how to do it right". So if some moral philosopher is trying to tell me "how to do it right", I want to make sure that this person has a good understanding of what it is that we are trying to do. I want to question authority, and I am well within my rights to demand from the moral philosopher one's ontological principles, to ensure that the one who is trying to tell me how to do it, knows what we are trying to do.

I believe we can see the beginnings of this questioning of authority in the Scholastics. The accepted science of the time is brought up to bear against the theological principles. At first, the theologians are capable of maintaining their grip on authority but this is the beginning of the decline of the church. As science advances rapidly, and the Church enforces a morality based in age-old principles, it cannot stand up to the onslaught of questioning the authority. This forced the division between the academic and moral, which you refer to, allowing the Church to maintain its role in morality without interfering in academia. Ultimately though, the two must be brought back into a healthy relationship, because what's the point in listening to someone telling you how to do it, when it's possible that this person doesn't even know what we are trying to do.

Moreover, according to medieval science food is transformed into living flesh; in the case of an anthropophagus who has fed on other human bodies, this would have to mean that in the resurrection one single matter would be reintegrated into several individuals. — StreetlightX

The scholastics showed much disagreement over the scientific nature of the resurrection of Christ, and the associated sacrament, the Eucharist. I believe it was Aquinas who first produced a formal representation of the concept of transubstantiation, in an effort to affirm that the bread and wine of the Eucharist, truly are the body and blood of Christ. I believe he provides more than one, rather lengthy discussions on this topic. In this process there is said to be an inversion of matter and form.

One thing I feel fairly confident about is that they do not do it on the grounds of which philosophy is most 'rational', because a philosophy is only irrational if it makes contradicting claims, and that sort of thing is likely to be noticed. — andrewk

Well, you might be surprised. There is usually a fair amount of inconsistencies within the philosophy of individual philosophers. I like to judge based on consistency, not just internal consistency of an individual philosophy, but consistency in relation to other philosophies as well. To be a good philosopher requires one to read much philosophy.

My ideas are more of fantasy because at this point all theories can sound like sci-fi. But I really like playing with the idea currently that the entire universe could cease to exist for years on end and we would never know. If you think about it, if reality is a simulation, the simulation could crash and everything would cease to be. But if the simulation has save points and is rebooted at the time it crashed we wouldn't notice anything. It's a fun idea to think about I guess. — Grey

If the simulation crashed, wouldn't we all die? Do you think it's possible that we can die, and be rebooted at a save point? Since there would be a certain amount of loss, between the save point and the crash, wouldn't going back to the save point be like going back in time? Instead of worrying about this simulation, why not just try to find a way to go back in time, to a save point, if something happens that you don't like. Be careful though, you wouldn't want a Groundhog Day.

Actually, Descartes mainly gets blame as 'the first of the moderns'. Ed Feser writes a lot (and very well) on the problems that were introduced by, and subsequent to, Cartesian dualism, chief of which was the bifurcation of mind and matter, and the subsequent elimination of mind or spirit altogether from the modern view of the world (culminating in Cartesian anxiety). — Wayfarer

This is a good point. Descartes offers us a very poorly defined rendition of dualism. And as the founder of modern philosophy it is probably no coincidence that the acceptance of dualist principles has declined rapidly since.

1.) Its inherent connection to organized religion. Does Scholasticism justify Catholicism? Is Scholasticism truly impartial, or is it metaphysics-in-the-service-of-religion? In other words, would studying Scholastic philosophy lead you to Catholicism, or does it merely act as a psychological support structure for those already invested in the religion? It's not too difficult to find amateur philosophy enthusiasts touting around Scholasticism as the end-all, be-all solution to everything. Looking at history, wasn't Scholasticism basically tailored to Catholicism? — darthbarracuda

You should consider that at the time of Scholasticism, the Church had control over virtually all existing literature in the western world. It was not like the common person had books, or that you could go to the local library. The Church had the books, and governed the educational institutions. Prior to the Scholastics, very little of Aristotle's work had been received into the Church. Some Neo-Platonist principles had been brought in by Augustine. Aquinas worked to establish consistency between the Neo-Platonist ontological principles already held by the Church, and the metaphysical principles of Aristotle. This allowed the work of Aristotle to be brought into the educational system of the Church. Within the Church, it was of the highest priority to maintain consistency from the top down.

So the question, is Scholasticism a "metaphysics-in-the-service-of-religion", is kind of a moot point. The Church already held its top principles, the existence of God etc., so any interpretations of other philosophies would have been made from that perspective. If the philosophy was not consistent it would be rejected and not taught. Any principles maintained would be consistent, and therefore viewed by us as being used to support the religion. So if you are interested in learning some of these ontological and metaphysical principles, without the Catholic influence, I suggest you read the work of Aristotle and Plato directly. Then, after a good understanding, if you proceed to study the Scholastics, you can judge for yourself how well the Church remains true to the masters, or if they distort the principles to support their religion.

No, I mean the mind IS software. According to known physics, it can't be anything else. Consciousness is a software feature, and the software programs itself. — tom

That, I think is a very strange notion. You do realize don't you, that physics neither claims to understand the mind, nor attempts to understand the mind. So to make your determination of what the mind "is", according to known physics, would be a highly unusual, and fallible, thing to do.

