This begs the question.

But then, explaining free will in terms of neurological events is the essence of the very 'physicalist principles' which you then go on to reject. That is 'neurological reductionism'.

Again, I don't think you get the distinction between top-down and bottom up. — Wayfarer

We cannot ignore the facts of neurological involvement in the free will act. The question for the metaphysician is the cause of such activity. It seems very clear that the activity of the nervous system is the cause of the activity of the human body. And this indicates that top-down causation may not be consistent with the facts. If stating facts is begging the question, then the position I'm arguing against is most obviously fictional. Top-down causation denies that the free will act is free.

So I believe it is you who does not understand top-down causation. And by "understand", I mean to recognize it as a misunderstanding.

Well, I gave an example of the neutron's properties being determined by its being situated in an atom. — Wayfarer

As I explained, this assumes an unacceptable causal relationship. This perspective assumes that the atom is the cause of the relationships which constitute it. From the premise that a cause is necessarily prior in time to the effect, this means that the atom must exist before the relationships which constitute it exist. To my mind, this is impossible, to say that a thing exists prior to the existence of its constituent parts. To resolve this, we could say that the idea of the atom exists prior to the constituent parts, as the "blueprints" for the atom, but then we are no longer referring to the atom itself, but a Neo-Platonic "Form" of the atom, which acts as the cause of existence of the atom

Because it is a case where a subject's belief produces a physical result; belief is 'top down', because it belongs to a higher level of organisation than the molecular and cellular structure of the patient. — Wayfarer

You are using "belief" here as a noun, it refers to a static thing. But you are claiming that this static thing is a cause. This is the problem with Pythagorean idealism which Aristotle demonstrated. Such idealism assigns existence to ideas, but in doing so, it gives the ideas the property of passivity. This makes it impossible that ideas are truly causal. Therefore we have to see beyond this problem, as the Neo-Platonists did, and find a way to understand the ideas as active.

The physicalist and emergentist perspective is to describe the mind as a property of the activity of the brain. This means that things of the mind, consciousness, ideas, and concepts, etc., are caused by the physical activity of the brain. But for a complete understanding we must look for the cause of such physical activity. Why do living things behave in the peculiar way that they do? The emergentist wants to look at the activities of the physical universe in general, and show how the activities of living things is really no different from the activities of non-living things, and this is how they account for the emergence of life and consciousness. They create a false compatibility between the activities of living things and the activities of non-living things, through the means of "top-down" causation. But the dualist metaphysician will understand this as wrong, and maintain that the soul is the true cause of the physical activity of the living being, and this is distinctly different from any top-down causation..

I'm not sure you're getting the meaning of 'top-down' or 'bottom-up'. Intentionality and free will are both 'top-down' practically as a matter of definition; which is why materialists, such as Dennett, are obliged to try and deny them. — Wayfarer

As I said, "We do not know where the free will act derives from...". Perhaps, you for some reason, think that free will and intentionality are examples of top-down causation, but I think you've got it wrong. Clearly the free will act begins in the most minute parts of the neurological system, perhaps within the brain, moving outward to move the parts of the body, which move things in a larger surrounding area. How do you define "top-down", such that this activity is consistent with "top-down causation"? As I've argued before, I think the entire concept of top-down causation is misguided, it's a fiction. It's an attempt to explain the existence of life through physicaist principles.

I continue to think that in each of these cases the understanding takes its measure from some notion of wholeness or completeness, regardless of how difficult this may be to pinpoint or articulate. — Erik

OK Erik, I'm willing to compromise on this point. I agree that there is always some sort of overarching idea, or notion of "better", even if its just some vague feeling (like in the case of the unsalted dish, when it just doesn't taste quite right), which inspires one to be critical. The problem is that this notion, idea, or feeling, "it could be better", is often very vague, and sometimes we have no idea where it comes from, or what is causing it. It may simply be a feeling of being dissatisfied, and it could result from something as simple as being bored. I am bored, so I think that things could be better, so I am dissatisfied with the way that things are around me, and I am critical. Being critical relieves my boredom and makes me feel better, so I continue to be critical.

But let's put this into the perspective of morality and ethics. I believe that in moral training we are taught to guide ourselves toward good goals, honourable ends. It is by having such honourable ends that we avoid acting badly. If one's goal in life is to have a respectable career, and be a respectable part of society, then this individual will be less likely to carry out immoral acts, or get into trouble with the law etc.. You could call it a type of "trickle down" within the human psyche, if one's overall, top priority, long term goals in life, the most important things in life, are good and consistent with strong moral principles, this acts to guide all the lower level goals such that they are consistently moral goals.

Now what about this vague notion or feeling, "it could be better"? Here we have no clearly defined long term goal, no guiding principle, and therefore no guarantee that the "better" which is referred to here is consistent with any form of morality. See we have a vague notion of "better", with no defining characteristics, and therefore no way of knowing whether this "better" is morally better or not. If, when we have this vague notion that things could be better, and this becomes important to us, and we start to criticize and attack the status quo, with intent to dismantle, having nothing defining this "better", there is a high risk of becoming wayward. The status quo is attacked with nothing to replace it with. If there is no defining elements of "better", then one's course of action will change from day to day, as that individual seeks through trial and error to determine exactly what "better" is.

