Why don't you just look it up, or Google it? Plenty of stuff on cardinalities, countable and uncountable infinities, the diagonalization argument, Cantor ... — tom

I have, but you can't believe that just because a mathematician says it is so, therefore it is so. There's a lot of misunderstanding and sophistry in the world.

It appears very obvious to me that you do not understand the accepted meaning of the word "countable" and, more fundamentally, the distinction between logical possibility and nomological possibility — aletheist

As I said, it's an accepted name, "countable". But just because it's called "countable" doesn't means it's actually countable. You seem to believe that it actually does mean that it's countable. And as I explained, when talking specifically about the infinite itself, there is no difference between the countable and the uncountable. There is simply a difference between the thing which you are attempting to count.

Your worldview is too small because it limits the real to the actual and the finite. — aletheist

I'd rather a smaller world view which distinguishes fact from fiction, than a larger world view which doesn't distinguish fact from fiction.

OK, so you can count integers, but you cannot count the real numbers, even in a tiny subset. There is an uncountable infinity of reals within any subset - hence it is a continuum. The countable infinities do not have this property. They are different and one is at least infinitely bigger than the other. — tom

No, to say that one is infinitely bigger than the other is nonsense, unless you are assigning spatial magnitude to what is being counted. We are referring to quantities, and each quantity is infinite, how could an infinite quantity be greater than another infinite quantity?

What is the case is that as you say, the real numbers represent a continuum, while the integers represent discrete, indivisible units. So there is a fundamental difference between what each represents. The continuum is assumed to be infinitely divisible, and also there is assumed to be an infinite number of discrete units. The meaning of "infinite" remains the same, so there is no difference between these two infinities. There is a difference between what "infinite" is being assigned to, division or addition.

I don't agree with the Freudian model, especially the distinction between ego and superego. I use "subconscious" in a way defined by philosophy rather than psychology. You appear to have identified my use of "subconscious" with a Freudian "unconscious", but that's not quite right because you also have a subconscious superego, which I have no respect for. If we continued to hash this out, it would become evident that you and I have completely different ways of looking at memory. This is important because memory is central to what we are discussing here.

But, where does this intention come from? — TimeLine

I think intention is inherent within life itself, as all living things tend to act with purpose.

Your point?

Do you think you might be able to count a subset of the integers? — tom

Yes of course, but a subset of integers is not infinite. The difference here is with respect to the thing being counted, what is within the set, real numbers versus integers, one is assumed to be divisible, the other is not. It is not a difference in the infinity itself. With respect to the infinity itself, one is no different from the other.

Try counting the real numbers between 0 and 1. — tom

It can't be done, but that doesn't mean that the natural numbers are countable. Neither real nor natural numbers are actually countable, because of the nature of infinity. One has no beginning point, the other has no ending point, but neither, as an infinity, is actually countable.

Countable infinities are precisely those which can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the integers. This is a definition, and no, no one expects you to count them all. — tom

That's the point, they are not countable, so to call them "countable" is just a name, a label, it doesn't mean that they are actually countable. You might differentiate natural numbers from real numbers by saying that one is countable and the other not, but that's just a name, in actuality neither are countable.

Newton's laws concern mass, not substance, in the Aristotelean sense. Crucial distinction. — Wayfarer

Mass was said to be a fundamental property of matter, weight or some such thing, which is quantifiable. Matter has mass, means that the matter of a body is quantifiable as the mass of the body, and being quantifiable means that it has a form. Mass is assumed to be the most fundamental form of matter. Therefore to discuss the mass of a body is to discuss substance in the Aristotelian sense, matter with form (mass). That's the point, mass is substance for Newton, in its most fundamental form, and Newton's laws take substance for granted, as a given, and describe the behaviour of substance.

I guess you must deny, then, that the integers are countable, since nothing and no one can actually count them all. — aletheist

That's right. It appears very obvious to me that if it is impossible to count them, then it is false to say that they are countable. Why would you accept the contradictory premise, that something which is impossible to count is countable? That makes no sense to me. This is the basic nature of infinity, that it is not countable. To believe otherwise is very clearly to believe a contradiction. The notion of infinity may be useful, but it's a fiction, a useful fiction.

