Assuming that the graph is as much a temporal layout as it is numerical, the beginning (left), is a time when the evidence is not viewed as evidence. No one knows the meaning of the grains of sand, and at first no one is interested The grains of sand keep coming in, but no one is thinking that the sand is making a heap, so it is not considered as evidence of a heap. The centre part of the graph is when the piling up of the sand becomes important. This is a time of theory and speculation. Therefore the grains of sand are viewed as evidence of something, at this time, and there is active and rapid thought as to what is going on, "evidence of what?". Once it is established that there is a "heap", the grains of sand keep piling up to very little notice as the existence of "the heap" is now taken for granted.

Suppose I'm about to climb a ladder, and someone I consider an authority assures me it's safe. If the ladder fails and I get a broken arm, I'm still the one who suffers the consequences. On the other hand, that person's assertion having proved wrong, I will be less likely to trust their judgment, so they suffer some consequence as well, just a slightly different sort. I might also suffer that same sort of consequence, if others think it was my mistake in trusting him. — Srap Tasmaner

I think I've lost track of the point your trying to make. But if your boss tells you to climb the ladder and assures you that it is safe, then the boss is the one liable to pay compensation when you get hurt. In any case, you seem to have missed my point. We use "the authorities said so" as an excuse, to pass on the blame, when we are caught making an assertion which turns out wrong. This allows us to nonchalantly make assertions when the information comes from an authority, knowing we will not be held accountable if the assertion proves wrong. So I can assert "it will rain today" when the weather forecaster says so, knowing that if I am wrong, the weather forecaster is due to get the blame, not myself.

So this is a type of confidence, which is real confidence because we have confidence in the authorities, but at the same time it isn't a true confidence, because we are just letting someone else make the decision for us. It is confidence in another person, not self-confidence.

Do you think the soul exists as a separate entity from our body, do you think personality has to do with the soul, do you think some souls shine brighter than others or can our existence and disposition be chalked down to environment and biology? — Locks

You should read some Plato. There is very much information there concerning the nature of the soul, and why it is necessary to assume that we have a soul. Much is anecdotal. Here's an example. The thirsty man will drink water to quench his thirst. But if the water is contaminated he will not drink it even if he is very thirsty. What can account for this fact, that when he is thirsty, sometimes he will drink the water, and other times he will not, other than the assumption that he has a soul which is in control of his body?

That just necessitates insufficiency of present knowledge, not a supernatural cause. — Thanatos Sand

Do you think that the soul, if it exists, is necessarily something supernatural? How would you define "supernatural", and "soul", such that the soul is necessarily supernatural?

You are still not getting it. I said the process of attending leads to a particular state of intention. So it brings intentionality - our general long-run state of orientation to the world - into some particular focused state. — apokrisis

Actually, you said that intentionality is formed by "attentional" focus. Attention forms a generalized intent. When I pointed out to you that this is inconsistent with the rest of your statement that this attentional focus requires effort by the brain, (implying that general intent exists prior to this) you said that what you really meant is that particular intentions are formed in this way.

However we can talk also of intentions - some focused mindset that exists at some point of time. That would be intentionality particularised. — apokrisis

All right, so let's proceed with a clear distinction between intentionality and particular intentions, intentionality being prior to, and necessary for focusing the attention, and a focused attention is what is associated with particular intentions. We still need to deal with the process of how intention focuses the attention. Since habit is described as coming about from this focus, we cannot turn to habit to understand this process.

But you yourself said you had to notice that you were hungry. So attending to a feeling was a first step. And from there flowed an action plan, an intention to actually do some particular thing. Choices can only form following attention. Although faced with the same situation often enough, those choices do become habits. I know its confusing. — apokrisis

Ok, we have here "attending to a feeling". Do you agree that this is a focusing of the attention in an inward direction, toward an internal object (the goal), and that this should be distinguished from focusing the attention on an external object (sensing)? In the one case we attempt to filter out all the vagueness of the general intentionality to focus on a particular intention, and in the other case, we attempt to filter out all the vagueness of the environment to focus on a particular thing.

Would you agree, that the latter is a description of consciousness, being aware of one's surroundings, and being capable of focusing one's attention on particular aspects of one's environment? And do you agree that the former is a description of being self-conscious, self-aware, being aware of one's inner feelings, and being capable of focusing one's attention on particular aspects of these inner feelings?

I think it is necessary to put this distinction in relation to the distinction between habit and attention, which you refer to, in order to properly understand the living activities. That is because we need to understand the role of introspection in relation to habits, to understand the capacity to break habits.

But here's another thing to consider. if the internal focus of one's attention is required for the living being to produce a new goal, and therefore a new activity, then the internal focus (self-consciousness) is what is responsible for the living being's capacity to move, and the external focus (consciousness) is simply a habit. How would you describe self-consciousness?

And then in doing that, the particular attentional/intentional state should be understood not as something already fleshed out and action specific, but instead a fixing of limits, a production of a state of generalised constraint on action.

From that generalised constraint on action, a habit level of performance can take over. — apokrisis

The model you describe outlines the forming of habits in relation to attention, but it does not address the breaking of habits.

