If you believe in a deterministic universe and that people don't have free will, even knowledge isn't "potential", because what will happen is defined in advance and there is only possible outcome. Potential is merely an illusion, a mental construct for people who don't have complete knowledge of the universe. — Kenshin

So what you are saying is that from a deterministic perspective, potential is not real, it is an illusion. Since we know that with respect to the future, there are some things which may or mat not happen, depending on the actions which human beings take, why adopt a deterministic perspective?

What is "other-directedness"?

However, when we see high rates of suicide among a particular demographic, like middle aged, white, unemployed, working class men, then it points towards social dysfunction -- on the part of society and maybe on the part of some of the men. — Bitter Crank

I think you are adding too many qualifying terms to your demographic here. Doing this just directs your conclusion. So for instance, many middle aged men commit suicide, regardless of whether they are white or unemployed. You might conclude that this is the result of a dysfunctional society, casting the blame of causation onto some phantom existent called "society". But why not look at the reality of this, that these are individuals who cannot cope with their environment. Who knows, perhaps if the conditions were right, you or I could join that group, but wouldn't this classify us as mentally ill? Mental illness doesn't have to be something you are born with.

My interest is in what truth is.

...

As to definitions, I fail to see what they have to do with truth. — tim wood

Why the contradiction? Do you not see this as contradiction? You are interested in "what" truth is, and this implies that you want a definition of "truth", yet you cannot see how "definition" is related to what "truth" is. As I've been explaining, definition is truth, and truth is definition, they are one and the same. You simply reject my definition of truth, as definition, but this does not make my definition false, it means that I have not successfully justified that definition.

Let's try a different approach. Do you agree that truth is what makes a statement true? And do you agree that what constitutes truth is the impossibility of falsity? Whatever it is which is impossible to be false, this type of thing is what truth is. Will you recognize that "definition" fulfills this condition, of that which is impossible to be false?

Suppose I define "square" as equilateral rectangle. I say that this is a definition, it is impossible that it is false, because it is not the type of thing which can be judged as true or false. You may reject my definition, if you do not like it. But your rejection of my definition does not make the definition false, it only means that I have failed to justify it. So a definition is a type of thing which can never be false. It can fail in attempts to be justified, but this does not make it false. Nor is a definition ever really true, it is just accept as that which defines the term. But since a definition can never be false, this is the type of thing which truth is.

What I'm looking for is an understanding of the generalization of this singular case, so I can use it (the understanding) to inform and answer the question, what is truth (if it's anything). The purpose of this example is to kick free of distracting notions of verifiability, indeterminateness, definition, justification, etc., which all seem to presuppose truth, and focus on just truth itself (again, if that's possible).. — tim wood

I'm telling you, "definition" is the generalization which informs us of what truth is. Suppose in your example, the man offers the proposition "a cow is in the barn". The truth of this statement is determined by the definitions of the terms. Is "barn" defined by the building which the man brought the animal into? Is "cow" defined by the animal which was brought into the building. If so, we have truth. But without such definitions we have no truth.

Not quite. It's probable that every ordinary language proposition has multiple interpretations. Given an interpretation, there is a truth function associated with that interpretation. It is the value of that truth function for that interpretation that I hold is not variable. This implies, and I accept, that different interpretations could have different and inconsistent truth values. — tim wood

The point here though, is that every interpretation is dependent on a mind, and exists only within that mind. We could offer our interpretations to each other, but this requires that we put them into words, and then these would need to be interpreted. So each separate mind has a separate interpretation of any proposition. The truth function which you refer to, therefore, can only be within that mind as well.

I think truth must have "contact" with something real, that bridges subject and predicate, and makes the proposition true. I think you're stuck in a relative subjectivism. Your position may facilitate critiques of how truth works, or how knowledge may work, or what certain limits of knowledge are. But for the question of what truth is, your position seems to destroy it. — tim wood

I am only looking for the reality of what truth is, as you claim to be doing as well. If the inquiry leads us to a relative subjectivism, then so be it. It seems to me like you are swayed by some prejudice, so you will not follow the inquiry. But if you look closely you will see that there is something real which bridges the gap between subject and predicate, and this is definition. When one defines the other, the gap is bridged, and we have truth. "The sky is blue." If your premise is that a definition is not something real, then you might be forced to the conclusion that truth is not something real, but how are you defining "real" here?

Why do you think it is, that people of various age groups, who are apparently completely mentally stable, not diagnosable of having major mental illness, will decide to commit suicide? Doesn't the act of suicide imply "major mental illness"?

In some respects, potential merely indicates a lack of knowledge. For with all knowledge, one might know exactly what will or won't happen, so the concept of potential becomes irrelevant. — Kenshin

On the contrary, knowledge itself is a form of potential, because it allows us to do various things. Knowledge allows one to decide what will or won't happen. So contrary to what you claim, the concept of potential is very relevant for understanding the existence of knowledge.

The absolute core is Love. — Agustino

What does Love mean to you?

"Asceticism" (if by this one means restraining greed, lust, selfishness and the like) is part of Love. — Agustino

I understand asceticism as a philosophy of abstaining from pleasure. But I understand love as being very closely related to pleasure. How do you reconcile these two? How do you abstain from pleasure and also love?

Morality and virtue are also parts of Love. — Agustino

I really don't know how you formulate your categories, but wouldn't it be more appropriate to say that love is a virtue, rather than to say that virtue is a part of love?

If the facts of extensive psychological research were known and understood, many cherished models of "free will" (among other things) would be considered absurd, and simply collapse. — Galuchat

Of course the inverse of this is true as well. If the nature of free will was known, and understood, many cherished psychological models would simply collapse.

Structural models of the human mind based on memory, knowledge, and processing capacity, dynamic models which simulate cognitive and intuitive processing (e.g., interpretation and mental modelling), and formal domain ontologies containing knowledge, are all being constructed and contribute to the field of artificial intelligence. — Galuchat

The concept of free will, as developed by St. Augustine is based on a tripartite model of the human mind consisting of memory, understanding, and will. If you remove will, such that you produce a model based on memory and processing (understanding), you have an incomplete model, ignoring a crucial aspect of the mind. You cannot even bring "knowledge" into this model because knowledge is based in belief which requires a choice, i.e. an act of will, conviction. So you necessarily have a gap of inconsistency between your model with its memory and processing, and the content which exists within the memory, and is being processed. Where does that content (knowledge) come from? I know, your model takes it for granted. That's how those models work, they take some fundamental principles as granted, and build upon that. But the production of such principles is critical to a real understanding of the mind. How valid is any claim to have modeled the mind, when you simply leave out, as granted, a very important aspect?

We have a behavioural definition, and we have an associated brain state, unsurprisingly, but we still don't have a cause, and it is the lack of physical cause that makes it a classical mental illness. Exit science, muttering 'give me more research grants'. — unenlightened

I think the talk of a "brain state" is somewhat misleading. "State" implies static, but the brain is continuously active. Ideas, beliefs, and concepts can be understood as static things, but I think it is a mistake to try to understand the brain in terms of states. Physicists have encountered the very same problem. They talk about quantum states, but what is being referred to is a bunch of activity, and not a state at all. So it is impossible for them to understand what they are talking about.

