To a non-theist, perhaps an alternative - and equally workable in my view - interpretation is that the accused themself makes this judgement. So a person is 'in fact guilty' if the person recalls having committed the crime. — andrewk

Yes I mentioned this possibility in my reply to Cicero, you can see it in the quote above. This would be what I called a subjective feeling of guilt. The person knows, deep inside, that what was done was wrong, and feels guilty. The problem which this leads to, as I mentioned, is that if the person doesn't know that what was done was something wrong, we still won't to be able to say that the person is "in fact" guilty, because the person will not believe that a crime was committed. Then we have no principle whereby we can say that the person is "in fact" guilty.


OK, so let's assume that a crime was committed, let's say a theft. We know that the theft occurred from the evidence, a window was broken and the valuables were stolen. No one has been found guilty by neither judge nor jury. Let's say that the person who took the valuables had a reason to steal, the other person owed him money, or he needed to get even with that person for some other reason. So this person who took the valuables feels justified, and does not feel guilt whatsoever.

Now, you and I, andrewk, and whoever might read this, will probably want to judge the person as guilty of theft. But let's assume that absolutely no one, except the thief himself knows what happened. Doesn't it seem like the thief is "in fact" guilty? But, by what principle is this person guilty? There has been no judgement made by a court, nor by any human being, and the person feels no guilt. How can we say that there is any guilt here unless we assume that the judgement is made by God?

I can very easily put my finger on why a tornado is inanimate, it is not living. And if you want me to detail the reasons why I say it is not living, I can do that as well. But as I said, I don't see the point, because you will just obstinately reject what I say, in order to maintain your unreasonable metaphysics. Evidence of this is that you use terms like "grow" and "die", in a way different from how we would apply these words to living things, preparing to make an argument through equivocation.

In the law, a person is "guilty" of a crime when a court or jury determines the person has committed a crime (or confesses to a crime). — Ciceronianus the White

My question was, what do you refer to when you say that the person "may in fact be guilty" when the court has determined that the person is not guilty?

Here's your post:

Well, consider. In criminal law, in the U.S. at least, juries regularly decide a defendant is guilty or not guilty of a crime. That's a determination, a finding, in the law; subject to revision as the result of an appeal, but otherwise inviolate. However, that determination is not necessarily true (as commonly defined) or untrue. That's to say, a person may well be not guilty of a crime and yet have committed it--may in fact be guilty of it, or so I think most would say. — Ciceronianus the White

Since it appears like a judgement is necessary in order that the person is actually guilty, and the court has not judged the person as guilty, yet you state that most people would say that the person is "in fact" guilty, then don't you think that most people assume God makes this judgement?

I already gave my definition of inanimate, it means not-living. You don't understand, because you see everything in terms dichotomy, so from your perspective, one cannot simply define one side of an opposing pair. But in reality, that's what we do. We describe the characteristics of one side, say "living" for example, and if the observed thing does not fulfill the conditions, we designate it not-living. Likewise, we define what it means to be circular, and everything else is not circular. Obviously, I can tell you what it means to be not-circular without telling you what it means to be circular. To be not-circular means that it doesn't fulfill the conditions for being circular. It means nothing more than that.

So I don't know why you're so hung up on "inanimate". It's very simply "not-living". The more relevant question is the one of the op, what constitutes "living". If one is wrong in their determination as to what constitutes living, then that person might also be wrong when they come to designate something as inanimate. But there is no need for an extensive description of "inanimate". It is just everything which does not fulfill the conditions in the description of what it means to be living.

As an alternative to the back-to-the-land-movement, I'm planning to join the Death With Dignity, Right Now! Movement. If I'm still alive when the crunch comes, I'll deploy the double barreled shotgun and dispatch myself. — Bitter Crank

I really don't want to be the one to spoil the celebration, but I think that blowing oneself to bits with a shotgun is the exact opposite of "dignity".

And what you were asked for was the essence of inanimate matter. — apokrisis

No, that's not true. You ought to make yourself more clear. What you asked of me was to define "inanimate". That I did. Now you add a subject, which is "matter", and make "inanimate" a predicate. So you are now asking for the essence of matter which is inanimate. I now need to produce two distinct definitions, one for "inanimate", and one for "matter".