This is exactly what we find in Donald Trump, the expression of dissatisfaction without any clearly defined goals as to what this "better" is. Because there is just a vague notion there, that things should be better, the means for achieving this "better" can change from day to day. This is why he appears to be "deceptive", having "reactionary policies", without "great moral character". He is lacking in that clearly defined long term goal, which we all must adopt in order to guide our shorter term goals, making us respectable parts of society. Deception is when we hide our true goals from others. The person who holds no true goals will appear to be hiding one's true goals. Reactionary policies are policies which are not guided by any long term goals. And "great moral character" refers to the individual who has clearly defined long term goals which are consistent with excepted moral principles.

Okay, so truthfulness should be valued not as an end in itself, but because it contributes to the building up of trust and legitimacy in society, which in turn serve as the foundation for the ultimate end, which is social order and stability. When trust is eroded through the use of lies by political leaders then legitimacy withers away, and when legitimacy is lacking then social stability is threatened. Without social stability then other ends, like economic prosperity, seem unattainable. If we start by positing individual freedom as the ultimate end or goal, then it would seem like something more akin to an anarchic 'state of nature' would be preferable, with an overemphasis on public security and stability threatening freedom and autonomy. Either way though I don't see how truth-telling could be disadvantageous to the social order. I'm sure you'll have plenty of counter-examples. — Erik

Since I've defined deception in relation to an individual hiding one's true goals, then consider truthfulness as the opposite of this. Truthfulness is a willingness to express one's true goals. It happens amongst people who trust each other. If I trust you, I believe that telling you the truth about what I am doing is beneficial, because you will only help me in fulfilling my goals. And if you think my goal is problematic, you will tell me the truth about this. Now let's remove the "true goals" from this scenario, go back to this idea of a vague notion of "better". If the person has no definable goals, just a vague notion of "better" where is truth now? Is there any such thing as truth now? Truth only exists in relation to one's goals, and if there are no clearly defined goals, then there is no such thing as expressing oneself in a way which is consistent or inconsistent with one's goals. Truth is just as vague as one's goals. Now there is no issue of whether truth-telling is advantageous, or disadvantageous, because under these conditions there is really no such thing as truth-telling. One cannot clearly express one's goals because that individual does not even know clearly one's own goals. Nor is there such a thing as lying. There are no clear goals to maintain consistency with, and therefore no truth or falsity.

But to maintain consistency with my concession, my compromise at the top of the page, I'll admit that such complete lack of goals is impossible, and therefore a complete lack of truth and falsity is impossible. However, a very vague overall goal, with very fleeting intermediate goals, which change from day to day due to the vagueness of the overall goal, is not conducive to any type of coherent "truth" .

You would say that it is intuitive to believe that there is a truth and falsity concerning any incident. But in reality we each observe from our own perspectives, and describe according to how we observe the incident. Each of these personal, subjective observations may be "a truth" even if they describe the same incident differently. If you and I share the common goal of understanding the incident, we will share our observations, work out incompatible aspects to establish consistency, and each grasp a fuller understanding of the incident. But if we do not share this goal, we will each cling to our own observations as "the truth", despite the fact that there will inevitably be contradictory aspects. So without the common goal, there is only this subjective truth. That's why real truth is based in trustworthiness, and this relates to one's goals and intentions.

Now of course the likes of Plato and Machiavelli and Nietzsche (in other words men much smarter than me) extolled the use of lies and deception precisely in the name of order and stability. But even they felt there must at least be the appearance of truth. Why is that? Why the human proclivity against being lied to? I'm not sure. For me I feel it may have a lot to do with pride and ego. The fact that you lied to me makes me think you don't respect me, that you'd like to manipulate me for your own nefarious ends, etc. I recall the experience of my own enthusiastic patriotism giving way first to sadness and then to anger. I was lied to. I was ready to go join the military and possibly give my life for these noble ideals and lofty values I'd imbibed as a child (through schooling, movies, etc.), and then to find out they were largely bullshit? That was a pretty devastating experience. — Erik

I believe you have brought up a very good point here. You have stated that truth is useful toward social order and stability. If you notice in my other post, I validated truth by referring to knowledge. Truth is useful for the production of knowledge. In this way, I would argue that social order and stability are also useful for the production of knowledge. So I have placed "knowledge" as the higher good than order and stability.

Now consider the consequences to your paragraph if "knowledge" is placed as the higher good, higher than social order and stability. Social order and stability are required for the sake of increasing knowledge. The "royal lie" of Plato is required for the purposes of social order and stability. However, inherent within the nature of the human being is the desire to know, this is what makes the human being a philosophical animal (philosophy is the desire to know), and ultimately a "rational animal" as Aristotle said. So in telling the royal lie, the natural desire to know is thwarted, deceived, for the purpose of social order and stability. That's why the lie must be hidden. The one's being lied to still have the natural philosophical desire to know, and this accounts for the proclivity against being lied to, as well as the need to create the appearance of truth.

But take a moment to recognize what has been done in the employment of this principle. What Plato does is create distinct classes. The highest level maintains the pure goal of knowledge, the philosophical desire to know. In the next level this pure goal is subdued with the royal lie, such that they do not seek the higher goal. Their goal is social order and stability. This second class is the class of the nobility, the guardians of the state. The second class rules the third class, which are the commoners engaged in the various acts of production and manufacturing etc., while the upper class is involved with the highest good of contemplation, education and the desire to know.. Notice that the lie is used at the very top level, by the top class, to maintain order within the second class, the policing, or military class. It hides the true goal, or intent of the upper class, (which is what deception does) and this is pure knowledge, making the second class believe that they have the highest goal, maintaining social order and stability. But that illusion is only created by suppressing the philosophical desire to know through the means of the royal lie. The second class must make the third class believe that they are involved in the highest goal which is the production of goods.