No, I'm not yet getting you understand a word I say. — apokrisis

Actually the issue being addressed is whether or not you understand what you're saying. You said something, and when I pointed to the inconsistency, you declared that you meant something else. We could take it for granted that I would not understand what you were saying, when you didn't say what you meant. The question is why would you not say what you meant in the first place. It appears like either you didn't understand what you were saying (mistaken), or you were actively trying to deceive.

Yes but I was talking about intentions. And it was my usage you were attacking. If you want to talk about intentionality, then that is a different subject. — apokrisis

You said:

Instead, arriving at a state of attentional focus is a process of evolving development. It begins with the vague potential of the many different attentional outcomes that could be the case, and then arrives eventually - half a second later - at the outcome, the state of intentionality, which appears to have the best fit for whatever are the challenges or opportunities of the moment. — apokrisis

And also:

Attention forms a generalised intent (that being the novel part), habit puts that into words (that being routine skill), and then attention can sign off on the final utterance - or at least come up with hasty self-correction having spotted something wrong with the way the words just came out. — apokrisis

So it should be clear that it was you making the category error, not myself. You talked about how "intentionality", and "a generalised intent" forms from attention, but when I took exception to this, you insisted you were talking about particular intentions.

In regards to habit or attention, they are both intentional or goal directed in a general sense. One is just intentions learnt and fixed while the other is the forming and particularisation of intentions. — apokrisis

Great, I'm glad that you see it this way. So we should avoid saying that intentionality, or generalized intent, is formed by attention. In reality, both attention and habit are formed through intentionality.

So something vague like a discomfort leads to the intention to look closer. And yet something vague like a discomfort attracts your attention so that you might develop a suitable intention.

Hmm. See your problem? — apokrisis

No I don't see any problem here. It is quite clear that intention develops from the more general toward the more particular. I'm hungry, I intend to eat. I look in the fridge and see some ground beef, so I intend to eat hamburger. I decide to turn on the BBQ and intend to eat grilled hamburgers. Intention is always there, whether it's in the more general, or more particular form.

So the facts you think significant are ones that are already accommodated. — apokrisis

I take it we are in agreement then. It is incorrect to say that intentionality, or generalized intent is formed from attention. It is correct to say that things like attention and habit are formed with intention. So when I find you speaking in this incorrect way in the future, you should not object when I correct you.

Talk about attention is talk about a general faculty. Talk about intentions is talk about particular states.

Now I am trying to get away from such a mundanely mechanical framing of the debate myself. But if we have to talk in those terms, then you can see how you are confusing apples and oranges. Or the general and the particular. — apokrisis

In case you didn't notice, I'm talking about the general thing, intention, not particular intentions.

Intention in its basic form is general, and not a particular intention. This is why we often do things without being able to state the particular intention involved with the act, when the act is nevertheless intentional.

Intentions have to form via attentional mechanism. And then having formed as particular states of attention, they can act as constraints on further attentional acts. — apokrisis

In the formation of particular intentions, one's attention must be directed inward. towards one's inner self, at the general intention which is within. So if I'm feeling uncomfortable, I direct my attention inward and form the particular intention to eat, or to urinate, or whatever I see as required to relieve this uncomfortable feeling. From there I move to the even more specific, what I will eat, or where I will go. So directing my attention is a process of determining the particulars of a general intention. This "directing my attention" must be intentional, or else there could be no "directing". It is not a particular intention, because it considers many possible intentions so it must be general..

Of course I cannot really name the general intention from which the particulars are derived, or else it would no longer be general, it would be something specific, named. But I can describe them in general ways, like the feelings of anxiety, anticipation, discomfort, etc., which all seem to exist in forms which attract my attention.

So you've got yourself into some pointless spiral in trying to prove attentional machinery is under voluntary control and never subject to involuntary trigger. But that machinery obviously has to switch efficiently between two modes of attending - either pursuing a plan or getting a new plan started. — apokrisis

"Intention" does not mean "voluntary control", that is a misrepresentation. To have intention means to have purpose, it does not mean to have control. So involuntary acts are still intentional acts according to the fact that they are purposeful. The conscious agent may not always be consciously aware of the purpose for all the acts which one is carrying out, but this does not make these acts unintentional.

Inasmuch as attention has an intentional (voluntary, noticeable, controllable, conscious) aspect, and an unintentional (involuntary, unnoticeable, uncontrollable, semi-conscious) aspect, it is unsuitable even as a metaphor for consciousness. It could just as easily serve as a metaphor for semi-consciousness. — Galuchat

It is a mistake to class the intentional as necessarily voluntary. All voluntary acts are intentional, but not all intentional acts are voluntary.

Intentionality resides wholly with the ego. — Posty McPostface

This is the mistake which I explain above. You create an incoherent model by restricting intentionality this way. Intentionality is required for learning, in order to focus the attention. Intentionality is behind all the desires which arise from the non-conscious aspects of being. If a desire inspires an action which is carried out for a purpose, it must be consider to be an intentional act.