You run close along the line of saying everything is in the mind. But I don't think that's you. Is it? I half agree with, and in that half, completely. That is, I think truth is a creature of mind. And I agree that nothing out there in physical reality is either true or truth. But I think you're putting both halves in mind and nothing out there. And maybe you're right, but that's radical, don't you think? And if you agree, don't you think that kind of radical understanding of truth needs rigorous demonstration? — tim wood

I'm not saying that everything is in the mind, just that truth is in the mind. Truth is what defines the terms. It is true that a square is an equilateral rectangle. It is true that pi is the ratio between the circumference of a circle and the diameter. It does not matter whether or not one of these things (circle or square) exists in the world. And these are not tautologies, they are definitions. They form the means by which we create these objects (squares and circles) in the world, and the means by which we recognize objects according to these names.

I'm looking for the something out there that grounds truth, makes it a) possible, b) sensible, and maybe c) singular. Let's take a brick of the yellow metal, gold. Clearly everything that is understood about gold is in the mind. But are you willing to exchange what I call real dollars for my mental gold? Of course not. There has to be something out there in reality that corresponds to the gold, that just is gold as understood. That you might be interested in exchanging for, at a good price. — tim wood

Truth is "grounded" by justification. When we draw a square, we demonstrate yes, it is possible to have such a figure. We draw a circle and demonstrate that it is possible to have this figure. The described figure is justified. These acts justify the definitions, and the truth is grounded. Everything which we know about gold, all those truths, are all justified by our dealings with gold in the world.

Any discussion about how we know it's gold, or how we know anything, is here simply the wrong discussion. — tim wood

But this is where I think you are really missing the point. The discussion of how we know it's gold is really the relevant discussion. This is where we find the essence of truth, how we know that a thing is actually the proper thing to be called by the name we are using to refer to it. If it is fools gold, then there is no truth to us calling it gold, and all the conclusions we make about its value will be wrong. Therefore how we know that it's gold is of the highest importance, because if it isn't gold yet we are calling it gold, this is an untruth which could have catastrophic consequences.

Generalizing, I think that for each true statement, there is something out there that corresponds to it, and grounds it. "There is a horse," is true if there just is a horse there, and not otherwise. And let's not be distracted by or get lost in notions of real v. fake horses, or how we know it's a horse, or are just mistaken, and so forth. We presuppose we can determine if a horse is there - the question being is it there, or not. — tim wood

"There is a horse" is only true if there is an animal which is correctly called by that name, "horse". The question is not whether it is there or not. There is always something there, the question is whether it is true to refer to what is there with the word "horse". This determines whether "there is a horse" is true or not. If it's a rock or a house there, then it's not true. Why do you desire to "presuppose" that we can determine whether there is a horse there, without referring to a definition of "horse"? There are ponies which look a lot like horses, so the thing which is there might have to be measured or checked for other features. We need to know which features to check for to confirm that it's a horse. That's why we have to consult the definition. The definition gives us the truth, of what it means to be a horse. We assign "horse" to animals that fulfill these conditions, and that is a fundamental truth.

With true statements about ideas, that themselves have no physical counterpart, I'll simply retreat to the notion of demonstration, which can always be rendered in a physical form. That is, the thing not strictly in the mind can be "out there" in the sense of the demonstration of ideas, and must be in the sense of the horse. So far, all this seems simple, intuitive, practical. — tim wood

Demonstrations are forms of justification. "Justify" is defined as demonstration. You do agree that there is a difference between truth and justification don't you? I believe that as much as you think that there is some part of truth which is "out there", you are conflating justification with truth, such that you see the justification which is "out there", and you are assuming that this is somehow a part of truth. But you should consider that there is this thing called "knowledge", and knowledge is generally believed to be a combination of justification and truth. So I think that you are looking at knowledge, and calling knowledge by the word "truth", and you see that which is "out there", justification, as a part of this "truth", when it is really a part of knowledge instead.

Meaning is out of court, here, except in the practical sense. If you're going to argue that we cannot really know anything, then I invite you back to the horse and the gold: at some point we know as a practical matter, and correctly, that the horse is a horse and the gold is gold. — tim wood

There is a problem with your so-called knowing "as a practical matter". Such knowing is often mistaken. What if the thing you called a horse is really a pony, or the thing you called gold was really fools gold? This is why we need clear, coherent, and consistent definitions. Sure, it's practical for you to call your rock gold, and tell everyone you have a golden rock, but when the time comes for you to sell it, and it's fools gold, then the practicality vanishes. Having definitions is a fundamental part of knowledge. Without them you'll insist that the rock is gold, and the buyer will insist that it's not, and how can you proceed other than to fight?

True-ness is the quality - truth - of a single true proposition. Qua itself, it cannot be interpreted in various ways (except in error). The proposition itself may give rise to different truths, but each in itself is univocal with respect to that truth. — tim wood

If it is true, as you say, that a proposition cannot be interpreted in various ways except in error, then whose interpretation is the correct one?

Now, it may be we're saying the same thing. Let's check. In this context I presuppose that indeterminateness is in the mind, and that it can be resolved into one or more determinatenesses, given appropriate effort. And there is no truth until that task is completed for at least the indeterminateness in question. — tim wood

The fact is that different minds will interpret the same physical collection of symbols in different ways. Each mind may designate "a meaning" and this creates an illusion of determinateness. It is an illusion because different minds designate different meaning, so the meaning of the symbols is really indeterminate. Therefore if we assume that the physical collection of symbols has meaning, this meaning must be inherently indeterminate.

If it cannot be resolved, then no truth can come from it (other than, perhaps, that it's unresolvable). — tim wood

That's right, there cannot be truth to the physical collection of symbols, so if you assume that a proposition is a physical collection of symbols there can be no truth to it. That is because, as I said in the last post, the symbols need be interpreted. But they are interpreted within a mind, according to definitions, and there can be truth here, within the mind. If we both agree that a particular proposition is true, our interpretations may be consistent. But if I believe the proposition is true according to my interpretation, and you believe it not true according to yours, then all we can do is attempt to justify our respective interpretations.

I have a new version of truth (grown from this discussion): truth is the capacity for a proposition to be grounded, in a practical sense, outside the mind, whether in exemplification or demonstration. Which seems just another way of saying that truth is the collection of singular true-nesses. — tim wood

This might be consistent with what I am arguing, where "grounding" is justification.

Our languages were developed from everyday concerns and perceptions. They were not designed for metaphysical inquiry, and we should keep that in mind when we use them for that purpose. — Mariner

Where our language fails us is where the metaphysical inquiry starts. In other words, the metaphysician will seek the areas of language use where the problems of language, such as you mentioned lie. These problems themselves indicate underlying, unresolved metaphysical issues, as the cause of such problems. Large semantic discrepancies indicate divergent metaphysical principles causing wonder and inspiration, in the philosopher.

Also, Psychology (a science by virtue of the method it employs to acquire knowledge that can be rationally explained and reliably applied) is very broad (i.e., not limited to a clinical application). — Galuchat

I think unenlightened has the right approach here. I believe the "scientific" status of psychology is highly suspect. The scientific method verifies theories through experimentation and empirical observations of the activities in the physical world. How is it possible to account for, within the theories of psychology, the fact that the thing being observed is a free willing human being? Since free will is at the root, the foundation, of all human actions, the psychologist has no hope of any scientific understanding without a firm understanding of the nature of free will. And this we simply do not have.

Do you not agree that the actual is some numerical subset of all the possible forms of organisation plus all their possible material accidents? — apokrisis

No, I think they are distinct, as per dualism. "All the possible forms of organisation" is a mental construct, conceptual only, whereas "the actual" refers to physically existing forms of organization. You don't seem to recognize this distinction and that's why I often accuse you of category error.