Does it not have its own form of nous - its reason for being - under Aristotelian hylomorphism? Is it not Platonically necessary as the indeterminate chora to accept the impression of the eternal ideas? — apokrisis

You have now completed your change of subject. The subject is no longer "inanimate", which is what you first asked me to define, the subject is now "matter". You appear to be suggesting that there is no such thing as inanimate matter, that all matter has inherent within it, properties of animate being, such as mind and intention. But this is not at all necessary to the concept of matter. "Matter" is a concept which accounts for our observed temporal continuity of existence. In Newtonian physics its essential property is expressed as inertia. Aristotle posited "matter", in his physics as that which persists, does not change, when change is occurring. Form is what is active and changing. With the assumption of matter, Aristotle could coherently talk about a changing object as continuing to be the same object despite changes to its form.

There is no need to assume that matter must have any properties of life. So long as the concept of "matter" provides us with the principles of temporal extension, there is no need to assign "life" to that temporal extension. In modern physics, "energy" has replaced the concept of "matter", because Newton's expression of "inertia" as the essence of matter replaced Aristotle's expression of "temporal continuity". These two are incompatible because Newton allows that inertia may be changed with force, while Aristotle does not allow that matter can change.

Since Newton's concept of matter replaced Aristotle's, there was a new need for a concept to account for observed temporal continuity. This need was filled by the concept of "energy" which now provides us with the principles of temporal extension. But there is no logical necessity forcing us to assume that energy must be living. So we have two distinct forms of temporal extension, living and not-living. Therefore we have two distinct classifications of matter and energy, living matter and energy, and inanimate matter and energy. There is no reason to conflate the two because that is simply category error.

I follow Aristotle's description which is mostly accepted by modern biology. Life is defined by the potencies of the living being, from the simplest, the power of self-nourishment, through self-movement, to the more complex, sensation, and intellection.

If it started with a big bang I suppose it ought to end with a big whimper, one being opposed to the other.

There's a book by a German forester Peter Wohlleben, called "The Hidden Life of Trees". It's quite interesting, with reference to numerous scientific studies. He considers the root system to be the tree's brain. There are many exchanges between the roots of different trees, carried out through mycelium which live in a symbiotic relationship with the trees. There is evidence that the trees communicate.

I note that you still seem unable to define what you mean by inanimate. That is pretty telling. — apokrisis

Yes, it's very telling. It tells me that you are being obstinate.

I just told you, inanimate means not-living. What more are you asking for?

I'll repeat myself:

That I couldn't describe the difference between animate and inanimate, in a way which would be acceptable to you, doesn't ,mean that there isn't such a difference. It could mean that I don't know the difference, and it could mean that you are obstinate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your metaphysics denies the difference between living and not living, so no matter how I define this difference you'll simply reject it in favour of your metaphysics. What's the point?

Would you categorise a tornado as inanimate and on what grounds precisely? — apokrisis

It's not a living thing. Inanimate means not living. You could, if you want, say that the tornado is animate by some other definition of "animate", but then we're not talking about the same thing. I'm talking about the difference between living and not-living. What are you talking about?

This consensus by most biologists is most likely real. Still, some burgeoning fields of biology do uphold plants to have intelligence and, therefore, plant-minds. — javra

Apparently, trees send within themselves, electrical messages, similar to the nerves of animals but they travel much slower. They are communicate through there roots and networks of mycelium which intertwine with the roots

But it seems it must be a problem for you, though. I suppose when you go home at night you greet a different companion each time. — John

It's no problem for me. I accept change as real. I expect that all my acquaintances will be different each time I meet them. This helps me in my efforts to remain stoic. Without this expectation, some of these differences might upset me.

I wonder how it is that you are able to recognize your wife, since she is never the same person from one day, or even one minute, to the next. — John

As I said earlier, in response to wayfarer's quote from Kant, there is an assumed continuity which allows us to say that a person remains the same person. I derive this idea continuity directly from my experience of self-consciousness, as Kant described in that quote. The problem which I described is that this idea of continuity is derived only from my living experiences, such as memory, so I cannot justify assigning continuity to non-living, inanimate matter. I can project this continuity towards other human beings, and living creatures, assume that they continue to be "the same" being through experiences like memories, because they're alive just like me, but to extend this to inanimate matter is unjustified. That's the point I made, the continuity of existence of matter is an assumption which is unjustified.