Acting on your belief, for instance by asserting it, carries risk, and we can naturally extend the above: the greater your confidence the greater the risk you are prepared to take; the greater the risk you expect to face, the greater your confidence in your choice of action must be. Thus, following consensus or authority is generally, but not always, so low-risk, you barely need any reason at all. — Srap Tasmaner

But following consensus, or authority, is a reason for confidence, a very good reason. So when you follow authority it's not that you do not need a reason, you already have the reason, and a very good one at that. This gives us confidence.

And I don't get what you mean by "the greater your confidence the greater the risk you are prepared to take". This seems contradictory. If you are confident, then you don't see yourself as taking a risk. So the higher the confidence, the less the risk, because taking a risk is to proceed with low confidence.

For example, we may be faced with a choice between saying, "I think it's going to rain," and saying, "It's going to rain," or "I know it's going to rain." We have described these before as less and more confident versions of the same belief. (That's not quite true, of course, because the first could actually express greater confidence by means of understatement.) — Srap Tasmaner

So in this example, if one has much faith in the weather forecaster who predicts rain, that person will say "it's going to rain". But a person who hasn't listened to the weather forecast, but is still quite skilled in forecasting the weather by looking at the clouds and the wind conditions, might say, with less confidence, "I think it's going to rain".

Pretty sure I didn't say certainty is "inherent within assertion"; I said it could function as a reason for you not to fear being held accountable for what you say, but there may be other reasons. For instance, just following consensus or authority is probably all the reason we need much of the time. — Srap Tasmaner

Consider the example now. One person has listened to the weather forecaster, and asserts with certainty "it's going to rain". Are you saying, that if that person turns out to be wrong, the person will just pass off the accountability to the weather forecaster? So the person makes the assertion, as if with certainty, but the person really does not have certainty and is just passing along the certainty of another, because the accountability s passed along in the same way.

Is this an acceptable way of speaking though? Is it acceptable to assert something as if you are certain of it, when you really are believing that if you're wrong you can just pass off the accountability to someone else? We could be making assertions as if we are certain all the time, pretending to be certain, but knowing all along that we really are not certain, and it doesn't matter if we're wrong because the accountability can just be passed along.

Tom has no conception of truth, and yet has true belief.

How, exactly can it be the case that Tom has true belief? — creativesoul

It is only your judgement of Tom's belief which says that it is true. You do have a conception of truth, and base your judgement in this. Tom does not believe that his belief is true, he just believes.

If true belief requires truth, and truth is prior to language, then Tom can have true belief despite not being able to talk about it, and we can accurately report upon it by virtue of properly taking account of it. — creativesoul

Tom's belief is not true unless it is judged by someone as being true. I think we went through this already in this thread, true is a judgement. Consider "the grass is green". It might appear like the grass is green without the need for any judgement, but this is not the case. Someone must judge the thing referred to by "grass", as qualifying for being called "green", in order that the grass is green. There's no way around this. You could say "if the grass reflected the right light, then it would be green regardless of whether or not it is judged as green", but all this does is make that necessary judgement. Without that judgement it is impossible that the grass is green, and also impossible that Tom's belief is true.

If our reports are accurate then it must be the case that true belief is capable of being formed and/or held by a language-less agent. — creativesoul

I don't agree with this. A stone is only a stone because it is judged to be a stone. A tree is a tree because it is judged to be a tree. A true belief is a true belief because it is judged to be a true belief. A language-less agent cannot judge a belief as being true, that requires language. It is true that you, a person with language, could judge the language-less agent's belief as true, but since that agent has no language to express that belief to you, that judgement is purely speculative and very unreliable. This is not at all suited to the use of "true", which implies certainty.

You are making a category error in trying to make attention the efficient cause of a final cause. — apokrisis

I wouldn't be so quick to make that claim. Efficient causes commonly come into existence as a result of a final cause, this is the nature of freely willed actions. Also, it is a fact that we consciously direct our attention toward things which interest us. Being attentive is the capacity to direct ones attention without be distracted by things which tend to create a sub-conscious, reflex action of the attention, toward other things. Being able to consciously direct one's attention is essential to learning. We cannot learn without this capacity to direct our attention.

A clear intention comes to be in focus because all the background chatter of the brain is being suppressed or restrained. The intent thus pops into view as the efficient cause (supposedly) of the voluntary or controlled behaviour that ensues. And the effort being talked about is the effort of repressing all the possibilities that might have been to allow some particular "best fit" state of mind become fully actualised. — apokrisis

So this is clearly backwards. Intention is what focuses the attention, suppressing the background chatter. You are assuming some sort of "effort" by the brain, to focus attention, which allows intention to pop up, when it's quite obvious that this effort is intention itself, already in action. What else would you assume this effort to consist of, when we clearly have so many examples of intention focusing the attention?

You seem to have taken this faulty materialist, determinist premise, that intention is subservient to attention, and you've run all over living behaviour with it.

So to control interactions with the world, we do have to learn what to do. But mostly that becomes learning to suppress the randomness of all the things we shouldn't do. — apokrisis

Do you think that intentional acts only come into existence through learning? In actuality, intention is required for learning, as that which focuses the attention. The ability to control interactions with the world is innate, it is not learned. That is what it means to be alive. What is learned is which things to control.