The mutual definition of the categories themselves is a different issue - which I also highlighted. — apokrisis

I don't think that defining the categories is a different issue, because if you have already positioned the set of actual, as a subset of the possible, then you leave yourself without the means for defining physical existence as actual.

Since we normally refer to things with physical existence as actual things, you create the possibility for ambiguity and equivocation. I believe you'd be better off to divide your category of "all possible forms of organisation", into true and false, or fact and fiction, something like that. This would clarify the epistemic status of that category, not creating the illusion that actually existing physical things exist within that category.

It would be usual to distinguish between every thing potential and every thing actual. One would be a subset of the other. — apokrisis

Why do you think one would be a subset of the other, instead of being completely different, mutually exclusive, categories? I would think that if a potential is actualized, then that potential, as a potential, no longer exists, instead, it is something actual. And if a thing potentially exists, this would deny the possibility that it actually exists.

I think that "knowing" implies correct judgement, because "truth" requires that a statement be interpreted, and judged as corresponding with reality. Even knowing what occurred requires a interpretation of reality. To know something is to make a correct interpretation, and interpretation requires judgement. So if God is believed to be the supreme knower, then God is believed to be the supreme judge. If God knows everything then all of God's judgements are correct, as knowing something is to make the correct judgement. This is how God is related to truth. If human judgements can be faulty, yet we assume that there is a truth (about whether or not a person is guilty for example) to the matter, then it must be God's judgement which comprises that truth, which is supposed to exist independent of human judgement.

So here's the point Ciceronianus. There are laws, that's a fact. There are human actions, and that's a fact as well. These are two very distinct things, laws and human actions. In order that a person's actions may be criminal, a comparison between the actions and the laws must be made, with a judgement following that comparison. Do you agree with me here? If you do agree, then in cases where human beings do not pass that judgement, whom other than God could?

We sure do, and not a slight difference either. "...completely arbitrary,...assumed, ...existing only in the minds which assume them." As I read you, this is your bottom line. The ultimate reality of truth is just no reality at all. — tim wood

But the reality of "truth" as "no reality at all" is not my bottom line. The bottom line is that the reality of truth, is that truth is entirely within the mind. Remember how we've progressed through this discussion. You first suggested truth was a attitude. I responded that it's an attitude of honesty. Isn't "attitude" within the mind? So I described it as subject matter, which is in the mind. But you keep wanting to put the "matter" or substance of truth outside the mind.

All I am doing is trying to bring your attention to the inconsistency in your approach. Why do you have this feeling, that "truth" must be explained through some outside force, when you keep returning to internal aspects to explain truth? I look at this as either a mistake, or downright dishonesty. You describe something by referring to the internal, yet you claim that there's got be something external here or it doesn't make sense. Why do you insist on this external aspect of truth? It appears as an unsupported prejudice which is completely unnecessary. Where do you pull this necessity for the external from?

How do you square this with any notion of reality? Let's look a little deeper: a rock hits you. You're angry (say), at what, at whom, for what? It's all just completely arbitrary assumptions on your part that exist only in your mind.It must needs be that you are angry at, and can be angry only at, yourself (never mind the problems with that notion). Nor are you rescued by the possibility of the existence of indeterminacies; after all, such indeterminacies can only be conjectural. — tim wood

Why be angry? Was the rock thrown with intent? If so you have reason to be angry, but the anger is caused by, and directed at the intent which threw the rock. There is no anger toward the rock. The rock was just the passive means by which the bad intent was carried out. If there is no intent, if the rock just fell, or you stubbed your toe, there is no reason to direct anger at the rock, you could only be angry with yourself. So it appears like you want to bring ager into the scenario where there is no warrant for anger. Its totally unreasonable to be angry at a rock, so I cannot accept your example as such.

I say, on the other hand, that true-ness is a real property, of propositions. — tim wood

You have an issue with "meaning" to overcome here. An utterance consists of a collection of symbols, having physical existence which can hit you like a rock. What is judged for trueness is an interpretation of the utterance. I'm sure that you respect the difference between the physical existence of the symbols and the interpretation of the symbols. The physical symbols themselves cannot be judged for truth.

There are some who claim that "proposition" refers to a mysterious conflation of physical symbols with interpretation, as if the physical symbols exist with an interpretation attached to them. You and I, tim wood, know that this is not the case. This could not be reality, it is impossible that there is a interpretation attached to the physical symbols when they hit you like the rock, because it requires a mind to interpret. So if you insist that a proposition exists in this way, as a set of symbols with an attached interpretation, I will insist that you are being dishonest. Therefore we must give up this idea "that true-ness is a real property, of propositions". The collection of symbols needs to be interpreted in order that it may be judged as true or false. Truth of falsity is attributed to the interpretation, and therefore true-ness is a real property of the interpretation.

So if true-ness is attributed to the interpretation, and the interpretation is within the mind, how do you get truth out of the mind? We could assume that the physical words, which hit you like a rock, have meaning inherent within them, but it is the essence of meaning that it must be interpreted before it can be judged. And it is an inherent property of meaning, that it may be interpreted in various ways depending on one's perspective. This is the fact which relativity theories employ. The meaning, or information which is inherent within the physical world will be interpreted in different ways depending on the perspective. Since meaning is interpreted in various ways, how can we get to a truth which is attributed to meaning itself rather than to an interpretation of that meaning?

So we come to an elemental recognition: true-ness is a function of meaning. Probably we knew this all along, but just failed to make it explicit. Where I think you have gone astray is by descending into sub-minimal considerations. I'm thinking that a sign of that confusion is when the real becomes unreal, it's "turtles all the way down," or when the ordinary becomes impossible. Does this put us on one page? — tim wood

No, see this is the root of our difference in opinion. True-ness cannot be a function of meaning, because it is an essential property of meaning that it can be interpreted in various ways. That is why I keep stressing the importance of indeterminateness. Meaning itself is indeterminate, requiring an interpretation as a mode of determination, in order that we can have any sort of truth. So true-ness is really a function of the interpretation. It cannot be a function of meaning itself, because meaning like information, and everything else with physical existence, (i.e. the entire physical world), must be interpreted before truth can be attributed to the interpretation.

This is your answer right here: drop out of the work force. Remember your hippy mantra, turn on, tune in, drop out. You've already turned on and tuned in, you now just need to drop out.

The grass and plants are always grateful to get watered. — Bitter Crank

And this is where it's at, become a gardener, it's very rewarding. Hopefully you can afford a plot of land. Not only will you witness your babies (crops) thriving under your care, but everyone in the world has always had the highest respect for those labourers who put food on the table, the farmer. It doesn't take much to produce a lot.

May laws have been violated, crimes committed, without our knowledge? Yes, as trees may have fallen without our knowledge. But I don't think this is a useful inquiry. — Ciceronianus the White

You seem to be missing the point. The question is whether the thing is "a tree" without being named as a tree. Since "tree" is only the name that we call it, it could not be. So how could a person be "a criminal" without being named as a criminal, when "criminal" is just a name that we assign to some people. You would not be "Ciceronianus" if you had not been named that, so why would a person be "a criminal" without having been named that?

It's a relevant inquiry, because you clearly desire to say that a criminal is a criminal without being named that, and that a tree is a tree without being named that. But this requires that someone, such as God attaches the name to the object.

You seem to have some difficulty with the claim that a person may commit a crime and yet be found "not guilty" by a jury. — Ciceronianus the White

No, what I am arguing is that in order for it to be true that a particular individual is a criminal, that person's actions must have been judged as being criminal, according to some set of laws. If that judgement is not made by human beings, who is it made by?