Define inanimate. What is its essence? — apokrisis

That I couldn't describe the difference between animate and inanimate, in a way which would be acceptable to you, doesn't ,mean that there isn't such a difference. It could mean that I don't know the difference, and it could mean that you are obstinate.

So somewhere life must have an idea of the material structure it desires to build or maintain. Which is where the imateriality enters the picture. — apokrisis

Why does this need to be an "idea"? Many of the activities of living things are of the nature of trial and error. Trial and error requires the will to act, but it does not require an idea of what success consists of. The will to act is most often driven by indeterminate feelings such as hunger, and these feelings cannot be classified as ideas. It is not necessary to assume an "idea" as the motivation behind the desire to act.

In many metaphysical stances, immateriality "enters the picture", as the immaterial cause, the will. Yes, we are lead to acceptance of the immaterial, through the existence of ideas, as ideas are evidence of the immaterial, but "the idea" is denied active status, and therefore causal status in the world, by the well established principles of Aristotle. Therefore the idea cannot have "actual" existence in the real physical world, its existence is confined to the minds of living beings.

So as metaphysicians we are forced to seek the means whereby that which is immaterial acts within the physical world, and this is the will. The will, as the immaterial cause, is something completely distinct from the idea. And as I described above, the will to act, as a cause of activity, is not necessarily guided by ideas. We feel the will to act, motivating us through indeterminate feelings. The rational mind attempts to put a halt to these motivating feelings with "will power", allowing ideas to intervene as guidance.

So no, this ain't about gods or minds or anything that requires hard dualism. Semiosis is how physicalism can enjoy all the benefits of dualism without any of its mystic-mongering and question-begging. — apokrisis

But you attribute to the inanimate universe, properties which only living beings are known to have, things like mind, intention, and habits. I'd call this a category error. We have a well structured division between living and non-living which is completely respected within the scientific disciplines. You don't hear physicists talking about particles behaving as they do because they have habits, or engineers referring to the second law of thermodynamics as the intention of the Mind of the Cosmos

Yes, the Cosmos has a Mind. And if that sounds whacky, well sorry but this is what we actually mean in terms of modern physical models based on the interchangability of H and S measures of information entropy. We can now talk about particles and brains in the same essential language. — apokrisis

Yes that does sound a bit whacky. You have taken metaphysics back to its primitive beginnings, to pre-Socratic times, prior to two and a half thousand years ago. It's a good idea to study these ideas for background information, but to adhere to these severely underdeveloped principles, well that's a serious regression. Have you no respect for the advancements made by metaphysicians between then and now? In particular, I refer to those advancements which have created the categories of animate and inanimate things.

You do indeed have a very valid point. But time was out of the question. — DebateTheBait

I think time is very relevant. The reason why one side of the tree is a different perspective from the other side of the tree, as stated in the op, is that the observer cannot be at both sides of the tree, at the same time. That's what defines it as a different perspective. So when the op is referring to different perspectives, what is being referred to is different places, which is determined as where the same observer cannot be at the same time.

So I think my point remains as relevant. If an observer could be at both sides of the tree, at the same time, this individual could confirm that it is the same tree being observed, knowing that no time has passed between the observation at point A, and the observation at point B, observing from both perspectives at the very same moment. Therefore no changes could possibly have occurred to the tree between the observation at point A and the observation at point B, and it is confirmed as the same tree.

So my use of "mind" is clearly deflationary. Especially as I am explicitly generalising it to semiosis, or sign rather than mind. Semiosis is mind-like - in being the mechanism or process by which formal/final cause are understood as immanent in nature. — apokrisis

The problem I see, is that you are attributing life-like features, terms used to describe the characteristics of living beings, properties which are only known to exist as attributes of living beings, to the inanimate "Cosmos". Do you not see that this is unreasonable? Or do you apprehend "The Cosmos" as a living being?

But - as I understand it anyway - it is critical that nous is immanent and not transcendent. It is not about some spirit or external hand acting on an inanimate and purposeless world. Instead, pansemiosis is a theory of immanent self-organisation - the taking of habits that forms a cosmos obeying its own accumulated laws. — apokrisis

I conclude that your metaphysics is essentially pantheistic. The Cosmos is a living god. Do you agree with this assessment?