MU claims that writings only have meaning in the act of being interpreted. — Janus

No, I was talking about the act of creating the sentences, not interpreting them. I said that a potential sentence cannot have meaning, it has to be created to have meaning. And it has meaning to the one who composed it, even if it hasn't been interpreted by anyone else.

That seems unintelligible, for how can a first cause be simultaneously a final cause? — Brian A

"Final cause" refers to a type of causation, the "final" does not refer to a temporal order. So there is nothing unintelligible about the first cause being a final cause. This would just be to say that the first cause is that type of cause, in comparison to an efficient cause for example.

The whole brain is involved and the effort is divided between habit and attention. Attention forms a generalised intent (that being the novel part), habit puts that into words (that being routine skill), and then attention can sign off on the final utterance - or at least come up with hasty self-correction having spotted something wrong with the way the words just came out. — apokrisis

When you refer to "the effort" which the brain is involved in, isn't this intentional effort? If so, then attention could not form intent, because attention is already subsumed under "the effort" which is itself intentional. If you don't mean intentional effort, what other type of effort could there possibly be?

None of this deals directly with truth. I'm just trying to clarify what assertion amounts to.) — Srap Tasmaner

I follow your clarification. It is my argument that it is within this certainty which is inherent within the assertion, that we find the essence of truth. The difference which you speak of between saying "I believe it is raining", and "it is raining", is that the latter is to say "it is true that it is raining", and the former implies no such certainty. And in your example of the captain in the army, his assertion that the bridge will be held, is equivalent to a claim that it is true that the bridge will be held. So this is where we find the meaning of "true", and therefore "truth" itself, within this confidence which allows one to make an assertion.

The difficult issue, as I mentioned already, is that sometimes when we claim such certainty we are proven to be wrong. Therefore the thing which is true, according to the true essence of truth, as outlined above (the confidence which inspires the assertion), may turn into a falsity when one recognizes one's own mistake. So there is false confidence, false truth. The people who oppose true with false will never recognize the true nature of truth, due to their adherence to that artificial definition of truth, which is inconsistent with what "true" is actually used to refer to.

Think about a poem you are yet to read; does it not have a potential meaning? — Janus

That poem has already been written, so I don't see how the example is relevant.

As much as this does not demonstrate that God is "personal", there are ways to derive the conclusion that the first cause is very likely the type of cause which is commonly referred to as "final cause". Final cause is exemplified by freely willed actions. This is why it is often said that the existence of the universe is according to the will of God.

First of all, the term "world" does not imply a particular way of apprehending, understanding one's environment. To quite the contrary, it implies many, many different ways. The world is not many many different ways; worldviews are. Thus, worldviews can be wrong. Worldviews are expressed in language(our talk). They consist of thought/belief about the world(what we're talking about). — creativesoul

This just supports what I said. What the word "world" refers to depends on the individual. Therefore there cannot be a thing referred to by the word "world", which is prior in existence to the understanding which the person has.

That shows your conflation between our talk and what we're talking about. — creativesoul

There's no such conflation on my part, I recognize the distinction. You just refuse to recognize the fact that there is no such thing as the thing talked about, without the talk. The thing talked about is existentially dependent on the talk, because without the talk it is logically impossible that there is the thing talked about.

Well, humans have a whole bunch of neurons that think very fast like a computer, and well, he or she is doing it very, very fast, in parallel, and well it's definitely superhuman, and very complicated. — Rich

Humans are superhuman? Isn't that contradictory?

And in humans, both would have then have the extra feature of being linguistically structured. — apokrisis

I don't see how the unconscious could be linguistically structured. Emotions and feelings arise from the unconscious which we cannot put words to. Trying to understand these inner feelings is where words fail us. Furthermore, when we think using words it is always a conscious effort. If we try to put words to the subconscious, in an effort to structure it, we must bring it into the conscious mind, so that it is no longer the subconscious which is being structured.

The world isn't existentially contingent upon the term "world".... — creativesoul

But the world is existentially contingent on the word, and that's what you don't seem to be grasping. "World" implies a particular way of apprehending, understanding one's environment, which developed from the use of the word "world". What "world" refers to is existentially contingent on this way of understanding. Consider the concept of "worldview". Even when you insist that "world" refers to something prior to the word, this way of understanding the word is dependent on the existence of the word. Prior to the use of the word "world", this way of understanding the word did not exist. So the world is existentially contingent on the word "world", because what the word refers to is contingent on the use of the word. No matter how much you insist that the thing referred to is prior to the word, the actual thing referred to is dictated by the understanding of the word, which develops from the use of the word.

When the word "world" first came into existence, our understanding of the world, and consequentially what the word referred to was completely different from today. Perhaps it was under the notions of geocentrism. As our understanding evolves, changes, so does the thing referred to by the word "world". What the word refers to is dictated by the way that we understand. And the way that we understand changes with time. Therefore the word existed prior to what the word refers to right now.