Here's an analogy. People will say that a rock, never observed by a human being, exists as a rock. Or some might say some thing never before observed by human beings, like a planet on the other side of the universe, exists as a planet on the other side of the universe. But unless this existence is judged to be "a rock", or to be "a planet", how is it correct to assume that such a thing exists as "a rock", or as "a planet"?

In this case, you seem to want to say that the person is "a criminal" ("in fact guilty"), even though the person has never been judged to have fulfilled the conditions of "having committed a crime". How is that possible? Sure, you can say that if the person committed a crime, then the person is a criminal, just like you can say that if there is something on the other side of the universe which fulfills the conditions of being a planet, then there is a planet there, but how does that make any particular person a criminal, or any particular thing a planet? In order for a person to "be in fact, a criminal", one must have been judged as such.

Consider, we would say that prior to the existence of human beings, the planets in the solar system existed. But they did not exist as "planets", because they has not been judged to be planets. How could they exist as "planets" if there was no one to judge them as being "planets"? We extrapolate, now, from our understanding, to say that the planets were there then, as "planets", before our existence, and so this statement that the planets were there before us, is justified. But we are not justified in the statement that the planets were "planets" without having been named as such. So we are not justified in the claim that a person is "a criminal" without having been named as such.

Any name "criminal" in this case, has meaning associated with it. And a mind associates the name with the object. But we cannot correctly claim that the object, the person in this case, has the name "criminal" associated with it, unless a mind makes that judgement.

If a person commits a crime that person is responsible for the crime, and is therefore guilty of committing the crime. — Ciceronianus the White

How does introducing a counterfactual condition explain how the person is "in fact guilty"? The point of my example is that the person's actions have not been judged as criminal, so whether or not the person committed a crime is indeterminate. We know the person was active, but there is no description of the actions. How can you say that the person is "in fact guilty"? To introduce a counterfactual to explain your claim of what is "in fact" the case, is contradictory.

OJ was found not guilty. Many believe that he nonetheless is guilty because they believe he is responsible for the crime having taken place--he committed the crime. This seems quite clear. The determination being made, or not being made, is whether a crime was committed, not whether it is "wrong" to commit the crime. — Ciceronianus the White

Are you saying that despite the fact that the court found OJ not guilty, the fact that many people believe he is guilty makes him "in fact guilty"? If I believe that someone is guilty does that make the person "in fact guilty"? Or does it require that many people believe that the person is guilty to make the person guilty in fact?

So the question I last placed stands despite us not knowing whether or not life first - else, independently - appeared on planet Earth. — javra

You should clarify your statement. Physics does not attest to a time in the universe when life was not possible. This is not physics, but speculative cosmology, metaphysics. And if you're going to insist on the claim that physics attests to a time in the universe when life was not possible, it's just as valid to say that physics allows for the possibility that life came from another universe. But I really don't believe that we have a very accurate representation of the history of the universe right now.

What alternative(s) are there to explain life’s appearance given a time when life did not physically exist? — javra

The evidence is that life did not physically exist on earth. How do you know that life did not come from somewhere other than earth?

Hi MU. We're a bit at sixes and sevens, but I'm not sure if it's a real disagreement or just a lack of clarity. I'm going for clarity. Also brevity. You packed in a lot. If I try to answer all of it, the posts very quickly become unwritable and unreadable. — tim wood

OK, let's see if we can clarify the difference between us. I think we both agree that what is "true", is true by assumption. That's what you say in 1), the proposition "this is a rock" is "true by assumption". My claim though is that we do not assume the truth of a proposition though, we ask that it be justified. This justification involves defining the terms, so real truth is deeper than the proposition, it is within the terms of the proposition. Otherwise, any proposition could be assumed as true, and we do not just assume as true, any old proposition..

So, we take "this is a rock", and we have two elements which need to be analyzed, and justified, before we can assume this proposition to be true. We need to analyze what it means to be a rock, and we need to analyze the thing being referred to by "this". With respect to the thing itself, we can test it, as you said, and I agree. But with respect to what it means to be a "rock", what I've tried to impress upon you, is that there are two distinct approaches.

We could start with a proposition, "a rock is ...", or, we could point to an object, and assume the proposition "this is a rock", is true. The latter is the "true" way, it is what produces the true assumption of "this is a rock". From this perspective, we need no testing of the thing, it is really true by assumption, because we've established that the very thing pointed to is the thing which is called by the name "rock". Therefore "this is a rock" cannot be false. If we choose the former perspective, and refer to a proposition "a rock is ...", in order to justify calling this a rock, then this proposition (this definition) itself needs to be justified and we risk the possibility of infinite regress in justification. Therefore at some time we have to turn to the thing itself, and say "this is a rock", stipulate so that we can agree, that this is the thing called "rock". We have undeniable truth because so long as there is nothing else called "rock", it is completely unreasonable not to agree to call the thing "rock". "Rock" has no definition, it is just the pointed to thing.

But now we have a problem if we want to call other things by the same name, "rock". This is when we have to test the thing, and test other things, determining principles of consistency, continuity between the thing we have called "rock", and other things, such that we can designate them all of the same family, and call them all "rocks". So it is only when we have two distinct things, and we want to say of them both "this is a rock", then we need justification. We cannot simply assume both propositions as true, because contradiction is implied when we want to call two distinct things by the same name. Therefore we need some reason, justification, to call them both by the same name.

2) ...
But you want to call it the indeterminate. Why? Is it your argument that while an indeterminate may exist that there is no way that we can from indeterminate to rock? If yes, then there's nothing that truth can be true about, because we cannot get from the indeterminate to the rock. — tim wood

The thing is indeterminate until it has been individuated, pointed to, or named. Once we name it, and agree on the name, then we have truth. The thing is called "rock". Naming it is a type of determination, but in another way it allows that the thing named is still indeterminate. It gives no concept, or form, to the named thing, no description or idea of what it means to be the thing which bears that name. The pointing to the thing indicates that the thing bears the name, but what it means to be that thing remains indeterminate. Therefore we allow that any concept whatsoever may be attributed to that thing which is pointed to, but we still have truth without conceptualization, truth by agreeing on the name. That is why I associate truth with the unknown, because we can have truth concerning the thing without knowing anything about the thing at all, just by having a name for it.

3) I suggested testing the rock as a way to validate the claim it's a rock Because it's a rock by assumption, no test is necessary: your remark about the testing I'm glad to have, but while interesting, it's irrelevant. — tim wood

Right, this is the key point, no testing is necessary. We have called the thing "rock", agreed that it is rock, and it is true that it is "rock", therefore no testing is necessary. The proposition "this is a rock", is not even properly called a proposition, because it's not saying anything about an item, it is pointing to an item.

5) Maybe here you can agree or clarify: I think by "subject matter" you mean mental contents. By the same expression I mean the thing spoken of, called here the rock. You misread me above - or, always possible, I misspoke: 6) For there to be truth, for truth (as proposition) to mean anything substantive, it must relate to the thing itself, and not the mere idea of the thing. — tim wood

Now we have the distinction of subject matter. This is where we have our biggest difference of opinion. How could subject matter be the thing itself? It is matter of the subject. We could assume that the thing exists of matter, but the thing is the object, not the subject. So subject matter must be mental content. And we have objective matter which is the substance of the object.