I said that, also, the reason being that Galilean and Newtonian physics rejected Aristotelean physics, it didn't need the scholastic concept of 'substance' in order to do its work (and besides wanted to break from the 'dead hand of scholasticism'). — Wayfarer

The argument I made to Pierre-Normand is that the concept of enduring substance is inherent within Newtonian physics, as the given. It is taken for granted by Newton's first law. So my argument is that it is not the case that the concept of enduring substance does not enter into the laws of physics, it is right there in Newton's first law, as the given, that which is taken for granted.

No one is talking about doing anything. To say that something is infinitely divisible does not mean that a human being is actually capable of infinitely dividing it. It means that it is possible in principle to divide it infinitely. — aletheist

Right, and to divide something it is to do something. So to assume that it is infinitely divisible is to assume that something is capable of dividing it infinitely. If it is not possible for something to do this, then that principle is false.

OK, that's why it comes down to the accuracy of our theories of "space".

Space is actually infinitely divisible and potentially infinitely divided. — Michael

This is exactly the question brought up by the op. Is space actually infinitely divisible, or is this just a false assumption, a mistaken theory?

You're still making the same mistake. It is false to say that space is potentially infinitely divisible only if it actually is. — aletheist

Well that's surely your problem not mine. You believe that something is possible (potentially doable) though it is actually impossible to do it. If you don't recognize this as a mistake, there's not much I can do to help you.

What a philosopher would ask is a question that science will never address, but desperately needs an answer to (so it will not be so easily commandeered by mindless megalomaniacs), a question that we all need an adequate answer to, the Greatest of the Great Questions of Life: that of "Why Bother?"

Without an adequate answer to that Greatest of the Great Questions of Life (for you must admit, you must answer that question before you even begin to address the others), all will crumble in uncertainty. (I have the answer, by the way) (and no - it is not a smart-ass answer. so don't go there). — Numi Who

Why must this question be answered first? If the philosophical nature is simply "the desire to know", then why can't we direct our inquisition toward anything we want? Philosophy begins in wonder, and we can wonder about anything without having any notion as to why we are wondering about this. What makes you believe that this particular question, "Why Bother", must be answered before we ask all those other questions?

I’m not sure I’d agree. My understanding is that Aristotle ultimately argues that substance is the unity of matter and form or, more generally, of dunamis and energeia. This unity is the necessary and sufficient condition of being. In that sense hylomorphism fundamentally differs from modern substance dualism, which explicitly dichotomizes thought and extension into mutually exclusive categories of being. In the modern approach a thinking substance can exist entirely apart from extended substance and vice versa. — Aaron R

Well, I think that "substance" was proper to Aristotle's logic, the categories, while the unity of matter and form was proper to his physics. Now we could say that physical objects, as a unity of matter and form, are primary substance, but we still have to consider secondary substance, which is more like the simple essence of a thing, form without the matter. Then in his metaphysics, when he seeks the nature of being itself, he finds that there must be a formal essence which underlies the material existence of a thing. That is to say that for every existing thing, there is a reason why it exists as the thing which it is, and this causes it to be the thing that it is. This formal essence therefore must be prior to the material existence of the thing.

So we clearly have a substance dualism here, though it is more complex than the simple representation of thinking substance and extended substance. It is more like "secondary substance" as the formal essence of a thing, and "primary substance" as a unity of matter and form.


I very much agree with that, and it's pretty much the same thing which I said earlier.

Either space is infinitely divisible or it is not. Whether anyone can actually divide space into infinitely many parts is completely irrelevant - only whether it could potentially be divided into infinitely many parts. — aletheist

Only the motion from one actual location (i.e., arbitrarily defined coordinate) to the next is a discrete event. We can only define a finite number of distance coordinates, so we can only measure motion in discrete units. — aletheist

You're still making the same mistake. It is false to say that space is potentially infinitely divisible unless it actually is. It is false to say that an object could potentially move to coordinate A, unless the object can actually do this. You are allowing fiction into your perspective by claiming that actuality has no bearing on potential. This allows you to claim that all sorts of impossibilities are real potentials, because your notion of potential is not restricted by actuality. This indicates that you have a deep misunderstanding of the concept of "potential".