It requires drawing mental correlation(s) between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own mental state. — creativesoul

It appears like "drawing mental correlations" is the very same thing as "the agent's own mental state". So where do these claimed 'objects' of "physiological sensory perception" enter this scenario? The correlations are mental, why do you think that 'objects' are required? Sure, sensory perception enters the scenario, but what justifies the claim that it enters in the form of 'objects'?

I think that 'objects' only enter the scenario when we give things names. The name must signify something with temporal stability so we assume an object. In other words, objects are created by language. We name sensory perceptions, and to justify the application of the name, we assume an object which is named.

Do you deny that there are many possible sentences that have never yet been spoken? — Janus

No I don't deny this but I don't see how it is at all meaningful. And I don't see how a potential sentence has meaning, nor does "meaning in potentia" have any meaning either. Just like a potential sentence does not exist as a sentence, and is therefore not a sentence, potential meaning is not actual meaning and therefore does not have any meaning either.

Then what does it require? Obviously it requires thinking/believing. How can it be a case of thinking/believing that something is there without believing that it is something which is there? If it's not a belief that it is something, then clearly it cannot be a belief that something is there.

You need some other way to describe this type of thinking/believing, other than as believing in something. But if you describe it in another way, then your argument doesn't hold. What you now refer to as "thinking/believing that something is there", cannot be called believing something is there, and believing a tree is there remains prior to believing something is there. Believing some unidentifiable thing cannot qualify as believing anything because if the belief cannot be identified it cannot be believed.

This seems to be your mistake, you think that believing something is there is prior to believing a tree is there. But this is not the case, because "belief" implies that the thing believed has been identified. And you seem to be claiming that there could be a belief in which the thing believed has not been identified. What do you think would be believed then, if the thing believed is not in some way identified?

Seeing something doesn't require identifying it as "something". — creativesoul

This is what you said:

The fact that one must think/believe that something is there prior to thinking/believing that that something is called "a tree", shows that not all belief is believing that something is true. — creativesoul

I merely pointed out that this is incorrect. We believe that there is something called a tree there, prior to believing that there is something there. We learn to call what we see a "tree", and believe that it is a tree without believing that it is "something". It is only at a later time, when we learn categorization, that we come to believe that the thing we call a tree is something. So we believe that there is a tree there prior to believing that there is something there.

This is directly contradictory to what you said, that we believe there is something there prior to believing that there is a tree there. And "seeing something" doesn't imply that one believes that something is there. Seeing and believing are distinctly different.

What about Euthyphro, do the gods love what is just because it is just or is it just because the gods love it? — darthbarracuda

I don't see your point. Say "the gods" are the authorities. There would be no such question as the one you are asking, without assuming the existence of the authorities in the first place. So the question of Euthyphro already assumes the existence of authorities, and there would be no such question without the assumed existence of authorities. The question involves how morality relates to the assumed authorities, not whether authorities are necessary for morality, authorities are already assumed.

If morality derived its legitimacy from authority, then there would be no reason to be moral if there was no authority to enforce morality. But that's wrong. Morality tells us to act in a certain way even if there's nobody there to make sure we do. — darthbarracuda

I don't see why you say "that's wrong". If there were no authorities to teach people what's moral and immoral, then the decision would be made by each individual without any learned principles. Each person's morality would be what one wants as "moral".

Furthermore, you misrepresent authority, by claiming that authority enforces morality. Authorities teach morality, they cannot enforce it because morality must be chosen by one's own free will. It must be learned, and one chooses to accept what is taught. Morality derives its legitimacy through education, not through enforcement. The educated person acts morally of one's own free will, according to one's own knowledge. The authorities educate the individuals concerning morality, they do not "enforce" morality, as enforcement is in itself contrary to morality. Once the person is educated the individual no longer has the need for authorities, but may proceed to act as an authority.

Right, but the fact that they are wrong doesn't mean that they are not authorities. That's why the appeal to authority may be a considered a fallacy.

Yes, it's an action. Actions are not truth-apt. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, that's the point I made way back at the beginning of the thread, it's not the statement itself which is judged for truth, but the meaning of the statement which is judged. Here, we have been talking about that meaning as the content, what I called "the belief", what you called "what is believed".

Or you could take that as proof that the content is not something in my mind or yours. Can we both believe that Donald Trump is President? I think so. How is this possible on your view? We can't have the same thing in our minds, so how can we share a belief? — Srap Tasmaner

We share the belief by means of its form, the words which express the belief, "Donald Trump is President". The content is not the same though, because you and I will have different images of what it means to be Donald Trump, and different ideas of what it means to be President. So as much as we say "Donald Trump is President" represents a belief which is shared by you and I, we say this as a matter of convenience. What is really the case is that these words have different associated ideas for you from what they do for me, so it's not really one belief which is shared, it is different, yet compatible beliefs. That's why the content is different.

How do we agree or disagree about anything? How do we even communicate? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't understand the reason for these questions. We agree and disagree depending on the compatibility of our beliefs. This compatibility is what makes communication possible. We are all different though, having different ideas and beliefs within our minds. The fact that our ideas and beliefs are compatible, and we can agree and communicate, does not necessitate the conclusion that our beliefs are one and the same. Nor does it necessitate the conclusion that there is an independent (Platonic) Idea which our own ideas partake in (Platonic participation).