Anyhow I feel that much of the righteous indignation from those on the Left over Trump's habitual lying can be traced to the sense that he has zero respect for anything they value, and that he'll gladly lie in order to roll back any prior achievements won by progressives. So it's not his lying per se, but the aim of his lies which is the more important issue. — Erik

So if we take this model of government, the one laid out by Plato in The Republic, where the rulers lie for the good of the subjects, we can extend it toward other governments. In Plato's republic, the lie was to facilitate the upper class in its quest for knowledge, this was supposed to be the best government. Now we can keep the lie in the model, but look at different goals of different governments. A colonialist or imperialist government would lie to the subjects, hiding the true motives behind its activities. A capitalist government might lie to hide the true motives behind its activities. We can look at documented cases of the recent "communist threat", and see how the threat of nuclear war, and such disastrous calamities were propagated in an effort to protect capitalist holdings in other countries with less stable governments. The goal of particular members in the US government might be to protect certain companies, which they hold interest in, with large capital holdings in countries which may fall to communist revolution. Lies, or "alternative facts", which hyped up the danger of communism, were encouraged, in order to justify military intervention.

The point is that the lies which the governing members tell, are directly related to hiding the true goals of such members. If we assume a situation now, where the goals of the governing party are vague, fleeting, and changing from day to day, then the lies which they serve up are just as vague as the truths which they offer.

There's a complete lack of trust, a sense that our government is illegitimate, and intimations of civil war sometime in the future as this nation hardens into two hostile camps with radically different worldviews. — Erik

When you have no way of distinguishing a lie from a truth, "a complete lack of trust" is inevitable. And that is the case when there are no clear goals. Being truthful in politics is disclosing your goals in a clear and coherent manner, to be understood by others. When there are no clear and coherent goals, then disclosing the goals in a clear and coherent way is impossible. Any expression, or disclosure of "a goal", could be equally true or false, and there is no way to tell the difference because there is no clear "real" goal behind that expression, to validate the truth or falsity of the expressed goal. Any person without clear goals is a person without a moral compass, and that person undoubtably inspire a lack of trust.

In summary then, I have moved from my position of someone being critical, and having a complete lack of notion for a "better" situation, to accepting that one must have at least a vague notion that a "better" is wanted. But if in politics, being truthful is inherently tied to accurately disclosing your goals, then having vague fleeting notions of "better" is really not much different from having no idea of what "better" is. You seem to suggest in your closing paragraphs, that when someone has such a vague notion of "better", then they will naturally proceed towards determining a moral better. What supports this assumption?

Suppose a person is very critical, is dissatisfied, and believes that things should be better. That person has no clear idea of what "better" is. Why would that person turn to morals, and decide that "better" is to be morally better. Unless the person studies philosophy, that person would probably not realize this. So that person is critical and dissatisfied for whatever reasons we do not know. But we can infer that whatever it is which is making the person dissatisfied, relief from this dissatisfaction is what the person will consider as "better". So there is no reason to believe that the person would turn to a moral "better", the person will naturally turn to whatever relieves the dissatisfaction. And the dissatisfaction could be caused by all different kinds of things, including mental illness, in which case the person might try anything and still not be satisfied. Or, it could be something simple like my example above, boredom. In this case the person might stir up the pot, to relieve the boredom. There is no reason though, to believe that the person who is dissatisfied, and looking for something "better" will move toward what is morally better.

Sean Carroll objects to the notion of downward causation because he doesn't understand it. He wrongly believes the possibility of downward causation to contradict the causal closure of the micro-physical domain, as if a macroscopic or systemic cause of a micro-physical event entailed a violation of the laws that govern micro-physical interactions. But downward causation doesn't have this consequence. It isn't something queer, magical, or unphysical. — Pierre-Normand

This is the same problem which I pointed to. Downward causation puts the effect prior to the cause. The atom only exists after the relationships between the parts has been established. The atom is the effect of these relationships. Therefore we must look for something other than the atom itself, as the cause of these relationships.

The problem is very evident if we refer to new relationships which come into existence, such as when human beings create synthetic chemicals. It is not the case, that the new complex object acts through downward causation, creating the new relationships necessary to bring itself into existence. It is the case that human minds determine the necessary relationships, then human beings act to bring those relationships into existence, causing the existence of the synthetic chemical.

What the proponents of downward causation seem to miss, is that there must be a cause of existence of the relationships which exist between the parts of a complex object. This cause of existence cannot be the complex object itself, because the complex object only comes into existence after the relationships. If some of these relationships are called "laws of nature", then the cause of the laws of nature is something other than the complex objects which come into existence as a result of the laws of nature.

I would have thought 'the placebo effect' provides a cogent example of top-down causation. — Wayfarer

I agree. Also every post on this forum is a cogent example of top-down causation. Question is, do we find such causation in inanimate nature. — Querius

We must be careful not to automatically assume that cases of mental causation, such as intention and free will acts, are automatically top-down causation. We do not know where the free will act derives from, but it has influence over the most minute parts of the brain and appears to be bottom-up.

I think it makes the case for 'top-down' causation very eloquently. Were you a classical atomist, who believed that the fundmental constituents of the world really were point-particles, then the fact that such a purported 'point-particle' relies on its context would, I think, greatly weaken your case. — Wayfarer

The problem is that context itself, cannot validate the assumed unity. The parts of the atom, being in proximity to each other does not give existence to the unity which is the atom. There is a very particular relationship of those parts which is necessary for the existence of the atom. The atom itself cannot cause this particular relationship, because the atom only exists after the relationship is established and a cause must be prior to the effect. To make this claim (top-down causation) is to put the effect (the existence of the atom) prior to the cause (production of the necessary relationships).