Sorry, my mistake, it's Anaxagoras who assumed Nous. The Nous is the mind which orders all the parts of the cosmos to behave in an orderly fashion. That's what you describe when you say that the universe follows final cause (the intent of a mind), and inanimate things behave according to habits (actions resulting from a mind).

Not familiar with "Nous"? How could that be the case when, from your writing, it appears to be your first principle of metaphysics?

I did say "more or less invariant". — John

The op indicates a logical problem with referring to "the same tree", when being observed from different perspectives. If you think that it is "more or less" the same tree, then I guess there is no problem for you.

The tree is the same but your perspective has changed, and in that changed perspective you can learn more from the tree thus giving it a different perception and understanding. — DebateTheBait

But the tree does change, with each passing moment of time it is a little different. And since it is impossible for you to hold perspective A and perspective B at the very same time, then in the time that it takes for you to change from one to the other, the tree has changed. If the tree has changed, then logically it cannot be the same tree.

Furthermore, the special theory of relativity indicates that any true description of the reality of what exists, is different and even contradictory from one perspective to another. These differences between what is the true reality from one perspective, and what is the true reality from another perspective, are supposed to be able to be made consistent with one another through the use of mathematical equations. But that only hides the contradictions within the assumed nature of time, allowing a multitude of "times", for a multitude of true realities, from a multitude of perspectives. This results in the conclusion that time is not real.

If a man already believes he has all the answers then we will not accept any question from another nevertheless the answer. And if that same man is very prideful of the color of his flag then he will indeed fight and die for it. — DebateTheBait

I believe "certitude" is a double edged sword. When an individual feels certain of the right things, that feeling is the confidence required to carry out one's actions. But when an individual feels certain of the wrong things, those actions will be wrong actions.

Only you alone can prove to yourself that there is no true and definite answer. I only wish to prove to you the right and just questions we must ask ourselves if we so choose to live with ourselves in peace. — DebateTheBait

When you prove to yourself that there is no answers to your questions, you put yourself in the place of Socrates who claimed that the only thing he knew was that he didn't know. But if you now approach others, as Socrates did, and attempt to prove to them that they really do not know the things which they believe themselves to be certain of, you are sure to receive scorn.

That's what I think, to say that a tornado rages across the land with the desire to destroy is simply metaphoric. And to do honest metaphysics by assigning the attributes of living things, such as intention and habit, to inorganic systems is a mistake which will only lead to confusion. Anaximander's "Nous" was long ago dismissed because it was inadequate as a metaphysical principle.

Relationships and similarities are not at all the same. Meaning is built on associations, relationships, not similarities. To say that similarity is what is important here is a mistake.

Eh?

That's the point though, nothing can be said to be related to anything else, except through how we identify them. So if I think that one thing is related to another, then it is related, by virtue of that very thought which relates them. Even if it is a case of "misidentifying", there is necessarily a relationship, because that act of misidentifying creates that relationship. To justify the claim that this is "misidentifying" rather than identifying, requires a demonstration that this relationship is incorrect. We do this by turning to other relationships (context). Vise versa, to justify an identification as correct rather than a misidentification, requires reference to other relationships (context). So context is a necessary part of identification because it distinguishes identification from misidentification.

I've described what the laws are, inductive conclusions, which are used as tools, by human beings in their activities. Whether or not some of these laws might reflect reality is irrelevant, because even if they did this would not imply that reality follows the laws. The reality does not follow the reflection. That's the point, we cannot say that the reality follows the laws, because it does not, even if the laws reflect the reality. So to say things like reality is constrained by these laws, is pure nonsense.

Not everything is like that though. A baby monitor works, because regardless of context, "I'm being harmed or terrified" noises are the same regardless of the surrounding context. — Wosret

This is not a good example of noise without context, because you have already stipulated the context as a baby monitor. Remove that context and who knows what the noises are. I heard a cat in a field, at night, making noises and it sounded just like a distressed baby. It took me some time to convince myself that it could not be a baby out there. A few days later my neighbour told me he had heard that noise, thinking the same thing, and he had come very close to going out into the field to find the baby.

So there is an issue here of convincing oneself that the noises ( words or utterances included) cannot mean what they appear to mean, because the context is wrong. And I cannot think of any noises which could be exempt from this problem. Interpretation is always dependent on context, that's just the way that the mind works, through associations.