Well, it's only that something like this must happen if motion is to be possible.

...

There are a finite number of coordinates for the object to pass through, "jumping" from one point to the next without passing through the space in between. — Michael

How can something "jump" from one discrete location to another without ever occupying the space in between? This is pure nonsense to me. — aletheist

Michael is correct here, that is simply how motion is. Consider walking, your foot is on the ground at one point, then on the ground at the next. It is not on the ground at all points in between. When we see an object moving, we assume that it must occupy every point along its course, but this is an assumption only. The assumed "course" is an oversimplification of what is really happening, and this is well known in QM.

It is not that I have incorrectly applied the term epistemological but rather you yourself have failed to understand the subconscious mind and the structural layers of the psyche; I fear you think that somehow the subconscious is distinct from the conscious mind. It is not, and as I said earlier, the subconscious mind is still a form of consciousness. — TimeLine

You appear to be entering contradiction in an effort to support an untenable metaphysical position. Subconscious, by definition is not a form of consciousness. By claiming this you only contradict yourself. I believe that you are denying the distinction between these two, conscious and subconscious, which I have utilized, in order to assume that the two exist only as an undivided whole. But this is not the case, because we see from the evidence of evolution that consciousness evolved, and that there was a form of subconscious prior to there being consciousness. So the distinction between these two, is in principle validated, while your claim that one cannot exist separate from the other, should be rejected.

The reality which you seem to be ignoring is the fact that the subconscious is necessary to support the conscious, but the conscious is not necessary to support the subconscious. So the subconscious can exist independently of the conscious, as we see in primitive animals and plants.

In my analysis, which I described in the last post, I have separated intention from conscious, so that the subconscious may still be directed by intention, but this is not a conscious intention. Consciousness is not necessary for intention, as we see that plants and primitive animals act with purpose, but not with consciousness. This allowed me to say that intention can direct the attention, at the subconscious level, without conscious interference.

Neither seem satisfactory to me. I think that we definitely need both, and I see no need to prioritize one, let alone kill one with the other. I can't bridge the gap either, but oh well. — Wosret

If you say that things are different in some ways, and the same in other ways, this appears to prioritize difference, as these "ways" must be different. Then again, that they are both said to be "ways", indicates that they are the same.

It is really no different from philosophy in this regard; it all boils down to one's assumptions. To get us back on topic, Zeno's alleged paradox exploits this by smuggling in the idea that any finite interval of space consists of infinitely many individual points, such that one must somehow pass through them all in order to get from one place to another. Once we dispense with that misconception and recognize that space is continuous, and the only actual points are the ones that we arbitrarily define, the paradox dissolves. — aletheist

I don't think there is any issue with points in this paradox. I believe the problem is quite similar to how TheMadFool states it. The issue is the assumption that space is infinitely divisible. Zeno assumes that in theory, space is infinitely divisible. However, in practise space is not infinitely divisible. The conclusion makes a statement about what can and can't be done in practise. The theory is wrong, and therefore cannot be successfully applied in practise.

You are confusing actual possibility with logical possibility. Mathematics deals with the latter, not the former. It is indeed actually impossible to add infinitely many fractions, but it is not logically impossible. — aletheist

Sure, mathematics is logic, but valid logic does not necessitate a true conclusion. The premises must be judged. So I am judging the premise with respect to what is actually possible. Your premise states "if someone does a thing which is actually impossible to do...". So I judge it as an impossibility and therefore a falsity. And so I judge your conclusion as a falsity as well.

Mathematics is entirely a matter of necessary reasoning about hypothetical states of affairs. There is no falsity whatsoever in saying that if someone were to add infinitely many fractions in a particular series, then the result would be 1. The fact that no one can actually add infinitely many fractions is completely irrelevant. — aletheist

No, the fact that it is impossible to add infinitely many fractions is relevant. Because your premise is "if someone were to add infinitely many fractions...". But this is an impossibility. Therefore your premise is false. It is stating "if someone were to do something impossible..." Your premise is false therefore your conclusion is equally false.

That would be really really boring. I already know you can do whatever you want with maths, just make it up as you go, and prove whatever you want to prove.