So you now agree that relationships themselves have causal status when we talk about the reality of things. — apokrisis

No, not quite. I assume that something must cause these specific relationships. I do not believe that the relationships cause themselves. Nor do I believe, as you seem to, that the thing caused by the relationships is a cause of the relationships (top-down causation). That would put the effect prior to the cause. As I said in other threads, I believe that the cause of the relationships is immanent within the parts, just like the will to act is immanent within individual human beings. When the part comes into existence, as all material things come into existence, the relations that it will have to other material things, is already inherent within it. The cause has already acted on that part in its creation. So it is given its position when it comes into existence. The cause of this, (that which gives it its position), cannot be the material object which is described as a unity of the parts, acting as top-down causation, because this material unity only exists after the parts come into existence, as the effect.

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Why would you say that the difference in stability of the neutron is a function of the atom, rather than a function of the relationships between the parts of the atom?

Both in California, Oklahoma, and Switzerland, injecting liquids into rock produced earthquakes. Earthquakes make yahoos twitchy. The yodeling yahoos got their rifles out of the closet and went looking for the usual suspects. — Bitter Crank

Is that what caused those earthquakes in Turkey that Gokcek was talking about?

I've been telling apokrisis the very same thing for some time now, to no avail. It's quite clear that this notion of top-down causation is completely ungrounded. It's nothing more than fantasy.

Does music have eternal properties? Or is philosophy is the highest music? — TimeLine

It is mathematics which expresses eternal properties, and to the extent that music partakes in mathematics, it has eternal properties. Do you understand the physics of consonance and harmony? This is when the wavelengths produce synchronized crests and troughs. Here, the subjective becomes objective, because what I like may be the same as what you like, due to something describable by mathematical principles.

There is a deep paradox to be found in the principles of harmony which demonstrates our inability to understand the relationship between space and time. Anyone who works over numerous octaves using the circle of fifths, or some such activity, will be familiar with what is known as the Pythagorean comma. In some forms of tuning this manifests as the wolf interval. The problem is that there is a very peculiar incompatibility between the fractions which are used produce harmonies. In modern musical engineering, the problem is resolved by using equal interval tuning. But such tuning denies the perfect harmonies which are to be found in "just", or "pure" intonation. The result is that there is no truly objective way of dividing the octave. We compromise, seeking a way which is pragmatic, and also conducive to producing harmony.

I think the problem can be exemplified like this. Suppose we take an octave between 220 Hz and 440 Hz. 220 and 440 are in perfect harmony, being the octave. The next octave would take us to 880. We can find the mid-point of each of these octaves, 330, and 660, so we have another octave here, with perfect harmony. All of these, 220, 330, 440, 660, are consistent with the divisor of 110, so there is a degree of consonance, and we have harmony here, the properties of good music which produce peace and love. But when we take the mid-way point between 330 and 660, we get 495, and an octave lower than 330 is 165. So if we halve this octave, we have dissonance in relation to the 220-440-880 octaves. This makes it impossible to produce the notes within the octave according to the pure principles of harmony. Each note requires that we jump to a different mathematical base, and there is no harmony, peace or love, between these different bases.

What this indicates is the fundamental difference between doubling a number and halving a number. From our mathematical training, we tend to see halving as a simple inversion of doubling. But what music demonstrates to us is that when we are dealing with frequencies there is a fundamental difference between doubling and halving. This problem manifests in the Fourier transform, and is well known as the uncertainty principle.

Yet the forment of the quantum vacuum generates particles with a spontaneity that is also completely statistically predictable. — apokrisis

The "forment" of the quantum vacuum? I assume you mean foment, but that still doesn't make any sense. Nor does the claim that the quantum vacuum generates particles with a spontaneity that is "completely statistically predictable". I think that the very opposite of this is actually what is the case.

But these particles of energy within the so-called "quantum vacuum" are just very clear evidence that quantum field theory is unacceptable. That's the real problem here, quantum field theory just hides the realities of existence behind some artificial, and incoherent, symmetries.

And then - surprise, surprise - rotational symmetry is one of physics foundational facts. — apokrisis

That's the point I was getting at. What a surprise. This incoherency is considered by some to be "one of physics foundational facts".

You see what happened to the assumed eternal circular motions which Aristotle assigned to the orbits of the planets. It turned out that they weren't actually circular, nor were they eternal. You are repeating the very same mistake with your "rotational symmetry".

As soon as you break the symmetry of a circle - put a nick or a mark on its circumference - immediately you can see (from this imperfection) that it has some relative rate of motion (or rest). — apokrisis

OK, but the issue was whether or not it is possible to have a perfect circle, such that you could not tell its rate of spinning, or even whether or not it is spinning. And if there is such a perfect circle, the perfect symmetry, which would be impossible to determine whether it's spinning or not, wouldn't it be nonsensical to speak about it as if it is spinning? That's what I am trying to get at, the nonsensicalness of this notion of spinning, which appears to be totally incompatible with the pure symmetry of a circle.