If laws are purely formal, then they don't reflect anything real about nature. To my way of thinking, it would only be under this assumption that it could rightly be said that human beings "create" laws. — John

Right, the laws don't reflect nature, they reflect the inductive conclusions of human beings, therefore the correct interpretation is that human beings create the laws.

The metaphysical question is as to whether the laws we formulate reflect a reality which is independent of our formulations. — John

That's not a relevant issue, it's a misguided question. The laws are created as tools, they assist us in what we are doing. Would you ask the metaphysical question of whether hammers and saws, and other tools "reflect a reality which is independent of our formulations" of these tools? The laws, as tools are produced to aid us in our activities, so if they reflect anything, they reflect those activities. Doesn't it seem like nonsense to you to ask whether these tools reflect a reality which is independent from us, when they are produced for the purpose of being used as tools, by us?

Before wading fully into the murky swamps of metaphysics, just recall what the discussion was about in the first place: that the sensory impressions we receive from the proverbial tree, constantly change and shift as we change our position relative to it. But there is a faculty in the mind which integrates all of those momentary impressions into a unified whole, and also makes judgements about the tree in terms of kind, and what the tree might mean (if anything) in the context in which it's being viewed. Whatever that faculty is, is described under the heading 'the subjective unity of perception', i.e. there is an innate ability to see 'holistically', which requires integration of many kinds of data and input into a whole. — Wayfarer

So the point I'm making, is that if it is a faculty of the mind which is creating a unified whole, being referred to as "the tree" here, we are not justified in the claim that the tree itself is a unified whole. The ancient, historic position is that the tree itself is in fact a unity, and this unity has a describable form. So no matter what your perspective is, that form is the same. But the principles of logic dictate that if the form changes, it cannot be "the same" tree. Modern physics, which notes that objects are continually changing, and especially relativity theory, deny the possibility that the tree could have one united, describable, form. That is why I say that the claim that there is "the tree", which itself is a unified whole, is unjustified.

Aristotle met the same problem in his day, with sophists denying the reality of being in favour of "becoming". His resolution was to assign the identity of the thing to its matter rather than to its form. This allows that the identified thing does not necessarily have a specific form which can be described, the form is actively changing. The identified thing is constantly changing, so it is not identified as the thing which it is, by its form. He posits matter, and the identity of the thing is transferred to its matter, rather than its form, and matter provides an assumed temporal continuity of existence, regardless of changes to the form. Therefore the unity of the object's existence is found in its temporal extension rather than its spatial form.

All our experience tells us that we do see stable objects and that others see the same objects. — John

Maybe your experience tells you that, but science tells us that what appears to be a stable object is in fact not stable at all. It is actually very active, interacting with electromagnetism for example. And what you see is this interaction, not a stable object. Science and reason are much more reliable than our senses, and that's why throughout the history of human existence, philosophers have been skeptical of what sense experience gives them. This doubt inspires reason and science to determine the true nature of things.

If this is right... — John

Don't you agree that there is no point in going on to consider the consequences of "if this is right", prior to determining whether or not this is right. There is no point in asking why there are stable objects, until we determine that there actually are stable objects. If science is telling us that what appears to be a stable object is actually a whole lot of activity, then how is this appearance of a stable object created by the human sensory system? And your question of why there is stable objects becomes a question of why does the human sensory system create stable objects.

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum.(A370)

Most people are by instinct 'transcendental realists', whereas I tend towards dualism. — Wayfarer

This, to "concede the existence of matter", is what I refer to in my post above, as an assumption. The existence of matter is assumed, it is not "known", because it is not justified.

Notice how Kant describes this as being directly derived from self-consciousness. The idea of "matter", as that which substantiates the temporal continuity of existence (the temporal continuity of substantial existence), is derived from one's own experience of a self which has continuous existence in time. One's experience of one's own continuous existence in time is what warrants the assumption of "matter", which is a projection of this continuity into the assumed thing itself, validating the thingness (objectivity) of the thing itself.

The problem though, is that it may be the case, that this experience of a "self" with continuous existence in time, may only be provided for by the fact that the self is living (the soul of the individual). Now we have "the soul" which is the essence of this temporal continuity, so the assumption of "matter", as the basis for temporal continuity in the thing itself, stands alone as entirely unwarranted and unjustified. The dualist now needs to revisit this concept, because there is no apparent reason to "concede the existence of matter". That's what Berkeley demonstrated.