My question is is math deserving of this respect and trust? Could it not be flawed? What does a mathemstical analysis of a given subject deprive us of? — TheMadFool

I assume you understand that to have a sound logical conclusion requires that you start from sound premises. Mathematics, being a form of logic, is no exception. This means that how we apply the numbers, how we evaluate things to be expressed mathematically (form the premises) is a crucial component of the reliability of the mathematical conclusions.

A chef's knife is good for cutting food, but not for cutting brick or steel, nor for heating or cooling water, nor for an infinite range of other purposes. Shall we call the knife "imperfect" or "an imperfect knife" on these grounds? — Cabbage Farmer

I think the question which TheMadFool is asking now, is what type of things is mathematics not good for. We could start with morality. I think that most people would agree that mathematics is not very good for solving moral issues. If we move from morality into social studies, we will find some areas where mathematics becomes useful, through the use of statistics, probabilities, and such things. I think that we might find a grey area here, between social sciences and moral philosophy, where some might argue mathematics is useful and others might argue that mathematics is not useful. If one is convinced that the mathematics is useful, when it is not, then the use of mathematics would be harmful.

Are there some areas of study where math is harmful instead of beneficial? — TheMadFool

Suppose that an individual is using mathematics according to some falsely determined principles of application, or in a subject where mathematics in not applicable. That person might be convinced, simply because the mathematics was applied, and the mathematics produced conclusions, that these conclusions were truths. But if these aren't real truths, then the use of mathematics here is harmful. It is not "mathematics" itself which is harmful, but it is the person's attitude toward mathematics which is harmful. Likewise, if one uses deductive logic without adequately judging the propositions accepted as premises, and believes in the truth of the conclusions produced by the logic, we have the same problem. It is not the logic itself which is the problem, it is the way that it is used.

We could go on, and examine the principles of logic itself, to see if the principles are sound. If unsound principles are accepted by logicians, and find there way into the logical system, through common convention, then we have a problem within the logic itself. Modern logic is very complicated with modal logic, fuzzy logic, operators, and such things. All of these principles need to be thoroughly examined to understand whether they are acceptable, and in which instances they are applicable. We have the same situation in mathematics, there are many new concepts and principles such as imaginary numbers, which are constantly being produced. In all of these new concepts, we need to be understood and determine sound applicability. If there is no sound applicability then this mathematics itself has a problem.

Yes, but I didn't realise you did. I'm feeling a tad bit like a crusty dragon right now. — TimeLine

There was surely some confusion, and it was my fault, because you had been talking about the experience of listening to music, and when I joined the discussion I started talking about the principles involved in creating music. So we were coming at the same thing from opposite directions. Theoretically, you might think that they would be the same thing, the principles which make music enjoyable, are the same principles which a composer would follow in producing a piece. But since they are opposing sides of the same coin, the relationship between the various aspects, subjectivity, epistemology, objectivity, ontology, is not the same.

The artist will approach composition with intent, and the goal might be to please oneself, or to please others. If it is to please others, the composer will look toward cold hard epistemological principles, grounded in objectivity and ontology. If the goal of the composer is to please oneself, then the artist is freed from such constraints to wander down various creative avenues, perhaps even discovering new objective principles, which may be accepted as epistemological principles in the future. In any case, the artist in today's environment must find an intricate balance between epistemology (what has been proven to work), and subjectivity (what pleases oneself).

With respect to the audience, the audience needs that recognition factor, and for the individual it is a subjective experience. But inter-subjectivity makes this subjective aspect the essence of the epistemological principles which the artist must respect. So as much as you and I have had different subjective experiences with respect to listening to music, the music which we have been exposed to, and conditioned by, is similar, and this grounds the epistemological principles.

I am slightly confused as to your position here. I never said that perceptual experiences were the same as listening to music but rather to the architecture of our subjectivity that amalgams memory, intuition and emotion. Our subconscious is filled with a network of experiences that our conscious mind has yet the tools to comprehend adequately with and becomes the reasoning behind why we are unable to articulate the 'movement' or emotional sensations we feel. It is perhaps the reason that makes it possible to enjoy music, since the subconscious mind it still conscious in that it is accessible but lacks a control since you are unaware of why, perhaps intuitively, you feel something is wrong or right. So, we may not be aware of why we associate certain feelings to particular musical experiences, but the logic is that we explore this subjectivity through sense rather than reason. As you say below, music brings up these emotions. — TimeLine

I think that what you are trying to say here, concerning the relationship between the conscious and subconscious, is so difficult to say, that you are having trouble saying it. Perhaps you should consider that all of our sensations have already been processed by the subconscious prior to being present to the conscious mind. If this is the case, then only "reasonable" experience is present to the conscious mind, experience which has been rendered in a form intelligible to the conscious mind. What the subconscious has made sense of, is what is present in the conscious mind. We cannot call this activity of the subconscious a form of reasoning, because that is what the conscious mind does. However it is similar to reasoning as it is a form of making sense of, what is occurring. I think this is what I called "recognition", but it isn't really proper to call it recognition either, because again, this is something which the conscious mind does. If we look at it from a semiotic perspective, it might be called an association, but this may be misleading. The question would be, does this subconscious process proceed by "recognizing" something as the same, or does it proceed by association, in which case one thing is associated with another thing. These are distinct, and perhaps we need to respect them both.