Which is what spinning a circle (or talking about rotational symmetry) illustrates. You can spin until you create a circle. But continuing to spin then doesn't make any actual difference. Once action has expressed its limit, further action doesn't change anything. — apokrisis

Wouldn't further spin increase the rate of spin? Do you think that the rate of spin is not an actual difference? If not, then there is no difference between spinning and not spinning either. Your statement seems to imply that there is no difference between a static circle and a spinning circle. But surely there must be, and if there is a difference between these two, then the rate of spin is also a difference which needs to be considered.

The media is not composed of an 'objective' and disinterested group of people who simply state facts. Its members have biases and preferences--be they from the Left or the Right--and we should therefore be suspicious of the attempt to portray truth as a simple matter. — Erik

In the US, there is a long standing tradition that the media reports things as they see fit to report them. It's called freedom of the press. Political biases exist, left/right etc.. They are expected and they are recognized. It appears like Trump now wants to dictate what the media should and should not report, but that is completely contrary to freedom of the press.

I'll give you a hint as to how to respond. Do like others confronted with the same, or similar, argument do, insist that what I've done is a semantic trick, pure sophistry.

As I have noted before, the perfect circle can be real, just not actual. — aletheist

The analogy referred to a spinning circle, and by this description, "spinning" implies necessarily that it is actual. Therefore the analogy refers to an actual circle, which according to your statement above, cannot be a perfect circle. However, the description in the analogy described the spinning circle in a way which could only refer a perfect circle. Therefore the situation described by the analogy is impossible, contradictory.

And what's a law? My suggestion is that a law just is a description. So if there's a description then ipso facto there's a law. — Michael

The problem is that the law is a sort of "ideal" description, just like the perfect circle is an ideal. How the ideal relates to what actually exists is another issue altogether.

I like your circle metaphor. However, how does one get from “unlawfulness” to a (perfect) circle?
Also I don’t see how the circle metaphor elucidates the existence of various fundamental constants, which could have been very different; see the multiverse hypothesis. IOWs in many cases the existence of limits (a la the circle form) is not apparent. — Querius

The perfect circle though cannot be a real, or natural figure, and this is indicated by the irrational nature of pi. So the analogy of spinning a circle is a flawed analogy, because there cannot be a real, perfect circle, spinning in time, in order to fulfil the analogy. The perfect circle can only exist as an ideal. This was Aristotle's mistake, he assumed an eternal circular motion as unmoved mover. But such an unmoved mover would require the real existence of a perfect circle. To fulfill the conditions of eternal circular motion, the circle must be perfect, just like the circle must be perfect to fulfill the conditions of the analogy.

But what standard is being used to guide the criticism? And what's the purpose of criticizing in the first place if not to point to an alternative? People who are indifferent to politics don't engage in that sort of activity. Also, it would appear as though the very notion of defectiveness implies its opposite, just as diagnosing sickness implies an understanding of health, and criticizing what is bad does so by virtue of an understanding of what is good. To use a culinary analogy, if I say a dish you prepared is too salty, then I don't need to come out and tell you to put less salt in it next time. It's implied, and clearly so. The same goes for suggesting that (e.g.) a certain trade deal hurts American workers. The implication is that we should opt out of that arrangement. — Erik

I don't think that the practise of criticizing is as clear as you make it sound. To take your example, one can simply say that the dish is lacking something, "it doesn't taste the way I think it should", without even being capable of identifying the exact problem. There is no clear idea of "how it should taste", or of what is needed to make it taste that way. To determine that something is missing, and to determine what it is that is missing are two distinct procedures. It is the same in the example of sickness, the person who is sick may be able to say "I am sick", without having any capacity to diagnose the illness.

Now, if you feel that Trump is worse than Obama (and not just different), then please tell me how you arrived at this position without employing language laden with moral--or political or economic or cultural--value judgments or preferences. Truthfulness is a value which we admire, as are things like selflessness and compassion. But if they're not 'better' than their opposites, then what's your issue with Trump? In fact, why is destroying or dismantling systems wrong? Even the use of this sort of language harbors implicit moral judgments within this context. You really don't feel as though basic moral assumptions and guiding ethical principles are at work in your negative assessment of this man, or the agenda that he's proposing? — Erik

The matter is this. Moral principles are very difficult to understand logically. Values must be grounded in ends. The end is what makes the value a "true" value, it is validated by the end. Ends must be clearly defined, or principles laid out whereby an end may be determined as good or bad, or else there are no true values whatsoever. You say "truthfulness is a value", but you do not support that logically, with reasons why truthfulness should be valued. Without these reasons, the claim is hollow.

We may have been raised for generation after generation, taught and trained that truthfulness is a value. It would be so ingrained into our way of life that it is almost instinctual, we just accept it, take it for granted, that truthfulness is to be valued, unconditionally, so we grow up to behave this way. Now, someone may come along and say, no, that's wrong, in many cases being untruthful can be to one's advantage. In this way, truthfulness itself may be attacked, criticized as wrong or bad, under these conditions. As soon as truthfulness, as an absolute value, is undermined, as only valuable in some instances, then deception spreads like wild fire through all the situations in which untruthfulness appears to be advantageous. We no longer grow up behaving like truthfulness should be valued in all situations.

There is no way to stop the spread except to go back and revisit the principles. Why was truthfulness so strongly instilled within us in the first place? What reason is there for this? What good does it serve? In western society, the philosophical mindset, the desire for knowledge, the desire to know the truth about life, the earth, the solar system, the universe, chemistry, physics, had given great value to "truth". Knowledge is a collective effort, and truth is of the highest importance in relation to knowledge.