I don't see how we could be dealing with anything other than mental content here. We have an object pointed to, and we assume the name "rock", but that this object is named "rock" is purely mental content. What more can it be? It appears like you want to bring truth outside of the mind, but this is impossible. There is a name "rock", within our minds, and there are associations with that name, memories of pointing, etc., but it's all within the mind, the associations are assumed. It is an assumption that the object is "rock", there is nothing about the object itself which necessitates it being "rock".

It appears to me, like you want to say that the name "rock" necessarily refers to some object outside the mind, and this is truth. But that's not reality. The name "rock" does not necessarily refer to any object whatsoever, it was arbitrarily chosen. So truth is entirely dependent upon this arbitrary choice, made by the mind to call that thing "rock". It is only when we move forward, to justify through testing and theories, that a specific object ought to be called "rock", that we establish such a necessary relationship. But that is why we need to keep justification and truth separate.

The question before us is, given that there are true propositions, is there a single genus we can identify that captures in a single notion what makes all of them true, that we can reasonably call truth? My answer from above, that I think you have actually not addressed, for being distracted by tangential questions, is, "...truth is the name of a kind of relationship that can exist between subject matter (things, understood broadly) and propositions (by reference, one to the other). The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true." — tim wood

So we each have a slightly different idea of what truth is. You say that truth is a kind of relationship between things (objects) and propositions. I reduce this, and say that such a relationship is just an arbitrary assumption, like the assumption which attaches the name to the object. That it's anything more than an assumption would require justification, but this justification would be based in the assumption of a more fundamental relationship, and this will now be the "truth" upon which the justification is based.

I call this fundamental relationship "subject matter", because it exists only within the mind. These relationships, that this word relates to this object, are completely arbitrary, existing only within the minds which assume them. In my last post I believe I called this a particle of meaning. It is an assumed association, existing within the mind, and it doesn't have to involve a word, or words, it could be simply memories and feelings, but these associations, particles of meaning, are "truths" because we accept them without the necessity for justification. They just are, just like memories just are.

This experiment has already been done, using Earth as the disk. — noAxioms

Do you perceive the earth as a flat disc? Did someone put a clock at the centre of the earth?

I say let's break out the old turntable and test this.

As to the issue of evidence: In one line of argument, it consists of the same evidence that dinosaurs existed, or that saber-toothed cats existed (still can’t figure out how they could capture any prey with those teeth … but our reality evidences that they existed all the same), or—to be more fastidious—the same evidence that three generations ago existed. The metaphysical and epistemological justifications can become both debatable and difficult in their details, but, via one allegory, even if the world started last Thursday all evidence would yet indicated the existence of a last Wednesday as well. Last Wednesdayism would in turn indicate the existence of a last Tuesday, so on and so forth. What is today has a history in what was yesterday. Though an indirect answer, I hope this made some sense. — javra

That there was a time on earth when there was no life, prior to the time that there was life, is not evidence that life developed from non-life. That certain life forms existed prior to human beings is not evidence that human beings developed from those life forms. If I was born before you, would you accept this as evidence that you developed from me?

It is the demonstration of continuity between those ancient life forms and human beings which serves as evidence that one developed from the other. It is a demonstration of temporal continuity from Tuesday to Wednesday which serves as evidence that Wednesday developed from Tuesday. In the case of non-life to life, there has been no demonstration of such a continuity, and therefore no evidence.

It's definitely "end of the world", but I wouldn't call it cataclysm. It's for the good.

Yes, of the two alternatives you describe, this one sounds closer to my position. — andrewk

OK, then to maintain consistency with your beliefs I will not refer to "the law", I will refer to "the laws". We could digress into a discussion of the reality of "the state" here, because I think that if you believe that the multitude of "laws" belonging to a governing state, do not exist under one coherent structure of "the law", then you cannot believe that there is a coherent "state". Then again, if each state itself represents "the law", then with a multitude of states, there is a multitude of "the law"s, and no real, coherent "the law" unless there was a world state.

I place the authority of all authors at naught, and I would encourage others to do likewise.

I do not accept Singer's words, and I would encourage others to do likewise. — andrewk

I agree that we should decide for ourselves what to believe, but we do need to get some ideas from others. You write pretty well, maybe you could be influential. In the case of deciding when to obey or disobey the law though, it may be the best policy for the average person, to always try to obey the law as much as possible. When I was younger I was not so committed to this principle, and I found that once I allowed the habit of deciding when it was good not to follow the law to form, there can be very unfavourable consequences. That is because the laws are defended with much force, and whether or not the law which you choose to disobey is a good or bad law, when you do disobey it, you are vulnerable to that force.

Singer is not your guru. I am not your guru. Nobody is your guru except you. You are your own guru. It is good to listen to what others have to say, as it helps one to think more widely and clearly. It exposes one to ideas, perspectives and channels of reasoning that one may not have previously experienced. But I believe that it is best for one to decide for oneself.

Since I am not your guru, you should not just accept that last sentence. If I were you I would think about it and decide for myself whether to accept it. — andrewk

OK, so I agree with you, take your advise, and decide for myself what to believe. But here we are discussing ethics, and ethics deals with actions. I like to believe that there is a difference between what one believes, and how one acts. You might think that one's actions are necessarily consistent with one's beliefs, and provide a representation of one's beliefs, but I don't think that this is true. So for instance, if I believe that a particular law is bad, and to be ethical I should not obey it, I will still obey it, believing myself to be behaving unethically, because of the threat of law enforcement. Therefore I believe myself to be acting unethically, but this is justified because I am being forced to act unethically by those who defend the laws. I think it is better to live unethically than to suffer the consequences of that force.

BTW your allusion to Thoreau's 'On the Duty of Civil Disobedience' is timely. I have been meaning to read it, and will bump it up my reading list as a consequence of this discussion. I suspect I will not agree with many of his conclusions as - based on Walden - his temperament seems to be much less communitarian than mine. But who knows? And in any case I expect it to be an enriching and entertaining read. — andrewk

I've read some Thoreau, I remember Walden's Pond quite well. He was a unique, and therefore odd character, probably very difficulty to befriend, but I do have respect for his thought. I think he was quite intelligent. I do not agree with his principles of civil disobedience though. As I've described above, I think it best to obey the laws as much as possible, regardless of how much you disagree with them. This is because disobeying becomes habitual and you will most likely suffer consequences. There are those who might choose to suffer the consequences, like Gandhi, in order to make a statement, but a campaign like that must be well orchestrated in order that it be successful. And in this type of campaign the question becomes whether or not it is necessary to appeal to religion, or God, as Jesus and Muhammad did, in order to have a truly successful campaign. It is difficult to unite people against a ruling force without a principle of unity. To say "X is bad" is one thing, but until you offer Y as the alternative which is good, it's difficult to unite against X.

BTW BTW apropos of an earlier discussion: did you read 'The Death of Ivan Ilych'? I just finished it. It's a short and easy read. I'm still working out what to make of it. I'm glad I read it. — andrewk

I started reading it and made it through the first chapter before I got very busy and had to put it down. I never got back to it, but I should because I was enjoying it. I really like the personalities which Tolstoy creates in his characters, there are literally layers of meaning within an individual's personality.

Stripped of the loaded language, I can accept your formulation. That is, I believe that it is reasonable and consistent to choose, after serious ethical consideration, to disobey a law that one is convinced is unjust, while still believing that, in the absence of gross injustice, laws should be obeyed. — andrewk

OK, so this implies that you believe that you yourself are better able to decide what you should and shouldn't do, with respect to ethical decisions, than the law. If you see the application of a particular law as a "gross injustice", you will not obey that law.