So, we may not be aware of why we associate certain feelings to particular musical experiences, but the logic is that we explore this subjectivity through sense rather than reason. As you say below, music brings up these emotions. — TimeLine

Here, you use the word "associate". Let me see if I can analyze this process of association. I believe that the essence of this association is to be found in the recognition of something as the same. I think that when something is sensed, it produces a feeling in the subconscious. When the same feeling occurs again, we recognize the cause of that feeling, the thing being sensed, as the same.

So for instance, I told you that my mother had a guitar which she played when I was a baby. The guitar was a particular Martin, with a distinctive sound, unlike any other guitar I've ever heard, unique to itself. I think, that maybe the instant I hear notes being played on that guitar, it produces a particular feeling within my subconscious, an association which goes way back to when I was a baby, when I first heard that guitar, and this causes the sound to be presented to my conscious mind as the same sound. And therefore I hear the sound as the sound of that guitar.

This would mean that I hear the sound as the same sound, because of some associations made by my subconscious. It would not be the case that I hear the sound, and then with my conscious mind, I determine that the sound is the same sound, the determination that the sound is the same sound has already been made by the subconscious, before my conscious mind apprehends the sound.

Now consider the possibility for error. Suppose there is another guitar which sounds very similar to my mother's but perhaps not exactly the same. The sound occurs, my subconscious makes the associations, and I hear the sound as my mother's guitar. I believe I am hearing my mother's guitar. So I look at the guitar being played, and see that it is not the same guitar. Now I must correct my feelings, suppress those feelings which make me think that it is the same guitar, and allow myself to hear that it is a different guitar being played.

I believe that this experience of error and correction is intrinsic to the subjective experience of hearing music. Consider first, the experience of hearing a song which you are well familiar with. The subconscious deals with the associations, and you hear the song as the same song. There is no issue of error and correction here, you correctly hear the song as the same song. Now consider that you hear an unfamiliar piece of music, but a certain portion of note progression is familiar, and triggers within the subconscious, the appropriate feelings associated with that progression. At that point, you have heard that note progression as "the same", so the conscious mind is alerted, in an attempt to remember, "the same as what?". I believe that this interplay between the conscious and subconscious, is fluid throughout the experience of listening to music. Feelings are always being triggered within the subconscious. Being the same as some other time, those feelings signify "the same" to the conscious mind. The conscious mind is then forced with the decision of impressing upon the subconscious, "not the same, forget those associations", or, searching the memory to confirm "the same". This is why listening to music can vary between a tumultuous emotional interplay between the conscious and subconscious, to a passive relaxing enjoyment of the decisive "I know and love that song", to the decisive "I hate that song", right through to the wonderment of "I've never heard anything like that before".

But if we are talking about human "self-consciousness" - the self-regulatory awareness of the self as a self - then the source of those higher level constraints come from right outside of individual biology and development. That level of selfhood is socially constructed and linguistically encoded. — apokrisis

Autonomous, responsible, free personhood is a prerequisite to rationality.
If external forces beyond my control shape me with insurmountable arbitrary constraints and if there is nothing but blind ‘potentiality’ running into those imposed constraints, then I am not in control over my actions and thoughts. And if I am not in control over my actions and thoughts, then I am not rational. And if I am not rational then I ‘have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality.’ — Querius

That social constructs exist outside of human consciousness, and act downward onto the consciousness of the individual is where the falsity lies. This assumes the illusion of Pythagorean idealism in which ideas (as social constructs) have some sort of independent existence. The moment we (falsely) assume that the existence of ideas is external to the consciousness of the individual, we surrender our moral responsibility. That is why Plato introduced "the good", to straighten out this perverted form of thinking. As apokrisis and Pierre-Normand have indicated, social constructs are based in habituation. The science of habituation is moral philosophy. All social constructs are based in morality.

The simple fact of the matter is, that morality comes about through the effort of the individual. Habituation is learning, and unless hard determinism is true (which it is not), learning is "caused" by individual effort, willful determination. Moral character, is what the individual must construct within oneself. Morality, hence all social constructs are caused by the efforts of the individuals.

The belief that morality is caused by external social constructs acting downward onto the individual consciousness is the grave mistake of the hard determinist. Consider the consequence, if every human being started to believe that it is true that morality is caused by social constructs acting on us. No individual human being would make any effort to learn or understand any moral principles, believing that morality is simply caused by external constructs acting on them. Consequently no one would be able to teach any moral principles, moral principles would be forgotten, and social constructs destroyed. We would all simply believe that morality is caused through some natural process of naturally occurring social constructs acting on us, until there were no more social constructs, then we'd have to wake up to reality, and rebuild.

That is the consequence if we receive as truth, the illusion that habituation occurs as some natural process of down-ward causation. Instead, we must face the hard cold facts, that morality is caused by the great strenuous efforts of each and every individual human being.

So, what's the difference between reason and Blobreason? I don't get the question. Suppose someone hooks you and I up to brainwave machines and demonstrates that we do not think in the exact same way. Then I say thinking is what I do, you don't think, you jackhuxythink. What's the difference between thinking and jakhuxythinking?