If we now want to answer scientific/metaphysical strength questions about natural kinds or essences - talk about the facts of the thing-in-itself, with no distorting human lens of self-interested speech - then we have to have a model of how the physical world is itself a mind doing semiosis. We have to be able to find a way to model formal/final causes "for real". And that is when we start to focus on how nature is in general a self-organising entropic habit. It is modelling itself into existence via acts of measurement. — apokrisis

Why would you want to practise metaphysics by modeling the physical world as a mind? With such an unreasonable starting point you have very little hope of producing a reasonable metaphysics. That's the sort of metaphysics which gives "metaphysics" a bad name, inclining people to disregard real metaphysicians.

Necessity is the tool of reason. You say that what is necessary could be a fantasy, a fiction. This renders reason impotent. Now you say that mankind has set reason as its god, but you've already left this god impotent. It appears like either you misunderstand mankind, or mankind misunderstands reason.

I think you should go back and read my first post on this thread, because I didn't say anything like that. And what is this that I've demonstrated "for the sixth or seventh time in our dialogue"? I think you've mixed me up with someone else.

It is undeniable that the only reason the entire planet is not in perpetual war is because enough diplomats have learned how to lie to each other gracefully, and it is too frequently the case that in-laws don't cause divorces is because they lie when they have to. — ernestm

Be truthful now ernestm. What you call "undeniable", I would say is extremely doubtful.

The first, obviously. Clearly there is a distinction between living and non-living, and being good philosophers, we have a desire to determine this distinction

Logically, we will never be able to agree "on when we might best use the words" until we determine that distinction.

But what people want, and what is actually the case, are two distinct things. What is actually the case is that knowledge progresses through the devolution of private thoughts. And to keep secrets, even innocuous looking ones like Santa Clause, actually hinders the growth of knowledge. So it's generally considered a moral virtue to be honest and sincere in one's interactions with others, because this is beneficial to society as a whole.

In the narrative 'you' are assumed to remain the same you, a first puzzle. The tree changes as you pass it, but in such a slow way that we tend to discount the difference, just as we do with whether your movement and ageing changes you significantly. (I saw a recent theatrical enactment of Paul Auster's New York trilogy in which two identically-dressed actors played him, one emerging a moment after the other left, or the two co-existing on stage for a moment) — mcdoodle

This is a good point. Why do we think that the tree is the same tree, from one moment to the next? We know that the tree is undergoing small changes with every moment of passing time, so why should we call it the same tree? We assume that it is the same tree, but we don't actually know that it is the same tree, this is just an assumption. This is the ontological status of the continuity of substance, we assume that substance has continued existence, but we do not actually know this, because the assumption cannot be justified due to the fact that changes are constantly occurring.

Nice piece ernestm, very down to earth and real.

That is to say, W holds that a theory of meaning and metaphysics is NOT NECESSARY for effective communication. — ernestm

Yes, effective communication is possible (and therefore NOT NECESSARY) under those circumstances, but there is a high probability of misunderstanding. Perhaps when Bob said "it is raining", what he really meant was "go fuck yourself", and not "I am not hungry".

That is why applicable theories of meaning and description are useful, to help us increase the odds of actually understanding what the other person is saying. What happens when we get into much more complex communications, such as scientific studies?

By the definition of the term itself: the smallest structural and functional unit of an organism. With this definition, if we were to ever find simpler organisms than our currently known cells, then these would also be called cells I think. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that definition of "cell" is outdated, and maybe based in misunderstanding. Isn't there many smaller active units within the cell?

Human beings formulate laws, and we don't know for sure whether those formulations reflect actuality in any absolute sense. — John

Yes, so you agree with me, human beings create laws. You can call it "formulate" if you like.

I think you are quibbling over different senses of "follows". Nature either invariably and absolutely acts in accordance with laws, or follows laws, or it doesn't. In either case what those laws are, where they "come from"; what their ontological status is; is a whole other (I would say ultimately undecidable) question. — John

Unless you can demonstrate that there are some laws which are not created, or formulated, by human beings, (perhaps they were formulated by God?) then you should accept that it is very clear that nature does not follow laws. Nature existed long before human beings, and "follows" implies necessarily, posteriority. If you think that I am quibbling about senses of "follows", and believe that there is a sense of "follows" in which the thing being followed is not prior to the follower, then please explain