Do you agree, that this puts you "higher than the law"? Or, do you think that there is no such thing as "the law"? There are just different particular laws, made by different particular groups of people, with different particular interests, and no such thing as "the law" in general. In the latter case, if the law appears like a "gross injustice" to your particular interest, it ought not be followed. It is not the case that you place yourself "higher than the law", because there is no such thing as "the law". There is only individual laws, and you can judge each one as applicable, or grossly unjust with respect to your interests, without placing yourself as "higher than the law".

Peter Singer has written about this at length. He argues that one should obey the law except where there are gravely serious reasons not to do so. In a nutshell, his argument is that we all benefit when nearly everybody obeys the law. That benefit can only be outweighed by very strong considerations in the opposite direction, usually in relation to a grossly unjust or otherwise harmful law. Such exceptions occur only rarely, but they do occur. — andrewk

Now you introduce another reason not to obey the law. If there are "gravely serious reasons", then the law ought not be obeyed. "Gravely serious reasons" means something completely different from "gross injustice". So we have two described situations in which we should not obey the laws. We could consult multiple other authors, and compile a whole list of situations in which the laws should not be followed. But how do we judge the authority of those authors? If we consult the right (or wrong depending on your judgement) authors, we could find reason to disobey all laws. My opinion is that you are leading me down a slippery slope, claiming that an author has the authority to tell me when it is ethical to disobey the laws.

If you want to call that 'disrespect for the law' then go ahead. But that looks to me a meaningless bunch of words, that is unable to account for why Singer scrupulously pays his taxes, does not litter, drives within the speed limit, etc. — andrewk

Why, do you accept Singer's words as to when to disobey the laws? Is Singer more intelligent than the lawmakers? Why not turn to someone like Thoreau instead? He will give you reason not to pay your taxes. Why would you think that paying your taxes, obeying the speed limit, and not littering, but disobeying other laws for "gravely serious reasons" makes a person more ethical than someone like Thoreau who saw large scale decisions made by the state, such as foreign policy, as grossly unjust, and concluded that protest is necessary? Remember, your personal reason, stated above is "gross injustice", not "gravely serious", which might put you closer to Thoreau than to Singer.

But again, this is at a crossroads with the hidden cline of behavior between nonlife and life which, for example, is required to explain how life could have developed from nonlife. — javra

Why would you assume that life developed from non-life? Don't you agree that there doesn't seem to be any evidence to support this assumption? If we do away with this assumption then we don't have to bother seeking degrees of existence between non-living and iving. This whole line of investigation, which seeks to determine these missing links, degrees of existence between non-living and living, is fueled by this belief that life developed from non-life. But this belief is unsupported, because there is no evidence of these missing links. Why not dismiss this as misdirected speculation?

I'm surprised that you have such a binary, black and white view of things. Do you not know of any people whom you mostly respect, but who have done one thing that you regard as stupid or mean? Are all your feelings about people either unconditional respect and obedience or complete dismissal? — andrewk

Now you've changed the subject, talking about people rather than the law. I don't think I've ever met a person whom I don't have respect for. But how do you suppose that this relates to my respect for the law? I still don't see how one can pick and choose which laws one will abide by, without having disrespect for "the law" in general. Are you suggesting that each law is a separate individual law, and not part of a coherent structure called "the law"? That way you could pick and choose which laws to abide by, without worrying that this means you have disrespect for "the law" in general. You only have disrespect for particular laws. But what gives you the right to pick and choose which laws to abide by? If you give yourself permission to choose which laws you will obey, isn't this best described as "disrespect for the law"? You will only choose to obey the laws which suit your purpose.

What I think tim wood, is that we need to distinguish between true and justified. Modern epistemology clearly assumes a distinction between these two, claiming that knowledge is both true and justified, but the distinction between them is often confused, conflated, vague, or ill-defined.

Presumably this rock is just here, even if no mind ever existed. Do we agree on this? Then you, or someone,comes along, and before you can talk about the rock, you must have something that grounds your talking about the rock. Let's call it perception, apperception, synthesis, knowledge, idea, whatever. I agree that rock somehow has to be in mind before we can talk about it. This mental content is what I understand you to mean by "subject matter." We ought to step carefully here: it is possible that you hold that the mental content, the subject matter, is all there is and is merely a sign of itself - after all, if it's all mental content, etc., then we need an account of how we get to the rock, which is not easy to come by. — tim wood

I don't believe that we can start with the assumption that the rock is just here even if no mind ever existed. This assumption needs to be justified. Imagine if there were no living things. There would be no distinction of this or that period of time, or individuation of this or that place. There would be the entire universe throughout all time, if we could even assume the universe, throughout all of time, and no one to separate out "the rock" as having existence independent from this mass of eternal time and infinite space.

However, I do think that the assumption of something independent from living minds is reasonable, but we must start with the assumption that whatever it is is indeterminate, until we justify the existence of actual distinct forms like the "rock". The question though, is does this assumption of something independent from living minds, even if it is indeterminate, require an assumption of truth? And I think that this is where we find the fundamental distinction between justified and true. We have a fundamental assumption, you that "the rock is just here", I that there is something indeterminate there. But neither of these assumptions is really justified, they are just assumed to be true. Remember, "true" is what we assign to the premises of a logical argument, the propositions which are accepted simply by assumption. The logic provides justification of the conclusion. The argument is sound when it has true premises and valid logic.

My position is that the rock is real. Likely all we can know about it comes through synthesis of whatever, as above, but that synthesis is grounded in the separate thing we call a rock. I defend this through our ability, basically, to question the rock. We can test it. "If you're a rock, you'll react this way to my test." Granted, when it comes to most rocks, the tests applied can be primitive. But the same approach, with appropriate sophistication, works (eventually) for anything and everything. — tim wood

What I think you have to pay respect for, is the fact that there are two sides of this issue. Not only do we test the "thing" to see if it is a rock, but we also adjust our definition of "rock" to ensure that it corresponds to the thing which we are testing, because this is the thing we call "rock". So the thing which we are testing may not prove to be a "rock", as we thought what "rock" meant, but we have always been calling this thing a rock, and will continue to do so, so now we have to change what it means to be a "rock", instead of saying "this is not a rock". It is not an insistence of "if you are a rock you will react this way to my test", it is an instance of "I know you are a rock, because that's what we call you, and I thought you would react this way to my test, but you didn't". That doesn't mean that it's not a rock, it means that I didn't have a good understanding of what it means to be a rock when I devised my test

This is where I think we can notice the difference between "truth" and "justification". Remember how we outlined the possibility that truth refers to a type of attitude. Let's say we have isolated and identified a thing which we're going to test. The "true approach" is to say that we are calling this thing which we have individuated, a "rock", though its essence, what it is, is indeterminate. We have no true definition of "rock". That's why we are testing it, we know not "what" it is, but we call it a rock. The other approach, is like you suggested, we have a definition, "rock =...", and we are testing this thing to see if it is a rock. The test determines whether or not we are justified in calling this thing a rock. The former method assumes as "the truth", that we do not know what it means to be a "rock", the latter method assumes as "the truth", the definition of "rock". Of course our definition of "rock" may be incorrect, so we are actually not justified in this latter assumption.

On your idea of truth, then, if truth is to be anything more than mere tautology (A=A), the mental content must refer to something outside of and apart from itself. — tim wood

So rather than tautology, "truth" refers instead to the unknown, that which cannot be justified, but is still assumed. When the assumption can be demonstrated to be unjustified, such as I explained with the assumption that the definition of "rock" is necessarily correct, then we cannot accept these assumptions as truth. Then the truth is that the fundamental assumptions are really unknowns.