There appears to be a trend in modern philosophy to deny the reality of the "I", the "self", reducing the "I" to simply a part of the community in some anti-reductionist manner. This I believe is a mistake. It is a mistake because it belittles the separation which exists between you and I. The separation between us is very real and needs to be respected. Without having complete respect for this separation we have no hope of providing an adequate understanding of the nature of reality.

Only after we recognize the reality of this separation, and adopt it as a firm principle, can we begin to understand the nature of the material existence which comprises that medium of separation. Then we can differentiate between natural, material objects, which are proper to the medium of separation, and artificial things, conventions and institutions, which are created by human beings to bridge that gap.

But I firmly believe it is a mistake to take for granted, all these artificial, institutions, which human beings have worked so hard to create, in an effort to close the gap between them, as if these things were naturally occurring. And this is what is the case when you start with the assumption that the separation between you and I is not a real and fundamental separation.

So it is epistemological? — TimeLine

I would think so, don't you?

Subjective experience can quite easily be flawed considering it is subconscious and therefore wrought with little conscious awareness, but it is nevertheless 'alive' and I tend to believe that the subconscious realm - or intuition - is a network of perceptual experiences that we are unable to identify and make sense of. — TimeLine

If listening to music were like this, "a network of perceptual experiences which we are unable to identify and make sense of", would it be possible to enjoy music? Imagine if music appeared to you like random unidentifiable noises. Wouldn't this make you very confused, maybe even scared, how could this be enjoyable? Even if you listen to music when extremely wired on acid or some other hallucinogen, you recognize it as music, and make associations. If there were some kind of background music, which you didn't recognize as music, it could really freak you out.

When I think of how my feelings could be flawed in some way, I begin to doubt my intention for liking the experience of music. — TimeLine

All kinds of different music causes all kinds of different associations in your mind, many quite emotional, stretching right into the subconscious level. I don't think it's really appropriate to question why you like music. It's just natural to like music, and as soon as you've heard it, it starts to bring back memories. Music helps you to bring up these emotions, understand them, and ultimately assist in knowing yourself. My mother had a guitar, which she would pick up, to play and sing a few songs, from time to time, when I was very young. These may be the earliest memories which I have. A mother's voice, singing, can be very pleasant for a child. When you're a baby, and you know that your mother is relaxed and happy, then so are you.

I agree, but these are objective principles which we are trained to hear, such as the top and bottom of the octave, the fourth and the fifth, etc.. When we hear them, we recognize them because we have learnt them, and it is this recognition which makes us feel good. Similarly, we learn scales, so we can recognize the intervals of different scales. But scales hold a considerable amount of subjectivity due to the many different ways that the octave may be divided. We may recognize that a particular melody is true to a particular scale, and this could be pleasing as well. What we recognize in the tones, in relation to what we've learned, tends to determine the melodies which please us. But what we learn, and therefore what is recognized, may be a function of true objective principles (harmonies), inter-subjective principles (the conventions which produce the intervals of scales), or pure subjectivity (personal idiosyncrasies).

Which brings me to the OP question. What do people mean when they say things like "the math is not the world," "the map is not the territory," etc.? In one trivial sense this is, of course, true and undisputed: a theory, a model, is just a concept that we hold in our minds, it is not that which the concept is supposed to describe. — SophistiCat

The issue here I think, is that mathematics must be applied, in order that it may tell us anything about the world. This means that things in the world must be evaluated, assigned a mathematical value. If there is a margin of error, when we assign the mathematical value, such as that indicated in my earlier post, then the precision of understanding which we normally associate with mathematics is lost.

So for example, if we have a unit of time, a period of temporal duration, which we assign "1" to, such that it is one length of time, and there is a margin of error, then "1" in this situation is not really equal to "1". In this situation "1" is equal to every value within the range of that margin of error.

My apologies Agustino, I didn't realize that.

It's not passive. Individual neuron firing is actually being suppressed or enhanced. — apokrisis

I would be interested to see more information concerning this point, a better description of the purported suppression and enhancement. Is there a chemical process involved? As I see it, neurons are always firing. The issue of top-down vs. bottom-up causation, would question whether all the neurons are attempting to fire all the time, in which top-down causation would be preventing this. Or, are just some of the neurons attempting to fire, because some underlying process is causing some neurons to fire while others are not, in which case it is bottom-up.

So the brain knows how to make sense of the current world because there is this "top-down" weight of prior experience to direct things — apokrisis

As I see it, "this weight" of memory, is just passive matter. The prior experience exists as matter in the brain, and this structure of matter will serve as constraint.

And I put top-down in quotes to show I am talking about a hierarchical story where the higher level stuff acts on a larger spatiotemporal scale, so avoids your vicious circularity that comes from thinking a process like attention or consciousness happens "all at once" in a flash. — apokrisis

With respect to the vicious circle, I think that we both respect the fact that we need to look toward something which is not the brain itself, to avoid the circle. This is where you and I take opposite routes. You proceed toward a larger spatiotemporal scale, and you validate final cause in the second law of thermodynamics. My opinion is that this gives you nothing more than infinite regress. So I go the opposite way, I turn deeper inward, looking toward an inner cause, which is prior to physical existence. I look to the inside of the circle, and find release in the non-spatial realm of the central point, while you turn to the outside, making a bigger circle which eventually gets lost in an infinite vagueness. Our two very distinct directions of approach are actually functions of the way that we apprehend time. I understand time in a way which is completely different from the way that you understand time, and this is why my approach is completely different from yours.