From your Wikipedia page Banno: "As n approaches infinity, sn tends to aproach 1." Does that means =1 to you?

Didn't see anything there that says I don't understand mathematics. However,I am good at recognizing falsity when I see it though. Whether that falsity is mathematically proven or not doesn't really matter too much to me.

Not at all. We can reason about infinity without actually doing anything an infinite number of times. If someone (God, perhaps) were to add up Banno's infinitely many fractions or carry out my multiplication to infinitely many decimal places, then the result would be 1 in either case. — aletheist

The problem is, that this feat of adding infinitely many fractions would never be finished, so 1 would never be reached. Therefore it is false to say that it equals one. It does not. You can claim Banno's cheat all you want, nevertheless you're still claiming that a falsity is true.

Because you know you're wrong.

So you are assuming that you can be done doing something an infinite amount of times? Sounds like a falsity to me.

Convert 1/3 to a decimal, then multiply it by 3. Is the result 1, or an infinitesimal fraction short of 1? — aletheist

Can't be done. What does that have to do with my question?

You're overthinking it.

½ + ¼ + ⅛...=1 — Banno

How do you get =1 here Banno? It appears to me, like no matter how far you go you'll always be a fraction short of 1. Have you got a cheat?

I think these kinds of intuitions is what the 'myth of the given' is criticising. It is the belief that knowledge has a dimension which is given or self-evident, which philosophy then elaborates on, when in fact, critical philosophy is questioning the very thing which you're taking to be self-evident. — Wayfarer

I think this is the issue which we approached with Pierre-Normand, concerning the notion of "enduring substance". Pierre mentioned that the concept of enduring substance doesn't enter the purview of the laws of physics. But I think this notion is inherent within such laws, essential to them, as the "given", which validates these laws.

Any law of physics assumes that what has been the case in the past, will continue to be the case, in the future. We make an inductive statement, of what has been, according to observation, and this statement acts as a law. The law contains predictive power according to the fact that what has been in the past, will continue to be so, in the future. So for example, I can state as a law, "the clear sky is blue". This is derived from past observations, and it holds predictive power about how things will be tomorrow, the clear sky will be blue, according to the principle that what has been the case in the past, will continue to be the case in the future. That principle is what is taken for granted, as given.

This is the essence of "enduring substance". What has been the case in the past, will continue to be the case in the future. It is what the laws of physics take for granted, as "the given". When we question this "given", we question the very nature of time itself. Why does reality appear to be like this, and how does this relate to the appearance of free will?

Personally speaking, I really enjoy reading the metaphysics of the various historical cultures. Neo-Platonism is mysterious and esoteric, yet intriguing. A what if? - what if Neo-Platonism actually is true?! Simply wondering about that possibility is enough. — darthbarracuda

Sometimes I wonder the very opposite thing, what if Neo-Platonism is not actually true? But really, it's not truth or falsity which we look to in metaphysical principles, it's understanding. And understanding is an art.

The difference may cut even deeper if, as Aaron R mentioned in another thread, true Aristotelian substances are unities of matter and form, of dunamis and energeia. In that case, the only true substances are living organisms, and also, arguably, pure chemicals or chemical elements (as argued by Aryeh Kosman in The Activity of Being: An Essay in Aristotle's Ontology). Artifacts and non-living objects like stones and mountains are substances only by analogy. — Pierre-Normand

According to Aristotelian physics, any object, living or inanimate, is a unity of matter and form. Aristotle finds it necessary to assume this duality in order to account for the existence of "change". When a thing changes, it in some ways stays the same (remains the same thing, only changed), yet in another way it must change. What remains the same, persists despite the change, is the matter, what changes is the form. The assumption of matter is necessary to account for the potential for change, and the assumption of form is necessary to account for actual change. So all changing things must consist of both matter and form to account for the fact that something always persists through a change, yet something always changes, otherwise it is not a "change".

In his biology he describes a special type of form called the soul. Living bodies have a soul, and in the case of a living body, this form, the soul, is prior to any form that the material body may have. So the soul is defined as the first actuality of a body having the potential for life. This is somewhat ambiguous, but in Neo-Platonism, the form of any body is prior to the material existence of that body.