The tautology then, which you express as A=A, is actually the fundamental form of justification, it is not truth. Behind this fundamental justification is still basic assumptions, such as the meaning of "=". In order for the justification to work, we must assume the truth of the meaning of "=", and this is not justified, it is simply assumed, and therefore it is not known.

In sum, it seems to me that truth cannot lie in the relationship between subject matter, understood as mental contents, and what it represents. I still, then, like my definition better than yours. Please hammer again! — tim wood

Actually, it was you who said that truth lies in such a relationship. I said that truth lies in the subject matter itself, that subject matter is a manifestation of truth. I do not believe that mental content (subject matter) represents anything, it, as you say "just is". It's only when we take subject matter and formulate an idea, or a proposition, that we put it into a form which represents something.

So "truth", as these fundamental assumptions which are essentially "unknowns", because they cannot be justified, do not actually represent anything. They are just assumptions of meaning. So the symbol "A", and "=", and "+", and "4", all mean something to me, and these are fundamental "truths", having the function of assumptions in my thinking, but they are not representations, as they do not represent anything. Nor can we properly say that there is "a relationship" here, because they are simply "particles" of meaning.

That goes too far for me. Look at my Gandhi example. Did he have no respect for the law? Of course not. He was a lawyer! He just had no respect for the race laws of South Africa. — andrewk

I don't see how this follows, logically. If a person has no respect for a particular law, how can that person have respect for "the laws in general"? It requires referring to a principle higher than "the laws in general" in order to determine which particular laws that one should not have respect for. Referring to something higher than the laws, in order to determine that particular laws are inapplicable in particular situations, implies disrespect for "the laws in general".

The higher law that for Gandhi and others overrules the race law is his ethics. That does not require a belief in God. For some people such a belief is involved, while for others it is not. This is vanilla meta-ethics. I assume you are very familiar with all this and do not find it controversial. — andrewk

No, I'm not familiar with vanilla meta-ethics. But I do not see how an individual can reasonably place one's own personal ethics as higher than the law without reference to God. As soon as an individual adopts the principle that one's own ethics can overrule the laws, at will, then one cannot reasonably deny that others can overrule the laws at will, as well. So the law becomes useless. But if one cites "God" as the basis for this overruling, then it follows that this individual expects that others who wish to overrule the law will refer to God as well. The reference to "God", indicates that it is not one's own personal ethics which is responsible for the overruling, but God's ethics.

By the way, I don't think my use is that unusual. I place very little credibility on dictionaries for philosophical discussions, but since you have referenced one it may help for you to consider the first definition under item 2 in this Oxford Dictionary definition: 'having done something illegal'. Or, if one prefers Cambridge, we have here: 'Responsible for breaking a law'. That law could be that one has to report any sightings of Jews to the Gestapo, and a saint could be guilty of breaking that law (and some were). — andrewk

That definition doesn't support your claimed usage. First, it qualifies "illegal", later in the sentence as "something bad", and second, even if it just said "something illegal", that would require the same type of judgement of the act, that it was "in fact" illegal. So this would just change the need of having the action judged in relation to some moral standard, to a need to have it judged in relation to some legal standard.

To your credit though, when I reflect, I recognize a sort of sloppy, metaphorical use of "guilty", where someone might say "yes I am guilty of that", signifying "I did that", even if it was a good act. But that's in jest, and if this is the usage you are looking at, then we're not talking about the same thing, because I am talking about the required judgement that an act is bad, wrong, or illegal. So it doesn't make any sense to introduce that usage of the word because it just directs our attention away from the issue which is being discussed.

I didn't blame you, and I'm sorry that you thought I did. I can't see anything I wrote that implied that. Recognising the existence of a Verbal Dispute is a way of resolving an apparent disagreement, not a way of allocating blame. I find it very helpful, and usually both parties benefit. — andrewk

OK, I accept that you didn't blame me, It just appeared like you were being critical of me not wanting to accept this as a Verbal Dispute. And I still don't believe it is a Verbal Dispute. I think you are making up this claim of a different usage, as a distraction. Clearly, what I have been talking about is the need for some sort of judgement concerning the quality of an action, in order for there to be "guilt" associated with that action. And you recognized this with your first post, saying "the person recalls having committed the crime". If a person recalls having committed a "crime", then the person has passed that judgement, that the act committed was not legal. If you now want to change your statement to "the person recalls having acted", you are not staying true.

Perhaps though, I'm now starting to see your point. Are you arguing that a person can have zero respect for the law, but at the same time, hold one's own system of judging good and bad, completely independent of the law? So the person judges oneself as "guilty" of having broken the law, but "not-guilty" of having made a bad action. Therefore despite having broken the law, and judging oneself as guilty, the person has absolutely no remorse, thinking that the action was good, according to some standard higher than the law. If this is the case, then how does that person justify the judgement of "not-guilty" except by turning to a higher law, such as the law of God? Surely the person cannot justify this judgement of "not-guilty", on a whim, after breaking the law. How does the person justify "the law is bad in this situation"? Or does that person just always believe oneself to be higher than the law?

In the law, though it's entirely possible that a person may be found not guilty of a crime and yet have committed it.

I'm not sure what you're asking. Are you asking why people believe that someone who has committed a crime is guilty of committing a crime? — Ciceronianus the White

What I'm asking is how is it possible that the person who was found not-guilty by the court is "in fact guilty"? By whose judgement is that person guilty?

Yes. That is how I use the term. I understand that it is not how you use it. Are you familiar with David Chalmers' very useful notion of a Verbal Dispute? That is what this is. — andrewk

I'm sorry, I didn't recognize your use of "guilty". But you should not blame me for this. I've never come across that use before, and it's not in my dictionary (check dictionary.com for example). Did you just create this new use for the sake of argument? I'm sure that if you go around making up your own definitions, known only to you, just for the sake of argument, you will encounter many Verbal Disputes. In this case, the blame is on you.

The described scenario is that many people are aware that a crime was committed, because of the evidence. So the deduction is that there is a person responsible for the crime. Therefore it is assumed that there is a person who is "in fact guilty". We do not know who committed the crime. The person who committed the crime does not believe it was a crime. How is that person "in fact" guilty?

They won't necessarily feel bad about it. When I say they 'recall having committed the crime' I mean they recall having done the alleged act, not that they also judge the act to be bad. They may even, as in Ellsberg's case, judge the act to be good. — andrewk

How is that person guilty then? "Guilt" implies a judgement of wrongdoing. If the person believes that what was done was good, there is no judgement of wrongdoing, and therefore no guilt. Your claim was "a person is 'in fact guilty' if the person recalls having committed the crime." But if the person recalls the act as good, and therefore recalls committing a good act, then there is no guilt, even if we might judge the act as a bad act.

As I pointed out above, you and I are using the key words differently. Replace 'crime' by 'act' and 'guilty of' by 'actually did' and you will have an accurate translation of my statement from my personal language to yours. — andrewk

We cannot translate "guilty" to "actually did", because "guilty" implies a judgement of wrongdoing, and "actually did" does not. To make this translation you remove the essence of "guilty", which is the judgement of wrongdoing, and you are left with something completely different from what we are discussing, and that is "guilty". There is no point in "translating" the proposition into another proposition with a completely different meaning, because then we would be discussing something completely different. And besides, that is not a proper translation.