'A free neutron will decay with a half-life of about 10.3 minutes but it is stable if combined into a nucleus.' That is from the science textbook. — Wayfarer

I don't question this. But the thing that maintains the existence of the neutron within the atom is the relations which it has with the other parts of the atom. So the question is, what causes these relations. You claim that the atom causes these relations, top-down, I claim that there is a deeper, underlying process which causes these relations, bottom-up.

What I think, is that turning to top-down causation, is a form of quitting, a refusal to go deeper to determine the true causes. For example, suppose we ask, why do water molecules exist in a liquid state at room temperature. One could answer, "this is the form of water", at certain temps it's solid, at others it's liquid, and at others it's gas. These specific constraints act on the water, in a top-down way, causing the water to be liquid at room temperature. But this is just a form of quitting, because it doesn't produce a deeper inquiry, proceeding to analyze the motions of molecules, and determine the true cause.

That is how I see this top-down way of looking at the atom. You put the parts of the atom in a static, and stable relationship, and claim that it is this form, this particular set of constraints called 'the atom" which acts top-down, and causes the longevity of the neutron. But I think that this is just a quitting, an unwillingness to look at the underlying activities of the parts of the atom, as the true cause of this stable relationship.

I can see the introduction of 'top-down' has introduced a lot of confusion. Some of those points have been addressed in the posts above. But what this is all about is that 'physical reductionism' is generally 'bottom-up', because it wants to explain such 'higher-level' things as actions, intentions, thoughts, and so on, in terms of the physical and physiological components of the being. So 'bottom-up' thinking, is usually characterised as reductionist, and/or physicalist. — Wayfarer

I understand this point. My approach, instead of turning the whole reductionist position upside down, as top-down causation does, is to go beneath the bottom of the reductionist approach. Remember, I am dualist, I assume non-physical existence. Physical existence gives the typical reductionist a set of limitations at the Planck scale. I am not physicalist, and I do not accept these artificial, physical, limitations produced by the limitations of the physicist's theories.

Generally speaking, Platonist philosophy is 'top-down' (and also anti-naturalist, anti-reductionist, and anti-nominalist.) I'm not saying that to appeal to the authority of Platonism, but to illustrate the kinds of philosophies that are associated with 'top-down' attitudes. — Wayfarer

I think that characterising Platonist philosophy as top-down is the result of a misunderstanding of Plato. Modern Platonism, and Platonic Realism portray Plato as a Pythagorean Idealist. In actuality though Plato thoroughly analyzed Pythagorean Idealism, and recognized its weaknesses. When the weaknesses were exposed, Aristotle finalized the refutation. That Plato does not follow these top-down principles, which Pythagorean Idealism does, is evident in his positing of "the good", in The Republic. The good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, like the sun makes visible objects visible. This means that the good, or in Aristotle's terms, that for the sake of which, or final cause, is something beyond an idea, or intelligible object, as the reason, or cause of intelligibility of such things. It is by making the good an idea, or intelligible object, as is sometimes expressed with "the idea of good" (which is a misinterpretation of Plato's "the good") that final cause is understood as an idea. This is very similar to the position apokrisis takes, it is a Pythagorean position, making final cause, or "good" into an idea, in apo's case, the concept of the second law of thermodynamics.

So when I said that your 'explanation' begs the question, what I mean is that when you say things such as 'Clearly the free will act begins in the most minute parts of the neurological system...', you're assuming a point of view that is generally associated with reductionist accounts. But as this is the very point that was being debated, it is this assumption that is begging the question. — Wayfarer

The problem is that the reductionist approach is based in good scientific principles of investigation. It makes no sense to dismiss these principles to seek a top-down causation, which from the very start gets lost in vagueness due to the fact that there is no evidence of top-down activity. Where there is no evidence of activity, how would we proceed in seeking a cause? There are constraints which appear as top-down structures, but even the activity which brings these constraints into existence, and changes these structures acts from bottom-up.

So it appears to me, like modern idealism is taking a wrong direction. Instead of turning inward, to find the true source of good, deep within, inherent within, as an immanent within the living being, it has turned outward seeking some transcendent good. The reason for this, I believe, is that we have let go of dualism, seeking the simplicity of monism. Reality though, is that there are two distinct directions, inward, and outward. What we find in the outward direction is distinctly different from what we find in the inward direction, and this is not just a matter of perspective. Looking inward is completely different from looking outward, and these two cannot simply be portrayed as directly opposite to each other. What we see in the inward direction is something radically different from what we see in the outward direction, hence the need for dualism. This is due to the peculiar nature of time, the past is distinctly different from the future, with respect to ontology, existence, they cannot be portrayed as simple opposites. Because of this distinct difference, we cannot let go of dualist principles without rendering reality unintelligible.