It is a very specific sort of substance that strictly obeys Newton's first (or second) law. It's a substance that is either defined as the mereological sum of its material parts, or that consists in an essentially indivisible mass. Substances that can survives the loss of some of their massive parts, or maintain their identities though the accretion of new massive parts, such as plants, animals, most artifacts, and celestial bodies, don't strictly obey Newton's laws of motion precisely because of the principle of conservation of momentum (which is a consequence of those strict laws). Those laws only strictly apply to physical "matter", things that have invariant mass. When an ordinary substance gains or loses parts, conservation of momentum only applies to the unchanging mereological sum of this substance and of the parts that it either lost or gained. — Pierre-Normand

I would not agree that it is necessary for "substance" to be defined as indivisible, or the sum of its material parts, in order for substance to obey Newton's first law. This law is not concerned with division, it provides no principles for division or unity of parts. The existence of parts is irrelevant to Newton's first. To account for division we need to describe individual parts each as separate substances, each having matter and form then. So division is a case of one substance, having matter and form, becoming a number of substances, each having matter and form. If we assume that division is a "change", then we need to account for the persistence of matter, as the thing which stays "the same", through the change, and this is the conservation of mass. In more modern physics, conservation of mass is replaced with conservation of energy, so that energy replaces Aritotelian matter, as the thing which persists, stays the same through the change. Also though, we need to account for a type of mathematical difference, one form becomes numerous forms.

But the point is, that division is not covered by Newton's first law. Persistence is covered, but division is not. So if we want to describe division under the terms of Newton's first, the single object, matter with form, moving as a unity of substance, under Newton's first law, must be defined as a number of objects, each, with its own matter and form. This allows each of the parts to move in different directions. So it's not the case that "substance" would be defined in a different way, it continues to be defined as a unity of matter and form, but it is the case that the object is described in a different way. So Newton's first would still apply in both cases. In one way the object would be described as a single substance, and in the second it would be a group, a number, of substances.

Since the description of the object is the form of the object, then the two descriptions are logically not descriptions of the same object. In one case, there are a number of objects, and in the other there is a single object. There is an inherent incompatibility between these, such that it is incorrect to say that they are two different descriptions of the same object. They are not, they are only the same to the extent of an assumed material equivalency. They have distinct forms, which makes them distinct objects, but we assume that it is the same matter. Such an assumption is a falsity, because the same matter cannot have, at the same time, different forms.

That's because those concepts, as used by Kant to investigate into the grounding of empirical knowledge, are revealed to be tied up with the concept of an enduring substance and such a formal concept doesn't fall under the purview of physical law. — Pierre-Normand

I don't think I would agree with this statement, specifically the part about enduring substance not falling under the purview of physical law. I think that Newton's first law, sometimes called the law of inertia, provides the formal concept of enduring substance. I admit that this law takes enduring substance for granted, but that's what laws of physics do, they take for granted what the law states. What this laws says, is that any substance will continue to exist, exactly as it has, in the past, unless acted upon by a force. So what this law does is describe enduring substance, as that which continues to exist as it has, in the past, unless it is acted upon.

When any law is drawn up, it represents a particular intent. That is why it is important in interpretation, to put that law into the context within which it was created. That's what true (objective) interpretation does, observes the law within the context of the intent of those who produced it. Judges know that the intent of true (objective) interpretation is to respect the intent of the law. The problem is that there is always ambiguity with respect to any interpretation of the intent of the law. It is impossible to recreate the context with 100% accuracy. This ambiguity will only be interpreted in relation to the intention of the particular judge doing the interpretation, because the judge's principal intent of true (objective) interpretation, cannot be completely fulfilled. Therefore it is inevitable that there will be some degree of subjectivity in interpretation.

So it is not necessarily the case, that the law either is or is not on our side, it is the case that the intent of the law cannot be determined in any absolutely definitive way. So if individuals such as you and I have certain biases, then we would prefer to have judges which have similar biases, in order that any ambiguity with respect to the intent of the law, would be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the way that we would interpret it.

It's almost as if we expect judges to intentionally distort the facts to agree with personal views. E.g. a Democrat will try to make it seem like the Constitution forbids a state-ban on abortion and a Republican will try to make it seem like it doesn't. — Michael

it's human nature to interpret the law in such a way as to maximize its compatibility with one's own intentions. That is the loop hole. Who would have better knowledge of the loop holes than a judge?