To me this is such an obvious point that I feel I must be misunderstanding your position. I mean this sincerely--I'm not primarily concerned with winning an argument here but really want to understand how one engaging in criticism need not do so from any (implied or explicit) notion of better or worse. I'll gladly concede if you can help me gain a better understanding of my own views, especially if they're flawed. I see this as an entirely separate issue (having to do with guiding assumptions being a necessary component of human existence) than the ascendancy of Trump to political power. Maybe the two are being conflated a bit. — Erik

So here is an example of criticism without an alternative proposal. I can criticise the mores of our society. I can say truth is becoming devalued. I can say that the entire moral structure, which was upheld in days long past, by the church, is becoming devalued. I can say that we take morality for granted, as if it is some naturally occurring thing, through the forces of evolution, and we've lost track of the fact that morality is really created artificially, requiring effort, strength of will. In our society we just assume that people will instinctively act morally, we have evolved to be like this. I have absolutely no idea or proposal for how to fix this. That's way beyond me. I can see a problem, and analyze it. And as I alluded to in the last passage, I can claim that it has to do with a loss of the philosophical mindset, but this is just deferring to a further problem. All I am doing here is working to identify the problem, similar to what Socrates did. I am providing no suggestions for resolution of the problem.

Finally, Trump did propose some solutions to what he perceives to be the nation's problems, even if we disagree with those. Pulling the US out of unfair trade agreements, controlling immigration, reigning in the ability of moneyed interests to lobby politicians, etc. — Erik

Until something is offered to replace the existing trade deals and immigration policies, I would not describe these as proposals for solution. These are just statements of "we should end the status quo because it's bad". And acting on this type of position is just to destroy existing systems with no proposal for how to replace them. But it may be that evolution actually works this way, the existing form must be destroyed in order for the new form to emerge and take its place. It is not a matter of repairing, and renovating the old, it is a matter of a complete rebuild. After all, as individuals, we all die, don't we?

Newton's laws were just explanatory hypotheses (retroduction) until they produced testable predictions (deduction) that were subsequently corroborated by experiments and observations (induction). — aletheist

Newton's laws were not written as hypotheses, to produce testable predictions in order to determine the reliability of the hypotheses. They were written as statements of fact, laws. These laws were intended to act as premises from which deductive reasoning could proceed. Since these laws were assumed to be true, the conclusions derived were also assumed to be true. To describe them as explanatory hypotheses is just a false representation.

As I see it, without the belief in something better (even if it simply means finally adhering to professed principles) there's really no ground on which to criticize any existing state of affairs.

...

And that was my point: it's hard to criticize anyone or anything without some idealized notion of how it could or should be. — Erik

I do not agree with this point. We can quite readily criticize, and point out what is bad, without offering an alternative, what is better. There is no need to propose a better system in order to point to the defects of the existing system. In fact, that seemed to be Trump's mo, how he got elected, by pointing to deficiencies, claiming they would be fixed, without proposing any real solutions. However, the issue is that there is a big difference between pointing to deficiencies, and actually moving to resolve the problems pointed to. The latter does require the idealized "how it should be", the "something better". Now trump may be in a position where he can actually start to dismantle systems which are seen to have deficiencies. Without the "something better", this may be a real problem. Dismantling destroys the good along with the bad.

We start with meanings first, or the "content" of the word, before we get to the label. The "content" is what is the word refers to: whether that is an object, feeling, idea, and so on. For example, the content of the word "square" is a specific shape. What matters is the shape itself; the name itself is irrelevant. The only thing that matters is that we ultimately understand that when I say "square", people understand what I am referring to. "Square" operates as a label for the content (in this case, a specific shape). — Chany

Now my point. Isn't this "content" just belief? That the word "square" refers to a specific shape, is dependent on people believing this. If everyone believed that "square" referred to a specific colour, then it would not refer to a specific shape, it would refer to a specific colour. But people believe that "square" refers to a specific shape, and therefore "square" refers to a specific shape.

However, we are simply agreeing on what a word means. From there, we can evaluate the truth value of the claim, "the sky is blue". Potentially, we all have different qualia of what we collectively call the color "blue" and simply agree to call whatever that is "blue". — Chany

So this is the crux of my argument. Before we can evaluate the truth value of a claim, we must agree on what the words mean. So there is no truth or falsity without an objective, or agreed upon meaning. But meaning is determined by what we believe. Therefore truth is inherently dependent on belief. And this is contrary to what you have been claiming, that what people believe has no bearing on truth.

I do not see the case for the claim that the belief in something is somehow evidence for the truth of that belief. — Chany

So you don't see that the truth about the meaning of a word is inherently dependent on what people believe? The truth about the meaning of "square" is dependent on what people believe. And therefore belief that "square" refers to a specific shape is evidence that it is true that "square" refers to a specific shape. Do you follow that? What about the word "God" now? Do you not see that when people believe that the word "God" refers to a being which necessarily exists, then this is evidence that the word "God" refers to a being that necessarily exists? This is just like the fact that when people believe that the word "square" refers to a specific shape, this is evidence that it is true that the word "square" refers to a specific shape.

These were both retroductions (experience to hypothesis), not inductions (hypothesis to experience). Inductive experimentation requires a retroductive theory and its testable deductive predictions before it can even begin. — aletheist

Just to let you know, I don't agree with this. Induction is not "hypothesis to experience". It is a generalization derived from experience, such as a law in the sense of a law of physics, like Newton's first law of motion for example. It does not need a prior hypothesis, with experimentation, it only requires observation. So I don't believe that an inductive conclusion requires a retroductive theory. Nor do I believe that one can make such a clear distinction between a retroductive and inductive principle.