The person -- the human being -- is responsible. The "higher level" isn't a higher level of neurological activity. It's a functional level (see functionalism in the philosophy of mind) of mental organization that relates to the lower level of neurology rather in the way that the software level relates to the lower hardware level in the case of computers. To pursue the analogy, the hardware level deals with the implementation and enablement of basic logical function. But what makes the execution of those basic logical function logical (or computatonal) at all, and what makes the resulting effects (e.g. screen or printer outputs) the results of the computations that they are is their participation in the global hardware+sofware functions and architecture. — Pierre-Normand

If we are going to discuss a higher level, and a lower level, then we need to distinguish the two distinct aspects of the free will act. First, we have the impulse to act, and second, we have the will to deliberate. The first inclines us toward action according to instinct reflex, or existing habits. The second is the capacity of the will to decline, or resist this action, we call this "will power". It is this second aspect which makes rational decisions, and conscious deliberations possible. Do you agree that the first is the lower level, and the second is the higher level?

Now if we are to look for the cause of the free act, we must look for the source of activity, and this is to be found in the lower level. The upper level has the capacity to prevent particular activities, diverting energy toward deliberation and rational decision making, instead of making a rash act, but it does not cause activity it directs the activity. So if we are to describe the free will act in terms of bottom-up, or top-down, wouldn't you agree that it is a bottom-up causation, which is influenced by the upper level, which has the capacity to guide the efficient causes in different directions? The true source of activity, is to be found in the lower level.

That's not the reason why I am looking for something other than an "efficient" cause. I am rather looking for a final (intelligible/formal/teological) cause -- something like a goal or reason -- because of the form of the question and the formal nature of the effect: Why did so and so intentionally do what she did. — Pierre-Normand

When we look for the final cause, in the way you describe, we are faced with ideas, as the reason why so and so did such and such. But as I explained to Wayfarer these ideas are passive things, and analyzing passive things will not bring us to the active final cause. The true final cause must be an active cause because it sets in motion the efficient causes necessary to produce the intended end. A passive idea cannot produce efficient causes. This is why, following the Neo-Platonists, we need to proceed to a form of immaterial cause, which is similar to an idea, but is itself active. In this way, intention and final cause become intelligible. But since the final cause is what brings into existence the efficient causes, which proceed to bring about the end, it is necessary to place the final cause at the lowest level, prior to the efficient causes.

It's standard neuroscience I would say. Attention acts top down by applying a state of selective constraint across the brain. You can hook an electrode up to a retinal ganglion cell and watch it in action. Or an EEG can record the fact as it happens in general fashion as a suddenly spreading wave of suppression - the P300.

So, as far as neuroscience goes, folk wouldnt talk about it as consciousness (too many unhelpful connotations for the professionals). But top down integrative constraints are how the brain works. — apokrisis

Yes, I agree with this, read my reply above. The point I made already though, is that this top-down form of constraint is not acting as causation, top-down, it is passive. The free act derives from the bottom and is therefore a bottom-up form of causation, which simply moves upward through the constraints. The constraints may appear to be arranged in a top-down fashion, but since they are passive, there is no real top-down activity here, and this is a misnomer to call it top-down causation, it is just a structure of constraints. If we want to look for the true final cause, the cause of the free act, we must look to the very bottom of the chain of efficient causes, to find a source of activity which is free from efficient causes.

This is what I was arguing in the case of your army analogy in the other thread. What you call "the army", consists of a structure of static constraints. Call them top-down, bottom-up, it doesn't really make any difference at this point, it's a static structure. Now, it is the actions of each individual soldier, through their free willing acts to partake and follow the structure, which causes the existence of the army. The cause of the army is bottom-up, each individual coming in and choosing to do one's part.

You might say that this is a trivial difference, to argue that the constraints are a static structure, and not a true active cause, but it becomes important when we look at beginnings, the coming into being of things. The set of constraints, which exists as "the army", isn't passive in the absolute sense, the army must have come into existence. This is the "construction" which you referred to. These constraints come into existence in a bottom-up fashion, as you described, so they are truly bottom-up constraints, and their top-down appearance is just an illusion.

'Begging the question is 'assuming what is to be proved'. The statement of yours which I said was 'begging the question', was this one: — Wayfarer

What I meant by "clearly", is that evidence indicates this. Even Pierre-Normand admitted this. If you have any evidence to the contrary, then bring it forward.

But the point that is at issue is whether such an act can be understood on the basis of 'the most minute parts' - that being 'the bottom' - or from the formation of a conscious intention - that being 'the top'. So I said your statement begged the question, because it assumes what it needs to prove, which you're still doing. — Wayfarer

I would disagree with you, that conscious intention is "the top". I think it is you who is begging the question by describing conscious intention as "the top". You only do this to support your claim that anything caused by conscious intention is ipso facto "top-down" causation, because according to this assertion there is nothing above conscious intention. I support my claim, which you call "begging the question", with accepted neurological facts. You have the dubious claim that conscious intention is the top. Can you offer any support for this assumption of yours, that conscious intention is the top? In what context is intention the top of anything?