The objector has not understood the fact that time is one of the forms of sensibility. — Wayfarer

Why would time be considered as a form of sensibility? The concept of time is produced by us relating numerous activities. What is being sensed here in this relationship? It is not the activity itself, being sensed, that lends itself to the concept of time, it is the relationship. The earth circles the sun once, then it circles again, and these are judged as "the same" amount of time, by comparing to the cycles of the moon, or other things. The concept of time is based in such relationships, not the things being sensed.

But, what exists 'beyond perception'? And, what does 'duration' comprise? It might seem obvious, but in order for time to exist, there has to be sense of scale. Humans conceive of time in terms of the rotation of the earth around the sun, which gives them days and years - everything is measured by us in those terms. But what if you perceived it from the point of view of a being that lived for a million years? Or a being that lived for an infinitesmal instant? Those scales would be vastly different to the human scale - which is real? — Wayfarer

This is a better explanation, time is "beyond perception", but that's why Agustino referred to it as transcendentally real. As you say, it's beyond any particular scale, human or otherwise. The fact that it's beyond any particular scale does not make it unreal, it only confirms the reality of it. Time is not a scale, it is really what is measured, and can be measured by many different scales.

My argument is not that the world doesn't exist in the absence of any or all observers, but that whatever we can say we know about what exists, presupposes a perspective. Even if that is mathematicized, which effectively eliminates purely individual perspectives and gives a kind of 'weighted average' of all points of view, it's still an irreducibly human point of view, which is inextricably an aspect of whatever we say exists. — Wayfarer

You are assuming here, that every description is particular to a perspective, and there's nothing wrong with that, it's a valid principle. Now, consider something which enters the description regardless of the perspective, and here we have time. Each and every perspective of reality includes time, so it is something which is common to every perspective. Therefore it is that thing which is evident from every perspective. It is what is real, objective, not perspective dependent.

This is a view of the "block universe" in which time just is another dimension akin to the three spatial dimensions. — Pierre-Normand

If we propose a "block universe", we propose a perspective from which there is no time passing. That is, there is no such thing as the activity of time passing, from that perspective. If we accept this proposition we deny that time passing is something which is evident, and observable from each and every perspective, these are incompatible. Then time as something real, independent, objective, is denied, because the objectivity of time is dependent on the assumption that it is something which is evident from each and every perspective.

Such a view of the universe can't of course mesh with our view of the world as a source of possible objects of experience. Kant argues in the Analogies of Experience (in his CPR) that an empirical experience can't have an objective purport if it doesn't potentially rationally bear on other experiences. (Wilfrid Sellars also argued for this in his Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind currently being discussed in another thread). And this is only possible if we can distinguish the successive experiences of a single thing that has changed from the simultaneous experiences of two separately existing things. — Pierre-Normand

The idea that two distinct objects have "simultaneous experiences" is what, in the past, grounded our notion of objective existence. This gave us the notion that distinct things had something in common, the experience of time passing. This thing which they have in common was called existing. The precepts of special relativity do not necessitate that we dismiss this objectivity in favour of the block universe. What special relativity indicates is that there is vagueness with respect to "simultaneous experience". How we understand "simultaneous experience" greatly influences how we produce laws of physics. So there is variance within the laws of physics depending on one's interpretation of simultaneous experience.

I guess the point I am trying to make is that what is innate is relative to our experiences and that is why it is epistemological and not independently innate. It triggers emotional responses through memory and imagination, only sometimes we are just not aware at conscious level as to why. — TimeLine

I would not use "epistemological" in this way, and that's why I had trouble understanding your use of this term earlier. Epistemology is the study of knowledge, and knowledge is related to the conscious mind rather than the subconscious. It's true though, that we do talk about innate knowledge, and we must have some innate capacities which make knowledge possible, but I'd prefer to call these innate capacities rather than knowledge. These innate capacities may be related to emotional feelings, but I wouldn't call them epistemological. Those feelings are purely subjective, (of the subject), and with conscious knowledge we try to bring objectivity to bear against these subjective emotions. So I would use "epistemological" to refer to this process of trying to objectify the subjective, not directly to purely subjective experiences.