What observations? — tom

The observations I am talking about are the observations concerning the motions of bodies made by physicists prior to Einstein, such as Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler, etc.. Relativity was developed by Newton and Galileo. The fact that the motions of the solar system could be described by either the geocentric or the heliocentric models, is an indication that motion is relative.

Are you claiming this is not true for Newton's Laws? — tom

No I'm not claiming any such thing, that's why it's called Newtonian relativity.

I went to school and graduated with honors?? Then went into a job market and I had no idea what to do. So what's your point exactly? I'm sorry but, I feel a bit of assholiness coming out of you? — Ariel

"Assholiness". Is that a word you learned in your honours studies?

The observations were made prior to Einstein. Relativity theory involved the inductive conclusion that all motions are relative. Einstein took another inductive conclusion, that the speed of light is always the same relative to physical objects, and produced consistency between these two, with the special theory of relativity.

I'm not entirely sure what your point is. Yes, if we called "blue" by another name or used "blue" to refer to something else than we usually use it, then "the sky is blue" would be false. However, changing defenitions and what the word refers to is irrelevant. What matters is the content of what "blue" refers to. The content is what matters, not the language we use to describe the content. — Chany

Clearly, what the words mean is not irrelevant, to the contrary, it is the content. If we do not agree that "blue" is the word which refers to the colour of the sky, then how can it be true that the sky is blue? Contrary to what you say, truth is dependent on belief.

You seem to believe in some mystical concept of content, "the content is what matters". You say, "what matters is the content of what 'blue' refers to". How is this so-called "content" anything other than the belief of what "blue" refers to?

Although truly I do think Trump will meet his match in the US system; here's hoping that he goes a step too far and falls into the abyss (by being impeached or removed from office for blatant abuse of power.) — Wayfarer

Most likely when he finds out that he can't do what he wants through legal means, he'll resort to illegal means, as his attitude seems to be that the president should be able to do whatever he wants.

We don't hear a 'thing out there' (as with sight); so much as we are implicated in the sound itself; we - or our ear drums and cochlea - vibrate along with the sound, such that we - as bodies - are enfolded into the very phenomenon of sound without which we would not be able to 'hear' it. — StreetlightX

We do hear a "thing out there", just like we see things. We hear the thing which makes the noise, the French horn, the violin, the dog barking, we always hear a thing, making a sound. Yes, it requires identification to determine that the sound is coming from a French horn, but whenever we hear a disembodied "sound", we are merely confused with "what's that?". Nevertheless, we always assume that the noise comes from something. It is not believed that the noise is "out there" without a thing causing it. This is no different from seeing. We can see a colour, and if we can't identify the object we think "what's that?". But we know that the colour which is being seen is coming from the object, as a property of the object, just like we know that the sound is coming from the French horn, as a property of the French horn

To think of sound without either wavelength or amplitude would be to do away with sound altogether. Naively of course, vision excludes this ‘in-built’ dimension of difference: to see is to see self-identical ’things’ (this is not quite right, but let’s run with it for now…) — StreetlightX

I would not be so quick to focus on the difference between hearing and seeing. What we see are differences of colour, and these are wavelength/frequency differences, just like the differences which we hear. We do not see "self-identical things", we learn to identify things through the power of thought, not sight. We can identify the same note when it comes around in a piece of music, just like we can identify the same colour in different things.

Through this power of identification, we can also recognize that hearing and seeing are actually very similar. It's simply the case that the speed of sound is much slower than the speed of light, so we understand the mechanism of hearing much better than the mechanism of seeing. Did you know that the spectrum of visible wavelength of electromagnetism is almost precisely one "octave"?

Generally, the fact that people believe something is nuetral. It may, at best, serve as very minor evidence or an indication of something that requires further study. Rather, the justification of evidence comes from realiable judgement. In the case of the color of the sky, people's senses are generally reliable enough to cast reliable judgement on the color of something they see everyday. — Chany

The point though, is that the colour which we call "blue" is the colour of the sky. What makes it true that the sky is blue, is the fact that people believe that the colour which the sky is, should be called "blue". If everyone believed that the colour which the sky is should be called "red", or that the colour of the grass is the colour which should be called "blue", then it would not be true that the sky is blue. So actually, contrary to your insistence, it is the fact that everyone believes that "the sky is blue" is true, which makes it true that the sky is blue. If people stopped believing this, it would no longer be true that the sky is blue.

What does it mean for something to exist? — mew

I would say that to exist is to have temporal extension. Anything which in some way stays the same, for a duration of time, exists

I am saying that, regardless of everything else, your argument is bad. Belief in something is not evidence of that belief's truth. — Chany

Are you saying that people believing that "the sky is blue" is true, is not evidence that "the sky is blue" is true? What else would qualify as evidence that "the sky is blue" is true?

When we discussed politics you confessed to believing in God. Clearly that's not the case, or you wouldn't be asking such silly questions now would you? What's really the case, are you skeptical toward God, or a strong disbeliever?

Why not do it in audio? — The Great Whatever

I think audio is too difficult. It adds the dimension of comprehending the sounds, and remembering what was said. Playback would be required, to maintain quality responses, and then what would be the point? The written word provides a better forum.