Gandhi is another example that comes to mind. In my language he 'was guilty of the crime of burning a racial identity card' and I revere him for that and no doubt he felt good about having done it. In your language he 'performed the act of burning a racial identity card'.

There is no difference in meaning. Only in the words used to convey the meaning. — andrewk

I don't see your point here. Are you suggesting that "guilty" does not necessarily imply a judgement of wrongdoing? Do you ever actually use "guilty" this way? Do you ever say that someone is guilty without implying that there has been a judgement of wrongdoing, either by yourself, or by someone else? If what you are insisting on, is that we can replace "guilty" with "actually did", without a difference of meaning, then this could only be true if you are using "guilty" in a different way from me. This would just be an equivocation to avoid the issue. What's the use in that?

Second try: truth is the name of a kind of relationship that can exist between subject matter and propositions. The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true. — tim wood

I'm not so sure about this because neither of us has provided any formal definition of "subject matter". Now your definition of "truth" requires "subject matter", but you say of subject matter, "whatever that is - just is". So you don't appear to have definition of subject matter. What I have stated is that subject matter is the manifestation of truth, and you have stated that subject matter is required for truth. Do you agree with this assessment? I have proposed that truth is somehow equivalent to subject matter, or perhaps even more fundamental than subject matter, while you have proposed that subject matter is prior to truth, truth is something built upon subject matter.

So let's analyze this concept for a moment. I propose that "subject" refers to the thinking human being, and "matter" refers to the content of thought. Whenever there is a thinking subject, there must be content, what is being thought, and this is subject matter. This content may be memories, beliefs, ideas, words, etc.

You have proposed as "truth", a relationship between the content and the proposition. Can we agree that the act of thinking, and the decision made, gives the content some sort of order, and this comes out as the proposition? So you would say "truth" is this ordering process which is the act of thinking. This act of thinking is the relationship between the content and the proposition. I assign "truth" to the content itself, which is the memories, beliefs, ideas, words, etc..

The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true. — tim wood

I don't think that we try to say something about the subject matter. The subject matter, as you say, "just is". We take it, formulate it in different ways, to say something. But what the proposition says something about, is not the subject matter itself, it says something about something else.

My argument is that the content, or subject matter, must already say something about something, before we formulate the proposition, and this is where we find truth. If the subject matter didn't say something about something, then thinking would be random, and propositions would be nonsense. So no matter how you break the proposition down into compositional parts, seeking the subject matter, there must be an element of truth in each part or else we get lost in random nonsense. Subject matter then is like a sign, it signifies or represents something. Truth is in the relationship between the sign and what it represents.

I said what I believed is that a tornado is the product of semiosis. As a dissipative structure, it is formed almost entirely by constraints outside of itself. It has no self-stabilising level of memory. So it can't "practise" semiosis. — apokrisis

If the semiosis which creates the tornado is external to the tornado itself, then it doesn't fulfill the conditions of "living", which I described earlier, as self-actuating.

And, if the universe itself, as an object, is such a dissipative structure, it would require a semiosis external to it, to produce it. Do you not see this as a serious problem for your metaphysics? You claim to have a metaphysics of immanence, yet your dissipative structures always require an external semiosis for their existence.

I was using 'guilty of the crime' with the meaning of 'had done the crime', whereas you were using it with the sense of 'felt bad about having done the crime'. Etymologically, yours may be more accurate, as I suppose that guilty derives from a root of 'feeling guilt', which is feeling bad about our actions. — andrewk

What you described though is "... that the accused themself makes this judgement. So a person is 'in fact guilty' if the person recalls having committed the crime." In this scenario, the person must recall committing "the crime", and therefore the guilt is due to knowing oneself to have committed a crime. That's why I called it a subjective guilt, it is a judgement by oneself, that I have done something wrong. The person will necessarily feel bad about it, if only for the moment, because to make the judgement "I have done wrong" is itself a bad feeling.

Where the issue is, is that the person who is "in fact guilty" of the crime, may not believe that a crime was committed. The other people see evidence of a crime, and believe a crime was committed, so they believe that someone is guilty. The person whom we are assuming is "in fact guilty", does not believe that a crime was committed, and does not judge oneself as guilty.

I think my meaning may be closer to common use though. When we say that a convicted person is actually innocent, we mean that they did not do the alleged act, not that they don't feel bad about it. Consider somebody that is convicted of the crime of breaking an unjust law. They may be a moral hero in our eyes for standing up to injustice, and may be in their own too. I would not say that Daniel Ellsberg was 'not guilty of breaking official secrecy laws' but I would say that I greatly admire him for doing so. — andrewk

The issue here, is a slightly different issues, so I'm going to stay away from it, so as not to confuse things.

Isn't that because intent is central to guilt? If a person kills another because he or she is in a florid state of psychosis and thinks the other is an evil alien then that person will often be found 'not guilty by reason of insanity'. If a person commits an act with right intention which has bad consequences, they may or may not be guilty, depending on circumstances. I find it hard to see many circumstances in which a person is 'unknowingly guilty' of a crime, but then, that presumes that persons are always sufficiently self-aware and well-informed to make that judgement themselves. — Wayfarer

We might have to ask Ciceronianus about that one, but I don't think that intent is central to guilt, if "intent" refers to being inclined toward what one knows is wrong, because as they say, ignorance of the law is no excuse. So if a person commits a crime without intending to commit a crime, that person will still be just as guilty. Insanity is a different issue.

This question is relevant to the concept of "original sin". The myth, as commonly told, states that Adam and Eve disobeyed God by eating the forbidden fruit. But it is also only by eating the fruit that they are said to gain the knowledge of good and evil. So there is some inconsistency, or paradox here, because they cannot know that obeying or disobeying God is good or bad, until they eat the fruit. If they obtain guilt from eating the fruit, as the story goes, then guilt must be independent from the intent to do an act known to be wrong, because it is impossible that they intended to do what they knew was wrong, when they could not know the difference between right and wrong.

So we might class "intent" as something other than the intent to do what is known to be good or bad. In this way an intentional act would be an act which one carried out for a purpose, with no necessity of deciding whether the act was good or bad. Any purposeful act can be judged for guilt regardless of whether the person knows that the act is good or bad. The random act of an insane person appears to have no purpose, and therefore no intent. But this requires that an act be judged for the presence of intent in order that the person be guilty. So in our example, of the person who is not judged by the court to be guilty, but is "in fact guilty", this person would have to be judged by God for the presence of intent.

So it says that the animate and the inanimate are alike in being hylomorphically semiotic. There is formal and final cause acting by way of top-down constraint to shape substantial being. And what is new here is proposing a mechanism - semiosis - by which that interaction generally happens. — apokrisis

That's what I disagree with, and I think is unreasonable metaphysics. I think there is no reason to believe that physical systems, which are commonly considered to be inanimate, can be said to act through a mechanism of semiosis. Do you believe that a tornado practises semiosis? I think that this is totally unfounded, and therefore your dissolution of the division between animate and inanimate is also unfounded.

And generally, all inanimate systems - especially those that grow, move, self-organise and self-optimise to meet the global purpose of the second law - can be understood as dissipative structures. Which means they must be informationally negentropic to be able to maintain the entropic flows that sustain them. I mean, keep them inanimately alive. — apokrisis

That a system may be modeled as a dissipative structure does not justify the claim that this system practises a mechanism of semiosis. There is a huge gap here which you seem to totally ignore, but it threatens to drop me into the abyss. So I'll just stay clear, and let you pretend that the gap is not there.