I would have thought authority would have derived its legitimacy from morality, not vice versa. — darthbarracuda

No, I don't think that's the case. In order that one acts in a way which is consistent with social customs and conventions, morally, one must learn to act in this way. To learn something, there must be a demonstration of it, and the learner must respect the demonstrator as an authority. Generally, the parents are observed as authorities when the child is learning. If the parent is not respected as an authority, the child will not learn what the parent teaches. Therefore no morality without authority. You can argue that the capacity to be moral is prior to authority, but this is not the same as morality, which is being moral.

Should we agree that 2+2=4 because we're commanded to? — Mongrel

Yes exactly, that's what we actually do, don't you think? The teacher is seen as the authority on this subject, mathematics, so we follow the teacher's lead. The teacher says there is an order, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, that (order) makes sense to us, so we learn to count. After learning the expression of order, counting, then "2+2=4" makes sense, so we agree. Fundamentally, within our intuitions and instincts, order makes sense. So we are inclined to see the one who gives order, or expresses order as an authority. Authority is a display of understanding order, so the one who demonstrates an understanding of order is naturally received as an authority

You've given yourself a way to refer to the content of an assertoric utterance -- what's asserted is a belief -- but you've left yourself no way to refer to the content of a belief.

If I believe that lighthouses are lovely, the content of my belief is "Lighthouses are lovely," not "I believe lighthouses are lovely," unless you like infinite regresses.

My believing lighthouses are lovely is a fact about me; lighthouses being lovely is not a fact about me. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me, that you have confused the issue, and have done exactly what you accuse me of doing.

The thing is, that you are removing the utterance of the statement, just like Janus wants to do. But the utterance of the statement is an action which must be respected as real and very necessary. The utterance is "lighthouses are lovely". The form is the physical presence of the words, and the content is the underlying belief.

We have to be able to make a real distinction between what the utterance means to me, and what it means to you (differences of interpretation), so we cannot say that the content is "lighthouses are lovely", because this assumes that the same content is within your mind and mine. It is not, therefore it is false to claim that this is the content. So, to lay out the content, the belief which is signified, what you believe by this statement, we must refer to something further. The fact that the "something further", will most likely be an expression in words, creates the appearance of infinite regress. But the infinite regress is not real, it is just an appearance created by the desire to express the content in words. The true content cannot be expressed in words because the words are always a formal representation of the content.

That appears to be the problem, you want to express the content in words. And that's what we do naturally, express our beliefs in words. But the words are always a representation of the content, which is the belief itself. So when you put the belief into words, you have a formal representation of the content, not the content itself. You can continue to explain the belief, using words, to an infinite regress, but all you have here is the formal representation, not the content itself. You can never get to the content this way.

So the real content is something assumed, just like we assume real content in the physical world. This is the material aspect of reality. We assume content as fundamental to the existence of beliefs, just like we assume content (matter) as fundamental to the existence of the physical world. Trying to understand the existence of content, or matter, plunges us into mysticism, because it has already been designated by the structure of language and logical systems as that which cannot be spoken about, due to its apparent capacity to defy the fundamental laws of logic.

Sentences as well as actually being said are in potentia as things that could be said. The existence of a language means (in the sense of 'entails' in case you are confused) that there are potentially an infinite number of sentences that could be said; each with at least one literal meaning. — Janus

These potential sentences you refer to have no existence, because they have not been created, They have no meaning because they do not exist. You continue to back up this nonsense train of thought with more meaninglessness.

This is nonsense; sentences don't get their meanings by being said; sentences can only be sayings at all insofar as they are already meaningful, otherwise the saying would just be meaningless noise or scribble. — John

Sentences do not exist unless they are said. Being said is what gives existence to a sentence. So first off it is nonsensical to speak of a sentence which wasn't said, unless you are referring to one which someone has in their head without speaking it. But even that sentence in the person's head has an author, that person. So to speak of a statement without an author is nonsense. Secondly, the meaning of a sentence is what is meant by that sentence, and "what is meant" refers to the intention of the author. These are two good reasons why your talk about the meaning of a statement without an author of that statement is nonsense. 1) There is no such thing as a statement without an author. 2) The "meaning of the statement" refers to what was meant by the author.

Again, you failed to get my distinction between the two senses of "means". — John

As I explained, I view your second sense of "means", as meaningless nonsense. You remove the statement from its context, the thinking mind which spoke it, and having no context the statement is no longer a statement, it's meaningless.

You can explain it as much as you want, and insist that I don't get it. What is the case, is that I completely get it, but I disagree, because I think it's nonsense to talk about the meaning of a statement with no context.