I really don't know what you would mean by "independently innate". Innate things are inherently within the subject, they are subjective, so what would you be referring to with "independent" here? I figure that everything which is present to the conscious mind during sensual experience, has been produced by the subconscious. So if I am seeing, or hearing something, this experience is actually created by the subconscious, and what is present to my conscious mind is an interpretation of what is being sensed. I think that "innate" would refer to what is at work in this subconscious level. And in the sense that it may appear to be prior to the conscious, in the case of a simple experience of listening to music, we might be inclined to say it's "independent" from the conscious. But even in such a passive experience, one's attention is always being direct through one's intention, so this underlying innate aspect of experience can never really be independent in that way.

You can experience this in a practise such as meditation. Through conscious intention you attempt to free yourself from the subconscious influence of sensation. This requires conscious effort, to completely ignore your surroundings. But if you achieve this meditative state, where sensations no longer attract your attention, then you realize that intention is required to focus on any particular sensible activity. This indicates that there must be some form of intention which is active at the subconscious level, directing the attention of the senses.

The window to surfacing our memories caught in the subconscious realm is our imagination; that is innate, a universal translator of sorts to our emotional responses that are triggered by musical experiences. It is not the same as language acquisition, but I do wander whether it may be a product corresponding to semantic mechanisms, but even then meaning and development is wholly social. — TimeLine

I would not say that if it is a semantic mechanism, it must be social. I would look at the opposite relation. I would say that a semantic mechanism is required to produce social relations, therefore the semantic mechanism is prior to social relations. That means that a semantic mechanism which is not social, can exist. This can be related to the failing of the so-called private language argument.

Not necessarily. Ever had an extremely strange dream, cut up into multiple, unintelligible parts as you say that when you wake up think, 'what the heck?' and have a rather intense emotional response to it; but when you think about the dream, are able to piece the puzzle as to why some images were perhaps representations of certain fears or desires, it begins to make sense and the anxiety subsides. It is an intellectual sophistication that would enable one to decipher and relate, just the same as one would when listening to music. Indeed, for the most part a temporal arrow enables us to surface our emotions, but it is not essential. The sophistication itself being as you say: — TimeLine

In this example of dreaming, what you are making sense of, what is intelligible, is the bits and pieces between the breaks. Each of these "pieces" is itself intelligible because within the piece there is a temporal order. But one piece does not align with the next, in a rational way, and this is where the unintelligibility lies. As much as you can create with your conscious mind, some arbitrary designations as to why this piece followed that piece, and assign an intelligibility in this way, in analysis, I believe that this is purely arbitrary. I believe that there is no real reason why X piece followed Y piece in the dreaming process, and it is truly unintelligible. This assumes a randomness in how the dream was produced. So within the dream, there is a mixing of rational order, which we can observe by understanding the pieces, and irrational order, which is a randomness in putting pieces together. In the dream state, the mind is practising its capacity for truly free thinking.

When we listen to music, we observe a very similar thing, so it can stir the emotions in a way similar to dreaming. In the case of listening to music though, it is not one's own mind which is producing the mixture of intelligible and unintelligible aspects, the composer has already done this. So it is the composer who is practising the capacity for free thought. However, the point I was trying to make, is that the musical composition usually has a particular rhythm, a time signature, which ties the whole piece together, from start to finish. This gives an overall unity to the piece, making it intelligible as one piece. Dreams are missing this aspect of overall unity. So the composer restrains the capacity for free thinking in order to increase the aspects of intelligibility.

Here's the final passage in the Wikipedia article on American exceptionaism:

'In a speech on the Syria crisis on September 10, 2013, Obama said: "however, when, with modest effort and risk, we can stop children from being gassed to death, and thereby make our kids safer over the long run, I believe we should act... That is what makes America different. That is what makes us exceptional."[105] In a direct response the next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin published an op-ed in The New York Times, articulating that "It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation... We are all different, but when we ask for the Lord's blessings, we must not forget that God created us equal."[106] Putin’s views were soon endorsed by future president Donald Trump who declared the op-ed “a masterpiece” to British television personality Piers Morgan: “You think of the term as being beautiful, but all of sudden you say, what if you’re in Germany or Japan or any one of 100 different countries? You are not going to like that term,” Trump said. “It is very insulting, and Putin put it to him about that.”[107] Some left-wing American commentators agree with Trump’s stance; one example is Sherle Schwenninger, a co-founder of the New America Foundation, who in a 2016 Nation magazine symposium remarked that “Trump would redefine American exceptionalism by bringing an end to the neoliberal/neoconservative globalist project that Hillary Clinton and many Republicans support”.[108]'

So you mean ... exactly what I said then?