It doesn't 'assume' anything - it's a statement of scientific fact. — Wayfarer

Let me get this straight. You are claiming that the atom is the cause of existence of the relationships which constitute the existence of the atom. So there are particular relations between the protons, the neutrons, and the electrons, and these particular relations are caused by the atom itself? Now you claim that this is a statement of scientific fact. Do you not see how silly this is? I suppose that the relationships between atoms which make up a molecule, are caused by the molecule itself? I learned in science, that it is a chemical reaction which causes these relationships, and the molecule comes into existence as a result of a chemical reaction. Likewise, with respect to the relationships which constitute the existence of an atom, it is a nuclear reaction which causes these relationships, and consequently the existence of the atom. So much for your "scientific" fact. I should rather class it as an "alternative fact", claimed as a fact just to support your untenable position..

How is it opposed to its nature if the constraints are responsible for its nature? — apokrisis

Isn't this contradictory to say that constraints are responsible for freedom? I don't know how that could work. Besides, you've assumed freedom as the starting point, and freedom constructs. So it cannot be constructing constraints which are responsible for its freedom, because it already has freedom prior to constructing.

Or rather, the failure to understand how hierarchical organisation is not viciously circular at all. — apokrisis

Well, I've seen you attempt to explain your understanding of hierarchical organisation, and like the one above, which I commented on, they all end up with a vicious circle.

The problem which I think Agustino is alluding to in the op is the intrinsic uncertainty in the way that we measure time. There appears to be an uncertainty inherent within the measurement of any time period. This is related to, and perhaps analogous to Einstein's principle call the relativity of simultaneity. Because simultaneity is reference dependent, we can say that there is a degree of uncertainty with respect to any determinations of simultaneity. Likewise there is a degree of uncertainty with respect to any determinations of a length of time.

Let's assume an arbitrary duration of time, and assign to it the mathematical value of 1. It is 1 unit of time duration. Due to the uncertainty which is inherent within our ability to determine a measurement of time, we should assign a margin of error to 1. We can assign the arbitrary margin of error of + or - 1%. Now our period of time which is assigned the mathematical value of 1, is really somewhere between .99 and 1.01, or we could assume that it is all the values in between. When we're talking about time then, 1 does not actually equal 1. The mathematics is inherently uncertain.

I believe that what the Fourier transform indicates, is that as we move toward a larger and larger duration of time, this uncertainty, when expressed as a margin of error like this, becomes a smaller and smaller percentage of the overall length of the time period, moving toward a smaller and smaller margin of error. Conversely, as we move toward a smaller and smaller period of time, the margin of error, becomes larger and larger.

But intentional human behavior also has a higher level characterization where it is evaluated in point of practical rationality

...

The neural cause of a specific muscular contraction can tell you why some muscle contracted at the time that it did, and hence why an arm rose but it leaves you clueless as to why the agent raised her arm (or even whether the motion was intentional at all). It's only from the standpoint of the rational/teleological organization of the cognitive economy of an individual as a whole that rationality transpires and that sensitivity to practical reasons is manifested as a form of top-down causation. — Pierre-Normand

Ok, so you have described a "higher level" of neurological activity, which you say is responsible for the intentional, rational, free will acts. Since you can identify no efficient cause for this activity, you assign the cause to the "individual as a whole". Now we have some extremely vague notion of, "an individual as a whole" being the cause of this neurological activity. Why is it that you believe that this vague notion of "an individual as a whole", being the cause of this activity, is a better description than the classical description which holds that the immaterial soul is the cause of this activity?

Anyway. Causality is dichotomous because that is simply how metaphysical development works. — apokrisis

When we consider causation in its primary sense, as active cause, like I described, there are two distinct types of active causes, we have efficient causes and final causes. One refers to the active cause of physical changes and the other refers to the active cause of intentional acts. In the secondary sense of "cause", the passive constraints which influence the active causes, affecting the effect of the causes, there is also two types. Here we have material constraints and formal constraints. So we have the four types of causation identified by Aristotle here, two primary, active causes (efficient and final), and two secondary, passive causes, (material and formal).

We have bottom-up construction matched by top-down constraints. Each is the cause of the other (as constraints shape the construction, and the construction (re)builds the generalised state of constraint). — apokrisis

This is nothing more than a vicious circle. Construction builds constraints and constraints constrain the construction. The whole point in attempting to determine which is primary, a procedure which you call "laughable", is to avoid such a vicious circle Which is really more laughable, the vicious circle, or the attempt to avoid it?

It is freedom that constructs bottom-up. The role of top-down constraint is to give shape to that freedom. So constraints (as the bloody word says) are all about limiting freedoms. They take away or suppress a vast variety of what might have been possible actions ... and in so doing, leave behind some very sharply directed form of action. Or as physics would call it - to denote the particularity that results from this contextual sharpening - a "degree of freedom". — apokrisis

This model makes no sense at all. You assume a "freedom" which constructs from bottom-up. What could this freedom be constructing other than constraints? But it cannot be constructing constraints, because the constraints as you say are top-down, limiting freedom. And why would freedom be constructing constraints anyway, this is opposed to its nature? Further, the assumed "freedom" cannot be constructing freedom, because it already is freedom, according to the assumption. So what is this freedom, which constructs from bottom up supposed to be constructing? And what kind of thing, which has the power to construct, do you propose "freedom" refers to?