If I assert that lighthouses are lovely, what I assert is that lighthouses are lovely, and it can be inferred from my asserting this that I believe it. But I am not asserting that I believe it. At some point you have to get to something that you're willing to call the content of the belief or the assertion. If you're always sticking "I believe" or something in front, you'll never get to what you believe. — Srap Tasmaner

The content is the belief. When you say "lighthouses are lovely", the content is the belief that this "lighthouses are lovely" refers to. What more are you looking for with your concept of "content"? I don't see the need to assume anything more. I know that you are not asserting "I believe lighthouses are lovely", but as you yourself admit, it is implied that you believe it. Therefore I can assume that you believe it, unless you are acting in deception. So the content is the belief, what is implied by the statement. It is only when you speak in deception, that the content, which is the belief, is negated. But it would be pointless to seek a further content in the act of deception, because there would be no identifiable relationship between the statement and the content, that is the nature of deception.

And truth attaches or doesn't to the content of your beliefs. We say, "What you believe is true (or false)." — Srap Tasmaner

"What you belief" is often referred to as "the belief", and this is the content, which is said to be true or false, what you believe, the belief. The statement is a representation in words of what you believe, or, the belief.

No, when someone says "this belief is true" it just means that this belief is true. — John

OK, so when Donald Trump says "this belief is true", that's what it means to you, that the belief is true? Good luck with that approach.

Obviously the same statement, someone saying "this belief is true" means something completely different to you from what it means to me. You're set in your interpretation, and I'm set in mine. I warn you though, you'll be deceived if you actually follow through with your interpretation.

Hey Srap, let's take it to the other thread.

As I argued in the other thread, what I think is essential to normativity is authority. There is no normativity without authority, or at least the perception of authority. What makes an authority a real authority (if there even is such a thing), and not just a perceived authority, is another question. And this is what differentiates a true argument from authority from a fallacious one.

When someone says "this belief is true", what it means to me is "I think this belief is true". If to you, it means that the belief is true, then you'll believe anything anyone ever tells you, and be forever deceived.

The "it is true that X" part is independent of anybody's beliefs. — John

This doesn't make sense, it's meaningless. You have taken the statement "it is true that X", and removed it from any speaker, claiming that no one has spoken it. This is to completely and absolutely remove it from any possible context, and leave it meaningless.



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I did leave out "other people", just for simplicity sake though. But I guess I thought it was rather obvious that we have more than one teacher, therefore there is more than one authority in the lives of each one of us. As you suggested, we are all authorities, and I agreed that as much as we are teachers, we are authorities.

The first statement concerns the truth of a belief, and the second concerns your attitude towards the belief. They are two very different things. I think it is incredible that you cannot see the distinction. — John

The first statement affirms what the speaker thinks of the belief, "it is true", it does not confirm that the belief is true.

There is a speaker of each statement. The first statement says that the speaker believes that the belief is true. It in no way confirms that the belief is true, as you imply. The second statement says that the speaker is certain of the belief.

I really don't see the difference between the first and second. In the first, the speaker affirms confidence in the belief "it is true". In the second, the speaker affirms confidence in the belief "I am certain of it". Where are you seeing this difference?

The model you give, where a prescriptive rule originates from someone recognized as an authority, seems clearly not to apply when it comes to, for instance, language use: here either there is no such authority, or we are all of us the authority. The latter seems preferable, but requires further analysis, which happily is quite interesting. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's right to the point. Language use, except in the case of formal logic including mathematics, is not controlled by prescriptive rules, in the same way that a game is regulated by prescriptive rules. We do have dictionary definitions of how language is used, but these are descriptive rules, not prescriptive. And there is no recognized principle which dictates that if a thing can be described by a rule, then it must be guided by a prescriptive rule, otherwise natural inanimate things would be considered to be following the guidance of prescriptive rules. So if we desire to understand how language use is guided by some sort of rules we cannot look at definitions of meaning, because this would be a category mistake.

I think that the question of whether there is no authority, or if we are all authorities, is to proceed in the right direction. Surely there is a demonstration of informal rules which are taught to us when we learn things. When someone shows us how to do something, we follow their rule. So in as much as we teach others, we are all authorities. But this requires another category of "prescriptive rule", principles which are not explicit, but implicit. So when you demonstrate to a student how to do something, it is implied by your act of demonstration, that the person ought to do it this way. By presenting yourself as an authority, the student apprehends you as an authority, and the implication is made, that the procedure ought be carried out in the way that you demonstrate. In this case, there is no prescriptive rule per se. There is authority, recognition of authority, the will to follow, and habituation. The result is essentially the same as the explicit prescriptive rule, with one big difference that I see. The explicit prescriptive rule may be published and directed to the masses, whereas the implicit demonstration reaches a limited number of people. The key point which is essential to both is the recognition of authority.

Are you denying that one must think/believe that something is there prior to thinking/believing that that something is called "a tree"? — creativesoul

Yes, I'm denying this, I think it's categorical wrong, and the reverse of what is actually the case. When we see something, and identify it as a tree, we do not identify it as a something prior to identifying it as a tree. "Something" is a special, complicated ontological concept. We do not identify that there is something there prior to identifying the tree, we just identify the tree. Later we might learn that the tree is part of a larger category referred to by "something".