Ie: Holism is four cause modelling, reductionism is just the two. And simpler can be better when humans merely want to impose their own formal and final causality on a world of material/efficient possibility. However it is definitely worse when instead our aim is to explain "the whole of things" - as when stepping back to account for the cosmos, the atom and the mind. — apokrisis

No, not at all what you said. The modeling which you describe portrays final cause (intention, or telos) as top-down causation, instead of its true position, bottom-up, as is evidenced by free will. You really don't provide a four cause modelling, as your top-down causation is just formal cause, through and through. You haven't provided a position for final cause.

edit: Posted in wrong thread

1. Hylomorphic dualism provides an interesting and worthy counterpoint to the dichotomous substance dualism that undergirds the dialectic of modern philosophy since Descartes and Locke. Subdues the modern tension between realism and idealism by more-or-less eliminating the underlying cause of that tension. — Aaron R

I do not think that it is correct to exclude Aristotle from substance dualism. In his Categories he clearly defines primary and secondary substance, primary substance being material substance, and secondary substance formal. Material substance he implies, substantiates, or grounds, the logical system. But in his metaphysics, when he seeks to substantiate being itself, he turns to formal substance.

So I don't see the support for your claim that hylomorphism eliminates substance dualism, as the underlying cause of tension. If anything, the Aristotelian principles of hylomorphism, which were introduced into Christianity by the Scholastics, only produced ambiguity. There was ambiguity with respect to how the logical forms of Aristotle were to be related to the immaterial Forms of Neo-Platonism. This was at the heart of the nominalist/realist debate.

I had the idea that the reason why Christianity engenders (which I prefer to 'secretes') atheism, is because of the compulsory nature of belief that it requires. Right from the outset of the early Church Councils, which thrashed out the Nicene Creed and the other articles, there was an emphasis on what belief is required of the professing Christian. 'Heresy' is derived from the greek word for 'choosing' or 'making a choice', the implication being that it is wrong to even have a view about what one ought to believe. As is well-known, the suppression or persecution of heresies gave rise to many of the darkest chapters in Christian history (not least the destruction of the Cathars). — Wayfarer

When discussing "choice" with respect to the theological principles of a religion, one should keep in mind the evolutionary stages of a religion. In its early days, a religion such as Christianity, must be adapted, to encourage individuals to choose that religion, in order that it may grow. A young religion trying to establish itself, has no real intrinsic power to encourage people to join, except to appear desirable. So it must encourage freedom of choice. Early fathers of Christianity, such as Augustine, display much freedom to choose metaphysical principles, and profess the intrinsic truth of free will. Even if a particular religion, as it grows, adopts certain principles to distinguish heresy, as in your example of the Nicene Creed, that religion must be very careful if it attempts to enforce any such contracts of belief.

In early medieval times, one would accuse another's beliefs as heresy, in debate, but there was very little means or desire to enforce punishment. This would be far too divisive. What came about in Christianity, in later medieval times, with the advent of Scholasticism, and the crusades, was a large influx of written materials, derived from various different places around the world. This presented a wide range of beliefs to choose from. The leaders of the Church saw the need to enforce laws of heresy, which led to the Inquisition.

But what I believe is that there is a fundamental difference here between early times and later times, with respect to the Church's attitude toward choice. In early times it encouraged freedom of choice, as a fundamental principle, with an attitude of tolerance toward different beliefs. But as it gained power, it ignored this principle completely, and turned its actions right around, in a hypocritical way, attempting to enforce belief in a way which cannot be successful. It is this hypocritical action which engenders atheism, because it cannot overcome the fundamental freedom of choice.