I agree. “Real existing” is a crucial qualifier here, since if constraints have no ontology, how can they have causal powers? — Querius

The issue I see with "real existing constraints", and why I used that phrase, has to do with the nature of the artificial prescriptive laws of how human beings ought to behave. These are constraints which are created by human beings, such as ethics, societal laws, etc.. We can see these laws as real existing constraints, but they dictate how we ought to behave, and the subject ultimately has the capacity to disobey those laws. Therefore they are radically different, ontologically, from the natural constraints which we assume dictate the way that natural inanimate physical objects behave. The inanimate physical objects do not have the capacity to disobey these natural constraints.

Reference to what do you mean? — Agustino

You started your thread with a quote from me. Don't you think you should provide a reference as to where the quote was taken from? Otherwise it is a quote taken out of context.

Thanks for the quote Agustino. Perhaps you should provide a reference just to make the context a little clearer.

To cut a long story short, it is 'limits' all the way down, up and sideways. — Querius

This may be the problem here in a nutshell. We describe the world in terms of constraints, we can call them "laws". There are two types, the laws of physics and the laws of ethics, or societal laws. The former describe the ways that physical objects behave, and the latter describe how human beings ought to behave. When we look at what the laws refer to as real existing "constraints", we can refer to those constraints as "causes". But this is to use "cause" in the sense of an influence, something which affects activity. We can say that these constraints have an affect on specific activities, and in this sense they are causes.

The constraint, as a cause, is inherently passive. It functions as a cause merely by affecting an occurring activity. This presupposes the existence of the activity. So the constraint is a cause only if there is activity. Therefore we still need to consider "cause" in its true primary sense, as the activity itself, which is required in order that a constraint may be capable of being a cause. If we focus on the constraints, as causes, and divide constraints into top-down and bottom-up constraints, we have simply distracted our attention from the true, primary cause, the activity itself, which is being constrained.

So, you may need to further explain how you concluded wavelengths can reach into the subjective and objectify rather than it being relative to the individual aesthetic and experience. Are we really experiencing something subjective or have we formed constructs where we attempt to form meaning through tonal patterns where our subjective inspiration is psychological? Is mathematics real? The former, I much prefer but would still be keen to know your thoughts. — TimeLine

What I believe is that there are objective aspects of tonal music, just like there are objective aspects of rhythm. In rhythm we find it in the repetition of equal temporal spacing, and in tones we find it in harmony. When we are trained in music, we train our ears to recognize the harmonies of wavelengths. This begins with a recognition of the octave. We cannot deny that the octave is an objective aspect of music. Also, it is objective fact that we can produce an octave by dividing the wavelength in half, or by doubling the wavelength.

Where subjectivity enters in, is in how we divide up the octave. We can make a chromatic scale, major, minor, or whatever, there are so many options. In general, one would choose certain points, such as the mid point between the two tonics, which are objectively conducive to harmony. There are a number of other factors which enter in, such as the desire of the composer to modulate from one key to another, and the capacity of the instrument to produce an octave from each note in the scale, allowing one to play in any key. Whichever scales are chosen, we can train our ears to recognize the intervals between tones, and train our voices to reproduce the intervals. So for instance, the major scale is a subjective division of the octave which has been agreed upon, and therefore conventionalized. Thus we have two distinct forms of "objectivity" here. We have the objective fact of harmony, and we also have objectivity by convention. Objectivity by convention is created through inter-subjectivity, and since it is based in subjectivity it is not a true or real objectivity, like the objectivity found in harmony. Inter-subjective convention is produced by a number of factors likely starting with the goal of maximizing the potential for harmony. But the purity of this goal is mitigated by many factors such as the basic objective difficulty of the Pythagorean comma, and many other practical concerns such as the nature of the various instruments.

Look, I absolutely love this that I got a little tingly when I read it, but the equal division of harmony [or two synchronous wavelength sources of equal amplitude] fails to adequately explain the question and is theoretical in its explanation of the concordance between harmony. Would that imply that something may be temporally wrong with jazz music because of its dissonance? Does something need to be pleasant in its consonance to be deemed harmonious? — TimeLine

The point to remember is that we are trained, or we train ourselves, to ear the different tonal aspects of music. So we do not automatically hear even the pure objective harmony of the two tonics of the octave. And even if a tone is played, and a second later the same tone is played, we must train ourselves to recognize this as the same tone. Musical theory seeks to determine objective facts concerning wavelengths, but then we must practise in order to be able to recognize the principles put forward by the theory. Subjectivity enters into the theory itself, because of the pragmatics of practise. The theorists may attempt to hide their subjectivity behind conventions of inter-subjectivity, to the point where the average musician cannot draw the line between objective principles of harmony and inter-subjective conventions. The creativity of the artist may inspire one to disrespect all conventions and experiment with new forms, but nevertheless, we all recognize that there are some basic objective facts, such as the octave.

It is only when early replicators not only were passively selected by environment pressure according to fitness, but also began to strive to survive and replicate, that they could be considered alive. They then had teleology in the sense that their parts became functional organs and they acquired autonomous behaviors. — Pierre-Normand

You cannot pass this off as apokrisis' point, because this is completely distinct from and inconsistent with, what apokrisis argues. Apokrisis assigns telos to the universe in general, so it is not as if telos emerges with the existence of life, it was a property of the universe already.