So, prescriptive rules ("commands of what one ought to do") are limited only to human actions, whereas descriptive rules are not so limited? Seems somewhat ad hoc... — Luke

If you think that describing the way things are, which is what philosophers are supposed to do, is "ad hoc", then I suppose the distinction between descriptive rules and prescriptive rules is ad hoc. It's just a description of how things are, the reality of the situation. There are existing rules, formed by inductive reasoning which describe the world, laws of physics etc.. I call them descriptive rules. There are also existing rules which tell human beings what they ought do and ought not do.

Can you provide an example of a prescriptive rule? Who prescribes these commands? — Luke

Take a look at a law book, common law, civil codes, that sort of thing. Or if you prefer, try a book of building codes. These are prescriptive rules. They are not produced as descriptions of how human beings behave, they are designed to conform human behaviour in certain ways. They have been drawn up, "commanded" by people in the position of governance.

If you prefer, consider the rules of a game. These prescriptive rules are very limited in scope, because they only apply to those who choose to play the game, and are only in effect for that particular game being played. Unlike the rules of a game, you are subject to the laws of the society where you live, regardless of whether you want to play that game. The rules of the game are drawn up by those who invent the game

No rhe second just says that the belief is true. Whether I am certain about it is irrelevant. Saying a belief is true, no matter how certain of that I might be, does not make it so. — John

I don't understand you, and don't see your point. How does saying "this belief is true" differ from saying "I am certain of this belief"?

This Stanford article lists by my count 118 titles in the bibliography, many - most - with the word "truth" in the title, and none that I saw that had the word "true." And this makes sense, because the the subject is truth, not "true." — tim wood

We were referring to common usage at that time, not philosophical speculations, you had said that there was difficulty with "truth" in common usage. And that's what my comment referred to, common usage. There is no such difficulty in common usage, "truth" refers to what is true. In philosophy one might look to a concept of "truth", and try to determine what that is. In my opinion, this would be like asking what it means to be true.

Perhaps we should give up the pursuit of Truth (with a capital T) and begin thinking that truth is really a way we have of speaking of what we agree on and what we find persuasive. In this way we should focus on truths (with a small t)." — tim wood

This is what I disagree with. Truth is not necessarily what we agree on. What we agree on is what is justified, and the things we agree on may not be the truth. Do you recognize that there is a difference between true and justified?

As I explained earlier, truth is of the subject, it is subjective. So it cannot be what "we" agree on. If I am certain of something, I will claim that it is the truth regardless of whether or not we agree on it. Truth does not require agreement. I may have information which neither you nor anyone else has access to, so I know the truth without agreement from anyone else. And if I persuade you, so that you agree, this persuasion is justification it is not truth. Truth is not "what we agree on".

If I recall, your definition of "true" is that which, after a tiresome number of iterations of justifications, falls under a comfortable assumption we can have confidence in. — tim wood

No, the point is that "true" is not what "we" can have confidence in at all, it is what "I" have confidence in. Individuals claim "X is true", and they will insist that X is true even if others claim something contrary. This is very evident here at tpf. They will attempt to convince others that X is true, to justify their claims. But when "X is true" is claimed, "X" always refers to how I understand X, not how we understand X (of course there is no such thing, because understanding is the act of an individual).

An example occurs to me: You have a large pot of beans, thousands of them. I hold up a bean and ask, "What is this?" "A bean," you answer. "Prove it," sez I. And you do. Then I hold up another bean and ask, "What is this?" At a fundamental level this is a fair question and one that can be asked of every single bean. — tim wood

This is exactly the nature of "truth". Each individual instance of truth, must be proven, justified. Each item in the pot must be proven as a bean before we can say that it is true that there are only beans in the pot.

So: truth is the -ness of anything that makes that thing what it is. It is real, the reality of the thing. Condensing a bit, we end up with truth is reality and reality is truth. — tim wood

I agree, that truth has to do with the reality of the thing, but each thing is unique and individual, so truth cannot be a generality. Furthermore, since each thing appears to be different from itself, depending on the perspective it is observed from (i.e., how a thing appears from one perspective is different from how it appears from another), "the reality of the thing" is in itself somewhat contradictory. If the reality of the thing is that it is different from itself, then this defies the law of identity. But that's exactly what a multitude of different perspectives demonstrates to us, that a thing is different from itself.

Or it could be the brick-ness of bricks, or the -ness of anything. The point is the "-ness." It bridges, it seems to me, the gap between the thing and the idea of the thing. How I'm not sure, maybe by putting them together. To have bricks and brickness, you need both. And this is unremarkable. We do it every day, all day, without a second thought, or any thought at all. This -ness is a fact, is real. It has an "always already" quality. Just as a hammer is always already a hammer, even before we have a use for it, or even know what a hammer is. — tim wood

I believe that attempting to bridge this gap with "truth" is a mistaken approach. The truth is that there is a difference between the individual, particular brick, and the "brick-ness" of the generality, which cannot be dissolved. It is an ontologically real, part of reality (and therefore truth itself according to your def.). The trend of modern philosophy to shy away from dualism, toward monism, inspires the desire to bridge this gap as if the gap were not something real. I believe it is a more appropriate approach to recognize the reality of this gap, and attempt to see what it consists of. What is the ontological status of the separation between the individual brick, and the generality "brick-ness"?