I feel that in-person debates with allotted time structures would take the focus away from the arguments themselves and transform them into points about style and delivery, though this might favor people who talk better than they write. — Chany

That's the whole idea, to focus on style and technique. A good discussion requires that each member focus not only on what they themselves want to say, but also on what the others are saying. This format would give participants the chance to practise rapid comprehension of written material, and rapid response, as well as give the audience a chance to criticize those who go off on a tangent, fail to display a clear understanding of what the opponent said, or write clearly It is to compare and balance interpretive skills with writing skills.

There are also some kinks that would need to be worked out, like how the first person to speak would have to spend part of their allotted time to just introduce the topic and offer some loose background info. Also, how exactly would the participants do this? Google Hangout? — Chany

There's no need for Google Hangout, do it here. Just limit the thread to the participants only, who agree before hand to the timing factors. A mod could introduce the topic and flip a coin or something to see who goes first. After the debate the audience, as well as the participants, can pick it apart.

Then in what sense did I exist before birth? — Agustino

"I" refers to a combination of body and soul, so in no sense did "I" exist prior to that combination.

No experience means no existence, — Agustino

I don't see any reason to accept this principle. What do you mean by "experience"? A rock doesn't experience, does that mean it doesn't exist?

Where is the soul before birth? Why don't I remember anything? — Agustino

You didn't have any memory before birth therefore you don't remember anything before birth. In fact, your memory was just developing at birth and that's why you can't remember things from a very young age.

Conscious (Mind) and Matter are one and the same, moving in different directions in Duration (real time). One can say that Matter is Mind (Bergson names it the Elan Vital) that is no longer evolving in Time. — Rich

I have no problem with this basic principle, that Mind and Matter appear to be the same, because neither philosophy nor physics has been able to determine "mind" or "matter". As undetermined, they appear to be the same. What physics deals with is the various forms which matter takes. It makes assumptions concerning matter but only bases these on the forms of matter. Philosophy deals with logical forms, and only metaphysics speculates about matter itself or mind itself. For all we know, mind and matter could be the very same thing.

However, there is an important difference which Aristotle points to. Matter is understood to be passive, while the soul is an active form. This becomes relevant in the cosmological argument. If we adhere to this difference, it is impossible that they are the same. This is evident from what you say as well. Mind is "evolving in Time" (active), while Matter is not (passive). That one is passive and the other is active makes it impossible that they are one and the same thing.

If one wished to be highly precise, there is still a bit of Duration in Matter but it had slowed so drastically that evolution has appeared to stop. — Rich

This is why matter is unintelligible. What is intelligible is active forms. But matter, to fulfill the assumptions of physics, must be passive, that which is acted upon. When we try to understand matter itself, we get lost in infinities such as "slowed so drastically that evolution has appeared to stop". We cannot use the principles which understand active forms to understand passive matter, because then matter appears as an infinitely slow activity instead of being purely passive. That's why we need dualism.

Right and this soul goes out of the body upon death and into some other realm right? — Agustino

Why "goes out... into some other realm"? It already is in that other realm. That's what dualism's all about. At death it has lost its influence over the material body.

I've read enough philosophy to know that the “weird-sounding portions" may be impossible to fix. They seem to be inherent within philosophy, as a function of the creative aspect, the idiosyncrasies of the author. At first I thought that such weird-sounding portions were due to poor translation, but I quickly realized that this is not the case.

In this sense QM is a kind of 'card' that sophisticated parlor gamers overrule, perhaps justifiably, with a disdain 'card.' — csalisbury

QM is the "trump" card. But if we don't like the idea of trump, and think it's a cheat, we can just make rules allowing us to ignore whoever's playing trump.

Then I would say there is still a problem, if the mind at all was involved with the movement of the physical body. — Rich

How the non-physical moves the physical is a complex issue, this involves free will, intention, etc.. I believe it can only be understood through a thorough understanding of the nature of time. No one has such an understanding of time. Do you notice that the past is radically different from the future? Think about the future. It is always right in front of you but you cannot see or sense anything in the future. That is because there is no physical existence in the future. The fact that, through a free willing act, the human being can change, or destroy any physical thing within its power, at any random moment of the present, demonstrates that there is no physical existence prior to the present. The continuity of existence at the present, which we take for granted in laws such as Newton's first law of motion, is not necessary. This means that the entire physical world must come into existence at each moment of the present. The soul, having its existence anchored in the non-physical side of the present, has some capacity to control how the physical comes into existence at each moment. Therefore it moves the physical body.

There is also the issue of how does the mind "grasp". How does the physical convert into something that can be grasped by the non-physical. I believe Bergson, as he was extremely well studied and reknown for his understanding of mathematics, biology, psychology, and philosophy, set out in his own metaphysics to — Rich

I am not familiar with Bergson, perhaps you could explain some of his principles. As far as how the mind grasps the physical though, I understand this in traditional Aristotelian terms of matter and form. It is not that the mind converts the physical into something that can be grasped, it is that the physical already exists in such a form. Under Neo-Platonic principles, the Form of any, and every object, must pre-exist that object in time. How I understand this, is that the form of the object, exists in the future of the object, and this determines how the physical object will come into existence at each moment of the present. To change the object is to change its form, such that when it comes into existence at the next moment, it will be different. So the form is fundamentally separable from the physical object, as the existence of the physical object relies on the form, but not vise versa. When the mind grasps the object, it grasps the form of the object. Being a form itself, I believe the soul has the capacity to reproduce aspects of the form of the object, in sensation, or in conceptual structure, without actually altering the object. It is a representation. The material aspect appears to be beyond the grasp of the mind, and this limits our ability to apprehend, and change the world.